Full opinion text
OPINION ROWE, Justice. The City of Dallas appeals from the trial court’s judgment in a suit in which Suzanne Cox, individually and as next friend of Carrie and Courtney Cox, was a plaintiff, R.D. Cox and the Town of Addison were plaintiff-intervenors (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Coxes), and Dallas was a defendant. The lawsuit involved the shooting death of Addison Police Officer Ron Cox by Dallas Police Officer Darren Coleman during a drug raid conducted in Dallas by officers of both police departments. In thirteen points of error, Dallas complains of the trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions and other alleged errors. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The Coxes filed numerous motions for sanctions for alleged discovery abuses on Dallas’s part. The trial court granted the first motion and ordered Dallas to pay $93,-250 to the Coxes. The trial court later granted the second through ninth motions for sanctions and struck Dallas’s answer. The trial court then rendered a judgment against Dallas on the issue of liability and conducted a jury trial on damages. After the jury made its findings, the trial court rendered a judgment awarding the Coxes $2,350,723.92 plus postjudgment interest. The trial court awarded Addison $52,133.16 plus postjudgment interest. We deal with Dallas’s second point of error first, where it contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the first motion for sanctions and ordering Dallas to pay $93,250 as a discovery sanction. The trial court had issued an order specifying deadlines of November 2 and November 5, 1987, for producing documents and answering interrogatories. On November 13, 1987, the Coxes moved for sanctions, alleging a pattern of obstructive and dilatory discovery tactics by Dallas. Specifically, the motion alleged, among other things, that requested documents were not furnished and that other documents were furnished only during depositions in a piecemeal fashion. Dallas responded and acknowledged that some documents were not provided as requested and ordered. Dallas maintained that these failures were due to oversights, mistakes, and inadvertence, and that such failures were to be expected because the materials requested were voluminous. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to require parties to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, for failure to comply with proper discovery requests or court orders on discovery, or for abuse of the discovery process. Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(2)(b)(8), 215(3). Discovery sanctions imposed by a trial court will be set aside only if the court clearly abused its discretion. Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex.1986) (per curiam). The test for abuse of discretion is not whether the reviewing court thinks that the facts presented an appropriate case for the trial court’s action. Rather, the question on appeal is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. The mere fact that a trial judge decided a matter within his discretionary authority in a different way from the manner in which an appellate judge might have decided the matter under the same circumstances does not establish that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Discovery sanctions may properly be imposed to secure compliance with discovery rules, to deter other litigants from violating discovery rules, and to punish parties for violation of the rules. Bodnow, 721 S.W.2d at 840. Rule 215 contemplates adherence to, and enforcement of, court orders concerning discovery. Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(1), 215(2). Discovery sanctions that do not serve the purposes that sanctions were intended to further constitute an abuse of discretion. Bodnow, 721 S.W.2d at 840. Before we review the propriety of the granting of the motions for sanctions, we will first discuss the nature of the lawsuit. The Coxes alleged several causes of action against Dallas. One cause of action was based on federal civil rights law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981). A cause of action under section 1983 is stated when a plaintiff alleges that personal injury or death was caused by the use of excessive force by police officers, thereby effecting an unreasonable seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1867, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1380, 1382, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under section 1983, a municipality may be held liable when execution of its policies or customs inflicts injury that amounts to a constitutional deprivation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect reflecting a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants may properly be considered a custom or policy that is actionable under section 1983. City of Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1205 & n. 10. The Coxes alleged that Ron Cox’s death was caused by the use of excessive force inflicted in accordance with policies or customs of the Dallas Police Department. They alleged that the execution of, and compliance with, Dallas Police Department policies, including training policies, caused Ron Cox’s death, depriving him of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure. They alleged that the policies were such that officials of Dallas knew or should have known that Dallas police officers were likely to kill without proper justification and restraint. The Coxes further alleged that the Dallas Police Department armed its officers with machine guns on fully automatic mode in reckless disregard of, or deliberate indifference to, the fact that use of such weapons would cause constitutional deprivations. The Coxes contended that the alleged acts and omissions constituted violations of section 1983. They also contended that the alleged conduct was actionable under the Texas Tort Claims Act and Texas common law. These allegations should be considered in reviewing the trial court’s discovery sanctions. With the foregoing in mind, we consider the record with respect to the first motion for sanctions. The Plaintiffs’ First Request for Production, filed June 1, 1987, asked for all written documents setting out the deadly force policy of the Dallas Police Department between 1982 and 1987, including all manuals, memos, and bulletins. All written documents evidencing formulation of the deadly force policy in effect at the time of the drug raid were also requested. The Coxes’ counsel produced, at the sanctions hearing, a Dallas Police Chief memorandum with attached Special Orders on the department’s deadly force policy. Dallas had failed to produce these documents in response to the discovery requests. These documents were admitted as evidence at the hearing. The trial court’s production deadline order required responses to the Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth Requests for Production. The third request asked Dallas for all written documents stating, describing, or setting forth rules, orders, policies, procedures, or standard operating procedures for the Tactical Section or Unit or the Special Operations Division of the Dallas Police Department. The fourth request asked for all memos, bulletins, letters, communications, or other written documents that pertained to the Tactical Section for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987. At the hearing, it was shown that a Tactical Officers’ Manual was produced during the deposition of Officer Darren Coleman, a member of the Tactical Section, a participant in the drug raid, and the officer who shot Cox. Coleman testified in his deposition that it was the manual in force when the raid occurred. Lieutenant Scoggins, who was responsible for seeing that the requested Tactical Section documents were provided, testified at the hearing that the manual produced at Coleman’s deposition was not the manual that was in force at the time of the drug raid and that it was erroneously produced. He stated that a subsequently provided manual was the controlling manual at the time of the raid. The Coxes’ counsel produced at the hearing yet another version of a Tactical Officers’ Manual that had not been furnished by Dallas, and this manual was admitted into evidence. Scoggins was asked if there were any other materials or manuals concerning the Tactical Section that he had not produced, and he replied that the only thing he could not find was an old SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). An Internal Affairs Division file with an excerpt from another (fourth) version of a Tactical Section manual was admitted into evidence, and Scoggins admitted that he had not produced that manual. It was established at the hearing that none of the manuals were dated in a manner that would allow determination of their effective dates. The Coxes’ counsel argued at the hearing that a number of witnesses would have to be redeposed because Dallas was now maintaining that the previously produced Tactical Section manual was not controlling at the time of the drug raid. In our view, that argument is reasonable, considering the circumstances. Obviously, time, effort, and money were wasted in depositions that had already been taken regarding a manual that Dallas initially produced as controlling but later repudiated. Those depositions were taken without the benefit of the memorandum and Special Orders that Dallas failed to produce. The Coxes’ counsel also argued that considerable time and expense were involved in hiring and consulting with experts. Those consultations were based on information previously provided by Dallas. As demonstrated at the hearing, the information provided was incomplete, and some of it was later repudiated by Dallas. Certainly, additional consultation with the experts would be necessary regarding the new information and materials not previously furnished by Dallas. Expert evaluations and opinions based on erroneously provided and incomplete information would be subject to reevaluation. The Coxes’ counsel also argued that Dallas’s established failures to comply with discovery requests and court orders did not inspire confidence regarding current and future compliance. The record contains a tabulation of expenses incurred by the Coxes. Those expenses included attorneys’ time spent meeting with expert witnesses and taking depositions and preparing for and attending court hearings, other deposition expenses, and other expert witness expenses. The trial court award of $93,250 for expenses was considerably less than the tabulated total of expenses. The record contains ample justification for the trial court’s action; it does not indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242-43. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See id. at 241-42; see also Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.1984) (per curiam) (amount of attorney fees awarded as discovery sanction is solely within sound discretion of trial judge, to be set aside only upon showing of clear abuse of discretion). The record shows that Dallas failed to comply with discovery requests and related court orders and that the Coxes incurred expenses because of those failures. There was additional evidence of Dallas’s failure to comply with discovery requests and orders, but we consider the matters detailed above to be more than sufficient to support the trial court’s action. The sanction imposed was authorized by the applicable rule. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(2)(b)(8), 215(3). Moreover, we think that the sanction imposed was in accordance with the purposes of discovery sanctions. See Bodnow, 721 S.W.2d at 840. We overrule Dallas’s second point of error. In its first point of error, Dallas argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the second through ninth motions for sanctions and striking Dallas’s answer. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the striking of pleadings for failure to comply with proper discovery requests or court orders providing or permitting discovery, or for abuse of the discovery process. Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(2)(b)(5), 215(3). In reviewing the trial court’s action, we are bound by the principles previously discussed regarding the trial court’s discretion as to discovery sanctions. In addition, with respect to determining a trial judge’s guiding rules and principles governing the imposition of sanctions, we should look to pertinent federal court decisions. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242; Tate v. Commodore County Mut. Ins. Co., 767 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex.App—Dallas 1989, writ denied). The United States Supreme Court has suggested that the sanction of striking a party’s pleadings might violate due process guarantees if the party were unable, despite good faith efforts, to comply with discovery requests or orders. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094-95, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). Nevertheless, this severe sanction must be available in appropriate cases to penalize and deter failures to comply with discovery orders. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). If a trial court properly finds, or could properly have found, that a failure to comply with discovery requests or orders was willful, in bad faith, or due to some fault of the disobedient party, the sanction of striking a party’s pleadings will generally be upheld. See Worldwide Anesthesia Assocs., Inc. v. Bryan Anesthesia, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Woodruff v. Cook, 721 S.W.2d 865, 868-69 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r. e.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980). In determining the propriety of sanctions, the trial court is entitled to consider the entire record of the case. Woodruff, 721 S.W.2d at 868; see Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241. Before we discuss the hearing on the second motion for sanctions, we note some pertinent facts and circumstances as shown by the record. In its order granting the first motion for sanctions, the trial court found that Dallas had been dilatory and obstructive in obeying discovery orders of the court and had continuously acted in bad faith during the discovery process. The trial court also stated that “any further abuses of the discovery process by the Defendants herein or anyone in privity with [them,] including but not limited to the abuses demonstrated to date, may subject the Defendants to additional sanctions, including the striking of their pleadings at that time.” At the hearing on the first motion for sanctions, counsel for the Coxes had noted that Dallas had failed to produce the psychological records of Coleman, the officer who shot Cox, which had been ordered by the court. Dallas had informed the Coxes that those records had been destroyed. Dallas’s counsel confirmed that those records were kept for two years and then destroyed. The Coxes’ counsel then referred to a state administrative regulation mandating maintenance of psychological records. See Tex.State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 22 Tex.Admin.Code § 465.22 (West Jan. 3, 1989) (Record Maintenance). According to its terms, the regulation is applicable to psychologists, and the record of the hearing shows that the Dallas Police Department employed a police psychologist. When the trial court’s order granting the first motion for sanctions was issued on December 4, 1987, Dallas had recently found and delivered some of the psychological records of Darren Coleman that were allegedly destroyed, but the trial court’s order recited that it “does not adjudicate any question of sanctions relating to the production or the failure to produce [Coleman’s] psychological records by the Defendants or any related matter. The Court expressly reserves any ruling on such questions for a later time.” The trial court further ordered Dallas to deliver those records to a specified questioned documents examiner. In a separate order dated December 10, 1987, the trial court again ordered Dallas to produce certain documents, including all written documents setting forth the deadly force policy at the time of the drug raid and all written documents controlling or governing the actions, conduct, or behavior of Tactical Section officers who were involved in the drug raid and the Cox shooting. In an apparent attempt to be very specific, the trial court’s order stated, “This directive includes all documents which governed the actions, conduct and behavior of these officers, be it related to communications, dress, training, weapons selection, ammunition selection, planning of the raid, execution of the raid, use of deadly force, tactical or policy matters, or other habits, customs or practices.” The trial court ordered production of all written documents outlining, describing, or defining the authority by which the Tactical Section planned, conducted, or executed drug raids in 1986. The trial court required the Chief of Police or an officer with the Dallas Police Department with the rank of captain or higher to state clearly in writing and under oath that the ordered documents have been produced. The order required Dallas to identify any written documents formerly possessed that had been destroyed, mutilated, altered, or lost regarding four specified areas (Coleman’s psychological records; written documents concerning the existence, operation, performance, or training of the Tactical Unit from January 1, 1984, to date, including all SOPs, manuals, directives, orders, and memos; all written documents pertaining to the formulation, operation, correction, or changes in the deadly force policy from January 1, 1984, to date; all written documents concerning the planning, conduct, or execution of hazardous drug warrants or drug raid operations). The trial court ordered production of all written documents authorizing or directing the destruction, mutilation, alteration, or loss of those documents. The trial court ordered the Chief of Police or an officer ranked captain or higher to clearly set forth in writing and under oath: (1) all documents which had been destroyed, mutilated, altered, or lost; (2) whether such destruction, mutilation, alteration, or loss was authorized and, if so, whether the authorization was written or oral; (3) the authorizing documents, if written; and (4) the identity of the authorizing person or persons and the date of the authorization, if authorization was oral. The order required the Chief of Police or an officer ranked captain or higher to clearly state in writing and under oath certain information about the rules, manuals, memos, orders, SOPs, and other written documents ordered to be produced: (1) the specific date when matters or directions contained in the written documents became effective; (2) the identity of the person who authorized that the writings should become effective; (3) when and to whom the written documents were distributed; and (4) the manner in which the written documents were distributed. The Coxes’ second motion for sanctions was primarily addressed to Dallas’s initial contention that Coleman’s psychological records no longer existed because they were destroyed in accordance with policy and Dallas’s subsequent determination that some of those records did in fact exist because they had not been destroyed. The Coxes alleged that Dallas had materially misstated the policy regarding destruction of the psychological records of police officers, that Dallas had materially misrepresented the nature and extent of any search or effort to locate Coleman’s psychological records, and that the records ultimately produced did not appear to be complete, genuine, and authentic. The motion stated that this alleged conduct constituted an actual or constructive fraud on the court because Dallas’s agents and employees either knew or should have known that the statements concerning Coleman’s psychological records were false. The motion requested, among other things, the striking of Dallas’s pleadings. Our record does not contain a written response to this motion. An extensive hearing was conducted on the second motion for sanctions. One of the witnesses at the hearing was Edwin Spencer, Administrative Assistant to the First Assistant Chief of Police. Spencer was in charge of the Public Information Office of the Dallas Police Department. He testified that he had talked to the police department psychologist, Dr. Somodevilla, about Coleman’s psychological records. Spencer’s understanding, based on this conversation with Dr. Somodevilla, was that the records had not been maintained. Spencer stated that he then talked to Captain John Chappelle of the police department’s Personnel Division in an effort to confirm the information provided by Dr. Somodevilla. Chappelle told him that it was the department’s policy to purge psychological records after an employee had been with the department for two years because such records were dated and had no useful value. During Spencer’s testimony, a Dallas Administrative Directive was admitted into evidence. The directive concerned records disposition, and Spencer acknowledged that it was binding on all city departments, including the police department. The directive defined permanent records as any records that have been determined by department heads to have sufficient value to warrant their continued preservation. The directive defined a records control schedule as a records disposition schedule which designates records, specifies the retention period for such records, and determines the means of final disposition such as destruction or micrographic processing. Under the heading “PROCEDURES,” the directive stated, “To apply records control schedules, they must have the signed approval of the department head. This approval constitutes the authority to destroy records at the expiry of the retention period.” Spencer agreed that the directive stated that records could not be destroyed in the absence of the authority provided by a records control schedule signed by a department head. The directive had an effective date of April 1, 1978. A memorandum sworn to by Captain John Chappelle of the Dallas Police Department was introduced into evidence. It was sworn to in compliance with the trial court’s previous order of December 10, 1987, and was part of the information furnished by Dallas in accordance with that order. The memo stated that the “memorandum on the psychological evaluation of Coleman was discarded as part of a longstanding practice of destruction of the background investigation, polygraph results, preliminary interview, and psychological evaluation.” The memo also stated: The Personnel Division does not have any written documents which authorizes [sic] the destruction of records. Sometime before 1978, an oral directive was given to destroy the background investigations, polygraph results, preliminary interviews, and psychological evaluations of all individuals who were hired. The records were to be maintained in a sealed envelope for two years, then destroyed. It is unknown as to when and who issued the oral order. Spencer testified that the Dallas Administrative Directive discussed above apparently governed police department records. He stated that his understanding of the directive was that records could not be destroyed without the authority provided by a records control schedule signed by a department head. However, Spencer declined to draw any conclusions as to whether the destruction of documents in accordance with an oral policy or order was in violation of the Dallas Administrative Directive. He stated that no one that he talked to within the police department regarding Coleman’s records had mentioned the directive. Captain John Chappelle was called as a witness at the hearing. He testified that some of Coleman’s psychological records should have been destroyed but were not destroyed because they were erroneously commingled with records that were to be maintained. He stated that the directive was not followed when Coleman’s psychological records were destroyed. He stated that the directive did not have to be followed because it did not deal with records such as the psychological records. Chap-pelle said that he understood that the directive only dealt with permanent records. However, he also acknowledged that the directive dealt with records that could be destroyed or eliminated. Nevertheless, he refused to characterize records that could be destroyed or eliminated as anything other than permanent records. Dr. Walter Stenning was called to testify as an expert witness. He has both a bachelor’s degree and a Ph.D. degree in psychology. He stated that he held three titles at Texas A & M University: Professor in the Department of Educational Psychology, Professor in the Department of Educational Curriculum Instruction, and Chief Psychologist for Law Enforcement Security Training. He had helped to train law enforcement agencies and personnel at the local, state, national, and international levels. He had trained people in the U.S. Marshals Service and the U.S. Secret Service. His training activities involved the areas of hostage negotiations, stress on peace officers, selection of peace officers, and the use of firearms and deadly force by peace officers. He estimated that he had interviewed at least 400 applicants for various law enforcement agencies. Dr. Stenning examined a grid sheet or scoring sheet furnished by Dallas and represented by Dallas to be Coleman’s grid sheet that was filled in by Coleman as part of the process of taking a psychological test. The grid sheet contained responses to questions in a personality test known as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). There were spaces on the grid sheet for the name, sex, and age of the person taking the test. Dr. Stenning testified that the name insures that the grid sheet can be matched with the person who actually gave the responses on the sheet. He stated that the sex of the person taking the test was essential to correct scoring of the test because some different responses can be expected based on the sex of the test-taker. He said that the age of the person taking the test can be important because different responses and behaviors may or may not be appropriate depending on the person’s age. He indicated that all of the information (name, age, and sex) also helps to insure the integrity of the test by providing information that can be double-checked so that one person’s grid sheet does not get erroneously matched with another person who also took the test. Dr. Stenning noted that one of Coleman’s grid sheets provided by Dallas did not contain the name, age, or sex of the test-taker. He characterized the absence of the name and the sex as surprising. He said that the absence of the age was strange, but less strange than the absence of the name and gender. He characterized the absence of all three items as very surprising. During his career, he remembered only one instance of all three items being missing from an MMPI grid sheet. He said that one of his assistants had failed to obtain the information, and he reprimanded the assistant for that failure. Dr. Stenning stated that the grid sheet could not be properly scored without the gender information. Dr. Stenning also testified that it was his opinion that written notes of in-depth psychological interviews of police applicants should be made and preserved in order to allow the psychologist to refresh his memory at a later time. More specifically, he stated that an in-depth interview of Coleman should have been conducted, and written notes of that interview should have been made and maintained. The Coleman psychological records furnished by Dallas did not contain any such notes. When asked if such notes would be essential records required to be maintained by the State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, Dr. Stenning replied that he would see that as a legitimate aspect of the state board’s requirements on record-keeping. He explained that an initial set of data concerning an individual becomes a base line norm. Data or information concerning that individual obtained at a later time can then be compared to this base line norm. Therefore, according to Dr. Stenning, MMPI scores, other test data, and written notes of an in-depth interview should be maintained during a law officer’s career so that information obtained in subsequent counseling sessions can be meaningfully compared with that officer’s base line norm information. Dr. Stenning then examined a second MMPI scoring sheet that was represented by Dallas to be Coleman’s scoring sheet. This scoring sheet also did not contain age or sex information, but it contained a signature reading “Darren Coleman.” Dr. Sten-ning also examined Coleman’s signature as found on Coleman’s deposition. He was asked to compare the two signatures, and he stated that they did not appear to be the signature of the same person. When requested to assume that the deposition signature was in fact Officer Coleman’s signature, and when asked about the scoring sheet signature, Dr. Stenning replied that the signature on the scoring sheet did not appear to be Coleman’s signature. In preparation for the hearing, Dr. Sten-ning had viewed Coleman’s video deposition. In that deposition, Coleman testified about an incident in August of 1985 when Coleman shot and injured a man while Coleman was on duty. Coleman testified that he went to Dr. Somodevilla, the Dallas police psychologist, to discuss the shooting. Among the materials furnished by Dallas, Dr. Stenning found no written record of that consultation. He expressed his opinion that a written record or written notes of the consultation should have been made and maintained. He stated that written notes should be preserved because the psychologist has no idea at the time of the initial consultation whether additional counseling or sessions will be necessary, or whether any problems associated with the shooting will be immediately resolved or will be of an ongoing nature. He said that a psychologist needs a chronological record. He characterized maintenance of such a record as extremely important. He stated his opinion that the failure to keep such records would be a violation of the state regulation discussed previously. Coleman had also testified in his deposition that he went to see Dr. Somodevilla on three or four occasions following the Ron Cox shooting. Dr. Stenning testified that he found no written record of these consultations among the materials provided by Dallas. He stated that written records of those consultations definitely should have been made and preserved, and he again opined that the failure to do so would be in violation of the state regulation mandating maintenance of psychological records. He described the failure to make written notes of such consultations as a departure from good psychological practice. He said that he would have a hard time believing that a competent psychologist would not have made any written notes of the Coleman interviews that followed the two shootings by Coleman. Dr. Stenning testified that the idea that psychological data can become dated or out-of-date is a misconception. He said that personality characteristics, which psychological tests attempt to identify, become relatively firm and stable at about the age of sixteen to eighteen years, unless something unusual, such as a psychological problem or extreme trauma, happens to a person. He also stated that maintenance of earlier data allows a determination as to whether there has been such an unusual psychological occurrence by means of comparing recent test results with older test results. He noted that there would be a high probability that two-year-old data would be reliable and valid. Dr. Stenning stated his opinion that there could be no dispute that psychological evaluations of police officers, test scores, and written notes of in-depth interviews and consultations, including consultations about shootings, would be essential psychological records that must be maintained. Dr. Santiago Somodevilla, the Dallas Police Department psychologist, also testified. As to the belated discovery of some of Coleman’s psychological records, he explained that after he read newspaper accounts suggesting the possibility of a coverup by the police department, he personally made an attempt to locate any existing records. He called Vicki Jackson, a clerk in the Personnel Division, and inquired as to whether Personnel had any of Coleman’s psychological records. He stated that Jackson put him on hold and then came back and told him that she had found the records. Dr. Somodevilla agreed that, considering the size of his potential pool of clients, it was necessary to keep accurate records so that the records of different individuals do not get confused. He stated that the failure of a police applicant to write his name on the MMPI grid sheet is probably not a good testing procedure. He said that Coleman should have written his name on the MMPI grid sheet. He also agreed that the sex and age of the applicant are important components of the MMPI. Dr. Somodevilla was asked to examine the “Darren Coleman” signature on the other MMPI scoring sheet and the signature on Coleman’s deposition. Based on that examination, he said that the signatures obviously were not the same. About the test-taking procedure, Dr. So-modevilla stated that police applicants would arrive at the Personnel Division and would be given a packet containing various tests. The applicants would take the tests and would keep all of their papers and materials together and turn them into the scorer. He said that after the tests were scored, they were placed in a sealed envelope, and the applicant would deliver the envelope to Psychological Services and hand them to Dr. Somodevilla’s secretary. His secretary would then deliver the envelopes to Dr. Somodevilla, and he would examine the test results and then interview the applicant. Dr. Somodevilla testified that he approved of the policy of destroying the psychological records of hired police applicants after two years. He said that his approval was oral, not written. He acknowledged that a person’s basic personality or psychological makeup is in place at age sixteen to eighteen. He agreed that the MMPI probes certain aspects of personality. He said that the results of an MMPI test can be valid in the future, but only for purposes of research. As to his discussions with police officers and the need to make records of those discussions, he testified that he drew a distinction between interviews and counseling sessions. He characterized an interview as information-gathering, whereas counseling involved a person seeking assistance for a real or imagined problem. He testified that he did not make notes of interviews. He said that an interview with a police officer who has been involved in a shooting is not an insignificant matter. He stated that officers who have been involved in shootings can become incapacitated or become threats to themselves. He agreed that it is vitally important to identify officers who respond inappropriately to a shooting and become psychologically unfit as police officers. Dr. Somodevilla testified that his discussion with Coleman after Coleman shot a man in 1985 (as discussed above) was an interview. He said that Coleman had some concerns but had no problems requiring treatment or therapy. He stated that he did not make written notes of the interview. Dr. Somodevilla testified that he met with Coleman on three occasions after Coleman shot Ron Cox. He said that all of those, discussions were interviews and that he did not make written notes of those interviews. He said that Coleman broke down and started crying during the first interview and that he was emotionally hurting and in pain. As to the second interview, he stated that he did not believe that Coleman was depressed. He stated that he did not make notes of his interviews with Coleman because he did not consider Coleman to be a patient. Dr. Somodevilla stated that his testimony about all of his interviews with Coleman concerning the 1985 shooting and the Cox shooting were based on personal recollection. He testified that he could not remember his interviews of other police officers that took place before and after these interviews with Coleman. He could not remember any other interviews conducted in the same months as the Coleman interviews. Dr. Harry Parker testified at the hearing as an expert witness. He said that he was a professor in three departments at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center: Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Psychiatry, and Rehabilitation Science. He stated that he was also a psychologist licensed by the State of Texas. He had served as Associate Dean and Dean of the School of Allied Health Sciences at the University of Texas Health Science Center. Dr. Parker examined the Coleman psychological records provided by Dallas. When asked if he had any concerns about those documents, he said that he was concerned about the fact that there was no narrative report or any comments explaining the significances of the raw data. He said that the lack of age and sex information and the lack of the test-taker’s name on one sheet were matters of concern to him. He noted that a document called “California Psychological Inventory” had an unidentifiable name and no age or sex information or other salient information. He stated that the records were incomplete and that important information was missing. Dr. Parker explained that the MMPI is a standardized test, and the manner in which it is administered is important to determining the accuracy of the test. He said that the MMPI documents, as furnished by Dallas, did not provide assurance that the test was given under appropriate standardized conditions. When asked if he agreed that psychological test data becomes invalid or archaic after a period of time, Dr. Parker replied that he did not agree that psychological records should be destroyed. He said that initial test data represent a point of departure or a set of base line data that allows determination as to whether a client or patient has been affected by intervening events or circumstances. Dr. Parker explained that psychologists look at all available information and make comparisons of information obtained at different times. He stated that he knew of no school of thought within the field of psychology which would encourage the destruction of psychological records. He expressed the view that any errors should be made on the side of collecting records rather than disposing of them. Dr. Parker testified that the keeping of good interview and evaluation notes is a basic principle taught to students of psychology because psychologists simply cannot recall all of the pertinent information about cases and clients. Dr. Parker found it incomprehensible that a psychologist would not have made any written records of an interview of a police officer after the officer was involved in a shooting. When asked about Coleman’s shooting of Cox followed by the psychologist seeing Coleman on three occasions after the shooting, Dr. Parker stated that failure to make any written record of the three interviews would not be in accordance with accepted standards of psychological practice. He said that such failure to make written records defies understanding, and he characterized it as unthinkable. He stated that excusing the failure to make written records by stating that there was no need for treatment would not be a sufficient explanation for not making notes. He testified that he believed that notes would in fact have been made. Dr. Parker said that any psychologist under his supervision who failed to make notes under the described circumstances would have been removed from that activity. Vicki Jackson, the clerk who found Coleman’s psychological records when Dr. So-modevilla inquired about them by telephone, testified at the hearing. She said that she found them in a matter of minutes while Dr. Somodevilla remained on the phone waiting. She stated that she had no difficulty finding the records. She testified that she had not previously been requested to look for Coleman’s psychological records. She had no knowledge of any such request directed to anyone in her department (the applicant section of the Personnel Division). She said that she was normally the person to contact about such records and that the records were readily available and could be easily found. She stated that, as far as she knew, it was common knowledge within the police department that she was the person to be contacted in order to obtain psychological records of police applicants. She was not aware of any memos or staff meetings or other forms of information or inquiries concerning the court-ordered psychological records. On December 10, 1987, the Coxes filed three additional motions for sanctions. The first of these, the third motion for sanctions, dealt with Dallas’s alleged failure to produce requested and ordered SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) manuals and Tactical Section manuals. The fourth motion for sanctions addressed Dallas’s alleged refusal to answer certain interrogatories on the ground that the information inquired about was too cumbersome, oppressive, or not subject to being readily provided. The motion also objected to Dallas’s refusal to stipulate that the Dallas Police Department systematically and habitually ignored its own high risk apprehension policy. The fifth motion for sanctions and motion for contempt did not deal with discovery problems. Instead, it dealt with Dallas’s alleged failure to abide by the trial court’s “gag order” forbidding public discussion of the case. On December 30, 1987, the Coxes filed their sixth motion for sanctions. This motion complained that Officer Jerome Thomas’s recantation of prior deposition testimony amounted to discovery abuse. Because the fifth motion for sanctions did not deal with discovery problems, and because no hearing was held on the allegations contained in the third, fourth, and sixth motions for sanctions, we postpone further discussion of those motions. On January 15, 1988, the Coxes filed their seventh motion for sanctions. Among other things, the motion alleged that Dallas was guilty of additional failures to properly comply with discovery orders and requests for the SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) manuals and Tactical Section manuals. As noted previously, Dallas was ordered to furnish the SOPs and Tactical Section manuals (and any other documents) that controlled or governed the actions, conduct, or behavior of the Tactical Section officers who were involved in the drug raid and the Cox shooting (as well as other SOPs and Tactical manuals). These documents had been requested in at least two separate requests for production. At the hearing on the first motion for sanctions, Lieutenant Scoggins, who was responsible for seeing that the requested documents concerning the Tactical Section were provided, was asked about the existence of a book of regulations called Standard Operating Procedures of the Special Operations Division of the Dallas Police Department. Scoggins acknowledged that these books were revised every year and that a version had existed for each of the years 1984,1985, 1986, and 1987. He testified that only the 1987 version had been produced because he was unable to find any of the other versions, including the 1986 version, which was in effect at the time of the Cox shooting. He further stated that, as far as he knew, the earlier versions had been destroyed. Scoggins had made statements to the same effect in his deposition. He also stated in his deposition that, as far as he knew, the 1986 and 1987 versions of the SOPs were basically the same. On January 4, 1988, Dallas produced a different version of the SOP manual. Deputy Chief of Police R..L. Schifelbein of the Special Operations Division swore that this particular SOP manual was the correct manual that should have been furnished. Along with this newly provided manual, Dallas produced a memorandum from Schi-felbein to counsel for Dallas. The memo was dated December 3, 1987, and it explained that the SOP previously provided by Scoggins was an unapproved master copy of a version that was in the process of being updated. The memo stated that the correct version of the SOP manual, which was dated 1983, along with the incorporated changes, was the manual under which the Tactical Section had been operating since 1983, coupled with a series of memo-randa. These memoranda were said to stipulate operational changes which were not included in the 1983 manual, but which would be incorporated in the updated version that was being completed. On January 5, 1988, Dallas provided the various memoranda and attachments which were apparently necessary to complete the correct version of the SOP manual as described in Schifelbein’s memo. The cover letter accompanying the January 5 production and the December 3 Schi-felbein memo did not provide definite information as to whether the most recently furnished SOP material represented the SOPs which were in effect at the time of the drug raid. The memo and cover letter indicated that the newly produced material represented the SOPs which were in effect as of the time of their production, not as of the time of the drug raid. In this regard, the cover letter from counsel for Dallas, dated January 5, 1988, states: “I am reproducing the Standard Operating Procedures to ensure that you are aware of the one which is currently in effect.” Because we do not find the attachments and memoran-da accompanying the newly furnished SOP manual in our record, we cannot ascertain whether those documents would allow a determination of the SOPs in effect at the time that Cox was shot. Obviously, matters would have been simplified if Dallas had merely identified the SOPs which were effective at the time of the drug raid, but the record before us does not indicate that Dallas did so. As previously discussed, the evidence presented at the hearing on the first motion for sanctions demonstrated that Dallas had produced one version of a Tactical manual which was later repudiated in favor of a second version. At different times, Dallas had represented (in sworn testimony and statements) that both of these versions were effective at the time of the drug raid. No less than four versions were ultimately introduced into evidence at that first hearing, and it was shown that none of the manuals were dated in a manner that would allow independent determination of their effective dates. On January 4, 1988, Dallas produced another version of the Tactical Section manual. This version was now represented by Dallas (and sworn by Schifelbein) to be the manual that was in effect at the time of the Cox shooting. This manual was one of the manuals introduced by the Coxes at the first hearing. The seventh motion for sanctions complained, among other things, of the above-described discovery problems. The motion alleged that Dallas’s conduct was constructively fraudulent because agents and employees of Dallas either knew or should have known that previous sworn statements about requested and ordered documents were false. The motion noted a continuing pattern of incorrect production and non-production of court-ordered documents which were vital to the movants’ case. The Coxes again alleged that these newest changes in the “rules of the game” would negate prior trial preparations and would necessitate additional consultations with experts and the redeposing of previously deposed witnesses. The motion asked the trial court to strike Dallas’s pleadings. Dallas’s response noted that it was a bureaucracy that managed millions of documents and that it had produced numerous documents containing between 7,000 and 10,000 pages. Dallas argued that its few failures were honest mistakes. It contended that the movants had exaggerated the need for redeposing witnesses and the corresponding expenses. Dallas maintained that, in view of the fact that it had been ordered to produce, under oath, the documents pertaining to policies by January 4, 1988, the movants should not have undertaken any additional consultations with experts until after the materials had been produced. A hearing was held on the seventh and eighth motions for sanctions. No testimony was elicited at the hearing, but a number of pertinent documents were introduced into evidence. At the hearing on the seventh motion, the Coxes’ counsel argued that some mistakes in discovery could possibly be justified, but the number of mistakes in this case, mistakes which prejudiced the Coxes and involved documents that were crucial to their lawsuit, indicated bad faith and willful conduct on Dallas’s part. On January 19, 1988, the Coxes filed the eighth motion for sanctions. The motion complained of Dallas’s belated production of documents concerning records management and disposition. As noted previously, the trial court had issued a detailed order on December 10, 1987. That order required Dallas to identify any written documents formerly possessed that had been destroyed, mutilated, altered, or lost regarding four specified matters, including Coleman’s psychological records. The trial court ordered production of all written documents authorizing or directing the destruction, mutilation, alteration, or loss of those documents. The trial court also ordered the Chief of Police or an officer ranked captain or higher to clearly set forth in writing and under oath: (1) all documents which had been destroyed, mutilated, altered, or lost; (2) whether such destruction, mutilation, alteration, or loss was authorized and, if so, whether the authorization was written or oral; (3) the authorizing documents, if written; and (4) the identity of the authorizing person or persons and the date of the authorization, if the authorization was oral. On January 18, 1988, Dallas supplemented its January 4 response to this order by producing a number of documents that set forth policies regarding the destruction and retention of records. The hearing on the second motion for sanctions (concerning Coleman’s psychological records) had begun on January 5, 1988, and was concluded on January 13, 1988. As discussed previously, the Coxes had alleged, among other things, that Dallas had materially misstated the policy regarding destruction of the psychological records of police officers and that the records ultimately produced did not appear to be complete, genuine, and authentic. At the hearing on the second motion, a memorandum sworn to by Captain John Chappelle of the Dallas Police Department was introduced into evidence. In that memo, Chappelle stated that Coleman’s psychological evaluation was discarded in accordance with a longstanding practice that was orally authorized. The memo stated that the origin of the oral directive was unknown and that the Personnel Division did not have any written documents authorizing the destruction of records. Chappelle was also called as a witness at the hearing on the second motion. Edwin Spencer, Administrative Assistant to the First Assistant Chief of Police, and Dr. Somodevilla, the Dallas police psychologist, had also testified at the hearing about policies governing destruction and retention of records. In the eighth motion for sanctions, the Coxes asserted that they were harmed by Dallas’s belated production of the documents on records management. They contended that they were effectively deprived of the opportunity to examine witnesses at the recently concluded hearing about the newly furnished documents. The Coxes alleged that it was inconceivable that Dallas was unaware of the existence of the documents prior to or during the hearing. They maintained that the discovery and production of the documents after the hearing had concluded could not be merely another mistake. They asked the trial court to impose harsh sanctions, including, but not limited to, the striking of Dallas’s pleadings. In its response, Dallas noted that some of the supplementing documents were found in the City Secretary’s office, not at the police department. Dallas contended that its supplementation was an act of good faith and that its late response was an honest and understandable mistake. Dallas argued that the movants had not been harmed. At the hearing on the eighth motion for sanctions, the Coxes’ counsel argued that it was unbelievable that the Dallas Police Department could be unaware of the existence of its own written policies regarding records retention and destruction. The ninth motion for sanctions dealt with a number of alleged discovery problems. In their third request for production, the Coxes had asked for the report or findings of any expert or group of experts concerning the use of deadly force by the Dallas Police Department. The request stated that it included, but was not limited to, the so-called Alpert report, which was the result of a study of the Dallas Police Department’s deadly force policies. In response to this request, Dallas produced the Alpert report and some related documents. Dr. James Fyfe was a member of the group of experts that ultimately produced the Alpert report. The Coxes obtained from Dr. Fyfe documents that he had written and submitted to the Dallas Police Department in connection with the Alpert group’s study. Those documents contained unfavorable and critical comments regarding various aspects of Dallas Police Department training, policies, and investigations with respect to the use of deadly force by Dallas police officers. The Fyfe documents were not produced by Dallas. The ninth motion asserted that the documents were clearly responsive to the third request for production and that the failure to produce the documents constituted an abuse of the discovery process. In response, Dallas contended that the documents were not within the scope of the requested discovery. Dallas maintained that a good faith search had not uncovered the documents. The ninth motion also concerned production of documents and tangible things regarding the Dallas Police Department investigation of the Cox shooting. The Coxes alleged that investigative documents had been altered or were not authentic. They asserted that photographs taken at the scene of the shooting did not accurately depict the actual circumstances and the physical evidence as it existed following the shooting. The Coxes stated that various reports prepared by Dallas investigative officers contained material misstatements. They alleged a repetitive pattern of discovery abuse by Dallas. As to some of the allegations concerning reports, photographs, and physical evidence, Dallas did not specifically answer the allegations in its written response to the ninth motion for sanctions. The Coxes sought various forms of relief, including the striking of Dallas’s pleadings. An extended hearing was held on the ninth motion. Most of the testimony related to the allegations regarding the production of documents, reports, and photographs concerning the Dallas Police Department’s investigation of the shooting and collection of physical evidence. Investigator James R. Vineyard of the Dallas Police Department’s Physical Evidence Section was one of the witnesses at the hearing. He was involved in the investigation of the circumstances of the Cox shooting. Vineyard testified that he photographed the machine gun that had been fired by Officer Coleman when Coleman shot Cox. The photograph showed the gun and the clip with twenty-six unexpended rounds, indicating that four rounds were missing from the thirty round capacity clip. Vineyard stated that the photograph showed the weapon as it was received following the shooting. He identified two other photographs of a throw rug that was located in the condominium where the drug raid and the shooting took place. One photograph showed a shell casing situated on top of the throw rug. Vineyard stated that the photograph documented the position and condition of the shell casing at the time that he observed the scene. The second photograph showed the throw rug rolled back and a shell casing on the carpeted area underneath the throw rug. Vineyard testified that if it was assumed that the immediate area had not been disturbed, the position of the shell casing found under the rug was very strange and peculiar. He stated that two different shell casings were depicted by the two photographs. Vineyard expressed the opinion that the second casing was under the rug because of some disturbance. He identified a third photograph depicting a third shell casing located underneath a chair. He stated that a total of four shell casings were found at the scene. He said that one of the shell casings was found on the shelf of an etagere close to a plant. Vineyard testified that he obviously had not photographed that shell casing, although he at one time thought he had. He also acknowledged that he had not photographed another shell casing that was found by Addison Police Captain Higgins. He said he did not photograph it because Higgins had moved it from its original location. When confronted with the suggestion that his testimony indicated that a total of five shell casings had been found, Vineyard then suggested that the photograph of the casing found under a chan-depicted the casing found by Higgins. When asked if he had any basis for the suggestion that the casing found by Higgins was the same as the one photographed under a chair, Vineyard stated that he had no such basis. Vineyard testified about a report he had prepared about the Cox shooting. He stated that his report was truthful and that all physical evidence collected at the scene was sent to the Southwest Institute of Forensic Sciences (SWIFS). He acknowledged that his report indicated that only four shell casings were found, and he testified that he submitted the four casings that he received to SWIFS. Vineyard’s report further stated that two projectiles were observed imbedded in the fireplace mantel. Later in the report, the two projectiles were more specifically described as a projectile and jacket found in the fireplace mantel. Vineyard testified that he did not photograph the projectiles in their imbedded position in the mantel. He acknowledged that it would have been a much better investigative procedure to have photographed the projectiles in the mantel before they were removed. Vineyard said that only one projectile and jacket combination was found at the scene and that it was found in the mantel. He stated that only one jacket was found, that being the one that was part of the projectile and jacket combination found imbedded in the mantel. He testified that a portion of a projectile was found underneath a table, but no jacket associated with that projectile was found. The report produced by SWIFS based on the physical evidence submitted to SWIFS was introduced into evidence. In addition to four shell casings, the report showed two items identified as a missile a