Full opinion text
SUBSTITUTE OPINION KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice. This case arises out of a business dispute over interests in a foreign oil and gas field. After a lengthy trial involving complicated facts and extensive expert testimony, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants $6.4 million in lost profits, plus attorney’s fees and interest, based on their breach-of-contract claims against defendants/appellants/cross-appellees. The main issue on appeal is whether the evidence proves with reasonable certainty the profits appellees claim to have lost as a result of appellants’ breaches of contract. We conclude that it does not. We also conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as to appellees’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that appellees take nothing against appellants. I.OVERVIEW Scott Van Dyke repeatedly tried without success to realize his “dream and business plan” by purchasing the equity of a company with development rights in a potentially lucrative oil and gas field in Kazakhstan so that he could try to profitably develop this field. After learning that another company had acquired these development rights, Van Dyke concluded that the purchaser acquired these rights by using confidential information obtained in violation of confidentiality agreements. Van Dyke’s companies filed suit against the companies he believed had breached these agreements and misappropriated confidential information and trade secrets. II. Factual and PROCEDURAL Background In 1992, Van Dyke and appellee/cross-appellant Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. (hereinafter “AD International”), a Texas corporation in which he was a principal, became involved in a group of companies that sought to identify, evaluate, and determine the feasibility of oil and gas opportunities in the former Soviet Union. Sugarland Oil Company, a Delaware corporation, was also a member of this group. The group purchased geological and geophysical data on a field in Kazakhstan known as the Tenge Field. The Soviet Union had produced gas from shallow horizons in the Tenge Field, and this data showed potential oil horizons beneath the gas. After deciding that the possibilities in the Tenge Field were worth pursuing, ap-pellee/cross-appellant Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C. (hereinafter “AD Tenge”), a company in which Van Dyke owned a ninety-percent interest, formed a Delaware limited liability company named Tenge Development L.L.C. (hereinafter “Tenge Development”). Sugarland (Ka-zakhtenge) L.L.C. (hereinafter “Sugar-land”), a Delaware company, also owned an interest in Tenge Development. Tenge Development, in turn, was a member of Anglo-Dutch (Kazakhtenge) L.L.C. (hereinafter “Kazakhtenge”), a Texas limited liability company. Later, N.I.R. Tenge L.P. (hereinafter the “Israeli Company”), an Israeli limited partnership, and Overseas Petroleum and Investment Corporation (hereinafter the “Taiwanese Company”), a Panamanian corporation affiliated with the government of Taiwan, both provided capital and became members of Kazakhtenge. At all material times, Tenge Development served as the administrative member of Kazakhtenge. Although Van Dyke’s company AD Tenge was the administrative member of Tenge Development and thus effectively the administrative member of Kazakhtenge until May 1996, neither Van Dyke nor any of his companies owned or controlled a majority interest in Tenge Development or Kazakhtenge at any material time. Lacking this ownership and control, Van Dyke and his companies, on various occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to acquire all of the interests in Tenge Development and Kazakhtenge. In November 1993, Kazakhtenge and Mangistaumunaygaz Production Association (hereinafter the “Gas Production Association”), a Kazakhstani association affiliated with the Kazakhstan government, entered into a Foundation Agreement regarding the creation of the Tenge Joint Enterprise (the “Joint Enterprise”), a Ka-zakhstani joint enterprise. Under this Foundation Agreement, which had a term of twenty-five years, each party owned a fifty-percent interest. The following diagram shows the ownership interests in the Joint Enterprise as well as Kazakhtenge’s relationship to the various entities vis-a-vis the matters in dispute: The purpose of the Joint Enterprise was to develop the Tenge Field. The Foundation Agreement and the Charter creating the Joint Enterprise allowed the Joint Enterprise to develop and sell hydrocarbons produced from the Tenge Field. In May 1997, appellant/cross-appellee Rameo Energy PLC (hereinafter “Rameo Energy”), a Scottish company, signed a confidentiality agreement with Anglo-Dutch (Neftenge) L.L.C. (hereinafter “AD Neftenge”) and examined the possibility of becoming involved in the development of the Tenge Field. In June 1997, Rameo Energy decided not to pursue this matter. Three months later, in August 1997, appellant/cross-appellee Rameo Oil & Gas, Ltd. (hereinafter “Rameo Oil”), a Scottish company, learned that Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (hereinafter “Halliburton”) was reviewing the Tenge Field prospect. Having worked with Halliburton in developing other opportunities in Central Asia, Rameo Oil decided to examine the possibility of becoming involved in the development of the Tenge Field with Halliburton. Rameo Oil and Halliburton signed an agreement delineating the terms of their relationship. On November 26, 1997, Rameo Oil and Halliburton entered into a Letter of Intent with AD Tenge and Anglo-Dutch (Jersey) Limited (hereinafter “AD Jersey”), a Channel Islands company, detailing, among other things, an approach to purchasing interests in Tenge Development and Kazakhtenge. The Letter of Intent was subject to many conditions, including approvals of executive management and, if necessary, Rameo Oh’s and Halliburton’s boards of directors. The Letter of Intent incorporated the terms of the May 1997 confidentiality agreement signed by Ram-eo Energy and stated that the terms of this agreement shall apply mwtatis mutan-dis (“all necessary changes having been made”), as if Rameo Oil had entered into the same agreement with AD Tenge. Pursuing development of the Tenge Field necessarily would require interface and dealings with the government of Kazakhstan. To obtain expertise and assistance in this regard, Rameo Oil and Halliburton retained as a consultant Golden Eagle Partners (“Golden Eagle”), which had experience in communications and relations with the Kazakhstan government. For business reasons unrelated to the Tenge Field, Halliburton formally withdrew from the Letter of Intent in July 1998. Rameo Oil withdrew as well in November 1998. AD Tenge and AD International (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) and Van Dyke continued to seek to purchase the interests of the Tenge Development and Kazakhtenge members not affiliated with Plaintiffs. Golden Eagle and Central Asia Industrial Investments, N.V. (hereinafter “Central Asia”), a Netherlands Antilles company, also negotiated with the Tenge Development and Kaza-khtenge members. On March 8, 2000, Ka-zakhtenge entered into a purchase agreement with Central Asia, under which it agreed to sell Central Asia all of the shares in a company to which Kazakhtenge would transfer all of its interest in the Joint Enterprise. Central Asia paid $2 million in cash at the closing of this purchase and agreed to future payments conditioned on future production. Plaintiffs filed this suit against Halliburton, Rameo Energy, Rameo Oil, and others, alleging breach of contract and various torts. Plaintiffs claimed that, in breach of their obligations to keep the information about the Tenge Field confidential, Halliburton, Rameo Energy, and Rameo Oil disclosed confidential information concerning the Tenge Field to Golden Eagle, which Golden Eagle and Central Asia then used for their own benefit. Plaintiffs later nonsuited some of their tort claims, and the trial court granted two motions for summary judgment filed by Rameo Energy and Rameo Oil (hereinafter the “Rameo Parties”), dismissing all Plaintiffs’ remaining tort claims against the Rameo Parties. Plaintiffs went to trial on their breach-of-contract claims against Halliburton, Rameo Energy, and Rameo Oil. Plaintiffs asserted that these defendants breached their contractual confidentiality obligations, allegedly resulting in Central Asia’s acquisition of Kazakhtenge’s interest in the Joint Enterprise. Plaintiffs claimed that, but for these breaches, they would have purchased the Kazakhtenge members’ interest, developed the Tenge Field, and earned $640 million in profits by 2018, the end of their agreement with the Gas Production Association. After a trial lasting more than six weeks, the jury rendered its verdict, awarding Plaintiffs $64 million in lost profits for Halliburton’s breach of its confidentiality agreement and $6.4 million in lost profits for the Rameo Parties’ breaches of their confidentiality agreements. The jury also determined that Halliburton and Rameo were partners regarding the Tenge Field project. The Rameo Parties filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial court denied their motion except as to the jury’s partnership finding, which it set aside. Otherwise, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding Plaintiffs $6.4 million in lost profits on their contract claims against the Rameo Parties, as well as attorney’s fees, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and court costs. The Rameo Parties subsequently filed this appeal. Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal, challenging, among other things, the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Rameo Parties as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and misappropriation of trade secrets. III. Issues Presented The Rameo Parties assert the following issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in admitting the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts George Schaefer and John Brickhill? (2) Is there evidence proving with reasonable certainty Plaintiffs’ lost profits? (3) As to Rameo Energy’s liability, can Plaintiffs enforce the May 1997 confidentiality agreement between Rameo Energy and AD Neftenge? (4) Did the trial court reversibly err in charging the jury on the Rameo Parties’ liability? (5) Is the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s liability findings against the Rameo Parties? (6) Are the Rameo Parties liable for attorney’s fees? In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs assert the following issues: (1) Did the trial court err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the partnership issue? (2) Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and misappropriation of trade secrets? (3) Did the trial court err in denying postjudgment interest on attorney’s fees? (4) Did the trial court err in denying prejudgment interest on future damages? (5) Was the trial court’s use of a five percent prejudgment and post-judgment interest rate based on an invalid statute? IV. Analysis A. Plaintiffs’ Proof of Lost Profits as Damages on Their Contract Claims The main issue on appeal arises out of Plaintiffs’ contract claims. In construing contracts, our primary concern is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the contract. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.1998). To ascertain the parties’ true intentions, we examine the entire agreement in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex.1999). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996). A contract is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id. However, when a written contract is worded so that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, it is unambiguous, and the court construes it as a matter of law. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex.2003). In reviewing the denial of the Rameo Parties’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex.2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. at 827. Under their third issue, the Rameo Parties assert the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence does not prove with reasonable certainty the profits Plaintiffs claim to have lost as a result of the Rameo Parties’ breaches of contract. A party seeking to recover lost profits on a breach-of-contract claim must prove the loss with reasonable certainty. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgm’t, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.1994). Evidence of lost profits must not be uncertain or speculative. Id. Whether evidence of lost profits is speculative depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. Profits are not required to be exactly calculated; it is sufficient that there be data from which they may be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty and exactness. Id. Opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits may be ascertained. Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994). Plaintiffs cannot recover profits that are largely speculative, such as activities dependent on uncertain or changing market conditions, chancy business opportunities, promotion of untested products, entry into unknown or unviable markets, or on the success of new and unproven enterprises. Id. Factors like these and others that make a business venture risky preclude a retrospective recovery of lost profits. Id. If the business is shown to have been already established and profitable when the contract was breached, such pre-exist-ing profit, together with other facts and circumstances, may indicate with reasonable certainty the amount of profits lost. Id. Is there evidence that proves Plaintiffs’ lost profits with reasonable certainty? The jury found that Plaintiffs suffered $6.4 million in lost profits resulting from the Rameo Parties’ breaches of their confidentiality agreement. The only actual damages awarded to Plaintiffs against the Rameo Parties were these lost-profits damages. The jury ultimately found that, as a natural, probable, and foreseeable result of Halliburton’s and the Rameo Parties’ breaches, Central Asia was able to purchase Kazakhtenge’s interest in the Joint Enterprise. Plaintiffs assert that, absent these breaches, Plaintiffs would have been able to (1) buy the Taiwanese Company’s and Tenge Development’s interests in Kazakhtenge, (2) develop the Tenge Field in accordance with their expert’s production plan, (3) produce and market more than 100 million barrels of oil and 911 billion cubic feet of gas from the Tenge Field, and (4) generate substantial revenues and profits for Plaintiffs after deducting the expenses and costs of financing. Under Plaintiffs’ lost-profits damage model, (1) Plaintiffs would have been able to purchase the Taiwanese Company’s and Tenge Development’s interests in Kaza-khtenge in accordance with the regulations governing Kazakhtenge (hereinafter “Ka-zakhtenge Regulations”); (2) Plaintiffs would have obtained financing to purchase these interests; (3) Plaintiffs would have obtained financing allowing them to drill 96 wells in the Tenge Field without losing any of them 100% equity interest in Kaza-khtenge; and (4) the Tenge Field would have been highly productive and profitable. Plaintiffs’ Experts Plaintiffs’ evidence of damages came primarily from the testimony of two experts, John Brickhill, the leader of a team that performed an economic analysis of the Tenge Field, and George Schaefer, a petroleum engineer and member of the same team that Plaintiffs hired to do a projection of production from the Tenge Field. Schaefer’s Testimony Schaefer worked for ten months projecting the Tenge Field’s production, using data that Anglo Dutch provided him. Schaefer determined that the Tenge Field, which measures approximately 19 square miles, had 717 million barrels of oil and 1.7 trillion cubic feet of gas below the surface. Schaefer and his staff, making allowances for cost-effectiveness and the technology available in the late 1990s, calculated the following projections for total oil and gas production from the third quarter of 2000 through the end of 2018: • 137.9 million barrels of oil, or 19% of the Tenge Field’s oh • 911 billion cubic feet of gas, or 55% of the Tenge Field’s gas Schaefer’s production plan called for the use of gas injection wells to increase oil production by pressurizing the oil. Under this production plan, 96 wells would be used to produce oil and gas as follows: • 10 reworked vertical wells • 24 new vertical wells • 40 new horizontal wells • 11 new horizontal gas injector wells • 11 new horizontal water injector wells Schaefer’s plan designates the location of these wells where he believed recovery would be maximized. Under this plan, oil would be produced for the first ten years, followed by gas production through the end of the term. Schaefer testified that, in conducting his analysis, he followed “standard operating procedure in our business” and calculated what he believed could be produced if the Tenge Field were developed. Schaefer calculated the oil-recovery factor for the life of the Tenge Field to be 26%, with 19% (137.9 million barrels) recovered in the first nineteen years. Schaefer based his gas-production profile on the 725 billion cubic feet of gas the Soviets produced from the shallower horizons. Brickhill’s Testimony Brickhill testified that he had worked in the field of economic analysis since 1969. According to Brickhill, there are generally accepted methods used in the oil and gas industry to calculate an oil field’s value, and his team used industry-accepted methods in its economic analysis of the Tenge Field, though he had never been to Kazakhstan, where the Tenge Field is located. Brickhill testified that the steps for calculating the oil field’s value are to project (1) revenues, (2) likely expenses, (3) field income, (4) the client’s share of the field income, (5) the client’s share of lost profits, and (6) the discounted present value of that projected profit stream. Brickhill’s team calculated oil and gas revenues for 2000 through 2018, when the initial term of Kazakhtenge’s agreement with the Gas Production Association was to expire. In his analysis, Brickhill relied on Schaefer’s oil revenue calculations. Brickhill’s team calculated that, if both oil and gas were produced, then 137.9 million barrels of oil could be generated from the Tenge Field between 2000 and 2018. If only oil were produced, the field would yield 171.0 million barrels of oil during this time frame. Explaining his calculations, data use, and methodology, Brickhill testified as follows: • In calculating the price of oil, he used the historical price for past periods. For future production, he primarily relied on the United States Department of Energy’s forecasts of the price of oil. • He calculated revenues by multiplying the number of oil barrels by the price per barrel of oil. • The Tenge Field would generate oil revenues totaling $3.682 billion through 2018, based on the production of both oil and gas. • The Tenge Field would generate oil revenues totaling $4.755 billion through 2018, based on the production of only oil. • In calculating gas revenues, Brickhill developed an independent forecast for the price of gas, using a price of $2.42 per thousand cubic feet (“mef’) of gas. He multiplied this price by 911,000,-000 mef, which is the amount of gas Schaefer believed would be produced from the Tenge Field. Brickhill calculated that, if both oil and gas were produced from the Tenge Field, the total gross oü and gas revenues through 2018 would be $5.895 billion. Explaining his analysis, Brickhill testified that the fact that Halliburton’s and Ram-co’s calculations were close to those of his team made him even more confident in his team’s numbers. Brickhill calculated that the total expenses would be $2.315 billion. By sub-trading expenses from revenues, Brickhill calculated the “field income” as $3.58 billion. He divided this number in half to reflect the Gas Production Association’s 50% share, which leaves $1.79 billion. Brickhill concluded that $2 million would be needed for Anglo Dutch to acquire interests in Kazakhtenge. He noted that in 2000, Anglo Dutch had tried to “buy out” the parties owning interests in Kaza-khtenge. Brickhill referred to these parties as “old investors,” the major one being the Taiwanese Company. Brickhill explained that to finance Anglo Dutch’s buyout of the “old investors” and its development of the Tenge Field, Anglo Dutch would have to obtain financing from new investors. Brickhill set the costs of this financing at 25% of Kazakhtenge’s share of the field income, which he calculated as $447.5 million. Brickhill stated that this cost figure was probably too high but he did not want to overstate the damages. Brickhill estimated that, at a ten percent discount rate, $140 to $200 million in outside financing could be attracted. He anticipated that Shell, Citibank, Lukoil, or Van Dyke’s brother-in-law would provide this “new investor” financing. Brick-hill testified that, after subtracting this $447.5 million, Anglo Dutch’s share of the lost profits for the nineteen-year term would be $1.3 billion. Briekhill’s team calculated the present value of the stream of lost profits at $640 million. Brickhill stated that his model reflects that Van Dyke would have had the $22.8 million necessary to acquire the Kaza-khtenge members’ interests. Although Brickhill said during his deposition that he assumed Van Dyke would be able to buy out all of the Kazakhtenge members, by the time he testified at trial, Brickhill had seen a document suggesting that Van Dyke would have been able to acquire all of these interests. This document is a February 8, 2000 e-mail from Fred Tresca of Golden Eagle — a person not affiliated with any of the Kazakhtenge members. Brickhill testified that, in this e-mail, Tres-ca told Lee Henkel, a lawyer for the Taiwanese Company, that Tresca understood that the Taiwanese Company and others had accepted or were about to accept Van Dyke’s offer. Brickhill believed that, although Van Dyke’s November 29, 1999 offer was rejected initially, the same offer was later accepted in February 2000. Briekhill did not dispute that Plaintiffs’ damage model depends on Van Dyke’s ability to obtain financing and buy out the Kazakhtenge members. If Van Dyke could not acquire the interests of these members, there would be no lost profits. Brickhill’s model also assumes Van Dyke would get the approximately $14 million from outside investors needed to start production, without which, Briekhill acknowledged, Van Dyke would have no lost profits. Although Briekhill was not aware of any commitments from lenders who would advance the $14 million to start production, he claimed he had seen indications that Citibank, Shell, or Lukoil would lend Van Dyke these funds. Briekhill testified that it would be “ridiculous” to assume that Van Dyke would be unable to obtain any financing because Van Dyke’s brother-in-law had said he would lend Van Dyke $2 million. Furthermore, Briekhill testified that he believed Van Dyke could have bought out the Kazakhtenge members by paying only $220,000 up front, plus additional payments later. According to Briekhill, Van Dyke’s “dream and business plan” was to obtain control of Kazakhtenge by buying the Taiwanese Company’s 66.5% interest and then to produce and market the Tenge Field’s oil and gas. Under Briekhill’s model for oil and gas production in the Tenge Field, there would be no gas production for the first ten years and therefore no gas revenue to help fund development of the field. If the oil wells in the first ten years did not produce enough oil to pay for field development, then there would be no profits because the field would not produce oil in sufficient quantities to pay for the development of the field. Without oil revenues, there would be no funds to continue development of the field. Likewise, if the gas could not be produced economically and sold profitably, then continued development of the gas wells would cease. Briekhill candidly admitted that he did not know about the state of Van Dyke’s relationship with the other Kazakhtenge members and did not independently investigate whether those Kazakhtenge members would have agreed to sell Van Dyke their interests. Van Dyke did not tell Briekhill that his relationship with the Ka-zakhtenge members had been “very rough” over the years. Briekhill testified that, even if some Kazakhtenge members disliked Van Dyke, Anglo Dutch only needed to have purchased the Taiwanese Company’s interest because that would have provided Anglo Dutch with a majority, controlling interest in Kazakhtenge. Briekhill acknowledged that section 11.01 of the Kazakhtenge Regulations provides that transfers of interests in Kazakhtenge must be approved by all Kazakhtenge members, rather than by a vote of the holders of a majority of the interests in Kazakhtenge. However, he later testified that he believed Plaintiffs could have bought the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge without the members’ consent if the Taiwanese Company had assigned all of its rights to distributions to Plaintiffs under section 11.02 of the Kaza-khtenge Regulations and agreed to always cast its vote in Kazakhtenge matters as directed by Plaintiffs. Brickhill was aware that Orrin Hein (who was administrative member of Sugar-land at the time of trial) had made statements that his company would not accept any offer from Van Dyke based on any kind of contingency payment. Nothing that Brickhill saw in his work on this case led him to believe that Tenge Development would sell Van Dyke its interest in Kaza-khtenge, and Van Dyke did not tell Brick-hill that he believed Tenge Development would sell him its interest in Kazakhtenge. Rather, Van Dyke told Brickhill that he could obtain a majority of the interests in Kazakhtenge, and Brickhill believed him. However, Brickhill knew of no documentation in which Sugarland indicated it would vote for and agree to Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge. Tenge Development’s Approval as a Prerequisite to Plaintiffs’ Purchase of the Kazakhtenge Interest In arguing that the evidence of lost profits is speculative and not reasonably certain, the Rameo Parties assert that, even if Central Asia had not purchased Kazakhtenge’s interest in the Joint Enterprise, Tenge Development would not have approved Plaintiffs’ purchase of any member’s interest in Kazakhtenge. Plaintiffs argue that Tenge Development’s approval was not necessary. Therefore, we examine whether Plaintiffs needed Tenge Development’s approval. First, we note that Brickhill was inconsistent as to whose interest in Kaza-khtenge the Plaintiffs would have needed to purchase. On direct examination, Brick-hill testified that Plaintiffs’ damage model was based on Plaintiffs’ owning all of Ka-zakhtenge’s equity. He projected that, to accomplish this acquisition of interests, Plaintiffs would purchase the interests of the “old investors” in Kazakhtenge. Although the only entity Brickhill mentioned by name as an “old investor” was the Taiwanese Company, Brickhill’s calculations were based on Plaintiffs’ owning all of the equity, meaning Plaintiffs would have had to acquire both the Taiwanese Company’s and Tenge Development’s interests in Kazakhtenge. Tenge Development’s approval obviously would have been required to purchase its interest; however, on redirect examination, Brickhill testified that part of Van Dyke’s “dream and business plan” was to obtain control of Kazakhtenge by purchasing only the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge. Although Brickhill did not change his damage model to allow for payments of profits to Tenge Development as a continuing member of Kazakhtenge, Brickhill asserted on redirect examination that the Taiwanese Company was the only “old investor” whose interest Plaintiffs needed to acquire to obtain control over Kazakhtenge. Brickhill indicated that Plaintiffs could have obtained approval of their purchase of the Taiwanese Company’s 66.5% interest by having the Taiwanese Company cast a majority vote in favor of the purchase. To evaluate this part of Briekhill’s testimony regarding the purchase of only the Taiwanese Company’s interest, we first determine whether Plaintiffs needed Tenge Development’s approval to buy only the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge. The unambiguous language of the Kaza-khtenge Regulations shows that Tenge Development’s approval would have been required because unanimous approval of all Kazakhtenge members is necessary for the assignment of any or all of a member’s interest: 11.01 Requirements Applicable to Assignment No assignment of all or any portion of a Member’s Interest, other than those provided for in Section 4.05, shall be valid or permitted unless approved by a unanimous vote of the other Members. No assignee of any Interest of a Member shall have any rights in and under the Regulations, the Foundation Agreement and Charter, or the Tenge Field unless or until such assignment is approved and such assignee expressly undertakes in writing, in a form satisfactory to all of the non-assigning Members, to perform the obligations of the assign- or, and provides any parent guarantees or other assurances, plus reimbursement of any transactional costs as all of the non-assigning Members may determine to be necessary. Because section 4.05 would not have applied, under section 11.01 of the Kaza-khtenge Regulations, Plaintiffs would have needed Tenge Development’s approval before purchasing the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge. When confronted with the Kazakhtenge Regulations, Brickhill admitted that section 11.01 requires members’ unanimous approval for assignments of interests in Kazakhtenge. However, Brickhill later testified that he believed Plaintiffs could have acquired the Taiwanese Company’s interest without Tenge Development’s approval by having the Taiwanese Company (1) assign all of its rights to Kazakhtenge distributions to Plaintiffs under section 11.02 of the Kazakhtenge Regulations and (2) agree to always cast its vote in Kaza-khtenge matters as directed by Plaintiffs. Section 11.02 of the Kazakhtenge Regulations reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 11.02 Assignment of Rights to Distributions and Mortgage of Interest A Member may assign all or a portion of its rights to Distributions, and may mortgage, pledge or otherwise encumber all or part of its Interest, without having first to obtain any approvals from the other Members, provided that: (i) such Member shall continue to exercise control of the vote associated with its Interest and shall remain liable for all obligations relating to such Interest ... Under the unambiguous language of the Kazakhtenge Regulations, the Taiwanese Company and Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, could not have used section 11.02 to avoid the need for Tenge Development’s approval if, as posited by Brickhill, the Taiwanese Company would be contractually obligating itself to vote as directed by Plaintiffs. This voting agreement would violate the Taiwanese Company’s obligation to “continue to exercise control of the vote associated with its Interest,” as required by section 11.02. Therefore, we conclude that section 11.02 would not have provided a means by which Plaintiffs could have circumvented the requirement of Tenge Development’s approval of Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Taiwanese Company’s interest. In sum, under the unambiguous language of the Kazakhtenge Regulations, as a matter of law, Tenge Development’s approval would have been required for any sale of the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge to Plaintiffs. Brickhill testified that Sugarland did not mention this need for Tenge Development’s approval in its correspondence; however, Sugar-land’s omission does not change or waive the unambiguous language of the Kaza-khtenge Regulations requiring such approval. Brickhill also testified that it would make no sense for the Taiwanese Company to have agreed to a unanimous-approval requirement for such transactions and that he did not believe the Taiwanese people who ran the Taiwanese Company are “stupid.” Regardless of Brickhill’s views and the Taiwanese Company’s folly or wisdom in agreeing to the Kazakhtenge Regulations, these regulations have not been challenged or set aside, and we must give force to their unambiguous language as written. See Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d at 161-62. We cannot rewrite the relevant provisions under the guise of interpretation. See id. Evidence that Tenge Development Would Have Approved Plaintiffs’ Purchase of the Taiwanese Company’s Interest Brickhill testified that Plaintiffs’ damage model depends on Van Dyke’s ability to acquire the Kazakhtenge members’ interests. Brickhill agreed that, without such a buyout, there would be no lost profits. As discussed above, Tenge Development needed to approve the purchase by Plaintiffs of any interest in Kazakhtenge, whether the interest in question was the Taiwanese Company’s or Tenge Development’s. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ damage model depends on Tenge Development’s approval for Plaintiffs’ purchase of at least the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Ka-zakhtenge, if not the other interests. However, the evidence that Tenge Development would have approved such a purchase is speculative at best. To put this issue in context, it is helpful to consider the prior dealings among the members of Tenge Development and the resulting friction in their relationship. Sugarland became the administrative member of Tenge Development on June 4, 1996. At all material times, Tenge Development was the administrative member of Kazakhtenge, which was the operator of the Joint Enterprise. Sugarland took over this position after AD Tenge was terminated as the administrative member of Tenge Development. Orrin Hein of Sugarland testified that AD Tenge was terminated as administrative member because (1) the other members had lost confidence in Van Dyke, (2) they no longer trusted Van Dyke’s business judgment, (3) AD Tenge had sought reimbursement for alleged expenditures without necessary backup data, and (4) AD Tenge had entered into a confidentiality agreement that prevented third parties from disclosing information to the other members. Hein stated that, on behalf of AD Tenge, Van Dyke had refused to accept AD Tenge’s termination as administrative member, forcing the members into arbitration. The arbitrator confirmed AD Tenge’s removal as the administrative member of Tenge Development and its replacement by Sugarland. In 1997, there was another arbitration between AD Tenge and the other members of Tenge Development. In that proceeding, the arbitrator determined that AD Tenge had breached its fiduciary duty to Tenge Development and the other members of Tenge Development by usurping a business opportunity belonging to Tenge Development — the chance to acquire part of the Israeli Company’s interest in Kaza-khtenge after the Israeli Company decided it no longer wished to fund future Kaza-khtenge cash calls. AD Tenge had given this business opportunity to its affiliate AD Neftenge rather than to Tenge Development. As a remedy for AD Tenge’s breach of fiduciary duty, the arbitrator placed AD Neftenge’s interest and membership in Kazakhtenge in a constructive trust for Tenge Development’s economic and voting benefit. The arbitrator also ruled that after July 14, 1997, Tenge Development would exercise all rights, including voting rights, of AD Neftenge as a member of Kazakhtenge. In light of this history marked by conflict and discord between Sugarland (the administrative member of Tenge Development) and Van Dyke, and given that some of the compensation in any deal would come from future payments conditioned on the profitability of the Joint Enterprise and Kazakhtenge, it is not surprising that there is evidence in the record that Sugar-land took a dim view of Van Dyke. Hein testified that a contingent payout from Van Dyke was highly speculative because Van Dyke already had spent $16 million and “gotten nowhere,” and he had “absolutely no confidence that [Van Dyke] could spend more money and get anywhere.” In fact, Tenge Development rejected a March 8, 2000 offer from a company controlled by Van Dyke, even though the offer’s terms were substantially similar to those of Central Asia’s successful offer. Hein explained that this offer was rejected because of a lack of confidence and trust in Van Dyke and a conclusion that an arm’s length transaction with a reputable party like Central Asia was a better alternative. Brickhill acknowledged that he had not seen any documentation in which Sugar-land indicated it would vote for and agree to Plaintiffs’ acquisition of the Taiwanese Company’s interest in Kazakhtenge. Brickhill also stated that nothing he had read in his work on this case led him to believe that Tenge Development would sell its interest in Kazakhtenge to Plaintiffs. According to Brickhill, Van Dyke himself never stated a belief that Tenge Development would sell him its interest in Kaza-khtenge, although he told Brickhill that he could obtain a majority interest in Kaza-khtenge. Brickhill testified that he did not know about the state of Van Dyke’s relationship with the other Kazakhtenge members in 2000. During his deposition, Brickhill said he assumed Van Dyke would have been able to buy out all of the Kaza-khtenge members; however, at trial Brick-hill stated that he had seen the February 8, 2000 e-mail from Fred Tresca of Golden Eagle to Lee Henkel, which Brickhill believed indicated the members would have sold Plaintiffs their interests. The e-mail’s entire body reads as follows: I had a relatively long conversation with [Mingson Juang of the Taiwanese Company]. I advised that we were happy to meet in Taipei if that facilitated coming to an agreement. I also reiterated that they are free to propose ongoing participation by [the Taiwanese Company] if so desired. One comment that I did not quite understand was that Mingson mentioned that the his [sic] Board has already approved a level of payments based on an earlier offer from Van Dyke and that our offer did not meet with the Boards [sic] earlier levels [sic] of approval. What does this mean? I requested that if at all possible we would like comments back on our proposal before Friday as we do not want to show up in Istanbul simply to receive comments with no opportunity to reach an agreement. He said that they would be meeting tomorrow to discuss our offer. Your input before that meeting could be helpful. Although it may be unclear exactly what Mingson Juang was telling Tresca, several things are apparent. The e-mail does not involve an officer or agent of Tenge Development or Sugarland, and nothing in this short communique involves or refers to Tenge Development or Sugar-land. Nothing addresses whether Tenge Development or Sugarland would have approved Plaintiffs’ purchase of the interest of any Kazakhtenge member. Furthermore, this e-mail does not state that the Taiwanese Company had accepted an offer from Van Dyke. If it had accepted Van Dyke’s offer, the Taiwanese Company would not have been in negotiations with Central Asia and Golden Eagle. In the context of those negotiations, the Taiwanese Company told Golden Eagle that its latest offer was less than a “level of payments” that the Taiwanese Company’s board previously had decided was a necessary part of an acceptable offer when considering an earlier offer from Van Dyke. In sum, this e-mail is not an objective fact or reasonably certain basis for concluding (1) Sugarland or Tenge Development would have approved Plaintiffs’ purchase of the interest of any Kazakhtenge member or (2) the Taiwanese Company had accepted one of Van Dyke’s offers. Brickhill admitted that he did not independently investigate whether the Kaza-khtenge members would have approved of Plaintiffs’ acquisition of the interests of the Kazakhtenge members. He stated that “bluster and intimidation” can be a negotiation tactic to try to get a better deal. Brickhill also referred to letters from Sug-arland in April and May of 1999 that have a more conciliatory tone and that discuss the possibility of the acquisition by one of Van Dyke’s companies of Tenge Development’s interest in Kazakhtenge or Kaza-khtenge’s interest in the Joint Enterprise. Although it is possible that Tenge Development would have approved Plaintiffs’ purchase of either or both of the Taiwanese Company’s or Tenge Development’s interests in Kazakhtenge, or Kaza-khtenge’s interest in the Joint Enterprise, the evidence does not show a reasonable certainty that any such approval would have been obtained. Brickhill’s testimony that the transaction would have occurred is speculative and based on an irrelevant document, the e-mail from Tresca. See Szczepanik, 888 S.W.2d at 650 (holding evidence company could have expected to retain accounts for lifetime of accounthold-ers lacked evidentiary foundation and was speculative, as part of plaintiffs lost-profits damage model). Financing and Maintaining of Plaintiffs’ Ownership Interest in Kazakhtenge Even if Tenge Development had approved Plaintiffs’ acquisition of the Kaza-khtenge members’ interests, Plaintiffs still would have had to finance the purchase of these interests and then finance the development of the Tenge Field under Schae-fer’s production plan. Brickhill testified that, even though Central Asia paid $2 million in cash at closing plus future conditional payments, he believed that Plaintiffs could have purchased the interests of the Kazakhtenge members for only $220,000 in cash at closing plus future conditional payments. Brickhill based this belief on a November 29, 1999 offer from Van Dyke on these terms. Although that offer was rejected, Brickhill believed it was later accepted, a belief based solely on the February 8, 2000 e-mail from Tresca to Henk-el. However, at most, this e-mail details an alleged statement by Mingson Juang of the Taiwanese Company that the Taiwanese Company had set a minimum “level of payments” based on an earlier offer from Van Dyke and that Central Asia’s current offer did not meet that minimum. It does not state that the Taiwanese Company had accepted an offer from Van Dyke or any of his companies, nor does it specify whether the “level of payments” refers to cash to be paid at closing or to future conditional payments. The e-mail also does not specify the Van Dyke offer to which the Taiwanese Company refers, and it does not state that the offer’s “level of payments” was $220,000. Even presuming that Plaintiffs could have bought out the Kazakhtenge members for $220,000 in cash at closing plus future conditional payments, Plaintiffs would have had to pay $220,000 plus the initial $14 million that Brickhill testified would be needed to begin operations under Schaefer’s production plan. The evidence at trial showed that Plaintiffs did not have significant cash on hand. Regarding the owners, Van Dyke and his mother, Plaintiffs stipulated that “[f]rom and after January 1, 1997, [Van Dyke] and [Van Dyke’s mother] did not have sufficient personal cash, funds, equity, money, or similar financial resources, or any other form of cash, funds, equity[,] money, or similar financial resources under their possession, custody, control, to purchase, finance, or acquire any additional interest in the Tenge Field or to fund the exploration, development, or further financing of the Tenge Field.” Therefore, Plaintiffs would have had to obtain these funds from third parties other than Van Dyke and his mother. Brickhill did not count on any funds coming from Plaintiffs, Van Dyke, or Van Dyke’s mother. Rather, Brickhill testified that, to finance the acquisition of the Kaza-khtenge members’ interests and the development of the Tenge Field, Plaintiffs would have had to obtain financing from “new investors.” Brickhill anticipated that Shell, Citibank, Lukoil, or Van Dyke’s brother-in-law would provide this “new investor” financing. Although he used the term “new investors,” Brickhill’s damage model is based on Plaintiffs’ owning all of the equity in Kazakhtenge, and Brickhill testified that the “new investors” would not own a percentage of the company. Instead, Brickhill calculated that, for the entire nineteen-year term, Plaintiffs would pay a total of $447.5 million dollars to have access to $140 to $200 million of financing. Brickhill testified that he was being conservative and that $140 to $200 million is far in excess of the amount of outside financing that would have been required. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that he had not seen a contract containing a binding commitment from any source to make funds available to Plaintiffs to purchase the interests of the Kazakhtenge members. Although Brickhill was not aware of any loan commitments to lend Van Dyke $14 million to start production, he stated he had seen indications that Citibank, Shell, or Lukoil would lend these funds to Van Dyke. Brickhill did not explain why he believed these entities would lend Plaintiffs this money; however, he stated that he was not surprised that no formal loan commitment had been made because Plaintiffs never bought the interests of the Ka-zakhtenge members and it would have been premature to obtain a commitment until these interests had been purchased. The evidence shows that, as of the time period in question, approximately $16 million had been invested in the Tenge Field with no profit. The evidence also shows that Van Dyke unsuccessfully sought loans from Shell, Texaco, and Citibank to accelerate production of the Tenge Field. In the factual context reflected by the trial record, it was speculative for Brickhill to conclude that Plaintiffs would have obtained $14.22 million in financing to purchase the Kazakhtenge interests and start production under Schaefer’s production plan. Likewise, it was speculative for Brickhill to conclude that Plaintiffs could have obtained this funding without giving any equity in Kazakhtenge to the lender (s). Moreover, even if an entity would have advanced $14.22 million to Plaintiffs without receiving an equity stake in the company, Brickhill’s damage model also presumes that either (1) the lending entity would not have required Plaintiffs to pledge their interest in Kazakhtenge as collateral to secure the loan; or (2) if the lending entity did so require, no event of default would have occurred that would have resulted in Plaintiffs’ loss of their interest in and right to receive profits from Kazakhtenge. Additionally, Brick-hill set the costs of obtaining financing at 25% of Kazakhtenge’s share of the field income, but did not explain the basis for this determination. The evidence at trial that Plaintiffs would have obtained sufficient financing to acquire the interests of the Kazakhtenge members and to commence operations under Schaefer’s production plan is speculative and not reasonably certain. See Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 650 (holding evidence that was part of plaintiffs lost-profits damage model lacked evidentiary foundation and was speculative); see also United Way of San Antonio v. Helping Hands Lifeline Found., Inc., 949 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (holding evidence of damages speculative and insufficient as a matter of law because it was based on the mere hope for funding renewable at the discretion of another party). Productivity and Proñtability of the Tenge Field Brickhill relied on Schaefer’s opinions as to how much oil and gas Plaintiffs could recover from the Tenge Field. Schaefer testified that, under his production plan using 96 wells, the Tenge Field would produce 137.9 million barrels of oil and 911 billion cubic feet of gas over a nineteen-year period. Schaefer also testified as follows: • He is “pretty certain” that his projections reflect what would be produced under his plan. On a certainty scale of one to ten, Schaefer is about an “eight” as far as certainty. • In his opinion, it is not speculative that 19% of the oil in the Tenge Field can be produced over this nineteen-year period. • He used generally accepted mathematical techniques and formulas to calculate the amount of oil to be produced. • There has never been any oil commercially produced from the Tenge Field. • In making his calculations, he did not use the production history for oil from the Tenge Field because there is no production history, just test data. • Well 109 was drilled in 1974 and then reentered in 1997 and “tested.” • He did not use the production rates from the well 109 test data in making his calculations. • The other well test achieved bad results, and well 109 initially produced oil at a stable rate for several months and then stopped producing in September 1997. Since then, to his knowledge, well 109 has never been back in production. • The data from Central Asia’s attempts to develop the Tenge Field was not available to him, and he did not know “what is going on in the Tenge Field.” • Most, if not all, of the reserves in the Tenge Field would not be categorized as proved reserves. Brickhill testified as follows: • Although AD Tenge has never had a dollar’s worth of income since its inception and AD International has never had more than negligible income in its twelve to thirteen years of existence, there is no question that the operator of the Tenge Field will be able to profitably sell gas starting in 2010. • Briekhill’s team did not base its projections of oil production on the actual amount of oil produced from the Tenge Field in 2001 and 2002, although it had estimates of actual oil production for those years. • Brickhill did not take into account in projecting the Tenge Field’s future production what the history of oil production had been because Brickhill believes the past performance is irrelevant. • Approximately three wells were worked over from 1990 to 2000 in the Tenge Field but Brickhill did not remember what happened to them, and he did not make an independent investigation to determine what happened to them. “That is not [his] area.” • Brickhill was not aware of any profit from the sale of oil in the Tenge Field at any time. • The only profits from the sale of gas in the Tenge Field that Brickhill was aware of is “the Communist sense of profits, ... and the Communists don’t measure profits in dollars and cents the way we do.... ” • Brickhill was not aware of any cash flow from the sale of gas from the Tenge Field at any time. Brickhill had not seen any executed contracts for the sale of oil or gas from the Tenge Field, and, to his knowledge, no such contracts exist. Gas has not been sold from the Tenge Field. • Although there has not been a commercial market for gas from the Tenge Field in the past, there is now. • The only wells that Brickhill was aware of in the Tenge Field that were worked by Kazakhtenge are well 25 and well 109. No production was possible in well 25 because it was blocked by tools that had been left in the hole. Well 109 produced some oil but is no longer producing oil. We presume that Schaefer applied generally accepted mathematical techniques and formulas to the geological information available to him to calculate the oil and gas in place and the amount of oil and gas that would be recoverable under his 96-well production plan. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ damage model is dependent upon production from the oil wells at the beginning of the plan to fund future development. This factor, combined with the significant financing that would have been necessary to acquire the Kazakhtenge interests and to fund the initial attempts to produce oil, would make production from the initial wells crucial to the success of Plaintiffs’ undertaking. However, in calculating Plaintiffs’ lost profits, Schaefer and Brick-hill did not quantify the risk of failure to produce in this early stage of development. Schaefer predicted a prolific and profitable field; however, he did not take into account the history of no commercial oil production from the field, the absence of oil production from well 25, and the lack of significant oil production from well 109. Brickhill stated that he did not take the history of oil production into account in projecting the Tenge Field’s future production because he believes the past production is irrelevant. Likewise, Brickhill predicted Plaintiffs could market 911 billion cubic feet of gas from 2010 to 2018, even though he admitted that, although the Soviets distributed gas from the Tenge Field among their citizens free of charge, no gas from the Tenge Field had ever been sold. Schaefer testified that most, if not all, of the reserves in the Tenge Field would not be categorized as proved reserves. The failure of the Plaintiffs’ damage model to take into account the important historical data from the field also renders their damage calculations uncertain and speculative. See Capital Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cen. of Tenn. Ry. & Nav. Co., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 573, 578-82 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (holding there was no evidence to prove lost profits with reasonable certainty because expert’s testimony was based on unfounded assumptions rather than objective facts or historical profitability); Aquila Sw. Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Explor., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 246 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (holding petroleum engineer’s evidence of lost profits to two oil and gas wells was speculative where witness did not base his calculations on evidence of the historical profitability of the wells in question). Reliance on Calculations by Halliburton and Rameo Oil At trial and on appeal, Plaintiffs have focused on calculations by Halliburton and Rameo Oil that the Tenge Field would be productive and profitable. These calculations include production projections that, although different in some respects, are similar to Schaefer’s projections regarding the total amount of projected production. Plaintiffs assert, and Brickhill and Schaefer testified, that these calculations confirm that their projections are conservative, correct, and reasonably certain. However, Halliburton and Rameo Oil created these calculations for their own use in analyzing their prospective business opportunities. They did not submit or test these calculations in litigation for the purpose of recovering lost profits on a breach-of-contract claim. Companies are free to create speculative, optimistic, and conjectural projections and to rely upon them in making business decisions. However, the mere existence of similar projections created by a company other than the plaintiff, even by a defendant in the breach-of-contract action, does not obviate the need for courts to apply the “reasonable certainty” test, nor does it indicate conformity with this legal standard. See Tex. Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at 280 (rejecting plaintiffs strenuous argument that projections must be reasonably certain proof of lost profits because even the defendant — Texas Instruments, Inc. — believed they were reasonable when they were made). The fact that Halliburton and the Rameo Parties at one time may have shared Plaintiffs’ hopes regarding the Tenge Field does not add any substance to Plaintiffs’ proof of lost profits. See id. Conclusory Statements Schaefer and Brickhill made several statements that their calculations were “conservative,” “reasonable,” “not speculative,” “based on reality,” or “based on facts.” At various times, Brickhill and Schaefer stated that they were “reasonably certain” about their projections. These conclusory and self-serving statements by the experts describing their own analysis do not affect this court’s need to conduct an independent review of the ree-ord to determine if the evidence satisfies the “reasonable certainty” test. See, e.g., Aguila Sw. Pipeline, Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 246 (holding petroleum engineer’s evidence of lost profits to two oil and gas wells was speculative, even though expert used standard methodologies in his calculations and testified that his calculations of lost profits were conservative). The One-Percent Solution Plaintiffs’ damage model showed that they suffered $640 million in lost profits. Although this lost-profits model was the same for both Halliburton and the Rameo Parties, the jury found Plaintiffs had sustained $64 million in lost profits as to Halliburton and $6.4 million in lost profits as to the Rameo Parties. Plaintiffs assert on appeal that any error regarding their lost-profits evidence is harmless because, by reducing their calculation of lost profits by ninety-nine percent, the jury “has wrung out of the verdict any speculation.” Plaintiffs argue that “[w]hen the jury award against [the Rameo Parties] is only one percent of what the experts calculated, Plaintiffs should not be put in the position of having to justify the experts’ actual figures.” Texas jurisprudence on lost profits does not support this proposition. The two cases cited by Plaintiffs are not on point. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument overlooks the possibility that there may have been no profits at all, if, for example, Plaintiffs could not have garnered the necessary approval to acquire the Kaza-khtenge interests or obtained sufficient financing to purchase them. Furthermore, if there is no evidence proving lost profits with reasonable certainty, the trial court must render a take-nothing judgment as to lost-profits damages; it cannot simply reduce the amount of lost-profits damages or endorse a formulaic reduction of these damages by the jury. See, e.g., Tex. Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at 281 (concluding there was no evidence to prove lost profits with reasonable certainty and affirming trial court’s order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the lost-profits damages). For these additional reasons, Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. Summary Schaefer testified that developing the Tenge Field is a “technical challenge” and demands “a particular sophisticated oil company expertise.” Nonetheless, he conceded that, to his knowledge, Van Dyke does not have any experience operating oil fields. According to Brickhill, this lack of experience is irrelevant because Van Dyke could have hired others to operate the field. He testified that $14.22 million would have been needed to purchase the Kazakhtenge interests and to begin production in the Tenge Field. Although Plaintiffs and Van Dyke had little cash on hand that would have been available for investment in the Tenge Field, Brickhill testified that Plaintiffs could have obtained financing from a third-party lender. This lender, according to Brickhill’s calculations, would not have required an equity position in Kazakhtenge and either would not have required Plaintiffs to pledge their interest in Kazakhtenge or would