Full opinion text
OPINION G. ALAN WALDROP, Justice. In these pretrial proceedings, James W. Ellis and John Dominick Colyandro seek the dismissal of indictments accusing them of accepting unlawful campaign contributions and money laundering. They argue that the election code provisions under which they have been indicted are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the money laundering statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense is unconstitutionally vague. The trial court denied relief and these appeals followed. We affirm the orders of the district court. The Indictments Ellis and Colyandro were first indicted in September 2004 on charges of unlawful acceptance of corporate political contributions (Colyandro only) and money laundering (Ellis and Colyandro). Collectively, the indictments accuse Ellis and Colyandro of participating in a scheme to channel unlawful corporate political contributions to candidates for the Texas House of Representatives in 2002 in violation of the Texas Election Code. Thirteen of the indictments pending against Colyandro allege that on various dates throughout 2002, Colyandro knowingly accepted political contributions from certain business corporations to a political committee called Texans for a Republican Majority PAC (TRMPAC) that Colyandro knew to have been made in violation of the election code. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.003 (West 2003); see also id. § 253.094 (West 2003). The remaining indictments alleged that on or about September 13, 2002, Ellis and Colyandro knowingly conducted and facilitated a transaction involving the proceeds of activity that violated section 253.094 of the election code, and that the value of the funds was $100,000 or more. See Act of May 26, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 761, § 2, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2966, 2967 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02 (West Supp.2008)) (money laundering); Tex. Elee.Code Ann. § 253.094 (prohibited contributions). The indictments state that six named corporations gave unlawful contributions totaling $155,000 to TRMPAC, that Ellis and Co-lyandro delivered these corporate contributions to the Republican National State Elections Committee in the form of a check for $190,000 drawn on a TRMPAC account and signed by Colyandro, and that the national committee then made contributions totaling $190,000 to a list of Texas house candidates suggested by Ellis. The $190,000 check to the Republican National State Elections Committee was expressly made part of and reproduced in the September 2004 money laundering indictments. Ellis and Colyandro were reindicted in July 2005. The new indictments alleged that Ellis and Colyandro knowingly facilitated a transaction involving the proceeds of activity violating sections 253.003 and 253.094 of the election code, and that the value of the funds was $100,000 or more. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.003 (unlawfully making or accepting contribution) and Act of May 26, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 761, § 2, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2966, 2967 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02) (money laundering). The allegations in the new indictments are essentially the same as those contained in the first set of indictments with the exception that the new indictments do not allege that the transfer of $190,000 from TRMPAC to the national committee was made by check and do not incorporate the check as part of the indictments. The original indictments were not dismissed, and both sets of indictments are pending. Ellis and Colyandro petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking dismissal of the original prosecutions on the basis that election code section 253.094 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (criminal defendant may use pretrial habeas corpus to challenge facial constitutionality of statute he is accused of violating); Ex parte Mat-tox, 683 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984), affd, 685 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (same). After they were reindicted, Ellis and Colyandro filed additional habeas corpus petitions, seeking dismissal of the new prosecutions on the basis that election code sections 253.003 and 253.094 are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the money laundering statute under which they were indicted is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied relief. Election Code Provisions Ellis and Colyandro seek dismissal of both sets of indictments arguing that sections 253.003 and 253.094 of the election code are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on their face. They argue that these sections are vague and overbroad because the statutory definition of “campaign contribution” is “insufficiently tailored and precise to avoid criminalizing protected conduct or chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights.” More specifically, Ellis and Colyandro point to the portion of the definition of “campaign contribution” providing that the contribution be “offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign” as too imprecise to give constitutionally adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited as well as criminalizing conduct that comes within the protections of the First Amendment right to free speech. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). A criminal law must be sufficiently clear in at least three respects: (1) a person of ordinary intelligence must be given a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; (2) the law must establish determinate guidelines for law enforcement; and (3) where First Amendment freedoms are implicated, the law must be sufficiently definite to avoid chilling protected expression. Id. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294; Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). When a vagueness challenge involves First Amendment considerations, a criminal law may be held facially invalid even though it may not be unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s conduct. Long, 931 S.W.2d at 288. Ellis and Colyandro argue that the election code provisions relating to corporate campaign contributions run afoul of all three requirements because of the indefiniteness inherent in the prohibition of contributions that are “given with the intent” that they be used “in connection with a campaign.” To place Ellis and Colyandro’s complaints in context, some background is necessary as to how the rather complicated Texas Election Code structure attempts to regulate political contributions. Chapter 253 of the election code regulates political contributions and expenditures in Texas. It is an offense for a person to “knowingly make a political contribution in violation of this chapter” or to “knowingly accept a political contribution the person knows to have been made in violation of this chapter.” Tex. Elee.Code Ann. § 253.003(a), (b). Ellis and Colyandro are accused of accepting unlawful corporate campaign contributions made in violation of election code sections 253.003 and 253.094. Subchapter D of chapter 253 governs political contributions and expenditures by corporations and labor organizations. “A corporation or labor organization may not make a political contribution or political expenditure that is not authorized by this subchapter.” Id. § 253.094(a). Subchap-ter D specifically authorizes a corporation to “make campaign contributions from its own property in connection with an election on a measure only to a political committee for supporting or opposing measures exclusively,” id. § 253.096 (West 2003), and “to finance the establishment or administration of a general-purpose committee” or “to finance the solicitation of political contributions to a general-purpose committee” from the corporation’s stockholders, employees, or families, id. § 253.100(a), (b) (West Supp.2008). Other political contributions or political expenditures specifically authorized by subchapter D include: direct expenditures “in connection with an election on a measure,” id. § 253.097 (West 2003), direct expenditures “for the purpose of communicating directly with [the corporation’s] stockholders or members,” id. § 253.098 (West 2003), and “expenditures to finance nonpartisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns aimed at its stockholders or members,” id. § 253.099 (West 2003). Thus, with the exception of the enumerated types of contributions and expenditures expressly authorized, all other “campaign contributions” and “expenditures” by corporations are prohibited. Although the election code sets out distinctions between authorized and unauthorized (i.e., criminal) contributions, Ellis and Colyandro contend that the provisions are too vague for “a person of ordinary intelligence” to determine what conduct is authorized and what conduct is prohibited. Ellis and Colyandro also argue that the statutory definitions of unauthorized conduct are unconstitutionally overbroad because they necessarily prohibit a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct in all applications. Ellis and Colyandro’s argument that section 253.094 — and by extension, section 253.003 — is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad focuses on the definitions of “political contribution” and “campaign contribution.” The election code defines “political contribution” as “a campaign contribution or an officeholder contribution.” Id. § 251.001(5) (West Supp.2008). A “campaign contribution” is “a contribution to a candidate or political committee that is offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for elective office or on a measure.” Id. § 251.001(3). Under the statutory structure, a “campaign contribution” is a type of “political contribution,” but the parties agree that, for purposes of this case, the two terms are effectively interchangeable. A “contribution,” in turn, is defined as “a direct or indirect transfer of money, goods, services, or any other thing of value and includes an agreement made or other obligation incurred, whether legally enforceable or not, to make a transfer.” Id. § 251.001(2). As a corollary, an “expenditure” is “a payment of money or any other thing of value and includes an agreement made or other obligation incurred, whether legally enforceable or not, to make a payment.” Id. § 251.001(6). Similar to the statutory structure for contributions, a “political expenditure” is defined as either a “campaign expenditure” or “officeholder expenditure,” with a “campaign expenditure” further defined as “an expenditure made by any person in connection with a campaign for an elective office or on a measure.” Id. § 251.001(7), (10). Thus, both campaign contributions and campaign expenditures are characterized by a payment or transfer of money or other thing of value with campaign contributions being distinguished by (1) the nature of the recipient (a candidate or political committee, as opposed to someone else), and (2) the contributor’s intent that the recipient of the contribution use it in connection with an election (as opposed to its simply being made “in connection with an election”). The definitions of campaign expenditure and campaign contribution overlap to an extent, as indicated by the election code’s definition of a “direct campaign expenditure” as a “campaign expenditure that does not constitute a campaign contribution by the person making the expenditure.” Id. § 251.001(8). As these myriad definitions suggest, whether a payment or transfer of anything of value falls within the prohibitions of the election code turns largely on the meaning of the phrase “in connection with a campaign for elective office.” An expenditure that is made “in connection with” a campaign is a regulated “campaign expenditure;” otherwise, it is not regulated. Similarly, if an expenditure can be construed as a direct or indirect transfer of a thing of value to a candidate or political committee with the intent that it be used “in connection with” a campaign, it is a regulated “campaign contribution.” Conversely, as the State acknowledges, a payment or transfer to a candidate or political committee is not a “political contribution” — and therefore, not regulated by the election code at all — if it is not “offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for elective office or on a measure.” This statutory demarcation of what constitutes acceptable as opposed to criminal conduct with respect to giving money to organizations that engage in the political process — relying as it does on a contributor’s intent and on the troublesome phrase “in connection with” a campaign — is the primary focus of Ellis and Colyandro’s overbreadth and vagueness challenges. As Ellis and Colyandro observe, a “political committee” is defined as “a group of persons that has as a principal purpose accepting political contributions or making political expenditures.” Id. § 251.001(12) (emphasis added). The legislature contemplated that an entity constituting a political committee may have one or more principal purposes other than accepting political contributions and making political expenditures. See id. § 251.001(13) (“specific-purpose committee ... does have among its principal purposes .... ”), (14) (“general-purpose committee ... has among its principal purposes ....”) (emphases added). Consistent with this statutory language, the Texas Ethics Commission has recognized that an entity constituting a political committee may have purposes or activities other than those subjecting it to regulation under Title 15 of the election code. See Op. Tex. Ethics Comm’n No. 131 (1993) (“Title 15 ... regulates a political committee’s activities that have to do with accepting political contributions and making political expenditures. It does not regulate other activities of political committees.”); Op. Tex. Ethics Comm’n No. 200 (1994) (same); Op. Tex. Ethics Comm’n No. 168 (1993) (“[A] general-purpose committee may have other purposes besides accepting political contributions and making political expenditures.”). Therefore, not all contributions to or expenditures by a political committee are regulated by the election code. Examples include contributions to political committees to “be used to hire lobbyists to influence legislators in regard to legislation” and grassroots advocacy “to supporters suggesting they write legislators,” id. No. 131; contributions for use in “forums” (if not “given with the intent that they be used to support or oppose a candidate for election to a public office”), id. No. 168; contributions for use in conducting a seminar to educate women “on the topic of developing positive influencing skills,” id. No. 200; contributions to fund a scholarship (as long as the committee’s expenditures in connection with the scholarship fund are not made in connection with a campaign for elective office or a measure or for officeholder purposes), id. No. 409 (1998); or contributions to cover a lobbyist’s own travel, food, and lodging in attending a political fundraiser golf tournament, id. No. 467 (2006). Emphasizing this aspect of the statutory scheme, Ellis and Colyandro argue that where an entity or association constituting a political committee also engages in lobbying, grassroots advocacy, or expressing its views on general issues of policy or public concern, such activities could easily be characterized as “in connection with” a campaign whenever they bear some resemblance to issues arising in a candidate’s campaign — whether the resemblance is intentional or purely coincidental. In such a context, Ellis and Colyandro argue, the line between an unregulated payment to a political committee and a regulated “contribution ... that is offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for elective office” fails to give potential contributors and potential “acceptors” constitutionally adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and gives law enforcement officers no clear guidelines for enforcing the election laws. This potential difficulty with knowing whether specific conduct will have criminal implications under the election code, Ellis and Colyandro maintain, chills constitutionally protected expression and necessarily brings within the coverage of the election code’s criminal provisions a substantial amount of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo and Progeny In support of their facial challenge to the Texas restriction on corporate campaign contributions, Ellis and Colyan-dro point to parallels in First Amendment jurisprudence regarding regulation of campaign expenditures. In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court considered constitutional challenges to various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), including a ceiling on campaign expenditures by individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U.S. 1, 39, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Although recognizing various government interests in regulating campaign finance, the Court emphasized that “[c]lose examination of the specificity of the statutory language is required where, as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First Amendment interests.” Id. at 40-41, 96 S.Ct. 612. Concluding that “[t]he use of so indefinite a phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech,” the Court construed the phrase in context with other provisions to “permit, if indeed ... not require, [it] to be read to mean ‘advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” Id. at 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, the Court reasoned, merely tying “relative to” to “advocating the election or defeat of a candidate” did not eliminate the vagueness problem: For the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest. In an analogous context, this Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945), observed: ‘[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of invitation would miss that mark is a question both of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such circumstances, safely could assume that anything he might say upon the general subject would not be understood by some as an invitation. In short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning. ‘Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim.’ Id. at 535, 65 S.Ct. 315. 424 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 612. To address constitutional vagueness concerns, the Court held that the statute “must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 43^4, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such “express terms” would include, the court suggested, those such as “ ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’ ” Id. at 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. The United States Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this “express advocacy” doctrine, construing similar regulations of campaign expenditures to apply only to the types of “explicit terms” noted in Buckley in an effort to articulate a discernible and enforceable line between permissible regulation of speech versus protected issue advocacy unrelated to (or only tangentially related to) the election or defeat of a specific candidate. The Court reaffirmed the “express advocacy” doctrine in its latest pronouncement on the subject of First Amendment protection of political speech in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, -, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2665, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007). The Texas Supreme Court has also applied the express advocacy doctrine in upholding the election code’s reporting requirements for direct campaign expenditures under a construction that limits their application only to the type of express advocacy outlined in Buckley. Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex.2000); see Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.062(a)(1) (West 2003). Citing Buckley, the Texas Supreme Court held that the election code’s definition of “campaign expenditure” as an expenditure “in connection with a campaign for elective office” was unconstitutionally vague for the same reasons that the phrase “relative to a clearly identified candidate” was found problematic in Buckley. Osterberg, 12 S.W.3d at 51; see Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(7). The Court wrote, “Applied to an individual making expenditures, the Texas Election Code is vulnerable to the same constitutional attacks that Buckley’s narrowing construction avoided.” Osterberg, 12 S.W.3d at 51. To avoid “constitutional infirmities,” the Texas Supreme Court followed the Buckley court’s approach and held that “a ‘direct campaign expenditure’ by an individual in a candidate election includes only those expenditures that ‘expressly advocate’ the election or defeat of an identified candidate.” Oster-berg, 12 S.W.3d at 51. Ellis and Colyandro assert that the phrase “in connection with a campaign for elective office” in the election code’s definition of “campaign contribution” is even less precise than the phrase “relative to a clearly identified candidate” found wanting in Buckley with respect to political expenditures, and equally as problematic as the exact same language found wanting in Ost-erberg with respect to campaign expenditures. Ellis and Colyandro argue that, at a minimum, we must apply the “express advocacy” limiting construction of Buckley and Osterberg to the election code’s definition of “campaign contribution” to address the potential chilling of pure issue advocacy, lobbying, or other protected speech unrelated to candidates that is expressed by contributing to entities that participate in the political process and either are or may constitute political committees. In other words, Ellis and Colyandro argue that “campaign contribution” under the election code must be construed, at least with regard to contributions to political committees, as a contribution that is offered or given with the intent that it be used for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate (e.g., “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” etc.). As a necessary corollary, the limitation would also define the scope of what is prohibited as a corporate campaign contribution under section 253.094. Ellis and Colyandro then posit that, while the reporting requirements upheld in Osterberg could be saved with the overlay of an “express advocacy” limiting construction, the campaign contribution prohibition of section 253.094 cannot be saved in a similar way because it involves criminal penalties that strike at core First Amendment rights. Even with an “express advocacy” limiting construction applied to the statute, Ellis and Colyandro argue, it is too vague to avoid chilling a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech because of the severity of the consequences if it turns out the contributor is wrong in his calculation of whether a fact finder will conclude that the contribution was made with the intention that it be used to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Corporate First Amendment Rights The State counters that the election code’s restrictions on corporate campaign contributions and expenditures do not implicate any First Amendment interests— and we should apply only a “rational basis” test in our constitutional review as opposed to a higher standard of scrutiny— because “corporations have no constitutional rights independent of the rights of the individuals who comprise them.” However, this is inconsistent with the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the constitutional rights of corporations. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny when analyzing Michigan ban on corporate independent expenditures in candidate elections; “[t]he mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment.”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 777-84, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (acknowledging “a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public interest” and invalidating restriction on corporate contributions in constitutional amendment election); see also Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 6 S.Ct. 1132, 30 L.Ed. 118 (1886) (Privileges and Immunities clause extends to corporations). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that corporations enjoy First Amendment free speech protections. In Bellotti for example, the court struck down a Massachusetts statute under a strict scrutiny analysis that prohibited corporations from making expenditures in a referendum election unless they could prove a material effect on their businesses or property. The Court noted: [Tjhere is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual. Bellotti 435 U.S. at 776-77, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. For Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (invalidating limits on corporate contributions to political committee established to oppose ballot measures); see also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (acknowledging corporations’ First Amendment right to petition legislative and administrative bodies); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961) (same). In addition, to prevent potential chilling of protected expressive activity, the court has applied the express advocacy limiting construction of Buckley to statutes regulating direct campaign expenditures by corporations. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2666-67; Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 248-49, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (applying express advocacy doctrine to regulation of corporate independent expenditures “in connection with” any federal election). This same analysis has been applied by the Texas Ethics Commission to the prohibition against corporate political expenditures in section 294.094. Op. Tex. Ethics Comm’n No. 198 (1994); see Osterberg, 12 S.W.3d at 51 (placing “great weight” on Texas Ethics Commission Opinion No. 198). Contributions v. Expenditures The State also asserts that even if corporations possess First Amendment rights, the election code’s prohibitions against corporate campaign contributions are nonetheless justified by legitimate, if not compelling, state interests and are neither unconstitutionally vague nor over-broad. The State correctly observes that the United States Supreme Court has viewed statutes regulating campaign contributions to implicate lesser First Amendment interests than those of campaign expenditures. The Court has viewed limitations on expenditures as tantamount to a direct restraint on speech and as endangering the ability of groups “from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-22, 96 S.Ct. 612. Therefore, the Court has analyzed restrictions on expenditures under strict scrutiny. Id. at 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“[T]he constitutionality of [a restriction on expenditures] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to the limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.”). In contrast, the Court has viewed limitations on contributions as lesser impositions on speech and associational rights, and has applied a lower level of scrutiny to statutes implementing limitations on contributions. Id. at 20-27, 96 S.Ct. 612. In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase “relative to a clearly identified candidate” was unconstitutionally vague with respect to expenditures. The Buckley court’s discussion of First Amendment free speech issues with regard to campaign expenditures is instructive as to why the vagueness argument does not apply — under the Court’s currently accepted jurisprudence — with equal force to campaign contributions. According to the Court, the language at issue — “relative to a clearly identified candidate” — was vague because there was nothing else in the statute clarifying what expenditures are “relative to” a candidate and the use of such an “indefinite” phrase “fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech.” Id. at 41, 96 S.Ct. 612. This is so because the limits on political expenditures “place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of’ the speakers themselves to express their political views— “the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.” Id. at 58-59, 96 S.Ct. 612. On the other hand, according to the Buckley court, a limitation on campaign contributions involves little direct restraint on speakers or on persons and entities that ultimately turn contributions into a published message. Id. at 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612. With regard to campaign contributions, the Court wrote: By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor. Id. Therefore, under the Court’s current rationale, a potential campaign contributor need not determine whether the manner in which his funds are spent is constitutionally permissible. The contributor need not determine, for example, whether an expenditure on an advertisement expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. The contributor gives funds, and the funds are transformed into political expression by someone else. It is the person making the expenditures or transforming the contributed funds into speech, not the contributor, who must be concerned with the vagueness of restrictions on the use of the funds. The concerns of the Court set out in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945), and quoted in Buckley as to speakers “hedging and trimming” their speech due to potential and unknown liability do not — under the Court’s precedent — apply with the same force to the contributor, who is not directly involved in transforming funds into political speech. The Court’s distinction between contributions and expenditures is also evident in the discussion in Buckley of FECA’s requirement that persons report contributions and expenditures made “for the purpose of ... influencing” the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74-77, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court held that, as applied to expenditures, this definition was unconstitutionally vague for the same reason that the limitation on direct expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate” was vague. To cure this deficiency so that the reach of the reporting requirement would not be impermissibly broad, the Court held that the reporting requirement applied only to expenditures “used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, the Court held that the reporting requirement for contributions made “for the purpose of ... influencing” a candidate election was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, finding that it bore “a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act.” Id. at 78, 96 S.Ct. 612. In cases that more directly address limitations on campaign contributions as opposed to campaign expenditures, the Court has consistently deferred to congressional enactments limiting political campaign contributions. The Court has recently stated that its treatment of restrictions on contributions reflects “the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms ... [and] the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits — interests in preventing ‘both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.’ ” McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Edüd 364 (1982)); accord Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. at 2665. The McConnell court added: [W]hen reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words “strict scrutiny.” The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court’s deference to Congress with regard to limits on political contributions is even greater with respect to corporate political contributions, and is manifest in its treatment of federal laws governing corporate political activity. It is a federal offense for “any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain federal elections, and for “any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.” 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(a) (2005). This statute, first enacted in 1907, grew out of “popular feeling that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption.” United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957). The Court recently observed that “[a]ny attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to curb corporations’ potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections,’ which we have canvassed a number of times before.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152,123 S.Ct. 2200,156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 585, 77 S.Ct. 529). After surveying the history of federal regulation of corporate campaign contributions and its opinions dealing with that regulation, the Beaumont Court wrote: As these excerpts from recent opinions show, not only has the original ban on direct corporate contributions endured, but so have the original rationales for the law. In barring corporate earnings from conversion into political “war chests,” the ban was and is intended to “prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.” But the ban has always done further duty in protecting “the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests of contributors and owners, however, another reason for regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged with restrictions on individual contributions, and recent cases have recognized that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for “circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.” To the degree that a corporation could contribute to political candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it, or whom it employs,” could exceed the bounds imposed on their own contributions by diverting money through the corporation. As we said on the subject of limiting coordinated expenditures by political parties, experience “demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law, and it shows beyond serious doubt how contribution limits would be eroded if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced.” In sum, our cases on campaign finance regulation represent respect for the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.” And we have understood that such deference to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages. As we said in [Federal Election Com’n v.] Colorado Republican [Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001)], “limits on contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political corruption than limits on other kinds of ... political spending are (corruption being understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence).” Id. at 154-55, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (citations omitted). The Beaumont Court held that applying the federal prohibition on direct corporate contributions to nonprofit advocacy corporations did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 149, 123 S.Ct. 2200. The United States Supreme Court has also affirmed the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting corporate political contributions and expenditures. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibits corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections, but exempts from this general prohibition expenditures made from a segregated fund created specifically for this purpose. Id. at 655-56, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The issue before the Court was the act’s ban on independent expenditures “in assistance of, or in opposition to, the nomination or election of a candidate.” Id. at 658, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The Court upheld the restrictions in the statute, holding that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.” Id. at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Reaffirming its view of restrictions on corporate political activity, the Court found that the Michigan statute is “targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending while also allowing corporations to express their political views” through the use of separate, segregated funds. Id. The Court rejected the Chamber’s argument that the act was overbroad because it applied to closely held corporations that do not possess vast reservoirs of capital, holding that “the potential for distorting the political process” justified the general application of the statute to all corporations. Id. at 661, 110 S.Ct. 1391. More recently, the Court has held that a nonprofit, nonstock, ideological advocacy corporation cannot constitutionally be prohibited by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 from spending its treasury funds to engage in “issue advocacy,” that is, the publication of ads on public policy issues that did not expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2673. The Court reaffirmed, in a somewhat fractured set of opinions, the Buckley express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction with respect to expenditures and applied it to a corporate entity making direct expenditures to participate in “issue advocacy.” With this backdrop of constitutional jurisprudence, we turn to a review of the Texas election code provisions at issue. Level of Constitutional Review As to whether the election code’s restrictions on corporate campaign contributions are subject to strict scrutiny or must only satisfy a less rigorous test such as being “closely drawn” to meet a “sufficiently important interest” or being “carefully tailored to meet reasonable legislative objectives in curtailing corruption in the political process,” we are guided by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The Court has regularly and consistently deferred to legislative judgment on restrictions of corporate campaign contributions, explaining that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.” Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200. The Court has also regularly upheld such restrictions if they are “closely drawn” to meet a “sufficiently important interest.” Id. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. In light of binding United States Supreme Court precedent noted above and the currently applicable rationale of Buckley v. Valeo regarding the constitutional distinction between political expenditures and political contributions, we hold that the Texas Election Code’s broad restrictions on the making and accepting of corporate campaign contributions — that is, contributions of corporate funds to candidates and political committees intended for use in connection with campaigns for elective office — is not subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, but a less rigorous standard as articulated in Buckley, Beaumont, and McConnell that the restrictions be “closely drawn” or “narrowly tailored” to meet a “sufficiently important interest.” Overbreadth In determining whether the challenged election code provisions are uneon-stitutional, we start with the presumption that the statute is valid and that the legislature acted in a constitutionally sound fashion. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). We will uphold the statute if it can be reasonably construed in a manner that will render it constitutional and carry out legislative intent. Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Ellis and Colyandro’s overbreadth argument is straightforward. They start from the proposition that Buckley prohibits the legislature from restricting issue advocacy, and then argue that, since the statutory phrase “in connection with a campaign for elective office” as used in the election code with respect to corporate contributions is broad enough to encompass issue advocacy, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. However, as we have noted, controlling United States Supreme Court precedent has not drawn the express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction for corporate political contributions, nor has the Court applied strict scrutiny to statutory restrictions on corporate political contributions. The Court has consistently upheld restrictions on corporate political contributions and even outright bans on certain types of corporate contributions as long as the restrictions were “closely drawn” — under the Buckley rationale — to meet important governmental interests such as “combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions” like those that could come from corporate contributors. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, 124 S.Ct. 619. In fact, as noted above, the Court has upheld restrictions that are similar to the restrictions at issue here at both the federal and state levels. Consequently, we are of the view that there is no basis in the current jurisprudence to apply an express advocacy limiting construction to the corporate contribution restrictions in the Texas election code. We also emphasize that to prevail on their facial challenge to the overbreadth of the relevant election code provisions, Ellis and Colyandro must demonstrate that the restrictions, in fact, reach a substantial amount of protected conduct. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). A statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional applications. Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 436 (Tex.1998). The overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” and should be employed “only as a last resort.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). There must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not be fore the court. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). Ellis and Colyandro have not met this burden. In light of the United States Supreme Court precedent expressly allowing the type of regulation of corporate campaign contributions about which Ellis and Colyandro complain, we are not convinced that the Texas Election Code provisions in question reach a substantial amount of protected activity as contemplated by the case law. Therefore, consistent with binding United States Supreme Court precedent, we decline Ellis and Co-lyandro’s invitation to strike down the election code’s restrictions on corporate campaign contributions on the basis that they are unconstitutionally overbroad because they could be read to encompass both express advocacy as well as issue advocacy. Vagueness Turning to Ellis and Colyandro’s vagueness challenge, Ellis and Colyandro complain that “[a] person of ordinary intelligence is not given a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited by laws providing that a corporation cannot make, and a person cannot accept, a contribution with the intent that it be used ⅛ connection with a campaign for elective office.’” They punctuate this point with the statement: “If one wishes to make a donation to a group to advocate in favor of an issue that is the cornerstone of a particular candidate’s campaign, is one making a donation ‘in connection with’ that candidate’s campaign? Who knows?” We recognize that the phrase “in connection with a campaign” is broad. We presume the legislature intended it to be broad. We also recognize that the elaborate structure for regulating political contributions in the election code is complicated and a challenge for “a person of ordinary intelligence” to understand and navigate. We further recognize that in some instances there may well be considerable challenges for prosecutors and fact finders in dealing with evidentiary issues relating to a contributor’s intent or distinguishing between authorized or unauthorized contributions, and therefore, criminal and innocent behavior. However, complexity is not synonymous with unconstitutional vagueness. In crafting the challenged election code provisions, the legislature followed the constitutional guidelines articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley and its progeny. Viewed in light of the controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, the challenged election code provisions are not so indefinite that they fail to give reasonable notice of what is prohibited with respect to corporate contributions, fail to provide law enforcement with sufficiently determinate guidelines for enforcement, or unconstitutionally chill protected expression. Statutes are to be read as a whole and interpreted to give effect to every part. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 26 (Tex.2003). Although Ellis and Colyandro argue that contributions to support measures or other permitted purposes could be criminalized — as a practical matter — if the statute were applied improperly or the finder of fact misjudges the evidence, their argument goes to the possibility of erroneous application of the statute rather than the propriety of the language of the statute on its face. The statute plainly allows corporations to make contributions to support or oppose a measure and to cover administrative expenses. Contributions to political committees to support advocacy on such “measures” in elections are specifically authorized by the election code. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 253.096. Here, whether the corporations intended the contributions to be for specific candidates or for the support or opposition of a measure is a question of fact — and therefore, an issue of evidence and proof — as are the nature of the circumstances surrounding Ellis and Colyandro’s acceptance or handling of the contributions. The statute is definite enough in its language to communicate that corporate contributions given with the intent to support measures are permissible while corporate contributions given with the intent to support candidates are not. We believe that a person of ordinary intelligence is capable of properly designating whether his or her contribution is intended to support or oppose a measure (lawful), be used solely for administrative expenses (lawful), be used for unregulated expenditures (lawful), or be used to “in connection with” a candidate’s campaign (unlawful). To the extent Ellis and Co-lyandro complain that this statutory structure could subject a person to penalty simply for being mistaken about what a contributor intends, the statute places burdens on those making and accepting corporate contributions to designate and to ascertain the purpose of a contribution before giving it or using it in a campaign for elective office. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncements in this area, we cannot find this burden unconstitutional, and we defer to the legislature’s judgment on this point. Ellis and Colyandro also complain that the election code permits corporations to finance the establishment and administration of general-purpose political committees, but it does not define “establishment” or “administration.” They argue that, as a result, the distinction between a lawful corporate expenditure or contribution to establish or administer a general-purpose committee and an unlawful corporate campaign contribution to such a committee is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it fails to define words or terms used. Anderson, 902 S.W.2d at 699. When words are not defined, they are ordinarily given their plain meaning unless the statute shows that they were used in some other sense. Id. In the absence of special definitions, statutory language can be measured by common understanding and practices or construed in the sense generally understood. Id. The Texas Ethics Commission has held that the guide for determining whether a particular expense is “administrative” under section 253.100 is whether the expense is one that would be incurred in the normal course of business by any active organization, whether or not it engaged in political activity. Op. Tex. Ethics Comm’n No. 132 (1993). Similarly, a permissible “establishment” expense is one that would be incurred by any organization, political or non-political. Examples of administrative expenses include expenditures on office rent, utilities, and office supplies. Id. By contrast, expenses that are tied directly to a political committee’s support for or opposition to candidates or measures are not administrative expenses. Examples of such non-administrative expenses include expenses to host a public reception for an identified candidate and expenses for meetings of members of the general-purpose committee with candidates for elective office. Id. “Even though the re-questor specifies that no public communication or endorsement of any candidate would be made at such a meeting, the activity described represents an initial phase of the committee’s political activity.” Id. Other categories of expenses, including, for example, expenses for postage, printing and stationery, travel, staff salaries, and legal fees, may be classified as part administrative expenses and part political activity expenses, depending on the circumstances of each case. Id. Such expenses are generally considered administrative; however, to the extent that the expenses encompass political activity, they are not administrative. Id. For example, if an employee of the general-purpose committee is compensated for his activities that support or oppose a political candidate, the portion of his salary attributable to those activities is not an administrative expense. Id. Considering these principles and examples, we believe that a person of ordinary intelligence is capable of intending and designating his or her contributions to a political committee to be for lawful purposes unrelated to supporting or opposing a political candidate. Whether misuse of such funds by the political committee or innocent redistribution of such funds for unlawful purposes may have implications for the contributor or raise additional constitutional concerns is not before us in this appeal. Additional clarification of what is and is not permitted can be found in the election code’s definitions of general-purpose committee and specific-purpose committee. These definitions state that a “political committee” has “a principal purpose” of either (1) accepting contributions made with the intent to support or oppose one or more candidates, officeholders, or measures, or (2) making expenditures for such purposes. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(13), (14). Consistent with these definitions, the Texas Ethics Commission has defined “political committee” in its rules, in relevant pari, as “[t]wo or more persons that have as a principal purpose accepting political contributions or making political expenditures to support or oppose candidates, officeholders, or measures.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.1(14) (2004) (emphasis added). These limitations also provide that a “political contribution” to a “political committee” is a “contribution ... offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for elective office” “to support or oppose candidates.” Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 251.001(3); 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.1(14) (emphasis added). In our view, a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence is capable of distinguishing between making contributions for the purpose of being used to defray unregulated expenses that are unrelated to any kind of political campaign and those that are campaign-related and, therefore, regulated. While reasonable minds might differ as to the utility and effectiveness of a regulatory structure such as that currently applicable to corporate political contributions in the election code, the current structure does not run afoul of constitutional protections. We hold that section 253.094 of the Texas Election Code is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. We have found that the election code’s prohibition on corporate political contributions is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. It follows that section 253.003 is not vague or overbroad insofar as it criminalizes the acceptance of an unlawful corporate political contribution that is known to be unlawful by the person accepting it. Money Laundering Statute A person commits the offense of money laundering if he “conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02(a)(2). “Proceeds” are defined to mean “funds” acquired or derived directly or indirectly from, produced through, or realized through an act. Id. § 34.01(4). Before 2005, section 34.01 defined “funds” to include: (A) coin or paper money of the United States or any other country that is designated as legal tender and that circulates and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issue; (B) United States silver certificates, United States Treasury notes, Federal Reserve System notes; and (C) official foreign bank notes that are customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in a foreign country and foreign bank drafts. Id. § 34.01(2). In 2005, after the acts at issue in these causes were committed, section 34.01 was amended to add an additional category of items that the term “funds” would include: (D) currency or its equivalent, including an electronic fund, personal check, bank check, traveler’s check, money order, bearer negotiable instrument, bearer investment security, bearer security, or certificate of stock in a form that allows title to pass on delivery. Id. § 34.01(2)(D) (West Supp.2008). Ellis and Colyandro are charged under the 2004 set of indictments with money laundering by delivering a personal check to the Republican National State Elections Committee. They assert that, if the term “funds” in the pre-2005 version of the money laundering statute is interpreted to include checks and the other items added by the 2005 amendment to the statute, the pre-2005 version of the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it fails to give constitutionally adequate notice that a person could be convicted of money laundering based solely on handling checks, money orders, or other negotiable instruments. The essence of their argument is that, if the pre-2005 version of the money laundering statute is read to criminalize transactions in which the “proceeds of criminal activity” were someth