Full opinion text
OPINION Richardson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. In January 1991, a jury , convicted appellant of capital murder for an offense committed in June 1990,, Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(1) (West 1990). Based upon the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.07R sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(g) (West 1990). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Buntion v. State, No. AP-71,238 (Tex.Crim.App. May 31, 1995) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant’s initial state application for habeas corpus relief was denied. Ex parte Buntion, No. WR-22,-548-02 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 5, 2003) (per curiam order, not designated for publication). Appellant’s subsequent application was granted, and the case was remanded for a new punishment hearing. Ex parte Buntion, No. AP-76,236, 2009 WL 3154909 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 30, 2009) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial court held a new punishment hearing in February 2012. . Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.0711, § 3(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.0711, § 3(j). Appellant raises twenty-seven points of error. After reviewing appellant’s points of error, we find them to be without merit. Consequently, we affirm.the trial court’s sentence of death. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In point of error twenty-seven, appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. Appellant states that, like the defendant in Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.Crim.App.2007), there is no evidence that he poses a future danger while in prison. He argues that, given his age, the only relevant society is prison society. He notes that his criminal record, though extensive, dates from the 1980s. Appellant states that he is now in his mid-sixties, and if he received a life sentence, he would not even be eligible for a parole review for many years. He avers that he would likely die of natural causes while in prison before reaching his first parole review date. Appellant points out that he has been “quiet and relatively complacent” since he was convicted of the instant offense over twenty years ago, and “he is now an old man” in poor health. He alleges that the State presented no psychological, opinion, or reputation evidence that would permit a rational juror to conclude that he is likely to. commit future acts of violence. . Therefore, appellant reasons, the evidence is not sufficient to allow a rational juror to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is a probability that he will commit criminal acts of violence and constitute a continuing threat to society. We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to the future dangerousness issue was “yes.” Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). A jury may consider a variety of factors when determining whether a defendant will pose a continuing threat to society. Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The facts of the offense alone may be sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of future dangerousness. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 231-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In this case, the facts of appellant’s offense alone were sufficient to establish appellant’s future dangerousness. His victim, James Irby, was a motorcycle police officer who made a traffic stop of a vehicle in which appellant was a passengér. ■ While Irby and the vehicle’s driver were standing and talking next to. the vehicle, appellant exited the vehicle carrying a loaded gun. Appellant shot Irby once in the head, causing him to fall to the pavement. While Irby was lying on the ground, appellant shot him twice in the back. Appellant fled the scene oh foot and committed several violent offenses during his efforts to; evade capture. Appellant attempted to steal a car that was waiting at a stop sign by standing in front of the vehicle and pointing a gun at the driver. As the driver began to back the car away, appellant fired a shot into the windshield. The bullet shattered the windshield, sending broken glass into the driver’s eyes, and struck the passenger in the arm. When a peace officer who had come upon the scene commanded appellant to halt, appellant shot at the officer and ran down the street. Appellant then walked into a nearby warehouse, where he pointed his gun at an employee, who ran outside. Appellant chased a second employee into the parking area. A supervisor who was pulling into the driveway saw appellant and confronted him. Appellant pointed his gun at the supervisor’s face and directed him to put his hands up, give appellant his wallet, and get on the ground. Appellant then attempted to steal the supervisor’s vehicle. However, when appellant could not operate the standard transmission, he abandoned the vehicle and ran inside a building, where a responding police officer arrested him. A jury may also infer a defendant’s future dangerousness from evidence showing a lack of remorse. See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 284-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 853-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Here, appellant’s conduct immediately after his arrest indicated that he lacked remorse for the offense: He refused to give the arresting officer his name or any other information and claimed that he was diabetic and paralyzed. While in the police station following his arrest, appellant was uncooperative, and appeared to be “mad at everybody.” The jury also heard evidence confirming appellant’s continued lack of remorse. During a 2009 recorded interview with a television reporter following the reversal of his initial sentence, appellant stated that his conduct in committing the offense was justified because he had no doubt that the victim was going to shoot him. Appellant also stated that if he were faced with the same situar tion today, he would do it again. Appellant’s prior criminal record also supported the finding that appellant posed a continuing threat to society. Se Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (noting that the existence of a prior criminal record and the severity of the prior crimes is a factor to consider in determining whether a defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society). Appellant had thirteen. prior felony convictions, many of which involved assaulting other people. Most notably, appellant was convicted in 1965 of “assault to murder” an Alabama peace officer. Further, appellant committed the instant offense a little over a month after he was released to parole while serving a sentence for the offense of sexual assault of a child. See id. at 363-64 (stating that committing an offense while on parole has some tendency to show future dangerousness). In addition, appellant committed numerous unadjudicated extraneous offenses and bad acts, both in and out of prison. During a previous term of imprisonment, appellant was found to be in possession of a shank. While on a prison furlough, appellant used his brother’s, birth certificate to obtain a visit with his ex-wife, wh.o was in jail. ■ When a jail official discovered appellant’s true identity and the fact that he was on a prison furlough, the official arrested appellant and returned him to prison. Approximately- a week before the instant offense, appellant showed an acquaintance a gun. He told her that he always .carried it because he would rather kill than go back to prison. While in jail for the instant offense, appellant threatened other detainees who asked, him why he was there. Appellant said that, he would kill them “like [he] killed the cop” if they did not leave him alone. Additional evidence indicated that appellant’s character for violence had not changed during his time in prison. See, e.g., Coble, v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). While in jail awaiting the punishment retrial, appellant wrote letters to his brother, Bobby. The letters contained language from which a jury could reasonably infer that appellant remained a continuing threat to society. For example, in a July 2011 letter, appellant stated that he was glad that he would never be released from prison because he would “hate to think about what [he would] do to certain people that have screwed [him] around.” In an August 2011 letter, appellant advised Bobby that if the district attorney questioned Bobby about Bobby’s previous criminal record, Bobby should just say that the district attorney “made [Bobby] what [he was]” by sending Bobby to. prison on his first offense, instead of giving him probation/ “If they create a ‘monster,’ they should not- complain when it feeds (on society.). right? [sic] Right.” Dr. Mark Vigen, appellant’s mental health expert, acknowledged, that appellant had served “a lifetime of prior'prison sentences” • before he committed the instant offense, Vigen acknowledged that-appellant’s criminal history and history of imprisonment could increase the risk for prison violence. Further, the jury had heard evidence that appellant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas prison gang. Vigen testified that membership in a prison gang is associated with an increased probability of prison violence. Vigen was also aware that appellant was in his mid-forties at the time he committed the instant offense. He acknowledged that it was anomalous for a- person of that age to commit ’such a violent offense. We reject appellant’s argument that, as the future dangerousness issue applied to him, the only relevant society was prison society. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 902-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that future dangerousness issue asks a jury to determine whether a capital defendant would be dangerous “whether in or out of prison,” without regard to the time he would actually spend in prison if sentenced to life). His good behavior in prison Over the past twenty years did not preclude a finding of future dangerousness. Se Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. See Hunter, 243 S.W.3d at 673; see also McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161, 168-69.(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that once the rationality of the future-dangerousness prediction is established, it is impossible to determine whether the prediction is nevertheless wrong or unjust because of countervailing evidence). Point, of error twenty-seven is overruled. JUROR DISABILITY In points of error one ■ through three, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not disqualifying, excusing, or removing juror, Kristi Kotsa-tos, due to her psychological instability, in violation of Article 36.29. Appellant argues that Kotsatos’ testimony demonstrated that she was psychologically crippled by the prospect of serving on his jury, so that she was “absolutely prevented from performing” her duties in this case. Appellant notes that Article 36.29 authorizes a' trial court to dismiss a juror who is physically or mentally - impaired in a way that hinders her ability to perform her duty as a juror, and he asserts that Kotsatos was such a juror. .. During voir dire, Kotsatos explained that her ex-boyfriend had been murdered. She stated that, ■ although they ‘ were no longer dating and she was not present at the time of -the offense, she did not handle the aftermath of the murder very well. -As a result of the experience, including sitting through the murder trial, Kotsatos failed some of her college • courses and suffered from clinical depression. She 'asserted that, although nine years had passed since this trauma, she did not wish to be a juror in this case because she would probably would be so distracted by her past experiences that she would be unable to be fair in her ultimate decisions. Both the State and the defense addressed Kotsatos’ mental distress about being a juror on a capital murder trial during individual voir dire. Each side conducted an extensive voir dire of Kotsatos. Kotsatos told the prosecutor that she would be “distracted,” and might be biased against appellant, but acknowledged that she would “have no problem answering the questions based on the evidence.” ■ - When questioned by defense counsel, Kotsatos expressed a willingness to consider mitigating evidence and base her decisions on the evidence presented, despite her personal feelings about the death penalty and her past experience. Despite Kotsatos’ clear expression that she did not want to serve on the jury, both appellant and the State accepted Kotsatos as a juror, and she was informed that she had been selected as a juror on January 23/2012. Kotsatos did not protest but simply asked about when she was expected to show up for trial. Yet, on February 3rd Kotsatos informed the court coordinator by telephone that she did not feel fit to serve on the jury. The court coordinator informed Kotsatos that she needed to return for jury duty as instructed. On February 7th, Annie McAdams, Kotsatos’ sister-in-law and a civil attorney, contacted the court and informed the court by telephone that she believed that Kotsatos’ mental state was deteriorating. Based on this phone call with the court, which both the State and the defense witnessed, the court decided to hold a special hearing the next day and question both McAdams and Kotsatos. After the hearing, and after an off-the-record conference among the trial judge and the attorneys for both sides, the court informed Kotsatos that she would1 remain a juror. Kotsatos did not express any opinion- about remaining-a juror at that time. The court advised Kotsatos in detail what she should do if at any time during the trial she had further problems or if she had further concerns about being an impartial juror. The record does not reflect any argument from the defense regarding whether or not Kotsatos should remain a juror. The record does not reflect an unambiguous bias against appellant. In fact Kotsatos repeatedly replied that she would consider the evidence and follow the law- in response to questions about the special issues she would be required to answer as a juror. Defense counsel did not challenge Kot-satos for cause, object to the trial court’s decision, or otherwise seek to exclude Kot-satos from the jury, either during Kotsa-tos’ individual voir dire or at the special hearing on February 8th. Immediately before the jury was sworn, the trial court, asked the parties whether there were any objections to the jury “as seated or selected.” Defense counsel responded, .“None other than previously stated.” .Appellant does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that he objected to Kotsatos’ jury service at any time during the trial. Therefore, appellant :did not preserve this point of error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that-the constitutional right to trial, by ,an impartial jury, like any other right, is subject to waiver). Points of error one through three are overruled. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S CONDUCT AND POLICE PRESENCE In points of error four and five, appellant asserts that the improper actions of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office and the Houston Police Department “so infected the trial that appellant was denied a fair, trial,” in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth .Amendments to the United States Constitution. In point of error six, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and should have granted appellant’s motion for change of venue based on Article 31.03 and the District Attorney’s comments to the local media. Appellant briefs these points together. Appellant filed-three pre-trial motions: Motion to Disqualify Harris County District Attorney’s Office; Motion to Change Trial Venue and For Sanctions; and Motion to Dismiss Death Penalty Prosecution or Alternatively, For Appointment of a Prosecutor Pro Tempore Due to Criminal Investigation of Harris County District Attorney’s Office. In furtherance of these pretrial motions, appellant issued subpoenas for District Attorney Patricia Lykos and other members of her staff. The trial court quashed the subpoenas and denied each of the pretrial motions. Appellant complains that denial of these pretrial motions and the subsequent prosecution by District Attorney Lykos’ Office resulted in a violation of his due process rights. Appellant also specifically cites the denial of the change of venue motion as an abuse of discretion by the trial ’court based on the statutory requirements of Article 31.03. We will address the statutory requirements of a change of venue motion first and then address -appellant’s due process allegations. Motion for Change of Venue Appellant filed a pretrial motion for change of venue in which he requested that his trial be moved to Travis County. Appellant complained that District Attorney Patricia Lykos. had made a statement to the Houston Chronicle stating that appellant would be released to “mandatory parole” if he received a life sentence. Appellant claimed that Lykos’ statement, which was published in the Houston Chronicle on February 8, 2011, made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Harris County and violated his right to due’ process and his Eighth Amendment right to accurate sentencing. In support of his motion, appellant noted that the Houston Chronicle was the “largest circulating daily in the county” and that • the . story had received more than eighty online comments. He averred that most of these comments - were hostile to appellant, and several of them stated that appellant should receive the death penalty so that he could never be released from prison. Appellant acknowledged that in a follow-up news .story published on- February 10, 2011, defense counsel pointed out that Lykos’ parole statement was incorrect, But appellant alleged that defense counsel’s statements had not cured the harm. Appellant noted that the readers’ comments that followed this story continued to express a preference for appellant receiving the death penalty. Appellant emphasized that Lykos had made this statement just weeks before the start of jury selection, so it would’be fresh in the minds of prospective'jurors. Appellant averred that he had not wanted tó mention parole to the jury at all, but based on Lykos’ inaccurate statement, he would be compelled to ask potential jurors whether they had seen the media coverage that referenced parole. Appellant noted that this case was already well-known, as shown by the fact that venue for his 1991 trial had been changed due to extensive pretrial publicity. Appellant also filed a subpoena for Lykos to testify at an eviden-tiary hearing on his motion for change of venue. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for change of venue for an abuse of discretion.' Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 724. If the trial court’s decision falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, it will be upheld. Id. Article 31.03(a) provides that a trial' court may grant a change of venue if the defendant establishes that “there exists in the county where the prosecution is commenced so great a prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial,” or that “there is a dangerous combination against him-instigated by influential persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial.” Art. 31.03(a). See also Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lundstrom v. State, 742 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To justify a change of venue based upon media attention, a defendant must show that the publicity was pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Widespread publicity alone is not inherently prejudicial. Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449; see also Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Extensive knowledge of the case or defendant in the community as a result of pretrial publicity- is not sufficient- if there is not also some showing of prejudicial or inflammatory-coverage. Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 450, 51; Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 338-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). News stories that are' accurate and- objective in their -coverage are generally considered by this Court not to be prejudicial or inflammatory. Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 451. The record contains photocopies of February ;8 and February 10 news stories from the Houston Chronicle as they appeared in print, as well as print-outs of the stories as they appeared online, followed by online reader comments. The print version of the February 8 story was titled, “Death Row Cases Back for Retrial.” The online version was titled, “Death row inmates get chance at life in retrials.” In both versions of the February 8 story, a sentence in bold-face type underneath the main title referred to a “cop killer” whose sentence ‘ could be 'changed to life. The text identified appellant as a person who had been convicted of “gunning down” a police officer during a traffic stop. ’ It further described appellant’s case as “the highest profile case” among “as many as sixteen” capital murder cases in which Ly-kos anticipated a punishment retrial following the reversal of the death sentence due to flawed jury instructions. In the context, of arguing against “potentially crippling budget cuts” for the District Attorney’s Office; Lykos stated that she intended to pursue the death penalty again in-most of those cases. Lykos explained that,, if any of the offenders received a life sentence, “it is possible that the ‘early release’ parole provisions. of. the 80s and 90s would result in mandatory parole.” Both versions of the February 8 story included a subheading in bold-face type titled, “Parole board has final say.” The text that followed the subheading explained that the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles,, and not a jury, would determine ■ whether ■ a life-sentenced offender would be released to parole. The story also quoted a Houston criminal defense attorney, who asserted that Lykos’ statement was inaccurate and that, as a practical matter, no Board member would ever vote to release appellant from prison because any member who did so would not be able to keep his job. The print version of the February 8 story appeared on the front page of the newspaper. The most prominent story on the front page concerned a crisis in health care funding and featured a large photograph of a doctor standing beside a bedridden patient. In contrast, the story at issue occupied only a two-column-wide, space on the front page, and it did not include any pictures. The report continued on an inside page with the title, “Trial: Irby’s wife calls new trial a ‘nightmare.’ ” Below this title were small identification photographs (each a half-column’s width) of Irby and appellant, and a larger photograph (column’s width) of Officer Irby’s widow and her father embracing. The online version of the story omitted the inside-page title referring to the quote from Officer Irby’s widow and included only the photograph of Officer Irby’s widow and her father. , . The February 10 follow-up story was titled, . “Killer’s Defense Wants Trial Moved.” In that story, defense counsel said that they were seeking a change of venue due to Lykos’ prior statement about early release. They asserted that Lykos’ statement was inaccurate because there was no mandatory release for a capital murderer. They also stated that the Board of Pardons and Paroles would never release appellant if he received a life sentence. In support of his motion for change of venue, appellant requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the 1990 changerof-venue proceedings that led to the initial trial being moved to Fredericks-burg. Further, counsel submitted a video of an interview that appellant gave to a local television news reporter following the 2009 reversal of appellant’s death sentence. Counsel noted that the interview was readily available'online. ■ In addition, appellant submitted his own affidavit concerning his understanding of the applicable parole law and his inability to: receive a fair -trial in Harris County. He- also submitted affidavits from David Cunningham and David Dow, criminal defense attorneys in Harris County. They opined that Lykos’ false statement to the media prejudiced appellant. Cunningham also stated that there was a “dangerous combination” working to deny appellant a fair trial because Lykos, a, very influential person in Harris County, had stated a “mistruth” in the local media. Further, appellant noted that a televi-: sion news station’s website had posted a summary of, and a link to, the February 8 news story. He also presented a print-out of approximately ninety online reader comments responding to that story. • Many of the comments expressed general hostility toward capital murderers and displeasure with the fact, that the. death sentences had been reversed in so many cases'. Several comments expressed- frustration that a life sentence did not actually mean life in prison because of the availability of early release. However, the comments did not differentiate between the mere possibility of early release and “mandatory”. early release. Appellant also presented a print-out of online reader comments responding to the February 10 follow-up article. This article received fewer comments than the first article. One commentator stated that Ly-kos was correct and that appellant’s defense counsel (“the vermin who represent the cop killer”) were lying. The comm,en-tator also said that appellant could be on the.street within a very short time if sentenced to life because there had been no life-without-parole option at the time of the offense. Like the comments to the first article, this comment to the February 10 article did not differentiate between the mere possibility, of early release and “mandatory” early release. To rebut appellant’s assertion that the number of online comments generated by the February 8 and February 10 articles reflected wide dissemination and high public attention, the State presented printouts of three recent unrelated Houston Chronicle news stories, followed by a sampling of online reader comments. The prosecutor argued that these print-outs showed, that “plain vanilla”, news stories received a roughly comparable number of online comments. The State also presented the transcript from a pretrial hearing in another capital murder punishment retrial in which jury selection had already begun when the February 8 news story was published. The hearing transcript showed that ten jurors were questioned about their exposure to Lykos’ statement concerning early release. Although these jurors had already been instructed to avoid media coverage of that case, the prosecutor argued that their statements during the hearing indicated that many jurors did not read the newspaper at all. The prosecutor also called Terrance Windham to testify about a defendant’s ability to get a fair and impartial jury in a widely publicized case. Windham, who had'served' as a Harris County assistant district attorney since 1989, explained that the original- trial in this case had been •moved to Fredericksburg. Windham was aware of very little media coverage since the 1991 trial; the only coverage he had seen were the attachments to ■ appellant’s motion. Windham opined that appellant could receive a fair trial in Harris County. He stated that the two, Houston Chronicle news articles attached.to-the motion;did not constitute “pervasive coverage” of the case. Further, Windham asserted that the articles were merely informational, and not prejudicial or inflammatory. Windham testified that he was unaware of any “dangerous combination” working to deny appellant a fair trial in Harris County. On cross-examination, Windham acknowledged that the news media was covering the instant hearing and that he had seen cameras outside the courtroom. Windham stated that he lived in Houston at the time of the 1990 offense and the 1991 trial. He stated that the case received1 quité a bit of media coverage at that time, but he did not recall the details. Windham stated that a trial involving the capital 'murder of a" police officer would typically be- well-covered in the media. Windham anticipated that the punishment retrial would receive additional media coverage as the trial date approached. Wind-ham acknowledged that Lykos’ statement in the - February 8 story was inaccurate because Texas does not .have “mandatory parole.” He agreed that capital murderers are not eligible for-any type of mandatory release. Windham testified that he did not know how a potential juror would interpret the term, “mandatory parole.” The State also -called the Montgomery County District Attorney, Brett Ligón. Ligón testifíéd that, as a defense attorney and as a prosecutor,-he had handled cases in Harris and Montgomery Counties that had received; extensive media coverage. Ligón opined that despite the media coverage, those trials had been fair.' Except for the two news articles attached to appellant’s motion, Ligón was not aware of any media coverage of this case following the sentence reversal. In his opinion, those articles did not constitute pervasive, prejudicial, or; inflammatory coverage. Ligón acknowledged that, “mandatory parole” does not exist in Texas and that this term could mislead potential jurors. He pointed out, however, that both the February, 8 and February 10 news articles quoted criminal defense attorneys who stated that Lykos’ “mandatory parole” statement was inaccurate. Ligón also stated that he was unaware of any “dangerous combination” working to deny appellant a fair trial in Harris County. Ligón testified that appellant could have a fair trial in Montgomery County if the motion to change venue were granted; However, based on his trial experience in both counties, Ligón thought that it would be a better strategy for the defense to try the case in Harris County rather than Montgomery County. Following this hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s -motion' for change of venue. The court found no evidence of a dangerous combination. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion. The affidavits appellant offered in support of his motion contained mere conclusory allegations that Lykos’ false statement prejudiced appellant and constituted a dangerous combination working to deny him a fair trial. See Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 725. The trial court reasonably found them to be unpersuasive. Further, the trial court reasonably determined that the news coverage of appellant’s . case wa's' not pervasive, prejudicial, or inflammatory. ‘See id. (concluding that the effects of pretrial publicity 'were adequately explored through a hearing on the motion to change venué and voir dire, and no prejudice was found); Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 450-51; see also Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding it significant that the majority of the news coverage about which appellant complained occurred years before the trial). The February 8 news story was accurate and • objective. It briefly described the facts of appellant’s offense of conviction. It also quoted Officer Irby’s widow, who was upset by the prospect of a retrial ánd the possibility that, if appellant received a life sentence, she and her children might have to go before the Parole Board when his case came up for review. The article clearly explained that the Parole Board would make any release decisions. The story quoted a local defense attorney who stated that, as a practical matter, the Board would never release appellant if he received a life sentence. The February 10 follow-up news story was also accurate and objective. The story merely reported that appellant’s counsel was moving .for a change of venue as a. result of Lykos’ misstatement in the first story. The story contained a quote from defense counsel that there was no mandatory parole and that the Board, and not a jury, would decide whether a life-sentenced offender would be released. To the extent that appellant relied on a recording of the 2009 interview that he gave to a television news reporter, we note that part of this’recording was later played for the jury. Under similar circumstances, we have declined to find that such evidence was prejudicial. See Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 452 & n. 29 (concluding that no prejudice resulted from pretrial publication of surveillance video of offense that was later introduced into evidence at trial). Appellant also appears to complain that any discussion in the media of parole or early release denied him a fair trial because defense counsel’s preferred strategy was to avoid mentioning the subject of parole during voir dire. This claim is without merit. See Feldman v. State, 63 S.W.3d 416, 433-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) finding parole instructions did not cause appellant egregious harm because parole was not an applicable issue in appellant’s capital case. The jury in this case was instructed not to consider .any possible action of the Board of Pardons and Paroles Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), or how long appellant would have to servé to satisfy a life sentence. We presume that jurors disregard parole when they are instructed to do so. Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion for change of venue was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement. ■ Due Process Violations Resulting from Conduct of District Attorney’s Office & Police a) Motion to Disqualify District Attorney’s Office Appellant filed a pretrial motion to disqualify the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in which he alleged: (1) The sitting District Attorney, Ly-kos, was a former Houston police officer. (2) Appellant was accused of murdering a Houston police officer. (3) No “cool reflection” was involved in the decision to seek the death penalty after the reversal of appellant’s initial death sentence. (4) There was no evidence of any deliberation in the decision to seek the death penalty against appellant. (5) Allowing the District Attorney to prosecute this case “would be a mockery of our system of fair justice. The image of Officer Lykos beating the drum of revenge on the steps of the courthouse is not the image of fair play this court stands for.” Appellant also filed subpoenas for Lykos and the lead prosecutor to appear at an evidentiary hearing to address this motion. The State filed motions to quash those •subpoenas. At a hearing on the parties’ motions, the prosecutor argued: that the motion to disqualify did not state a basis for relief that would necessitate an eviden-tiary hearing. The prosecutor noted that Lykos never knew the victim, Police Officer -Irby, and had not worked in the police department at the same time as Irby. Therefore, the prosecutor argued, appellant’s argument.that Lykos was biased did not merit development at a hearing. Because appellant failed to show the need for an evidentiary hearing, he could not show any need to compel the subpoenaed witnesses to appear. The prosecutor further stated that, to the extent that the subpoenas sought privileged information and work product that were not relevant to appellant’s particular case, appellant’s motion did not state a basis for overcoming the privilege. Defense counsel responded that Lykos made a “knee-jerk” decision to seek the death penalty against appellant a second time. In support, defense counsel pointed out that Lykos had announced her decision to the media one day after appellant had been granted a hew trial. Counsel also asserted that Lykos had a natural allegiance to a fellow police officer. The trial court granted the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas and denied appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court also denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney’s Office. The standard of review for disqualification of the prosecutor by the trial court is whether the court abused its discretion. Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court has limited authority to disqualify an elected district attorney and her staff from the prosecution .of a criminal case.- The office of a district attorney is constitutionally created and protected; -thus, the district attorney’s authority “can-' not be -abridged or taken away.” Landers, 256-S.W.3d at 303-04; Tex Const, art. V, § 21; see also, State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), . A district attorney is responsible for recusing herself in a particular case to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety. See Coleman v. State, 246 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Article 2.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recognizes that a district attorney “shall represent the State in all criminal cases” except when a district attorney’s employment prior to election would be adverse to the prosecution of a particular case. This Court has further limited the reading of Article 2.01 to permit the trial court to disqualify, the district attorney only when the conflict of interest rises to the level of a due process violation. Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In Landers v. State, this Court held that the district attorney’s prosecution of the defendant, whom he had previously represented on a different charge of intoxication assault, did- not violate the defendant’s right to- due process, and thus the district attorney could not be disqualified. The Landers Court, drawing on its previous holding in Ex parte Spain, reasoned that, since the'representation of the defendant was not on the same case that the district attorney was now prosecuting, and there was no' evidence that the State’s attorney used any confidential information in the defendant’s prosecution on the current charge, there had been no due process violation, and thus the district attorney could not be disqualified. Lan-ders, 256 S.W.3d at 304, n. 21 (“When a district attorney prosecutes someone whom he previously represented in the same' case, the conflict of interest is obvious and the integrity of the prosecutor’s office' suffers correspondingly.”)' (quoting Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). Although State ex rel. Eidson y. Edwards, a mandamus proceeding, held the trial court exceeded its authority by disqualifying a district attorney and his staff from prosecuting a case, the opinion reaffirmed the holdings of Morgan and Spain with respect to the rights violations that result from prosecution of a defendant by a prosecutor who previously represented the defendant in the same matter. Eidson, 793 S.W.2d at 6-7; see also Ex parte Morgan, .616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Grim. App. 1981). Appellant has not alleged, and we have not found, that any actual conflict existed. District Attorney Lykos did not previously represent appellant, nor did any of her staff.' Thus, appellant fails to show any conflict which this Court has previously found as grounds for disqualification. • ■ As for Appellant’s claim that DA “Lykos [was] beating the drum of revenge on the steps of the courthouse” and was not deliberate in her decision to seek the death penalty, that claim fails as well and is not a basis for disqualification of the district attorney. In an unpublished opinion by this Court, Judge Womack clearly articulates the idea that a prosecutor need not be a neutral party in criminal litigation:-' [A] prosecutor who zealously seeks a conviction is not inherently biased or partial. A prosecutor need not be disinterested on the issue whether a prospective defendant has committed the crime with which he is charged. If honestly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor is free, indeed obliged, to be deeply interested in urging that view by any fair means. True disinterest on the issue of such a defendant’s guilt is the domain of the judge and. the jury — not the prosecutor. Ex parte Reposa, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 725, 36, 2009 WL 3478455 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2009) (mem. op., not for publication). Judge Womack then goes on to quote the Supreme Court of the United States as support: It is true that prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous and become overly committed to obtaining a conviction. That problem, however, is personal, not structural..-.. . [S]uch overzealousness “does not have-.its roots in a conflict of interest. When it manifests itself the courts deal with it on a. case-by-case basis as an aberration. . This is quite different from approving a .practice which would permit the appointment of prosecutors whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested only in a conviction.” Ex parte Reposa, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 725, 36, 2009 WL 3478455 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2009) (mem. op, not designated for publication) (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 n. 18, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Edüd 740 (1987)). The'.footnote Judge Womack quotes from also distinguishes the determination of an actual conflict of interest from the determination that actual misconduct occurred as a result of the conflict of interest. Appellant has failed to show any evidence of actual misconduct on the part of Lykos or the District Attorney’s Office in pursuing the death penalty in appellant’s case. The trial court did not abuse' its discretion by granting the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas ór by denying appellant’s motion to disqualify the District Attorney’s Office. b) Motion to Dismiss Prosecution On February 8, 2012, appellant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Death Penalty Prosecution, to Suspend Prosecution or, Alternatively, For Appointment of a Prosecutor Pro Tempore Due to Criminal Investigation of Harris County District Attorney’s Office.” The motion referred to a local news story from February 7, 2012. The news story explained that -a grand jury had investigated the District Attorney’s Office regarding problems with. DWI testing vans. The story reported that the grand jury had found no wrongdoing in that matter. However, the Texas Rangers and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were scrutinizing the District Attorney’s Office’s use of county resources to conduct background searches of the individual grand jurors, special prosecutors, and judges involved in the grand jury investigation. In appellant’s motion, he asserted that the criminal investigation into District Attorney Lykos’ office would “irrevocably taint” the prosecution of his case, either by affecting the prosecutor’s impartiality or by creating an appearance of impropriety, unless the trial court granted relief by: (1) barring the State from pursuing the death penalty; (2) delaying the prosecution until after the completion of the investigation; or (3) disqualifying the District Attorney’s Office and appointing an independent prosecutor pro tempore to proceed with the case. At a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor argued that Lykos was not directly involved in appellant’s case, and there was no need to recuse the rest of the District Attorney’s Office. The prosecutor stated that general counsel in the District Attorney’s Office had confirmed that the subject of the pending investigation had nothing to do with appellant’s case or with capital murder cases in general. The prosecutor argued that appellant alleged only a general appearance of impropriety but failed to show a due process violation or any particular constitutional violation in his own case. The trial court denied the motion. It found that appellant had not identified any actual prejudice, there was no evidence of any suspected wrongdoing by Lykos in appellant’s case, and there was no showing that Lykos and her-office were disqualified. At a later- pretrial hearing, defense counsel re-urged this motion. Counsel stated that a newly published newspaper article indicated that the Texas Rangers had requested the appointment of a special prosecutor in the investigation. Defense counsel submitted the news article for the purpose of the hearing. The prosecutor responded that nothing had changed since the trial court previously denied the motion; appellant still failed to show any connection between the investigation and this case. The trial court .again denied the motion. The record does not show that any alleged wrongdoing for which the District Attorney’s Office was being investigated was related to appellant’s case. See -Art. 2.08(b). Appellant also failed to show that it constituted a due process violation for the District Attorney’s Office to seek the death penalty in his case. See Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The trial court properly overruled appellant’s motion. c) Police Presence Appellant failed to preserve his complaint about the police presence during trial. Defense counsel’s closing argument established that he was aware of the police presence in the courtroom. Nevertheless, counsel did not object to the police presence, and he obtained no ruling from the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that, for a party to preserve a complaint for appellate review, he must make a specific objection and obtain a ruling at the earliest possible opportunity). Rather,- defense counsel raised the issue for the first time in a motion for new trial. See Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 845 (finding that an argument made for the first time in a motion for new trial was not timely presented to the trial court and therefore appellant failed to preserve the issue for consideration on appeal); Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 & n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that an appellant may raise a sentencing issue in a motion for new trial for the first time only if he did not have the opportunity to object in the punishment hearing). Additionally, appellant refers us only to the record of the hearing on his motion for new trial to substantiate his complaints about the police presence during the trial. He does not direct us to any part of the trial record. Cf. Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (reh’g granted, reversed on other grounds) (declining to go outside the record and find that police presence in the courtroom was per se prejudicial when the record merely reflected that defense counsel had objected the police presence but failed to state how that presence was inherently prejudicial); see also Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) finding that appellant did not point to any disturbance or other prejudicial circumstance in the record caused by the presence of armed guards in the courtroom, and refusing to “assume the existence of any circumstance or fact” which would indicate “actual prejudice or lack of due process”. Therefore, appellant’s claim of prejudicial police presence is also inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App, P. 38.1(i); Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under these circumstances, we need not reach the merits of this point on appeal. d) Cumulative Harm ' Appellant argues that the combined effect of the pretrial publicity, the trial court’s rulings, and the police presence deprived him of “the chance for a fair and un-poisoned venire panel”, and a fair trial. However, appellant has failed to prove error concerning each of these claims separately, and so we find no cumulative harm. See Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (declining to find harm in “cumulative effect” of alleged constitutional violations after finding no constitutional violations). Points of error four through six are overruled. INTRODUCTION OF [MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD In points of error ten and eleven, appellant complains that prosecutor, Lance Long, interjected impermjssible evidence and argument into the trial proceedings. To support his points, of error appellant alleges that the §⅜⅛ attempted: 1) to “poison [the] jury’s deliberations by introducing such slippery slope evidence as another prisoner’s comparative death sentence;” 2) to mislead the, jury with incorrect information regarding the misconduct of another death row inmate, which the defense was not allowed to correct by introducing evidence to the contrary; and 3) to engage in impermissible jury argument. Appellant’s claims are inadequately briefed because appellant has not provided specific- record- References to the relevant argument, evidence, and rulings from the trial proceedings. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(1); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“We decide that this point of error is inadequately briefed and presents nothing 'for review as this Court is under no obligation to make appellant’s arguments for her.”). He relies solely on the record of the hearing on his motion for new trial. However, in the interest of justice, we will review appellant’s claim. But see Ladd v. State, .3 S.W.3d 547, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[Requiring appellants, even capital appellants, to abide by our published briefing rules and to make reasonable arguments in ■ their own behalf does not. offend traditional notions of .fair play and substantial justice.”). . Error in not admitting defense evidence to correct misinformation from the State During the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, appellant’s trial counsel explained on direct examination that a key part of the defense trial strategy was to rebut the State’s claim that appellant was a future danger and to advocate that appellant should be given a life sentence instead of the death penalty. At trial, defense counsel compared appellant to another death row inmate, Brian Davis, who had entered death row at approximately the same time as appellant. Counsel asserted throughout the trial that, unlike Davis, who had multiple incidents of violence while on death row, appellant had not had a single reported incident of misconduct during the 22 years he had spent on death row. Counsel urged the jury to consider appellant’s good behavior for over two decades on death row as evidence that appellant would not be a future danger. As evidence, of appellant’s good behavior while on death row, defense counsel called former TDCJ Officer Bobby Joe Blanton to testify that he had worked in proximity to appellant and Brian Davis for several years at the. Polunsky Unit. Blanton affirmed. that people on death row could be dangerous. Blanton testified that he was in daily contact with appellant, and appellant was always respectful and quiet. By contrast, Davis committed bad acts, includ.-ing throwing, feces on guards, threatening guards, and possessing contraband. Trial counsel testified at the hearing., on the motion for new trial that the prosecutor interjected information outside the record when he was questioning Blanton. From the record we can see that during cross-examination the prosecutor asked Blanton whether he could confirm that Davis had assaulted a correctional officer more than one time, and Blanton testified that he knew for sure of only one incident. Appellant’s trial counsel wanted to offer into evidence the State’s Rule 404(b) no^ tices from Davis’ case, in order to prove that Davis had more than one incidence of violence while on death row. The prosecutor objected that these documents were merely notices of the State’s intent to present evidence and prove up offenses in a different trial, and therefore they were hearsay. Defense counsel responded that the notices were necessary to rebut the false impressions created by the prosecutor during opening statement and during cross-examination that: (1) appellant had a clean disciplinary record only because it was impossible to get into trouble on death row; and (2) Davis had committed only one assault and had “only been written up one.time,” when in fact Davis had been written up sixty-six times for disciplinary offenses. The trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection to the Rule 404(b) notices. The court also noted that, under Rule 403, even if the notices were relevant, their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay. The court further noted that the proffered notices were cumulative of other evidence. Defense counsel was allowed to make a bill of exception but the notices were not admitted as evidence -to the jury. Appellant claims that not admitting the notices was error and prevented the defense from refuting the false impression the prosecutor created by asking Blanton to confirm that he had knowledge of only one assault committed by Davis while on death row. Trial counsel in the motion for new trial hearing claimed that the State led the jury to believe that it was not possible for death row inmates to commit misconduct because they were in isolation, and that the isolation, and not appellant’s changed character, were responsible for his lack of reported misconduct. At trial defense counsel, in a bill of exception, questioned the prosecutor about his personal knowledge as a prosecutor on Davis’ case of Davis’ misconduct while on death row. The prosecutor maintained that he was aware of only one incidence of assault. At that time trial counsel entered the 404(b) notices from Davis’ punishment retrial into the record. Trial counsel also requested that the defense be allowed to reopen its case and bring the prosecutor to the stand in front of the jury. This request was denied, at which point the defense requested a mistrial. The request for mistrial was also denied and the trial court next proceeded to the charge conference. Appellant opened the door on a comparison between himself and death row inmate, Brian Davis, and now he complains that the comparison did not pan out as expected. To remedy the problem, appellant asks this Court to find that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting him from introducing inadmissible evidence of misdeeds committed by Brian Davis. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant was not entitled to present .the State’s Rule 404(b) notices from Davis’ case to rebut a false impression. Pleadings from other cases are inadmissible as hearsay. See Sharpe v. State, 648 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (citing to Oliver v. State, 551 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)) (“This Court has consistently held that the pleadings and judgments from other cases are inadmissible as hearsay.”). Further, the trial court was well within its discretion to exclude the proffered evidence under Rule 403 because it was cumulative of Blanton’s testimony. Tex. R. Evid. 403. Error in allowing the State to make improper jury argument Appellant asserts in his brief that the State improperly argued in closing argument that appellant had no. opportunity to commit bad acts. However, appellant invited the State to make this argument by urging the jury during opening statements and testimony of defense witnesses to .believe that appellant, unlike other death row inmates, had not committed any misconduct for 22 years and would not be a future danger. The State did argue in closing argument that death row was a high security facility in which offenders were housed individually and had little opportunity to get into, trouble (although the prosecutor conceded that it was not impossible). The State even compared appellant to a vicious dog that had been muzzled and chained and asked the jury to consider whether that dog would be considered a future danger if he told you it had not bitten anyone since it had been restrained. The State also argued in closing that appellant had a long history of committing .violent crimes and played a video of an interview appellant gave to the média in which he expressed no, remorse for his crimes and even a willingness to do the same thing again. Appellant did not object during any of this argument by the State. During closing argument, defense counsel reminded jurors that Brian Davis had committed'numerous disciplinary offenses while on death row, including threatening and assaulting guards, but appellant had served the last twenty-two years on death row without incident. Defense counsel recalled for the jury the testimony of former corrections officer, S.O. Woods, Jr,, who described the lack of misconduct by appellant and the relatively minimal security of the Ellis Unit death row where appellant spent the first 9 years- awaiting execution of his current sentence. Counsel also recalled the testimony of Polunsky Unit corrections officers, Bobby Blanton and Wilford Griffin, who testified to the misconduct of Brian Davis and the lack of problems with appellant. Counsel urged the jury to find that appellant’s good behavior while in prison was a sufficient mitigating circumstance that merited a life sentence. 'The jury was free to consider assertions by both the State and the defense regarding future dangerousness and to decide which evidence it found more credible. However, what appellant ignores is that the State presented overwhelming evidence of appellant’s prior 13 criminal convictions, including stabbing a sheriffs deputy'in the chest with a piece of glass when he was 21 years old and a sexual assault of a 15 year-old girl when he was 46 years old. Although the State in its closing argument did rebut appellant’s claim that his past 22 years of peaceful conduct on death row was evidence that appellant would not be a future danger, the majority of the State’s closing argument regarding future dangerousness focused on the litany of past assaultive crimes committed by appellant. The mere facts. >of the crime ■ for which appellant was being re-sentenced in this trial may have been enough to convince the jury of appellant’s future dangerousness and no number of years on death row without misconduct may. have been enough to persuade the jury that he might not pose some future danger. We will not review the weight a jury may have given to mitigation evidence. We defer to the jury’s finding that the mitigation evidence presented by the defense was not sufficient to tip the scales against the evidence presented by the State of appellant’s future dangerousness. Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“While intoxication at the time of the offense and good behavior in prison are factors that a jury might consider, neither precludes a finding of future dangerousness.”). Appellant claims that the State misled the jury with incorrect information regarding the misconduct of another death row inmate, which the defense was not allowed to correct by introducing evidence to the contrary. However, appellant presents no evidence that Brian Davis, committed more than one assault while on death row, or that the State’s, characterization of death ro