Full opinion text
OPINION SAM J. DAY, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION A jury convicted Appellant Richard Lee Franks of aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment. In nine points, Appellant complains about: (1) the alleged denial of his right to a fair and impartial trial; (2) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of his detention; (3) the trial court’s denial of his motion for an instructed verdict; (4) the trial court’s denial of several motions for mistrial; (5) the trial court’s refusal to include an article 38.23 instruction in the jury charge; (6) the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance; and (7) the effectiveness of his trial counsel. We affirm. II. BACKGROUND On the evening of March 26, 1999, six-year-old Opal Jennings was playing with her two-year-old cousin Austin and four-year-old friend Spencer Williams on a lot adjacent to Opal’s grandparents’ house. While the three were playing, a car pulled up to the curb, and the driver got out, said hello to the kids, picked up Opal, hit her in the chest, threw her into his car, and drove off. Spencer described the abductor as a dark or light-complected, slender man who had long hair pulled back into a ponytail and marks on his face. Spencer further stated that the abductor was wearing a short-sleeve T-shirt, dark pants, dark sneakers, and a red ball cap and was driving a “purpledy-black” car. A person who regularly met with Appellant believed that the description given by Spencer matched Appellant and Appellant’s new car. Therefore, he contacted the appropriate authorities. When the authorities went to question Appellant, they noticed a black Cougar in his driveway and later learned that one of Appellant’s brothers had previously lived on the same street as Opal. Appellant was arrested on an outstanding traffic warrant. While in custody at the special crimes section of the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, Appellant consented to a search of his vehicle and gave a statement. Based on the statement, Appellant was arrested for the aggravated kidnapping of Opal. III.RECUSAL Appellant argues in his first point that he was denied due process because the trial judge, the Honorable Robert Gill, was not impartial. Specifically, Appellant contends that Judge Gill was required to sua sponte recuse himself from Appellant’s trial when Judge Gill’s testimony from a previous motion to recuse concerning disputed facts was introduced as evidence in Appellant’s motion to suppress hearing over which Judge Gill was presiding. Appellant was indicted on March 16, 2000, for the March 1999 aggravated kidnapping of Opal Jennings, and the case was assigned to the 213th District Court, over which Judge Gill presided. On June 14, 2000, Appellant filed a motion to recuse Judge Gill from hearing Appellant’s case based on the fact that Judge Gill had signed Appellant’s arrest and search warrants and had consequently determined the existence of probable cause, which Appellant contended constituted “comments reasonably calculated to be disseminated to the ... seated venire ... bearing on the Defendant’s innocence and admissibility of critical evidentiary matters.” Appellant’s recusal motion was set for a hearing on June 19, 2000, in front of the Honorable Jeff Walker. During the hearing, Judge Gill acknowledged that he signed Appellant’s arrest and search warrants as well as the State’s motion to seal the arrest warrant and affidavit. However, he explained that he did not recall discussing anything outside the four corners of the affidavit serving as the basis for the search warrant. Judge Gill also asserted that while he did not have much contact with Appellant during his arraignment, he noticed that Appellant was quiet. When questioned about the possibility that he could be called as a fact witness in Appellant’s case based on his observation of Appellant’s demeanor, Judge Gill responded that there were a number of people who could testify to the same things. However, he stated without an explanation that he did not agree that Appellant’s counsel could call him as a witness concerning those warrants he signed in relation to Appellant’s case. He also testified that he would expect to preside over pretrial motions to suppress the evidence he had previously concluded constituted probable cause to support the issuance of arrest and search warrants, but that it would not cause him any problems. Judge Gill finally testified concerning the effect his signing of the warrants would have on the jury’s impartiality. Specifically, Judge Gill asserted that his actions in setting Appellant’s bail at $1,000,000, determining there was sufficient probable cause for Appellant’s arrest, and determining that there was sufficient probable cause to search Appellant’s car did not constitute opinions on the case that could be conveyed to the jury. Following the hearing, Judge Walker concluded that Judge Gill’s actions in this case would not raise questions about his impartiality and denied Appellant’s motion. Before Appellant’s first trial for this offense, he filed a motion to suppress, which Judge Gill denied. Appellant did not call Judge Gill as a witness in the hearing or introduce his testimony from the recusal hearing into evidence. Before Appellant’s second trial, he filed a motion for Judge Gill to reconsider his ruling on Appellant’s previous suppression motion. During the hearing on his motion, Appellant called Judge Gill to testify; however, Judge Gill refused. Therefore, Appellant introduced Judge Gill’s testimony from the recusal hearing into evidence. After the introduction of the trial transcript from the recusal hearing, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Is there anything in particular in the trial testimony that you want to cite me to? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, nothing in particular. We find it to be very excessive. But I would go to the recusal hearing and I’d like to cite one thing. The Honorable Robert Keith Gill testifying. (Reading:) Question by [Defense Counsel]: Are you familiar that one of the grounds to recuse under Rule 18(b) is personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding? Answer: If it’s not, it should be. Your Honor, for all those reasons, we’d ask that you grant this motion to suppress and anything else, Your Honor, counsel wants to offer is fine. Judge Gill denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant argues that the failure of Judge Gill to recuse himself sua sponte violated his due process and due course of law rights under both the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Tex. Const, art. I, § 19. Specifically, Appellant initially contends that his conviction is void pursuant to the trial court’s violation of rule 605 of the rules of evidence. See Tex.R. Evid. 605. Rule 605 states in full that “[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.” Id. The language of rule 605 is unambiguous in its prohibition against a judge who is presiding over a proceeding from stepping down from the bench and becoming a witness in the very same proceeding over which he is currently presiding. Hensarling v. State, 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). We agree that under the applicable rule, Judge Gill’s testimony should not have been admitted into evidence. However, while we recognize the importance and mandatory nature of this rule, we are also cognizant of Appellant’s own role in any error. When requested to testify, Judge Gill refused and explained that he could not testify in the case. Appellant then introduced Judge Gill’s testimony from the recusal hearing without any objection by the State, and Judge Gill admitted it into evidence. While it is true that Judge Gill could have refused to admit such evidence, the defendant, as a general rule, cannot invite error and then complain about it on appeal. Hess v. State, 958 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref d). In other words, a “defendant may not create reversible error by his own manipulation.” Beasley v. State, 634 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); see also Kelley v. State, 823 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). This rule applies whether or not the error is perceived to be fundamental. Hess, 953 S.W.2d at 841; see also Cadd v. State, 587 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (op. on reh’g) (applying the rule of invited error to dispose of an issue on rehearing which, on original submission, the court determined constituted fundamental error). In Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 529-31 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1102, 120 S.Ct. 1840, 146 L.Ed.2d 782 (2000), the defendant requested the omission of a jury charge that was statutorily required to be given. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to submit the issue to the jury. In overruling the defendant’s contention, the court of criminal appeals expressly rejected the defendant’s complaint about the trial court’s deletion because the charge had been omitted upon the defendant’s request. Id. at 532. In the present case, Appellant requested the admission of the transcript. Appellant can not now complain on appeal that the trial court violated rule 605 based on evidence Appellant introduced. We understand that rule 605 specifically provides that a party need not object to the violation of the rule; however, application of the rule in a situation where the party not only failed to object to the trial court’s testimony, but also requested it not once but twice is unjustifiable. See Kelley, 823 S.W.2d at 302 (holding appellant cannot invite error and then complain about it on appeal). We hold on the facts of this case, therefore, that Appellant is estopped from complaining on appeal of the admission of the testimony. Appellant also argues that the introduction of Judge Gill’s testimony deprived him of a neutral and detached magistrate. Specifically, Appellant argues that his “substantive arguments concerning the warrants Judge Gill signed were not given any opportunity to be impartially weighed and considered” because Judge Gill also had to consider his own testimony in determining the outcome of the suppression motion. In fact, Appellant contends that “Judge Gill’s ruling in light of all the offered evidence by Appellant in support of his suppression motion directly contradicted and diminished Appellant’s position and gave the Judge the appearance of being aligned with the prosecution.” However, our discussion of invited error above also disposes of this contention. Appellant voluntarily introduced into evidence Judge Gill’s testimony that he now contends on appeal “was clearly adverse to Appellant and gave the Judge the appearance of impropriety frowned on by the Constitution.” Therefore, because Appellant specifically introduced Judge Gill’s testimony into evidence, we conclude that he is barred from complaining on appeal that such inclusion denied him of a fair and impartial magistrate. See Kelley, 823 S.W.2d at 302. Appellant’s first point is overruled. IV. MOTION TO SUPPRESS In his second point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of his allegedly illegal detention on the grounds that: (1) Appellant’s detention exceeded the scope of his arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant; (2) Appellant, due to his low intelligence quotient (I.Q.), did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; (3) officials failed to cease interrogation after Appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (4) search and arrest warrants in the case were not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate; and (5) the trial judge who “arraigned” Appellant failed to appoint him counsel at the time of the “arraignment.” A. Suppression Facts On August 13,1999, authorities discovered that Appellant had an outstanding traffic warrant. After determining that the warrant was still open and valid, officials arrested Appellant at approximately 8:15 p.m. on August 17, 1999, as he was getting out of his car at a convenience store in south Fort Worth. Appellant was then transported to the special crimes section of the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office and placed in a room for questioning. Danny McCormick, an investigator with the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, explained to Appellant that he was being arrested on an outstanding traffic warrant. McCormick also told Appellant that he wanted to discuss the disappearance of Opal Jennings. Appellant agreed to take a polygraph and signed a consent to search his vehicle. McCormick then Mirandized Appellant and had Appellant initial next to each warning to indicate that he understood his rights. No further questions or discussions were conducted until Eric Holden, the polygraph examiner, arrived. When Holden arrived at the office at approximately 10:30 p.m., he talked to Appellant in order to determine whether he wanted to take a polygraph examination and whether he was capable of being tested. Holden determined that Appellant was “anxious” to take the polygraph and that he was rested and was capable of being tested. The investigators then briefed Holden for about thirty minutes on the case, after which Holden obtained Appellant’s consent to proceed with the test. Holden initiated the polygraph at 2:01 a.m. and concluded it around 2:30 a.m. Appellant’s polygraph test results indicated the possibility of deception on Appellant’s part. Therefore, around 3:00 a.m., Holden informed Appellant of the results and asked him to explain his position. As Appellant told his story, Holden wrote five pages of notes. After about two and one-half hours, Appellant told Holden that he was tired and did not want to talk anymore; therefore, Holden terminated the conversation and showed Appellant the notes that he had taken to confirm that he had memorialized their discussion correctly. Appellant noted the veracity of Holden’s notes on the last page in his own handwriting. Holden then left the room and gave his notes to McCormick who had them transcribed. During this process, McCormick asked Appellant if he would allow McCormick to read the typed version of Holden’s notes to him to see if he agreed with it, which Appellant agreed to do. McCormick then took the typed statement to Appellant for his approval. McCormick read the Miranda warnings contained at the top of the typed statement to Appellant, stopping after each warning and asking if he understood them. McCormick testified that Appellant indicated that he understood each of his Miranda rights and nevertheless waived them. McCormick then read the statement to Appellant, which Appellant signed at 8:00 a.m. with only one correction. Arrangements were made to take Appellant before a judge. While he was being transported, Appellant told the officials that words had been put in his mouth and he had not done the things contained in the statement that he had signed. McCormick then asked Appellant if his statement was true, and Appellant answered that it was. The officials then obtained an arrest warrant for the aggravated kidnapping of Opal Jennings, and Appellant was “arraigned” on those charges. While Appellant was waiting to appear in court he began recanting his statement, only to later reaffirm his statement’s truthfulness. Appellant filed several pretrial motions to suppress his written statement and arrest warrant, as well as any oral statements he made during his detention. During the hearing on these motions, Dr. Daniel Lowrance testified that he gave Appellant a Wechsler Adult IQ test approximately three months before the suppression hearing that indicated that Appellant had an IQ of 64, which fell within the first percentile. Because Appellant’s IQ fell below the two-percent range, Dr. Low-rance concluded that Appellant suffered from a mild mental deficiency. He explained specifically that while Appellant had graduated from high school through the special education department, Appellant’s mental age was equivalent to a ten- or eleven-year-old child. Dr. Lowrance conceded during cross-examination, however, that the real-world experiences of a thirty-year-old man would be significantly different from those of a ten-year-old child. At the close of the hearing, the trial court made the following oral findings of fact, which it ultimately reduced to written form: • The arrest warrant that led to Appellant’s initial detention was valid and was signed by a neutral and detached magistrate; • Appellant’s statement was voluntarily given; • The Miranda warnings and waivers were legally sufficient under article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure; • There was no causal connection between the State’s failure to take Appellant before a magistrate and the resulting statement; • Appellant’s statement “I want to stop, I’m tired” was an ambiguous request to terminate .the interview and Mr. McCormick merely followed up on Appellant’s request to see if Appellant was actually invoking his Fifth Amendment right; and • Appellant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right. The trial court consequently overruled Appellant’s motion to suppress. B. Standard op Review In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court should give great weight to the inferences drawn by the trial court and law enforcement officers. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Davis v. State, 989 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Thus, the trial court is free to believe any or all of a witness’s testimony. Id.; Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993). The court of criminal appeals has provided three standards of review to be applied in reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We must afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports when the trial court’s findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. Likewise, we are to utilize the same deference in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution of the questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. However, we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within the preceding two categories. Id. In other words, we review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” that do not turn on a witness’s credibility and demeanor. Id. C. Voluntariness Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his statement was voluntarily given in compliance with Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 2002). Appellant does not dispute the fact that he was given and signed or initialed several Miranda warnings; he alleges instead that there was no showing that he understood the consequences of his waiver of his rights due to his mental impairment. Whether, due to Appellant’s diminished mental capability, he was unable to understand the consequences of his waiver of his Miranda rights is a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, because the resolution of this question involved the evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the record applying an abuse of discretion standard of review. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Article 38.21 of the code of criminal procedure provides that a statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that it was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion. Tex.Code Ceim. PROC. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 1979); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S.Ct. 480, 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995). Article 38.22, section 2(b) specifies that no statement made by an accused as a result of custodial interrogation may be admissible unless the accused “prior to and during the making of the statement, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived” the warnings prescribed by section 2(a). TexCode Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 38.22. The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is based on an examination of the totality of circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 744; Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet ref'd). An inquiry into the waiver of Miranda rights has two distinct dimensions. First, the waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). Second, the waiver must be made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 857 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); Ripkowski, 61 S.W.3d at 384. Appellant does not contend that he was coerced or intimidated into giving the statement at issue. Instead, he argues that due to his mental impairment, he was not aware of the consequences of waiving his Miranda rights. Consequently, we will focus our discussion on the second inquiry into the validity of his waiver of Miranda rights. While not alone determinative, mental impairment is a factor in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession. Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 744; Bizzarri v. State, 492 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Reed, 59 S.W.3d at 281. In essence, the question is whether the accused’s mental impairment is so severe that he was incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his statement. See Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Reed, 59 S.W.3d at 281-82. The court of criminal appeals has repeatedly upheld the voluntariness of confessions given by defendants with mental deficiencies. See Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 745-46 (appellant’s IQ ranged from the forties to the seventies and appellant could not read or write); White v. State, 591 S.W.2d 851, 858-59, 860 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (appellant’s IQ was measured at 75, 84, and 86 and he was considered “borderline mentally retarded”), overruled on other grounds by Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800, 809 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (appellant was “mildly retarded”), cert. denied, 453, U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3145, 69 L.Ed.2d 995 (1981); Nash v. State, 477 S.W.2d 557, 563-64 (Tex.Crim.App.) (holding that a defendant with an IQ of 76 and intelligence-emotional level of a twelve-year-old was capable of waiving his rights), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887, 93 S.Ct. 191, 34 L.Ed.2d 144 (1972); Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) (appellant had an IQ of 68 with a mental age of eight to ten years of age and had an educational equivalent of approximately second grade); Grayson v. State, 438 S.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (appellant had an IQ of 51 and was classified as a “low-grade moron”). While Dr. Lowrance testified that Appellant had an overall IQ of 64, he never testified that Appellant was incapable of understanding his Miranda warnings or understanding the effect of their waiver. Instead, Katherine Manning, an investigator with the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, testified that Appellant was read his Miranda warnings by McCormick shortly after Appellant arrived at the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office and gave his consent to search his vehicle. After each individual warning, McCormick stopped and asked Appellant if he understood, and Appellant indicated that he did. Appellant also initialed each warning. McCormick further testified that he had no trouble communicating with Appellant. Holden, who also gave Appellant written Miranda warnings in a written release necessary to continue the polygraph examination, testified that, while he was told before starting his examination that Appellant was a slow learner, he believed that Appellant understood the subject matter of their conversation. Consequently, Appellant never indicated that he did not understand the warnings. Appellant’s evidence that he was “mildly mentally deficient” does not, standing alone, render his statement involuntary. See Penny, 903 S.W.2d at 746; White, 591 S.W.2d at 858; Casias, 452 S.W.2d at 488; Grayson, 438 S.W.2d at 555. Therefore, because Appellant failed to provide any evidence that he was coerced or intimidated into giving his statement, and because Appellant provides this court with no evidence that he did not understand his rights or the consequences of abandoning them, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress his statement and the arrest warrant that relied on it. D. Invocation op Appellant’s Right to Remain Silent Appellant also contends that his statement was illegally obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, because his right to silence, once invoked, was not “scrupulously honored.” Specifically, he argues that his statement — “I don’t want to talk anymore. I’m tired.” — invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and that McCormick’s continued questioning of him after this invocation violated his rights. When faced with this argument at trial, the trial court specifically found that Appellant’s statement that he was tired and did not want to talk was “at best, an ambiguous request to terminate the interview and that the officers validly followed up on that request to see if the Defendant was, in fact, invoking a Fifth Amendment right.” Because this is a mixed question of law and fact whose resolution turns on credibility and demeanor, we review the trial, court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. A failure to cut off custodial questioning after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent violates his rights and renders any subsequently obtained statements inadmissible. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100-01, 96 S.Ct. 321, 325, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). A law enforcement officer may not continue to question the suspect until the officer succeeds in persuading the suspect to change his mind and talk. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257. But an officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect’s invocation of his right is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355-56, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257; Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 832, 116 S.Ct. 106, 133 L.Ed.2d 59 (1995). The court of criminal appeals has specifically explained that words may not be necessary to invoke a defendant’s right to remain silent under Miranda because Miranda makes clear that the interrogation must cease when the person in custody “indicates in any manner” that he wishes to remain silent. Watson v. State, 762 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). In fact, the court concluded that there need not be a formal invocation of Miranda rights; instead, anything said or done by the defendant that could reasonably be interpreted as a desire to invoke these rights should be sufficient to halt questioning. Id. at 598; Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630, 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874, 101 S.Ct. 215, 66 L.Ed.2d 95 (1980). As such, the court of criminal appeals, while recognizing that an express assertion of a right to remain silent is desirable, concluded that an express invocation of the right is not required. Watson, 762 S.W.2d at 599. Therefore, the court of criminal appeals determined that the defendant’s silence and refusal to answer questions, coupled with the police officers’ appreciation of the defendant’s wishes was sufficient to invoke the defendant’s right to remain silent. Id. Nevertheless, eight years later, in a case similar to the one at hand, the court of criminal appeals held that a similar statement to the one in question had failed to unambiguously invoke the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257. The court of criminal appeals specifically held that the defendant’s statement, “I can’t say more than that. I need to rest,” merely indicated that he believed he was physically unable to continue, not that he wanted to quit. Id. We believe that this case is bound by the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Dowthitt and Appellant’s statement that he did not want to talk anymore, he was tired is ambiguous and was merely an indication that Appellant was physically unable to continue. In fact, in Appellant’s own handwritten statement at the end of Mr. Holden’s notes, Appellant stated that he “told Mr. Holden that I am tired and we stop [sic] the interview at my request.” (Emphasis added). Because we conclude that Appellant’s statement was ambiguous, we hold McCormick did not violate Appellant’s rights by continuing the interrogation. E. Unnecessary Delay Appellant further contends that the State violated article 15.17 of the code of criminal procedure by failing to bring him before a magistrate within a reasonable time after arresting him on the traffic warrant. See Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 977, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4053 (amended 2001) (current version at Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 15.17(a) (Vernon Supp.2002)). Consequently, Appellant argues that the delay tainted the written statement he gave during this delay that provided the basis for the arrest warrant for the aggravated kidnapping of Opal Jennings, thereby requiring the suppression of both the statement and the arrest warrant. Specifically, Appellant alleges that his detention became illegal when the State failed to take him to a magistrate to make arrangements for him to pay his traffic ticket. We can find, however, no such request. While there is evidence that Appellant was “curious about how much it would cost to get out of jail,” we can find no evidence that Appellant ever made any attempt to actually pay his ticket. Instead, Appellant not only agreed to discuss the Opal Jennings case with the investigators, but he also submitted to a polygraph examination without ever requesting to be taken before a magistrate or offering to pay his traffic ticket. Appellant further seems to argue that because investigators lacked probable cause to arrest him for aggravated kidnapping, any delay in bringing him before the magistrate on the traffic violation was unreasonable because it allowed the investigators the opportunity to “partake in a classic ‘fishing expedition’ based on a ‘hunch.’ ” There was an approximate thirteen-hour delay in taking Appellant before a magistrate. While Appellant was arrested on an outstanding traffic warrant at 8:15 p.m. on August 17,1999, he was not taken before a magistrate to be arraigned on aggravated kidnapping charges until approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 18,1999. The court of criminal appeals has held that taking a defendant before a magistrate within approximately sixteen hours after his arrest satisfies the “without unnecessary delay” requirement of article 15.17(a). Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 807-08 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (op. on reh’g). Therefore, we hold that there was no unnecessary delay in taking Appellant before a magistrate after his arrest. F. Neutkal and Detaohed Magistrate Appellant further argues that: “[t]he arrest and search warrants for Appellant were not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate as required” by articles 15.01 and 18.01 of the code of criminal procedure; “[t]he issuance of said warrants was also not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of Appellant’s unlawful arrest;” and “[t]he warrants were not supported by probable cause.” See Tex.Code Crim. Proo. Ann. art. 15.01, 18.01 (Vernon 1977 & Supp.2002). Appellant provides absolutely no argument in support of any of these assertions. He does direct us to “see APPELLANT’S ‘FIRST POINT OF ERROR’ FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION” in support of his attack on Judge Gill’s neutrality and detachment. However, Appellant’s first point addressed Judge Gill’s failure to sua sponte recuse himself from Appellant’s second trial after Appellant introduced Judge Gill’s testimony from the hearing on Appellant’s motion to recuse him before the first trial. Even this discussion lacks any argument as to Judge Gill’s lack of neutrality or detachment at the time he signed the warrants. Therefore, we hold Appellant has failed to adequately brief this subpoint for our review. See Tex. R.App. P. 38.1(h) (providing that appellate briefs contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made); Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 591 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. refd) (explaining that by raising an issue and failing to present any argument or authority on that issue, the party waives that issue). G. Appointment of Attorney at Arraignment Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress when it failed to appoint him counsel to represent him during his arraignment the morning following his arrest on an unrelated outstanding traffic warrant. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right does not attach, however, prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, which may be initiated by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180,187-89, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297-98, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); Green v. State, 872 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). However, not every event following the inception of the proceedings is a “critical stage” that requires the presence of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Green, 872 S.W.2d at 720. In assessing whether a particular stage is critical, we examine the event “in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.” United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2575, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973); Green, 872 S.W.2d at 720. Appellant argues that his “arraignment” the morning after his arrest on the traffic warrant became a “critical stage” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to counsel once the State filed a motion to seal Appellant’s arrest warrant. We cannot agree with Appellant’s characterization of his hearing as an arraignment. The code of criminal procedure provides that an arraignment occurs after the filing of formal charges. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.01 (Vernon 1989) (“In all felony cases, after indictment, ... there shall be an arraignment”); Id. art. 26.02 (“An arraignment takes place for the purpose of ... hearing his plea”); Id. art. 26.03 (“No arraignment shall take place until ... a copy of the indictment was served on the defendant”). No formal charges had been filed in this case at the time of the hearing in question. Instead, the evidence suggests that Appellant was brought before Judge Gill for purposes of receiving his article 15.17 warnings, which the court of criminal appeals has held does not constitute an “arraignment.” Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 977, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen Laws 4053, 4053-54 (amended 2001) (current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proo. Ann. art. 15.17(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002)) (requiring the magistrate to inform the arrested person of the accusation against him, accusation contained in any affidavit filed, his right to have an examining trial, and his Miranda rights); Watson v. State, 762 S.W.2d 591, 594 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (explaining that an article 15.17 hearing is not an “arraignment” under Texas law). We need not decide here whether adversary judicial proceedings commenced during Appellant’s article 15T7 hearing, however. For even if this preindictment hearing was sufficient to mark the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings when the State requested the sealing of the arrest warrant, we can find no merit in Appellant’s argument that this alleged error had any effect whatsoever on the voluntariness of his statement that he gave at least five hours earlier or on the arrest warrant itself. Appellant does not raise his argument in terms of the propriety of the hearing in and of itself; instead, Appellant couches his argument in terms of its relation to his motion to suppress. As such, because Appellant fails to explain how his failure to be granted counsel during the article 15.17 preindictment hearing affected the arrest warrant or his written statement, both of which had already come into existence before the hearing, Appellant has provided us with no evidence upon which we may conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s second point is overruled. V. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INSTRUCTED VERDICT In his third point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an instructed verdict. A challenge to the denial of a motion for an instructed verdict is actually a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 597 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); see also Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 1432, 113 L.Ed.2d 483 (1991). The standard of review for the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 389-90 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). The critical inquiry is whether, after so viewing the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844, 118 S.Ct. 125, 139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. The issue on appeal is not whether we as a court believe the State’s evidence or believe that the defense’s evidence outweighs the State’s evidence. See Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 268, 83 L.Ed.2d 204 (1984). Our duty is not to reweigh the evidence from reading a cold record, but to act as a due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 846. Appellant specifically complains on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for an instructed verdict because the State failed to prove the corpus delicti for the offense of aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidentiary sufficiency that can be summarized as follows: an extrajudicial confession of wrongdoing, standing alone, is not enough to support a conviction; there must exist other evidence showing that a crime has in fact been committed. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see also Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Appellant’s statement, omitting the Miranda warnings, reads as follows: On March 26, 1999, I went to Saginaw Texas to see my brother, [Danny], when I saw Opel [sic] Jennings and two other kids (a boy and a girl) playing in a field beside a house. This was about 4:00PM in the afternoon or a little later. I was driving a Ford Cougar, and was by myself. I went by Danny’s house, saw the girls and a boy outside playing in the field. I stopped to talk to them and Opel [sic] said, “where are you going?” I was in the car and Opel [sic] was talking to me through the fence, she asked where I was going, and I told her that I was going to see if my brother was home so I could go visit with him. I told Opel [sic], “If he’s not there, I’m going home.” She said, “they might be at work,” and I then asked her how she was doing and she said she was doing good in school. She said that she was getting good grades. She came up to the car on the driver’s side, the driver’s door was open, she came up to the door, gave me a hug, and shook my hand. I asked her if she was passing and she said “I hope so.” I then told her that if she was doing good in school, then she would. I said, “I hope you pass.” The other kids wanted her to hurry up so she could play with them. I said, “you need to get back and finish playing what you'all are playing.” They were playing some kind of ball. She reached in the car, I thought she was going to try and grab me, I didn’t know what she was going to try to do, so I pushed her back and said, “what are you trying to do, I’m not the one to be doing it with.” I didn’t want to do nothing that would get me in trouble, she was just a kid. I don’t see myself doing nothing like that. I was afraid she was going to make a pass at me or get me to take her somewhere. She was wanting me to take her to the store, she went around the front of the car to get in the passenger side. I was afraid she wanted me to take her to have sex with her or something. I took her to the store, she got in the passenger side, the other two kids were outside playing. I told her I was going to bring her back so she could finish playing with the other two kids. I took her to the convenience store a block from the house, I sat in the car, and she got something to drink. She bought a coke, then she came back to the car, she said “thank you for bringing me up here,” but I said, “I won’t do it again.” Opel [sic] tried to move over toward me, I didn’t know what she tried to do. She tried to grab me between the legs, she grabbed my dick. She wanted me to fuck her, I told her no. She said “fuck me.” She tried to take her pants off, I told her “no.” She asked me why and I said “because I don’t do that.” She asked me why and I said, “because you’re too young and I could get in trouble for it.” “She unzipped my pants, took my dick out, she had it in her hand, she went down like she was going to go down on it.” I pushed her back, I put my dick back in my pants. She was sitting beside me, when she went to bend over I pushed her back. I said “I’m not going to have sex with someone younger than I am.” I told her that she needed to get out of the car, this happened on the way back from the store. I took her to her house, and left her off the same place where I talked to her at. I don’t know if she went in the house or not. I just wanted to get away from her. When I dropped her off, she gave me a hug, and I left, the other two kids were in the field playing. Aggravated kidnapping is defined as the intentional or knowing abduction of a person with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her or to violate or abuse her sexually. Tex. PeNal Code ÁNN. § 20.04(a)(4) (Vernon Supp.2002). The penal code further defines “abduct” as: “restrain[t of] a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2). The court of criminal appeals has further explained that secretion and the use of deadly force are part of the mens rea element of abduction, rather than the actus reus. Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S.Ct. 717, 133 L.Ed.2d 670 (1996); see also Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 475-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838, 117 S.Ct. 115, 136 L.Ed.2d 66 (1996). Consequently, the basic elements of “abduct” are: (1) a restraint is made (2) with a specific intent to prevent liberation by either of two particular means. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.01(2); Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 475-76. Because Appellant’s statement contains no admission whatsoever that he took Opal to the store with the intent to prevent her liberation by secreting her or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found or by using or threatening to use deadly force, Appellant, through his statement, did not confess to abducting Opal. Furthermore, Appellant’s statement fails to encompass any evidence of an intent on Appellant’s ’part to inflict bodily injury on her or to violate or abuse her sexually or to terrorize her, which is the additional requisite mens rea element of aggravated kidnapping. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.04(a)(4), (5); see also Chew v. State, 804 S.W.2d 633, 647 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd) (en banc op. on reh’g) (Butts, J., dissenting); White v. State, 702 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1985, no pet.). As such, because the corpus delicti rule only precludes the use of extrajudicial confessions as the sole basis for conviction of a crime, and because we determine that Appellant’s statement cannot be classified as a confession to aggravated kidnapping, we do not believe the corpus delicti rule is applicable to these particular facts. Accordingly, we will address Appellant’s complaint as a simple challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of aggravated kidnapping. As explained above, the essential elements of aggravated kidnapping are as follows: (1) a person; (2) intentionally or knowingly; (3) abducts; (4) another person with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her or to violate or abuse her sexually. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.04(a)(4). Unfortunately, the State’s one hundred-page brief devotes only two pages of argument in support of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We do recognize that the State focused its argument on the establishment of the corpus delicti of aggravated kidnapping, which does not require the showing of all the statutory elements of the offense, including the identity of the perpetrator. See Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232, 111 S.Ct. 2856, 115 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1991). However, the only evidence the State points to in support of the sufficiency of the evidence is the four-year-old eyewitness’s recollection that the perpetrator was a long-haired man wearing a red baseball cap who picked up Opal, hit her in the chest, and threw her in his car. Nevertheless, our own thorough evaluation of the record reveals the following additional facts that constitute legally sufficient evidence. In an effort to prove that Appellant abducted Opal, the State relied on five primary pieces of evidence: (1) the similarities between Appellant’s car and the description of the kidnapper’s car given at the scene; (2) witnesses’ descriptions of Appellant as wearing a long ponytail and a red baseball cap before the day of the abduction; (3) Appellant’s statement that he had contact with Opal the day she disappeared; (4) the recollection of allegedly incriminating statements Appellant made while in jail; and (5) Appellant’s knowledge of Opal’s neighborhood. A. Appellant’s Cak Three witnesses from Opal’s neighborhood testified that they had observed a suspicious car driving through the neighborhood before the abduction. When shown a photograph of Appellant’s 1986, black, two-door, Mercury Cougar with a black, vinyl half-roof, the three witnesses testified that the car they saw was “very similar,” “real similar,” and “similar” to Appellant’s car. The two witnesses who testified that Appellant’s car was “very similar” and “real similar” to the car they saw explained that they were not testifying that Appellant’s car was the car they actually witnessed driving through the neighborhood. Further, while the third witness could testify that Appellant’s car was “similar” to the one he saw the night of Opal’s abduction, he could not say it was the same car. He described the car he saw as a medium-sized, “real dark purple” car with “very dark tinted windows” and “shiny wheels” that sat higher in the front than it did in the back, which was not the appearance of Appellant’s car five months after the abduction. However, he testified that he observed the car during sunset, which could have caused it to look purple. He also ended his testimony by explaining that Appellant’s car could have been the one he saw. Four-year-old Spencer, Opal’s friend, also described the car the abductor was driving. Unfortunately, however, Spencer failed to give a consistent description. Throughout the investigation, Spencer said that the abductor’s car was “purpledy-black,” purply-pink, and a “dark car,” which Spencer’s grandmother testified ran the gamut from black to dark blue. He also told his grandmother that the car was either high in the front or in the back. Spencer also attempted to describe the type of car the abductor was driving. At the scene, Spencer said that the car he saw was similar to his mom’s car, a black Trans Am, but he said it was not just like it. He also saw a black Chrysler car, possibly a Cougar, drive by after the abduction, which he said looked like the one the abductor was driving. B. Appellant’s AppeaRance Spencer further aided the investigators by giving them a description of the abductor, whom he described as a fight or dark-skinned male with pimples, wrinkles, and long hair pulled back in a ponytail who was wearing a red baseball cap, dark short-sleeved T-shirt, dark pants, and dark sneakers. Spencer was not, however, consistent with his estimation of the age of the abductor. Spencer indicated the abductor’s age by pointing to an officer who was between forty and forty-five years old. Later, Spencer indicated that the abductor was between twenty and sixty years old. At the time of his arrest on the outstanding traffic warrant, Appellant was thirty years old. Six witnesses testified on behalf of the State about the length of Appellant’s hair before and after the abduction and Appellant’s propensity to wear a red baseball cap and his hair in a ponytail. This testimony revealed that Appellant “sometimes ... had [his hair] in a ponytail,” that he had a “long ponytail,” that his ham was “[o]ver the collar, long, and ... sometimes pulled back.” The testimony also established that Appellant “always wore a baseball cap,” “occasionally” wore a baseball cap, and wore a red baseball cap “all the time.” Appellant also told one of his questioners on the night he was arrested that he wore red ball caps. The evidence also established that Appellant had short hair shortly after Opal’s abduction. One -witness testified that when he met with Appellant six days after Opal’s disappearance, Appellant had really short, clean-cut hair, unlike he had ever seen on Appellant, while another testified that she never saw Appellant wear a red hat again. In support of Spencer’s description of the abductor as having marks on his face, the State also introduced a picture of Appellant, which one witness testified showed Appellant with what appeared to be “pimples or something like that on the side of his face.” The defense, however, introduced evidence that when Spencer was shown a picture of Appellant on television, he said that Appellant was not the abductor. The State pointed out, though, that the picture of Appellant on television did not show Appellant with long hair or wearing a red baseball cap. C. Appellant’s Statement The State also relied on the statement Appellant gave at the district attorney’s office on the night of his arrest on the outstanding traffic warrant as evidence of Appellant’s guilt. On appeal, Appellant points us to the inaccuracies in his statement when read in conjunction with the facts adduced at trial. While Appellant explained in his statement that he talked to Opal through a fence, there was no fence on the property on the day of the abduction. Instead, the fence was erected after the abduction. The State elicited testimony, however, that other than the fence, all of the other facts contained in Appellant’s statement capable of being confirmed were consistent with the actual events of Opal’s abduction. Specifically, the statement was consistent with the actual events with regard to the place where the children were playing, the time of day, and the general description of the car. Holden also testified that when he accused Appellant of killing Opal on the night Appellant was arrested, Appellant’s interview was terminated when he complained about being tired, which Holden testified he took as Appellant’s attempt to shut him out because he was getting too close. Lori Keefer, a special agent with the FBI, also explained that the morning after Appellant gave his statement, she and McCormick provided Appellant with a false scenario about another kidnapping. According to Keefer, Appellant became very agitated and said he did not do it. Keefer testified that Appellant told them that he knew that if he admitted to contact with Opal then he would get blamed for every similar crime that happened. D. Jailhouse Statements- Several inmates and jailers who became acquainted with Appellant during his confinement in the Tarrant County Jail also testified on behalf of the State about several statements Appellant made while in jail. Robert Wood, a jailer, testified that Appellant told other inmates that he had taken Opal to the store and dropped her off somewhere else. According to Wood, Appellant also told them that the State could not convict him because they did not have a body. In addition, Wood testified that Appellant told him he knew it was wrong to take Opal to the store and drop her back off, but he did not know how the State was going to convict him without a body. Roger Poison, another jailer, testified about a similar conversation he had had with Appellant in which Appellant told him that he did not kidnap Opal, he just took her to the store and dropped her back off. James Blackburn, a trustee inmate who cleaned Appellant’s cell one morning, also testified that Appellant told him that Appellant and his wife had heard that there had been an abduction in the neighborhood so they drove past Opal’s house to see how close it was. Appellant believed that he was picked up because the police saw his car in the area after the abduction. Blackburn also testified as follows: [STATE:] ... Did he later tell you anything else? [BLACKBURN:] Yes, ma'am, he did. [STATE:] What did he tell you? [BLACKBURN:] Then he said he’s been stalking her for about a year and he decided to go over to her house to get satisfied. And then after that, he picked her up, took her down the road to a fast-food place and when he got her out of the vehicle to take her inside, she started screaming. So he put her back in the [car] and he said that he went to go take care of her and he said after 15 or 20 minutes, she was gone. [STATE:] Can you describe for the ladies and gentlemen his demeanor when he said this? [BLACKBURN:] The way I took it, that he meant to go have sex with her. Andrew Bouyer, an inmate, testified that Appellant told him that he had picked up Opal in a dark blue or black car and had taken her out to eat, but when she offered to have sex with him, he dropped her off. Appellant also told Bouyer that the authorities would never find Opal, which Bouyer testified Appellant was concerned about because it could have linked him back to the crime. E. Appellant’s Knowledge of Opal’s NeighboRhood The State also relied on evidence that established Appellant’s knowledge of Opal’s neighborhood. The evidence shows that from 1989 until December 1998 Appellant’s half-brother lived approximately one hundred feet from the vacant lot where Opal was abducted. During this time, a witness saw Appellant at his half-brother’s house about ten times, the last being in August or September 1998. His half-brother testified that Appellant had last visited him at that address around June 1998. F. Sufficiency After a careful review of the record, we believe that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant abducted Opal with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her and violate or abuse her sexually. The direct evidence in the record suggests that Appellant had contact with Opal on the day in question. Wood, Poison, and Bouyer all testified that Appellant picked Opal up on the day of the abduction with the intent, according to Appellant’s conversation with Blackburn, “to get satisfied,” which Blackburn interpreted as to have sex with Opal. Moreover, Bouyer testified that Appellant was concerned about the possibility of Opal’s body being found because it could link him to the crime. Therefore, all of this evidence, coupled with the similarities between Appellant’s appearance prior to Opal’s disappearance and the description of the abductor, as well as the likeness Appellant’s car shared with the description of the abductor’s car, supports the essential elements of aggravated kidnapping. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve fairly conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89. Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s third point. VI. MISTRIAL Appellant contends in his fourth point that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because of the State’s concealment of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and jury misconduct. Mistrials are an extreme remedy for curing prejudice occurring during trial. Bander v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). They ought to be exceedingly uncommon and employed only when less drastic remedies are inadequate to the task of removing residual prejudice. Id. A. Brady Violation With this in mind, we turn to the question of whether the trial court was required to grant Appellant’s motion for mistrial based on evidence that child sexual abuse allegations had been made concerning Opal’s residence. Appellant argues that the State withheld critical exculpatory evidence concerning child sexual abuse allegations at Opal’s residence and the existence of pornography on the family’s computer. In answering this question, we examine the due process requirements of Brady. Under Brady, in order to ensure the accused a fair trial, a prosecutor has an affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to turn over to the accused all exculpatory or impeachment evidence, irrespecti