Full opinion text
OPINION MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER, Chief Justice. A jury convicted appellant, Dror Haim Goldberg, of murder and assessed punishment at 45 years confinement and a $10,000 fine. We affirm. In 51 points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence because he was illegally arrested; (2) admitting evidence that was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial; (3) admitting evidence obtained as a result of a school search that took place three years before the offense; (4) admitting irrelevant letters that appellant wrote to a friend two years before the offense; (5) permitting witnesses to identify appellant at trial after they had viewed impermissi-bly suggestive line-ups; (6) admitting statements that appellant made to German police officers when he was taken into custody; (7) allowing the State to use its peremptory strikes to exclude women from the jury; (8) violating the rule of “optional completeness” by not allowing appellant to introduce the entire statement he made to police after the State introduced other portions of the same conversation; and (9) permitting the State to comment on appellant’s decision not to testify. We affirm. BACKGROUND In the late morning or early afternoon of November 27, 1998, a young, white male entered a wig shop at the Weslayan Plaza Shopping Center in Houston, Texas. He walked in, looked around, and left without talking to either Manuela Silverio or Roberta Ingrando, both of whom were working there that day. At just before 4 p.m. the same day, the same man returned to the wig shop. Mrs. Ingrando saw the man walk up to Ms. Silverio and “punch” her in the neck, so Mrs. Ingrando ran to call the police. The man cut Mrs. Ingrando’s wrist, knocking the phone from her hands. He then stabbed her several times, asking her, “Do you like it?” He also told her that he was going to cut her nose and ears and make her pretty. Mrs. Ingrando’s husband, Roland, who was working in the back of the store, ran to the front when he heard his wife screaming. Mr. Ingrando threw a tray of hair rollers at the assailant, and then wrestled with the assailant briefly, sustaining several cuts during the struggle. The assailant fled the store. At the same time, Dr. Randall Beckman was leaving a pet store across the parking lot after purchasing dog food. Dr. Beck-man saw the assailant running across the parking lot. Thinking that someone might need assistance, Dr. Beckman got into his car and followed the man across the parking lot. Dr. Beckman saw the man get into a dark Lincoln Navigator and back out of a parking space. Dr. Beckman then passed the Navigator in the parking lot and was able to clearly see the driver, as the two vehicles passed driver’s side window to driver’s side window. After passing the Navigator, Dr. Beckman turned around and wrote down the license plate of the Navigator. Dr. Beckman then parked in front of the wig shop and went inside to see if anyone needed his help. He found Manuela Sil-verio lying in a pool of blood on the floor and Mr. and Mrs. Ingrando hysterically trying to telephone the police. Dr. Beck-man tried to revive Silverio, but she was dead. Mr. and Mrs. Ingrando were taken to the hospital. Mr. Ingrando’s injuries were minor, and he was soon released. However, Mrs. Ingrando required surgery and was hospitalized for at least a week. Dr. Beckman was interviewed at the scene of the crime, and he gave the police the paper upon which he had written the license plate number of the Navigator. He also described the assailant as a white male, approximately six feet tall, 18-19 years old, 165 pounds, with short-to-medium sandy blonde hair. The police ran the license plate number provided by Dr. Beckman and discovered that it was registered to Loren Nelson, who lived nearby at 2202 Dunstan. Loren Nelson, now Loren Goldberg, lived with appellant’s father at that address. Several officers drove to the 2202 Dunstan address and located the Navigator in a covered parking area behind the house. One of the officers touched the hood of the Navigator and it was still warm, but no one was at home at the residence except the housekeeper, Marleny Vilorio. Ms. Vilorio told the officers that Dr. Goldberg and Loren Nelson were out of town and that appellant, Dror Goldberg, had been left in charge of the house. The keys to the Navigator were in the house. At 6:07 p.m., appellant drove up to 2202 Dunstan in his white pick-up truck. Officer M.L. Sampson approached appellant and asked if he were Dror Goldberg. Appellant said that he was, and Officer Sampson handcuffed him, performed a pat-down search, and informed appellant of his rights. Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and indicated that he would be willing to talk with the officer. Appellant was later uncuffed, and he talked with the police about his whereabouts that day. He also executed consent forms for the police to search: (1) his father’s residence at 2202 Dunstan, (2) appellant’s own white pick-up truck; and (3) appellant’s apartment at 4301 Bissonnet. While at 2202 Dunstan, police noticed blood on appellant’s shirt and a red mark on his chest. They also seized the Navigator and had it towed to the police station, where it was later searched pursuant to a warrant. Before searching 2202 Dunstan, the police took a Polaroid photo of appellant. At 8:07 p.m., the police completed their search at 2202 Dunstan and transported appellant to the police station. During the ride to the police station, appellant told the police officer that the Navigator had been stolen in the past, but that every time it was stolen, the thief always just returned it. At the police station, appellant gave police his finger and palm prints. He also executed a waiver of the presence of an attorney and participated in a videotaped line-up. At approximately 11:00 p.m., appellant was released and went home with his mother. Meanwhile, at 8:30 p.m., Dr. Beckman looked at a photo array containing the Polaroid taken of appellant and indicated he was 80% certain that appellant was the man he had seen running from the wig shop. Dr. Beckman and Mrs. Ingrando were later shown the videotaped line-up and both identified appellant as the assailant. Appellant was indicted on February 17, 1999, but efforts to arrest him were fruitless because he had left the country. A federal warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was arrested at the Frankfurt Airport in Germany on June 21,1999. A. Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of November 27, 1998 Searches In points of error one through nine, appellant contends that he was arrested at 6:07 p.m., the moment he approached the house at 2202 Dunstan and was handcuffed. He argues that, because there was no probable cause to arrest him at that time, the trial court should have suppressed all evidence seized at 2202 Dun-stan, from appellant’s pick-up truck, and from appellant’s apartment. Appellant also contends that the photo and video line-ups should be suppressed because they, too, were fruits of his illegal arrest. 1. Standard of Review When a motion to suppress is presented, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The appellate court’s only role is to decide whether the trial court improperly applied the law to the facts. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). Unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion, we will not disturb its findings. Rivera v. State, 808 S.W.2d 80, 96 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Williams, 937 S.W.2d at 26. Further, the appellate court affords nearly complete deference to the trial court’s rulings on “mixed questions of law and fact,” such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion, where the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court. Id; Taylor v. State, 945 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (applying standard and reversing trial court). 2. Facts Relating to the Seizure of Appellant At approximately 4:24 p.m. on the day of the murder, officers on the scene at the wig shop determined that the Navigator seen by Dr. Beckman was registered to Loren Nelson, who lived at 2202 Dunstan. Several of the uniformed officers left the wig shop and drove to the Dunstan address, where they found the Navigator parked in an open carport behind the house. The carport opened on to a public alley behind the residence and the license plate was clearly visible from Shepard Street. One of the officers walked up to the Navigator, felt it, and determined that the hood was still warm. Homicide detective Mike Sampson was dispatched to the Dunstan address and arrived at 5:45 p.m. His purpose in going there was to seize the Navigator and question the maid. Sampson talked to the maid, Marleny Vilorio, and she told him that Loren Nelson and Dr. Goldberg were on vacation, but that their son, Dror, had been left in charge. As the officer was talking with Vilorio, appellant drove up to the residence in his white pick-up truck, got out, and approached the officers. He was wearing a white t-shirt and grey shorts. Vilorio indicated that appellant was the son to whom she had referred. Sampson asked appellant if he was “Dror Goldberg,” and appellant answered affirmatively. Sampson then handcuffed appellant and read him his rights. Sampson explained that a witness to a murder had seen the assailant flee in the Navigator and that he was there to seize the Navigator. Appellant was initially very nervous — almost hyperventilating — but he soon calmed down. Sampson asked appellant if he had driven the Navigator that day. Appellant answered that he had not, but stated that he had driven his father and Ms. Nelson to the airport in the Navigator the day before. Sampson had appellant feel the hood of the car, and appellant agreed that it had been driven recently. He also gave Sampson a detailed description of his activities of the day. Sampson asked appellant if he would consent to a search of 2202 Dunstan, and appellant agreed. Sampson unhandcuffed appellant, escorted him back to the police car, and had him sit in the back. He told appellant that he had the right to refuse consent and the right to read the “consent to search” form before signing it. Appellant read the form and signed it. It was witnessed by two other officers at the scene. Although there were several officers present, and all were armed, no weapons were drawn and no one threatened appellant in any way. While still outside with appellant, Sampson noticed a red mark near the center of appellant’s chest, near the collarbone. Appellant explained that he must have gotten the injury playing football. Sampson then escorted appellant into the house. He had appellant wait in the dining room while the house was searched. At some point, appellant indicated that he needed to use the restroom. Sampson escorted appellant to the restroom, and, on the way back to the dining room, Sampson noticed what he believed to be a bloodstain on the back of appellant’s shirt. He took the shirt as evidence and had appellant put on another shirt. Sampson also took a Polaroid photograph of appellant while they were in the house. No other evidence was found in the house. At approximately 7:30 p.m., after searching the Dunstan house, Sampson also asked appellant if he would consent to a search of his apartment at 4301 Bissonnet and his white pick-up truck. Again, Sampson informed appellant that he had the right to refuse consent, and, again, appellant agreed to the search and signed the “consent-to-search forms.” Two knives were recovered from appellant’s pick-up truck — one an illegal double-edged knife, the other a Swiss army knife. When police searched appellant’s apartment, they recovered a pair of dark warm-up pants, with boxer shorts still inside them, and a dark thermal long-sleeved shirt from the floor of appellant’s closet. Sampson secured the Dunstan house at approximately 8:00 p.m., and appellant was taken to the police station at 1200 Travis Street, where he agreed to provide the police with a set of “elimination” finger and palm prints. Appellant was questioned at 1200 Travis by Officer Brian Harris, during which time he agreed to participate in a videotaped line-up. However, to conduct the line-up they had to travel to the old police headquarters at 61 Reisner Street. The fingerprints that appellant had agreed to provide were also to be taken at 61 Reisner. During the drive to 61 Reisner, appellant was not handcuffed and sat in the front seat next to Harris. During the drive, appellant asked whether it would matter that the Navigator had been stolen before. He went on to say that the Navigator had been stolen on several prior occasions, but that it was always simply just retened to the Dun-stan address. He theorized that someone must have a duplicate set of keys. After arriving at 61 Reisner, appellant was given a document entitled “Waiver of Right to Have an Attorney Present at a Show Up.” The document informed appellant that the purpose of the line-up was to see if witnesses could identify him as a person who has committed a crime. It also informed appellant that he had the right to have an attorney present at the line-up, or to have one appointed if he could not afford one. Finally, the document stated that appellant made the waiver of his own free will. Appellant signed the document, and then participated in a videotaped line-up. At approximately 11:00 p.m., appellant was released and went home with his mother. Meanwhile, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Dr. Beckman was shown a photo array containing the Polaroid photograph of appellant, which was taken at the Dunstan residence. Dr. Beckman was 80% certain the man he chose from the photo array, appellant, was the same man he had seen fleeing the wig shop. Both Dr. Beckman and Mrs. Ingrando were later shown the videotaped line-up, and both identified appellant from the line-up as the perpetrator. 3. Detention or Arrest at 2202 Dun-stan? Appellant contends that he was arrested at 6:07 p.m., when he approached 2202 Dunstan and was handcuffed. The State argues that this was nothing more than an investigative detention. Whether a detention is an investigative detention or an arrest depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the detention. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 378-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Hilla v. State, 832 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). The reasonable use of handcuffs or the ordering of a suspect to lie down alone does not convert an investigative detention into an arrest. Handcuffing alone will not necessarily convert a temporary detention into an arrest. See Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Burkes v. State, 830 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hilla, 832 S.W.2d at 778. Whether an officer believes a suspect is detained or arrested, is not determinative of the issue. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 412; Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 378; Hilla, 832 S.W.2d at 778. Rather, we look to the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, which is to be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the advantage of hindsight. Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118. “Furthermore, allowances must be made for the fact that officers must often make quick decisions under tense, uncertain and rapidly changing circumstances.” Id. Police may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the detention: investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety. Id. at 117. An investigative detention implies that the obtrusive act is for the purpose of actually investigating. Burkes, 830 S.W.2d at 925. Thus, where no investigation is undertaken, the detention cannot be considered investigatory and rises to the level of an arrest. Id. When Sampson was dispatched to 2202 Dunstan, his assignment was to seize the Navigator and to begin an investigation by questioning the maid. As such, he was clearly conducting an investigation when he was approached by appellant. It was reasonable, in light of the fact that a brutal murder had just occurred, for Sampson to handcuff appellant for the officer’s own safety while attempting to ascertain whether appellant had, in fact, been driving the Navigator that day. After appellant was identified as the person who had been in charge of the Navigator, it was reasonable for Sampson to continue to detain him while he, Sampson, completed his investigation of the scene. Although Sampson read appellant his rights, appellant was never told that he was under arrest. Rather, Sampson told appellant that he was investigating how the Navigator came to be seen leaving the scene of a murder. Sampson then continued his investigation by questioning appellant about whether he had driven the Navigator that day. Therefore, we conclude that the initial handcuffing of appellant was not an arrest, but a temporary detention, and was justified by concerns for the officer’s safety. The appellant’s continued detention was justified by Sampson’s need to continue the investigation he had been dispatched to 2202 Dunstan to perform. A Reasonable Suspicion for Investigatory Detention? Having decided that Sampson’s initial encounter with appellant at 2202 Dunstan was an investigatory detention, not an arrest, we must next decide whether it was based upon reasonable suspicion. A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer, in light of his experience, has a reasonable suspicion supported by articu-lable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). A temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific, articulable facts at the time of the detention which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. A reasonable suspicion means more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). A detention is not permissible unless the circumstances objectively support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Officer Sampson testified that he detained appellant because: (1) the Navigator had been seen leaving the scene of the wig shop murder; (2) appellant fit the description of the person witnesses had seen fleeing the wig shop and getting into the Navigator; (3) the maid told Sampson that appellant had been staying at 2202 Dunstan and had been left in charge of the Navigator; and (4) the Navigator was still warm, as if it had been driven recently. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Sampson to suspect that appellant was involved in the wig shop murder and to temporarily detain him for further investigation. 5. Voluntary Consent to Search? Having decided that’the investigatory detention of appellant at 2202 Dun-stan was lawful, we next address the issue of whether he voluntarily consented to the searches of 2202 Dunstan, his apartment at 4301 Bissonnet, and his pick-up truck. A search pursuant to voluntary consent is an exception to the requirement that a search be based upon a warrant supported by probable cause. See Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). For consent to be valid, however, it must be voluntary. Id. at 817-18. The fact that a defendant is in custody does necessarily mean that his consent was involuntary. Id. To determine voluntariness, trial courts “must [assess] the totality of all the surrounding circumstances— both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. at 818, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In Reasor, the defendant was arrested at gunpoint and the police illegally swept his house for weapons. 12 S.W.3d at 815-17. Nevertheless, the court found that his subsequent consent to search was voluntary because appellant twice received his statutory warnings, signed a consent to search form, and was repeatedly warned that he had the right to remain silent. Id. at 818. The court concluded that the defendant was aware of his rights, but, nonetheless, voluntarily chose to waive them. Id. at 819. In this case, as we have already determined, appellant was lawfully detained. No weapons were used to effectuate the detention. Appellant was read his rights, and, additionally, Officer Sampson told him three times that he had the right to refuse to consent to any search. Finally, appellant read and signed the consent to search forms. There is nothing to indicate that ■ appellant’s “will was overborne” by oppressive police conduct. See Jackson v. State, 968 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041). Furthermore, it was not unreasonable for the officers’ to continue to detain appellant while they executed the search he had voluntarily given them permission to conduct. 6. The Line-up Evidence and Evidence Collected at Police Stations Although not addressed in a specific point of error, appellant also appears to complain that the videotaped line-up was also a product of his illegal arrest. The State points out that even if appellant was arrested at the time he was transported to the police station, (1) appellant consented to participate in the line-up, and (2) there was probable cause for appellant’s arrest. We agree with the State on both arguments. a. Consent The evidence shows that appellant was asked whether he would consent to participating in a videotaped line-up, and he answered affirmatively. To conduct the line-up, appellant and Officer Harris had to travel from 1200 Travis to 61 Reisner. During the ride to the Reisner police station, appellant was not handcuffed and sat in the front passenger seat of Harris’s car. Appellant read and signed a “Waiver of Right to Have an Attorney Present at a Show Up.” In the document, appellant acknowledged the purpose of the line-up, the fact that he knew could have an attorney present, but chose to proceed without counsel, and the fact that his decision to do so was made of his “own free will.” Again, there is nothing to indicate that appellant’s “will was overborne” by oppressive police conduct. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. b. Probable Cause Furthermore, even if we were to assume that appellant’s detention became an arrest when he was transported from 2202 Dunstan to 1200 Travis, we would nonetheless find that the arrest was proper based upon article 14.03(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the person is found in a suspicious place and under circumstances that reasonably show that such person has been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.2002). Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d at 87; Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Probable cause deals with probabilities; it requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. “The rule of probable cause seeks to accommodate the sometimes opposing interests of safeguarding citizens from rash and unreasonable police conduct and giving fair leeway to legitimate law enforcement efforts.” Id. Police broadcasts that are based on probable cause and that report a felony and a description of the perpetrator satisfy the requirements for a warrantless arrest. Law v. State, 574 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Therefore, we must examine the information that Officer Sampson had gathered by 8:00 p.m. — the time he decided to transport appellant to 1200 Travis for further questioning. Officer Sampson, in his own words, described his probable cause as follows: [Defense Counsel]:What justification, what evidence, what factual discoveries did you make justifying the continuing custody of Dror Goldberg and asking one of the uniformed officers to take him down to homicide? [Officer Sampson]: As we have stated, he matched the general description of the person seen running from the wig shop. The Navigator that was seen at the location that the person got into was registered to the Dunstan address. Dror Goldberg was left in charge of the house. He did have access to the keys of the Navigator ... He had an injury that I saw on his chest that was consistent in appearance to what I had been told about some activity that took place inside the wig shop where the murder took place. His accounting of his day did not actively or accurately — let me retract — restate that. His accounting of his day did not account for 4:00 p.m. at the approximate time that the offense was supposed to have taken place. I used that to base my decision to have him taken to the Homicide Division to give a statement. Although not mentioned by Officer Sampson in this passage of testimony, Sampson had also discovered that appellant had blood on his shirt. Although the blood turned out to be appellant’s own blood, Sampson could not have known that at the time. Also not mentioned by Officer Sampson, but present in the record, was evidence that appellant became extremely nervous — almost hyperventilating — when he was informed of the reason for the police investigation. In light of the facts that: (1) appellant matched the description given by witnesses at the scene of the crime; (2) the Navigator that was seen fleeing the crime was left in appellant’s care and control, appellant had access to the vehicle, and the vehicle was still warm; (3) appellant could not offer a clear alibi for the time of the offense; (4) appellant had a wound to his chest that was consistent with information that a struggle had occurred at the wig shop; (5) appellant had what appeared to be blood on his shirt; and (6) appellant almost hyperventilated when he was told the purpose of the officer’s visit, we conclude that Officer Sampson had sufficient cause to believe that appellant was involved in the wig shop murder. c. “Suspicious Place” To justify a warrantless arrest under article 14.03(a)(1), the State must prove not only the existence of probable cause, but also that the defendant was found in a “suspicious place.” Very few places are suspicious per se. Johnson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1986.) A place may become “suspicious,” however, based on the surrounding circumstances. Id. The facts available to the arresting officer at the time, and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, may render a place suspicious so as to invoke article 14.03(a)(1). Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421. A place can be suspicious because: (1) an eyewitness or police officer connected the place to the crime; (2) a crime occurred there or the police reasonably believed a crime occurred there; (3) specific evidence directly connected the defendant or the place with the crime; or (4) appellant’s behavior was a factor in determining whether a place was suspicious. See State v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264, 268-69 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). In this case, appellant was found at 2202 Dunstan in his father’s yard. Although not an inherently suspicious place, the presence of the Navigator at 2202 Dunstan connected the defendant to the crime scene, because an eyewitness saw the same Navigator at the crime scene and appellant had access to the Navigator. Therefore, the presence of the Navigator rendered 2202 Dunstan a suspicious place. Even if we agree that appellant’s detention became a full blown arrest when he was transported downtown for further questioning, we conclude it was a valid arrest pursuant to article 14.03(a)(1) because it was based upon probable cause and appellant was found in a suspicious place. Therefore, evidence collected at 1200 Travis and 61 Reisner, including the line-ups, were not the fruit of an illegal arrest. Accordingly, we overrule points of error one through nine. 7. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Exterior of Navigator? In point of error 10, appellant contends the trial court erred by considering the fact that the hood of the Navigator was warm when touched by police. Specifically, appellant argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, which the police violated by approaching the vehicle and touching it. We disagree. The record shows that the Navigator was parked in a driveway, covered by an open carport, behind the residence. The carport consisted of metal poles supporting a canvas-type awning, which provided shade for vehicles parked beneath, but did not shield them from public view. The carport was accessed from a public alley that ran behind the house. The Dun-stan address was on the corner of the block, and the Navigator was visible from both the public alley and the adjoining street. In fact, the Navigator was parked no more than a few feet from Shepherd Street and the adjacent sidewalk and was also within a few feet from the public alley. To the left of the Navigator was a hedge of bushes, which partially separated the carport from the street. However, there was no privacy fence. The rear entrance of the house was clearly visible through the open carport. a. No Search In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974), the defendant was arrested and his car was seized from a public parking lot and impounded. 417 U.S. at 588-89, 94 S.Ct. at 2468. At that point, the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle had been used in a crime. 417 U.S. at 587-88, 94 S.Ct. at 2467. However, the next day, without first obtaining a warrant, the police examined the tire treads and took paint scrapings from the car. 417 U.S. at 589, 94 S.Ct. at 2468. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the physical examination of the exterior of the car was not a search. 417 U.S. at 592-93, 94 S.Ct. at 2470. [NJothing from the interior of the car and no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect, were searched or seized and introduced into evidence. With the “search” limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed. Stated simply, the invasion of privacy, “if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.” Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. (citations omitted). In Hudson v. State, 588 S.W.2d 348, 350-52 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, following Card-well, also held that the examination of the exterior of a vehicle was not a search, even if the examination took place on private property. In Hudson, the defendant was arrested in his home, while his car, which was parked next to his home, was photographed, both inside and out. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the photographs of the exterior of the car were admissible because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his car. Id. at 352. Therefore, taking photographs of the exterior of the car was not a search. Id. at 351, 352. The court found it unimportant that the police were on private property when the photographs were taken. See id. at 352. It is true that the car was taken from a public parking lot in Cardwell, but that was not the basis of the [Supreme] Court’s decision. The gravamen of the holding was that the owner of the car had no reasonable expectation that the exterior of his car would not be examined. Id. (footnote omitted). In this case, the police, while standing on a public street or in a public alley, were able to identify the license plate of the Navigator as the same number that Dr. Beckman had written down at the murder scene. At that point, they had probable cause to believe that the Navigator had been used in the crime. Touching the hood of the vehicle, like the taking the photographs in Hudson or the paint scrapings in Cardwell, was not a search, but was simply a physical examination of the exterior of the vehicle. b. probable cause plus exigency However, even if we were to conclude that the touching of the Navigator was a search, it would nonetheless be permissible because the exigency of the situation made the procurement of a warrant impracticable. To justify a warrant-less search, the State must show the existence of probable cause at the time the search was made, and the existence of exigent circumstances, which made the procuring of a warrant impracticable. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hooper v. State, 516 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). As we stated above, the police had probable cause to search the vehicle once they determined that the license plate and description of the vehicle matched that provided by Dr. Beckman at the scene of the crime. See Blount v. State, 965 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (holding that police broadcast describing alleged crime committed, the color of defendant’s car, and defendant’s license plate number established probable cause). Obtaining a warrant before touching the vehicle to see if it had been recently driven would have been impracticable, because, obviously, the heat emanating from the engine would have dissipated while the officers were waiting for the warrant. Therefore, based on the existence of probable cause plus exigency, we conclude that the officers were justified in touching the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. Furthermore, the intrusion by the police by walking into the open carport and touching the vehicle was so slight, that the privacy interest appellant seeks to protect is not one we believe that society would deem reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511-12, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (holding that fourth amendment protects people in places where they have a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable). Finally, even if we were to disregard the fact that the hood of the car was warm, our disposition of the preceding points of error would remain unchanged. For these reasons, we overrule point of error 10. B. Relevancy of Knives and Clothing 1. The Knives. When the police searched appellant’s pick-up truck they recovered two knives — one a Swiss army knife and one a large, double-edged knife. In points of error 11-13, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting the knives because they were either (1) irrelevant, or (2) the probative value of the knives was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. The State argues that the alleged error was not preserved because appellant did not object every time the State presented evidence about the knives. We believe that the error was preserved because the trial court heard appellant’s relevancy objection outside the presence of the jury and ruled that the evidence of the knives would be admitted. “When the court hears objections to offered evidence out of the presence of the jury and rules that such evidence be admitted, such objections shall be deemed to apply to such evidence when it is admitted before the jury without the necessity of repeating those objections.” Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). a. Relevant? Thus, we must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence regarding the knives was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Where the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and the reviewing court will uphold the trial court’s ruling. Id. The exclusion of evidence does not result in reversible error unless it affects a substantial right of the accused. See Tex. R.App. P. 44.2(b). Substantial rights are affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any consequential fact more or less probable than it is without the evidence. Tex.R. Evid. 401; Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh’g). Appellant argues that the knives that were recovered from the truck are irrelevant because the State did not theorize that either of the knives was the murder weapon. Appellant points out that the coroner was of the opinion that the victim’s wounds were caused by a single-edged knife, but that the large knife recovered from appellant’s truck was a double-edged knife. Appellant also points out that, in her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that it was likely that appellant disposed of the actual murder weapon. We do not agree that appellant’s possession of the double-edged knife was irrelevant. The coroner testified that he was 75% certain that a single-edged knife was used in the attack. That, of course, leaves a 25% chance that a double-edged knife was used. The victim was killed with a knife, and a knife was recovered from appellant’s truck. There is no conclusive proof that the knife recovered from the truck could not have been the murder weapon. It was within the province of the jury to decide whether or not the knife recovered from the truck was the knife used by appellant. As such, the double-edged knife was relevant. The Swiss army knife we will address in our harmless error analysis below. b. Unduly Prejudicial ? Having decided that at least one of the knives was relevant, we must now decide whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value. Texas Rule of Evidence 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence, and it presumes that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Verbois v. State, 909 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.). The burden is on the party opposing admissibility to demonstrate that the negative attributes of the admitted evidence substantially outweigh its probative value. Id. The trial court’s decision to admit the evidence should be overturned only on an abuse of discretion, i.e., only when it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. In this case, the risk of undue prejudice was that the jury would convict appellant based on the fact that he carried an illegal knife. However, the prosecutor never mentioned to the jury that the double-edged knife that was recovered from appellant’s» truck was, in fact, illegal. Furthermore, the second knife recovered was a Swiss Army knife, and was clearly not illegal. It is hard to see how the jury would be unfairly prejudiced against appellant simply because two apparently legal knives were recovered from his truck. Accordingly, we hold that the admission of the knives did not violate Rule 403. c. Harmless Error? Even if we were to agree that the knives were irrelevant, we would nonetheless conclude that the admission of the knives was harmless error. The record shows that the State did not emphasize the knives in presenting their case. Less than 5 pages of a 35 volume reporter’s record mention recovery of the knives. The prosecutor did not mention the knives during her closing argument at all. Although the double-edged knife was illegal, the State, by not mentioning that fact to the jury, lessened any chance that the jury would convict appellant simply because he was a bad person who carried illegal knives. Although the jury asked to see the knife recovered from appellant’s truck during deliberations, it is unlikely that it placed undue weight on the knife in deciding whether to convict, especially in light of the State’s argument that the killer probably disposed of the murder weapon. Similarly, we find it hard to imagine that the jury would place undue weight on the fact that the police recovered an innocuous Swiss army knife, because such knives are not illegal and are commonly carried by law-abiding citizens everyday. Therefore, even if we had found the knives irrelevant, which we did not, we would nonetheless conclude that their admission did not affect a substantial right of the accused. Accordingly, we overrule points of error 11,12, and 13. 2. The Clothes When the police searched appellant’s apartment, they recovered a pair of dark warm-up pants with boxer shorts still inside them and a dark thermal long-sleeved shirt from the floor of appellant’s closet. These clothes, generally, matched the description of the clothes the murderer was wearing. In points of error 14-16, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting the clothes because they were either (1) irrelevant, or (2) the probative value of the clothes was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. The State argues that the alleged error was not preserved because appellant did not object every time the State presented evidence about the clothes. In this instance, we agree with the State. There was no objection to the clothes that was heard and ruled on outside the presence of the jury, as there was with the knives. Therefore, appellant cannot rely on Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) to preserve error. To preserve error for appeal, appellant was required to make a timely, specific objection at the earliest possible opportunity. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 763 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim.App.1991). Officer Sampson testified, without objection, that when he searched appellant’s apartment, he recovered clothes that were similar in appearance to those worn by the man seen fleeing the scene of the murder. He also identified State’s exhibits 225, 226, and 227 as the clothes that he recovered from appellant’s apartment. The prosecutor, however, did not move to introduce the clothes during Sampson’s testimony. Instead, the clothes were introduced through a later witness, Officer Alfredo Mares, a member of HPD’s Crime Scene Unit Division, who actually took possession of the clothes at the scene of the search. Mares testified that exhibits 225, 226, and 227 were, in fact, the same clothes that he recovered from appellant’s apartment. The prosecutor then moved to introduce the clothes, and appellant’s counsel, for the first time, objected that the evidence of the clothes was irrelevant. Appellant’s objection came too late because both Sampson and Mares had already testified about the clothes, and the clothes had already been shown to the jury. See Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627, 635 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (stating timely objection must be made as soon as ground of objection becomes apparent). Accordingly, we overrule points of error 14,15, and 16. C. Admission of Journal Confiscated at School in 1995 and Letters from 1996 In points of error 17-26, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence that was recovered as a result of a school search that occurred in 1995, three years before the murder. A brief recitation of the pertinent facts is appropriate. 1. Background On April 10, 1995, appellant threw a • beer can out of his car window as he drove into the Bellaire High School parking lot at 10:30 in the morning. The can almost hit Houston Independent School District (HISD) Officer Duggan, who, along with HISD Officer-in-Training Griest, approached appellant and asked if he had been drinking. Appellant told Duggan that he had been drinking, and that he had some beer left over from a party the night before. He volunteered to show the officers the beer in his trunk. Before beginning the search appellant’s of trunk, Dug-gan radioed Bellaire Police Officer Bartlett for help. The police found the beer in a cooler in appellant’s trunk and told appellant that, if he would pour it out, he would not be charged as being a minor in possession of alcohol. Appellant poured out the beer. The officers, with appellant’s consent, searched appellant’s car and found three marihuana cigarettes in the ashtray. The police also discovered a small novelty knife on appellant’s keychain, which was illegal because it was double-edged. Appellant was taken to the assistant principal’s office and his parents were notified. At the principal’s office, appellant’s backpack was searched to see if it contained any other weapons or contraband. During the search, Officer Griest opened a spiral notebook to look for drugs. She testified that they sometimes find smashed marihuana, cocaine, and LSD in books. As she flipped through the pages of the notebook, Officer Griest noticed a drawing of the devil with blood “all over it and blood everywhere and it was just — it was striking.” On the very next page was a title “How to Kill a Woman.” Officer Gri-est testified about what was written under that title as follows: [Griest]: I remember that I read thoughts. It wasn’t a poem, it wasn’t a letter and it took you from beginning to end. It took you — talked about abducting. Talked about using a knife to make several cuts so that when she bled, the body would be covered, I mean, in red. Talked about her begging for her life. You could feel it. I mean, it was disturbing. Talked about her begging for her life and then the joy when she looked into his eyes and he realized they were dead and that he had no use for the bitch. [The prosecutor]: Do you remember the notebook saying anything about words that he used? [Griest]: Yes. [The prosecutor]: What? [Griest]: Say things to her, Do you like it? Want me to do it some more? I’m going to do this. Just really talking. It was very talkative to the victim while she was being stabbed. Very tormenting. [The notebook described] how she would sweat, how her eyes would look, just the terror. You could — it was like reading the best novel you’ve ever read in your life. The notebook also contained a title “How to Rape a Woman,” which Griest described as follows: Talking about during penetration putting hands around her neck and her begging him stop, her begging him till she couldn’t beg anymore because her air flow was getting cut off and getting erect when he let go right before her body — right before, I guess, he said lifeless and she would gasp for air and sexually turn him on. * * * * There were several references. I mean, talked about urge to kill, talked about having the — you know, the urge be [sic] so strong that he didn’t think he could fight it anymore. It was getting harder and harder. Contemplating suicide. Griest testified that she asked appellant why he would write such “sick shit” and he replied, “I have thoughts.” Appellant was then released into the custody of his parents and the notebook was turned over to them. Appellant was charged with possession of an illegal weapon and placed on juvenile probation. 2. Reading Notebook an Illegal Search? Appellant contends that reading the notebook was an illegal search under the article 18.02(10) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: A search warrant may be issued to search for and seize: (10) property or items, except the personal writings by the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence tending to show that a particular person committed an offense[.] Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 18.02(10) (Vernon Supp.2002). However, no search warrant was issued in this case, thus, article 18.02(10) is not applicable. See Morton v. State, 761 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988, pet. ref'd). Furthermore, we note that no search warrant is needed to perform a school search of a student who is under the school’s authority. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). To determine whether a school search is reasonable we must first determine whether the search was justified at its inception. Coronado v. State, 835 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742-43). A search is justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated, or is violating, either the law or the rules of the school. Id. Second, we must determine whether the search, as actually conducted, was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. Id. A search is permissible in scope when the measures adopted and used are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and are not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. a. Justified at Inception? In this case, the HISD officers were justified in detaining and searching appellant and his vehicle because Officer Duggan saw appellant throw a beer can out his car window. This was evidence that both the law and school rules had been violated. The further detention and search of appellant’s backpack were likewise justified because marihuana cigarettes were found in appellant’s ashtray, and it was reasonable for the officers to attempt to determine whether appellant was carrying marihuana onto school premises. Officer Griest testified that she was flipping through appellant’s notebook because students often hid drugs in their books. Therefore, we conclude that the search of appellant’s notebook was justified at its inception because the officers had a reasonable ground for suspecting that appellant was violating the law and school rules by carrying marihuana. b. Excessive in Scope? Appellant argues that, even if the HISD officers were justified in searching his backpack, they exceeded the necessary scope of the search by reading the notebook. Again, we disagree. In determining that a warrant requirement was unnecessary for school searches, the Supreme Court recognized “[t]he special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself ...” T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 105 S.Ct. 733, 749, 83 L.Ed.2d 720. As we have learned from unfortunate events such as the school shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, school officials must take seriously perceived threats to the safety and well-being of their students and faculty. As we stated earlier, Officer Griest was conducting a reasonable search for drugs in appellant’s notebook when she noticed a picture of a demon dripping blood and the title “How to Kill a Woman.” We believe that the officer then had the right, if not the responsibility, to read the passage in the notebook to determine whether it constituted an immediate threat to a student or teacher at Bellaire High School. We do not agree with appellant’s assertion that private writings are always beyond the scope of a permissible school search. In fact, in T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court held that it was permissible for a school administrator to read letters found in a student’s purse, which implicated her in drug-dealing. 469 U.S. at 347, 105 S.Ct. at 746. Accordingly, we hold that appellant’s notebook was seized and read pursuant to a valid school search. There was no violation of Texas law or the Fourth Amendment. S. Violation of Privilege Against Self-IncHmination? Appellant, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), argues that admitting the notebook violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In Boyd, the Supreme Court held that a subpoena duces tecum ordering the defendant to produce an invoice that established his guilt for non-payment of taxes was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Court noted that it was “unable to perceive that the seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.” 116 U.S. at 633, 6 S.Ct. at 534. The Court further stated that “a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the [defendant] ... is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ...” 116 U.S. at 634-35, 6 S.Ct. at 534-35. However, in the 1970’s, the Supreme Court began to retreat from the “broad statements” of Boyd. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2744, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (noting, “the continued validity of the broad statements contained in [Boyd and earlier cases] has been discredited by later opinions”). In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1579-80, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), the defendants, relying on Boyd, argued that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protected them from complying with IRS summonses requiring them to produce personal tax records prepared by the defendant’s accountants. The Court noted that the “Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but only applies when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.” 425 U.S. at 408, 96 S.Ct. at 1579. Because the preparation of the papers sought was “wholly voluntary,” the Court concluded that it was not “compelled testimonial evidence.” 425 U.S. at 409-410, 96 S.Ct. at 1580. The Court also noted that there was no general Fifth Amendment right to privacy. Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence, which in the Court’s view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort. We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy — a word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against “compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.” 425 U.S. at 399-401, 96 S.Ct. at 1575-76. In Andresen v. Maryland, the police seized personal business records of the defendant that they discovered while performing a search pursuant to a search warrant. 427 U.S. at 466, 96 S.Ct. at 2741. The defendant argued that the introduction of the documents into evidence violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 427 U.S. at 469, 96 S.Ct. at 2743. The Supreme Court disagreed, and, in doing so, elaborated on what the terra “compelled self-incrimination” meant. [Petitioner was not asked to say or do anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present. This case thus falls within the principle stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913). This principle recognizes that the protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment “adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.” Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. [322] at 328, 93 S.Ct. [611] at 616 [34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973)]. Thus, although the Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect[,] the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence. 427 U.S. at 473-74, 96 S.Ct. at 2745. The Supreme Court concluded that, “because the statements seized were voluntarily committed to paper before police arrived to search for them” appellant was not compelled to give evidence against himself. 427 U.S. at 477, 96 S.Ct. at 2746-47. Finally, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984), the Court again concluded that, because the personal documents at issue in the case were prepared voluntarily, they “ ‘cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence’ in and of themselves.” 465 U.S. at 612 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 1242 n. 9. Even though the documents at issue in Doe were personal business records, the Court, without limitation stated, “If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not privileged.” 465 U.S. at 612 n. 10, 104 S.Ct. at 1242 n. 10. At least four federal courts of appeals have concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not protect documents, business or personal, that were voluntarily prepared. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir.1993) (holding calendar prepared by grand jury target not protected by Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir.1991) (holding appointment books and records relating to vacation home not protected by Fifth Amendment privilege); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C.Cir.1989) (holding privilege does not cover contents of any voluntarily prepared records, whether personal or business); In re Grand Jury Proceedings on Feb. 1, 1982, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir.1985) (holding contents of business and personal documents not privileged unless created under compulsion). This interpretation is supported by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in United States v. Doe, wherein she writes: I write separately ... just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of [the Court’s] opinion: that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd v. United States, but our decision in Fisher v. United States, sounded the death knell for Boyd. “Several of Boyd’s express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time,” and its privacy of papers concept “ha[d] long been a rule searching for a rationale ...” Today’s decision puts a long overdue end to that fruitless search. 465 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 1245 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As the S