Full opinion text
HARPER, Judge. By proclamation duly issued the Governor of this State convened the Legislature in special session for certain purposes named in the proclamation. Thereafter, during the session, he called their attention to a number of other matters, and requested or authorized legislation thereon, but neither in the original., proclamation nor in any subsequent message to the Legislature did he authorize the passage of a law regulating elections in this State. We do not deem it necessary in the disposition of this case to name the subjects on which he did request or authorize legislation, but simply to state that no amendment of the election laws was authorized by him in any of his messages, for in this case, under the facts, it is only necessary for us to determine the authority and power of the Legislature, in the absence of express authority from the Governor, to provide for the gathering of information in regard to the mode and conduct of elections in the past, that such information might form the basis for recommendation for future legislation. On the fourth day of the special session the following simple resolution was introduced and adopted by the Senate: “Whereas, The preservation of free government and of the right of the people to control their governmental affairs depends upon' maintaining and safeguarding the purity and freedom and honesty of the ballot and the uncorrupted independence of the voters—in short, upon a patriotic and uncorrupted ballot properly safeguarded so as to secure it against any improper influence and to insure that it will be counted as cast by the voter, and “Whereas, The laws of this State regulating elections have been recently enacted and changed many times during recent years, and are in need of revision and amendment, as has been generally ad- . mitted by many eminent citizens familiar with such laws and their operation, and “Whereas, The conduct of elections in recent years, particularly that held on the 22d of July, 1911, will, if investigated, place this and future Legislatures of Texas in possession of information which will be very valuable for the purpose of promoting the formulation and passage of such laws as will properly safeguard the purity, freedom and honesty of the ballot and insure that it will be counted as cast and returns of elections made in accordance with the ballots as cast, and “Whereas, It is charged and believed by a great number of citizens, and has been published in many newspapers throughout the State that large sums of money were used to influence the result of the election held on July 22, 1911, and the manner in which money was used in opposing the adoption of such amendment and the large amount alleged to have been used, has been challenged and criticised as having been improper, unlawful and against sound public policy; which charges, if true, demand further legislation that will prohibit the corruption of the ballot, and , “Wlhereas, It has been charged by many persons of good standing that those engaged in operating breweries or interested therein, and those engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors have for many years maintained an organization of some kind for the purpose of' collecting funds for improper use in elections in this State and in various counties and precincts in the State and for improper' use in influencing legislation in this State, and “Whereas, It has been frequently charged that funds collected from brewery owners and from liquor dealers have been used in promoting the candidacy of various candidates for office in this State, and “Whereas, It has been charged by many persons of good standing that various public officers of this State are upon the payroll of such alleged organizations, and these charges, if true, demand legislation 'to secure disinterested public service upon the part of all public officials, and “Whereas, It has been charged by the Executive Committee of such State-wide Prohibition Amendment Association, through a report made by a subcommittee of such executive committee, which said report was signed by the following named citizens of Texas, as members of said subcommittee: Thomas H. Ball, B. F. Looney, Thomas B. Love, W. J. McDonald, Cullen F. Thomas, D. E. Garrett, B. Harper Kirby, W. T. Bartholomew, T. C. Harriss, William E. Hawkins, B. H. Powell, J. S. Crumpton and Bichard Mays, that in the recent election held in this State on July 22, 1911, many fraudulent and illegal ballots were cast, and other methods of fraud and evasion of the election laws resorted to at said election, and other charges made concerning the purity of the ballot box, and “Whereas, Said parties charge that they have gone far enough into an investigation of such election to convince them to a moral certainty that the result of the election of July %%, 1911, does not represent the verdict of a majority of the qualified voters of the State lawfully entitled to participate in the election, and “Whereas, Such committee charges that evidence has been submitted to them which convincingly shows that at the very inception of the contest over the State-wide prohibition amendment and in preparation therefor, that the liquor interests entered into a widespread conspiracy to control the election by the use of very large numbers of poll tax receipts illegally issued and that where sworn officers of the State, such as tax collectors, could be reached, poll tax receipts were procured directly from their offices and mailed to voters who had never applied for them or made the necessary affidavits, although the receipts issued therefor- showed upon their face that all the requisites of the law had been complied with, and “Whereas, It is further charged by said .committee that in a number of counties it was the practice to have deputies, in some instances negroes, to go out and solicit the payment of poll taxes, their services being paid for by the liquor interests, which also paid for the poll tax receipts, and “Whereas, Said committee make many other charges which have been published in the daily press of this State, which, if true, render it necessary and proper that this investigation provided for in this resolution should be had to the end that further safeguards may be provided to secure the honesty and fairness of elections and the making of true returns thereof, and “Whereas, It becomes of vital importance to this or any subsequent Legislature, which may legislate for the purpose, of carrying out section 4 of article VI of the Constitution, that the methods used to evade and violate the laws and destroy the purity of the ballot box shall be known in order that adequate laws preserving the purity of the ballot may be enacted by this or a subsequent Legislature, and the evidence of the violations and evasions of the laws preserved for the assistance of this or any subsequent Legislature which desires to legislate to protect the purity of the ballot box, and “Whereas, Unless an investigation be now made, much evidence useful to future Legislatures will become inaccessible, therefore be it “Kesolved by the Senate of Texas, That a committee of five (5) be elected by the Senate to conduct such investigation as may be lawful and proper for it to conduct to ascertain and report to the Senate upon the aforesaid matters and the following matters: “1. The amount of money used by any association of persons or • person representing such in promoting and favoring, and the amount of money used by any organization or association of persons, or representative of such in opposing the prohibition amendment to the Constitution, voted upon on July 22, 1911, how such money was used, by whom used, from whom collected, or by whom contributed, for what purpose paid out, to whom paid out, including all matters in connection with such usé and such expenditure of such money. 2. The fraudulent issuance of poll tax receipts, if any, and unlawful payment thereof, or use thereof, and the evasions, if any, of the provisions of the election law to prevent illegal and corrupt voting. 3. Any frauds committed in procuring naturalization papers, or filing declarations of intention of becoming a citizen. 4. Any illegal voting in such election and any fraud committed, and the failure, if any, of any of the officers of such election or' any officers of any county to comply with the election laws. 5. What legislation, if any, is advisable to further safeguard elections against corruption, fraud and improper influences. 6. Whether or not there exists in this State an organization or association of any kind furnishing or expending money to improperly influence elections or legislation in this State, and the methods pursued by such organization, if any, in the conduct of its operation, and the amount of money that is being collected by such organization, the purpose for which it is being collected and how it is being expended, and whether or not the same is being expended in such manner as to contravene sound public policy, and what legislation, if any, may be necessary to remedy the evil. 7. To report generally upon such legislation as may be necessary to correct any or all of the evils, if any, in relation to these matters about which this investigation is directed. ' “In addition to the powers and authority conferred upon the committee hereby created, the said committee shall have all the power and authority granted to such committee by chapter 7 of the General Laws of the State of Texas passed at the Thirtieth Legislature at its regular session and approved February 18, 1907, to be found on pages 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of such laws, and in addition to such powers the said committee hereby created and any member thereof and any subcommittee appointed by such committee shall have all such powers and authority conferred by the Act aforesaid and full power and authority to hear testimony, to swear witness, to administer oaths, to send for books, papers, letters, telegrams and documents, and to compel the production of such matters and things before said committee or subcommittee or any member thereof, as such committee or subcommittee or member may deem necessary to the proper carrying out of the purposes of this investigation. And in addition to the means authorized by the Act aforesaid, the said committee or any member thereof or subcommittee may report any refusal to obey process or any disobedience of process or any evasion of process to the Senate, and have any person guilty thereof or charged of being guilty thereof brought before the bar of the Senate to be dealt with as the Senate may direct. “The expenses of the said committee and of any subcommittee and members thereof in conducting the investigation hereby directed and in procuring the attendance of witnesses and paying therefor and the service of process and the paying therefor, and all other expenses necessarily incurred in conducting the investigation shall be paid out of the contingent expense fund of the Senate upon the warrant of the chairman of said committee authorized by the committee itself. “The said committee shall be known as the Senate Investigating Committee, and such committee shall elect its own chairman and such other officers as it may desire, and establish and make such rules for governing its own procedure and forms of process as may be permitted by law. “Such committee shall cause the testimony of all witnesses to be taken by a competent stenographer, questions and answers, and shall make a report to the Senate at this session of the Legislature, and shall accompany such report by the evidence taken by it and its recommendation for such changes in the present election laws and for the enactment of such new laws as the evidence adduced may demand for the preservation to the people of their constitutional right to the purity of the ballot.” On the same day the Senate adopted a resolution petitioning the Governor to submit certain subjects for legislation, to wit: “(1) The amendment of the election laws of this State so as to provide against illegal payment of poll taxes, and to reenact such further laws as may be necessary to safeguard the ballot box and secure fair and honest elections without a taint of irregularity, fraud or bribery. (2) The prohibition of brewers, brewery owners, stockholders therein, saloons, saloon owners, and all others connected directly or indirectly with the liquor traffic in this State, from contributing to campaign funds to' influence elections, and the prohibiting of persons within this State from receiving, using, or disbursing such funds as might be so contributed by the liquor traffic, etc. (3) The enactment of suitable legislation requiring all persons engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors to close their places of business from 7 o’clock p. m. until 6 o’clock a. m., and to keep same closed during those hours, and providing penalties, etc. (4) The prohibition of the sale of liquor within this State except in unbroken packages and quantities not less than one quart, and prohibiting same from being drunk on the premises where sold, with penalties, etc. (5) The prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors within ten miles of any State educational institutions, including the State University, that are supported in whole or in part by appropriation from the State’s general revenue, and for penalties,” etc. A committee consisting of Senators Vaughan, McNealus, Warren, Carter and Terrell, of McLennan, was selected by the Senate as the committee authorized by the above resolution, and after organizing they summoned before them relator W. H. Gray, who refused to answer a number of questions propounded by the committee or under its authority. The relator answered all questions propounded in regard to violations of then existing laws, but declined to answer who, if anyone, was in the employ of the anti-prohibition organization, what salary, if any, was paid to such persons; from what source contributions were received, except that none were received from corporations so far as he knew. He declined to answer whether or not he personally was connected with the anti-prohibition organization in the recent campaign; whether he secured the services of anyone to oppose the amendment, and what, if anything, was paid to such persons, virtually declining to answer any and all questions in regard to the funds received, by whom contributed, the mode and manner of its expenditure, the salary, if any, paid to anyone, and questions in regard to the conduct of the recent election. The committee reported to the Senate the refusal of the witness to answer the questions, embodying in its report the questions propounded, and the fact that the witness had declined to answer, with the following recommendation: “Whereas, It appearing to the Senate of the State of Texas, that the said refusal of said witness to answer said question as aforesaid was wilful, and that the same is an obstruction to the lawful proceedings both of the said committee and of the Senate; therefore be it “Besolved by the Senate of the State of Texas: “First. That said W. H. Gray be, and is hereby held and adjudged to be guilty of contempt of this Senate and of obstructing the lawful proceedings of a lawful committee of this Senate. “Second. That the said W. H. Gray be cited to appear before the bar of this Senate at 3 o’clock on the 24th day of August, A. D. 1911, then and there to show cause, if any he has, why the aforesaid adjudication of contempt against him should not be held and adjudged in contempt of this Senate and punished therefor, as required by law.” After a hearing of the cause by the Senate the following resolution was adopted adjudging relator guilty of contempt and assessing his punishment: “Therefore be it resolved by the Senate of the State of Texas, now in session in the city of Austin, Travis County, Texas, That W. H. Gray be, and he is hereby, held and adjudged to be in contempt of this Senate, and his punishment therefor is assessed at imprisonment and confinement in the county jail of Travis County, Texas, for the period of twenty-four (24) hours, and the assistant sergeant-at-arms of this Senate is hereby ordered and directed to take the body of the said W. H. Gray, and commit it to the jail of Travis County, Texas, for the period of twenty-four hours, unless the said W. H. Gray shall sooner purge himself of said contempt and testify before said committee in aswer to the questions propounded by it or under its direction, and which he has failed and refused to answer, the said questions being pertinent to the matters authorized by the, resolutions herein-before set out, and the jailer of Travis County, Texas, is hereby ordered and directed to receive the body of the said W. H. Gray into the jail of Travis County, Texas, for the purpose of the imprisonment and confinement herein imposed; and a copy of this resolution and order shall be a sufficient authority for the commitment and the imprisonment of the said W. H. Gray.” - When arrested under a commitment issued by the Lieutenant-Governor by virtue of said resolution; relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was 'granted by a member of this court, and after consultation with all members of the court, the cause was set down for hearing at the next regular term of this court. The sergeant-at-arms of the Senate filed with the court the resolution adopted by the Senate, and the writ of commitment issued by the Lieutenant-Governor as authority for his action in the premises. Eelator appeared and filed the following answer: “For answer to the return of the respondent filed herein, and showing that he arrested and holds relator by authority of a writ of commitment, issued on the 26th day of August, 1911, by A. B. Davidson, president of the Senate of the Thirty-Second Legislature of said -State, and attested by the secretary of said Senate, commanding the arrest and confinement of relator: “Eelator avers that the issuance of said commitment was illegal, and that the same is now and has been at all times void and violative of the Constitution of the United States of America, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, and of the laws of this State- for the following reasons, among others, to wit: “First: Because the Senate had no lawful authority to create and appoint the committee before which he, on their demand, refused to answer certain questions, and to deliver certain properties, by them propounded to and required of him; and had no lawful authority to pass the resolution under which said committee was acting; and had no authority in law to confer upon said committee the powers, nor any of the powers attempted to be conferred by the resolution providing for and raising said committee; and no authority to pass said resolution in manner and form and substance as it was passed. “Second: Because said committee had no lawful authority to ask or to require relator to answer any of the questions which he refused, to answer, nor to require him to deliver any of the property which he refused to deliver. “Third: Because said Senate had no lawful authority to pass the resolution adjudging him guilty of contempt and assessing a punishment against him of confinement in the county jail of Travis County; as he had committed no act or offense of which said Senate had jurisdiction. “Fourth: Your relator avers that the investigation authorized by the resolution passed by said Senate on August 3, 1911, requiring the appointment of said committee, was not offered, introduced, nor passed for any legitimate or lawful purpose, or within the line of the duty or privileges of said Senate; but that same was passed solely for political purposes of the Prohibitionists of the State of Texas, and in order that they might gain or endeavor to gain an unlawful and unwarranted advantage over the anti-prohibitionists of this State; that same was not passed, nor was any investigation made, or intended to be made, to gather information in good faith for legislative purposes, nor to aid or assist in any legislation pending or contemplated by said Senate, or the Legislature of which said Senate formed a part, nor to assist or aid in the performance of any duty or lawful act of said Senate, nor were any of the questions asked, to which answers were refused, pertinent or relevant to any legislative proceedings pending or contemplated by said Senate. “Fifth: Your relator avers that said resolution and the acts of said committee raised thereby, and the acts and resolutions of the Senate -done thereunder are in violation of the following provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America and of the Constitution of the State of Texas, respectively: “(a) The attempted punishment, and the manner and form in which it is attempted, of the relator by said Senate, violates that part of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides: Tío person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall private • property be taken for public use without just compensation.’ And also violates the Fourth Amendment of said Constitution, which reads as follows: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ “(b) The passage of the resolution, the action of the committee thereunder and the attempt to punish this relator in the manner and form in which it has been done, is in violation of the following provisions of the Constitution of the State of Texas: Section 9, article 1: ‘The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable seizures and searches, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or tiling shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.’ “Section 19, article 1: ‘lío citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised except by the due course of the law of the land.’ “Section 29, article 1: ‘To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this hill of rights is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto or to the following provisions shall be void/ “Section 1, article 2:' ‘The powers of the government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another, and no person or collection of persons being of one of these departments shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others except in the instances herein expressly provided/ “Section 1, article 3: ‘The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which, together, shall be styled—“The Legislature of the State of Texas.”' “Section 11, article 3: ‘Each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings, punish members for disorderly conduct, and with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same offense/ “Section 15, article 3: ‘Each House may punish by imprisonment during its sessions any person not a member for disorderly or disrespectful conduct in its presence, or for obstructing any of its proceedings, provided, such imprisonment shall not, at any one time/ exceed forty-eight hours/ “Section 32, article 3: ‘Ho bill shall have the force of a law until it has been' read on three several days in each House. . . / “Section 40, article 3: ‘When the Legislature shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling such session, or presented to them by the Governor; and no such session shall be of longer duration than thirty days/ “Section 37, article 3: ‘Ho bill shall be considered unless it has been first referred to a committee and reported thereon, and no bill shall be passed which has not been presented and referred to and reported from a committee at least three days before the final, adjournment of the Legislature/ “Section 44, article 3: ‘The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers, servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in this Constitution . . .. but shall not grant, by appropriation, or otherwise, any amount of money out of the treasury of the State to any individual on a claim, real or pretended, when same shall ’ not have been provided for by preexisting law, nor employ anyone in the name of the State unless authorized by the preexisting law/ “Section 1, article 5: ‘The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one supreme court, in courts of civil appeals, in a criminal court of appeals, in district courts, in county courts, in commissioners courts, and in courts of the justice of the peace, and in such other courts as may be provided by law.’ ” Counsel for relator and respondent appeared and. made able oral arguments on the questions presented, and have filed briefs manifesting great research and thought, and on account of the importance of the questions involved, we have devoted much time to a careful study of the briefs, the authorities cited, and the questions involved. Under the first paragraph of relator’s answer, it is insisted that one branch of the Legislature (the Senate) had no authority to appoint a committee and authorize it to conduct an investigation for the purpose of obtaining information and making recommendations; that if such power existed, it existed in the Legislature as a whole, and it would take the concurrent action of both Houses, together with the approval of the Governor, to give life and validity to an investigating committee; (2) that if the Senate had such power in a general session, it did not have it at a special session; that at the special session it was limited in all its actions to such matters as were submitted by the Governor. Section 40, article 3, provides that there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated by the Governor in his proclamation. If the powers granted the committee come within the meaning of the word "legislation,” then it was prohibited at a special session and would also be in violation of article 3 of section 1, which vests the legislative power in the Senate and House of Representatives jointly. The legal definition of the word -“legislation” in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary is “The act of giving or enacting laws— the authority conferred by or exercised under the Constitution of a State or of the United States to make new laws or to alter or repeal existing ones.” In Words & Phrases, vol. 5, page 4086, it is said: “Wharton in his lexicon defines ‘legislation’ as follows: The act of giving or enacting laws—the power to make laws.” The definition of Bouvier is adopted in the Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 2, page 822 (2d ed.), and adds to it: “To legislate is to give, pass or enact law or laws,” citing authorities under notes 1, 2 and 3. In 25 Cye., 180, it is said the word “legislate” means, to make laws, citing Abbott’s Law Dictionary, and the definition of the word “legislation” is given as the “act of giving or enactment of laws,” citing authorities to be found on that page. In the dictionaries the word is defined: “Legislate—To make or enact a law or laws: legislation—Act of legislature; act of making or passing a law or laws; the enactment of laws; laws or statute enacted.” We do not think that the appointment of a. committee to gather information and make recommendations in regard to amending, enacting or repealing laws is “legislation” within the meaning of the word as used in our Constitution. However, it is insisted that if the committee could be appointed at a special session, it took the joint action of both . Houses to create it. Section 37, article 3, of the Constitution, provides that “Ho bill shall be considered unless it has first been referred to a committee,” etc. Does this mean a committee appointed by authority of both Houses, or a committee appointed by either House ? Since the organization of our government, each branch of the Legislature has assumed authority to appoint its own committees, without the concurring action of the other branch, and our Supreme Court in the ease of The Day Land & Cattle Company v. State, 68 Texas, 544, holds: “The answer of the defendant alleged that the Act of February 25, 1879, was never legally passed, in that the bill was not referred to a committee of each House before it was acted upon. The answer shows that the bill was referred to a committee by the Senate, who reported upon it favorably before the Senate acted upon it, but that it was not referred to a committee by the House of Eepresentatives before that body acted upon it. “The Constitution provides that ‘no bill shall be considered unless it has been first referred to a committee and reported thereon/ (Const., article 3, section 7.) This does not in terms require a bill to be referred to a committee by each House before it can become a law. The requirement is, that a bill shall be ‘referred to a committee and reported thereon’ before it shall be considered; this, from the averments of the answer, was done, and we can not, under the wording of the Constitution, say that more than this was necessary.” Thus it is seen that when a bill is referred to a committee created by the Senate alone, it has been held a sufficient compliance with section 37 of article 3, thus recognizing the right of each branch of the Legislature to appoint its own committees, and article 11, of section 3, specifically provides that “each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings,” and if the Senate in the exercise of its discretion deemed it essential to appoint a committee to gather information and report back recommendations in regard to the enactment of laws, we think it had the power and authority. This has been the construction of our Constitution by all of our Legislatures in the past, the construction that the Congress of the Hnited States has given to the power possessed by each branch thereof, and the construction of the powers of each branch of the Legislature in almost every State of the Hnion, in the absence of constitutional inhibition, and we hold that the Senate had the authority and power to create the committee and authorize it to gather information and make recommendations on all subjects, upon which the Legislature would have the right to enact laws. The second contention is that the questions asked relator sought information which the committee had no right to demand of him. The authority of the committee would be as broad as the Senate cared to make it, so long as it only sought information upon subjects which it had a right to legislate upon, or to inquire into, and if the information could serve any useful purpose in enabling it to arrive at conclusions upon which to base recommendations for the passage of laws, or the amendment of laws, or the repeal of laws, or the performance of any other of its authorized functions, it would have the right, to propound the interrogatories and gather the information. The information demanded must be such as would throw light upon subjects upon which the Legislature would have the right to enact laws or act upon. If this investigation' went beyond that scope, relator would not be compelled to answer. And while not taking up each question asked, we think some of them were of a nature that would furnish information to the Legislature on questions which they in their legislative capacity would be authorized to regulate, and inasmuch as failure to answer one question within the scope of the power conferred on the committee would render relator subject to the power of the Senate to be punished for contempt, if it possesses the power to punish in this character of case, we do not deem it necessary to take up each question and discuss whether or not it came within the scope of the resolution passed, but will content ourselves with laying down the general rule that the authority of such committee to propound interrogatories and gather information would' be as broad as the language of the resolution authorized, so long as it related to matters upon which the Legislature would be empowered to prohibit, regulate or control, or had a right to inquire into to enable it to properly perform its duty in matters upon which they would be authorized to act. We must presume that the Legislature in petitioning the Governor to submit to it certain subjects for legislation, including the amendment of the election laws, acted in good faith, and believed the Governor would do so if the investigation developed the necessity therefor. And we must also presume that the Governor would have done so, if the information given him either from the investigation or any other source, had convinced him there was urgent need of such legislation. That he did not comply with the petition sent him, we must again presume that in the opinion of the Governor that there was no such urgent demand or need for such legislation as to authorize him to keep the Legislature together in extraordinary session. Congress has passed an Act making it punishable as a misdemeanor to fail to answer proper questions, and in the case of Re Chapman, 166 U. S., 661, it is held: “It is insisted that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a Criminal Court, had no jurisdiction; that the questions were not authorized under the Constitution; and that the Act of Congress under which petitioner was indicted and tried is unconstitutional. “Laying section 103 out of view, we are of opinion that sections 102 and 104 were intended, in the language of the title of the original Act of January 24, 1857, ‘more effectually to enforce the attendance of witnesses, on the summons of either House of Congress, and to compel them to discover testimony.-’ To secure this result it was provided that when a person summoned as a witness by either House to give testimony or produce papers, upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any committee of either House, wilfully fails to appear, or appearing, refuses to answer ‘any question pertinent to the question under inquiry/ he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished accordingly. And it was also provided that when, under such circumstances, the facts are reported to either House, the President of the Senate or the Speaker .of the House, as the case may be, shall certify the fact under the seal of the Senate or House to the district attorney for the District of Columbia, that the matter may be brought before the grand jury for their action. “It is true that the reference is to ‘any’ matter under inquiry, and so on, and it is suggested that this is fatally defective because too broad and unlimited in its extent; but nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion (Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 114 U. S., 47, 58 (36:340, 345), and we think that the word ‘any’ as used in these sections refers to matters within the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Congress, before them for consideration and proper for their action; to questions pertinent thereto; and to facts or papers bearing thereon. "When the facts are reported to the particular House, the question or questions may undoubtedly be withdrawn or modified, or the presiding officer directed not to certify; but if such a contingency occurs, or if no report is made or certificate issued, that would be matter of defense, and the facts of report and certificate need not be set out in an indictment under the statute. In this case we must assume that there was such report and certificate, and indeed we do not understand this to be controverted, as it could not well be in view of the Senate proceedings as disclosed by its journal and otherwise. Senate Journal, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 238; Senate Rep. No. 477, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 238; Rep., 53d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6143. “Under the Constitution the Senate of the United States has the power to try impeachments; to judge- of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; to determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member; and it necessarily possesses the inherent power of self-protection. “According to preamble and resolutions the integrity and purity of the members of the Senate had been questioned in a manner calculated to destroy public confidence in the body,- and in such respects as might subject members to censure or expulsion. The Senate, by the action taken, signifying its judgment that it was called upon to vindicate itself from aspersion and to deal with such of its members as might have been guilty of misbehavior and brought reproach upon it, obviously had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the inquiry it directed and power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to require them to answer any question pertinent thereto. And the pursuit of such inquiry by the questions propounded in this instance was not, in our judgment, in violation of the security against unreasonable searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment. “In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168 (26:386), among other important rulings, it was held that there existed no general power in Congress, or in either House, to make inquiry into the private affairs of a citizen; that neither House could on the allegation that an insolvent debtor of the Hnited States was interested in a private business partnership, investigate the affairs of that partnership, as a mere matter of private concern; and that consequently there was no authority in either House to compel a witness to testify on the subject. The case at bar is wholly different. Specific charges publicly made against senators had been brought to the attention of the Senate, and the Senate had determined that investigation was necessary. The subject matter as affecting the Senate was within the jurisdiction of the Senate. The questions were not intrusions into the affairs of tlie citizen; they did not seek to ascertain any facts as to the conduct, methods, extent, or details of the business of the firm in question, but only whether that firm, confessedly engaged in buying and selling stocks, and the particular stock named, was employed by any senator to buy or sell for him any of that stock, whose market price might be affected by the Senate’s action. We can not regard these questions as amounting to an unreasonable search into the private, affairs of the witness simply because he may have been in some degree connected with the alleged transactions, and as investigations of this sort are within the power of either of the two Houses they can not be defeated on purely sentimental grounds. “The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the' subject matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the committee to inquire ‘whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate.’ What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we can not say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument, but it is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. “Hor will it do to hold that the Senate had no jurisdiction to pursue the particular inquiry because the preamble and resolutions did not specify the proceedings were taken for the purpose of censure or expulsion, if certain facts were disclosed by the investigation. The matter was 'within the range of the constitutional powers of the Senate. The resolutions adequately indicated that the transactions referred to were deemed by the Senate reprehensible and deserving ,of condemnation and punishment. The" right to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member. 1 Story, Const., sec. 838. Beference is there made to the case of William Blount, who was expelled from the Senate in July, 1797, for a ‘high misdemeanor entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a senator.’ The offense charged against him, said Mr. Justice Story, was an attempt to seduce an American agent among the Indians from his duty, and to alienate the affections and confidence of the Indians from the public authorities of the United States, and a negotiation for services in behalf of the British government among the Indians. It was not a statutable offense nor was it committed in his official character, nor was it committed during the session of Congress, nor at the seat of government. “Commenting on this case, Mr. Sergeant says, in his work on Constitutional Law, 2d ed., p. 302: ‘In the resolution the Senate declared him guilty of a high misdemeanor, though no presentment or indictment had been found against him, and no prosecution at law was ever commenced upon the case. And it seems no law existed to authorize such prosecution.’ “The two Houses of Congress have several times acted upon this rule of law, and the cases may be found, together with debates on the general subject, in both Houses, of great value, in Smith’s Digest of Decisions and Precedents, Senate Doc. Ho. 278, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. The reasons for maintaining the right inviolate are eloquently presented in the report of the committee in the case of John Smith, accused in 1807 of participating in the imputed treason of Aaron Burr, 1 Hall, Am. L. J., 459 ; Smith Dig., p. 23. “Wie can not assume on this record that the action of the Senate was without a legitimate object, and so encroach upon the province of that body. Indeed, we think it affirmatively appears that the Senate was acting within its right, and it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation was concluded. “Doubtless certain general principles announced in Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S., 543 (30:1170), cited by petitioner’s counsel as conclusive, were correctly set forth, but that case has not been approved in subsequent decisions on the same subject, and the presumptions in favor of official action have been held to preclude collateral attack on the sentences of courts-martial, though, courts of special and limited jurisdiction. United States v. Fletcher, 148 U. S., 84 (37:378); Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S., 553 (ante, 823). “Counsel contend with great ability that the law under consideration is necessarily subject to being impaled on one or the other of two horns of a dilemna, either inflicting a fatal wound. The one alternative, is that the law delegates to the District of Columbia Criminal Court the exclusive .jurisdiction and power to punish as contempt the acts denounced, and thus deprives the Houses of Congress of their constitutional functions in the particular class of cases. The other alternative is that if the law should be interpreted as leaving in the Houses the power to punish such acts, and vesting in addition jurisdiction in ■ the District Criminal .Court to punish the same acts as misdemeanors, then the law is invalid because subjecting recalcitrant witnesses to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense contrary to the Fifth Amendment. “The refusal to answer pertinent questions in a matter of inquiry within the jurisdiction of the Senate, of course, constitutes a contempt of that body, and by the statute this is also made an offense against the United States. “The history of congressional investigations demonstrates the difficulties under which the two Houses have .labored, respectfully, in compelling unwilling witnesses to disclose facts deemed essential to taking definitive action, and we quite agree with Chief Justice Alvey, delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, That Congress possessed the constitutional power to enact a statute to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to make disclosure of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge their legitimate functionsand that it was to effect this that the Act of 1857 was passed. It was an Act necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in Congress and in each House thereof. We grant that Congress could not devest itself, or either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the power of either House properly extended; but, because Congress, by the Act of 1857, sought to aid each of the Houses in the discharge of its constitutional functions, it does not follow that any delegation of the power in each to punish for contempt was involved ; and the statute is not open to objection on that account. “Nevertheless, although the power to punish for contempt still remains in each House, we must decline to decide that this law is invalid because it provides that contumacy in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States, who are interested that the authority of neither of their departments, nor of any branch thereof, shall be defied and set at naught. It is improbable that in any case cumulative penalties would be imposed, whether by way of punishment merely, or of eliciting the answers desired, but it is quite clear that the contumacious witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same offense, since the same act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also an offense against another; and indictable statutory offenses may be punished as such, while the offenders may likewise be subjected to' punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two being diverso intuitu and capable of standing together. General Houston’s case, 2 Ops. Atty. Gen., 655 (Attorney-General Butler) ; Rex v. Lord Ossulston, 2 Strange, 1107; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S., 131 (33:287); Re Debs, 158 U. S., 564 (39:1092); State v. Woodfin, 5 Ired. L., 199 (42 Am. Dec., 161); Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns., 395 (6 Am. Dec., 290); State v. Williams, 2 Speers, L., 26; Foster v. Com., 8 Watts & S., 77. “In our opinion the law is not open to constitutional objection, and the record does not exhibit a case in which, on any ground, it can be held that the Supreme Court of the District, sitting as a Criminal Court, had no jurisdiction to render judgment.” In the fourth ground relator assails the good faith of the Senate in appointing the committee. With that phase of the question we do not deem it the province of the court to discuss. So long as the legislative branch of the government acts within the scope of the authority vested in it, its good or bad faith in the passage of laws or resolutions is no more a matter to be submitted to our judgment than would the good faith of the court in rendering a decision in this case be a proper subject for legislative criticism. As to the motives, object and purposes of the Senate in passing this resolution and in the appointment of this committee, we have no right to inquire if they had the legal right to appoint a committee to gather information to enable them, as they assert, to correct evils they claim existent in present laws on any subject. Should a committee thus appointed seek to go beyond the scope of authority conferred by the resolution creating it, or should they seek to require a citizen of this State to answer questions in regard to matters they had no right to inquire into, or elicit information on subjects not embraced within their power to regulate by legislation, this court.could and would protect the citizen in all the rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution of this State. 'The third ground has been the question that has been the cause of much study, of grave thought and anxious solicitude to arrive at a correct judgment. Article 3,. ccction 15, provides: “Each House may punish by imprisonment, ' during its session, any person not a member, for disrespectful or disorderly conduct in its presence, or for obstructing any of its proceedings.” That relator has been guilty of disrespectful or disorderly conduct in the presence of either House ■ during its session none assert, but it is insisted by respondent that by refusing to answer the questions propounded to him by its committee, relator has been guilty of “obstructing the proceedings” of the Senate, and as one of the main cases relied on by the respondent to sustain this contention is the case of In re Chapman, 166 U. S., 661, we have heretofore copied pretty fully from that opinion, for in it it is held that the Senate alone had the power to appoint a committee to investigate a matter within the powers conferred on it and to gather information to enable them to act intelligently in matters-upon which they were authorized to deal, even though the purpose of the inquiry was not disclosed by the resolution. Bespondent also insists .that it as clearly announces that a failure to answer a proper inquiry would be a contempt of the Senate, and the Senate would have the right to punish for such contempt. To this we do not entirely agree. In the opinion it is not claimed that the Constitution of the United States gave to the Senate this power to punish for such contempt, but only that in a proper case where the Senate would under its inherent power be authorized to punish, this would not render unconstitutional and void a statute which authorized the punishment as a misdemeanor by the courts of the country for failure to answer proper questions. Mr. Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, page 193, says that it has been held that a refusal to appear or to testify before a legislative committee would be a contempt of the House, and on page 191 he says: “Bach House may also .punish contempts of its authority by other persons, where they are committed in its presence, or where they tend directly to embarrass or obstruct its legislative proceedings; and it requires for the purpose no express provision of the Constitution conferring the authority. It is not very well settled what are the limits to this power,” but that power was sustained in the case of Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., 204. Since the rendition of this opinion the doctrine laid down has been questioned and rejected as to some of its reasoning in the case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168. And he adds: “But in America the authority of legislative bodies in this regard is much less extensive than in England, and we are in danger, perhaps, of being misled by English precedents. The Parliament, before its separation into two bodies, was a high court .of judicature, possessed of the general power, incident to such a court, of punishing contempts, and after the separation the power remained with each body, because each was considered to be a court of judicature and exercised the functions of such a court. American legislative bodies have not been clothed with the judicial function, and they do not therefore possess the general power to punish for contempt; but, as incidental to their legislative authority, they have the power to punish as contempts those acts of members or others which tend to obstruct the performance of legislative duty, or to defeat, impede, or embarrass the exercise of legislative power.” And then cites us to the case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168. In this case Kilbourn had refused to answer certain questions propounded to him by a committee appointed by Congress, and had been adjudged guilty of contempt, and sentenced to imprisonment, and the right of Congress to so punish, or either branch thereof, in the premises is discussed. It is said in this case: “The argument before us has assumed a very wide range, and includes the discussion of almost every suggestion that can well be conceived on the subject. The two extremes of the controversy are: the proposition on the part of the plaintiff, that the House of Representatives has no power whatever to punish for a contempt of its authority; and on the part of defendants, that such power undoubtedly exists, and when that body has formally exercised it, it must be presumed that it was rightfully exercised. “This latter proposition assumes the form of expression sometimes used with reference to courts of justice of general jurisdiction; that having the power to punish for contempts, the judgment of the House that a person is guilty of such contempt is conclusive everywhere. “Conceding for the sake of the argument that there are cases • in which one of the two bodies, that make together the Congress of the Hnited States, may punish for contempt of its authority, or disregard of its orders, it will scarcely be contended by the most ardent advocate of their power in that respect that it is unlimited. “The power of Congress itself, when acting through the concurrence of both branches, is a power dependent solely on the Constitution. Such powers are not found in that instrument, either by express grant or by fair implication from what is granted, are ‘reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ Of course, neither branch of Congress, when acting separately, can lawfully exercise more power than is conferred by the Constitution on the whole body, except in the few instances where authority is conferred on either House separately, as in the case of impeachments. Ho general power of inflicting punishment by the Congress of the United States is found in that instrument. It contains in the provision that no ‘person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,’ the strongest implication against punishment by order of the legislative body. It has been repeatedly decided by this court and by others of the highest authority, that this means a trial in which the right of the party shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law, which tribunal is to be governed by rules of law previously established. An Act of Congress which proposed to adjudge a man guilty of a crime and inflict the punishment, would be conceded by all thinking men to be unauthorized by anything in the Constitution. That instrument, however, is not wholly silent as to the authority of the separate branches of Congress to inflict punishment. It authorizes each House to punish its own members. The 3d clause of the 15th section of the first article declares that ‘each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.’ And in the clause just preceding it is said that they ‘may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.’ These provisions are equally instructive in what they authorize and in what they do not authorize. There is no express power in that instrument conferred on either House of Congress to punish for contempts. “The advocates of this power have, therefore, resorted to an implication of its existence founded on two principal arguments. These are: 1, its existence by the House of Commons of England, from which country we, it is said, have derived our system of parliamentary law; and, 2, the necessity of such a power to enable the two Houses of Congress to perform the duties and exercise the powers which the Constitution had conferred on them. “That the power to punish for contempt has been exercised by the House of Commons in numerous instances is well known to the general student of history, and is authenticated by the rolls of the Parliament. And there is no question but that this has been upheld by the courts of Westminster Hall. Among the most notable of these latter cases are the judgments of the Court of King’s Bench, in the case of Brass Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils., 188, decided in the year 1771; the case of Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1, in 1811, in which the opinion was delivered by Lord Ellenborough, and in the case of Sheriff of Middlesex, in 11 Ad. & E., 273, in 1840. Opinion by Lord Denman, Chief Justice. “It is important, however, to understand on what principle this power in the House of Commons rests, that we may see whether it is applicable to the two Houses of Congress and, if it be, whether there are limitations to its exercise. “While there is, in the adjudged cases in the English courts, little agreement of opinion as to the extent of this power, and the liability of its exercise to be inquired into by the courts, there is no difference of opinion as to its origin. This goes back to the period when the bishops,- the lords and the knights and burgesses met in one body, and were, when so assembled, called the High Court of Parliament. “They were not only called so, but the assembled Parliament exercised the highest functions of a court of judicature, representing in that respect the judicial ■ authority of the King in his Court of Parliament. While this body enacted laws, it also rendered judgments in matters of private -right, which, when approved by the King, were recognized as valid. Hpon the separation of the Lords and Commons into two separate bodies, holding their sessions in different chambers, and hence called the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the judicial function of reviewing by appeal the decisions of the courts of -Westminster Hall passed to the House of Lords, where it has been exercised without dispute ever since. To the Commons was left the power of impeachment and, perhaps, others of a judicial character, and jointly they exercised, until á very recent period, the power of passing bills of attainder for treason and other high crimes which are in their nature punishment for crime declared judicially by the High Court of Parliament of the Kingdom of England. “It is upon this idea that the two Houses of Parliament were each .courts of judicature originally, which, though devested by usage, and by .statute, probably, of many of their judicial functions, have yet retained so much of that power as enables them, like any other court, to punish for a contempt of these privileges and authority, that the power rests. “In the case of Burdett v. Abbott, already referred to as sustaining this power in the Commons, Mr. Justice Bailey said, in support of the judgment of" the Court of King’s Bench: ‘In an early authority upon that subject, in Lord Coke, 4 Inst., 23, it is expressly laid down that the House of Commons has not only a legislative character and authority, but is also a court of judicature; and there are instances put there in which the power of committing to prison for contempts has been exercised by the House of Commons, and this, too, in cases of libel. If, then (said he), the House be a court of judicature, it must, as is in a degree admitted by plaintiff’s counsel, have the power of supporting its own dignity as essential to itself; and without power of commitment for contempts it could