Full opinion text
HARPER, Judge. —Appellant was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in. the penitentiary for life. That the person who killed Earl Mabry on the night in question was guilty of murder in the first 'degree there can be no question. The question presented by this record is, was appellant one of the participants in the crime? Roy Pringle on this trial says that appellant struck deceased in the back of the head with an iron pin, and then cut his throat with a poclcetlmife. Deceased had been knocked in the head, and his throat had been cut, and some seventeen other wounds had been inflicted on him. Roy Pringle was an aceonrplice, admitting that he stabbed deceased several times, and the court so instructed the jury. The contention that there is no testimony corroborating the accomplice, tending to connect appellant with the crime, can not be "sustained. A knife was found near the dead body. Sis Hamp positively identifies this knife as the knife of appellant. This tended very strongly to connect the appellant with the crime, and is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice in and of itself to sustain the conviction. However, it may be stated that there are many other circumstances in the record corroborative of the accomplice, tending to connect the appellant with the offense. The contention that someone other than the accomplice must have seen appellant at or near the scene of the crime, and must have seen him strike the blows, to be sufficient as corroborative testimony, is not the law. If the State had such testimony, it would not need the testimony of the accomplice. When the deceased was found dead near the railroad dump, his throat cut from ear to ear, and a knife found by his side that is identified as the knife of appellant, the corroboration is sufficient. It is true that appellant assails the testimony of Roy Pringle and Sis Hamp. Witnesses swear that their reputation for truth and veracity is bad, and it is sought to impeach them by proving contradictory statements, yet all this was for the jury, and we suppose it was as ably argued in the trial of the case as it is here presented, yet the jury finds appellant guilty. Appellant presents a strong alibi. The witnesses tie their memory to circumstances that would seem to render the defense indisputable, yet the State introduces an equal or greater number of witnesses who testify as positively to facts that would render the alibi untrue. This was a question for the determination of the jury, and the court’s charge on alibi is not subject to the criticisms contained in appellant’s motion for new trial, for it is drawn in language frequently approved by this court. Hines v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 23; Caldwell v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 566; Harris v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 411; Stevens v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 154. On Simdav morning, the 31st day of September, 1907, the body of a young man was found on the south side of the railroad dump on the west of Texas & Pacific Railway bridge, on the road from Dallas to the cement plant, dragged into some high weeds. The skull was crushed in the back of the head; there were sixteen or seventeen knife wounds in the body, and the head had been nearly severed from the body, witnesses say only about two inches of skin at the back of the neck connected the head with the body. An iron coupling pin, bloody, was found near the body; a knife was also found, with the big blade open, the point being broken. A red leather grip was also found, and in this grip were sertain letters, a time book, etc. To prove that the body was that of Earl Mabry, the sister, who never saw the dead body, was permitted to testify that the letters found in the grip were written by herself and her mother to her brother Earl; that the writing in the- time book was in her brother’s hand writing; that the hat found near the dead body was her brother’s hat; the watch found on the body was her brother’s watch. The defendant objected to the introduction of the letters and the time book in evidence on various-grounds, but as the identity of the deceased was an issue in the case, and the State was required to prove lhat the dead body was that of Earl Mabrjr, the letters and time book and other articles mentioned were admissible on the issue of identity of deceased. This question was specifically passed on in the case of Campbell v. State, 8 Texas Crim. App., 84, and the valise and contents held admissible on the question of identity of deceased. See also Wharton’s Criminal Law, section 941, and cases there cited. However, it was improper for the prosecuting officer to state in his argument that the time book and certain items therein showed that the deceased was a hard working boy, and that said book showed the deceased had worked all the month of August and up to the 18th day of September, and that the book showed he had $40 in his possession. The time book' was not admissible to show these facts, if it did so show, but was admissible only on the question 'of the identity of the deceased, and the objection to that portion of the argument of State’s counsel should have been sustained. B.ut is the error such an error as will call for a reversal of the case? The fact that deceased had on Saturday evening some $50 or $60 is amply proven bjr other witnesses, and there is no testimony that he did not have money on his person, so the amount of money he had was not an issue in the case. That he had, just before being killed, been at work near Mineóla was amply proven by other witnesses, and that he came to Dallas Friday night was proven by defendant, by Charles Moore and Mrs. Wilky. Then, too, the issue in the case, as made by the testimony offered in behalf of appellant, was not whether the deceased had been murdered for the purpose of robbery, but that appellant was not the person who did the killing,—that he was at home at his father’s Saturday and Saturday night, and could not have been the person who killed the deceased. That deceased had been foully murdered in a brutal way was shown by all the testimony adduced on the trial, and as the remarks of the prosecuting officer complained of above were not such as could or would cause the jury to find that appellant was the person who did the killing, nor had any influence in regard to that issue, the remarks do not present reversible error. Gertrude Wilson was the twenty-sixth witness introduced by the State, and she testified: “In 1907 I remember about hearing of the dead body of a man being found over west of the Trinity river, and I heard about it Sunday evening after the killing, and the way I heard about it was by hearing them talk about it. I knew Frank McCue at that time. Oh, I hadn’t known Frank McCue very long. I saw him at Beasley’s several times and had heard him talk there and heard him talk at Bisa Beasley’s and several others, and heard him talk at Bisa Beasley’s on the Saturday night before I heard of this killing the next Sunday evening. I am acquainted with Frank McCue’s voice. I heard some parties talking that Saturday night upstairs in Bisa Beasley’s room, and I taken one of the voices to be Frank McCue’s.” It will be recalled that the defense of the defendant was an alibi,—that he was at home all Saturday night. When this witness was offered the defendant objected to her testimony on the following grounds: “(1) Because the evidence that would be put before the jury and by and through the answer of said questions by said witness would be immaterial, inadmissible, irrelevant and incompetent, in that it "would not establish nor tend to establish any allegation in the indictment nor any material issue in the case. “(2) Because the testimony that would go to the jury through the medium of said witness’ answers to said questions, would have only the effect to prejudice the jury against the defendant.” The court did not err in overruling the objections made, for it is manifest b}7 the testimonj7 of this witness if true that appellant was not at home on Saturday night, but instead was at Bisa Beasley’s. This evidence was on a most material issue in the case,—to prove that his alibi was not true. The testimony of Ike Owens was reproduced. He had testified that in 1907 he worked for T. H. Moore as a bar-tender, and that at 6 :30 on Saturday evening (the evening of the killing) he saw appellant, Pringle and Mabry in Moore’s saloon. That the three drank together in the saloon, and appellant (McCue) said that Mabry was a stranger in the town and they were showing him around. That Mabry paid for the last round of drinks, and had fifty or sixty dollars in his purse,—that he, Owens, changed a $5 bill for him. Mr. DeBerry testified that Owens was dead,—that he saw his dead bod)7, and attended the funeral. The court did not err in overruling the objections made: Robertson v. State, 63 Texas Crim. Rep., 216. When the defendant had offered his testimony to prove an alibi,— that he was at his father’s home in Oak Cliff all day Saturday and Saturday night, among other witnesses the State introduced Amos Clem, who testified, among other things, that on that Saturday he was in Dallas and saw appellant on Main Street in Dallas. That “at the time I was passing him, a young fellow passing by sáid, ‘Hello, McCue, where are you going?’ and the one called McCue said, ‘Going over to the cement plant after a while.’ The cement plant is close to Dallas and west of Dallas, and is near the Texas & Pacific Bailroad, and I guess it is two or three miles from Dallas. I guess it must have been betwixt two o’clock and three ofclock when I saw the young man called McCue on Main Street, but I couldn’t say positively. After that I saw him that night-—-that evening ten minutes before seven o’clock when he stepped off the sidewalk and went into a saloon, him and two other boys. At the time I saw him ten minutes before seven o’clock it was right north of where I first seen him across straight right north, and I seen two other hoys' with him and one was carrying a suit case or a grip. The man sitting there (indicating defendant) was the one with the two boys when I saw them.” This testimony was clearly admissible on the issue of appellant’s alibi, and when the State had introduced this testimony, and appellant had then introduced J. C. Clem, who testified that Amos Clem had net been in Dallas that Saturday evening, it was permissible for the State to prove by other witnesses that Amos Clem was in Dallas. And when the defendant introduced J. C. Clem and proved by him that Amos Clem had told him he knew nothing about the case, but was going to testify anyway, it was permissible for the State to show by Mr. Samuels that Amos Clem had made the same statement to him one week after the homicide as that he testified to on this trial. When the defendant undertook to impeach the witness Amos Clem by evidence that he was not in Dallas on that Saturday evening, and had made statements that he knew nothing about the case, but was going to testify anyway, then Amos Clem could be supported. Branch’s Grim. Law, sec. 874, and cases there cited. Fawn Simpson testified for the State: "The day before the killing I saw Frank McCue some time after one o’clock on the corner of Elm and Crowdus Street in East Dallas, and east of the Union depot, and about four hundred yards east of the Union depot. He was sitting in Joe Harbretche’s saloon at a table drinking some beer, and some fellow was with him, but I did not pay any attention to him. I did not notice how he was dressed. The fellow that was with Frank McCue had a grip setting down by his side. It was a suit case—I didn’t pay any attention to it. It was similar to that grip you show me, I think. McCue and the young man were sitting at the table on my left as I went in at the front door of the saloon. They were drinking beer—■ that is, I took it to be beer. I just spoke to Frank as I went in—just said, ‘Hello, Frank,’ and he said ‘Good evening.’ No words passed between us. It was after one o’clock. The man that went in there with me was W. B. Fortune.” This testimony was admissible, for it tended to show that appellant was not at his father’s home in Oak ClifE all day Saturday as contended by him. The State then introduced W. B. Fortune, who testified that he did go in the saloon with Simpson; that two men were sitting at the table, one of whom Simpson addressed M Frank. That he did not know appellant, and could not and would xot identify appellant as one of the persons sitting at the table. It was permissible for Mr. Fortune to testify that he went in this saloon, and saw two men sitting at the table, although he did not know appellant and could not identify him, when Simpson testified that he did know appellant, and appellant was one of the men he and Fortune saw sitting there. Fortune was testifying to facts within his knowledge and not to anything someone else had told him. By his twelfth bill of exception appellant would show the following facts: "The defense of the defendant herein and his sole defense, it might be said, was an alibi. This alibi for the most part was made by the immediate members of the defendant’s family, towit: his father and mother, his brothers and sisters. The substance of defendant’s alibi was that during all of the day and all of the night of the day on which and in which the offense laid in the indictment was committed, that defendant was at his home in the Oak Cliff part of the City of Dallas, Texas, and that defendant was at no time, during all of said day, and all of said night, away from his said home or outside of his father’s home. “Only two witnesses besides the members of the defendant’s family testified for defendant that he was at his home on the evening of the day and immediately preceding the night on which and in which the offense laid in the indictment was committed. These two witnesses were W. A. Brown and Sam Anderson, and both of them swore that as they Avere passing the home of defendant at or about the hour of four o’clock on the evening immediately before the offense herein as is disclosed by the testimony in this record was committed, at about 8 o’clock that night they ssav defendant at his said home and in a hammock on the porch of said home. “Said members of defendant’s family swore positively that defendant was at his home and at no time absent from or away from his said home during all of the day and all of the night of the day when the evidence shows deceased named in the indictment was killed. . . . “All of the testimony of all the witnesses in this" case, who testified as to the matter at all, shows positively that defendant’s home where defendant lived at that time with his father, was fully three miles from the place where the dead body of deceased named in the indictment was found, and from the place where deceased-was killed. That said home was west of the Trinity river, and fully three miles from the courthouse just east of the Trinity river in the City of Dallas, proper, and that said home was fully four miles from the Union depot in the City of Dallas proper. “It was the contention of the State herein,, stoutly argued by the State, both in the State’s testimony and in the argument by counsel for the State, that defendant’s defense of an alibi was false. The theory of the State in this case was that defendant was a principal in the commission of the offense laid in the indictment, and that he was actually present at the time and place of the commission of the offense, three miles distant from his'home, and that he, together with the State’s accomplice witness, Roy Pringle, actually participated in the commission of the offense. “The names of defendant’s family who- testified in his behalf, and who swore to a complete alibi for defendant, were J. M. He Cue, father of defendant; Mrs. J. M. McOue, mother of defendant; Howard MeCue, brother of defendant; Miss Willie McOue, sister of defendant; John MeCue, brother of defendant, and Miss Ida MeCue', sister of defendant. After all of said members had testified and established by their testimony and so far as their testimony was concerned, a complete and positive alibi, the State introduced a great number of witnesses for the purpose of contradicting said members of defendant’s family, and for the purpose of destroying defendant’s alibi, and for the purpose of shoAVing that it was false.” In the bill are named J. F. Stanley, Ashley Ewing, Will Irby, Ed Irby, Amos Clem, T. E. Briggs, A. B. McDougal, G. T.- Hare, J. A. Burgess, Gertrude Wilson, Alice Meadors, Sis Hamp, B. ü. James, M. Samuels, Boy Pringle, Fawn Simpson, W. B. Fortune, Ike Owens, Callie Flowers, as witnesses who testify to facts which would show that the alibi is not true, and then recites: “And be it remembered that L. J. Truett, county attorney of Collin county, who conducted the trial of this case, in his cross-examination of each and all of the herein-before named members of defendant’s family, subjected each and all of them to as thorough cross-examination as he could possibly give.” After reciting all these facts appellant insists that the court erred in refusing to permit him to introduce witnesses to prove that the reputation of the father and mother of appellant and his sisters and brothers for truth and veracity was good. It is true that appellant’s father and mother and other members of his family lived in Dallas County, while this case was tried in Collin County, and that the witnesses offered by appellant to prove his alibi had perhaps no acquaintance in Collin County, but as to that the record discloses that all the witnesses for the State on this issue also lived in Dallas County, and Mr. Branch in his work on Criminal Law correctly states the rule to be: “Proof of general reputation of defendant or any other witness for truth is not admissible where no attack has been made on the witness, but there is a mere contradiction between witnesses, or confusion in the statements of the witness,” citing Hill v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 246, and many other cases in section 877 of his work. In this case in the cross-examination of the witnesses who testified to facts tending to prove an alibi for appellant, no questions were asked that would reflect upon the witnesses. Only a legitimate cross-examination was made, testing their memory, etc., and under such circumstances the court did not err in excluding the testimony as to general reputation for truth. The most serious question in the case is the one presented by bills of exception Eos. 14, 13, 11, and 3. We will not take them up in the order numbered, but rather as they occurred on the trial. In bill Eo. 14 it is made to appear that while the accomplice, Boy Pringle, was testifying the State proved by him that the first time he ever met appellant was at Fannie Howard’s; that he had met him there several times; that Fannie Howard ran a saloon and negro house of prostitution. In bills Eos. 11 and 13 it is shown that Officers Briggs and McDougal testified that on Tuesday after the homicide on Saturday night they saw appellant drive up to Fannie Howard’s saloon and house of prostitution with two negro women in his buggy; that they all got out and appellant went in Jew Jake’s saloon and invited all present to drink with him; that he rattled money in his pocket and threw a dollar down on the counter; that from the noise made he judged appellant had some twelve or fifteen dollars, and appellant remarked that everybody who refused to drink with him was a piker. In bill Eo. 3 it is shown by Deputy Sheriff Chick when he arrested appellant on Thursday, that he saw him come out of an alley between Fannie Howard’s saloon and her house of .prostitution, and he arrested him in front of Fannie Howard’s door. All this testimony was objected to on various grounds, it being unnecessary to state them all, for if the testimony was inadmissible, sufficient objection ivas made to it. As to the testimony of Officers Briggs and McDougal, we think it clearly admissible. The record discloses that just prior to the killing of young Mabry,1 appellant pawned his watch to Ed Goldstein, who was in the pawn brokerage business; that appellant was, in common parlance, broke. That Mabry had on his person some fifty or sixty dollars,, and Pringle says Mabnr was killed to get his money. Hnder such circumstances any testimony which would tend to show that appellant had money after Mabry’s death would be admissible. It would be a circumstance tending to show his guilt under the facts in this case in the absence óf any explanation of where he got this money. • It is perhaps unfortunate for appellant, wherever he got the money, that he was spending it taking negro prostitutes driving in a buggy, and spending it in Jew Jake’s saloon, treating the crowd, yet this would not render the testimony inadmissible. The fact Mabry on the day of his death had money and appellant saw it, is shown by the testimony of Mrs. Meadors, Ike Owens and others. That he did not have it when his body was found is shown by all the testimony. Then the fact that appellant had no money prior to Mabry’s death, and the further fact that he was well sujiplied with money after Mabry’s death, would tend strongly to corroborate Pringle, who testified that appellant killed Mabry for his money. As to -the testimony of Pringle that the first time he met McCue was at Fannie Howard’s house, and that he had seen him there frequently, under the evidence in this case, was admissible. Gertrude Wilson testified that at 11 o’clock on the night of the homicide, while she did not see appellant, yet she heard him talking there at Fannie Howard’s place. Sis Hamp testified that appellant and Pringle came to that house that Saturday night and that'they were bloody; that they washed their hands and changed their clothing in this house of prostitution, and spent the remainder of the night in the saloon, “smoking hop,” etc. That appellant had been seen at these places and was a frequent visitor of them, would be material in passing upon whether or not Gertrude Wilson and Sis Hamp had testified to the truth, and would be admissible as supporting their testimony. The order of its introduction would be immaterial, if upon the record as a whole it was admissible. Appellant appreciated the strength and force of Sis Hamp’s testimony and sought to break it down by a most rigid cross-examination; by evidence that her reputation for truth and veracity was bad, and by proving contradictory statements. The other bill, that appellant when arrested on Thursday, after the homicide on Saturday night, was coming from these places and was arrested in front of the saloon, would be admissible in our opinion for the same reason. But if we should- be wrong in these conclusions (which we do not think we are) would the fact that appellant was a frequent visitor and often found in Fannie Howard’s saloon or her house of prostitution influence the jury in passing on his alibi? Appellant did not testify, so it can not be said that this testimony caused the jury to fail to give due weight to his testimony. His defense as hereinbefore shown was an alibi, and it is not shown nor asserted that any of the persons who testified to his alibi were ever in Fannie Howard’s saloon nor her house of prostitution, so this testimony could not affect their credit as witnesses. It can not be said this testimony influenced or aroused the passion of the jury, because they gave appellant the minimum punishment for the offense submitted to them. As the testimony all showed that deceased was murdered to obtain his money, only murder in the first degree was submitted, and if the jury had given him the death penalty, then it might be said that this testimony inflamed their minds against appellant, but they do not assess that punishment, but give him the least punishment the law authorized for the crime submitted to them, so evidently this testimony created no prejudice in the minds of the jury, and as it would not and could not affect his defensive theory and testimony, and if it did tend to support the State’s evidence and theory it would be admissible for that purpose, if error there be, in admitting the testimony, would not call for a reversal of the case. These are all the bills of exception in the record,-—the remainder of the motion for a new trial complains of the charge of the court. As before stated, the court only submitted murder in the first degree, and .in so doing appellant concedes there was no error, as the element of murder in the second degree or manslaughter are not presented by the testimony. Many complaints are urged to the charge on accomplice testimony, but these matters have been so frequently before the court we do not deem it necessary to discuss each of them. The charge on this issue as given is a virtual copy of the-form prescribed in Campbell v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 301, and approved in King v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 363, and other cases handed down since the rendition of these two opinions. The criticism of the charge on alibi has heretofore herein been passed upon and the cases cited, showing there was no error in that portion of the charge. The charge on who are principals in the commission of an offense is severely criticised, and taken by itself it might be subjected to some criticism. But when we read the charge as a whole, no jury could have been misled thereby. The criticism that defendant’s defense being an alibi, the charge on principals was erroneous in that it did not require the jury to find that defendant was personally present at the time of the commission of the offense, might be said to be true by a strained construction of the language used in that paragraph alone, yet we find that in paragraph 18 of the charge the court instructs the jury: “How if the evidence raises in your minds a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place where the offense was committed, at the time of the commission thereof, you will find the defendant not guilty,” so by no construction of the charge could it be said that the jury was authorized to convict appellant, though he was not present at the time of the commission of the offense. This case was submitted the latter part of last June; the record is a voluminous one, and we have read and reread it, so as to arrive at the true issues in the case, and the testimony legitimately bearing on these issues. A lifetime imprisonment is assessed against appellant; the testimony supporting his plea of alibi is strong, and yet the testimony offered by the State on that issue is as equally convincing. The court in his charge was fair to appellant, and the only error in the record, as we view it, were the remarks of the county attorney in commenting on the testimony which was legitimate to prove identity, yet used by him on other issues. But as hereinbefore stated, this could not and would not affect this plea of alibi, nor support the State’s theory that appellant was the person who cut Earl Mabry’s throat and murdered him for his money. That it did not arouse the passion nor inflame the minds of the jury is evidenced by the verdict inflicting the minimum penalty, and we are constrained to believe that the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Affirmed.
on rehearing. February 25, 1914. HABPEB, Judge. —Appellant has filed a motion for' rehearing in this case, and then an amended motion, a brief and argument on the motion, and a supplemental argument, in which a number of the questions involved are ably presented, yet in some parts of the argument expressions are used that are not in accord with their high standing as lawyers, such as intimations that the court may not read the argument, jand they take one expression, “The question presented by the record is, was appellant one of the participants in the crime,” and while in their original brief and in the briefs and arguments filed on this motion their main insistence is that the evidence is not of that satisfactory character which would authorize the incarceration of appellant in the penitentiary for the span of his natural life, yet they take this expression and say though he was a guilty participant, yet there are other questions such as whether error was committed in receiving or excluding evidence; whether or not the court correctly instructed the jury, etc. That this is true is shown in the original opinion, for after discussing whether or not the testimony would authorize and sustain the conviction—a finding that appellant was one of the participants—we then take up and discuss each of the bills wherein it was claimed that the court erred in admitting or excluding testimony, the complaints as to the charge, etc. We always regret to see such exhibitions of temper, and strained technical criticisms of an opinion, for while it is apparent that counsel for appellant thoroughly believe in the innocence of their client, and that errors were committed in the trial, yet this court is not a partisan of the State nor the defendant, and tries to view these matters from the standpoint of what is right and just, and administer the law whether it results in an affirmance or reversal. But it is sometimes insisted that we too often hold that while some slight error has crept into the record against the voluminous one, and we have read and reread it, so as to arrive at the case, and these technical matters are never held against the State. Counsel in their zeal forget that we never have an opportunity to so hold. The State has no right of appeal, and no matter how erroneous a ruling of the trial court may be against the State in regard to admitting or rejecting testimony, the State can not bring those questions to us for review. On appeal all we pass on is, was there error committed against the defendant on the trial of the case, and if so was it of that nature to harmfully affect him? If the State could bring its side of the question up for review also, doubtless there would be as many holdings that some slight error was committed as against the prosecution, but that it was harmless error. As hereinbefore stated, counsel in their zeal forget that only a defendant can appeal, and this court can and only does pass on whether or not there has been error committed against him—has he or not had a fair and impartial trial. We have been led to make these suggestions or remarks by the ill-timed expressions contained in the arguments on file, and we are satisfied that counsel, when they coolly reflect on the matter themselves, will admit that the use of the remarks and expressions were wholly unwarranted and out of place. Counsel complain very bitterly that we did not pass on every question raised in the voluminous record, containing more than four hundred pages of typewritten matter, besides the lengthy brief and arguments on file, and seem to think we did not consider them, for if we had, such matters would present reversible error. One we did not pass on was the question of request for a new trial on account of newly discovered evidence. This had so often been decided adversely to appellant’s contention we did not deem it necessary, or think he seriously relied on it. However, we will state this was the fifth trial of appellant, and yet after his conviction he filed a motion setting up newly discovered evidence, that of Geo. T. Garvin and Ed Carlton, who say they would swear to facts tending to support appellant’s plea of alibi. Mr. Garvin says he did not tell MeCue nor his family, nor his attorney about the facts he would testify to, but that he “had, however, many times mentioned the fact to persons in Dallas with whom he was talking.” So it can be readily seen as to this witness, during the five years this case was pending, the slightest diligence would have discovered this testimony, for he says he had many times mentioned the matter to persons with whom he was talking. Mr. Carlton says that at the time he would testify to seeing appellant, he spoke to appellant and appellant replied. So it is seen that appellant all the time was as well aware that he saw Carlton as Carlton was that he saw appellant. So under no rule of law would this testimony come within the rules of what is termed newly discovered testimony. Carrico v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 618; Reagan v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 227; McVey v. State, 23 Texas Crim. App., 659; Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311; Brown v. State, 16 Texas, 123, and almost an innumerablé list of authorities cited under subdivisions 3 and 4 of sec. 1169, White’s Ann. Proc. Again it is shown that this is the fifth trial of the case, and several continuances had. Eight witnesses testified to an alibi for defendant on the trial, some of whom were related, but two of them were in no way-related to him. The testimony of .Messrs. Garvin and Carlton would be but cumulative of the testimony of these witnesses. Appellant cites us to the case of Thomas v. State, 101 S. W. Rep., 797, 51 Texas Crim. Rep., 329, wherein it was held: “In a prosecution for theft from the person, an application of the accused for a continuance, in order to obtain the testimony of an absent witness to the effect that accused was at another place at the time the crime was committed, should have been granted, where diligence to obtain the testimony was shown.” In the opinion it is said this was the first application for a continuance, and it has always been the rule of law in this State that doctrine- of cumulative testimony does not apply to the first application for a continuance, and in addition to the authorities cited by appellant, hundreds of others could have been cited. The other cases cited by appellant on this question are: Pinckord v. State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 468; Baines v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 510; Smythe v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 244, and in none of them was the court passing on a second or subsequent application, and in all of them diligence had been shown, and in none of them is the rule as stated by appellant sustained. In this case there is a total lack of diligence; as hereinbefore shown it was not the first application, but this application comes after the fifth trial of the case. How what is the rule of law in this State on the second or any application other than the first application ? It is “that a new trial will not be granted in a criminal case for newly discovered testimony which is merely cumulative,” and this is supported in all the following decisions: Shaw v. State, 27 Texas, 750; Kemp v. State, 38 Texas, 110; Henderson v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App., 432; Terry v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 236 ; Duval v. State, 8 Texas Crim. App., 370; Garner v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 356, 30 S. W. Rep., 782; Granger v. State, 31 S. W. Rep., 671; Washington v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 154, 32 S. W. Rep., 693; Porter v. State, 32 S. W. Rep., 695; Scruggs v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 622, 34 S. W. Rep., 951; Little v. State, 35 S. W. Rep., 659; Price v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 403, 37 S. W. Rep., 743; Turner v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 451, 36 S. W. Rep., 87, 40 S. W. Rep., 980; Simnacher v. State, 43 S. W. Rep., 512; Adler v. State, 50 S. W. Rep., 358; Gass v. State, 56 S. W. Rep., 73; John v. State, 58 S. W. Rep., 105; Thompson v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 244, 76 S. W. Rep., 561; Duncan v. State, 77 S. W. Rep., 13; Mathews v. State, 77 S. W. Rep., 218; Hanna v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 269, 87 S. W. Rep., 702; Taylor v. State, 87 S. W. Rep., 1039; Owens v. State, 89 S. W. Rep., 837 ; Goen v. State, 101 S. W. Rep., 232; Coffman v. State, 51 Texas Crim. Rep., 478, 103 S. W. Rep., 1128; Harrolson v. State, 54 Texas Crim. Rep., 452, 113 S. W. Rep., 544; Roberts v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 199, 122 S. W. Rep., 388; Reagan v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 642, 124 S. W. Rep., 685; Garza v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 476, 145 S. W. Rep., 590; Hogan v. State, 66 Texas Crim. Rep., 498, 147 S. W. Rep., 871. And this rule is the rule also in other States: Douglass v. State, 91 Ark., 492; High v. State, 12 Ariz., 146; People v. McDonell, 47 Cal., 134; Leggett v. People, 26 Colo., 364; Long v. State, 42 Fla., 612; Watson v. State, 118 Ga., 83; People v. Biles, 2 Idaho, 114; People v. Hayer, 249 Ill., 603; Ludwig v. State, 170 Ind., 648; State v. Blain, 118 Iowa, 466; State v. Nimerick, 74 Kan., 658; Lawson v. Com., 152 Ky., 133; State v. Turner, 122 La., 371; People v. Quinly, 134 Mich., 625; State v. Sherber, 111 Minn., 138; Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss., 383; State v. King, 194 Mo., 474; Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb., 148; Territory v. Yarberry, 2 New Mex., 391; Williams v. People, 145 Barb. (N. Y.), 201; State v. Lilliston, 141 N. C., 857; State v. Brandner, 21 N. Dak., 310; Loeffer v. State, 10 Ohio, 598; Harvey v. State, 11 Okla., 156; State v. Oregon, 39 Ore., 90; Com. v. Hine, 213 Pa., 97; State v. Henderson, 49 S. C., 330; State v. Raice, 24 S. Dak., 111; King v. State, 91 Tenn., 617; People v. Peacock, 5 Utah, 237; May v. State, 77 Vt., 330; Baccigalupo v. Com., 33 Grat. (Va.), 807; State v. Beeman, 51 Wash., 557; Bales v. State, 3 W. Va., 685; Passo v. State, 19 Wyo., 344; Canada Ry. v. McIlroy, 15 U. C. C. P., 116. In the majority of these States they apply the rule of no new trial on account of .testimony that is merely cumulative'even to the first application, but our court has adopted the most liberal rule on the first application where diligence is shown, but adheres to the rule on the second or subsequent application. In the case of Spencer v. State, 69 Texas Crim. Rep., 92, 153 S. W. Rep., 858, this court, in an opinion by the writer, held that where the testimony was about on an equipoise, and the defensive matter was testified to by a brother of the defendant alone, and the testimony really came within the rule as to newly discovered testimony and was cogent, we would grant a new trial, but in thus broadening the rule we went as far as any court has gone, and further we can not go. So under no phase of the law did the court err in overruling the motion for new trial on this ground; and we, to do so, would have to overrule every decision rendered by this court, and the great weight of authority outside this State as shown above. Appellant also contends that we erred in holding the letters, etc., found in the grip near the body of deceased, admissible. He in his argument says that any number of persons swear to seeing Earl Mabry in Dallas on Saturday, and that a number testify to seeing appellant with him on that occasion. That Earl Mabry was in Dallas on Saturday is proven beyond the shadow of a doubt by positive testimony. But what witness, among the great array of witnesses, testifies that the body of the young man found near the Texas & Pacific bridge murdered was the body of Earl Mabry, the person whom they had seen in Dallas the day before? Hot one, so far as we have been able to ascertain by again searching the record, and appellant points us to none. Hone of the persons who testify to seeing Earl Mabry Saturday who knew him saw the body after death and say it is the same person they saw the day before. This record discloses that the way the officers were led to believe it was the body of Earl Mabry, with the body they found a lady’s card, and they telephoned this lady, and she informed them she had given a card to a young man Friday night, who said his name was Earl Mabry, and that he said his mother lived in Abilene. The nearest to positive testimony is that of a witness who lived at Marshall, who testified he saw the corpse after it was shipped from Dallas to Marshall, and it was the body of Earl Mabry, but that this was the body picked up near the Texas & Pacific bridge is proven only by circumstantial evidence, and if the State had not offered all the proof it did on this issue, we would be met with the contention, and properly so, that appellant was charged with killing one Earl Mabry, and if he did in fact kill the man found near the bridge, it was not proven it was the body of Earl Mabry. We have frequently had this issue presented to us, and at times we have been .compelled to sustain it. (Walker v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 609, and other cases.) So as the State was compelled to establish that fact, the quantum of proof it should offer is not subject to review, provided a sufficient amount of proof be offered to prove that fact, and the testimony offered was properly admissible to prove that issue. We thought this so well settled we did not deem it necessary to cite but one or two authorities. However, in ICugadt v. State, 38 Texas Grim. Bep., 681, speaking through Judge Hurt, this court held: “We would further observe, in this connection, that before a person can be convicted of felonious homicide the death of the deceased must be shown to have been caused by the act or agency of such party; and in this State it is enacted by statute that ‘no person shall be convicted of any grade of homicide unless the body of the deceased or portions of it are found and sufficiently identified to establish the fact of the death of the person charged to have been hilledSee Penal Code, 1895, art. 654. How, it will be noted that, while the statute requires' that the body of the deceased, or portions thereof which are found, must be sufficiently identified to establish the fact of the death of the person alleged to have been killed, yet there is no attempt to indicate the character of testimony by which the identity of the person is to be established. The statute says that -the remains must be sufficiently identified; that is, we take it, the statute requires that the proof be of a legal character. Nowhere is it said that the testimony must be positive. If it be circumstantial, that is all that is necessary if it sufficiently identifies the remains or the portions thereof found as those of the Eeceased. See Taylor v. State, 35 Texas, 97; Wilson v. State, 41 Texas, 320, 43 Texas, 472 ; Brown v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App., 154; Jackson v. State, 29 Texas Crim. App., 458; State v. Davidson, 30 Vt., 377; McCulloch v. State, 88 Ind., 109; State v. Williams, 52 N. C., 466, reported in 78 Am. Dec., 248, and note 2, at page 253; Campbell v. People (Ill. Sup.), 42 N. E. Rep., 123; State v. Martin (S. C.), 25 S. E. Rep., 113; Webster v. Com., 5 Cush., 386; 1 Bish., Crim. Proc., sec. 1057 et seq. “The above cases not only show that the body or portions thereof may be identified as that of the deceased by circumstantial evidence, but the corpus delicti itself may also be proved by this character of testimony. . . . Hr. Greenleaf (volume 3, section 133), on this subject, uses the following language: ‘But, though it is necessary that the body of the deceased be satisfactorily identified, it is not necessary that this be proved by direct and positive evidence, if the circumstances be such as to leave tío reasonable doubt of the fact. Where only mutilated remains have been found, it ought to be clearly and satisfactorily shown that they are the remains of a human being, and of one answering to the sex, age and description of the deceased. The agency of the prisoner in their mutilation, or in producing the appearances found upon them, ought to be established. Identification may also be facilitated by circumstances apparent in and about the remains, such as the apparel, articles found on the person, and the contents of the stomach, connected with proof of the habits of the deceased in respect to his food, or with the circumstances immediately preceding his dissolution.” This has ever been the rule in this State, and not only in this State; in addition to the authorities from other States cited by Judge Hurt, we find that the Encyclopedia of Evidence, vol. 6, p. 925, says: "Where the question in issue is the identity of a dead body it is competent to show the physical characteristics. So also, the similarity of wearing apparel and articles found on or near the remains to those known to have been in the possession of deceased, may be .shown. The papers or documents found on the body or in the possession of deceased are competent evidence of identity.” Citing State v. Martin, 47 S. C., 67; Thornton v. State, 113 Ala., 43; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo., 438; Bryant’s Estate, 176 Pa., 309, and the cases from Texas Beports hereinbefore cited. Appellant also insists that we erred in holding that the testimony of Amos Clem could be supported. Amos Clem testified to being in Dallas on Saturday evening before the dead body was found on Sunday morning. To prove that this was not true, appellant introduced J. C. Clem, who testified that Amos Clem was not in Dallas that evening, but was at home twelve miles in the country sick in bed. Amos Clem testified that he recognized appellant as the person he saw in Dallas that day and dressed as McCue and whom he saw with two other young men, one of whom had a suit case or grip, and heard McCue saying he was going to the cement plant after a while. This went to disprove appellant’s alibi, and placed him with a young man with a grip, and deceased is shown to have been in Dallas that evening with a grip; that he heard McCue say that he was going over to the cement plant after a while, and near to and on the way to this cement plant was where the dead body was found. These were very cogent facts and circumstances, connected with the other evidence, to establish the guilt of appellant. Appellant recognized this, and to break the force of this testimony, he introduced J. C. Clem, who not only testified that Amos Clem was not in Dallas but had him testify that Amos Clem had told him he (Amos) knew nothing about the case, but that he was going to testify. Said all he knew was what his son had hold him, and wanted (J. C. Clem) to get a full description of Frank McCue, appellant, and what kind of hat he-wore, and to find out all he could about him.' Appellant also proved that Amos Clem had been indicted and tried for murder; that he was a spiritualist, and claimed to he able to talk to the spirit world. It must also he remembered that Amos Clem was as much of a stranger in Collin County as were the relatives of appellant, whom appellant contends it was error to refuse to permit him to support, and he claims it was error in spite of this attempt to impeach the witness Amos Clem, to permit the State to support him. We will first show that it was no error to permit Amos Clem to he supported by other testimony. Perhaps it is true that if appellant had stopped when he had J. C. Clem testify that Amos Clem was not in Dallas this would be a mere contradiction of witnesses, and in such case supporting testimony would not be admissible. But appellant is not satisfied to stop there and has J. C. Clem to testify that a year or more after the killing of deceased, when on their way to Fort Worth to attend a trial of this case, Amos Clem had told him he knew nothing about the case. This certainly would be a contradictory statement to the statement made on 'this trial. He would also have Amos Clem manufacturing and fabricating his testimony on this trial some year or more after the alleged offense. How what are the rules of law when you can support a witness? Mr. Branch in his Criminal Law says, supporting it by the citation of authorities quoted: “Where State’s witness is attempted to be impeached by showing that he has made statements with reference to the transaction out of court different from and contradictory to his testimony delivered on the present trial, it is not error to allow the State to support the witness by showing that shortly after the transaction he made statements of the matter similar to his evidence delivered on the trial. Goode v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 508, 24 S. W. Rep., 102; Stephens v. State, 26 S. W. Rep., 728; Sentell v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 260, 30 S. W. Rep., 226; Dicker v. State, 32 S. W. Rep., 541; Kirk v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 224, 32 S. W. Rep., 1045; Duke v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 283, 33 S. W. Rep., 349; Parker v. State, 34 S. W. Rep., 266; Hamilton v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 376, 37 S. W. Rep., 431; Johnson v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 378, 60 S. W. Rep., 48; Lee v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 462, 72 S. W. Rep., 195; Kipper v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 386, 77 S. W. Rep., 611; Wallace v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 350, 81 S. W. Rep., 966; Rice v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 650, 100 S. W. Rep., 771; Pitts v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 524, 132 S. W. Rep., 801; Sims v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 164, 36 S. W. Rep., 256 ; Moore v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 236, 20 S. W. Rep., 563; Simpson v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 552, 81 S. W. Rep., 320.” And where the testimony goes to charge the witness with recent fabrication of his testimony, and that the witness testifies from corrupt motives, statements of the witness are admissible in consonance with his testimony on the trial made shortly after the happening of the event in support of his testimony. Williams v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 665; Jones v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 103; Jones v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 119; Heith v. State, 44 S. W. Rep., 849; Ballew v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 266; English v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 200; Reddick v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 469; Mitchell v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 278; Romero v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 437. And as the defendant had attempted to prove by ,T. G. Clem that appellant was a volunteer witness, and was going to swear to manufactured and fabricated testimony; and by the cross-examination of Amos Clem to prove the same facts, and that he was volunteering as a witness in the case, there was no.error in permitting Mr. Samuels to say that he furnished Amos Clem’s name as a witness, and informed the county attorney of the materiality of his testimony. (Gonzales v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 154.) Appellant after insisting that Amos Clem could not be supported after he had sought thus to impeach him,—that he had made contradictory statements, fabricated his testimony, and volunteered as a witness, and had assaulted his credibility bv proving that he had been indicted for murder, that he believed in spiritualism, table rapping, etc., and proved he claimed he could communicate with the spirits of those who have died and gone before, Clem being a stranger in Collin County, yet inconsistently insists that his witnesses, who had testified to an alibi for defendant, could be supported, although the State had not sought to impeach either of them, prove they had been guilty of any crime, or that they had any peculiar personal characteristics, or that they had theretofore made different or other statements than they had made on the trial of this case. And as we have held that it was not error to permit the State to support Clem under the circumstances above recited, are we equally inconsistent as appellant in holding that appellant’s witnesses could not be supported ? Let’s take the allegations of the bill presenting this issue in the strongest light for defendant. It is copied almost in full in the original opinion, but we will group the allegations contained in various parts of the bill: “It was the contention of the State herein, stoutly argued by the State, both in State’s testimony and in argument by counsel for the State, that defendant’s defense of alibi was false”; and then says, “the State introduced a great number of witnesses for the purpose of contradicting said members of defendant’s family, and for the purpose of destroying defendant’s alibi, and for the purpose of showing that it was false,” and that the county attorney “in his cross-examination of each and all of the hereinbefore named members of defendant’s family subjected each and all of them to as thorough cross-examination as he could possibly give”; and counsel for the State “in argument to the jury, stoutly insisted and argued that the alibi of defendant was false, and argued to the jury that even if one of the State’s witnesses who swore that defendant was east of the Trinity river and in the City of Dallas proper during any part of the Saturday immediately preceding the Saturday night on which deceased was killed, that the alibi of defendant was false, and not under circumstances to be believed; that the fact that a great number of State’s witnesses had positively sworn that on the Saturday, and during different times on said Saturday, showed that at least some of said witnesses were hound to he telling the truth about having seen the defendant in the City of Dallas proper, and that it was preposterous and impossible that all of said witnesses could he mistaken, or that all of said witnesses were swearing falsely about having seen defendant on that day”; and then it is alleged that the witnesses had resided in Dallas County for more than seventeen years, and had never at any time resided in Collin County, where this case was tried, and were strangers in said county. Then follows an allegation that defendant offered some half dozen witnesses, who also resided in Dallas County, except one who lived in Collin County, who would have testified to the good reputation for truth and veracity of the witnesses named in the hill, to which testimony the State objected on the ground “that there had been no attack made upon the reputation of the witnesses who testified in any way, and no predicate laid to impeach-them or either of them,” which objection was by the court sustained, to which action of the court defendant excepted on- the ground that the witnesses who testified to defendant’s alibi were strangers in Collin County, and strangers to every member of the jury; that they were examined thoroughly and rigidly on cross-examination, and defendant was entitled to show that his witnesses were of an unimpeachable character, and the jury thereby enabled to judge of their credibility.” We have restated this bill, because it is so much insisted on not only by original counsel for appellant, but also in a supplemental brief filed by Mr. Wenckey, an attorney of Dallas, who married a sister of accused. ¡Now, what are the allegations? That the witnesses were strangers in Collin County, and were subjected to a thorough and rigid cross-examination; that the State introduced witnesses who testified that appellant was in Dallas proper on that Saturday, and not in Oak Cliff at home as testified to by defendant’s witnesses; that the county attorney in his argument insisted that the alibi was false, because it would have been impossible for so many persons who testified to .seeing him in Dallas to be mistaken. It is the first time the proposition has been presented that the argument of counsel upon the weight of the testimony adduced after the testimony had closed would furnish grounds upon which to introduce testimony supporting a witness or witnesses whose testimony was criticised by counsel in their argument to the jury. As anyone knows, appellant’s able counsel certainly also in their argument insisted that the testimony of an alibi was true, and the testimony of the State’s witnesses on this point was untrue and the witnesses mistaken. When testimony pro and con on this issue was introduced, it was done that the jury might determine which was correct, and counsel on each side had the right to comment thereon. In the bill it is not claimed that counsel for the State in his cross-examination or other testimony in any manner reflected on the character or reputation of the witnesses for defendant on this issue, hut merely that the State through counsel and by the evidence offered by it sought to prove that the alibi was untrue. The rule of law is that proof of general reputation of witnesses for truth and veracity is not admissible where no attack has been made on the witness, but there is mere conflict in the testimony offered by the State and the defendant, and this is all there was in this case. Britt v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App., 215; Rushing v. State, 25 Texas Crim. App., 607; McGrath v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 413; Murphy v. State, 51 S. W. Rep., 940; Harris v. State, 45 S. W. Rep., 714; Payne v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 290; Jacobs v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 353; Zysman v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 432; Hill v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 241; Bass v. State, 65 S. W. Rep., 919; Rutherford v. State, 67 S. W. Rep., 101. It is true that there has been a slight limitation placed on this general rule in this State where the witness is a stranger in the county where he testifies, and this is where the witness "is assailed on cross-examination by questions attacking his credibility and tending to bring him into disrepute before the jury, he may be sustained by proof of his general reputation for truth and veracity.” (Phillips v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 158; Crook v. State, 27 Texas Crim. App., 198; Harris v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 338; Goode v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 220.) In the Phillips case, supra, it was held that where the witness was a stranger and testified to isolated facts, and the cross-examination to which he was subjected tended strongly to discredit his statements, he could be supported. But as hereinbefore shown, in this bill there is no allegation that the witnesses or either of them was subjected to a cross-examination which tended to discredit the witness, the only allegation being that county attorney "cross-examined the witness as thoroughly and rigidly as he could,” but it is not claimed that questions propounded nor the answers given were such as tended to discredit the witness. And this case is as far as this court has ever gone, but now appellant would have us expand the rule further and hold that if there is a conflict in the witnesses for the State and defendant, and they are strangers, their testimony may be supported. We have searched our reports for a case so holding and we find none. The Encyclopedia of Evidence, vol. 7, p. 229, says: "In Connecticut only, the mere fact that a witness is a stranger in the community warrants the introduction of proof of his reputation for truth and voracity.” We can not expand the rule as desired by appellant in the face of all of our own decisions, and the courts of last resort of all the States in the Union except Connecticut. We have read the opinion in the Connecticut case, and it does not appeal to us, for it would open so wide the door that there would be no end to trials. To do so, as in this case, the venue being changed from Dallas to Collin County, every witness offered either by the State or defendant could be supported by proof of reputation, and the trial would become, instead of a trial of whether or not the person on trial was guilty of the crime charged, a trial of which witness had the best reputation for truth and veracity, and the issues really involved wholly lost sight of. Judge Henderson, in Murphy v. State, 40 S. W. Rep., 978, citing the Phillips ease, supra, and other cases, speaking for the court, holds: "We do not understand the rule to be, though a party be a stranger in the county of the trial, that if merely some contradiction is shown between the testimony of the witnesses for defendant and the witnesses for the State, it is permissible 'to introduce testimony as to the reputation of the witness in the community in which he may have lived. The State did not make an attack on these witnesses on cross-examination tending to bring them into disrepute.” Not only is this the rule in this court, but in our Supreme Court it is also said to be the prevailing rule of law of this State in the case of T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Raney, 86 Texas, 363, wherein it is held: “The fact that a witness is a stranger or well known will not influence the deter