Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gay (86 Tex. 571, 1894)

STAYTON, Chief Justice.

This action was brought by the wife and minor child of John M. Gay to recover from John C. Brown, as receiver for the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, damages for an injury received by him while in emplopment of the receiver, which resulted in his death.

At the time the action was brought John C.'Brown was operating the Texas & Pacific Railway as receiver, under appointment made by the Circuit Court of the United States sitting for the Eastern District of the State of Louisana, but pending the litigation the receiver was discharged.

After the discharge of the receiver, with pleadings setting up that fact, a judgment was rendered against him, which on appeal was reversed. Brown v. Gay, 76 Texas, 444.

After this the pleadings were amended, and thereby the Texas & Pacific Railway Company was made a defendant; but this did not occur until jtnore than one year had elapsed after the death of John M. Gay.

The pleadings show a state of facts which would have entitled John M.. Gay to have maintained this action against the railway company for the-injury, had he lived; but as it has been held that actions for injuries resulting in death could not be maintained against receivers under the law as it was when the injury and death in question occurred, questions have-been certified to this court under pleadings and a judgment against the-railway company which make them pertinent. '

The questions will be considered in their order.

“ First. Did the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana have jurisdiction to take possession through a receiver of that part of the road situated in the State and Northern District of Texas ? ’ ’

The Texas & Pacific Railway Company was chartered by an act of Congress, approved March 3, 1871, by which it was “ empowered to lay out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain, and enjoy a continuous railroad and telegraph line, with the appurtenances, from a point at or near Marshall, county of Harrison, State of Texas; thence by the most direct and eligible route, to be determined by said company, near the thirty-second-parallel of north latitude, to a point at or near El Paso; thence by the-most direct and eligible route, to be selected by said company, through. New Mexico and Arizona, to a point on the Rio Colorado, at or near the southeastern boundary of the State of California; thence by the most direct and eligible route to San Diego, California, to Ship’s Channel in the-bay of San Diego, in' the State of California.” Sec. 1, Act 1871.

By the fourth section of the act the company was empowered “ to purchase the stock, land grants, franchises, and appurtenances of, and consolidate on such terms as may be agreed upon between the parties, with any railroad company or companies heretofore chartered by congressional, State, or territorial authority, on the route prescribed in the first section of this act.”

The ninth section of the act provided for a grant of land to the company for so much of its road as was to be constructed through the Territories of the United States and the State of California.

The twenty-second section of the act provided, “ that the New Orleans, Baton Bouge & Vicksburg Bailroad Company, chartered by the State of Louisiana, shall have the right to connect by the most eligible route, to be selected by said company, with the said Texas Pacific Bailroad at its eastern terminus, and shall have the right of way through the public lands to the same extent granted hereby to the said Texas Pacific Bail-road Company; and in aid of its construction from New Orleans to Baton Bouge, thence by way of Alexandria, in said State, to connect with the said Texas Pacific Bailroad Company at its eastern terminus, there is hereby granted to said company, its successors and assigns, the same number of alternate sections of public lands per mile, in the State of Louisiana, as are by this act granted in the State of California to said Texas Pacific Bailroad Company.”

The seventeenth section of the act required the construction of the road to commence 1 ‘ simultaneously at San Diego, in the State of California, and from a point at or near Marshall, Texas, as herein before described, and so prosecute the same as to have at least fifty consecutive miles of railway from each of said points complete and in running order within two years after the passage of this act; and to so continue to construct each year thereafter a sufficient number of miles to secure the completion of the whole line from the aforesaid point on the eastern boundary of the State of Texas to the bay of San Diego, in the State of California, as aforesaid, within ten years after the passage of this act.”

Congress passed a supplementary act, which was approved on March 2, 1872, and the first section of that changed the name of the corporation to “The Texas & Pacific Railway Company.”

The fifth section declared, “That the said Texas & Pacific Bail way Company shall commence the construction of its road at or near Marshall, Texas, and proceed with its construction, under the original act and this supplement, or in pursuance of the authority derived from any consolidation as aforesaid, westerly from a point near Marshall, and towards San Diego, in the State of California, on the line authorized by the original act, and so prosecute the same as to have at least 100 consecutive miles of railway from said point complete and in running order within two years after the passage of this act; and so continue to construct each year thereafter a sufficient number of miles, not less than 100, to secure the completion of the whole line from the aforesaid point on the eastern boundary of the State of Texas to the bay of San Diego, in the State of California, as aforesaid, within ten years after the passage of this act; and the said road from Marshall, Texas, throughout the length thereof, shall be of uniform gauge.”

After providing for construction from San Diego eastward, the section contains the following: ‘1 Provided, that said Texas & Pacific Bail way Company shall be and is hereby authorized and required to construct, maintain, control, and operate a road between Marshall, Texas, and Shreveport, Louisiana, or control and operate any existing road between said points, of the same gauge as the said Texas &c Pacific Railroad; and that all roads terminating at Shreveport shall have the right to make the same running connections, and shall be entitled to the same privileges for the transaction of business in connection with the said Texas & Pacific Railway as are granted to roads intersecting therewith: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall be construed, as changing the terminus of said Texas & Pacific Railway from Marshall, as provided in the original act. ’ ’

The Southern Pacific Railway Company was chartered by the laws of this State, and was empowered to construct, own, and operate a railway from the eastern boundary of Texas to El Paso. Spec. Laws 1852, p. 197; Spec. Laws 1856, p. 76; Spec. Laws 1860, p. 130.

The Southern Transcontinental Railway Company was also chartered under the laws of this State, and empowered to construct a railway from a point on the eastern boundary of Texas to its western boundary. Spec. Laws 1870, p. 40; Spec. Laws 1871, p. 92.

These corporations were authorized to consolidate with the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Spec. Laws 1871, p. 489.

Under this and the act of Congress referred to, the consolidation of these roads was effected, and Congress, by an act approved June 22, 1874, ratified the consolidation, and declared, that “ the roads so merged as aforesaid shall for that and all other purposes be deemed and taken to be a part of the said Texas & Pacific Railway, and shall hereafter be subject to all the provisions and limitations of the act of Congress incorporating said company, and of the supplement thereto.”

These are the laws under and by virtue of which the Texas & Pacific Railway Company exists; and it is evident from them that the eastern terminus of that road is at the eastern line of the State of Texas, and that no part of it is in the State of Louisiana.

It is true that the supplementary act, as well as the original, contemplated that, through some other road, connection between the terminus of the Texas & Pacific Railway and Shreveport, in the State of Louisiana, should be made; and to that end the later act required that company to make such a connection through a road to be built, controlled, and operated by it, or by some existing road between these points of which it might be able to obtain control; but that act expressly declares, that “ nothing herein shall be construed as changing the terminus of said Texas & Pacific Railway from Marshall, as provided in the original act.'”

Both acts proceed upon the seeming assumption that the town of Marshall was at the eastern boundary«of the State of Texas; but in view of the questions submitted, it is immaterial whether the terminus be at the one place or the other, for they are both in this State.

The original act evidently contemplated that there would be connection between the eastern terminus of the Texas & Pacific Railway and the Mississippi River through the New Orleans, Baton Rouge & Vicksburg Railway, and to that end, and to secure that, provided for a grant to that company of public lands situated in Louisiana; but no grant of public lands was contemplated for any road the Texas & Pacific Railway Company might construct from its eastern terminus to Shreveport.

Congress had power to authorize the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to construct a railway other than that which it declared should be the Texas & Pacific Railway, and to operate and control it; and at the same time to declare that the one should not be part of the other.

Where the terminus of a railway is under the terms of its charter, there it necessarily ends, in fact as well as in law; and the fact that the company may be authorized to construct and operate a railway beyond that terminus can not make the two one.

A case is not presented in which one railway, under the terms of its charter, extends through or into two or more States, in one of which a receiver over the entire road was appointed by a court sitting in a State in which part of the road was; but the case is one in which a receiver was appointed by a Circuit Court of the United States sitting in and for the Eastern District of Louisiana, to take possession of, operate, and control a railway, no part of which was in the State of Louisiana.

The appointment of a receiver by a court of general jurisdiction ought to be held conclusive of the power of the court to make the appointment when that is called in question collaterally, unless it appears that in the particular case the court was without jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction must depend on the laws creating the court and prescribing its powers; and if it attempts to exercise a power not thus conferred, its judgments and decrees are not binding even upon parties, and may be declared inoperative by any other tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to them. If the fact on which jurisdiction depends is determined by law, then resort to presumptions ordinarily indulged in favor of the power of a court of general jurisdiction which has assumed to act in a given case is neither necessary nor admissible.

In the matter now under consideration, it appears through a positive law, creating the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and fixing the locality of its road, that no part of that extends into the State of Louisiana; and the inquiry is presented whether the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in a district in that State, has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver with power to take possession of a railway situated in this State, and to control and operate it under its orders.

The importance of avoiding conflict between the courts of the United States and the State courts can not be overestimated; but such harmony as should exist between them will be most surely preserved if strict regard by each for its own jurisdiction be observed; for usurpation of power by either will necessarily bring conflict. Where one has assumed the power to act in a given case, every lawful presumption that it did not act without jurisdiction ought to be indulged; but where it is clear that either has acted without lawful power, the other, when called upon to adjudicate the rights of litigants, can not refuse to make inquiry even as to jurisdiction of the other, when this becomes necessary to the determination of a question upon it, without surrendering power conferred updn them for the preservation Of the rights of litigants before them.

For present purposes it will be assumed that the Texas & Pacific Railway Company exists by reason of its incorporation by acts of Congress, and that this is not affected by reason of its consolidation with corporations created under the laws of this State, and the acquisition of rights through consolidation.

The Texas & Pacific Railway Company having been incorporated by acts of Congress, it is probably true that the Circuit Courts of the United States would not have jurisdiction of controversies between it and others on the ground of diverse citizenship. Neptune v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat., 91.

It has, however, been held, in effect, that such courts have jurisdiction over litigation to which such corporations are parties, on the ground that they were so chartered, and without reference to the character of the question on which the right of litigants may depend. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Kirk, 115 U. S., 2.

In a case in which such a corporation is a party jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States ought to be presumed, if the action be not one local in its nature, or the relief sought, in whole or in part, be not such as can be given only by a court sitting where property is situated through which the court’s judgment may be enforced.

The purpose for which the suit was brought in Louisiana by the Missouri Pacific Railway Company against the Texas