Full opinion text
Opinion LUCAS, C. J. Defendant Fred Berre Douglas appeals from a judgment imposing death following his conviction of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated), accompanied by the special circumstance finding of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) in connection with the 1982 killings of 19-year-old Beth Jones and 16-year-old Margaret Kreuger. We affirm the judgment in its entirety. I. Facts and Procedure A. Guilt Phase Evidence The case against defendant was based substantially on the testimony of his accomplice, Richard Hernandez, who was granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. Another witness, Kathy Phillips, also testified for the prosecution pursuant to a promise of immunity. Hernandez’s and Phillips’s statements were substantially corroborated by physical evidence and other witnesses. 1. Phillips’s Testimony In 1979, Phillips, a heroin addict, wanted money to buy drugs. Her friend, Richard Hernandez, worked next door to defendant’s furniture refinishing shop in Santa Ana. Hernandez often supplied Phillips with drugs. He introduced Phillips to defendant, who told her he would pay her if she posed for nude photographs while in bondage. Phillips agreed to pose for defendant and shortly thereafter defendant took her to his shop, where he tied her hands and ankles and gagged her mouth. According to Phillips, defendant showed her photographs of several other women to indicate how he wanted her to pose. He also instructed her to “look scared” but did not harm her during the photo session. Defendant paid Phillips $40 after he had taken pictures of her with a Polaroid camera for about an hour. Phillips eventually left the shop with Hernandez, who then purchased drugs for her. Two weeks after the above incident, defendant asked Phillips if she would assist him in killing young women in the desert while making sex films that included bondage, sadism and homosexual scenes. Defendant believed that Phillips’s presence during the filming would make it easier for the victims to trust him—thus making his crime easier to commit. According to Phillips, defendant told her he would bury the bodies so that no evidence would be discovered and that he would make a lot of money (around $35,000) by selling the films to “people in Las Vegas.” Phillips testified that although her drug habit kept her from going to the police, she told defendant she did not want to participate in the crimes. She also stated she continued to frequent defendant’s furniture shop even after his proposition because she was dependent on Hernandez to supply her with drugs. About a month after defendant attempted to enlist Phillips as an accomplice in his sex-and-murder film scheme, Phillips went to defendant’s shop in order to meet Hernandez. She instead encountered defendant, who asked her “what she was going to do” about his earlier proposition. On another occasion, Phillips said defendant called her to tell her he “had a woman with him” and wanted to “carry out his plan.” Phillips told defendant she did not want to be part of his scheme. Her contact with defendant ended when she was convicted of burglary and sentenced to county jail for one year. 2. Hernandez’s Testimony Hernandez began working for defendant at his furniture refinishing shop in 1981. He was paid in food, beer, lodging and occasional spending money. He lived in defendant’s boat that was parked behind the shop. Hernandez drank beer throughout each day. After Hernandez had been working for defendant for almost eight months, defendant asked him to have a coworker drive Hernandez to his house in Costa Mesa. When Hernandez arrived, he saw an unconscious naked woman lying on a sofa bed in the living room. Defendant told Hernandez he had drugged the woman. He instructed Hernandez to take off his clothes so he could take pictures of Hernandez with the woman. Hernandez removed his clothing, and posed with the woman. Defendant told Hernandez to insert a baton inside the woman’s vagina, but it would not fit. Instead, Hernandez put butter on the object and inserted it inside her rectum. Defendant then told Hernandez to place his penis in the woman’s mouth so that defendant could take a picture. When the woman awoke three days later, defendant and Hernandez let her go. On the day of the murders the two victims met defendant and Hernandez in a 7-Eleven parking lot. The foursome drove, in defendant’s car, to the desert south of Indio. During the drive, Hernandez drank beer, and he and Kreuger smoked marijuana. When they arrived at the desert, Kreuger and Hernandez smoked more marijuana, and Hernandez followed defendant’s instructions to lay a sheet on the ground and prepare rum and Cokes for the four of them. After the foursome relaxed for an hour, defendant instructed the victims to remove their clothing. Kreuger asked defendant if she could see the money, and defendant showed her a $100 bill. Defendant then gave Hernandez a rope (which, Hernandez testified, was “a bit thicker than Venetian blind cord”) and told him to tie up the victims. Hernandez tied their feet at the ankles and then tied their hands behind their backs. When Kreuger asked defendant where he kept the camera, he and Hernandez walked to the car, where defendant retrieved a rifle from the trunk. Hernandez testified that he became scared when he saw the gun. On returning to the victims, defendant put a clip in the rifle and told them “[hjere’s the camera.” He then told the victims to “make love to each other.” Hernandez testified that for the next 10 to 15 minutes, defendant paced back and forth, shouting instructions first to one victim, and then to the other. He ordered one victim (Hernandez could not remember whether it was Jones or Kreuger) to kiss the other’s feet, and then stated he wanted “some tongue on her crotch.” When the victims requested a drink, Hernandez gave them each a sip of soda. Hernandez recalled that he continued to drink alcohol during the time defendant was shouting instructions to the victims, because he was “afraid of defendant.” Hernandez testified that after he gave the women a drink, defendant cut Kreuger on the neck with a razor blade and sucked on the open wound for about 10 minutes. When defendant stopped sucking the cut, he retrieved a beer from the cooler and told Hernandez that the women “just couldn’t go back.” Thereafter, defendant told the victims to suck on his penis, while they remained in a kneeling position. The victims next began to orally copulate Hernandez. When he was unable to sustain an erection, he told defendant that he had to urinate. As he squatted to defecate behind a bush, Hernandez heard one of the victims yell “Leave her alone!” Hernandez stated that as he walked back toward the victims, he saw defendant choking Jones. He also noticed that Kreuger was dead, blood spurting from her mouth. Hernandez claimed he attempted to knock defendant off of Jones, but that defendant knocked him down instead. According to Hernandez, he was too “messed up,” after using drugs and drinking beer, to stop defendant. After choking Jones, defendant hit her with the wooden butt of his rifle, killing her. Defendant then told Hernandez that the heat was bothering him, and he wanted to get a drink at a bar in town. Hernandez covered the victims with a sheet and hid their bodies behind a bush before the two men went to a bar in Borrego Springs, where they consumed several drinks each. When they returned to the desert, defendant told Hernandez to untie the ropes and to remove all jewelry from the victims (along with anything else that could be used to identify them). Defendant told Hernandez the items would be thrown away on the trip back to Orange County. He also told Hernandez to dig a grave and to bury the bodies. Defendant then left the scene for an hour while Hernandez followed his instructions. When defendant returned to the desert, the two men drove to Borrego Springs where they placed the sheets, ropes and the victims’ clothing in a dumpster behind a market. The men then drove back to defendant’s shop. The next day, defendant instructed Hernandez to return to the murder site to find the razor blade that he used to cut Kreuger’s neck. Hernandez did as he was told, but failed to find the blade. When Hernandez returned to the shop, he found it locked. Defendant told him that someone had called the shop and asked for “Jack” and that unknown persons had tried to “break in.” Defendant instructed Hernandez that if the “burglars” returned, he was to call the Garden Grove police at a certain number. Defendant then gave Hernandez a rifle and told him, “Anybody comes, shoot at them.” According to Hernandez, defendant told him to sleep on a “glue table” inside the shop. After defendant left the shop, a woman called and asked for “Jack.” Later that evening, Hernandez called the police after he was awakened by a noise on the roof. According to Hernandez, at least one officer believed that those attempting to break into defendant’s shop were angry over a “drug burn.” The next day, Hernandez and defendant were questioned at the Garden Grove Police Department about the disappearances of Kreuger and Jones. Hernandez recited an alibi that defendant had concocted a few days before the murders, telling the authorities that on the day of the murders the two men spent the day fishing in Oceanside and then traveled to Corona to search for Hernandez’s brother, whom they never found. That evening, defendant and Hernandez drove north, arriving several days later in Victoria, Canada, where they both obtained employment at Strong’s Furniture Refinishing Shop. Approximately six weeks later, defendant told Strong he was leaving for Seattle to seek medical attention for gout in his leg. Instead, defendant and Hernandez drove to Reno, Nevada, where they bought a car in order to trade its license plates with those on defendant’s car. Two days later, they drove to the murder site to check the grave. Toward the end of 1982, defendant and Hernandez returned to Victoria with a man named “Bob.” Defendant instructed Bob to provide Hernandez food and shelter. Defendant then left, his destination unknown to Hernandez. While in Canada, Hernandez was questioned by Canadian detectives about the disappearance of the victims, on several occasions. At one point, Hernandez declined offers of immunity and Canadian citizenship in exchange for his testimony. The bodies of Kreuger and Jones were discovered in the Anza-Borrego National Park by a photographer and his wife during the 1983 Easter holidays. Once the burial site was excavated, police collected human teeth, hair, barrettes and bones. Forensic odontologist Norman Sperber examined the skulls found at the site and two weeks later the skeletal remains were matched with the victims’ dental charts and X-rays. Meanwhile, Hernandez had returned to Orange County. After defendant and Hernandez discovered that the grave site had been disturbed, and that warrants had been issued for their arrest, they traveled to Loreto, Mexico. Defendant left Loreto after spending three weeks hiding from the authorities. Hernandez stayed in the city for approximately 10 months before he was taken into custody by Mexican authorities, who had been told by American police detectives (Johnson and Martinez of the Anaheim Police Department) that Hernandez was wanted in the United States. Apparently, as discussed further below, before he spoke to the American officers Hernandez had confessed the murders to the Mexican authorities after they beat him. Hernandez was then turned over to Detective Johnson, who did not question Hernandez regarding the murders on the return trip to the United States. Defendant was eventually arrested in North Las Vegas, Nevada, in February 1984. Shortly after his arrest, he signed a waiver of extradition and was returned to California. Both defendant and Hernandez were charged with murder (§ 187) and conspiracy to commit prostitution (§ 647, subd. (b))- 3. Other Testimony Dana Lee testified for the prosecution under a grant of immunity while he was incarcerated on a parole violation arising out of his conviction for burglary and possession of heroin. Lee had met defendant a month before the murders. He stated that several days before the murders, defendant asked him if he knew any women who would pose nude for photographs. Defendant told Lee that he would pay him $50 to $100 for an introduction. After initially refusing defendant’s offer, Lee introduced Kreuger to defendant. According to Lee, Kreuger then introduced defendant to her roommate Jones. Both women said they would pose for defendant. Defendant then asked Hernandez to accompany him to the desert where the photo session was to take place. Hernandez agreed to go with defendant to “meet some girls.” Lee recalled that later the same day, defendant and Hernandez met Kreuger and Jones in a 7-Eleven parking lot in Garden Grove and drove them to a restaurant for pizza. Terry Alimón, the victims’ roommate, recalled that after the victims returned from initially meeting with defendant and Hernandez, they told Alimón that they planned on “making a quick $500 by posing for nude photographs.” According to Alimón, Jones stated that if she and Kreuger were not back by noon the next day, “something was wrong.” Alimón called Jones’s mother after she became worried when Jones did not return home the next day. George “Dave” Stevens, who had been staying in the victims’ apartment since approximately one month before their disappearance, testified that he saw the victims leave their apartment at approximately 1:30 a.m. on the day of the murders. Leoncio Mondragon Garcia testified that he had worked in defendant’s shop for “a few days” before the murders. Garcia recalled that the night before the murders, defendant left his shop in the early evening hours, but returned (at approximately 1 a.m.) and woke Hernandez, who was sleeping in defendant’s boat in the backyard. Garcia and another employee saw defendant and Hernandez leave through the front door of the business and enter defendant’s car. Garcia followed defendant and Hernandez until they stopped at a nearby gas station. Garcia returned to the shop the next morning, and stayed there until 3:30 p.m. He testified that neither defendant nor Hernandez returned to the shop while he was there. B. Defense Defendant presented an alibi defense. Henry Akers, who had known defendant for about 10 years, owned a furniture refinishing shop near defendant’s establishment. Akers testified that on the morning of the murders, he spoke to defendant between 5 and 6:30, the same time Hernandez testified that he and defendant were driving to the desert with the murder victims. Donald Hemmer, Kreuger’s boyfriend, testified that Kreuger told him the day before the murders that she was going to visit friends. According to Hemmer, after the victims disappeared, he confronted Lee about a man named Douglas or “Doug.” Hemmer stated that Lee then described “Doug” as having “dark hair, a beard, about late thirties, early forties.” Finally, Karen Bobie, an acquaintance of Kreuger, stated she thought she saw both victims at the Garden Grove Mall in September, one month after the murders were committed. Although she had never met Jones, Bobie testified she became familiar with her picture from a missing persons flyer. All three witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the prosecution. C. Penalty Phase Evidence The People introduced evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), of three incidents of prior criminal activity. A different woman testified as to each incident. As explained in greater detail below, witnesses McGettrick and Pendleton testified about separate incidents in 1976, when defendant forced or frightened them into posing for nude photographs or performing sex acts with him in the desert. The third woman, Williams, testified that in 1977 defendant sought her participation in a plan to make movies involving the torture and killing of girls or women. Defendant was charged with attempted murder and other crimes arising out of this plan and, after the jury deadlocked, he eventually pleaded nolo contendere to solicitation to commit a felony under section 653f. Defendant presented testimony by various relatives and acquaintances regarding his good character, his nonviolent nature and his background as an orphan and an abused child. In rebuttal, the People introduced evidence that defendant’s wife of 33 years (who had testified on his behalf) had lost contact with defendant before the murders were committed, and had not seen him again until he was in custody. II. Guilt Phase Issues A. Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction At the preliminary hearing and again in superior court, defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that Orange County lacked jurisdiction. As stated above, defendant and Hernandez were initially charged with conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182), murder (§ 187) and conspiracy to commit prostitution (§ 647, subd. (b)). The prostitution conspiracy charge was based on evidence that the two men had planned to engage in sex with Kreuger and Jones for money. When Hernandez was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony, the conspiracy charges against both Hernandez and defendant were dismissed. Defendant contends that once the conspiracy charges were dropped, the Orange County Municipal and Superior Courts lacked territorial jurisdiction over his case because there was no evidence to connect the murders of Kreuger and Jones to Orange County aside from “inconsequential preliminary arrangements” made between defendant and Hernandez prior to the killings. Such minor preliminary arrangements, defendant argues, are insufficient to confer jurisdiction on Orange County. (See People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32 [59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137].) Instead, defendant asserts, after the conspiracy charges were dismissed only San Diego County—where the crimes were committed—had jurisdiction. Defendant observes that, although preliminary arrangements need not rise to the level of an element of the offense, nonetheless, under section 781, such arrangements must be “requisite to the consummation of the offense” in order for jurisdiction to lie. In ruling on defendant’s motion, the municipal court concluded, “there is territorial jurisdiction in the County of Orange to try this matter, relying on the theory that preliminary arrangements, which led to the commission of the offense, were held in Orange County; that principle being upheld in People v. Tabucchi [(1976)] 64 Cal.App.3d 133 [134 Cal.Rptr. 245], which, in turn, relies on section 781 of the Penal Code.” The superior court similarly rejected defendant’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction over his case, notwithstanding the dismissal of the conspiracy charges. As both lower courts noted, section 781 resolves the jurisdictional question. That section states: “When a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.” In Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32, a kidnapping of two police officers began in one county, and one of the officers was killed in another. We held that under section 781, the county in which the preliminary arrangements for the crime were made was a proper county to prosecute the offense even though the preparatory acts did not constitute an essential element of the crime. (67 Cal.2d at p. 62; see People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 370 [303 P.2d 730].) Defendant seeks to distinguish Powell on the ground that he did not engage in planning in Orange County to murder or to kidnap the victims; rather, he claims, the women accompanied him voluntarily to San Diego County. As the People observe, however, several preliminary acts leading to the consummation of the crimes occurred in Orange County. For example, defendant met his victims in Orange County; arrangements for the desert photography session were made there; and on the morning of the murders, defendant, Hernandez and the victims met in that county before leaving for the desert in San Diego County. We find the totality of the acts sufficient to confer jurisdiction on Orange County. (Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 62.) Moreover, we disagree with defendant that once the conspiracy charge was dismissed, Orange County lost jurisdiction to try the case. In Powell, supra, we rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish Abbott, supra, 47 Cal.2d 362, on the ground that in Abbott the defendant was charged with both murder and kidnapping, whereas in Powell there was no kidnapping charge. In so doing, we stated: “We are satisfied that territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases should depend upon the acts committed rather than upon the form of the accusatory pleading. . . . The section was intended to broaden criminal jurisdiction beyond the rigid limits fixed by the common law in cases of crimes committed in more than one jurisdiction. . . . Since section 790 is not exclusive in cases of murder, section 781 may properly be applied here. It follows that although the kidnapping of [the officers] in Los Angeles may not have constituted an essential element of the murder offense, there took place in Los Angeles County sufficient acts preliminary to the murder to allow jurisdiction to attach in that county under section 781.” (67 Cal.2d at pp. 62-63.) Like the Powell court, we find the preliminary arrangements made by defendant in Orange County were sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Orange County courts. The first necessary steps toward execution of the ultimate crimes occurred in Orange County. Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s rulings allowing the prosecution of the charged crimes in Orange County. B. Improper Venue Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion for a change of venue on the ground that he could not receive a fair trial in Orange County because of the combined effect on the jury of publicity surrounding the present trial and his 1977 arrest and subsequent trial for attempted murder. Defendant argues that although he was successful in excluding (pursuant to a pretrial motion in limine) the prior arrest and trial from the guilt phase of the present trial, his tactical decision to do so under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b), made it impossible for him to conduct voir dire on the effect of the 1977 pretrial publicity without exposing the jurors to exactly the prejudicial publicity that created the potential for bias. A change of venue motion must be granted if a defendant can show that absent such relief, there is a reasonable likelihood he will not receive a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125 [259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146]; People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 948 [171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240].) Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, “the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable.” (Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1125; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 231 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) The factors to be considered on review are the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the media coverage, the size of the community, the community status of the defendant and the prominence of the victim. (Williams; supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1125; People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 818 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832].) As we observed in Williams, however, review on appeal differs from writ review in that after trial the review is retrospective. (48 Cal. 3d at p. 1125.) In other words, “any presumption in favor of a venue change is unnecessary, for the matter may then be analyzed in light of the voir dire of the actual, available jury pool and the actual jury panel selected.” (Id. at pp. 1125-1126.) The question then is whether, in light of the failure to change venue, it is reasonably likely a fair trial was not had. (Adcox, supra, 47 Cal. 3d at p. 231.) Our review of the record reveals the trial court’s denial of the venue motion was proper. The record shows the court determined that the status of the defendant and the victims’ prominence in the community were neutral factors. Although the murder victims were popular with their friends and families, there is no indication that they were “prominent” in Orange County. (See Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 949.) Next, although the court observed that the nature and gravity of the offense was a “major factor” in determining proper venue (at one point the court stated, “this is not the regular run of the mill type of homicide that we are dealing with, nor was the Hillside Strangler, nor the Manson case, nor the attempt to shoot President Reagan”), the court also believed that in a community the size of Orange County, defendant could receive a fair trial. In this context, it noted that Orange County’s population was approximately 2 million, making it one of the 10 largest counties in the United States. (Compare Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1126 [reversed on venue grounds when sensational murder trial held in “relatively small county”; the defendant was Black and the victim was White and from a prominent family].) As to the publicity received, the court observed that there were 43 “highly inflammatory” newspaper articles written about defendant’s 1977 arrest, whereas there were only 9 articles regarding the 1982 murders. When defense counsel argued that he was concerned with the combined effect of the articles on the present jury, the court stated that in light of the passage of time between the first and second trials, the county was large enough that jurors could be found who could set aside their own prejudices and decide the case on the evidence presented. Initially, in conducting voir dire, the court spoke to the panelists in groups of 12 and asked general questions about whether anyone had heard of defendant or whether his name “rang a bell” with any of the prospective jurors. No juror recalled having heard of defendant or his prior trial. Later, during individual examination, one juror was excused for cause after she revealed to the court that she overheard people discussing the case at a dinner party she had attended. In addition, defendant presents no evidence indicating the jurors remembered at all, let alone improperly relied on, evidence of the 1977 trial. Moreover, the record reveals that none of the jurors selected remembered anything damaging to defendant, none knew about his prior criminal background, and none had formed an opinion concerning his guilt or innocence. Accordingly, we find that under the facts, it is not reasonably likely defendant was denied a fair trial. (Williams, supra, 48 Cal. 3d at p. 1132; see People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 177 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) C. Admissibility of Hernandez's Testimony 1. Facts In March 1984, Hernandez was arrested by Mexican police in Loreto, Mexico. Detective Johnson of the Anaheim Police Department was informed of the arrest shortly thereafter, and he and other United States police officers traveled to Mexico to return Hernandez to the United States. On arrival in Mexico, the United States officers informed the local police of the murders of Kreuger and Jones, showed them the affidavit for the arrest warrant, and provided them with some photographs. The Mexican officers informed the United States officers that they intended to question Hernandez, and asked to borrow a tape recorder, which the Americans provided. The United States authorities were then advised that they would be contacted when the questioning was concluded. Mexican officials proceeded to question Hernandez. When they were unsuccessful in their initial inquiries, Hernandez claims they resorted to physical violence, subjecting him to a 15-20 minute beating. Hernandez still did not talk. The Mexican police ceased the interrogation, but informed Hernandez that he could expect even worse treatment that evening. As promised, the officers returned later that evening. Hernandez had earlier noticed that one of them had carried an automatic weapon. The officers informed Hernandez that they were going to “take him out to the beach.” At this point, fearing for his life, Hernandez gave a full confession. His statement was typed and signed after he was told it would not be given to United States officials, but instead would simply be placed in the Mexican police files. Mexican police thereafter released Hernandez to United States authorities, and gave them a copy of Hernandez’s statement. The United States officers escorted Hernandez across the border, where he was officially arrested, then taken to court in Anaheim for arraignment. Before he was arraigned, Hernandez was interviewed at the police station by Detective Johnson and Deputy District Attorney Rackacaus. Rackacaus did not give Hernandez the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]; rather, he informed Hernandez that their discussion was to be “off the record” and that it could not be used against him at trial. Before informing him of the charges he faced and the possible penalties therefor, Rackacaus told Hernandez that he was in “serious trouble.” Rackacaus stated he wanted to know Hernandez’s story to see if he could be used as a witness against defendant. Hernandez agreed to tell his story. Rackacaus then asked Hernandez if he wanted the interview taped, and Hernandez stated he did not. During the interview, Rackacaus never mentioned the alleged Mexican confession, nor did he inform Hernandez that United States authorities had any knowledge of it. Although Hernandez suspected that the American police may have been given the Mexican statement, he did not know if his suspicions were borne out. Rackacaus made no offer of leniency before the interview, but indicated afterward that if Hernandez cooperated, the charges against him might be reduced. During the interview, counsel for Hernandez arrived at the police station. Rackacaus told Hernandez of this fact, and Hernandez indicated he would finish giving his statement before speaking with counsel. Hernandez’s statement conformed closely to the one he had given to the Mexican officials. He subsequently testified that his statements to Rackacaus were made freely and voluntarily. A few weeks after the interview, following negotiations between the prosecution and Hernandez’s counsel, Hernandez was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony against defendant. Defendant sought extraordinary writ relief in the Court of Appeal in an effort to vacate the order granting immunity. The court summarily denied relief and we rejected defendant’s petition for review. The trial court next held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 on the voluntariness of Hernandez’s statment to Rackacaus, and concluded “beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the statements by Hernandez were indeed voluntary here in the U.S.” The court subsequently stated for the record that it had excluded the Mexican confession as involuntary. 2. Defendant’s Contentions Defendant asserts Hernandez’s trial testimony “was inadmissible as a matter of law because it was obtained by improper and coercive police and prosecution conduct,” and that the trial court therefore erred in permitting its admission into evidence. He argues that (i) the coercive tactics employed by the Mexican police in extracting Hernandez’s initial confession are attributable to United States authorities, (ii) the “taint” from the initial coerced confession was never “purged” (and was in fact aggravated by subsequent police and prosecutorial misconduct), and (iii) the testimony under grant of immunity was itself a form of “coercion” sufficient on these facts to mandate exclusion of the trial statements. As we explain below, we reject each contention. 3. Law Governing Review As a preliminary matter, we address what law governs this issue. The murders of Kreuger and Jones occurred in August 1982. Before the offenses were committed, however, the voters of this state adopted the initiative measure designated on the ballot as Proposition 8. Section 3 of the initiative added section 28, subdivision (d), to article I of our state Constitution. That section, labeled the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision, declares that “relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.” In People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149], we held that Proposition 8 applied to offenses committed on or after its effective date of June 9, 1982. Recently, in People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 71 [260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042], we determined that the “Truth-in-Evidence” provision of Proposition 8 abrogated the rule adopted in People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 605 [147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672], imposing a stricter standard of proof on the voluntariness of confessions than that used by the federal courts. Thus, we determined that the voluntariness of confessions or admissions must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. (Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 71.) With this standard in mind, we review defendant’s substantive arguments. 4. Burden of Proving Involuntariness Defendant correctly observes that the federal and California courts have consistently recognized that the “admission at trial of improperly obtained statements which results in a fundamentally unfair trial violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” (Wilcox v. Ford (11th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 1140, 1148; see also United States v. Chiavola (7th Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 1271, 1273-1274; United States ex rel. Cunningham v. DeRobertis (7th Cir. 1983) 719 F.2d 892, 895-896; United States v. Fredericks (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 470, 480; LaFrance v. Bohlinger (1st Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 29, 34-35; People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 102-104 [221 Cal.Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; People v. Varnum (1967) 66 Cal.2d 808 [59 Cal.Rptr 108, 427 P.2d 772].) But unlike those situations in which a defendant challenges his own prior involuntary statements (see Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627, 92 S.Ct. 619] [the government must prove voluntariness of defendant’s confession by preponderance of evidence]; Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [same]), when a defendant seeks to exclude the allegedly involuntary testimony of a witness or codefendant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the admitted statements were involuntarily obtained (Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 102-104). As we observed in Leach, the heightened protections courts have traditionally afforded defendants in the self-incrimination context are designed to assure that an accused’s coerced confessions will not be used against him, and to protect against evidence of guilt emanating from his own involuntary statements. (41 Cal.3d at p. 103.) “[T]here is no such need for prophylactic rules directed at assuaging our fear of convicting the innocent—or even the guilty—by means of evidence obtained in violation of due process, when the victim of the violation is not the defendant. In such a case, we see no reason for departing from the ordinary rule that a party ‘claiming that a person is guilty of . . . wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue.’ (Evid. Code, § 520).” (Id. at p. 104.) Defendant fails to meet his burden here. Although he emphasizes the assertedly coerced Mexican confession and the subsequent informal interview between Hernandez and Rackacaus, this emphasis misperceives the limited nature of the exclusion recognized for coerced third party testimony. (Leach, supra, 41 Cal. 3d at p. 104.) Because the exclusion is based on the idea that coerced testimony is inherently unreliable, and that its admission therefore violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial, this exclusion necessarily focuses only on whether the evidence actually admitted was coerced. Here, none of the statements made by Hernandez to the Mexican police was introduced at defendant’s trial. Accordingly, defendant can prevail on his suppression claim only if he can show that the trial testimony given by Hernandez was involuntary at the time it was given. (Ibid.) 5. Fifth Amendment Claim We reiterate that even though the issue before us involves an alleged forced confession, it does not involve a violation of defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Neither the People’s discovery of Hernandez as a potential witness, nor Hernandez’s trial testimony was gained from incriminatory statements made by defendant. (Cf. United States v. Ceccolini (1978) 435 U.S. 268 [55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054] [violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights may justify exclusion of live witness testimony discovered as a result]; accord People v. Superior Court (Sosa) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 883, 892-894 [185 Cal.Rptr. 113, 649 P.2d 696].) Moreover, defendant lacks standing to object to any perceived violation of Hernandez’s privilege against self-incrimination. That right is personal, and may not be vicariously asserted by another. (See, e.g., Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d at p. 1148, fn. 13; United States v. Fredericks, supra, 586 F.2d at p. 480; United States v. Shaffner (7th Cir. 1975) 524 F.2d 1021, 1022; see also Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165 [22 L.Ed.2d 176, 89 S.Ct. 961].) Any basis for excluding Hernandez’s testimony must be found in a federal constitutional right personal to defendant. (Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 71.) 6. Discussion In Bradford v. Johnson (E.D.Mich. 1972) 354 F.Supp. 1331, one of the first cases to consider the exclusion of coerced testimony by a nondefendant, police officers arrested suspect Payne and subjected him to a prolonged period of beatings and torture, ceasing only after Payne implicated the defendant and agreed to testify against him at trial (apparently in exchange for the cessation of torture). In holding Payne’s trial testimony was so untrustworthy as to violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the court noted that Payne “was physically tortured before arraignment. He appeared at arraignment visibly beaten and was returned by the magistrate to the custody of his torturers. He was tortured until he confessed and incriminated petitioner. He was promised cessation of his torture only after he incriminated another in addition to himself. . . . The [trial] testimony of a witness obtained by these means when he must surrender himself immediately after testifying to those persons who tortured him, does not comport with due process.” (Id. at p. 1336.) The Bradford court was careful to note, however, that “[t]his does not mean that incriminations of others coerced by torture necessarily poison all future [trial] testimony.” (354 F.Supp. at p. 1337; see also United States v. Ceccolini, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 278 [55 L.Ed.2d at p. 278] [“we have specifically refused to hold that ‘making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.’ ”].) Indeed, in the numerous cases following Bradford, few, if any, have ordered suppression of trial testimony that was not itself shown to be unreliable or coerced. (See also United States v. Merkt (5th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 266, 274 [recognizing distinction between suppressing reliable trial testimony following an earlier coerced statement, and suppressing only the coerced out-of-court statement itself]; DeRobertis, supra, 719 F.2d at p. 896 [“in contrast to . . . LaFrance and Bradford, the allegedly coerced confession [in this case] was not introduced at petitioner’s trial. While the confession may have aided in the investigation of the crime, this use presents no basis for relief ... if there was nothing improper about the trial itself [italics added]”]; United States v. Shaffner, supra, 524 F.2d at p. 1022 [trial court not required to rule on whether codefendant’s possibly coerced confession was voluntary because codefendant pleaded guilty, testified on behalf of the government, and stated the confession was voluntary]; cf. LaFrance, supra, 499 F.2d 29 [prohibiting use of coerced out-of-court statements for impeachment purposes when codefendant testified at trial recanting the coerced statements].) In the present case, defendant fails to demonstrate that Hernandez’s trial testimony was coerced. Hernandez was not subjected to any violence by United States authorities, and thus, unlike the defendant in Bradford, was not forced to “surrender himself immediately after testifying to those persons who tortured him.” (Bradford, supra, 354 F.Supp. at p. 1336.) By contrast, Hernandez testified under a general grant of immunity, precluding use against him of any statements made in connection with his testimony. The immunity agreement was reached only after Hernandez consulted with counsel and after negotiations between counsel and the prosecution. The agreement required only that Hernandez testify truthfully as to his knowledge of the murders, and was not conditioned on consistency of his testimony with his earlier out-of-court statements, or on ultimate conviction of the defendant. (Cf. U.S. ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen (N.D.Ill. 1981) 540 F.Supp. 151, 154 [coercion involving out-of-court confession by codefendant would taint codefendant’s trial testimony when codefendant plea bargained to testify “consistently with [his] challenged confession”].) Moreover, Hernandez testified under oath that his statements were made freely and voluntarily and were not compelled by the earlier statements that he made in Mexico. His trial testimony was subject to thorough cross-examination and impeachment. In a similar case, Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d 1140, the defendant was accused of murdering a victim whose body was not discovered until eight years after the crime was committed. The primary prosecution witness was Wrentz, an elderly, illiterate man, who had been in the company’s employ for over 30 years. He testified, apparently under a grant of immunity, that he helped defendant and several other men load the victim’s corpse into a box, after which they drove to a secluded spot where they buried the body. Defendant sought to exclude Wrentz’s testimony on the ground that Wrentz’s earlier consistent statement to police had been impermissibly coerced from him. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim, noting: “Even assuming that the police employed improper interrogation techniques to obtain . . . Wrentz’s out-of-court statements implicating Wilcox in the crime, [they were not] introduced at trial. . . . There is no proof that Wrentz was incompetent to testify or that his trial testimony was coerced. . . . [If] Even assuming, however, that the reliability of Wrentz’s direct testimony . . . was somewhat suspect, the defendant had adequate tools in hand to challenge the reliability before the jury. The defense had full knowledge of the nature of Wrentz’s . . . interrogation, had access to the tapes and transcripts of the interrogation sessions prior to trial, and had a full opportunity to use those materials in examining [him]. Furthermore, in addition to a full opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], Wilcox had adequate opportunity to put on independent evidence to discredit the challenged testimony and did in fact put on such evidence. Finally, the trial court gave the appropriate jury charges on reasonable doubt, credibility, and immunity to aid them in assessing the value of the evidence in question. Considering all of these factors, we conclude that Wilcox did receive a fundamentally fair trial in spite of any government misconduct that might have occurred.” (Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d at p. 1149.) Similarly, in the present case, defendant does not claim that Hernandez’s allegedly coerced out-of-court statements were improperly admitted at trial. Rather, he challenges only Hernandez’s trial testimony. Here, as in Wilcox, the accomplice’s trial testimony was subject to cross-examination and impeachment, and defendant possessed “adequate tools” with which to challenge the reliability of Hernandez’s testimony, being fully apprised of all of the circumstances surrounding Hernandez’s earlier interrogation in Mexico. Moreover, we are unpersuaded that Hernandez was in any way subject to coercion at the time he testified at defendant’s trial. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the admission of Hernandez’s trial testimony deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defendant maintains, nonetheless, that Hernandez’s trial testimony and his out-of-court statements are inseparable for admissibility purposes, and that we must examine the “totality of circumstances” to determine voluntariness here. Analogizing to the “successive confession” cases in the Fifth Amendment context (e.g., Clewis v. Texas (1967) 386 U.S. 707 [18 L.Ed.2d 423, 87 S.Ct. 1338]; Lyons v. Oklahoma (1944) 322 U.S. 596 [88 L.Ed. 1481, 64 S.Ct. 1208]; see also People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815 [183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]), defendant argues that the “physical abuse and prior coerced confessions establish an unbroken chain of coercion culminating in Hernandez’s testimony at the trial.” Defendant contends that none of the events subsequent to the Mexican confession was sufficient to “purge the taint” of the earlier involuntary statements. Even assuming arguendo that such “poisonous fruit” analyses are applicable to cases in which a defendant challenges a third party’s allegedly coerced statement, we believe defendant’s claim must fail on these facts. The federal constitutional standard concerning successive confessions was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596. As here, the Lyons court was faced with a situation in which assertedly “improper methods were used to obtain a confession, but that confession was not used at the trial. Later, in another place and with different persons present, the accused again told the facts of the crime.” (Id. at p. 602 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 1485].) Lyons observed that “[t]he voluntary or involuntary character of a confession is determined by a conclusion as to whether the accused, at the time he confesses, is in possession of ‘mental freedom’ to confess to or deny a suspected participation in a crime. . . . [ft] . . . If the relation between the earlier and later confession is not so close that one must say the facts of one control the character of the other, the inference is for the triers of fact and their conclusion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession should be admitted as voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process. ” (Id. at pp. 602-603 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1485-1486].) Here, we are unpersuaded that the asserted facts surrounding Hernandez’s confession in Mexico, as offensive as they may be to our notions of civilized conduct, necessarily “control the character of” the testimony given by Hernandez at trial. First, we disagree with defendant’s assertions that the coercion applied by the Mexican authorities can somehow be attributed to the United States police, or that United States authorities were “joint venturers” in the Mexican interrogation. On the contrary, there is no evidence that the Mexican authorities were acting at the behest of United States officials, or that the United States authorities even had knowledge of the alleged beatings at the time they occurred. The fact that United States officials knew the Mexican police would question Hernandez, or that they shared information about the crime with Mexican authorities or lent them a tape recorder upon request, hardly indicates knowledge or approval by United States officials of the assertedly improper interrogation tactics utilized by the Mexican police. Moreover, we believe any “taint” remaining from Hernandez’s Mexican confession was dissipated following Hernandez’s escort across the border by United States officials. By Hernandez’s own account, any remaining threat of beatings disappeared once he crossed the border, and he was confident that physical coercion could not and would not be used against him here. He was at this point completely outside the reach of his earlier tormentors and had no reason to anticipate further mistreatment. (See Leon v. Wainwright (11th Cir. 1984) 734 F.2d 770, 772-773 [subsequent confession found voluntary under Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596, when police obtained earlier statements by physical force and threats, but subsequent statements were obtained by “a completely different group of police officers” who “meticulously explained” defendant’s constitutional rights before taking statement].) In addition, we note that Rackacaus, in his subsequent interview with Hernandez, scrupulously avoided any mention of the Mexican confession and, although Hernandez suspected possible United States awareness of his Mexican confession, he was never informed of or threatened with that fact. Nor was Hernandez offered leniency in return for his statements, although he was told of the potentially grave charges he . faced and their possible penalties. Finally, although Rackacaus apparently did not read Hernandez his Miranda rights, and his arraignment was briefly delayed, he was told in the informal interview that his statements could not be used against him. Thus, we are not persuaded that Hernandez’s statements to Rackacaus were unlawfully coerced, or that they were a direct product of the coerced Mexican confession. Accordingly, we conclude that subsequent events in the United States sufficiently purged any “taint” remaining after the Mexican confession. Even assuming that a “successive confession” analysis under Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596, is appropriate here, we are satisfied that Hernandez’s trial testimony was sufficiently unrelated to his Mexican confession so as to dissipate any possible “taint” from the earlier statements. In sum, we conclude that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by virtue of the admission of Hernandez’s trial testimony. In so concluding, we must also reject defendant’s claim that Rackacaus’s alleged “prosecutorial misconduct” in obtaining Hernandez’s initial statements merits reversal. If admission of Hernandez’s testimony did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, a fortiori, pretrial prosecutorial efforts to secure that testimony did not impair defendant’s right to a fair trial. Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that his conviction must be reversed because Hernandez’s preliminary hearing testimony, made at a time when Hernandez was still a codefendant, was involuntary, and therefore should not have been relied on by the court in binding defendant over for trial. “Illegalities in pretrial commitment proceedings, other than those which are ‘jurisdictional in the fundamental sense,’ are not reversible per se on an appeal from the subsequent trial. Rather, ‘defendant [must] show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination.’ (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].)” (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 628 [205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) Because we conclude that defendant’s trial was fair, his pretrial “sufficiency of the evidence” claim must fail. (See People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1017-1018 [230 Cal.Rptr. 237]; People v. Flint (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 13, 17-18 [225 Cal.Rptr. 323].) D. Corroboration—Sufficiency of Evidence Defendant argues that, assuming Hernandez was found by the jury to be an accomplice, the People presented insufficient corroboration of Hernandez’s testimony. Section 1111 provides, “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such proper evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances.” The key inquiry is whether the evidence tends to connect the defendant with the crime so that the jury may be satisfied that the accomplice is telling the truth. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1206-1207 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795].) Moreover, corroborating evidence is sufficient if it connects the defendant with the crime, although such evidence is slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 773 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].) Finally, “Corroborating evidence may be circumstantial in nature, and may consist of evidence of the defendant’s conduct or his declarations.” (Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Assuming for the purpose of this determination that Hernandez was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration under section 1111, we are fully convinced that there was sufficient corroborating testimony at trial. As explained above, in addition to Hernandez’s testimony, statements of several other witnesses tended to connect defendant to the murders. Lee testified that two days before the victims disappeared, he introduced Kreuger to defendant after she told Lee that she was in need of money. Thereafter, Lee testified that he drove Kreuger to her home, where he met Jones. According to Lee, both girls discussed a “photo session” with defendant. Garcia testified that on the morning the murders were committed, he saw defendant and Hernandez leave defendant’s refinishing shop at 1 a.m. At the same time, the victims’ roommate, Stevens, testified he saw the victims leave their apartment at 1:30 a.m. On the afternoon before her disappearance, Jones told her best friend, Alimón, that she and Kreuger were going “to make an easy $500 by posing for nude pictures.” Alimón also testified that Jones told her if she had not returned by noon the following day that “something was wrong,” and she was to “do something.” We conclude Hernandez’s testimony was substantially corroborated. (See Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 773.) E. Accomplice Instructions The court instructed the jury on both the sufficiency of the testimony of a single witness and the requirement of corroboration for the testimony of an accomplice. Defendant contends that it erred by so instructing. It is settled that “we must look to the entire charge, rather than merely one part, to determine whether error occurred.” (People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 830 [218 Cal Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372].) After looking to the charge as a whole, we find no error. Contrary to defendant’s claim, we do not believe the jury was led to disregard the instruction on the requirement of corroboration for the testimony of an accomplice by the instruction on the sufficiency of the testimony of a single witness. In our view, reasonable jurors would have understood the latter instruction as declaring the rule governing witnesses generally, and they would have understood the former as stating the exception applicable to witnesses who happened to be accomplices. (See generally People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1313 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) F. Hernandez’s Invocation of a Fifth Amendment Privilege During the course of the trial, Hernandez was charged with committing two felonies under section 4573 and Health and Safety Code section 11350 (conspiracy to smuggle heroin into jail and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia). The record reveals that immediately following his arrest on those charges, Hernandez lied to the police about his involvement in the foregoing illegal activity. Hernandez was never offered immunity in connection with either felony. On cross-examination of Hernandez at trial, counsel for defendant sought to impeach Hernandez as a drug abuser and habitual liar by questioning him regarding the recent charges filed against him, and the fact that he lied to the police after he was implicated in the drug smuggling scheme. Hernandez, however, asserted the Fifth Amendment, refusing to answer any questions pertaining to the drug charges. Defense counsel objected to Hernandez’s silence on the ground that it violated defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine a witness under the Sixth Amendment. As an alternative to permitting Hernandez to make a limited assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, defense counsel suggested that Hernandez’s testimony either be stricken in its entirety, or that he be granted use immunity in exchange for his testimony. Defendant renews his argument on appeal, claiming that he suffered substantial prejudice because of Hernandez’s refusal to respond to questions regarding the charges pending against him. The court held an in camera hearing on the issue. In response to defense counsel’s objection to Hernandez’s silence on the drug charges, and his suggested alternatives, the prosecutor explained to the court that it was “very reluctant to give Mr. Hernandez anything short of a prison term on these new charges, and it just doesn’t seem like a good balance to put us in that position just in order so that counsel can do some cross-examining on what is clearly a very collateral area here.” The court agreed with the People after determining that “it is a collateral charge, that [Hernandez] has an absolute right to remain silent on anything about that charge.” Nonetheless, the court stated it would allow counsel to reargue the issue if further discovery on the matter revealed the pending drug charges against Hernandez directly affected the present case (e.g., if the fact of pending charges formed the basis for a deal with the prosecution and hence, a motive to lie). The issue did not arise again. We have consistently held that it is within the trial court’s discretion to exclude collateral evidence offered for impeachment purposes (see, e.g., People v. Redmond (1981) 29 Cal.3d 904, 913 [176 Cal.Rptr. 780, 633 P.2d 976]), as well as to exclude evidence that is cumulative, confusing or misleading (Evid. Code, § 352). In addition, as defendant himself observes, he suffered no prejudice as a result of Hernandez’s barred testimony because the court allowed him to call other witnesses (including a jailhouse informant) to testify about events leading to the drug smuggling charges against Hernandez. Thus, the jury was well aware of the charges pending against Hernandez and was allowed to draw its own inferences about the relationship between Hernandez’s habitual drug use and the credibility of his testimony against defendant. (See Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 354-355, 94 S.Ct. 1105].) Accordingly, in our view, defendant had adequate opportunity to inform the jury of the charges pending against Hernandez, and his Sixth Amendment right to confront Hernandez was not significantly compromised by Hernandez’s refusal to answer questions regarding the charges pending against him. G. Admissibility of Phillips’s Testimony Defendant asserts the court committed reversible error by allowing Kathy Phillips to testify, over his objection, that in 1979 (three years before the subject murders) she participated in a photo session at defendant’s furniture refinishing shop during which defendant photographed her in the nude while she was bound and gagged. T