Full opinion text
Opinion BROWN, J.—A jury convicted defendant Paul Clarence Bolin of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code), one count of attempted first degree murder (§§ 187, 664), and one count of cultivation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358). It found true allegations of personal firearm use (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury also returned a true finding on the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and set the penalty at death. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to modify the sentence (§ 190.4, subd. (e)). This appeal is automatic (§ 1239). I. Facts A. Guilt Phase The crimes occurred Labor Day weekend of 1989, when defendant was living in a small cabin located in a secluded mountainous area of Walker Basin in rural Kem County. Vance Huffstuttler also lived on the property in a trailer. Together they cultivated marijuana defendant had planted nearby. Defendant had taken on Huffstuttler as an assistant in the marijuana venture and intended to give him a portion of the profits when they sold the crop. On Friday, September 1, Steve Mincy and Jim Wilson drove from Garden Grove to a campsite owned by Mincy’s father, Robert, near Twin Oaks, also in Kem County. Robert and several other family members and friends had already arrived and were planning to spend the weekend. The next day, Wilson went for a bicycle ride and then met Steve Mincy at a bar in Twin Oaks. Mincy was there drinking with several others, including Vance Huffstuttler; defendant was also among the group. Later, Wilson returned to the campsite, where he agreed to drive Huffstuttler back to his trailer; Mincy accompanied them. According to Wilson’s trial testimony, the trip to Walker Basin took about 45 minutes in his truck, including 30 minutes on rough dirt roads leading into defendant’s property. Defendant had already returned to his cabin. Upon arriving, Mincy, Wilson, and Huffstuttler saw him there with Eloy Ramirez, a friend of defendant’s who was blind in one eye. When they got out of the truck, Huffstuttler took Mincy and Wilson across a creek bed and showed them numerous marijuana plants under cultivation. Defendant followed shortly thereafter and confronted Huffstuttler about bringing strangers to the location. Wilson testified defendant became “pretty agitated” and began arguing with Huffstuttler. The two returned to the other side of the creek bed toward the cabin, out of Wilson’s view, still arguing. Wilson then heard a gunshot from that direction. A moment later, he and Mincy saw defendant appear from behind a line of trees holding a revolver and saying he had “nothing against” them. As Wilson turned and ran, defendant fired a shot that hit him in the shoulder. He heard several more shots as Mincy begged for his life. According to Ramirez’s testimony, when defendant and Huffstuttler returned across the creek bed arguing, defendant went into the cabin and came out with a revolver. Huffstuttler asked, “What are you going to do, shoot me?” Defendant did not respond, but instead fired one shot at close range. Huffstuttler fell to the ground and did not move. Defendant then approached Mincy and Wilson and fired several more rounds. Back at the cabin, he took a rifle and shot at Huffstuttler’s inert body. He also took other steps to make the scene appear like the result of a drug deal gone bad. Ramirez refused to assist him. When defendant finished, they both left for Southern California. Meanwhile, after traveling all night over the mountainous terrain, Wilson found his way to a neighboring ranch, where the owner called the sheriff’s office. When sheriff’s deputies went to defendant’s cabin, they found Huffstuttler’s body lying near Wilson’s truck; Mincy’s body was in the creek bed in a fetal position. Both had several fatal gunshot wounds; Huffstuttler had been shot with both a revolver and a rifle. The area inside and outside the cabin was in disarray with broken bottles and marijuana paraphernalia as well as some loose marijuana scattered about. The revolver, wiped clean of fingerprints, was found near Huffstuttler. A knife was found nearby as well. Spent shell casings and bullets were retrieved from near each body. At trial, Criminalist Gregory Laskowski determined that grooves in the bullets were consistent with having been fired from the .45-caliber weapon found at the scene. He also testified that blood spatters around Mincy’s body indicated some gunshot wounds had been inflicted while he was running and at least one other while he was in a fetal position. Despite an extensive search, law enforcement was unable to locate defendant for several months. Authorities eventually arrested him in Chicago, where he had been living with friends and family members: Sheriff’s deputies also traced the whereabouts of Eloy Ramirez to the house of his girlfriend, Patricia Islas, in Covina, where he had gone after the killings. At trial, Ramirez corroborated the description of events recounted by Wilson. The defense presented no evidence at the guilt phase. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of two instances of violent criminal conduct—an unadjudicated assault with great bodily injury of Matthew Spencer and the attempted manslaughter of Kenneth Ross, for which defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison. The prosecution also submitted a threatening letter defendant wrote to Jerry Halfacre while incarcerated awaiting trial. Halfacre had previously had a relationship with defendant’s daughter, Paula, and was the father of her child. Among other things, the letter warned Halfacre not to see Paula again or defendant would have him “permanently removed from the face of this Earth.” Halfacre had given the letter to his probation officer, who transferred it to a Kern County District Attorney investigator. 2. Defense Evidence In addition to testimony that defendant had acted under provocation in the incidents involving Spencer and Ross, the defense presented evidence of his upbringing. Defendant’s parents divorced when he was eight years old, and within a few years neither wanted to care for him. He lived on the street until he was 16 years old when he joined the Navy and went to Vietnam. Defendant’s two daughters testified he had raised them from young ages when their mother abandoned them. Defendant also raised his stepdaughter, Pamela Castillo, after he and her mother were divorced. Other family members and friends recounted how defendant had helped them in various ways. II. Discussion A. Pretrial Issues 1. Change of Venue Motion Prior to trial, defendant moved for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity about the case. Not only had the local television and print media given the killings substantial coverage, the program, America’s Most Wanted, featured a television reenactment of the crimes during a segment aired just prior to defendant’s arrest. The broadcast apparently led to his identification in Chicago as the alleged perpetrator, and a second airing shortly thereafter described his apprehension. In support of the motion, defendant submitted videotaped copies of the television episodes as well as local news clippings reporting the crimes. At the hearing on the change of venue motion, defense counsel also referred to the results of a public opinion survey the defense had undertaken in Kern County: Based on the survey, counsel represented that 45 percent of the people responding indicated they had some knowledge of the case due to the media attention. Of this number, 20 percent had seen the America’s Most Wanted reenactment. Initially, we address defendant’s claim counsel was ineffective for failing to make a sufficient record in support of the motion because he failed to have the public opinion survey entered into evidence. We find no deficiency. (See post, at p; 333.) The trial court had a copy of the survey for its consideration. Counsel orally represented the statistical information he deemed most vital to the motion. Since the prosecutor offered no contradiction, we have concluded those representations were accurate and accepted them as part of the record, but for the reasons discussed below find them irrelevant to our determination of this issue. Defendant fails to identify any other materials that would have bolstered his motion. After considering the materials presented, the trial court found only the initial television episode a possible basis for granting a change of venue, expressing concern that psychologically those who had watched the reenactment would be unable to set aside its impact. Nevertheless, the court tentatively denied the motion and reserved final ruling to see the number of prospective jurors who had actually viewed it and their reactions. At the close of voir dire, defendant accepted the jury with 16 peremptory challenges remaining, notwithstanding the fact 3 jurors had seen the crime scene dramatization on America’s Most Wanted. Because he never raised the issue again or sought a definitive ruling, his claim on appeal is procedurally barred. This court has long held “that it is no error for the trial court to postpone the consideration of an application for a change of venue until an attempt is made to impanel the jury, where leave is granted to counsel to renew his application if the facts disclosed . . . warrant it, and . . . where counsel fails thereafter to renew his motion, he cannot claim . . . error was committed by the court in failing to order a change of venue. In those cases it was held . . . that the failure to renew his motion, where it was denied temporarily only, was an abandonment and waiver of the whole question, and fatal to any - claim based upon the original application.” {People v. Staples (1906) 149 Cal. 405, 412 [86 P. 886], overruled on other grounds in People v. Newland (1940) 15 Cal.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778].) Here, denial of defendant’s motion was expressly conditioned on the extent to which the television reenactment might have influenced the attitudes of prospective jurors. As the court explained, “This is tentative.” “I want to see first of all how many perspective [sz'c] [jurors] we get who actually have seen this video .... [H] So your motion is reserved . . . .” As in Staples, “no ultimate disposition of the motion was made, and defendant was accorded the right to subsequently renew his motion. He did not do so, and he cannot, within the rule of [cases cited in Staples], now insist that the court erred, when his right to move was only postponed, and he did not see fit to avail himself of his opportunity to subsequently renew the motion.” (149 Cal. at pp. 412-413.) In the alternative, defendant contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to press for a definitive ruling. As will appear, this is the first of many instances in which he attempts to transmute a failure to preserve an issue for appeal into a claim of attorney incompetence. We therefore note some preliminary considerations in this regard. Although the Constitution does not demand an error-free trial, this case came close to meeting that exacting standard, perhaps because there were so few opportunities for error. With two eyewitnesses to the killing, the defendant’s state of mind and intent were the only issues open to question. The forensic evidence bearing on those elements was straightforward, to the point, and not susceptible to much controversy. The guilt phase was matter-of-fact in tenor, and the penalty phase was presented and argued without inflammatory rhetoric or vilification. Under the circumstances, defense counsel had few viable options, but made reasonable efforts to negate first degree murder despite considerable factual impediments. With more evidentiary leeway at the penalty phase, counsel marshaled a respectable array of family and friends to attest to defendant’s good qualities and plead for his life. They could not, however, change the fact that defendant had turned a deaf ear to similar pleas from Steve Mincy. Notwithstanding these efforts, the jury found death the appropriate punishment for defendant’s crimes. Our Constitution thus mandates an appeal, but the hurdles for appellate counsel were formidable on these facts. Understandably, one strategy in such circumstances is to identify, with the acuity of hindsight, every aspect trial counsel could arguably have handled differently. “[I]n a painstaking search of any record, a zealous appellate counsel can find areas in which he would quibble with trial counsel.” (In re Lower (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 144, 147 [161 Cal.Rptr. 24].) Recognizing the adverse impact on effective advocacy, the courts have long cautioned against such intrusive posttrial inquiry and second-guessing of trial counsel. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; People v. Brooks (1966) 64 Cal.2d 130, 140 [48 Cal.Rptr. 879, 410 P.2d 383].) Counsel’s performance is “a question of judgment and degree that must be assessed in light of all the circumstances of the case and with a view to fundamental fairness.” (People v. Whittington (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [141 Cal.Rptr. 742].) Evaluating the record in light of these principles, we find no incompetence. Counsel’s failure to renew the change of venue motion did not result from ignorance or inadvertence and reflected a reasonable trial strategy. (See post, at p. 333.) The impact of the pretrial publicity generally and the America’s Most Wanted episodes in particular was a critical focus of the voir dire. Although many prospective jurors had been exposed to some pretrial publicity, including the segment reenacting the killings, for the most part few recalled the specifics or had formed a resolute impression of defendant’s guilt. In particular, those who eventually sat on the jury all gave assurances they would decide the case based solely on the courtroom evidence. (See post, at p. 316.) In light of these responses, counsel could well have recognized the effect of the publicity had not been as substantial as feared, especially after an 11-month interim. Thus, renewed effort to seek a change of venue would be futile since the trial court had conditioned any change in its tentative ruling on a determination the television coverage had impaired the ability to assemble an impartial jury. In addition, the reenactment was relevant only to the guilt phase portion of the trial. With guilt virtually a foregone conclusion, counsel’s concern may at that point have turned to the penalty phase, which was substantially insulated from the effect of pretrial publicity. (Cf. People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 661-662 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) Given the possibility of a valid trial tactic, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) 2. Refusal to Excuse Jurors for Cause The trial court granted only some of defendant’s numerous challenges for cause. He now contends the court erroneously failed to excuse five prospective jurors who eventually heard the case. As noted, the defense had exercised only four of its twenty peremptory challenges when it indicated no further objection to the jury as constituted. “ ‘It has long been the rule in California that exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a “condition precedent” to an appeal based on the composition of the jury. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 770 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) “Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised as long [as] he could have secured the juror’s removal through the exercise of a peremptory challenge.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373]; cf. Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85-88 [108 S.Ct. 2273, 2276-2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80].) Accordingly, “California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal of the composition of the jury, the defendant must have exhausted those challenges. [Citation.]” (People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 770; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 904-905 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) Defendant did not do so; he may not now claim error. Acknowledging these principles, but citing dictum in People v. Lucas, supra, 12 ,Cal.4th at page 481, footnote 13, defendant argues alternatively that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to excuse biased jurors when counsel failed to do so. Whatever the language in Lucas may imply, this court has never imposed on the trial court an independent, affirmative obligation to excuse a prospective juror notwithstanding counsel’s failure to exercise a peremptory challenge for that purpose. The decisional and statutory authorities cited do not support that proposition. (See former Code Civ. Proc., § 223, enacted by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 2, p. 4148 and repealed by initiative measure, Prop. 115, § 6, passed by voters at Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); former Pen. Code, § 1078, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 36, p. 4155; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 845 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983]; Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729-730 [112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492],) While the authority to control voir dire includes the power to excuse prospective jurors for cause (see People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1621 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027]), it does not impose a sua sponte duty to do so. We thus decline to excuse defendant’s failure to preserve this issue for review. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000].) We also reject defendant’s passing suggestion that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to utilize all available peremptory challenges. “[T]he decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel’s tactical choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial.” (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 480.) We have reviewed the voir dire of the jurors in question. Whether or not they had been exposed to any pretrial publicity, including viewing America’s Most Wanted, each gave credible assurances he or she would decide the case based only on what transpired in the courtroom. 3. Exclusion ofHispanics From the Petit Jury' Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly utilized three peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors with Hispanic surnames. (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69].) At trial, counsel failed to make a Wheeler motion. This omission waives the right to complain on appeal. {People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 166 [276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) Alternatively, defendant argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to question the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges based on the court’s general obligation to ensure a fair jury. He cites no authority in support of this argument. (See ante, at pp. 314-316.) Moreover, it conflicts with the procedure set forth in Wheeler allocating to the aggrieved party the burden of raising the point in a timely fashion and making a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.Sd at p. 280.) Whatever the obligations of the trial court to control the jury selection process, the defendant must comply with procedural prerequisites to preserve any error for appeal. (People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 413.) Absent an appropriate challenge to the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptories, the issue is not preserved. (Cf. People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1160 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950].) Defendant makes a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve the Wheeler issue. On this record, we are unable to determine the reason counsel did not make a timely challenge. He may have perceived the prosecutor could adequately rebut the charge, or he himself may have been dissatisfied with the individuals excused. Since the decision may well have been “an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence, the conviction must be affirmed. [Citation.]” {People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) 4. Prosecutor’s Use of Peremptory Challenges to Excuse Jurors With Scruples About the Death Penalty Relying primarily on Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776] and Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841], defendant contends the prosecutor violated various constitutional rights by using peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed scruples about imposing the death penalty. Witherspoon and Witt set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court properly excused prospective jurors for cause based on their attitudes toward capital punishment. (See, e.g., People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 645-648.) With respect to peremptory challenges, this court has consistently held such excusáis do not implicate any constitutional guaranty. (See, e.g., People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 907.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reexamine that determination. Consequently, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an objection. (See post, at p. 333.) B. Guilt Phase Issues 1. Juror Observations of Defendant in Shackles Defendant contends he was denied his right to a fair trial because on two occasions certain jurors observed him manacled. The record discloses no error. On the first occasion, one of the jurors arrived at the courtroom prior to the commencement of trial for that day. The bailiff directed him to the jury room pending the completion of other court business. Unbeknownst to the bailiff, defendant was in the jury room sitting in a chair handcuffed and shackled. The juror immediately came out and informed the court of defendant’s presence. The court instructed the juror not to discuss the matter and to wait in the hall. After informing counsel of the incident, the court held a voir dire examination during which the juror indicated in response to questioning by the court and defense counsel that he was in the jury room about a minute and a half and did not observe whether defendant was restrained in any manner. The juror also affirmed the encounter had not affected his impartiality. Prior to the voir dire examination, defense counsel had already represented he did not think the incident warranted juror disqualification. Thereafter, he did not suggest the examination had changed his mind. Nor does anything in the record support defendant’s current claim. The second incident occurred following the guilt phase. Counsel represented that defendant had been brought into court and was being unshackled when three jurors walked into the courtroom. The bailiff immediately turned them around and sent them out. According to counsel, “it happened so quickly” and he was “not going to raise that as an issue.” The court conducted individual voir dire examinations of the three jurors. One juror said she saw “just people’s heads” and “wasn’t really looking.” Another “didn’t see anybody but backs of heads” and did not know who was in the courtroom. The third juror saw defendant standing with his back toward the doorway. He did not notice anything about his dress, his manner, or what he was doing. Following the examination, counsel did not indicate he had changed his mind. (Cf. People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, .842 P.2d 1142].) Again, nothing in the record supports a contrary view. Neither incident could have affected defendant’s right to a fair trial. (People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 652.) Moreover, since no juror saw him in restraints, the court had no obligation to instruct on the point. 2. Evidence Issues a) ' Police and autopsy photographs Over defense objection, the trial court admitted into evidence three photographs of Mincy’s body, which Criminalist Gregory Laskowski utilized to illustrate his testimony about blood spatters and drips found at the crime scene. Defendant renews his contention these photos were cumulative and more prejudicial than probative due to their “gruesome” nature. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The admission of photographs of a murder victim lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse, i.e., that their probative value is clearly outweighed by their prejudicial effect. (People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 514 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].) In overruling the objection, the court here characterized the evidence as “highly relevant” because Laskowski used all three pictures to explain how he concluded from the blood spatters and drips that Mincy had been in motion when defendant fired some of the shots. In the court’s view, “it certainly goes to the issue of intent and premeditation and planning . . . .” These conclusions reflect a proper exercise of the court’s discretion. Since identity was not at issue, defendant’s state of mind was critical to the charge of first degree murder (see People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18-19 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748]), and firing at a fleeing victim reasonably reflects an intention to kill. (Cf. People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) Moreover, even though the pictures served to corroborate a testimonial witness, they were not cumulative since the photographic evidence could assist the jury in understanding and evaluating that testimony. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610]; see also People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) Indeed, Laskowski’s testimony may have made little sense without appropriate illustration. We have examined the exhibits and also do not find them unduly gruesome. For the first time on appeal, defendant contends the court’s ruling violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Because he failed to object on these grounds at trial, the claim is not preserved. (People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) b) Testimony by Jim Wilson Defendant objected to testimony by Wilson concerning his actions after fleeing the scene of the shootings, arguing it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, §§ 351, 352.) The prosecutor countered that the evidence of the all-night flight through the mountains was relevant to the charge of attempted murder and on the question of premeditation and deliberation because Wilson’s actions reflected his perceptions of defendant’s murderous intentions and state of mind. The trial court admitted the evidence on that basis. We find no abuse of discretion in the ruling. Wilson’s testimony was relevant primarily in that his description of events following his flight completed that portion of the overall narrative and explained when and how law enforcement initiated their investigation. A full rendition of the details also bolstered his credibility by demonstrating his ability to recollect accurately despite the trauma of the shooting. Nor was the testimony unduly prejudicial. Wilson’s actions were a natural reaction to defendant’s unprovoked assault. The testimony was short and relatively dispassionate, with no particular danger of evoking the jury’s unwarranted sympathy. Moreover, since the jury eventually viewed the scene, they could reasonably have inferred the nature of Wilson’s escape ordeal even if he had not testified. Defendant also challenges as inadmissible hearsay Wilson’s testimony regarding Mincy’s pleas for his life. Because he failed to make an appropriate objection, the issue is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) In any event, the evidence was not hearsay. Mincy’s words were not offered to prove the truth of the statements but the fact of the statements. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Nor were, they unduly prejudicial. Because they reflected defendant’s deliberate callousness, they were particularly relevant to his intent and the issue of premeditation. “The ‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” (People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 377 [191 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Counsel thus was not incompetent for failing to object. c) Testimony of Patricia Islas After the killings, Ramirez went with defendant to the house of Patricia Islas, a friend who lived in Covina. Over a hearsay objection, Islas testified that when defendant left her house, Ramirez told her defendant had shot three men, including Huffstuttler, and described the shootings. The prosecutor argued Islas’s testimony was a prior consistent statement necessary to rehabilitate Ramirez’s testimony following cross-examination. The trial court overruled the objection on that basis. Evidence Code section 1236 authorizes the admission of hearsay if the statement is consistent with a witness’s trial testimony and is offered in compliance with Evidence Code section 791. Evidence Code section 791 allows a prior consistent statement if offered after “[a]n express or implied charge has been made that [the witness’s] testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.” (Id., subd. (b).) The trial court correctly ruled Islas’s testimony came within this exception. On cross-examination of Ramirez, defense counsel elicited testimony he had given his account of events implicating defendant in the killings only after he himself had been charged with two counts of murder and after he had spoken with his attorney. He was then released from custody and the charges were dropped. Impliedly, the defense was attempting to undermine Ramirez’s credibility by suggesting his attorney had encouraged him to fabricate the accusations against defendant. Since the statements to Islas were made before that motive arose, they were properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1236. (See also People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1014 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017].) d) Testimony of Criminalist Gregory Laskowski Utilizing photographs of the crime scene, Criminalist Laskowski testified regarding the various positions of Mincy’s and Huffstuttler’s bodies when they were shot. Based on blood spatters and drips depicted in the photos, he indicated one shot was to Mincy’s body while in a “fetal-like” position on its left side; as to the others, his body was in a vertical position. Laskowski also concluded Mincy “was moving at a relatively rapid pace” after being initially wounded. With respect to Huffstuttler, he determined that for several shots the body was prone and not moving. Defendant now contends this evidence was inadmissible because the witness was not qualified to render an expert opinion (Evid. Code, § 720) and because he did not personally investigate the crime scene. He further asserts it should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. Since he failed to make these objections at trial, the issue is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); see People v. Rodriquez (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 770, 776 [79 Cal.Rptr. 240].) We also reject defendant’s related claim counsel was incompetent for failing to challenge the evidence; any objection would have been properly overruled. Evidence Code section 720 provides that a person may testify as an expert “if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him,” (id., subd. (a)) which “may be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.” (Id., subd. (b).) The trial court’s determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. (.People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 357 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].) “ ‘Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility.’ ” (Seneris v. Haas (1955) 45 Cal.2d 811, 833 [291 P.2d 915, 53 A.L.R.2d 124].) The record establishes Laskowski was fully qualified to testify based on his educational background in biochemistry and serology and his training as a criminalist for 13 years, including attending and giving seminars in blood-spatter analysis and crime scene investigation. He had also testified as an expert witness on numerous prior occasions. Given his expertise, Laskowski’s testimony was not cumulative. Utilizing his knowledge of blood spatters and drips, he was better able to describe the particulars of what occurred during the shooting of Huffstuttler and Mincy than any photographic depiction of their bodies. For example, he concluded from the spatter evidence that Mincy was moving around after he was first shot and before he fell into a fetal position, where he was shot one more time. He also explained that the large pool of blood around Huffstuttler’s body indicated he was prone and not moving when he received the final shots. As discussed in other contexts, this evidence was relevant to the issues of intent and premeditation and deliberation. The photographs Laskowski referred to adequately illustrated his testimony; therefore, the fact he did not personally examine the crime scene was a matter of evidentiary weight. Since his testimony was admissible on all grounds, counsel had no basis for objecting. e) Testimony by Mincy family members Mincy’s father, Robert, and cousin, Shelly Barber, presented evidence at the guilt phase. Defendant now claims their testimony was objectionable under Evidence Code section 352. Because he did not raise this challenge at trial, the issue is waived. We also reject the claim counsel was incompetent for failing to object. These two witnesses were at the Mincy family campsite for the Labor Day weekend and were present during various activities involving Mincy, Wilson, and Huffstuttler preceding their departure for defendant’s cabin. Their testimony filled in the chronology of events from Friday evening through Saturday afternoon. It does not appear from the record that either witness was unduly emotional or likely to evoke an inappropriate response from the jury as to defendant’s guilt, especially in a case in which identity was not at issue. Defendant complains of testimony that as he left with Wilson and Huffstuttler, Mincy told his daughter he would return shortly and take her to a dance that evening. This brief statement was insufficient to inflame the jury. 3. Jury View At the prosecutor’s request and with the express agreement of the defense, the jury was taken to defendant’s cabin to view the scene of the crimes accompanied by the court, counsel, a court stenographer, and Sheriff’s Deputies Layman and Williamson, who acted as bailiffs. For the first time on appeal, defendant contends Layman and Williamson were impermissibly allowed “to provide testimony regarding the crime scene, which they had investigated.” He argues this “testimony” violated provisions of section 1119 requiring that the officer charged with conducting the jury to the place of the view “must be sworn to suffer no person to speak or communicate with the jury, nor to do so himself or herself, on any subject connected with the trial . . . ,” We find no error. When the jury arrived at the scene, the court indicated “we are not going to take any testimony at this time.” The jurors were then permitted to walk around the area, including where the marijuana plants had been growing, but were admonished not to discuss the case. After the jurors had looked around for an unspecified time, the court inquired, “Do any of you have any questions?” One juror asked for the location of the trailer where Huffstuttler had lived, which defense counsel indicated. Thereafter, on inquiry primarily from the court, Layman and Williamson, who had originally investigated the crime scene, pointed out the location of Wilson’s truck, Huffstuttler’s body, a woodpile, and the main road into the cabin area, all of which had been testified to in court. Williamson also described the foliage as taller at the time of the investigation, obscuring the view of the marijuana plants from the cabin. Because defendant failed to object to any aspect of the jury view, he cannot raise further challenge on appeal. {People v. Pompa (1923) 192 Cal. 412, 422 [221 P. 198]; People v. Fitzgerald (1902) 137 Cal. 546, 550 [70 P. 554].) “[W]here, as in the present instance, no objection is made to the appointment of the person showing parts of the premises, the defendant cannot later complain. In putting certain questions to the ‘shower,’ the trial judge intended to clarify and expedite the proceedings; as to any other alleged irregularity at the scene of the view . . . , there can be no contention on appeal that there was error, for the silence of the defendant’s counsel in those circumstances constitutes a waiver. [Citations.]” (People v. Walther (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 310, 323 [69 Cal.Rptr. 434]; People v. Pompa, supra, 192 Cal. at p. 422.) In any event, the trial court conducted the jury view in full conformance with the provisions of section 1119, which expressly provides that when the court determines a jury view of the scene is proper, the place or property “must be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose . . . .” Originally, in People v. Green (1878) 53 Cal. 60, 61, this court construed the statute to preclude any person, even on direction of the trial court, from speaking to the jury on any subject connected with the trial. In People v. Bush (1887) 71 Cal. 602, 606 [12 P. 781], however, this rigid construction was rejected as illogical and inconsistent with the statutory language: “[W]e cannot conceive how [the shower] could have shown the jury the . . . places which they were sent to view in any other way [than pointing out and naming such places], under the statute.” (See People v. Milner (1898) 122 Cal. 171, 185 [54 P. 833].) For more than a century, courts have consistently applied this interpretation, implicitly recognizing that the admonition that “no person . . . speak or communicate with the jury” (§ 1119) is plainly directed to insulating the jury from extraneous contact and potential tampering. (See, e.g., People v. Tarm Poi (1890) 86 Cal. 225, 231 [24 P. 998]; People v. Bush (1886) 68 Cal. 623, 627-628; People v. Walther, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at pp. 322-323; People v. Cahill (1909) 11 Cal.App. 685, 689 [106 P. 115].) At the same time, the broad discretion conferred by the statute authorizes the trial court to conduct the view as appropriate to the circumstances. For example, in People v. Pompa, supra, 192 Cal. 412, we rejected the defendant’s claim of error that the view was not, as originally directed by the court, strictly limited to an inspection of the premises. (Id. at p. 421.) Although considerable testimony was taken and evidence received by the jury, “the record expressly disclose[d] that during the entire proceedings . . . the court in its completeness, including the judge, the clerk, the bailiff, the reporter, the interpreter,-the jury, the defendant, and the respective counsel was at all times present, the only element absent being the walls and fittings of the courtroom wherein the court is usually convened.” (Id. at p. 422.) Since “the forms of law governing the trial of causes” was otherwise observed, we declined to hold this “absence of formality” had compromised the proceedings. (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 739 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485].) In this case, Layman and Williamson investigated the crime scene; the trial court therefore reasonably designated them as “showers” to explain how the actual physical conditions related to their trial testimony. The record establishes that their involvement was limited to that end, i.e., “showing” the jury what their words had described and the photographs had depicted. (See People v. Milner, supra, 122 Cal. at pp. 182-185; People v. Walther, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at p. 323.) Given the court’s broad discretion in these matters, we find no abuse in having the deputies respond to specific questions rather than proceeding in some other manner. (People v. Walther, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at pp. 323-324.) Williamson’s statement that the foliage differed in height from the time of the crime was also proper “to account for any change in [the] condition between [its] state as shown by the evidence and [its] appearance at the time the jury inspected [it].” (People v. Cramley (1913) 23 Cal.App. 340, 349 [138 P. 123].) We also find no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of his absence during the view. Prior to the excursion, defendant expressly waived his presence and acknowledged he did so voluntarily. The record reflects that before making this decision he had discussed the matter with counsel. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause of the United States Constitution or the due process clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 15) prevents a criminal defendant from waiving the right of presence at a critical stage of a capital trial. (People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 738, and cases cited therein.) We have no reason to reconsider that conclusion, particularly when no additional testimony was taken in conjunction with the view. (Cf. ibid.) We also find no prejudicial error with respect to defendant’s statutory rights. In People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1211 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254], this court held “that a capital defendant may not voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977, including those portions of the trial in which evidence is taken [before the trier of fact] . . . .” (See also § 1043.) Although a jury view is not among the designated proceedings in section 977, we have long held that “in so viewing the premises the jury was receiving evidence” even if nontestimonial. (People v. Milner, supra, 122 Cal. at p. 184.) Thus, it comes within the purview of section 977. Nevertheless, in this case it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been reached had defendant, in addition to his counsel, been present. (People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 738-739.) On this record, we find “no sound basis to question the contemporaneous judgment of defense counsel, with which defendant then agreed, that defendant’s trial interests would be better served by not attending the jury view.” (Id. at p. 739.) With respect to this latter point, we reiterate the “note of caution” sounded in People v. Mayfield: “Had the trial court obeyed the letter of the statutory commands by refusing to accept defendant’s waiver of presence, defendant might well have argued on appeal that requiring him to attend the jury view, thereby exposing the jurors to the strict security precautions that would be necessary in such a situation, had so prejudiced him before the jury as to deny him his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. We do not imply any view on the merits of such a contention, which is not now before us; we suggest only that trial courts should proceed with caution and that the Legislature may wish to reconsider the wisdom of statutory provisions that deprive capital defendants of the ability to waive their presence at trial proceedings outside the courtroom.” {People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 739.) 4. Instructional Issues a) Consciousness of guilt The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.06 regarding any attempt to suppress evidence as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. Defendant contends the instruction was unsupported by the evidence and improperly equated the conduct described with an admission or confession, especially when considered in conjunction with CALJIC No. 2.52, the “flight” instruction. At the time the court discussed jury instructions, defense counsel agreed the evidence supported CALJIC No. 2.06 and did not object to the court’s proposed wording. Any claim of error is therefore waived. {People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1223.) Regardless, no error occurred. Sufficient evidence supported the instruction in light of Ramirez’s testimony defendant attempted to make the murder scene “look like a bad dope deal” by breaking bottles, scattering loose marijuana, and shooting the body several more times with a rifle after the initial revolver shot. Defendant wiped his fingerprints off the handgun, put the weapon in Huffstuttler’s hand, placed a knife near the body, and poured chili sauce around it. He then fled south before leaving the state for Chicago. Along the way he threw away some wires he had taken to disable Wilson’s truck. CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.52 do not impermissibly emphasize noncriminal activity as “consciousness of guilt.” On the contrary, these instructions “made clear to the jury that certain types of deceptive or evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate consciousness of guilt, while also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove a defendant’s guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance assigned to such behavior. The cautionary nature of the instructions benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory. [Citations.]” (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1224.) Moreover, section 1127c requires a flight instruction when the prosecution relies on such conduct as tending to show guilt. As in past decisions, we find no merit in the contention the instructions improperly allow the jury to draw inferences about defendant’s state of mind and equate evidence of suppression or concealment with a confession. “A reasonable juror would understand ‘consciousness of guilt’ to mean ‘consciousness of some wrongdoing’ rather than ‘consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.’ The instructions advise the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instructions do not address the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871 [251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423].) For cognate reasons they do not violate the proscription of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106] against referring to the defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify as evidence of guilt. The instructions in no respect implicated defendant’s failure to testify or directed the jury to draw negative inferences from it. b) Special circumstance With respect to the special circumstance allegation, the trial court instructed in accordance with CALJIC No. 8.80 (5th ed. 1988) in part as follows: “The People have the burden of proving the truth of that special circumstance, [f] If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not a special circumstance is true, then you must find it to be not true.” Defendant contends the court erroneously failed to define “reasonable doubt” in this context or to direct the jury to find the special circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The instruction correctly states the law, and defendant did not request clarification or amplification. He has therefore waived the issue on appeal. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980]; see People v. Byrnes (1866) 30 Cal. 206, 208 [general instruction sufficient “particularly . . . where the accused does not request that the charge may be made more specific or minute”].) Moreover, the claim is meritless. Shortly before giving the special circumstance instruction, the court had already charged the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It then delineated the applicable standard: “Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.” “It is well established in California that the correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. [Citations.] ‘[T]he fact that the necessary elements of a jury charge are to be found in two instructions rather than in one instruction does not, in itself, make the charge prejudicial.’ [Citation.] ‘The absence of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538-539 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) In Burgener, the court had not defined reasonable doubt in conjunction with the instruction on express malice but had given the definition elsewhere. (Ibid.) Hence, the instruction was not defective. “Given the entirety of the charge to the jury, it is clear that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have been misled as to the appropriate standard for their special finding on express malice. The instructions taken as a whole indicate that the prosecution’s burden of proof throughout was proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 540.) We reach a similar conclusion on this record. c) Mental state for lesser included offenses Without much elaboration, defendant contends the instructions on the mental states necessary to prove the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter “were more likely to have confused the jury and caused the jury to assume that [defendant’s] mental state was the crux” of these offenses. Contrary to defendant’s premise, the perpetrator’s mental state is precisely the “crux” of the distinction between first and second degree murder and between murder and manslaughter. (See §§ 187, 188, 189, 192; see generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) §§ 452-455, pp. 508-513; id., §§ 487-489, pp. 549-553; id., §§ 511-517, pp. 577-585.) The instructions correctly stated the law and were not likely to confuse the jury when considered in context and in relation to each other. (People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 538-540.) Since defendant did not request clarification or amplification, further consideration on appeal has been waived. (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) Moreover, any alleged ambiguity in the second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions could not have prejudiced defendant when the jury found him guilty of first degree murder. d) Reasonable doubt As previously explained, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.90, defining reasonable doubt as the state of the evidence which “leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.” (See ante, at p. 328.) Defendant now contends this definition violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution because the reference to “moral certainty” allowed the jurors to determine guilt based on their own subjective evaluation of defendant’s conduct. As with prior similar challenges, we find no fault with this instruction. “We have repeatedly upheld the efficacy of this instruction, and defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544]; see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) 5. Verdict Form for Prior Felony Conviction Allegation The trial court bifurcated proceedings on the truth of the allegation that defendant had previously been convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and deferred consideration pending the jury’s determination of guilt on the substantive charges. Following the submission of evidence on the prior allegation, the jury received a verdict form on which to record their finding, which read: “We, the Jury, empaneled to try the above-entitled cause, find it to be true that the defendant Paul Clarence Bolin previously has been convicted of a violation of 664/192.1 of the Penal Code, within the [meaning] of Penal Code Section 667.” The form also contained an alternate version for a “not true” finding. Defendant now maintains the verdict was defective due to the “unintelligible” reference to section “192.1,” which assertedly is not a valid statute. He further contends this defect rendered the subsequent penalty verdict unreliable. We find no objection of record to the form of the verdict either at the time the court proposed to submit it or when the jury returned its finding. The issue is therefore waived. (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 446 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) We also find no prejudicial defect. Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter in 1983. At that time, nonvehicular voluntary manslaughter was set forth in section 192, subdivision 1, also referred to as section “192.1,” as in the abstract of judgment for defendant’s prior conviction. (See Stats. 1945, ch. 1006, § 1, p. 1942; see also Stats. 1984, ch. 742, § 1, p. 2703 [amending section 192 to designate former subdivision 1 as subdivision (a)].) Any variance in the wording was thus technical at worst. “[Tjechnical defects in a verdict may be disregarded if the jury’s intent to convict of a specified offense within the charges is unmistakably clear, and the accused’s substantial rights suffered no prejudice. [Citations.]” (People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 447, fn. omitted; see §§ 1258, 1404.) The jury returned a “true” finding based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the proceeding, all of which was predicated on the allegation defendant had been convicted under former section 192, subdivision 1. Accordingly, we discern no possibility of prejudice. 6. Sufficiency of the Evidence of First Degree Murder Defendant contends the evidence of first degree murder was insufficient to establish a preconceived design or careful thought or reflection. (See, e.g., People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) In particular, he argues that he could not have formed the requisite state of mind because the unexpected arrival of Mincy and Wilson immediately precipitated both the argument with Huffstuttler about the strangers’ observations of the marijuana plants and the shootings. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319-320 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789-2790, 61 L.Ed.2d 560].) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755 [79 Cal.Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 321].) (26) In People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pages 26-27, we identified three categories of evidence relevant to resolving the issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. However, as later explained in People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]: “Anderson does not require that these factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]” Thus, while premeditation and deliberation must result from “ ‘careful thought and weighing of considerations’ ” (70 Cal.2d at p. 27), we continue to apply the principle that “[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 767.) Defendant correctly notes the killings took place within a few minutes of the victims’ arrival at his cabin. What occurred within those few minutes, however, is particularly telling with respect to his state of mind. According to both Wilson and Eloy Ramirez, defendant began arguing with Huffstuttler when Mincy and Wilson were shown the marijuana plants. Defendant continued berating Huffstuttler as the two walked back toward the cabin. Defendant went inside, retrieved a revolver, and shot Huffstuttler at close range. He proceeded back across the creek and confronted Wilson and Mincy. After apologizing that he had “nothing against” them, he opened fire. As a wounded Wilson fled the scene, he heard Mincy plead for his life. More shots were fired. Defendant returned to Huffstuttler and fired several rifle rounds into his motionless body. The autopsy report indicated at least three shots were inflicted before he died, although according to Ramirez he did not move after the first shot. After the shootings, defendant told Ramirez he was going to make the scene look like a bad dope deal had occurred and scattered marijuana, broke bottles, and poured chili sauce around Huffstuttler’s body. None of the victims were armed; nor did they engage in any provocative conduct. From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could infer defendant had a motive for the killings, both to punish Huffstuttler for revealing the marijuana operation to strangers and to protect his crop from theft or exposure to law enforcement. He also may have wanted to eliminate Mincy and Wilson as witnesses to the Huffstuttler shooting. In conjunct