Full opinion text
Opinion GEORGE, J. Following the guilt and special circumstance phase of a capital trial, a jury found defendant Steven Edward Crittenden guilty of the first degree murders and the robbery of Katherine and William Chiapella (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 211, 212.5). As to both murders, the jury found that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed the murders in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)). With respect to the murder of Katherine, the jury found true the additional special circumstance allegation that defendant committed multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and with respect to the murder of William, the jury found true the additional special circumstance allegation that the murder involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). The jury also found defendant guilty of the additional offenses of escape from jail with force or violence (§ 4532, subd. (b)), and the kidnapping of Douglas Kronen (§ 207, subd. (a)). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed the death penalty. After denying defendant’s motion for modification of the verdict imposing the death penalty, and imposing sentences on the other convictions, the court sentenced defendant to death for the murders of Katherine and William Chiapella. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety. Facts The evidence at trial (held in Placer County following defendant’s successful motion for change of venue from Butte County, in which the City of Chico is located) established that on January 13, 1987, defendant entered the Chico residence of William and Katherine Chiapella and, by threatening Katherine, forced her to write a personal check payable to defendant in the amount of $3,000. Defendant tied up both William and Katherine and then proceeded to kill both of them. Defendant subsequently was arrested and confined in jail. On May 11, 1987, defendant escaped from jail and confronted Douglas Kronen inside Kronen’s residence. Defendant forced Kronen at gunpoint to drive defendant to Sacramento, where defendant was apprehended. I. Guilt Phase Evidence A. The prosecution’s case 1. The Chiapella crimes In 1986, Dr. William Chiapella (hereinafter, William), 68 years of age and suffering impaired locomotion from disease, and his wife, Katherine Chiapella (hereinafter, Katherine), 67 years of age, lived at 1416 Downing Avenue in Chico. On October 9, 1986, Katherine submitted a job order form at the Employment Development Department at California State University, Chico, seeking to employ a student to perform yard work at the rate of $4.50 per hour. On the following day, Katherine hired defendant, who then was enrolled as a student at that institution, but Employment Development Department records indicate he failed to appear for work. In the middle of that month, defendant mentioned the job to his girlfriend, Diana. In mid-December 1986, Julie Gearing sublet her apartment to defendant. Early in January 1987, defendant’s landlord telephoned defendant to discuss defendant’s rent payment, because the landlord had been unable to cash defendant’s check due to insufficient funds. On January 11, defendant contacted his landlord in order to reschedule their meeting from January 12 to January 14, advising him that defendant would “pay it all” at that time. Meanwhile, on January 6, 1987, William had submitted a job-order form at the Employment Development Department, seeking someone to perform yard work at the rate of $5 per hour. Edith Bullard, the Chiapellas’ housekeeper, last saw the couple when she cleaned their residence on January 12, 1987. At the time, she observed that the desk in the study was neat and there was no accumulated mail. She recalled five days earlier having cleaned a plastic floor runner under the desk. On the morning of January 13, Ms. Bullard telephoned the Chiapellas, informing Katherine she had the flu. That same day, John Eyrich, defendant’s roommate, noticed that a knife he owned (used by his father years earlier in the meat packing business to drain blood from animal carcasses) was missing. Defendant informed Eyrich that defendant was using it to repair his stereo and would return it the following day. On the morning of January 13, Dr. Joseph Chiapella, William and Katherine’s son, spoke with his mother by telephone. That morning, William telephoned Janet Steunkel, a family friend, to wish her a good trip. When Steunkel informed him she was not leaving on the trip until January 16, William advised he would telephone again on January 14 or 15, but never did so. Shortly after 1 p.m. on January 13, Katherine brought a pair of slacks to a local dry cleaners, requesting that they be cleaned by the following day, but she never returned to collect them. At 3 p.m. on January 13, the Chiapellas met with their attorney, Robert Laughlin, for less than 30 minutes. The Chiapellas informed him they planned to travel to San Francisco the following day to attend the theater and visit Katherine’s mother. At approximately 1 p.m. on January 13, Rodney Cox was washing his truck in front of his residence (located four homes from the Chiapellas’ residence), when he noticed a college-age man twenty feet away, on the same side of the street. The individual was African-American, approximately 6 feet 2 inches to 6 feet 3 inches tall, weighed approximately 180 to 190 pounds, and was wearing a long-sleeved, white hooded sweatshirt with front pockets and lettering on the front, as well as “walkman”-type black headphones. Cox observed the man walk toward the Chiapella residence, and approximately one hour later saw him walking along the street and up the Chiapellas’ driveway. A minute later, Cox observed the man cross to the other side of the street. Cox did not identify defendant at an “in-person” lineup, but did select defendant’s photograph as one of five which resembled the man he had seen. At trial, Cox identified the man as defendant. Diana (who married defendant in November 1987) testified that she moved in with defendant on January 9, 1987 (at which time her parents discontinued providing her with financial support). On January 13, she and defendant had an argument over money. Defendant left their apartment with a bicycle at approximately 2 p.m., returning with the bicycle approximately two hours later. At that time, defendant informed Diana he had received some money from his father in Texas and asked her to prepare a budget based upon assets of $3,000. On the following day, defendant proceeded to a bank, where he cashed a check dated January 13, 1987, for $3,000, made out to defendant and executed by Katherine. It later was determined the check had not been entered in Katherine’s check register, although customarily she recorded the checks she had written. Defendant received the cash primarily in $100 bills. On that date, defendant paid in cash to his landlord the amount of late rent plus $1,277.50, representing all sums due on the lease through July 1, 1987. Defendant paid in cash an $85 traffic fine at North County Municipal Court, and paid in cash $112 to K-mart and $144.63 to Safeway Stores to cover checks he previously had written on insufficient funds. That day, defendant returned his roommate’s knife, which later was determined to contain blood on the finger recess of the knife blade. On the morning and evening of January 14, and again on January 15, Ms. Bullard telephoned the Chiapellas but received no answer. The newscarrier who delivered the Chico Enterprise Record testified he delivered it at approximately 4 p.m. on January 13. On the following day, he delivered the newspaper at approximately the same time, noticing that the previous day’s paper remained on the porch. On January 15, Joseph Chiapella stopped at his parents’ residence and, receiving no response to his knock, dropped a letter through the slot in the front door. On January 16, Lois Cox, a neighbor, stopped by the Chiapellas’ residence, rang the doorbell, and, receiving no response, stacked the accumulating newspapers in a comer of the porch. On the same day Audrey Powers, another neighbor, removed the three morning and four evening newspapers, leaving a note. After Ms. Bullard expressed her concern, Joseph Chiapella entered his parents’ residence on January 17 and noticed a large amount of mail that had accumulated in the entryway near the mail slot in the front door, including the envelope he had left on January 15. Upon entering the main bedroom, Joseph discovered his father, dead. Joseph entered the bathroom and discovered the words, “just the beginning” written in lipstick on the mirror. The same words were written on the mirror in another bathroom. Joseph went into the kitchen and called two friends, the emergency “911” service, and his wife. While speaking to her, he saw his mother dead on the kitchen floor, on the other side of the counter. Dr. Gwen Hall, a forensic pathologist who examined the bodies in the residence and later performed autopsies on them, testified as to their condition. We summarize this testimony at considerable length, because it bears upon some of the issues raised on appeal, including the sufficiency of the evidence of torture. Katherine was discovered lying on her back, her head and face covered by a blanket. Her mouth had been gagged and her hands tied behind her back with three separate bindings consisting of strips of strawberry-patterned cloth. (When Ms. Gearing sublet her apartment to defendant, she left behind a set of strawberry-patterned sheets and a matching pillowcase.) Katherine’s skirt was pulled up around her hips, and she was not wearing underpants, although there was no evidence of sexual assault. Fecal matter was present on her pubic area. Her purse, its contents spilled out, was located nearby. Prior to Katherine’s death, her shirt had been pulled up above her chest and a large knife had been thrust deeply into Katherine’s left breast, causing damage to the lung and aorta and breaking four ribs. The knife had been moved within the body, creating a backwards C-shaped wound, and was protruding from the body at the time it was discovered. Prior to death, Katherine had received an additional stab wound to her upper abdomen above the navel, two inches deep and consistent in size with the knife that defendant returned to Eyrich. Prior to death, Katherine also had suffered massive injuries to the head and face. She had incurred a three-and-one-half-inch-long laceration above the left eye, exposing the fractured bone of the forehead, which was caused by a strong blow from a hard instrument, possibly from a dented and bloody fire extinguisher found next to William’s body. Prior to death, her nose had been broken and she had received a relatively minor injury to her lower lip. She had died from multiple trauma, primarily from the forehead and chest wounds. William was discovered lying on the rug, his hands tied behind his back to a desk chair, which had been knocked over, his head and face covered by a pillowcase. A large knife found inside his chest had been driven completely inside his body; even the handle was not visible above the skin surface. A sock was used to gag his mouth, and there was a loose binding around his neck. He had suffered 13 wounds. (1) A large laceration and contusion above the right eye had been inflicted by blunt trauma, causing a fracture in the deep skull and bleeding in the ear canal. (2) There was a separate, large blunt-force laceration higher on his forehead above wound No. 1. (3) There was another blunt trauma wound to the right of, and approximately the same level on the face as, wound No. 2. (4) There was a blunt trauma wound behind the right ear. (5) Two separate, blunt-force lacerations had been inflicted in the center back of the head. (6) A small, superficial cut by a sharp instrument such as a knife had been made on the left front of the neck. (7) A long laceration had been made at the center front of the neck. (8) A stab-type wound had been made with a sharp instrument toward the right side of the neck. (9) William’s lower jaw had been fractured by blunt force. (10) The upper jaw was severely fractured, with blunt-trauma injuries to the upper lip and tissues beneath it. (11) There was a wound on the upper left chest caused by the large knife having been driven completely inside the body with a great amount of force, as if someone had stomped on the knife or had used a heavy object (such as the fire extinguisher found near the body) to pound on it. The wound was made using several thrusts of the knife. (12) There was a wound to the lower left back, caused by the knife protruding through the body from the other side (wound No. 11). (13) There were two wounds above wound No. 12, approximately one-quarter inch deep, caused by a sharp instrument, consistent in size with Eyrich’s knife. Dr. Hall testified, that, based upon the amount of internal and external bleeding that had occurred, wound Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 13 were premortem. The wounds would have caused pain if inflicted while William was conscious. Wounds Nos. 1 and 2 could have caused William’s death. The cause of death was multiple trauma, caused primarily by the large chest wound and injuries to the right side of the head. Dr. Hall was unable to determine which of the two victims had died first. The pathologist could not determine the sequence in which the wounds upon William had been inflicted, nor which of the three knives had inflicted specific injuries. The blows received by the victims were sufficient to cause unconsciousness, and it was probable each victim had been unconscious prior to death, although it could not be determined for how long. Two crumpled checks, made out in Katherine’s handwriting for cash, but unsigned and numerically immediately preceding the check cashed by defendant, were found inside the front doorway of the residence. A bloody copy of the San Francisco Chronicle newspaper dated January 13, 1987, was found open on the kitchen table. In the study, defendant’s name and current address were written in defendant’s handwriting on a sheet of paper found on the desk. Defendant’s left thumbprint was obtained from a Wells Fargo automatic teller slip found on the desk. A shoe print was discovered on the plastic floor runner beneath the desk. An unused portion of cloth similar to the bindings used on the victims was found beneath a chair near the desk. Envelopes containing checks had been opened and the contents strewn on the desk and floor. There were linear markings on the carpet from the study to the bedroom where William was found. On January 21, 1987, Chico Police Department Investigators Rodney O’Hem and Terry Moore and Captain Robert Horton executed a search warrant on defendant’s apartment on West 9th Street. The officers located sheets with a strawberry pattern that matched the design found on the bindings used to tie up the Chiapellas. The officers did not find pillowcases matching the sheets in the apartment. The officers seized a pair of black tennis shoes having a small amount of blood on them and possessing a design on the soles that proved to match the design left by the shoe print located in the Chiapellas’ study. The officers found a white hooded sweatshirt with lettering on the front and also located two “walkman” radios, one of which had a black headset. 2. Defendant’s arrest On January 21, 1987, while officers still were present at the apartment, defendant arrived and was arrested. At the time of his arrest, defendant provided an alibi, stating he had been out of town “partying” with his girlfriend and roommate all day and evening on January 13, 1987. During an interview at the police station that evening, defendant gave the following version of the events. Defendant told the police he had met Katherine in August 1986 at the Employment Development Department when she posted an advertisement for a yard work job. Defendant told officers that three days later Katherine picked him up in her vehicle and paid him $50 after he allowed her to orally copulate him. Between August and December 1986 they met on over 12 occasions. Each time, Katherine picked him up in her vehicle and paid him $200 to $300 in cash. After approximately four meetings, in October or November 1986, Katherine wrote him a check for $550 on an account at Bank of America, and defendant deposited the check in his account. Defendant described an episode in which he and Katherine went to the Thunderbird Lodge in Chico. Katherine retrieved a blow-up doll from the trunk of her vehicle, carried it inside the motel room, and watched while defendant had sexual intercourse with the doll, an act for which he received $1,000 in $100 bills. On January 9, 1987, Katherine and defendant went to the Thunderbird Lodge, room 96, where Katherine had registered. Katherine watched while defendant placed a battery operated machine on his penis and climaxed, after which Katherine swallowed the seminal fluid. Katherine gave him the $3,000 check for this activity. Defendant told the police he had received the check on January 13, later stating the check had arrived on January 14. Defendant told the police he and Katherine did not meet at the Chiapellas’ house, and that he never had gone to their residence. During the interview, defendant also told the officers that on January 13, 1987, he remained at his apartment until approximately noon. Following a minor argument with his then girlfriend, defendant, clad in a black and gray Puma warm-up outfit, went to Acker Gym, arriving at 1:30 p.m. and remaining two to three hours. At that location he met with a basketball coach, Kirk Freitas, as well as Shawn Hicks and Gerald Boles. He returned to his apartment at approximately 4 p.m., and he and his then girlfriend went out that evening to see the film, “The Morning After.” Defendant told the police he received a student loan payment of $1,250 in October 1986 and another payment of $1,250 in December 1986, but had no other income. Defendant borrowed a knife from Mr. Eyrich in order to repair his stereo antenna. Defendant stated he had not worn his black tennis shoes since the previous fall and had not lent them to anyone. He remembered that the strawberry-patterned sheets had been in the apartment when he moved there in December 1986. The same day as the interview, defendant had his hair cut very short. The police did not find any semen stains in the Chiapellas’ automobile or any sexual aids or materials in the Chiapellas’ residence or automobile. Katherine’s checking account did not reflect earlier checks made out to defendant. Defendant’s bank account did not reflect a deposit of $550 but did show that 43 checks had been returned for insufficient funds, and that on December 23, 1986, the account was closed for insufficient funds. The police also discovered that neither Katherine nor defendant had registered at the Thunderbird Lodge on January 9,1987, and that there was no room 96 at that motel. Coach Freitas and Mr. Boles testified they had met with defendant, who was wearing gray “sweats” and tennis shoes, and carrying a “walkman” radio, at the gym on January 7, 1987, but not thereafter. 3. Defendant’s escape from jail On May 11, 1987, defendant was an inmate in the Butte County jail at Oroville, awaiting trial on the above described offenses. That afternoon defendant could not be located at the jail. It was discovered that the wire mesh screen over a jail window had been forced open, the window had been broken, and an orange jumpsuit was hanging from the jail window. At approximately 2 p.m. on that day, Douglas Kronen, who lived one-half mile from the Butte County jail, entered his residence. Kronen heard a noise and discovered defendant, whose arms were cut and bleeding, pointing a gun at him. Defendant told Kronen, “Don’t do nothing stupid. I don’t want to hurt you,” ordered him to lie down on the floor, and threw a blanket over his head. Defendant placed a foot, knee, or hand on Kronen’s back and informed him that defendant “was going to have to” tie him up. Defendant had removed and tom into pieces a pillowcase that had been in one of Kronen’s children’s bedrooms. Defendant grabbed a knife, placed his foot on Kronen’s back, and said, “I can’t drive.” Fearing for his safety and that of his children, who were due to return from school, Kronen offered to drive defendant wherever he wanted to go. The two men drove away in a track, once stopping to purchase gasoline. When Kronen reentered the truck, defendant instructed him to “head for Chico,” and Kronen complied, until they noticed several police vehicles on the highway, at which point defendant moved down in his seat and instructed Kronen to “head for Sacramento.” On the way, defendant volunteered to Kronen that defendant had not committed “the killings.” When Kronen suggested that defendant return to jail if he was innocent, defendant responded he would rather be dead than in jail, and that he did not feel he would receive a fair trial because he was African-American. Defendant said he did not know how his sheets happened to be at the residence of the persons who were killed. When they reached Sacramento, defendant told Kronen to let him out of the truck. Kronen did so and contacted the police. Later that day, after a brief chase on foot, the police apprehended defendant, who was carrying a water pistol at the time. The trial court admitted evidence of two subsequent escape attempts by defendant, solely on the issue of flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. (§ 1127c.) On September 26, 1988, defendant, still an inmate at Butte County jail, pulled Jim Corbin, a guard, into defendant’s section, grabbed him around the chest and throat, and slammed him against the cell bars. Corbin was able to say, “jail break,” and two officers came to his rescue. A gun made of soap, a “shank,” a hacksaw blade, and three stuffed jumpsuits were discovered inside defendant’s cellblock, and the bars on one cell door in that block had been sawed. After defendant’s transfer to Placer County jail following a change of venue to that county on defendant’s motion, on March 9, 1989, it was discovered that defendant had cut through the plaster in the ceiling of one of the jail cells, patching the hole with tape and toothpaste. Defendant, stating he wished to get through the ceiling in order to escape from the jail, had instructed another inmate how to grind through the brick. Defendant had attempted to make a hole in a wall, using as a tool a vent he had removed. B. The defense case Defendant received over $3,000 in student financial aid during the period September to December 1986. Paul Widmon, a newscarrier who delivered the Sacramento Bee newspaper in the neighborhood of the Chiapellas’ residence, testified that early one morning between January 1 and January 17, 1987, he noticed a dark-complected man drive a pickup truck past the Chiapella residence. Defendant did not own or possess a pickup truck. One of the investigating officers testified Attorney Bob Laughlin had informed him that on the afternoon of January 13, 1987, the Chiapellas had departed between 3:15 p.m. and 3:20 p.m. from his office, located three to four miles and ten minutes by automobile from the Chiapellas’ residence. The distance between defendant’s apartment and the Chiapella residence was 2.6 miles. A defense investigator timed the shortest route between those points, determining that by vehicle it took 9 to 10 minutes, by bicycle 12 minutes, and on foot 39 to 40 minutes to traverse that distance. Defendant’s wife, Diana, testified that on January 13, 1987, defendant and she attended the 8 p.m. showing of the film, “The Morning After,” at a theater in Chico, the theater manager confirming the film had been shown at that time on that date. Detective O’Hem testified that the Chiapellas’ son, Dr. Joseph Chiapella, told him he last had spoken to Katherine on January 15 or 16, 1987. After hearing the evidence described above, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder (with special findings that the murders were willful and premeditated and committed during the course of a robbery), with two enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon, and guilty of one count of robbery, also finding true the four charged special-circumstance allegations. The jury also found defendant guilty of the offenses of escape from jail and kidnapping. II. Penalty Phase Evidence The prosecution did not present additional evidence in aggravation. The jury was instructed to consider in aggravation the circumstances of the robbery murders and the kidnapping, as well as the battery of the prison guard. The defense presented the following evidence in mitigation. In February 1989, an EEG (electroencephalogram) examination and a BEAM (brain electrical activity mapping procedure) examination were performed on defendant. The EEG demonstrated abnormal electrical activity, indicative of seizure disorders. Defendant had physiological abnormalities in the frontal region and the right frontal and central temporal regions of the brain, believed to be a developmental defect. These areas of the brain gauge the appropriate level of emotional response to a given situation. These abnormalities had been present for more than one year. Neurological testing of defendant, performed in March 1989, revealed a high probability that defendant suffered organic brain damage, although it could not be established whether he had brain damage two years previously. Defendant’s “significant mild” brain damage subjected him to lapses in which he could not function normally. During 1987, there were 13 escapes from Butte County jail, and during 1988, 6 escapes from that facility. Throughout that period, the jail experienced overcrowded conditions; it was understaffed and had an inadequate physical plan. The testimony given by defendant’s high school and college football coaches and high school basketball coaches stressed that defendant was sportsmanlike and an excellent player, as well as cooperative, helpful, polite, respectful, very well respected, and good with children. A teammate furnished similar testimony. The testimony provided by one of defendant’s high school teachers, an instructional aide, and a cheerleading adviser portrayed defendant as respectful and cooperative, and a good student, leader, and outstanding player. Defendant had not presented any disciplinary problem at a summer youth job-training camp. Defendant’s minister, a fellow churchgoer, and a family friend portrayed defendant as polite, respectful, considerate, and a regular churchgoer. A friend of defendant, who had lived with defendant’s family for a year during high school, and the friend’s parents reported their fondness for defendant and stated they considered him a member of their family. Another parent of one of defendant’s friends testified defendant was polite, considerate, and respectful. Defendant’s wife, Diana, testified to her love for him, describing him as loving, compassionate, sensitive, sincere, honest, extremely thoughtful, and generous. Defendant had wanted to play professional football or join the Air Force. He had introduced Diana to Christianity and had influenced her to join the church. Defendant’s brother, Bryant, testified to his love and admiration for defendant and their good relationship. Defendant had assisted Bryant with school assignments, particularly with the subject of psychology. Defendant’s sister, Gwen, admired defendant, describing his encouragement of her and his assistance with her mathematics homework. Defendant’s stepfather, Chris, described defendant as warm, kind, and helpful. He testified that defendant had had a happy childhood and was a member of a close family, and that he loved defendant. Defendant’s mother, Pearlie Mae, reported defendant had had a happy childhood and got along with his siblings. Defendant was religious and a frequent, willing churchgoer. She dearly loved defendant. Defendant’s sister, Sharon, also testified to her love for defendant and reported that defendant was a good athlete and had a good sense of humor. Defendant had sent her letters in which he had denied committing the murders. The defense also produced a number of photographs depicting defendant with his family and attending such functions as high school graduation. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury fixed the penalty at death. Discussion I. Jury Selection Issues A. The trial court’s denial of defendant’s Wheeler motion Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion, pursuant to People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], for mistrial, to quash the jury venire, and to commence jury selection anew, on the ground the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse the sole African-American juror in the venire, Mrs. Casey. A presumption exists that a prosecutor has exercised his or her peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 652 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 278.) Nonetheless, it is well established that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of a presumed group bias, based upon membership in a cognizable group, violates both the federal and state Constitutions. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.) “ ‘Group bias is a presumption that jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group,’ ’’ distinguished on grounds such as race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. (People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 170 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664]; People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 713 [286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]; see J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994) 511 U.S. _, _ [128 L.Ed.2d 89, 101-104, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1425-1427]; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 407-410 [113 L.Ed.2d 411, 422-425, 111 S.Ct. 1364].) “ ‘ “If a party believes an opponent is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, that party must make a timely objection and a prima facie showing that the jurors are being excluded on the basis of group bias. [Citation.] To establish a prima facie case, the moving party should first make as complete a record as possible; second, the moving party must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group; and third, the moving party must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of group association.” ’ ’’ (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 171; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 164-165 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]; People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 714; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-89].) A party may make a showing of a “strong likelihood” by, inter alia, pointing out “that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristic—their membership in the group—and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly, ... if [defendant is a member of the excluded group], and especially if, in addition, his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 280-281, fn. omitted.) In support of his motion, defendant emphasized that the prosecutor had excused the only African-American juror in the venire. It is clear, however, that defendant did not rely solely upon the circumstance that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was directed toward the only African-American juror; defendant made an effort to set forth other relevant circumstances. (Cf. People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 171; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154.) He presented evidence, compiled from the biographical information of 50 prospective jurors, that Mrs. Casey was typical in terms of her age (58 years), employment status (housewife with prior employment outside the home), length of residence in the community (17 years), and marital status and children (1 marriage, 2 adult children), and in that her husband had served in the armed forces. Defendant also compiled a list showing that, like Mrs. Casey, 24 other prospective jurors had expressed views suggesting opposition to, or concerns with, the death penalty. Defendant presented evidence indicating that, in an earlier trial in Butte County involving an African-American defendant, the same prosecutor had employed a peremptory challenge against the one African-American prospective juror remaining in the venire after for-cause challenges had been exercised. Defendant also emphasized that Mrs. Casey and defendant both were African-American, whereas the victims were Caucasian. The court denied the motion on the ground that defendant had not established a prima facie case, the court determining that during voir dire Mrs. Casey had shown indecisiveness and could not decide whether she would be able to follow the law. “‘[W]hen a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. [Citations.] As with other findings of fact, we examine the record for evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges’ personal observations, we view their rulings with “considerable deference” on appeal. [Citations.] If the record “suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged” the jurors in question, we affirm. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140,171-172; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 498, 501 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 98, fn. 21 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81, 89].) When Mrs. Casey was asked by the court how she felt about serving on a jury for the first time, she responded, “Not good,” and that it “was scary” to do something she never had done before. When asked whether she would decline to find first degree murder even if the prosecutor had established that crime, out of fear of having to decide whether to apply the death penalty, she initially stated she was against persons being put to death, as well as against “people killing people. [] That is hard to answer,” then responded in the negative, also responding in the negative to the question whether she would refuse to vote on the issue of special circumstances if these were shown. When asked whether she could conceive of situations in which she might vote for the death penalty if first degree murder and special circumstances were established, she answered in the affirmative. Upon questioning by defense counsel, Mrs. Casey reiterated she did not believe in the death penalty, and also did not believe in “nobody killing anybody either,” so that she was “in-between or whatever.” She also stated she could conceive of a case in which the death penalty would be appropriate, if the circumstances of the case were “awful bad” and if she “believed it.” Upon questioning by the prosecutor, Mrs. Casey reiterated that she truly did not believe in the death penalty, and stated: “But if it is bad, it [is] really bad and I felt that, you know—I hate death. I don’t know how to express myself, really. But I really hate to see anybody be put to death. And I hate to see someone take a life. I don’t care who it is. So—it is—it is hard for me to express it. [¶] But I could, if proven to me, to, no doubt, that it was a crime, then I don’t think I would hesitate.” She indicated she did not know whether the prosecutor was at a disadvantage because of her views; she “couldn’t say fully,” but would attempt to be completely open and objective about the issue. When the prosecutor asked whether she honestly believed she could vote for a verdict that would cause defendant to be sent to the gas chamber, she replied: “I can’t sit here and really say for sure if I could. But, if it is proven to me, truly proven to me, and I feel deep down inside that he did it, I could. I think I could.” When the prosecutor asked, “You think you could?” Mrs. Casey said, “Yes, I have to say I think I could. This is all new to me. So I am very upset with it.” She further stated that her feelings concerning the death penalty (that she did not believe in it) would make it difficult for her to make a decision on that issue. She could not say “yes or no” to whether her feelings about the death penalty might substantially impair her ability to evaluate fairly all the evidence pertaining to the death penalty. She indicated that, despite her not believing in the death penalty, she believed she could vote in favor of it if she heard facts and circumstances that warranted it, but then stated: “I can’t say—I can’t come out and say fully, yes, I could or, no, I couldn’t, because I don’t know the circumstances.” Following these statements, Mrs. Casey informed the court that her family possessed only one automobile, which her husband used when not carpooling, and that she could not depend upon automobile transportation. The trial court denied the prosecutor’s for-cause challenge to Mrs. Casey, premised upon her statement that she did not believe in the death penalty, and the prosecutor later employed a peremptory challenge to excuse this prospective juror. Because the trial judge had presided over all of the voir dire, he was in a good position to determine from all relevant circumstances whether a strong likelihood existed that the prosecutor had challenged Mrs. Casey solely by reason of her group association. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156.) He properly could consider the nature of the prosecutor’s voir dire, which was not desultory but rather reflected a thorough investigation of her views, especially as to her feelings concerning the death penalty. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156.) Mrs. Casey’s apparent opposition to, uncertainty about, and repeatedly contradictory responses pertaining to the death penalty, her indication she might be unable to apply the law in that regard, her apparent general apprehension at serving on a jury for the first time, as well as her concern over her transportation to the court for trial, indicate there were legitimate, race-neutral grounds upon which the prosecutor reasonably might have challenged her. (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 172-173; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630,774 P.2d 659].) As indicated above, defendant presented other matters to the court in an attempt to make a prima facie showing. His demonstration that Mrs. Casey generally appeared to be an otherwise typical member of the community, although a circumstance properly the subject of consideration, did not obviate the concerns evoked by her responses. Defendant’s showing that 24 other prospective jurors had expressed views suggesting opposition to, or evidencing concern over applying, the death penalty, does not establish a prima facie case, because all except one of these prospective jurors were excused (almost all by the prosecutor), and the prosecutor’s failure to excuse the remaining juror must be viewed in light of the circumstance that the juror was called later in the proceedings, when the prosecutor’s remaining peremptory challenges were few. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221 [comparison of prospective jurors did not take into account such factors as the prosecutor’s remaining peremptory challenges and the number of prospective jurors with a particular point of view].) Moreover, that juror indicated her understanding of and willingness to uphold the law, despite her reservations. Assuming defendant’s showing that the prosecutor had, in an unrelated case involving an African-American defendant, exercised a peremptory challenge in order to excuse an African-American prospective juror is relevant under Wheeler (22 Cal.3d 258, 285-287 [a defendant need not show that the same prosecutor has excluded all members of a cognizable group over a long period of time]; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 92-96 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81-82, 84-88]; see also People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156, fn. 4) this showing is not very probative, in light of the isolated nature of the prior conduct (cf. People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 162, 168) and the record introduced in the trial court of the circumstances surrounding that excusal, indicating the prosecutor validly excused the prospective juror on the basis of the juror’s legal training. Although the prosecutor’s excusal of all members of a particular group may give rise to an inference of impropriety, especially if the defendant belongs to the same group, that inference, as we have observed, is not dispositive (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156; People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 500.) Moreover, in the present case the inference is of less weight, because the prosecutor excused only a single member of that group. In light of all the relevant circumstances, the trial court properly could find that defendant had not made a prima facie showing, and, accordingly, the burden did not shift to the prosecution to establish a neutral explanation, related to the particular case, for the peremptory challenge. (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 164-165; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 281.) We also reject defendant’s claim that his right under the Sixth Amendment to an impartial jury was violated. Although a defendant has a right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community as a means of ensuring his or her right to an impartial jury, he or she has no right to a jury that reflects the racial composition of the community. (Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 480, 482-483 [107 L.Ed.2d 905, 916, 918, 110 S.Ct. 803]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 173; see also Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 538 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 702-703, 95 S.Ct. 692].) Defendant’s claim of a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment lacks merit because, as explained above, the record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that this prospective juror was excluded on the basis of group bias. (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 363-367 [114 L.Ed.2d 395, 408-411, 111 S.Ct. 1859]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 96-97 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81-82, 87-88]; cf. Johnson v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 1327.) B. The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to excuse jurors for cause Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied defense motions to excuse for cause two prospective jurors who did not unequivocally state they would not automatically vote for the death penalty, and who thus called into question their ability to be fair and impartial. These two prospective jurors never were impaneled, however, having been excused following defense counsel’s exercise of peremptory challenges against them. Defendant nonetheless argues that the trial court’s failure to exclude these prospective jurors for cause violated his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under the California Constitution (art. I, § 16), his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and the California Constitution (art. I, §§ 7 & 15), and his right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the California Constitution (art. I, §§ 7, 15, & 17), because he was deprived of the full exercise of his 26 peremptory challenges due to the trial court’s error in denying his challenges for cause. Both the federal and the state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a trial by an impartial jury (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 173-174; see People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 683 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 104 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 679 [250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]), made up of jurors who will not automatically vote for the death penalty, but who will consider the mitigating evidence presented. (Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 733-736 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-503, 505-507, 112 S.Ct. 2222]; accord, Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 319 [106 L.Ed.2d 256, 278-279, 109 S.Ct. 2934].) Whether the contention is that the trial court erroneously failed to exclude prospective jurors who exhibited a pro-death bias, or excluded prospective jurors who exhibited an anti-death bias, the same standard has been held to apply. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 227-228 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1224.) Under that standard, a juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852,105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 456.) If a defendant contends that the trial court wrongly denied a challenge for cause, he or she must demonstrate that the right to a fair and impartial jury thereby was affected. (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 174; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088.) Initially, a defendant must establish that he or she exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question, exhausted the defendant’s peremptory challenges, and communicated to the trial court the defendant’s dissatisfaction with the jury selected. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 184 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087.) “[I]f he can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected because he was deprived of a peremptory challenge which he would have used to excuse a juror who sat on his case, he is entitled to reversal; he does not have to show that the outcome of the case itself would have been different. [Citations.]” (48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088; cf. People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950] [6th Amend, claim obviated by exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors not excused for cause, without comment by this court on other potential constitutional claims].) Our duty is to examine the context in which the trial court denied the challenge, in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision that the juror’s beliefs would not “substantially impair the performance of [the juror’s] duties” fairly is supported by the record. (See People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 456-457; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1224.) Where a prospective juror provides conflicting answers to questions concerning his or her impartiality, the trial court’s determination as to that person’s true state of mind is binding upon the appellate court. (People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 229; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 456; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1089.) In the present case, prospective juror Carrington initially indicated he believed that if a defendant had committed deliberate, first degree murder, he or she should receive the death penalty, that this form of punishment was not imposed frequently enough, and that a defendant’s background or life experiences would not affect his decision to impose the death penalty. Mr. Carrington also indicated, however, that he would be able to put aside his personal views concerning the death penalty, that those views would not substantially impair his ability to conduct the required weighing process, and that he would be able to vote in favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if that were the appropriate penalty in light of the evidence introduced at the penalty phase, would weigh the evidence, and would not vote automatically in favor of the death penalty if defendant were found guilty of intentional, premeditated murder with special circumstances present. The trial court denied the challenge for cause, noting this prospective juror had indicated quite strongly he would consider the facts of the case, would not apply the death penalty automatically, and was an earnest person whose intention was to follow the law. In his responses to written questions, prospective juror Roberts indicated he believed the death penalty served as a deterrent and decreased crime. When asked initially, this juror stated he did not believe he would vote automatically in favor of the death penalty, but then indicated he would do so. When asked whether he would vote in favor of the death penalty, regardless what evidence was presented as to defendant’s background, Mr. Roberts indicated he “could go either way” and subsequently stated that, considering this background information, he would not vote automatically in favor of the death penalty. Mr. Roberts stated that he would follow the guidelines provided by the court and consider such factors as defendant’s age and family, and that he could be neutral at the inception of the penalty phase. In denying this challenge for cause, the court alluded to the prospective juror’s initial struggle to understand certain questions concerning whether he favored the death penalty, his lack of a consistent viewpoint in favor of the death penalty, his responses that he would follow the court’s instructions, and his forthright demeanor and neutrality toward both the defense and the prosecution positions. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s challenges for cause to these two prospective jurors. Neither juror expressed views indicative of an unalterable preference in favor of the death penalty, such that their protestations that they would follow the law would not “rehabilitate” them. (Cf. Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. 719,733-736 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 505-507, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) Moreover, because both jurors provided conflicting responses relating to their views concerning the death penalty, as indicated above, the trial court’s determinations as to their state of mind, based in part upon their demeanor, are binding upon this court. The prospective jurors’ statements did not demonstrate that their views would substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. (See People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 457; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194,1224; cf. People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 763-764 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260]; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1088-1090.) II. Guilt Phase Issues A. Admissibility of defendant’s postarrest statements Defendant contends that his question, postarrest, “Did you say I could have a lawyer?” constituted an invocation of his right to counsel, and that the trial court erred in ruling that subsequent statements made by him in the course of police interrogation were not obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]. At the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to exclude evidence of his statements based upon this alleged violation of Miranda; after the motion was denied, he renewed it prior to trial, again relying upon the evidence received at the preliminary hearing. In support of his motion, defendant presented the following evidence; at approximately 3 p.m. on January 21, 1987, three police officers went to defendant’s apartment for the purpose of serving a search warrant as to the premises and an arrest warrant on defendant. Not finding defendant at home, they proceeded to search the residence. Defendant arrived and entered the apartment, but upon discovering one of the officers, and being informed he was under arrest, defendant began backing out of the apartment. The other two officers, summoned by the third, grabbed defendant’s arms, held him against the outer wall of the apartment, and handcuffed him, informing him he was under arrest for murder. Defendant, who struggled during the arrest, was placed stomach down on the floor of the apartment. One of the officers began reciting the Miranda warnings, but was interrupted several times by defendant, who was agitated and loud. At one point, the officer told defendant to “shut up” so the officer could read him his rights. Defendant repeatedly asked why he was being arrested. Defendant was informed several times that he was being arrested for the murder of the Chiapellas, and at one point the officer referred to the occurrence of the murders on Tuesday of the previous week. Defendant responded he had an alibi for that date, because he and his girlfriend had been at a party all day. The officer cautioned defendant that the police would “check it out.” The officer read the advisements concerning defendant’s right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law, of his right to an attorney before any questioning, if he wished, and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford to hire one, and that if “you decide at any time to exercise your rights and not answer any of the questions or make any statements—and I gave up at that point.” Defendant then said, “Did you say I could have a lawyer?” The officer told him, “yes, if he wanted one.” Defendant did not respond and remained silent. The police did not ask defendant any questions at that time. Defendant was transported to the Chico Police Department and, on the same day (January 21), at approximately 8 p.m., the police read to defendant the full Miranda advisements, including his right to have counsel present during questioning and to have counsel appointed in the event defendant could not afford an attorney. Defendant also was asked whether he understood and wished to waive his rights, and proceeded to waive them. Near the conclusion of that interview, at approximately 8:40 p.m., defendant asked to use the telephone. An officer told him he could do so, but forgot to comply with defendant’s request. A second interview was conducted from 9:10 p.m. to 10:08 p.m. At the end of the second interview, when asked whether he had any questions, defendant asked when a lawyer would be appointed for him, and an officer told him that would occur during arraignment. Both interviews were tape-recorded in total. The statements that defendant sought to exclude were in the nature of admissions. In addition to making exculpatory statements denying he had committed the murders or ever had been to the Chiapellas’ residence, defendant attempted to explain his cashing of a check made out to him by Katherine in the amount of $3,000 on the day following the minders. He asserted that on January 9, 1987, as on a number of prior occasions during the fall of 1986 and the early part of 1987, he had been paid by Katherine Chiapella to perform sexual acts. Defendant claimed he and Katherine had gone to a particular room at the Thunderbird Lodge. Defendant reported that on this occasion, as well as on others, sexual devices were employed, which Katherine transported in the trunk of her vehicle. Defendant also claimed that he had borrowed his roommate’s knife in order to fix his own stereo antenna, and insisted that for a number of months he had not worn the bloodstained shoes found at his apartment. The trial court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s statements were voluntarily made. 1. Whether defendant’s failure to renew his motion at trial precludes appellate review of his Miranda claim As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends that, by failing to renew the Miranda motion in Placer County, defendant waived the issue. Defendant unsuccessfully moved, during his preliminary hearing in 1987, to exclude his statements on the ground they were obtained in violation of Miranda. In March 1988, prior to the commencement of trial in Butte County, defendant renewed his motion to exclude the statements on Miranda grounds. The court denied the motion. In March 1989, following the change of venue to Placer County, defendant again moved to suppress these statements, this time on the ground that the probability that their admission would prejudice defendant substantially outweighed their probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Although at that time defendant did not renew his objection expressly on the basis of Miranda, the Placer County judge observed, after the prosecutor advised him that the judge in Butte County already had ruled upon the admissibility of the statements, that the Butte County court expressly had ruled that Miranda did not bar admission of the statements. The Placer County judge then stated that the only remaining questions were whether the statements were relevant and whether they should be sanitized, and defense counsel agreed with this assessment. Defendant did not specifically renew his objection at the time the statements were admitted into evidence. We conclude that, under the circumstances described above, defendant did not waive the Miranda issue. It is true that a judgment will not be reversed on the ground that evidence has been admitted erroneously, unless “ ‘there appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion . . . ” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 853-854 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983], italics in Mattson, quoting Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) “Specificity is required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 854.) “Miranda-based claims are governed by this rule. ‘The general rule is that a defendant must make a specific objection on Miranda grounds at the trial level in order to raise a Miranda claim on appeal.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 236 [246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669] [pretrial motion was not pursued to obtain a ruling]; People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048]; see also People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 54 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) In addition, we have held that a pretrial ruling on a claimed violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights is subject to reconsideration by the trial court, and an objection on Fifth Amendment grounds to the admissibility of the evidence is waived if not made at trial when the evidence is offered. (People v. Edelbacher (19