Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. An Orange County jury convicted defendant Christian Antonio Monterroso of the first degree murders of Tarsem Singh and Ashokkumar Patel; the attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Allen Candías; two counts of burglary; three counts of robbery; and two counts of false imprisonment by violence; all by use of a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 211, 236, 459^160, subd. (b), 664, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury found true the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances as to each murder and a multiple-murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), former subd. (a)(17)(i) and (vii).) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied defendant’s motions for new trial (§ 1181) and to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to die. This appeal is automatic. We affirm the judgment. I. Background In the early morning hours of November 21, 1991, defendant Christian Antonio Monterroso robbed and murdered Tarsem Singh, a clerk at the Circle K Market on West Vermont Street in Anaheim, and Ashokkumar Patel, a clerk at Hanshaw’s Liquor Store on nearby Lincoln Avenue. Each man was shot and killed with a .45-caliber automatic pistol, which police recovered later that day at defendant’s apartment. Police also recovered personal property belonging to Singh and Patel in defendant’s bedroom. A. The Murder of Tarsem Singh Defendant started drinking beer with Felipe Lopez, 16-year-old William Galloway, and a man named Fabian late in the afternoon of November 20, 1991, at the apartment where defendant lived with Galloway and his mother. The men also ingested some cocaine. Lopez observed that defendant had a gun in his waistband. Later in the evening, the adults went to a bar and a liquor store and returned to the apartment complex. A little before midnight, defendant left again, this time by himself. Sometime after midnight, Gonzalo Chavez saw defendant outside the Circle K Market, which was about five blocks from the apartment complex. Defendant followed Chavez into the store. Chavez was about to buy cigarettes and gum when defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from him and from the store clerk, Tarsem Singh. Defendant also asked Chavez for his car keys, but Chavez said they were in the car. Defendant cursed Chavez and pushed him and Singh towards the bathroom at the back of the store. Defendant said he would kill Chavez if Chavez came out. When Chavez pleaded with defendant not to kill him and pushed the gun away, defendant fired at the floor. Defendant then fired three or four shots at Singh, who was trying to get up from the floor. When the store bell rang to indicate someone else had entered the store, defendant returned to the front. A short time later, defendant led another Hispanic male into the bathroom. Defendant demanded car keys from his prisoners and then took the other Hispanic male out of the bathroom. At some point, defendant told Chavez and the other Hispanic male, “I won’t harm you because we’re the same race, but don’t point a finger at me.” When defendant was not looking, Chavez hid in the ice machine. Meanwhile, more people came into the store, and defendant demanded money from each of them and told them to take off their clothes. Carlos Chacon entered the store to find defendant pointing a gun at another man’s head. Defendant led Chacon and the other man to the bathroom and told Chacon to lie on top of Singh, who was bleeding from his gunshot wounds. Before Chacon could do so, defendant looked at Singh and said, “You’re still alive son of a bitch.” Defendant shot Singh twice more, adding, “This proves I am not playing games.” Defendant brought Chacon to the front briefly to help him look for money and then led him back to the bathroom. When Rodrigo Pelayo and his brother arrived at the Circle K, defendant was holding a Hispanic male by the hair and had a gun to the man’s head. Defendant ordered the Pelayos to put their money on the counter and to take off their clothes. A few seconds later, three to five more Hispanic males came in, and defendant told them to take off their clothes and put their money on the counter. He told this new group he was not “kidding around. I already have dead man in the back.” Defendant ordered the group into the bathroom and shut the door. A few minutes later, Allen Canellas arrived. Canellas was homeless and a panhandler and a drug addict, but Singh, the Circle K clerk, had given him some com dogs and soda a few hours earlier. Canellas considered Singh to be “a nice man.” When Canellas entered the store, he found money on the counter and clothes piled up in front. He called out to Singh, but Singh did not answer. Instead, defendant came to the front of the store and asked, “Can I help you?” Canellas saw defendant had a gun and fled. Defendant fired as Canellas left through the glass door. Canellas felt the bullet whiz by his ear, kept running, and called 911. Meanwhile, another customer, this time an African-American male, entered the store and was ordered into the bathroom. The police arrived at the Circle K at 12:34 a.m. The glass door in front was shattered. There were two piles of clothing in the front and a .45-caliber casing on the floor. Singh lay dead on his left side in a pool of blood in the back of the store. He had been shot six or seven times. Eight people were in the bathroom. All were upset and frightened. The seven Hispanic males were naked from the waist up. The eighth, an African-American male, was dressed but said that his car had been stolen. The car was later recovered near defendant’s apartment. A Circle K representative estimated that $14.09 was missing from the cash register. Later that day, Rodrigo Pelayo and Carlos Chacon each identified defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and murder. They also identified defendant in court. Canellas’s description of the perpetrator on the night of the shooting, was consistent with defendant’s appearance that night. B. The Murder of Ashokkumar Patel While defendant was at the Circle K, Lopez and Galloway went to a bar. Defendant was already home when they returned. Around 1:30 a.m., the three left in Lopez’s car to look for cocaine but were unsuccessful. At defendant’s suggestion, they stopped at Hanshaw’s Liquor Store on West Lincoln Avenue on the way home. Defendant directed Lopez to park the car on the street (instead of in the parking lot) and went inside. Lopez observed that defendant still had his gun. Defendant returned about 10 minutes later. He was carrying two 12-packs of beer and told Lopez to drive home. When they arrived, Lopez saw defendant counting money in the bedroom, but it did not look like much. Anaheim police responded to a report of a burglary at Hanshaw’s at 4:16 a.m. When they arrived, they heard a faint voice behind the counter. The clerk, Ashokkumar Patel, had been beaten and shot in the back but was still alive. Patel said he had been robbed and shot by a short Mexican male. Around $90 was missing from the register. Police set up surveillance outside defendant’s apartment later that day. Galloway’s mother, Jean Brock, had found defendant’s gun and hid it. When defendant arrived home around 10:00 p.m., he asked Brock, who was on the phone with the police, where his gun was. Following police instructions, Brock told defendant to leave. Defendant was arrested by police outside the apartment. Brock received a $500 reward for her assistance. The 11 casings from the Circle K and the single casing from Hanshaw’s had come from the .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol found at defendant’s apartment. Police also found a .45-caliber magazine hidden in the stereo speaker in defendant’s bedroom and a .45-caliber casing under the mattress. Singh’s driver’s license and other identifying documents were found in a wallet underneath an end table in the living room. A Citibank card with Patel’s picture and other identification were found in a dresser drawer in the bedroom defendant shared with Galloway. An Indian religious medallion and some Indian currency were on top of the dresser. Patel died 11 days later of multi-organ system failure caused by the bullet wounds. He also suffered blunt force trauma that caused bleeding into the brain. C. Penalty Phase The prosecution presented victim impact evidence through the testimony of the victims’ relatives. Ashokkumar Patel was remembered as a very generous person and a devoted son, husband, and father to his two children. Because of Indian custom, his wife had never had to worry about earning a living. She did not speak English and was now helpless. Tarsem Singh, who was only 28 years old when he died, was a hardworking person and a positive role model for the younger members of the family. His murder caused his family to split apart: his mother and two brothers returned to Fiji, while his father, who was still unable to work, remained in the United States with Tarsem’s other brothers. The prosecution presented additional evidence of defendant’s conduct involving force or threats of force. On the evening of March 8, 1988, defendant confronted Susan Selstad, an English teacher and choir director at Katella High School, in the school parking lot after an evening rehearsal. He blocked her from getting to her car and, after verifying her identity, said, “I know what you’re doing and I don’t like it and Pm here to let you know.” His eyes were angry and his tone was harsh and frightening. Selstad stepped backwards and took off running. When he chased her, she screamed for help. At trial, defendant said that his girlfriend had told him Selstad was making passes at her. He denied threatening Selstad or chasing her. On November 30, 1989, defendant led a group of West Side Anaheim gang members toward a group of El Monte gang members near Anaheim High School. Defendant started a fistfight with Leonard Velasquez, a rival gang member. At trial, defendant claimed that he and his opponent threw punches at the same time. On May 25, 1990, defendant assaulted Calvin Marshall. Marshall was leaving the house with his family and discovered defendant marking the sidewalk with gang symbols. When Marshall asked him to stop, defendant replied, “Nigger, this is my block. I will do what I want to do.” When Marshall asked his wife to call the police, defendant hit him in the face very hard. Marshall grabbed onto of defendant and held him until the police arrived. A couple of days later, Marshall’s wife awoke to find defendant and several other people vandalizing the family’s van with a cement block and carving gang symbols on the side. The purpose of the vandalism, according to a gang expert, was to intimidate the Marshall family. Defendant was subsequently convicted of assault and battery. At trial, defendant and Renae Alvarez, whose boyfriend was also a member of West Side Anaheim, claimed that Marshall and his wife were the aggressors. Defendant denied participating in the vandalism of the van. Defendant admitted to police that he was a member of the West Side Anaheim gang. He had a “WSA” tattoo on his shoulder and the word “Puro” on his upper arm, which had almost a “racist” connotation. The tattoo, combined with defendant’s statement to Gonzalo Chavez at the Circle K, suggested that defendant did not like people whose ethnic background differed from his own. On October 28, 1990, defendant assaulted David Hall, who had discovered defendant and a companion burglarizing his car. Hall chased and captured defendant, who warned that Hall would regret holding him. At trial, defendant claimed it was only brief mutual combat. The prosecution also presented evidence of defendant’s misconduct while incarcerated. Shortly after midnight on January 1, 1992, Deputy Bradford Blakely responded to a disturbance on one of the housing floors of the Orange County Central Jail. Many of the inmates (including defendant) had T-shirts over their heads and were yelling, rattling cell bars, and throwing burning objects out of their cells. When Blakely ordered them to return to their bunks, most complied. Defendant, however, refused and said, “Fuck you copper. Come an[d] get me.” He then added newspapers and sheets to the fire and “mooned” and exposed himself to the deputies before retreating into his cell. Defendant disobeyed orders to come out and instead charged headfirst into the deputies. It took four deputies to wrestle him to the ground and cuff him. At trial, Jose Guillen and Alex Perez, fellow inmates and convicted felons, disputed Blakely’s account. Defendant, too, claimed that he was just protecting himself. On May 3, 1993, the module deputy in the administrative segregation unit of the jail informed Deputy Shawn Crisp that three of the inmates said they did not receive their lunch trays. Although two of the inmates had no tray in their cells, defendant had a tray in his hands. Crisp ordered two more meals to give to the other inmates, but not one for defendant. Defendant shook the cell door and screamed that he was going to “shank” Crisp the next chance he got. At trial, Robert Laimbeer, a fellow inmate with numerous felony convictions, claimed that he had received two trays that day and ate most of each before giving one of them, “out of respect,” to defendant. He did not hear defendant utter any threats. D. Mitigating Evidence The defense offered testimony from defendant and others concerning his turbulent childhood. Defendant was bom in Guatemala in 1971. His parents fought frequently and his father often came home drunk. When defendant was four and one-half years old, his mother abmptly left his father and placed defendant and his brother with a nanny. Defendant claimed the nanny left him outside on a pillar overnight or for longer periods if he wet his pants and that dogs sometimes attacked him. He saw his father only once during this period. When defendant was five years old, he was taken to live with his mother and stepfather in the United States. Defendant was moved from one school to another in Anaheim, and his academic performance was unimpressive. He said his stepfather hit him with a belt if he made mistakes on his multiplication tables, although his brother questioned that account. He often received detentions in junior high school but would be beaten if he arrived home late. Defendant was transferred from one junior high school because of a fight and dropped out of school when he was 16 years old. He drank hard liquor, smoked marijuana, and experimented with cocaine until his girlfriend convinced him to stop and enroll in a religious treatment program called “Set Free.” When he returned home, however, his mother and stepfather pressured him to get a job and gave him an ultimatum of either joining the Job Corps or moving out of the house. Defendant moved out and lived on the streets for a week, until his mother sent him to Guatemala to learn about poverty. Defendant, who was 16, arrived in Guatemala with only $20 in his pocket. He lived with his father and worked in a sweater factory, but was let go because business was poor. He next tried welding, but he injured his eyes the first week. He did not get along with his father’s new wife, who eventually threw him out of the house. Forced back on the streets, defendant resumed using drugs and alcohol. He also resorted to theft. However, he also befriended a number of children in the area and raised money for their sports programs. Defendant stopped stealing because of fear of the Guatemalan death squads. After he had lost a lot of weight, he took the advice of Lillian Lopez, a neighbor, and enrolled in a rehabilitation program in Guatemala. Over the next five weeks, he committed himself to the program and exhibited a desire to help and share with others. Jacobo Castillo Colon, the program director, believed that defendant was in need of love and attention. Defendant was only in the first stage of the program when he returned to the United States. Castillo recommended that defendant remain in the program, but defendant’s mother had already purchased tickets for defendant to return to the United States. Defendant returned to Anaheim in July or August 1989. His stepfather continued to dislike him and occasionally beat him. It bothered defendant that his family kept pressing him to get a job. He went to live with Margarita Fernandez Garcia’s family for a couple of years. Fernandez testified that defendant had only one change of clothing when he arrived and that he was a very fine, respectM boy. Defendant left when he was arrested for stealing a truck. Defendant continued to drink and occasionally used drugs. His work history was spotty, and he spent some time in jail. He said it was difficult to find a job. Instead, he sometimes sold drugs. In November 1991, defendant moved in with Jean Brock and her son, William Galloway. Galloway did “claim” the West Side Anaheim gang in a police interview but denied membership in it. Brock described defendant as polite, helpful, and respectful. She also said that she and defendant drank a lot. Galloway described defendant as “mild.” Brock and Galloway testified that defendant started drinking early in the day on November 20, 1991. Galloway and defendant had obtained a gun to protect Brock from a man who had attacked her earlier. Defendant was drunk, but he loaded the gun before he left the apartment that night. Later that night, while they were driving around looking for drugs, defendant laughed about the Circle K murder. The next morning, defendant gave Brock $60 for rent and chuckled. A short time later, Galloway and some other friends accompanied defendant to Long Beach, where they spent the money defendant had taken from the robberies. Defendant said he could not believe he had shot two people. He said he shot the Circle K clerk because the clerk did not seem to believe he was serious. He said he hit the second clerk because the clerk was being an “ass.” On the way back home, defendant decided he was going to turn himself in. Gayle McGarrity, a sociocultural anthropologist, and Norman Morain, a sentencing consultant, each opined that defendant would do well in a structured, secure environment where he was respected and treated fairly. McGarrity testified that gang membership had provided defendant with the structure that he failed to receive at home and that defendant appeared to be a cultural nationalist. Peter Chambers, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified that defendant had experienced abandonment by his mother and father, which had resulted in poor choices in peer groups (such as gang membership) and a deviant lifestyle. He opined that defendant suffered from major depression, a sequel of posttraumatic stress disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. II. Guilt Phase Issues A. Pretrial Issues 1. Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized from Jean Brock’s Apartment Before trial, defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized from the warrantless search of Jean Brock’s apartment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety. Defendant now seeks review of that ruling insofar as it applies to the evidence found in the bedroom he shared with Brock’s 16-year-old son, William Galloway. We find no error. About half an hour after defendant’s arrest, Detective Larry Garrison asked defendant for permission to search the apartment. Defendant replied that he did not feel he could consent to a search since it was Brock’s apartment. When Garrison informed defendant that Brock had already consented to a search, defendant appeared skeptical, so the police allowed Brock to come to the patrol vehicle and personally inform defendant that she had consented to the search. Defendant then agreed to the search and signed a consent form. Our review of the trial court’s implied finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search is limited. “The . . . voluntariness of the consent is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact; and in that stage of the process, ‘The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings—whether express or implied—must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135] (James).) Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling is fatally undermined by the fact that he was arrested and in handcuffs at the time his consent was sought, that he had not received any Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602]), and that he had not been informed of his right to withhold consent to the search. He is mistaken. As we have previously explained, the fact that a defendant is under arrest and in handcuffs at the time of giving consent “ ‘is but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter’ ” (James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 110), even if no Miranda warnings have been given. (People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686-687 [224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665].) The same is true when the police fail to advise the defendant of his or her right to withhold consent. (United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 206-207 [153 L.Ed.2d 242, 122 S.Ct. 2105].) That the police asked Brock for her consent to search the apartment and informed defendant of that fact in no way constituted a “false inducement[]” for defendant’s consent or rendered his consent involuntary as a matter of law. After all, it was defendant who conditioned his willingness to consent on Brock’s agreement. In any event, the police were entitled to communicate this relevant and truthful information to defendant as he made his decision. (Cf. People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 687.) Inasmuch as Garrison made no overt or implied threat of force, his request for permission to search the apartment itself carried the implication that it could be refused, and defendant was hardly a newcomer to the criminal justice system, we find ample support for the trial court’s finding that defendant’s consent was voluntary. (United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424-425 [46 L.Ed.2d 598, 96 S.Ct. 820].) 2. Judicial Misconduct During Voir Dire Defendant complains next that the trial court’s comments during death-qualification voir dire had the effect of encouraging the jury to return a death verdict in violation of his state and federal rights to due process, a fair trial, an unbiased jury, and a reliable guilt and penalty phase determination. The claim is without merit. We observe first that defendant failed to object to any of the comments he now asserts as reversible error and thus has forfeited the claim. (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1177 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969].) Defendant has not shown that a timely objection or an appropriate admonition could not have cured the harm. (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1106 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-822 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673].) Even if the claim had been preserved, the record does not support defendant’s claim of error. None of the comments identified by defendant can reasonably be characterized as “a recruiting drive for jurors who would return a death verdict.” (a) After one prospective juror stated he was in favor of the death penalty “as long as somebody else does it,” the prosecutor explained that there are “cases such as this being made out all across the county every day . . . where we’re asking people from the community who don’t know the attorneys, don’t know any of the witnesses, to come in and vote their moral conscience.” The prosecutor then turned to a different prospective juror and asked whether the juror could offer the benefit of his honesty, intelligence, common sense, and experience in coming to a fair and just verdict in this case. When the juror said he could, the court commented that there were at least two capital cases currently in the courthouse. The court’s comment in no way diminished the gravity of the jury’s task. To the contrary, the court informed the venire that “[t]his is an important case to both sides, and it’s an important case to society. It’s an important case to you if you serve on the case. It’s an important case to you even if you don’t serve on the case.” (b) When a prospective juror stated that he supported the death penalty because he believed it was a deterrent, the court agreed that it was a deterrent to the person executed but warned that the notion of general deterrence was a controversial one and, more importantly, that the juror’s task was not to “send any message to any future criminal that may be out in the community to stop them from committing crimes by your conduct of a particular capital case, [f] So the moral is, you should not impose a death sentence for the reason solely of deterrent but only if it’s the appropriate punishment as to the particular individual who is being sentenced. Okay?” This was not error. (Cf. People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1105-1106.) (c) In discussing the evidence that might be presented at a potential penalty phase, the court explained to a prospective juror that “aggravating factors may be other bad things, bad conduct, possible criminal conduct of the defendant, that naturally points you towards the death penalty. You are also entitled to consider as an aggravating factor the crime that you just had found the defendant guilty of. [][] The mitigating factors will be offered by the defense, generally speaking, and they are substantially unlimited, [f] Can you assure us that you will be open to be persuaded by both sides as they offer mitigating and aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase of the trial?” Several days later, the court advised a different prospective juror that the charged murders “are factors potentially of aggravation that you can use that naturally point to the death penalty. But you will not lock yourself in, no matter how bad the crimes, until you have heard all the evidence to the death penalty. [][] In other words, you would be open, right? [f] . . . [f] If during the course of the trial . . . you hear something about the defendant that [is] sympathetic, then you can use [it] in the penalty phase.” In neither instance did the trial court instruct the panel that particular evidence “naturally” led to the imposition of the death penalty. Rather, the court merely defined “aggravating circumstances” as those that weigh in favor of death and “mitigating circumstances” as those that weigh in favor of a life sentence. (d) Early in the process, the court exhorted the panel that “[f]or those of you that actually serve on the case, many of you may believe that it’s the most important thing that you do in your whole life. So that’s the commercial for you to consider strongly, forgetting about the lame excuses you were thinking about giving me, to honor your oath as a juror and do the job that society requires as appropriately honest and decent citizens.” Several days later, after discussing with a prospective juror the need for a panel that has the inner strength to fairly consider either sentencing option according to the evidence, the court referred back to its earlier statement that “these kinds of cases often times are the most rewarding thing, in a sense of doing something for society that many of the jurors will ever experience in their whole [lives]. So I would urge you to stay on the case, all of you, if you can, if you meet all the qualifications and have the appropriate tenacity, [f] So how do you feel about it? Are you interested in staying or do you want out of here?” This record flatly rebuts defendant’s claim that the court’s comments indicated that only a death verdict would demonstrate “tenacity” and would be “rewarding” to tiróse who served. (e) In examining a prospective juror who was a witness in a different trial (and was ultimately excused from the venire), the court elicited that the juror believed in the death penalty and believed that somebody who valued life would not take somebody else’s life. The juror also stated that she would not be “the type of person you guys are looking for.” When defense counsel then interrupted to announce that he and the prosecutor had stipulated to the dismissal of this prospective juror because of her testimonial obligations in the other courtroom, the court joked to the prosecutor, “Okay. She’s saying a lot of good things here, though.” Defense counsel replied that he had “mentioned” that to the prosecutor, who groused that the prospective juror had said those things “after I was willing to stipulate, so I’m stuck with it.” Defendant’s contention that the court, through this exchange, made it “unmistakably clear” to the venire that a death verdict was warranted in this case is fanciful, and we reject it. In sum, none of these statements communicated a “strong judicial partisanship on the material matter of the penalty.” 3. Judicial Decorum Defendant complains that the court’s comments, quips, and banter during voir dire and the penalty phase injected “prejudicial levity into a very serious proceeding.” He contends the jury was “overly entertained,” thereby diminishing the jurors’ responsibility to reach a death verdict “in a reliable fashion” in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Although the liberal use of humor in a capital case is a delicate matter that has the potential to raise concerns about proper judicial decorum, the comments here do not cast doubt on the validity of defendant’s conviction. As defendant concedes, he failed to object to any of the “over 40 quips and humorous comments” he now challenges on appeal. He has thereby forfeited his objections. (People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1177; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 511 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249].) We also reject his claims on the merits. “Although a jury trial, especially for a capital offense, is obviously a serious matter, ‘Well-conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during a long, tense trial. Obviously, however, the court should refrain from joking remarks which the jury might interpret as denigrating a particular party or his attorney.’ ” (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 511; see also People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1175.) Defendant does not claim here that the court denigrated defendant or his attorney or otherwise called into question the court’s impartiality. (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 753 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] (Melton); cf. Ng v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1024 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 49].) Indeed, defendant concedes that judicial comment exhibiting bias against the defense “is not the issue” here. He argues instead that the court’s reliance on humor improperly diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for its death verdict. The record does not support his claim. The trial judge explained during voir dire that he had known the attorneys “for a long, long time,” believed that both counsel were “competent, intelligent and decent human beings,” and therefore “in all probability . . . will have friendly exchanges with both” and “may be flippant occasionally.” Defendant relies in particular on two occasions when the court quipped that recalcitrant prospective jurors should be shot and one occasion when the court similarly joked that jurors who were caught talking about the case in violation of the admonition would be shot. We have reviewed the entire record, including each example defendant cites in support of his claim. These comments, even when considered in conjunction with the trial judge’s numerous other efforts at humor throughout the trial, did not so trivialize the proceedings as to raise a question whether the jurors were fully conscious of the gravity of their decision. (People v. Hess (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 [90 Cal.Rptr. 268]; accord, State v. Simmons (Mo. 1997) 955 S.W.2d 752, 774 [court’s humorous but disparaging comments about sequestration “ ‘were nothing more than reasonable attempts by the Court to use humor to alleviate the tedium of voir dire and did not, as a matter of fact, have the direct or indirect effect of forcing the sitting juries to hasten deliberations or otherwise act unfairly’ ”].) CALLIC No. 17.30, which instructed the jury not to take its cue from the judge, further bolsters our analysis. (People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232, 244-245 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 198].) Defendant cites no authority to justify a contrary conclusion. Although we have concluded that defendant’s rights were not infringed by the trial judge’s comments, we reiterate that even well-conceived judicial humor is best invoked in measured doses. B. Admissibility of Ashokkumar Patel’s Dying Declaration Ashokkumar Patel, the clerk at Hanshaw’s Liquor Store, was shot in the back, below his shoulder blade. When the police arrived at the liquor store, Patel told them that he had been robbed and shot and that the shooter was a short Mexican male who had arrived in a car. Those statements were admitted at trial as a dying declaration over defendant’s hearsay objection. Defendant renews his hearsay objection here and, in a supplemental brief, argues for the first time that the admission of Patel’s statement also violated his federal constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354] (Crawford). The claim is without merit. As to the hearsay objection, the prosecution established the objective severity of Patel’s fatal wounds as well as his subjective awareness of those wounds. A dying declaration constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule if the statement was made on personal knowledge, which is not disputed here, and “under a sense of immediately impending death.” (Evid. Code, § 1242.) “ ‘This sense of impending death may be shown in any satisfactory mode, by the express language of the declarant, or be inspired from his evident danger, or the opinions of medical or other attendants stated to him, or from his conduct, or other circumstances in the case, all of which are resorted to in order to ascertain the state of the declarant’s mind.’ ” (People v. Tahl (1967) 65 Cal.2d 719, 725 [56 Cal.Rptr. 318, 423 P.2d 246].) In this case, the prosecutor relied on the declarant’s statements, demeanor, and conduct, as well as his evident injuries. The gunshot pierced Patel’s respiratory system, his gastrointestinal system, and his liver. The chest wound and the liver damage were each “of a great magnitude and dangerous in itself.” These wounds were the cause of death, which occurred 11 days later. Further, Officer Cheryl Murphy testified that at the time the statements were made, Patel knew he had been shot, was in great pain and on the ground in a fetal position, was fearful of dying, and never spoke again. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under the exception for dying declarations, even though Patel lingered on for several more days before dying. (Tahl, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 725-727.) As to the constitutional objection (and assuming without deciding that defendant did not forfeit this claim by failing to object on this basis below), we conclude that the admission of Patel’s dying declaration did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. Defendant relies exclusively on Crawford, which repudiated the high court’s prior ruling in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 100 S.Ct. 2531], under which an unavailable witness’s statements were admissible against a criminal defendant if the statement bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66.) To meet that latter test, evidence had to fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ibid.) In overruling Roberts, Crawford held that out-of-court statements by a witness that are testimonial are barred under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause unless the witness is shown to be unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court. “Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘rehability.’. . . To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 61 [124 S.Ct. at p. 1370].) Defendant asserts that Crawford has abrogated the exception for dying declarations. Yet the holding of Crawford does no such thing, inasmuch as the challenged out-of-court statements there were admitted by the state court under a finding that the statements bore “ ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 40 [124 S.Ct. at p. 1358].) The analysis in Crawford, which relies heavily on the right of confrontation as it existed “at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding” (id. 541 U.S. at p. 54 [124 S.Ct at p. 1365]), also fails to support defendant’s position. Although the high court found “scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case” at common law (id. at p. 1367), “[t]he one deviation we have found involves dying declarations. The existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed. [Citations.] Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. [Citations.] We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” (Id. at p. 1367, fn. 6.) Confronted now with that precise issue, we conclude that the dying declaration in this case passes constitutional muster. Dying declarations were admissible at common law in felony cases, even when the defendant was not present at the time the statement was taken. (Peake, Evidence (3d ed. 1808) p. 64.) In particular, the common law allowed “ ‘the declaration of the deceased, after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the party by whom it was committed,’ ” provided that “ ‘the deceased at the time of making such declarations was conscious of his danger.’ ” (King v. Reason (K.B. 1722) 16 How. St. Tr. 1, 24-25.) To exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation “would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion in some cases would inevitably set at naught. But dying declarations, made under certain circumstances, were admissible at common law, and that common law was not repudiated by our constitution in the clause referred to, but adopted and cherished.” (State v. Houser (Mo. 1858) 26 Mo. 431, 438; accord, Mattox v. United States (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 243-244 [39 L.Ed. 409, 15 S.Ct. 337] [“from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility”].) Thus, if, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding” (Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1365, citing Houser, supra, 26 Mo. at pp. 433-435), it follows that the common law pedigree of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment. We therefore conclude the admission of Patel’s dying declaration was not error. C. Alleged Instructional Errors Defendant challenges a number of instructions, claiming that they violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and (except as to the manslaughter instruction) the analogous provisions of the California Constitution. 1. Manslaughter Instruction The information charged murder in counts 3 and 10. As defendant points out, however, a portion of the instructions concerning lesser included offenses mistakenly referred to different counts: “If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you may nevertheless convict him of any lesser crime, if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of such lesser crime, [f] The crime of voluntary manslaughter is lesser to that charged in counts 1 and 5.” In reality, count 1 charged commercial burglary, and count 5 charged false imprisonment. Fearing that the jury was thereby prevented from returning a verdict of manslaughter as a lesser offense to murder, defendant asserts his murder convictions must be reversed. When, however, the jury instructions are considered as a whole, it is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood the role of the manslaughter instruction. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-527 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) Although that lone instruction misnumbered the charged counts, the other instructions stated explicitly that the crime of voluntary manslaughter “is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder”; that if a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the crime was murder or manslaughter, the jury “must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder”; and that the distinction between murder (other than felony murder) and manslaughter is that murder (other than felony murder) requires malice. In addition, the verdict forms reiterated that manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder as charged in counts 3 and 10. Finally, the prosecutor’s argument correctly and repeatedly explained that manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably likely the jury failed to consider manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder. 2. CALJIC No. 2.90 Defendant contends the standard reasonable doubt instruction used at his trial—former CALJIC No. 2.90—unconstitutionally permitted the jurors to take into account moral considerations in determining his guilt. As he acknowledges, however, the United States Supreme Court has sustained the language of former CALJIC No. 2.90 against constitutional challenge (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 114 S.Ct. 1239], affg. People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862]), and this court consistently has affirmed the validity of the instruction. (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 979 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 651-652 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) Defendant has not submitted any argument that would undermine these decisions. 3. CALJIC No. 8.81.17 Defendant argues that the jury instructions removed “an essential element” of the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special-circumstance allegations—i.e., that the murder was committed to facilitate the specified felony. We conclude that defendant did not suffer any prejudice. The challenged instructions, which were based largely on CALJIC No. 8.81.17, were virtually identical to each other and stated in relevant part: “To find that the special circumstance ... is true it must be proved: [][] One, that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of [the specified felony], or [f] Two, the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of [the specified felony] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection, [f] In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [specified felony] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.” Defendant contends that the instruction’s use of the disjunctive “or” (italicized above), rather than the conjunctive “and,” erroneously permitted the jury to find the allegations true without first finding the essential element that the murder was committed to facilitate the burglary or robbery. The second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 derives from People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], in which we determined that the felony-murder special circumstance did not apply where the defendant’s intent was not to steal but to kill and the robbery is merely incidental to the murder because its sole object is to facilitate or conceal the primary crime. We subsequently held, however, that inasmuch as Green did not announce a new element of the special circumstance allegation but had merely clarified the scope of an existing element, a trial court had no sua sponte duty to provide a clarifying instruction in the absence of evidence to support a finding that the felony was in fact merely incidental to the murder. (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501-503 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) Thus, unless the evidence supports an inference that the defendant might have intended to murder the victim without having an independent intent to commit the specified felony, there is no duty to include CALJIC No. 8.81.17’s second paragraph. (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 860-866 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105].) Here, there was no substantial evidence to reasonably suggest defendant entered the store or committed a robbery merely in order to murder either victim. As to the first murder, uncontradicted evidence revealed that defendant shot Singh when Singh failed to comply with defendant’s orders not to move and that defendant relied on the murder to show the other robbery victims that he was not kidding around. Although (as defendant points out) Singh may also have been selected because of his race, concurrent intents to kill and to commit a felony nonetheless support a felony-murder special circumstance. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 257 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123]; People v. Harden, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 866-867.) As to the second murder, defendant eliminated the only witness to the burglary-robbery. (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 628 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) Thus, the evidence showed only that defendant committed these murders to advance the burglary-robbery or to facilitate his escape or to avoid detection. Inasmuch as the second paragraph properly could have been omitted from the instructions, defendant suffered no prejudice by the trial court’s error in phrasing the two paragraphs in the disjunctive. 4. Multiple Felony-murder Special Circumstances Defendant also asserts that section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) does not allow the prosecutor to charge, or the jury to find true, multiple felony-murder special circumstances as to each murder. We have repeatedly rejected this contention (e.g., People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213]), and do so again here. “Only a strained construction of the language of this section would support a conclusion that section 190.2(a)(17) permits only one special circumstance finding regardless of the number of felonies in which a defendant was engaged at the time of a murder.” (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 682.) D. Cumulative Error Defendant argues that even if no single error requires reversal of his convictions, the cumulative effect of the errors must be deemed sufficiently prejudicial to warrant this remedy. Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we have found each possible error to be harmless when considered in isolation. Considering them together, we likewise conclude their cumulative effect does not warrant reversal of the judgment. III. Penalty Phase Issues A. Alleged Griffin Error Defendant, who did not testify at the guilt trial, took the stand at the penalty trial. He testified only about the circumstances of his life prior to the murders. The prosecutor attempted, unsuccessfully, to cross-examine defendant about the details of the murders. Defendant contends that these questions violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229] (Griffin) as well as the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore require reversal of the judgment of death. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any comment by the prosecution on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer guilt therefrom. (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 611-615.) At the guilt phase of a trial, “[d]irecting a jury’s attention to a defendant’s failure to testify at trial runs the risk of inviting the jury to consider the defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 670.) “ ‘Similarly, we have recognized that a prosecutor may not urge that a defendant’s failure to take the stand at the penalty phase, in order to confess his guilt after having been found guilty, demonstrates a lack of remorse.’ ” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 454 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) In this penalty phase, however, defendant did take the stand. At the close of direct examination, defense counsel explained to the court that he had elected not to inquire into the two murders and would interpose an objection of “beyond the scope” if the district attorney brought up the topic. After the court expressed skepticism that the defense could put on a “conditional examination,” the district attorney stated this was a “very touchy” area and asked for time to conduct additional research before asking “too many questions” about the murders. On cross-examination, the district attorney therefore inquired, “Would you like to talk with me about the crimes that you committed against Tarsem Singh and Ashokkumar Patel?” The trial court sustained an objection, commenting that “[hje’s not here to talk with you.” When the district attorney rephrased the question, defense counsel objected on Fifth Amendment grounds and as beyond the scope of the direct examination. The court overruled the objection, stating that “[w]hen a defendant chooses to take the stand and testify in a criminal action he waives his right against self-incrimination. ... If you want to ask him questions about the crime you may do so.” In order to “protect the record,” the district attorney instead continued to ask whether defendant would be “willing” to answer questions about the crimes. Defense counsel instructed his client not to answer, then withdrew the instruction when the court threatened contempt. After the court sustained relevance objections to two more questions as to defendant’s willingness to testify voluntarily about the murders, the parties went to a sidebar conference. At sidebar, the district attorney explained that he was proceeding in this fashion “[a]s a precautionary measure.” The court offered a prediction that defendant would eventually testify voluntarily about the murders “[f]or the reason that the court will probably order that all of the testimony be stricken in the event he fails to fully comply with cross-examination.” The district attorney promptly asked for an opportunity to research the issue “[b]efore the court does that. ...[][] I don’t want the judge to force him to answer any questions until I know.” In open court, the court informed the jury that the last question had been withdrawn. The following Monday, the district attorney explained that since there were cases “both ways” on the validity of defendant’s invocation of the privilege in these circumstances, he had decided not to ask defendant about the murders. Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the fact the defense objections were sustained and defendant never had the opportunity to answer, the district attorney’s questions violated his privilege against self-incrimination. As the district attorney noted, the cases are divided as to a capital defendant’s ability to testify at the penalty trial on some topics but not others. (Compare Lesko v. Lehman (3d Cir. 1991) 925 F.2d 1527, 1542 [“we do not believe that a defendant’s penalty phase testimony about mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the charges against him operates as a complete waiver of the defendant’s self-incrimination privilege or his rights under Griffin”] and State v. Cazes (Tenn. 1994) 875 S.W.2d 253, 265-266 [following Lesko] with Com. v. Clark (1998) 551 Pa. 258 [710 A.2d 31, 40] [“we reject the rationale of Lesko”] and Tucker v. Francis (11th Cir. 1984) 723 F.2d 1504, 1515 [prosecutor may properly comment at penalty phase on defendant’s failure to testify at the guilt phase; “since the waiver and the prosecutor’s comment occurred after guilt had been determined, it caused no adverse affect on the culpability determination”].) Yet, even assuming that defendant was entitled to resist efforts to inquire into the circumstances of the crime at the penalty trial once he had taken the stand, we cannot discern any prejudice. The district attorney made no reference to the exchange in closing argument. Even at the time, the district attorney nowhere suggested that defendant’s failure to answer these questions exhibited a lack of remorse. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 455.) Nor did the district attorney suggest that defendant’s silence was evidence of his guilt of the murders—although, inasmuch as defendant had already been convicted of the crimes, any such inference could have had only a trivial effect on the subject. In sum, defendant offers nothing to question the applicability of the general rule that “ ‘ “[i]ndirect, brief and mild references to a defendant’s failure to testify, without any suggestion that an inference of guilt be drawn therefrom, are uniformly held to constitute harmless error.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 455-456; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 66 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 478 [108 Cal.Rptr. 15, 509 P.2d 959].) B. Challenges to the Admissibility of Evidence Defendant challenges the admission of certain evidence as violative of his state and federal rights to due process, a fair trial, a fair and reliable penalty determination, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 1. Evidence of Vandalism as an Aggravating Factor Factor (b) of section 190.3 directs the trier of fact to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” Factor (b) encompasses only those threats of violence that are directed against persons, not property. (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1016 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) Invoking Kirkpatrick and Boyd, defendant claims that the admission of evidence concerning the vandalism of the Marshalls’ van on May 27, 1990, was outside the scope of factor (b) and, because it deprived him of a state-created liberty interest, also violated the federal Constitution. He is mistaken. Claudia Jones-Marshall testified that in the early morning hours of May 27, 1990—a couple of days after defendant marked her sidewalk with graffiti, insulted and assaulted her husband, and was arrested—she was awakened by a noise. She looked out the window and saw people hitting her van with a cement block. Defendant was scratching “WSA,” the initials of his gang, on the side of the van. As the prosecution’s gang expert, Alfonso Valdez, explained, the vandalism was a warning to the Marshalls not to “mess” with the gang. The purpose of the act was to instill “fear.” Thus, the act of vandalism unquestionably qualified as an express or implied threat to use force or violence against the Marshalls under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant then argues that even if the act could have been viewed as a threat against the Marshalls, the instructions permitted the jury to consider it as an aggravating factor even if it believed only that the vandalism was a crime against property. He relies on the jury instruction that defined a threat of force or violence under section 140; “Every person who willfully threatens to use force or violence upon the person of a witness to, or victim of, a crime or any other person, or to take, damage, or destroy any property of any witness, victim, or any other person, because the witness, victim, or informant has provided any assistance or information to a law enforcement officer or to a public prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or juvenile court proceeding, is guilty of the crime of threat of force or violence because of assistance in prosecution under Penal Code Section 140.” Defendant reasons that, under this instruction, the jury could have believed he committed “the crime of threat of force or violence” if he merely acted “to take, damage, or destroy any property of any witness, victim, or any other person” without any finding that such conduct constituted a threat against a person. Defendant, however, fails to consider the further limitation contained in CALJIC No. 8.87 which, as modified for this trial, instructed the jury that it may consider the “implied threat of force or violence against Calvin and Claudia Jones-Marshall ... on May 27, 1990” only under specified conditions; “You may not consider crimes against property as an act of violence in and of itself, but may only consider such evidence if you determine it to be directly related to a threat of violence upon another. If you do not so find, a crime against property is not a crime of violence to be considered as an [aggravating] factor.” In other words, even if the jury believed the act of vandalism did not constitute a threat against the Marshalls but was merely vandalism against property, they would have understood from the other instructions that a crime against property could not be considered as an aggravating factor. Hence, it is not reasonably likely the jury would have interpreted the instructions in the way defendant suggests. We therefore reject his state claim of error as well as the federal constitutional claim on which it depends. 2. Evidence of Defendant’s Gang Affiliation Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his membership in the West Side Anaheim gang as well as evidence of the gang’s activities and the motivations of gang members to participate in criminal activities. In his view, this evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. Defendant argues first that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Floyd Smith, who testified about defendant’s involvement in the November 30, 1989, assault near Anaheim High School, to testify also that defendant was a “hardcore” gang member, that the assault was preceded by “mad dogging” (a slang term referring to the practice of star