Full opinion text
Opinion CHIN, J. This is an automatic appeal (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law. A jury convicted defendant Jose Francisco Guerra of the first degree murder of Kathleen Powell. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant murdered Powell while engaged in the attempted commission of rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now subd. (a)(17)(C)) and further found that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, to commit the murder (§ 12022, former subd. (b), now subd. (b)(1)). After a penalty trial, the jury set the penalty at death. (§ 190.1 et seq.) The trial court denied defendant’s motions for new trial (§ 1181) and to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic. We affirm the judgment. I. Facts A. Guilt Phase 1. The Prosecution’s Case In October 1990, Kathleen Powell lived with her boyfriend, Charles Sims, on Kirkside Road in Los Angeles. The house next door to Powell’s residence was being remodeled. Defendant was a construction worker at the remodeling site. On October 25, 1990, around 7:15 p.m., Sims arrived home and found Powell’s body lying on the utility room floor in a pool of blood with a knife on top of her chest. The utility room extended from the kitchen and had a door to the backyard. Earlier in the morning, around 10:00 a.m., Powell beckoned to Odell Braziel, one of the workers at the construction site, to come to her house. Powell had hired Braziel about a week before the murder to repair some dents in her car and detail it. Thereafter, Powell occasionally had given him food and beverages as well as plates of sandwiches to share with the other construction workers. When Braziel reached Powell’s house, she said, “I have a problem. I can’t keep feeding all these people. You, I don’t mind, you’re working on my car,” but “I got a problem with Francisco [defendant, Jose Francisco]. I can’t keep him away from my house.” Braziel suggested that she tell Sims or the contractor, or call the police. During their conversation, defendant walked into Powell’s house through the utility room door and into the kitchen. The conversation ended, and as Braziel left, Powell asked him to take defendant back to the remodeling site. When he returned to the site, Braziel informed A1 Canale, an electrical contractor, of Powell’s complaint. After lunch, defendant asked Braziel to buy him a quart of beer. Braziel returned shortly thereafter with the beer, found defendant standing on Powell’s back patio, and gave him the beer. Around 2:30 p.m., Eric Sloane, the site manager, arrived at the remodeling site. Sloane testified that Braziel had complained that defendant was “pestering” Powell and spent considerable time at her house during the day. As Sloane walked around the site looking for defendant, he heard the gate to Powell’s backyard close and observed defendant emerge from a hedge dividing the two houses. When Sloane asked defendant what he was doing on Powell’s property, he noticed defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and his breath carried a strong odor of alcohol. Sloane asked defendant whether he had been drinking, and defendant said that he had been robbed of his life savings the previous night. He apologized to Sloane and assured him that he would not go to Powell’s property again. After his encounter with Sloane, defendant told Braziel, “Forget you see me there.” Shortly thereafter, Braziel found defendant on Powell’s back patio. Braziel testified he tried to persuade defendant to leave, but defendant gyrated his hips “in a sexual way” and repeated, “Kathy for me, me for Kathy.” Braziel demonstrated defendant’s movement for the jury by simultaneously gyrating the lower portion of his body and thrusting his hips forward. Braziel observed defendant step through the patio sliding glass door and go about three feet into Powell’s den just as the telephone rang. Powell answered the telephone in the front part of the house. Octave Semere, a coworker of Powell’s, testified that sometime between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., he telephoned Powell. While speaking to Powell, he could hear Powell’s sliding glass door open and close. Powell hollered for “Jose” to get out of the house and asked Semere whether he knew how to say “get out” in Spanish, but he did not. Semere heard a second person enter through Powell’s sliding glass doors and heard a man’s voice say to her in English that, “this guy Jose is crazy” and “not to trust him.” He then heard Powell tell a third person who had come through the sliding glass door to get out of her house. Meanwhile, in Powell’s den, Braziel told defendant that Powell was just friendly and did not like him romantically. Defendant repeated “Kathy-me, me-Kathy” and continued to gyrate his hips. A few days earlier, while sitting around with several coworkers, defendant had made similar statements and gyrations and used the Spanish word “panocha,” a slang term for female genitalia, in reference to Powell. Braziel believed defendant was drunk because he slurred his words, had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and had difficulty standing. Powell then called out, “Francisco, why don’t you go to work? Why don’t you find something to do?” and indicated, with a “shooing” motion, for Braziel to leave and take defendant with him. According to Braziel, she “begged” him to take defendant back to the jobsite. Braziel warned Powell that she should “watch out” for defendant and lock her door. He then returned to the jobsite with defendant. Braziel testified that Powell had arranged to take him to her friend’s house in the evening to work on the friend’s car. Powell had told him she was going to take a nap and asked him to wake her up at 4:00 p.m. by tapping on her back window. When Braziel woke Powell from her nap, she said, “Francisco was in my house when I was asleep, and my door was open.” Braziel asked her how she knew defendant was there, and she explained, “I know. I know. I could feel him. I know he was there. I locked my doors and I woke up, my doors were open.” Braziel returned to the jobsite and informed Canale about Powell’s fear that defendant had been in her house. Canale testified that sometime after this conversation, he was working on an electrical panel about 12 to 15 feet away from Powell’s utility room. Through the utility room window, he observed defendant standing in the utility room near the opened door leading to the backyard. Defendant was drinking a brown substance from a glass that Canale believed was Jack Daniels whiskey based on the odor of alcohol emanating from the utility room. Defendant walked in and out of Powell’s utility room several times. John Romanak, an electrical contractor, testified that he arrived at the remodeling site between 4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Canale informed him that defendant had been drinking and was bothering Powell. Defendant then staggered out of the kitchen and asked, “Que pasa?” Canale understood the phrase to mean, “What’s happening?” and responded, “Nada,” meaning “nothing.” Defendant emitted a strong odor of alcohol. Romanak commented, “What’s wrong with this guy? He seems awful uptight.” Romanak suggested they put away their tools and leave for the day. Braziel put his tools away and met Powell in front of her house. After he got into her car, defendant approached Powell on the driver’s side, reached for the upper back of the driver’s seat with his right hand, and simultaneously leaned his upper body and head into her car, possibly as if to kiss her. Defendant said something in Spanish to Powell, but Braziel did not understand him. Powell “jerked back” away from defendant and towards the passenger seat. She said she was afraid and would start locking her doors. Susan Michel, Powell’s neighbor, testified that sometime after 4:00 p.m., she observed defendant as she walked by the remodeling site. He asked her whether she had come from Powell’s house. Michel answered, no, that she lived on the comer. Powell and Braziel arrived at Ayshea Levy’s house shortly before 5:00 p.m. so Braziel could detail Levy’s car. Powell left 10 to 15 minutes later. After Braziel completed his work on Levy’s car around 7:30 p.m., Levy’s gardener, Roberto Gonzalez, gave him a ride to the intersection of Pico and La Brea. Powell was scheduled to begin her work shift at 7:00 p.m. Around 7:15 p.m., Sims found Powell dead in their utility room and called 911. Los Angeles Police Detective Kurt Wachter found Powell’s purse in her car with the keys in the ignition. Powell’s wallet was on the bar area of her house. The knife on Powell’s chest matched the knife set in Powell’s kitchen. The door leading from the utility room into Powell’s backyard was locked with a key-to-key deadbolt. The side door to the house being remodeled was ajar. Several of defendant’s fingerprints and his bloody palm print were found on the walls of Powell’s utility room, and his bloody palm print was found on the kitchen counter of the house being remodeled. Blood samples collected from the wall bearing the palm print in Powell’s utility room and the fence separating Powell’s front and backyards were consistent with Powell’s blood type, as were blood samples collected from the kitchen counter and a telephone in the house being remodeled. A throw mg in Powell’s kitchen contained a bloody shoe print that had the same lug-sole pattern as a bloody shoe print on the dining room carpet in the house being remodeled. The pattern may have been of a work boot. Detective Wachter, assisted by Officer Sergio Guzman who acted as translator, interviewed defendant on October 26, 1990, before his arrest on the same day. Defendant denied that he knew Powell until he was shown her photograph. He denied having had any contact with Powell and said that he had never been in her yard or house. Defendant stated that he arrived at home by 5:30 p.m. the day Powell was murdered. He consented to a search of his apartment and gave the officers the clothes and cowboy boots that he said he wore that day. The clothing was freshly laundered and folded in the closet. The clothes and boots contained no blood. The Los Angeles County Deputy Medical Examiner, Irwin Golden, determined that Powell died from numerous fatal stab wounds to her upper body and multiple “through-and-through” stab wounds to her neck. Dr. Golden observed several small poke wounds on her breasts, right front shoulder, and right back shoulder; a slicing or slashing wound on each breast; and defensive wounds on her arms and hands. He testified the poke wounds were “very small, some appeared to be triangular, some were lengthwise, and appeared to be just nicks of the skin . . . compatible with the tip of a sharp instrument.” The poke wounds on Powell’s breasts and right back shoulder were inflicted while she was alive. The poke wounds on her right shoulder were inflicted at or near the time of death. The knife that was found lying on her chest could have inflicted the stab wounds. There was no vaginal trauma or other physical evidence of a sexual assault. Powell was fully clothed in a blouse, brassiere, slacks, panties, and shoes. Powell’s shirt contained multiple slits and cuts to the front, back, and sleeves. Her panties were blood-soaked, but not cut or tom. 2. The Defense Case Defendant testified in his own defense and denied killing Powell. He stated that on the day of the murder, when defendant encountered Sloane near the driveway between the two houses, he had been coming from the garage and not the gate leading to Powell’s backyard. Defendant denied telling Sloane he had been drinking and had been on Powell’s property. He could not recall whether he told Sloane that he had recently been robbed. Defendant testified he had three or four beers that day, but he did not tell Braziel to buy him beer. The work crew left the jobsite at 4:30 p.m. He was the last worker to leave. Before he left, he decided to swim in the pool. He had removed his shirt and boots when he heard screaming next door. Defendant walked to Powell’s house, entered through the sliding glass back door, and found Powell lying in a “little bit of blood.” He tried to lift her by her shoulders but saw that she had “too many wounds” and laid her back down. Defendant put his hand on the wall to balance himself as he stood. He returned to the jobsite and picked up the telephone. Defendant did not know whom to call because he was scared, and he did not know how to call 911. He washed up in the pool, redressed, and walked to the bus stop around 5:40 p.m. Defendant arrived home at 5:45 p.m. He called his wife but did not tell her about the crime because he was afraid she would have been upset with him and would “bawl [him] out or something.” Defendant testified that he lied to police officers when they interviewed him and denied he had been in Powell’s house because he thought he would be beaten by officers. Defendant testified that in his native Guatemala, the police are corrupt and often beat and torture people to obtain incriminating evidence. When officers told defendant his fingerprints were on the wall near Powell’s body, he told them he might have been in Powell’s house but was too drunk to remember. A second pair of shoes taken from defendant’s apartment did not match the shoe prints found at the crime scene or at the remodeling house. 3. Rebuttal Evidence Defendant’s “wife,” Antonia Juventina Salguero, testified that he generally wore tennis shoes to work. Defendant wore his brown boots only on special occasions and never to work. Defendant told Salguero that he had taken off his shoes and socks and went into the pool about 5:35 p.m. Defendant did not tell Salguero that he went into Powell’s house until about five or six months after the murder. Salguero admitted that she would become angry when defendant helped people and had threatened to leave him. Manuel Paz, defendant’s nephew, told police that on the day of the murder, defendant had arrived at his apartment about 6:30 p.m. and was drunk. 4. Surrebuttal Evidence When defendant tried to help Powell, he touched a wall with his left hand. He did not remember how he positioned himself around Powell’s body. B. Penalty Phase 1. The Prosecution’s Evidence The prosecution presented victim impact evidence through the testimony of Powell’s father, Sims, and Powell’s ex-boyfriend, Hector Tobar. The prosecution presented additional evidence of defendant’s conduct involving force or threats of force. Angela Guerra de Maderos, who lived in a small town in the Republic of Guatemala, testified that one evening around the year 1986, she was walking home through the forest accompanied by 12-year-old Edgar Ramirez. Defendant, whom she had known since he was bom, jumped in front of them, wielded a machete, and prevented them from going forward. He wore a bandanna over his face. De Maderos ran into a field, and Ramirez ran to de Maderos’s house for help. Defendant caught up with de Maderos and told her, “You’re here with a guerilla. I am going to rape you and I’m going to kill you.” Defendant kicked de Maderos, causing her to fall, and poked her throat with the machete, causing numerous puncture marks. His bandanna fell off during the struggle. Defendant left when de Maderos’s husband and son approached and fired a shot. He left behind his machete sheath, with the initials F.G. De Maderos did not report the attack to the police because she was afraid that they would not investigate the incident and that defendant would kill her. The day after the attack, defendant told Ramirez, “I did scare you yesterday, didn’t I?” Ramirez responded, “How come you did that to us unjustly, unfairly, like that?” Defendant just laughed and smiled at him. 2. The Defense Evidence Defendant worked as a medic, police officer, and farmer in Guatemala. He often helped his family and members of his community when they were sick, injured, or hungry. He took injured people to the hospital, gave blood when needed, and visited people by horseback to give them medical injections, when needed. Defendant’s wife, Salguero, testified that defendant was accused of shooting someone whom he had tried to help. After this, Salguero told defendant that if he continued to help people, she would no longer love him. II. Discussion A. Pretrial and Jury Selection Issues 1. Denial of Funding Request for an Alcohol-induced Electroencephalogram Test Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his multiple requests for funding to conduct an alcohol-induced electroencephalogram (BEG) test, thus violating his statutory rights under section 987.9 and various state and federal constitutional rights. a. Procedural Background On three occasions, defendant sought funding to conduct an alcohol-induced REG on the basis that he may have suffered an alcohol-induced psychosis or allergic reaction on the day of Powell’s murder due to his ingestion of alcohol, and as a result was unable to form the requisite specific intent of the charged offense. The court denied each request because it doubted whether the test results would be admissible, whether the test could duplicate a person’s reactions to alcohol on a previous occasion, and whether this particular test was the only test that could determine allergic reactions to alcohol. The court noted that a defense psychiatrist had already received $2000, and it approved 10 additional hours for otherwise approved investigations. b. Applicable Law An indigent defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to ancillary services reasonably necessary to prepare a defense. (§ 987.9, subd. (a); Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-320 [204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360].) The defendant has the burden of demonstrating the need for the requested services. (Corenevsky v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 320.) The trial court should view a motion for assistance with considerable liberality, but it should also order the requested services only upon a showing they are reasonably necessary. {Ibid.) On appeal, a trial court’s order on a motion for ancillary services is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 234 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365]; Corenevsky v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 321.) We find no such abuse in this case. Defendant failed to demonstrate the test was reasonably necessary for his defense. Counsel provided no facts showing defendant blacked out or suffered any memory loss due to his ingestion of alcohol on the day Powell was murdered. Thus, defendant’s assertion that he may have suffered a pathological reaction to alcohol that induced a state of unconsciousness or amnesia on the day Powell was murdered is mere speculation. Also, as the trial court noted, counsel failed to establish how the proposed test conditions would duplicate the circumstances on the day of the murder and yield relevant and reliable information. Indeed, counsel provided no explanation for his request that defendant be administered tequila during the test even though defendant admitted he drank beer on the day of the murder. Contrary to defendant’s argument, Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68 [84 L.Ed.2d 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087] does not compel a different conclusion. In Ake, the Supreme Court held an indigent defendant is entitled to access to a psychiatrist for assistance in preparing a defense when he makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial. (Id. at p. 83.) Defendant presented no evidence that he suffered a pathological reaction to alcohol on the day of Powell’s murder. The record shows defendant had access to a psychiatrist, as Ake requires: a defense psychiatrist had received $2000 in court-approved funds, and the trial court approved an additional 10 hours for further investigation. Moreover, any error in denying defendant’s request for funds was harmless. Defendant’s palm prints and fingerprints were found in Powell’s blood inside her utility room and also on the countertop in the remodeling site. Defendant testified he went inside Powell’s house when he heard screaming. He found Powell lying in a “little bit of blood.” He tried to lift Powell by her shoulders but laid her back down when he realized she was too severely injured. Defendant returned to the remodeling site but did not call the police because he did not know how to dial 911. The level of detail in defendant’s rendition of the facts on the day of Powell’s murder belies any claim that alcohol rendered him unconscious. In addition, although defendant’s nephew and sister-in-law testified they had observed defendant drink beer previously, there was no evidence that defendant had ever suffered a psychotic or allergic reaction to alcohol. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the denial of his request for funds. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 159 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) 2. Suppression Motion Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during two police interviews and all evidence obtained as a result of those interviews. He argues that his statements were involuntary. a. Factual and Procedural Background (1) The Interviews (i) October 26, 1990 Interview On October 26, 1990, Los Angeles Police Detectives Kurt Wachter and Charlie Brown approached defendant at the office of his employer, Directions, the company that was remodeling the house next door to Powell at the time of her murder. Defendant spoke Spanish and not English, but another employee translated for them. They asked defendant if he would accompany them to the police station for questioning about a crime that was committed the previous day. They said he was not under arrest and would not be handcuffed. Defendant agreed. The detectives drove him, unhandcuffed, to the West Los Angeles police station in an unmarked detective car and placed him, still unhandcuffed, in an interrogation room. There, with Detective Sergio Guzman translating, Wachter interviewed defendant. Defendant was concerned but calm. Throughout the interview, all participants maintained a relatively conversational tone. Wachter thanked defendant for coming to the station and advised him that he was there voluntarily and not in custody or under arrest. He advised defendant of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda).) When the translator asked defendant if he wanted to give up his right to remain silent and speak with the detective, defendant answered, “Yes. Yes.” The translator then asked him if he wanted to give up his right to speak with an attorney and have one present during questioning. Defendant said he did not need an attorney and did not have money to pay an attorney. At Detective Wachter’s request, the translator again explained to defendant his Miranda rights. The interview continued as follows: “[Translator]: Okay, do you wish to give up the right to remain silent? “[Defendant]: Yes. “[Translator]: Do you wish to give up the right to speak an, with an attorney ha . . . and to have him present during your questioning? “[Defendant]: Okay. “[Translator]: Okay. What is okay, what? That you don’t want the, the, the, the attorney? “[Defendant]: Uh, I, attorney, no, because I don’t have any money, right? “[Translator]: I, I know, but also, one can be appointed for you without cost before you are questioned. “[Defendant]: And I don’t have to pay for him? “[Translator]: Yes. “[Defendant]: And I don’t pay? But since, since I don’t, I don’t have, uh, a problem to, to have any attorney, I don’t [UI][] that is I am, I am . . . “[Translator]: [ENG] Yeah, I don’t have money for an attorney, but however I have no problem. I, I have no . . . there is no problem going on with me because, ‘cause I did nothing wrong or something so there’s no need for me having an attorney. “[Wachter]: Okay, just understand, uh, please make him understand that he has to answer the question yes or no. “[Translator]: [SPAN] Oh, okay, then, the thing is we need to know that neither [ric] you say whether or not you want the attorney here before you are questioned. And as I say, one can be appointed for you without cost before . . . “[Defendant]: That, that is fine, well then, appoint one for me. “[Translator]: Huh? “[Defendant]: Well that is fine, for him to be appointed for me [UI] have an attorney, right? “[Translator]: Then, do you want an attorney? “[Defendant]: Yes, I want an attorney. “[Translator]: [ENG] He said, ‘Yes, I want an attorney.’ “[Wachter]: Okay, understand this, if he wants the attorney and doesn’t wish to speak to us, then from the information that we have, he’s going to be arrested for murder and we’ll book him into jail right now. “[Translator]: [SPAN] Okay, I want you to ... the detective says that I want, that it is, that you (should) know about this. Then if you want the attorney here and you don’t want to speak to the detectives about yesterday’s case then I want you to . . . they have enough in . . . information about what oc . . . occurred yesterday . . . “[Defendant]: Uh-huh. “[Translator]: . . . that right now they are going to arrest you. They are going to put you in jail for the, for the death of the lady [UI]. “[Defendant]: That is, the thing is, is that I didn’t understand you, right? I understand you, right? That, well, if I ask for an attorney for myself, but since I’m not guilty of anything, nor do I know, nor do I know what, what that is, then, I need to speak to them. That they tell me, they tell me what, what. . . “[Translator]: What? Speak with whom, then? The detectives? “[Defendant]: With them, with them. “[Translator]: That, that’s why I’m here. I, I [UI] am . . . “[Defendant]: [UI] “[Translator]: [UI] “[Defendant]: Then [UI] rather speak with them and [UI]. “[Translator]: [UI] Spanish, that’s why I’m, I’m here helping you. “[Defendant]: [UI] as I say, the thing is, I don’t, don’t know, I am, I don’t know anything about that. Uh-huh. “[Translator]: Don’t, don’t you know anything about what happened, it, of what happened? “[Defendant]: I don’t know, I don’t know because I, I go in to work, uh, at eight. I go to the office to work. “[Translator]: Okay, but, sir, you are telling me about what happened yesterday. I don’t want you to tell me anything until you, until, that, that, that, you say that you didn’t want the attorney here, but you also have your right, so, to have the attorney. But as I say, they have enough information about you . . . “[Defendant]: Uh-huh. “[Translator]: . . . about what happened yesterday . . . “[Defendant]: Uh-huh. “[Translator]: . . . and if you want the attorney present here, then they are going to go, put you in jail. “[Defendant]: I know, I know what they are telling me, I know. But, as I say, right? I would rather speak to them, and I don’t want an attorney. I don’t want an attorney.” The detectives then proceeded to question defendant. After defendant was shown a photograph of Powell, he admitted that he had seen her “go by the jobsite.” But defendant said he was “not on familiar terms with her” and denied that he had ever been in Powell’s house or on her property. He further denied that he ever approached her car or spoke to her. The detectives asked defendant about the clothes he wore at the jobsite on the previous day. Defendant offered to take the detectives to his apartment and retrieve the clothes he wore to work that day. He then asked for directions to the police station and informed the detectives he would go to his apartment, get his clothes, and come back. The translator told defendant the detectives would accompany him to his apartment. Defendant later signed a form stating that he voluntarily consented to the detectives searching his residence. (ii) October 30, 1990 Interview Defendant was initially arrested and placed in custody after he retrieved his clothes from his apartment following the first interview on October 26, 1990. Four days later, on October 30, 1990, Detective Wachter interviewed defendant again. He again advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant waived them. When asked if he wanted an attorney, defendant replied, “No, because it’s a waste (of money) for the Government and everything, you understand me? And I prefer, well, by himself [szc], right?” Detective Wachter described defendant as self-assured and forceful with his responses. Defendant again denied that he ever spoke with Powell but admitted he may have gone into her yard, possibly at the direction of his supervisor. The translator informed defendant that his fingerprints were left in Powell’s blood in her house and at the jobsite. Defendant responded, “My prints are there?” and “I don’t think that my prints are there.” He maintained that he had not entered Powell’s house. Defendant later stated that he might have been drunk and gone into Powell’s house after someone else killed her. He stated he was not capable of “killing that person.” He then suggested, “perhaps maybe, maybe I went in but maybe I found her dead.” “And perhaps, and perhaps I, I was too drunk when I went in and perhaps I thought she wasn’t dead and, and I saw her perhaps, I don’t know.” He said he did not remember but he might have tried to pick her up to see if she was alive. He saw no one in the house or running from the house. Defendant drank “maybe some, some five” beers or more on the day Powell was murdered, but he also said he did not recall getting drunk. Defendant was arraigned later that day. (2) The Suppression Hearing At the suppression hearing, defense counsel conceded that there was no Miranda issue and that the detectives complied with Miranda during their interrogation of defendant. But he argued defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was coerced and his statements were involuntary because the detectives threatened to arrest him and failed to stop questioning him once he requested counsel. Also, counsel argued defendant’s waiver and statements were involuntary because he believed he had no choice but to submit to the detectives’ questioning based on his experience with the police in his native Guatemala who would “beat or kill” or “put a cattle prod on” those who did not cooperate during an interrogation. The prosecutor countered that defendant’s waiver and statements were not coerced and that defendant’s experiences in Guatemala were irrelevant to a determination of the validity of his waiver. The trial court first determined that the prosecution had sustained its burden of showing defendant had been advised of and had waived his Miranda rights. Counsel nonetheless moved the court to permit Dr. Jose La Calle to testify “about the way that people, such as [defendant], view the police in the context of Guatemala” and about defendant’s understanding that he had no choice but to talk to the officers. After considering counsel’s arguments, listening to the audiotape, and reviewing the transcript of the first interview, the trial court ruled that defendant had been properly advised of and had waived his Miranda rights. It specifically found that (1) the officers’ conduct during their interrogation of defendant complied with Miranda; (2) defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights and his statements were voluntary; and (3) defendant spoke with the detectives in an effort to exculpate himself. The court stated, “[T]here is absolutely no question in this court’s mind that this defendant knew exactly what was taking place,” was “not an unintelligent person,” and “appreciated some very subtle nuances in the questions that were asked of him.” It found the proffered testimony of Dr. La Calle irrelevant. Defense counsel also moved to suppress defendant’s statements from the October 30 interview on the grounds that they were involuntary because they derived from the first interview, and because he was not arraigned within the statutory deadline. (§ 825.) The trial court excluded the October 30 statements from the prosecution’s case-in-chief because of the four-day delay in arraignment, but permitted their use for impeachment. b. The Applicable Legal Standards (1) Miranda In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court “recogniz[ed] that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive” and “held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 67 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280].) The Miranda safeguards apply to confessions and “statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense” regardless of whether they are exculpatory or inculpatory in nature. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 476-477.) A statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be admitted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but, if voluntary, may be admitted to impeach the defendant. (Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 223-224 [28 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 643]; People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 67.) On appeal, we review independently a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress a statement under Miranda. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) In doing so, however, “we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) (2) Voluntariness A defendant’s statements challenged as involuntary are inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that they were voluntary. (Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 487-489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 92 S.Ct. 619]; Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386 [12 L.Ed.2d 908, 84 S.Ct. 1774]; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 69-71 [260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042].) “The due process [voluntariness] test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ ” (Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 434 [147 L.Ed.2d 405, 120 S.Ct. 2326], quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041].) This test “examines ‘whether a defendant’s will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.” (Dickerson, at p. 434.) We make the same inquiry to determine the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 169-170 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 107 S.Ct. 515] [“There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a ‘voluntariness’ inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context”].) “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 167; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) Coercive police activity, however, “ ‘does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.’ [Citation.] The statement and the inducement must be causally linked. [Citation.]” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404-405 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1].) We review independently a trial court’s determinations as to whether coercive police activity was present and whether the statement was voluntary. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 296 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890].) We review the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) “[T]o the extent the facts conflict, we accept the version favorable to the People if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 921 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103].) c. Issue Preservation At trial, defendant did not argue that his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. Defense counsel apparently made a tactical decision to waive any Miranda issue, a decision that appears reasonable on the facts of this case. Because defendant left his palm prints and fingerprints in Powell’s blood at both the crime scene and the house being remodeled, counsel may reasonably have believed that defendant had to testify at trial to explain those fingerprints. Testifying would place his credibility at issue. If counsel succeeded in having defendant’s statements excluded solely under Miranda, they still would be admissible to impeach him. (Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. at pp. 223-224; People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 67.) Only if counsel could convince the court that the statements were involuntary would they be excluded for all purposes, including impeachment. (Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at pp. 385-386; People v. Neal, supra, at pp. 67, 79.) Therefore, if defendant intended to testify to try to explain the fingerprints and palm prints, counsel’s motion to suppress would gain defendant nothing unless he established the statements were involuntary, rather than solely the product of a Miranda violation. Accordingly, on appeal, defendant contends that his statements should have been suppressed for all purposes because they were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. Defendant asserts these circumstances include Detective Wachter’s questioning after he invoked his right to counsel, Wachter’s threat of arrest, and defendant’s experiences in his native Guatemala. The People argue defendant has forfeited the issue regarding any improper questioning by Detective Wachter. The People are correct, but only in part. Although counsel waived any Miranda issue arising from police conduct during the interrogation, he specifically asserted Detective Wachter’s conduct was a factor that rendered his statements involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, although defendant may not, and does not, rely solely on Miranda for relief, he may rely on all of the circumstances, including the continued questioning, as they relate to the voluntariness issue. d. Analysis (1) October 26 Statements As stated, defendant has waived any Miranda issues as grounds for suppressing his statements from the October 26 interview. The only issue presented is whether defendant’s statements were voluntary. Defendant contends his statements from the October 26 interview were involuntary because (1) Detective Wachter failed to stop questioning him after he invoked his right to counsel; (2) Wachter threatened to arrest defendant and put him in jail if he did not speak with the detectives; and (3) defendant’s experiences in his native Guatemala affected his understanding of the interrogation. After reviewing the entire record independently, we disagree. Defendant first contends the detective’s failure to stop the interview when he requested counsel was coercive and rendered his statement involuntary because it led him to believe that his rights were meaningless and that he had to speak with the detectives. “While the fact that a statement was obtained despite the defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel is one of the circumstances we consider [in determining whether a statement was voluntary], it ... is not dispositive.” (People v. Bradford (1977) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544]; see also People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 81-85 [officer’s continued interrogation of defendant after defendant invoked his right to counsel was one of three circumstances considered in determining voluntariness of subsequent confessions].) Defendant had voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the police station from his place of employment. Before invoking his right to counsel, defendant had repeatedly expressed his willingness to cooperate with the detectives and claimed to have no need for an attorney because he did not have “a problem.” Once defendant invoked his right to counsel and was threatened with arrest, his desire to cooperate with the detectives remained unchanged. He again stated he did not need an attorney because he did not know anything about the murder. As such, the record does not establish that defendant was affected in any manner or that his free will was overborne by the continued interrogation by Detective Wachter. There is no causal connection between the continued interrogation of defendant and his purported belief that he was required to cooperate during the interview. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 404—405.) Defendant next contends Detective Wachter coerced him into making his statements by falsely threatening to arrest him. Wachter testified at the suppression hearing that he did not believe he had probable cause to arrest defendant until after he initially interviewed defendant and searched his apartment. Defendant contends Wachter’s threat was particularly coercive because he was confused and lacked knowledge about our legal system. Nothing in the record, however, suggests defendant was coerced. He did not become confused or otherwise lose his composure after Wachter said he would arrest him. (See, e.g., People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 298 [“no indication that defendant was frightened into making a statement that was both involuntary and unreliable” by the detective’s “persistent references to the dire consequences he was facing”].) To the contrary, defendant remained eager to talk throughout the interview. As the detectives were about to conclude the interview, defendant offered to retrieve his clothes from his home and return to the police station. Clearly, he did not feel as if he was under arrest. When the translator clarified that the detectives would accompany defendant to his home, he said, without hesitation, “Okay, fine.” He then asked if he could let his wife know “what’s going on.” Such conduct belies any claim by defendant that he felt coerced or feared the detectives would mistreat or torture him. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that “defendant knew exactly what was taking place” during the interview. He appreciated subtle nuances in the questions and intelligently answered some poorly phrased compound questions. The sole cause appearing in the record for defendant’s cooperation during the interview was his desire to exculpate himself. People v. Hayes (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 898, 905-908 [215 Cal.Rptr. 595], is factually similar. In that case, after the 16-year-old suspect stated, “ ‘ “ 1 want to talk to a lawyer,’ ” ’ ” the detective immediately informed him that he (the suspect) was going to be booked for first degree murder, detained at juvenile hall, and certified as an adult in the case. (Id. at pp. 906-907 & fn. 4.) As the detective began to leave the interrogation room, the suspect told the detective that he “ ‘couldn’t do that to him’ ” and that he “ ‘hadn’t killed anybody and ... he would show [the detective] where the gun was.’ ” (Id. at p. 907, fn. 4.) The Court of Appeal found the detective’s statements informing the suspect what was going to happen to him after he invoked his right to counsel were not made in an attempt to elicit statements from the suspect. (Id. at p. 907.) After invoking his right to counsel, the suspect was motivated to speak with the detective, not by coercion, but rather by his desire to clear himself of any suspicion. (Id. at pp. 907-908; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 58 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [“His resistance, far from reflecting a will overborne by official coercion, suggests instead a still operative ability to calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or withhold information”].) Therefore, the court held the suspect’s change of heart in desiring to speak with the detective and his subsequent statements were voluntarily made. (Id. at p. 908.) In this case, Wachter responded to defendant in much the same manner as the detective responded to the juvenile suspect in Hayes—he essentially informed defendant that if he did not speak with him that he (defendant) would be arrested and charged with Powell’s murder. Defendant then decided to speak with the detectives, in an effort, the record indicates, to clear himself of suspicion. He denied that he knew Powell until he was shown a photograph of her and stated he “[didn’t] know anything about that.” He further denied that the had ever been in Powell’s house or yard. Defendant’s behavior is not the behavior of one whose free will has been overborne. Therefore, we discern no causal link between the detective’s threat of arrest and defendant’s subsequent statements and waiver of his right to counsel. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) Further, that Detective Wachter may have informed defendant falsely that he had sufficient probable cause to arrest him for Powell’s murder did not render defendant’s subsequent waiver of his right to counsel and statements involuntary. Although false statements made by the police during questioning may affect the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession, “ ‘they are not per se sufficient to make it involuntary.’ ” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988], quoting People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) A finding of involuntariness is unwarranted if the deception is not of a type reasonably likely to produce a false statement. (People v. Farnam, supra, at p. 182.) Here, the detective’s statement that there was sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant was not likely to produce a false statement. (See, e.g., People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 299 [detective’s deceptive statements to defendant implying that he knew more than he did or could prove more than he could were not reasonably likely to procure a false statement].) A finding of involuntariness on this basis, therefore, is unwarranted. Finally, to the extent that defendant contends his statements and any waiver were involuntary based on his experiences in Guatemala, we disagree. “The due process inquiry focuses on the alleged wrongful and coercive actions of the state . . . and not the mental state of defendant.” (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 921, citing Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 165; see also People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1041 [“The Fifth Amendment is not ‘concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’ ”].) At the suppression hearing, counsel sought to present evidence that defendant’s experiences in Guatemala affected his understanding of the interrogation. Defendant would have testified that he believed he had to submit to questioning by the detectives in this case because in his native Guatemala, the police would torture or kill him if he did not cooperate during an interrogation. Also, he would have testified he had no understanding of the legal system in this country. Dr. La Calle, a psychologist, would have testified on the cultural conditions of Guatemala and the general manner in which the police mistreat people. Based on his interview of defendant, Dr. La Calle also would have testified that because of defendant’s experience with the Guatemalan police, he (defendant) believed he could not refuse to answer the detectives’ questions in this case. Defendant’s proffered testimony, however, would have established only that his “ ‘pressure’ sprang from within [himself].” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 650 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84] .) As a matter of law, this involved no state coercion. {Ibid.) No causal link existed between the defendant’s internal pressure from his experiences with the Guatemalan police and any police activity in this case. Accordingly, based on our examination of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant’s statements from the October 26 interview were voluntary and therefore admissible for impeachment. (Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at pp. 385-386; People v. Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 69-71.) (2) October 30 Statements On October 30, 1990, four days after defendant was initially interviewed and arrested, Detective Wachter conducted a second interview. Defendant was given and waived his Miranda rights before answering any questions. Counsel moved to suppress defendant’s statements from that interview on the ground they were involuntary as a result of the coercive nature of his interview on October 26 and the delay in his arraignment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, excluding this statement from the prosecution’s case-in-chief because of defendant’s delayed arraignment, but permitting its use for impeachment. Defendant now claims his statement should have been excluded for all purposes, including impeachment. We disagree. We have already found that the statements on October 26 were voluntary. Nothing about the circumstances surrounding the October 30 statements suggests that what was voluntary four days earlier had become involuntary. The delay in arraignment was not itself coercive. Defendant was as cooperative in talking to the police the second time as he was the first time. It remains clear that defendant still wanted to give the police an exculpatory statement. This was not a case of the police effectively coercing a confession, as in People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th 63, but of defendant voluntarily giving statements denying his involvement in the crime. (3) Defendant’s Consent to Search His Apartment During the October 26 interview, defendant consented to a search of his apartment by the detectives. He gave the detectives the clothes he wore to work on the day of Powell’s murder. Defendant moved to suppress this evidence on the ground his consent was involuntary and obtained during the coercive first interview. The trial court denied his motion. Defendant renews his claim on appeal. Because we have concluded defendant’s statements from the October 26 interview, including his consent to search his apartment, were voluntarily made (see ante, at pp. 1094-1098), defendant’s consent did not derive from an involuntary or coerced source. Accordingly, the evidence seized during the search was not excludable on this basis. 3. Challenges for Cause Defendant contends the court erred in overruling his challenges to eight prospective jurors for bias in favor of the death penalty. “To preserve a claim of trial court error in failing to remove a juror for bias in favor of the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do so.” (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 667.) Here, defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges for the sitting jury, although he did so for the alternate jurors. Additionally, defendant did not object to the jury as it was finally constituted. Therefore, he has forfeited these claims for appellate review. In any event, we may reject defendant’s claims without examining the merits of his challenges for cause because he cannot show prejudice. “To prevail on such a claim, defendant must demonstrate that the court’s rulings affected his right to a fair and impartial jury.” (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 114.) In this case, none of the prospective jurors defendant challenged sat on the jury. Defendant peremptorily challenged six of the eight prospective jurors he had challenged for cause. The remaining two were never called into the jury box. Therefore, because defendant did not challenge any sitting juror for cause, he cannot show the court’s rulings affected his right to an impartial jury. (Ibid, [to obtain relief on appeal from the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, the record must show the defendant challenged a sitting juror]; see also Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85-91 [101 L.Ed.2d 80, 108 S.Ct. 2273].) 4. Batson/Wheeler During voir dire, defense counsel timely objected under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712] (Batson), and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] (Wheeler), to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges of three Hispanic and three African-American prospective jurors. As to counsel’s objections to the first Hispanic prospective juror and the first African-American prospective juror, the trial court ruled that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to each group. With respect to the remaining objections, the court asked the prosecutor to justify his peremptory challenges. The prosecutor did so, and the court accepted the explanations as genuine and race neutral on each occasion. Ultimately, no jurors identified as Hispanic and two jurors identified as African-Americans were among the sitting jurors. Defendant contends the court erred in overruling his objections. Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Recently, “the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be employed by trial courts when challenges such as defendant’s are made. ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by “showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622], quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416], fn. omitted (Johnson).) The high court clarified that “a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” (Johnson, supra, at p. 170 [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417], reversing in part People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270] [requiring the defendant to “show that it is more likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias”].) In determining whether the defendant ultimately has carried his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination, “the trial court ‘must make “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges for cause or peremptorily . ...” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852].) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” {Ibid.) Inquiry by the trial court is not even required. (Id. at p. 920.) “All that matters is that the prosecutor’s reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is sincere and legitimate, legitimate in the sense of being nondiscriminatory.” (Id. at p. 924.) A reason that makes no sense is nonetheless “sincere and legitimate” as long as it does not deny equal protection. (Ibid.) a. Asserted Trial Court Error in Failing to Find a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Defendant argues first that the court erred in finding no prima facie case of discrimination when the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors R.M., a Hispanic, and L.B., an African-American. We disagree. “When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. [Citations.] We will affirm the ruling where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question.” (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 135.) As a preliminary matter, in supplemental briefing defendant asserts that because the trial court did not state the standard it used to determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination, we must presume the trial court used the improper more-likely-than-not standard under People v. Johnson. (See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727] [trial court is presumed to follow established law absent evidence to the contrary].) Therefore, he asks that we independently determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination using the reasonable inference test under Batson. As in People v. Cornwell, “[r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming without deciding that the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference, we have reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson . . . [we] are able to apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.” (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73.) We conclude the record fails to support “an inference that the prosecutor excused [any] juror on the basis of race.” (Ibid.) As to Prospective Juror R.M., defense counsel sought to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based solely on the circumstance that R.M. was the only Hispanic sitting in the jury box, leaving only two other Hispanics on the entire panel. This circumstance, standing alone, is not dispositive on the issue of whether defendant established a prima facie case. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; but see Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173 [125 S.Ct. at p. 2419] [the removal of all three African-American prospective jurors established a prima facie case].) Moreover, the record discloses reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge Prospective Juror R.M. He indicated on his questionnaire that a person’s voluntary intoxication should automatically be considered a defense, or reduce his or her culpability, if that person commits a crime “because your mind is not where it [is] suppose[d] to be.” The prosecutor volunteered that this response was something he considered in excusing R.M. He may reasonably have believed that R.M. would have difficulty setting his belief aside and evaluating the evidence in this case because defendant claimed he was intoxicated at the time of Powell’s murder. Defendant contends the trial court rejected this possibility because it stated that the juror’s attitude towards intoxication was “not disqualifying at all.” But it may merely have meant the attitude would not support a challenge for cause, not that a prosecutor had to ignore it. “The circumst