Full opinion text
Opinion KENNARD, J. A jury found defendant John Irvin Lewis II guilty of the first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) and robbery (§ 211) of Jose Avina and Agustine Ramirez and of the first degree murder, robbery, kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)) of Willie Sams, Elizabeth Nisbet, and Shirley Denogean. As to each of the five murders, the jury found true special circumstances of murder while lying in wait (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15)), and murder during the commission of robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i) [now subd. (a)(17)(A)]). The jury found true special circumstances of murder during the commission of a kidnapping or kidnapping for robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(ii) [now subd. (a)(17)(B)]) for the Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean murders, and it found true a multiple-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found defendant guilty of the robbery, kidnapping for robbery, and kidnapping of Eugene Valdez, Juan Rios, and Sonia Aguirre; one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, former subd. 1 [now subd. (a)]); and one count of conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found that defendant had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) during each of the murders, robberies, kidnappings for robbery, and kidnappings. After a penalty phase, the jury fixed defendant’s penalty at death for each of the murders. The trial court denied defendant’s automatic motion to modify the verdicts (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed death sentences for those counts. The court imposed prison terms for the other counts and enhancements, stayed pending imposition of the death penalty. This case is before us on defendant’s automatic appeal. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the lying-in-wait special-circumstance findings related to victims Avina, Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean; reverse defendant’s six convictions for simple kidnapping (counts 7, 12, 13, 17, 21 & 25); modify the judgment to reflect a single sentence for conspiracy (count 27); and order stayed the sentences for the conspiracy conviction in count 27 and for the robbery convictions in counts 5, 8, 9, 15, 19 and 23. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment, including the sentence of death. I. Factual Background During July and August 1991, defendant and codefendants Bobbin Monique Machuca, Vincent Gerald Hubbard, and Eileen Marie Huber engaged in a crime spree in Los Angeles County involving the robberies, kidnappings, and/or murders of eight separate victims. Defendant was linked to the crimes by eyewitness accounts, automated teller machine (ATM) photographs, fingerprints, ballistics and other forensic evidence, and defendant’s statements to police. Defendant and his three codefendants were tried together. A. Guilt Phase 1. Prosecution’s case-in-chief Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 201 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 69 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280]), the evidence at trial established the following. In July and August 1991, defendant was living in apartment E of the Woodside Village Apartments in West Covina with codefendants Huber (defendant’s girlfriend), Machuca (defendant’s half sister), and Hubbard (Machuca’s boyfriend). a. Robbery and murder of Jose Avina (counts 1 & 2) About 10:00 p.m. on July 5, 1991, in Monrovia, defendant was riding in codefendant Huber’s car, following Derrick Colbert (defendant’s brother-in-law) and Timmy Lane, who were in Lane’s car. Lane’s car bumped a red truck driven by Jose Avina, who pulled over and stopped. Defendant approached Avina and demanded the keys to the truck. Defendant then shot Avina once in the head with a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun. The truck rolled onto a lawn in front of an apartment complex. Defendant pulled Avina’s body from the truck, jumped into the driver’s seat, and drove to Baldwin Park, where defendant and his companions removed stereo equipment from the truck. Defendant then drove the truck to Pomona and abandoned it. Defendant later put an amplifier from the truck into his own car, a brown 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass. Avina died from a shotgun blast to the left side of his face, which obliterated most of the left temporal and occipital lobes of his brain. Several copper-coated pellets or fragments were removed from his head. b. Robbery and murder of Agustine Ramirez (counts 3 & 4) Agustine Ramirez owned the Magic Mushroom restaurant in West Covina. His wife, Linda Ramirez, worked with him at the restaurant. Linda was friends with Sylvia Medina, who lived with her daughter Barbara Espinoza in apartment A of the Woodside Village Apartments, where defendant and his three codefendants were occupying apartment E. During July and August of 1991, Espinoza went on a few dates with defendant. One evening in early or mid-July 1991, codefendant Machuca accompanied Sylvia Medina to the Magic Mushroom, where she stayed for over an hour. On the morning of August 3, 1991, Agustine and Linda Ramirez drove to the restaurant in separate cars. About midnight, they decided to go home. Agustine walked Linda to her car in the alley behind the restaurant, then began walking to his car. Linda started her car and turned on the headlights. When Agustine was about 15 feet from Linda, a car occupied by defendant and driven by another person drove up to Agustine and stopped, blocking his way. Agustine talked to defendant. Linda noticed that defendant was holding an 18-inch shotgun. As Linda struggled to get out of her car, defendant shot Agustine once in the abdomen, then was driven away. Agustine Ramirez was taken to a hospital, where he died from a single gunshot wound to his left abdomen. Stippling around the wound and on his left forearm indicated the shot was fired from a distance of about two feet. Thirteen copper-coated double-aught shotgun pellets were removed from his body. The next morning, five of Ramirez’s credit cards were found near a dumpster on the grounds of the Edgewood Middle School in West Covina. c. Kidnapping and robbery of Eugene Valdez (counts 5, 6 & 7) Eugene Valdez worked as a salesman, for a car dealership in the City of Industry. In late July or early August 1991, Valdez bought a brown 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass from the dealership. About 9:00 p.m. on August 9, 1991, Valdez left the dealership driving the Cutlass to return to his home in Victorville, about 70 miles away. After driving about 30 minutes, Valdez became sleepy and decided to stop and rest. He pulled into a restaurant parking lot, shut off the engine, locked the doors, and fell asleep. About two hours later, Valdez awoke to find defendant and codefendant Hubbard banging on the car and yelling for him to open the door. They held a sawed-off shotgun between them. The two men forced Valdez to lie facedown on the backseat. Hubbard sat on top of Valdez’s legs, holding the shotgun against Valdez’s neck. Defendant sat in the driver’s seat, chose a music station on the radio, and began driving. As they were driving, Hubbard threatened several times to kill Valdez, but defendant urged him not to, saying, “Don’t do it, we can use the car.” Hubbard also asked defendant, “Why are you going this way?” Defendant replied, “I can get there just as fast.” Hubbard hit Valdez with his fists, spit on him, and demanded his valuables and credit cards. Valdez surrendered his money, billfold, and watch. Some 30 minutes later, Valdez felt the car climbing into the mountains. The car then pulled into a turnout near the Morris Dam, about 10 miles north of West Covina. Defendant and Hubbard got out of the car and ordered Valdez to get out as well. Valdez noticed that a second car occupied by a woman had pulled up beside his car. The men ordered Valdez to walk toward the edge of the turnout, where the land dropped off steeply. Hubbard still held the shotgun. As Valdez walked toward the edge, he heard one man say to the other, “You shoot the mother fucker.” Fearing he would be killed, Valdez threw himself over the precipice. As he did so, he heard a clicking sound as if a shotgun had misfired. Valdez tumbled about 150 feet down a steep incline. He remained at the bottom of the slope for several minutes. When he was sure the kidnappers had left the area, he climbed up the slope and flagged down a passing motorist, who took him to a phone to call the police. Defendant removed the front fenders, front grille and bumper, hood, and left rear taillight assembly from Valdez’s car and installed them on his own brown 1983 Cutlass. He also put the battery, tires, car radio, and speaker covers from Valdez’s car in or on his car. Defendant then abandoned Valdez’s car in Baldwin Park, where it was found about six days after the kidnapping. Defendant’s car still had the installed parts from Valdez’s car when a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s detective examined it on September 3, 1991, at an auto body shop in Rosemead to which it had recently been towed. d. Thefts from Gary Huber (count 26) Codefendant Huber’s father, Gary Huber, lived in Baldwin Park. On the morning of August 13, 1991, Gary left home with codefendant Huber and her brother to drive to Pismo Beach. When he returned the next day, the house had been broken into and ransacked. Several firearms were missing, including five rifles of various types, a Ruger .357 Magnum handgun, and a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson handgun. Also missing were two boxes of ammunition, a gun case, two holsters, a bayonet, and a survival knife. e. Kidnapping and robbery of Juan Rios and Sonia Aguirre (counts 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13) About 10:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, Juan Rios, accompanied by his fiancée Sonia Aguirre, pulled Aguirre’s car up to the drive-through ATM at a Security Pacific Bank in West Covina. As Rios was inserting his bank card into the ATM, a man ran up to the driver’s side of the car, pointed a gun at him, and ordered him to take as much money as possible out of the ATM or be shot. At the same time, another man approached the passenger side window and pointed a gun at Aguirre, demanding that she hand over her diamond engagement ring. She did so. Rios tried several times to withdraw money, but the ATM was not functioning. One of the men, whom Rios and Aguirre later identified as defendant, got in the backseat behind Rios. The other man, whom Rios and Aguirre identified as codefendant Hubbard, got in next to defendant, behind Aguirre. Rios drove to the front of the bank while defendant held a gun to the back of his head. Defendant ordered Rios to go to the walkup ATM and withdraw $200, threatening to shoot Aguirre or Rios if Rios “tried anything.” Rios complied. When Rios returned to the car, defendant was in the driver’s seat. Rios got in and gave the men the $200. Rios also surrendered his watch, gold chain, and ring. When Hubbard asked defendant what they were going to do, defendant said, “I have a plan.” Defendant began to drive. Defendant and Hubbard assured Rios and Aguirre that they would not be harmed because they were cooperating. About three miles from the Security Pacific Bank, defendant pulled over and let Rios and Aguirre out of the car, telling them not to “try anything” or they would be killed. Rios and Aguirre walked to a nearby store and called the police. Police located Aguirre’s car early the next morning in a shopping center parking lot across the street from the bank where Rios and Aguirre had first been accosted. Fingerprints lifted from the outside of the car on the driver’s side matched defendant’s prints. f. Kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Willie Sams (counts 14, 15, 16 & 17) About 9:30 p.m. on August 18, 1991, Willie Sams drove his car to the same Security Pacific Bank from which Rios and Aguirre had been abducted on August 14. From a gas station across the street, defendant saw Sams drive up to the drive-through ATM. Defendant and codefendant Hubbard approached Sams’s car and got in. Pointing the Ruger handgun at Sams, defendant forced him to withdraw $200 from that ATM and then to drive to another Security Pacific Bank and withdraw another $600. Defendant drove Sams to Edgewood Middle School, the same school where Agustine Ramirez’s credit cards had been found in early August. Defendant and Hubbard forced Sams to get into the dumpster near the baseball field. Defendant and Hubbard each fired several shots at Sams, killing him. Defendant later removed the radio from Sams’s car, attempted to wipe his fingerprints off the car, and abandoned the car in a shopping center parking lot. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., West Covina police officers found Sams’s body. Several copper-jacketed bullets or bullet fragments were recovered from the dumpster. A couple of hours later, at 1:07 a.m., $60 was withdrawn from Sams’s bank account using an ATM. On August 19, 1991, codefendants Hubbard and Machuca attempted to use Sams’s credit card to purchase about $700 worth of clothing from a store in El Monte. When the attempted purchase was denied, Hubbard and Machuca hurriedly left the store. Sams’s car, minus its radio, was recovered two days later in the shopping center parking lot. Fingerprints on the car and on papers found in the car matched defendant’s prints. Machuca’s prints were found on papers in the car. Sams died of gunshot wounds to his head, trunk, and legs. One wound perforated his heart; several others were potentially fatal. Four shots entered the right side of the body and traveled to the left, while three shots entered the left side and traveled to the right, indicating the shots were fired from two sources. Three bullets were removed from Sams’s body. A criminalist compared the bullets and bullet fragments recovered from Sams’s body and from the dumpster in which he was found with bullets test-fired from the Ruger and Smith & Wesson handguns stolen from Gary Huber, codefendant Huber’s father. He concluded that the bullets removed from Sams’s body and one bullet fragment from the dumpster could have been fired from the Smith & Wesson, and that three bullet fragments found in the dumpster were fired from the Ruger. g. Kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Elizabeth Nisbet (counts 18, 19, 20 & 21) Around 11:30 a.m. on August 24, 1991, Neil Nisbet and his wife Elizabeth drove their car to the Puente Hills Mall. Elizabeth was wearing or carrying several items of jewelry, including a gold ring with 17 diamonds, a gold bangle bracelet, and a gold rope chain bracelet. Elizabeth waited in the car while Neil entered the mall to run an errand. When Neil returned about 10 minutes later, the car and Elizabeth were gone. Neil searched for Elizabeth for several hours and then called the police. Meanwhile, defendant, codefendant Machuca, and possibly one or more other codefendants arrived at the Puente Hills Mall in codefendant Huber’s car, parked, and saw Elizabeth Nisbet in her car. Defendant forced his way into the car and pointed his gun at Nisbet. One or more of the codefendants bound Nisbet’s hands and feet with duct tape. Defendant drove the Nisbets’ car to the Covina branch of First Interstate Bank, where he and codefendant Machuca used Nisbet’s ATM card to withdraw $400. Defendant then drove to a convenience store in Covina, where an additional $100 was withdrawn from Nisbet’s account through an ATM. Defendant then drove north on the 605 Freeway, followed by codefendant Huber’s car. After stopping along the side of the freeway, defendant shot and killed Nisbet. Defendant or one of his codefendants removed Nisbet’s jewelry, and they departed in Huber’s car. About 3:10 p.m. that same day, California Highway Patrol officers found the Nisbets’ car on the northbound 605 Freeway. Elizabeth Nisbet’s body was under a blanket on the rear floorboards. The body was not yet cold. Elizabeth Nisbet had a gunshot wound to her left temple, which caused her death, and there were several gunshot wounds to her left arm and hand. She had a large blunt force trauma injury between her eyes, lacerations on her cheeks and lips, blackened eyes, and bruises on her wrists and hands. Holes in the blanket covering her indicated shots were fired through the blanket. Fragments of duct tape were attached to her socks and to her right forearm, and a twisted ring of duct tape was found underneath her body at approximately waist level. Three bullets were recovered from various locations inside the car. Several fingerprints lifted from the Nisbets’ car and from an ATM receipt found in the car matched defendant’s fingerprints. A forensic scientist from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department determined that the duct tape used to bind Elizabeth Nisbet’s feet came from a roll of tape that was recovered from a nightstand in the bedroom of apartment E in West Covina after defendant’s arrest. Two bullet fragments were removed from Nisbet’s brain and two from her forearm. A criminalist concluded that the Smith & Wesson revolver stolen from Gary Huber could have fired the bullets removed from Nisbet’s body as well as three bullets recovered from the Nisbets’ car. h. Kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Shirley Denogean (counts 22, 23, 24 & 25) Between 12:15 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. on August 27, 1991, Shirley Denogean drove her Mercedes-Benz car to the Puente Hills Mall. Meanwhile, defendant, codefendant Huber, and at least one other codefendant drove to the mall. Defendant brought along the Ruger handgun and some plastic ties. Defendant saw Denogean arrive, enter the mall, and return about 20 minutes later. As she was getting into her car, defendant forced his way at gunpoint into the car. One or more of the codefendants tied Denogean’s hands in front of her with the plastic ties. Defendant drove Denogean to the First Interstate Bank’s City of Industry branch, where $400 was withdrawn from Denogean’s account. Defendant then drove Denogean to another branch of the same bank, where Huber withdrew another $100 from Denogean’s account. Several unsuccessful attempts to withdraw more money from Denogean’s account were made at various ATM’s. Defendant drove Denogean’s car west on the Pomona Freeway, stopping between the Rosemead and San Gabriel Boulevard exits. Codefendant Huber followed in her car. Defendant forced Denogean at gunpoint to walk down an embankment, to an area surrounded by bushes. Once there, defendant fired three shots at Denogean, killing her. Defendant and his codefendants then drove away. About 12:04 a.m. the next day, $220 was withdrawn from Denogean’s bank account through an ATM at a convenience store. Denogean’s car was found in El Monte that same day. Fingerprints on the car and on papers found in the car matched defendant’s and codefendant Machuca’s prints. Denogean died from two gunshot wounds to her head. Both bullets entered the right side of her head and exited the left side. Gunshot residue around one of the wounds indicated the shot was fired at close range. Denogean also had gunshot wounds to her left hand and to both legs. A criminalist concluded that the bullets removed from Denogean’s body and bullets recovered from the scene of her murder were fired from the Ruger handgun stolen from Gary Huber. i. Arrests and defendant’s confessions Codefendant Huber was arrested about 2:30 a.m. on August 30, 1991. At 3:15 a.m., defendant and codefendants Machuca and Hubbard were arrested at apartment E in West Covina. Gary Huber’s Ruger handgun, loaded with bullets bearing defendant’s fingerprints, was on the living room floor a few feet from defendant. Gary Huber’s loaded Smith & Wesson revolver was found under a child’s bed in the bedroom. Gary Huber’s five rifles, rifle case, ammunition clips, and two gun belts were found in various locations in the apartment. His two metal ammunition boxes and his bayonet, as well as a firearm cleaning rod and loose ammunition, were found in the apartment’s dishwasher. Several plastic ties of the kind used to bind murder victim Shirley Denogean’s wrists were found in the dishwasher and in the hall closet. The roll of duct tape that had been used to bind murder victim Elizabeth Nisbet was found inside the nightstand in the bedroom. An unexploded triple-aught shotgun shell was found in a patch of ivy outside the front door. Gary Huber’s black survival knife was found in codefendant Eileen Huber’s car. The search also revealed several items of the victims’ property, including Denogean’s white purse, credit card, camera, and diamond engagement and wedding ring set, and the radio from murder victim Willie Sams’s car. At the time of her arrest, codefendant Machuca was wearing several pieces of murder victim Elizabeth Nisbet’s jewelry. After his arrest, defendant made four statements to law enforcement officers in which he admitted killing Avina, Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean. Defendant denied kidnapping Valdez. Regarding the Avina killing, defendant claimed that he was headed to a party with Lane and Colbert when Lane’s car accidentally bumped Avina’s truck after Avina stopped suddenly; that Avina then argued with Lane and Colbert, saying, “I should blow your Black ass away, fucking nigger”; and that when defendant approached the truck, Avina reached down to grab a gun, at which point defendant shot him in the face. Defendant said he used double-aught buck ammunition because when he was growing up his stepfather told him, “If you ever buy a shotgun and you want some shit that will blow a mother fucker’s head off, this is what you buy.” Regarding the Sams murder, in addition to recounting the basic facts, defendant said that after getting into the dumpster Sams cried and begged for his life, but defendant shot him five times until he “couldn’t shoot no more.” Defendant admitted he shot Sams because Sams could identify him, but he also claimed he shot Sams because Sams looked like defendant’s abusive stepfather. Regarding the Nisbet murder, defendant said he originally went to the mall intending to rob a jewelry store, but when he saw Elizabeth Nisbet he decided it would be easier to rob her instead. Defendant said that he stopped at the side of the freeway intending to leave Nisbet there isolated from communication, and that he fired one round near her head to scare her into being quiet. When Nisbet began screaming “Don’t kill me” and breaking free from her restraints, defendant shot and killed her. Regarding the Denogean killing, defendant said that he went to the mall intending to “look at” a jewelry store, but he decided to kidnap Denogean after seeing her. He said that while they were driving on the freeway Denogean said, “Go ahead and kill me now,” and attempted to strike defendant and grab his gun. After defendant parked and ordered Denogean to walk down the embankment, she said, “I know you are going to kill me so I might as well start screaming now.” Defendant shot Denogean only after she screamed and tried to run away. Defendant admitted he shot Denogean because she could identify him. Defendant said he knew that everything he had done was wrong and that he had to suffer the consequences. He said: “I’m not afraid to die. I don’t have nothing to live for.” j. Additional evidence Laroy Johnson testified that in August 1991 defendant tried to recruit him to commit robberies. Woodside Village Apartments resident Laura Pouncy testified that one day in August 1991 defendant came into her apartment and asked to watch the television news. During a broadcast showing helicopters and a body being brought up, defendant jumped up and ran out of the apartment. He appeared happy, as if “he had just hit a homerun.” Defendant once told Pouncy, “When you put a gun in a person’s face and they think they are going to die their eyes get real big.” 2. Defense case Edwin Bonilla testified that he was standing in front of the Magic Mushroom restaurant in West Covina on the night its owner Agustine Ramirez was killed. When he heard a shotgun blast, Bonilla looked into the alley and saw a brown station wagon parked with the passenger door open. A Hispanic or light-skinned Black man was walking toward the passenger door. The man appeared to be reloading a shotgun with a pumping action. The shotgun depicted in a photo found in apartment E in West Covina was a break-open shotgun, not a slide or pump-action shotgun. About three weeks before the killing, Ramirez had broken up a fight at the Magic Mushroom restaurant. The participants in the fight had threatened to kill the bartender after she refused to serve them. Defendant also presented evidence that he was in custody from 11:15 p.m. on July 4, 1991, until some time before 6:20 p.m. on July 5, 1991, the day Jose Avina was killed. Codefendant Huber presented evidence that defendant had been seen chasing her with a gun and shooting at her. A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department detective testified that Huber said she was afraid of guns, but she continued to “hang[] around guns and people that had guns” because “ ‘[i]t is also scary that you are told that if you leave they are going to kill you anyway.’ ” Codefendants Hubbard and Machuca both presented evidence intended to distance themselves from defendant and the crimes. 3. Prosecution’s rebuttal In response to Edwin Bonilla’s testimony, a prosecution witness testified that no shotgun shell was recovered at the scene of Agustine Ramirez’s murder. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution’s case in aggravation In January 1987, defendant tried to force 16-year-old Marlene L. to have sex with him. The prosecution also presented evidence that in November 1989 defendant and several other men and women were involved in five armed robberies or attempted armed robberies: a robbery of a convenience store in El Monte, during which the clerk was shot in the leg; an attempted robbery at a trailer park in Baldwin Park, during which two people were shot; a robbery of a customer at a gas station in El Monte; an attempted robbery of several customers at a gas station in Baldwin Park, during which two customers were shot; and a robbery at a shopping center in Alta Loma. On November 24, 1989, when defendant was 19 years old, he was arrested. He was convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun and was returned to the California Youth Authority for violating his parole for crimes he had committed as a juvenile. Defendant was confined in the California Youth Authority from November 24, 1989, until June 29, 1991, six days before the murder of Jose Avina. In June 1992, while defendant was in the county jail awaiting trial, a homemade stabbing instrument known as a “shank” was found in his cell. One day in November 1992, during the trial, a deputy sheriff found an 11-inch-diameter hole in the wall of the courthouse lockup where defendant was placed when not attending proceedings in the courtroom. Friends and relatives of the five murder victims testified about the impact of the murders on them. A correctional officer testified about prison conditions for persons sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. 2. Defense case in mitigation Defendant’s older sister Carmen, social worker Linda Witt, and a family friend testified that defendant’s stepfather, Donald Deary, abused the children physically and sexually. Defendant was removed from his mother’s home at a young age, and thereafter, when not incarcerated, he lived with Carmen, his older sister Bridgette, or his older brother Darryl. Defendant’s mother died in 1983. Bridgette was found dead on the street from a drug overdose a few months before defendant’s trial. Family acquaintance Oma Colbert described defendant as a happy child on the outside but sad on the inside. Defendant missed his parents and seemed to want love and attention. A high school teacher testified defendant was an average student. Francis Crinella, a psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, testified that defendant’s violent behavior, as well as his inability to control himself or his impulses, to organize his behavior, or to consider alternatives, were related to organic brain damage and his chaotic childhood. Dr. Crinella based this opinion on defendant’s behavior, his inability to profit from experience, his poor achievement in school, his history of seizures, and neuropsychological test results that were consistent with mild diffuse brain damage. Defendant had “one of the most extraordinarily chaotic childhoods” Dr. Crinella had ever seen. Defendant was abused sadistically by his stepfather from an early age. He began breaking the law when he was 10 years old. Other members of his family abused drugs. His mother died from an apparent drug overdose when he was 13 years old. His stepfather sexually abused defendant and his sisters. Defendant said he used marijuana soaked in phencyclidine (PCP) and often committed crimes when he was high. In Dr. Crinella’s opinion, defendant was a very fearful person with a “predatory world view[]” and a “limited” “emotional repertoire.” He “put[] on a show of bravado and toughness” to hide his fear. Defendant believed everyone was “out to get him.” He also was very manipulative. On cross-examination, Dr. Crinella acknowledged that California Youth Authority mental health professionals said defendant did not have brain damage but rather had an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Crinella also acknowledged that during interviews defendant had said he would kill a guard or other inmates in prison. II. Discussion A. Prearraignment Delay Defendant was arrested around 3:15 a.m. on Friday, August 30, 1991, the beginning of the Labor Day weekend. There was no warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant was arraigned four days later, on Tuesday, September 3, 1991. During the intervening period, while confined in the West Covina Police Department jail, defendant made several statements. At 9:00 a.m. on August 30, defendant waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda) and made an initial statement. At 10:15 a.m., defendant made a second statement. At 12:36 p.m., defendant invoked his right to an attorney under Miranda, and questioning ceased. About 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 1, more than two days after his arrest, defendant initiated contact with police and made a third statement. At 9:58 p.m., defendant made a fourth and final statement. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the statements he made on September 1, 1991, as a violation of his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436. At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the statements should be suppressed because defendant was questioned after he expressly asked for an attorney but no attorney was appointed. Counsel pointed out that defendant made the statements only after he “sat in jail for two days after asking for an attorney.” Counsel argued that this procedure violated the rule of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880], that the police may not question a suspect who invokes his Miranda rights unless the suspect initiates the questioning. The trial court denied the motion, observing that the police had no obligation to contact the public defender’s office, that normally an attorney is not provided until arraignment, and that defendant simply “didn’t wait long enough.” Defendant now contends that the four-day delay between his warrantless arrest and his arraignment before a neutral magistrate violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizures as defined in Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854] (Gerstein), and in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44 [114 L.Ed.2d 49, 111 S.Ct. 1661] (McLaughlin), and that his two September 1, 1991, statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were made during an unconstitutional detention. In Gerstein, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention after a warrantless arrest. (Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 114, 125-126.) In McLaughlin, the high court held that a jurisdiction may choose to combine the probable cause determination with other pretrial procedures such as arraignment. A jurisdiction that does so generally will comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein if it provides the probable cause determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. (McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 56.) If the delay exceeds 48 hours, the government must show that “a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” justified the delay. (Id. at p. 57.) Neither the need to consolidate pretrial proceedings nor intervening weekends constitutes extraordinary circumstances justifying delay of a probable cause hearing beyond 48 hours. (Ibid.; see also Hallstrom v. City of Garden City (9th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 1473, 1480 [construing language in McLaughlin regarding “weekends” as meaning weekends or holidays].) Defendant did not raise a McLaughlin claim at trial. At trial; he raised a very different claim that suppression was warranted because the police had violated his Fifth Amendment right to be left alone after his invocation of Miranda rights until an attorney was appointed. (See Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-487.) The trial court properly rejected that claim because defendant had initiated the contact with police on September 1, 1991. Although defendant argued that the delay in supplying him with an attorney was unreasonable, he did not assert that the failure to provide a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights under McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44. Accordingly, the prosecution never had a chance to justify the delay. Defendant therefore forfeited his McLaughlin claim on appeal. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 270 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 325-326 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 177 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521].) Defendant asserts that we may reach the McLaughlin claim because it “ ‘merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.’ ” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765], quoting People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]; see also People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].) We disagree. The focus of the Edwards claim that defendant raised is whether defendant initiated any questioning that occurred after he invoked his Miranda rights. (Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-487.) The focus of defendant’s McLaughlin claim is the very different inquiry into whether there was an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance justifying the delayed probable cause hearing. (McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 57.) As defendant himself points out, there is no evidence in the record on the latter issue. That is because defendant did not object on Fourth Amendment grounds at trial and thus did not give the prosecution an opportunity to make a record justifying the delay. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Defendant argues that his McLaughlin claim should be heard on appeal despite his failure to raise it at trial because the United States Supreme Court has held that McLaughlin is retroactive to cases that were pending on direct review when the decision was announced. (Powell v. Nevada (1994) 511 U.S. 79, 85 [128 L.Ed.2d 1, 114 S.Ct. 1280]; see also Anderson v. Calderon (9th Cir. 2000) 232 F.3d 1053, 1069-1070.) We disagree. The high court in Powell expressly left open for determination on remand “the consequences of Powell’s failure to raise the federal question.” (Powell v. Nevada, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 84.) Moreover, retroactivity analysis is beside the point. The high court decided McLaughlin in May 1991, months before the crimes in this case occurred and over a year before defendant moved to suppress his statements. Under these circumstances, defendant is charged with knowledge of the decision in McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, and his failure to raise the claim at trial forfeits it. B. Change of Venue Defendant asserts that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a change of venue violated state law (§ 1033, subd. (a)) and his rights to due process, a fair trial, and an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Before trial, defendant moved for a change of venue, or in the alternative for countywide jury selection, on the ground that otherwise a fair trial could not be had because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In support of the motion, the defense submitted copies of local newspaper articles about the crimes and court proceedings, and videotapes of televised news coverage. On September 14, 1992, the court held a lengthy hearing, during which it viewed the videotapes. After entertaining argument, the trial court denied the motion. It concluded that the news coverage was largely factual rather than inflammatory and that the bulk of it had occurred a year before the hearing on the motion; that the juror questionnaires revealed that although the prospective jurors had general knowledge about the crimes, they were not prejudiced against the defendants; that there was no requirement that the jurors be completely ignorant of the facts of the crimes; and that voir dire would reveal if any particular juror was biased and unable to serve. Defendant renewed his motion for change of venue several times during the trial. Each time, the trial court denied it for essentially the same reasons it had denied the original motion, except the trial court noted additionally that there was no indication the chosen jurors had prejudged the case. A trial court must grant a change of venue if “there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county” in which the charges were brought. (§ 1033, subd. (a); see Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333, 362 [16 L.Ed.2d 600, 86 S.Ct. 1507]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 672 [250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673]; Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375 [66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372].) Among the factors the trial court considers in ruling on a motion for change of venue are “ ‘ “the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim, and of course the nature and extent of the publicity.” ’ ” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 578 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29]; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 434 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64].) The ultimate question for the trial court is “whether on the peculiar facts of the individual case [citation] there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors who will be, or have been, chosen for the defendant’s trial have formed such fixed opinions as a result of pretrial publicity that they cannot make the determinations required of them with impartiality.” (People v. Bonin, supra, at pp. 672-673.) Defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof. (Id. at p. 673.) “A denial of a motion for change of venue will be upheld on appeal unless the record shows both that it was 1 “reasonably likely [that] a fair trial could not be had at the time the motion was made,” ’ and that it was ‘ “reasonably likely a fair trial was not in fact had.” ’ ” (People v. Massie, supra, at p. 578.) “Reasonably likely” in this context means something less than “ 1 “more probable than not,” ’ ” but something more than “merely possible.” (People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1126 [259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146]; see People v. Bonin, supra, at p. 673.) Here, the charges included five counts of first degree murder with special circumstances as well as numerous kidnapping, robbery, and other charges. As in People v. Ramirez, a case involving 12 murders, “[t]he ‘nature and gravity’ of the present offenses could not have been more serious, but this factor alone does not require a change of venue.” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 434.) Further, “[n]either defendant nor the victims were known to the public prior to the crimes and defendant’s arrest. . . ,” so two additional factors—the status of the defendant and the popularity and prominence of the victim—do not support a change of venue. (Ibid.; see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 46 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Defendant notes that he is Black and that two of his victims—Nisbet and Denogean—were middle-class White women. Defendant’s other victims, however, were themselves minorities: Sams was Black, while Avina, Ramirez, Valdez, Rios, and Aguirre apparently were Hispanic. Although some prejudice may have arisen from the racial difference between defendant and seven of the victims, “[t]his element of possible prejudice presumably would follow the case to any other venue . . . .” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1214 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015]; see also People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468,-523 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].) We focus our attention, therefore, on the two remaining factors: the size of the community and the nature and extent of the media coverage. First, the crimes occurred in Los Angeles County, “the largest and most populous in California” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 655 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752]), a factor that normally would weigh heavily against a change of venue (see ibid.). Without citation to the record, however, defendant contends that the jury selection occurred in the San Gabriel Valley, a “discrete segment” of Los Angeles County, while the Attorney General responds, also without citation to the record, that “the selection of the jury from the area surrounding the Pomona courthouse . . . represents a population exceeding that of most counties.” Assuming the San Gabriel Valley was the primary source for jurors, that area encompasses several cities, including Covina, West Covina, Baldwin Park, Walnut, and Glendora. Juror questionnaires reveal that potential jurors came from all of these cities and from Pomona, Claremont, La Puente, Duarte, Hacienda Heights, Rowland Heights, La Verne, Diamond Bar, Valinda, and San Dimas. These cities all are,part of the greater Los Angeles area, a “ ‘populous metropolitan area’ ” in which we assume “the ‘adversities of publicity [were] considerably offset.’ ” (People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 949 [171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240] (plur. opn. of Clark, J.).) Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant failed to meet his burden (see People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 673) of establishing that the small size of the relevant community weighed in favor of a venue change. Further, this case did not involve the type of political controversy that has justified changes of venue from Los Angeles County in past cases. (See, e.g., Powell v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 785, 798-802 [283 Cal.Rptr. 777] [White police officers charged with videotaped beating of Black motorist Rodney King]; Smith v. Superior Court (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 145, 148-149 [80 Cal.Rptr. 693] [bribery and perjury charges against city commissioner].) The final factor we consider is the extent and nature of the media coverage. The defense presented 39 articles from four newspapers, spanning a period of 13 months from August 1991 through September 1992. The defense also presented approximately 95 minutes of videotaped television coverage. Certainly, the evidence of media coverage was considerably less extensive than in other cases in which we have affirmed denials of motions to change venue. (See, e.g., People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-1214 [270 newspaper articles and extensive television coverage]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 434 [trial court described media coverage as “ ‘saturation, as much as they possibly can give’ ”]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1237 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163] [193 newspaper articles, 300 pages of television transcripts, and eight videotapes].) The nature of the media coverage weighs a bit more in defendant’s favor. We agree with the trial court that much of the coverage was “largely factual, and noninflammatory.” (See Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 800-801, fn. 4 [44 L.Ed.2d 589, 95 S.Ct. 2031] [distinguishing “largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or inflammatory”]; see also id. at p. 802.) Nonetheless, many articles and broadcasts used inflammatory terms such as “execution-style,” “rampage,” “cold-blooded,” “spree of terror,” and “execution bandits” to describe the crimes and the defendants. The articles and broadcasts emphasized how the crimes had gotten “under the skin” of San Gabriel Valley residents and “reached into the mainstream of suburban life” due to the random selection of victims who were engaged in everyday activities. One article quoted a detective as stating the victims were “all of us.” Additionally, some of the articles and broadcasts revealed facts about the crimes and defendant that were inadmissible against defendant at trial, including defendant’s prior incarceration, his gang affiliations, and the content of codefendant Huber’s confessions. The articles and broadcasts also revealed potentially prejudicial information, such as defendant’s status as a suspect in several other unsolved offenses, and that he had confessed in detail to several of the murders. On balance, however, we find this factor did not compel a change of venue. Most of the coverage—and nearly all of the potentially inflammatory coverage—occurred in September and November 1991, nearly a year before jury selection occurred. Although a brief flurry of articles appeared in September 1992, immediately before jury selection, those articles focused on codefendant Hubbard’s competency hearing and recounted the facts of the crimes only in summary form. As we have noted, the passage of time diminishes the potential prejudice from pretrial publicity. (People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 677; see also People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 434-436; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 655.) Moreover, some of the potentially prejudicial information revealed in the articles and broadcasts, such as the content of defendant’s confessions, was admitted against him at trial, so no prejudice resulted. (People v. Ramirez, supra, at p. 436.) Further, although a large portion—72 percent, according to defense counsel—of potential jurors who responded to questionnaires had heard something about the case, the trial court concluded that most of those jurors remembered the case only in general terms, seemed to have no independent recollection of the facts, and had not prejudged defendant’s guilt. Defendant does not dispute that assessment. As we have explained, the vagueness of jurors’ recollections of past news coverage may “suggest[] the absence of prejudice.” (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) Moreover, there is no requirement that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts of a case, as long as they can lay aside their impressions and render an impartial verdict. (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 655.) In sum, we conclude defendant did not meet his burden of establishing a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Los Angeles County. We further conclude that on appeal defendant has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he did not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury. The jury voir dire bore out the trial court’s conclusion that a fair jury could be chosen. Each juror assured the trial court that he or she could be unbiased notwithstanding exposure to media reports about the case. Although the jurors’ assurances of impartiality are not dispositive (see People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 361 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 800), neither are we free to ignore them (see Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217, fn. 7 [71 L.Ed.2d 78, 102 S.Ct. 940]; DeLisle v. Rivers (6th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 370, 384). We have in the past relied on jurors’ assurances that they could be impartial. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 448 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790]; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46.) Absent a showing that the pretrial publicity was so pervasive and damaging that we must presume prejudice (see Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 [81 L.Ed.2d 847, 104 S.Ct. 2885]; Murphy v. Florida, supra, at pp. 798-799), we do the same here. Considering all the circumstances, defendant has not established a reasonable likelihood, as opposed to a mere possibility, that he did not in fact receive a fair trial before impartial jurors. (See People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 673-679.) Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by considering only one of the five factors relevant to the weighing process—the nature and extent of media coverage. We disagree. Although the court did not discuss all of the five factors in considering defendant’s motion for a change of venue, it focused on the salient inquiry—whether it was reasonably likely that pretrial publicity had caused potential jurors to form such fixed opinions of defendant’s guilt that they could not render an impartial verdict. (See People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 672-673.) No abuse of discretion occurred. C. Joint Trial Issues In this part, we consider defendant’s closely related claims that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion for severance and in admitting into evidence at the guilt phase the redacted statements of codefendant Huber. 1. Denial of severance Defendant contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion for severance or for separate juries was erroneous and violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and corresponding provisions of California law, requiring reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments. For the reasons outlined below, we conclude defendant is not entitled to relief. a. Facts After his arrest, defendant made several statements to law enforcement officers implicating himself and his codefendants in the Avina, Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean crimes. After her arrest, codefendant Huber made several statements to law enforcement officers implicating defendant, herself, and her other codefendants in the Avina, Valdez, Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean crimes. Codefendants Hubbard and Machuca made no postarrest statements to law enforcement officers, although some of Hubbard’s prearrest statements were introduced into evidence at trial. . Before trial, defendant and his codefendants each moved to sever his or her trial or, in the alternative, for a separate jury. Each argued that a joint trial would be unfair because, among other reasons, the prosecution intended to introduce into evidence the statements defendant and codefendant Huber had made to police that implicated other defendants, in violation of People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265] (Aranda) and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620] (Bruton). The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing the statements could be redacted to remove references to the other codefendants. The prosecutor submitted proposed redacted statements to the court. At the hearing on the motion, defendant argued that a joint trial would be unfair because codefendant Huber’s statements implicated him in the charged crimes and because the proposed redaction of his own statements inaccurately portrayed him as the sole perpetrator of several of the crimes. The trial court denied the motions, concluding that the proposed redactions sufficiently protected each defendant’s rights. Later, during trial, the court ordered further redactions. The redacted statements of defendant and codefendant Huber were read to the jury during trial. The jury was instructed to consider these statements against the speaker only and not against any other defendant. b. Legal framework Our Legislature has expressed a preference for joint trials. (.People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 231 [250 Cal.Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25].) Section 1098 provides in pertinent part: “When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.” The court may, in its discretion, order separate trials if, among other reasons, there is an incriminating confession by one defendant that implicates a codefendant, or if the defendants will present conflicting defenses. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574-575 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869].) Additionally, severance may be called for when “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” (Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 539 [122 L.Ed.2d 317, 113 S.Ct. 933] [addressing severance under Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 14, 18 U.S.C.]; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 40.) We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared when the court ruled on the motion. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 167 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) If we conclude the trial court abused its discretion, reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at a separate trial. (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 503 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) If the court’s joinder ruling was proper when it was made, however, we may reverse a judgment only on a showing that joinder “ ‘resulted in “gross unfairness” amounting to a denial of due process.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) Here, defendant was charged along with at least one of his codefendants in each count with having committed “common crimes involving common events and victims.” (People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 500.) The court accordingly was presented with a “ ‘ “classic case” ’ ” for a joint trial. (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 40, quoting People v. Keenan, supra, at pp. 499-500; see also People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 575.) Defendant contends, nonetheless, that severance was warranted because (1) the admission of the statements of his codefendants Huber and Hubbard prejudiced him; (2) the redaction of his own statements denied him crucial exculpatory and mitigating evidence; and (3) the defenses presented by his three codefendants were antagonistic to his defense. We address each contention below. c. Statements of codefendants Huber and Hubbard Defendant first argues that severance was required because the joint trial resulted in the introduction into evidence of out-of-court statements by codefendants Huber and Hubbard that implicated defendant, in violation of defendant’s rights under Aranda and Bruton. Consideration of defendant’s claim requires that we review the governing law in some detail. A criminal defendant has a right, guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to confront adverse witnesses. The right to confrontation includes the right to cross-examination. (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065].) A problem arises when a codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant is introduced into evidence at their joint trial. If the declarant codefendant invokes the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declines to testify, the implicated defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant codefendant regarding the content of the confession. In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 127-128, 135-137.) The high court reasoned that although juries ordinarily can and will follow a judge’s instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence, “there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” (Id. at p. 135.) Such a context is presented when “the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.” (Id. at pp. 135-136.) Three years before Bruton, we had come to a similar conclusion on state law grounds, but we also concluded that the codefendant’s confession may be introduced at the joint trial if it can be edited to eliminate references to the defendant without prejudice to the confessing codefendant. (Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 530-531.) If not, and the prosecution insists on introducing the confession, the trial court must sever the trials. (Ibid.) The high court limited the scope of the Bruton rule in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 [95 L.Ed.2d 176, 107 S.Ct. 1702] (Richardson). There, defendant Marsh was jointly tried with one Williams for murder. Williams’s confession was introduced into evidence, but it was edited to remove any reference to Marsh. The high court held that admission of Williams’s confession with a limiting instruction did not violate Marsh’s confrontation rights. The court explained that Bruton recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions, and this narrow exception should not apply to confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but become so only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial. (Richardson, supra, at pp. 206-207.) That is because, “[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence.” (Id. at p. 208.) Accordingly, the high court held, “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when ... the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” (Id. at p. 211, italics added.) In People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187], we addressed a question expressly left open in Richardson: whether the admission into evidence of a codefendant’s confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced with a blank space, the word “delete,” a symbol, or a neutral pronoun