People v. Brown (8 Cal. 4th 746, 1994)

Opinion

GEORGE, J.

—Historically, under the common law fresh-complaint doctrine, evidence that the alleged victim of a sexual offense disclosed or reported the incident to another person shortly after its occurrence has been held admissible, as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, in a subsequent criminal prosecution for that offense. In California, the governing decisions have explained that the victim’s extrajudicial “complaint” is admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose—namely, simply to establish that such a complaint was made—in order to forestall the trier of fact from inferring erroneously that no complaint was made, and from further concluding, as a result of that mistaken inference, that the victim in fact had not been sexually assaulted. (See, e.g., People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 351 [11 Cal.Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433].)

In the case before us, defendant, initially asserting that the fresh-complaint doctrine is based upon false, outdated assumptions and misconceptions relating to the reactions of victims of sexual offenses, urges us to abolish this common law rule traditionally applicable in sexual offense cases. Defendant further contends that, even if the fresh-complaint doctrine remains viable, evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statements in the present case was not properly admissible under that doctrine, because the victim, a 12-year-old girl, did not voice the complaint promptly, and, when she ultimately did report the incidents, made the complaint only in response to questioning by an adult friend.

In recent years, the continuing validity of the fresh-complaint doctrine has been questioned by a number of legal scholars and commentators. As recognized by courts in other jurisdictions, the validity of one of the historic premises of the doctrine—that it is natural for the victim of a sexual offense promptly to disclose the incident if it actually occurred—has been eroded substantially in contemporary times by numerous empirical studies. Upon reexamining its theoretical underpinnings, we conclude that the fresh-complaint doctrine, as traditionally defined, no longer provides a sound basis for the admission of evidence of extrajudicial statements made by the victim of a sexual offense in reporting the alleged crime.

At the same time, however, we conclude that—setting aside the outdated notions upon which the doctrine traditionally has rested—the limited, non-hearsay evidence that in the past has been admitted under the fresh-complaint doctrine nonetheless is, in most instances, properly admissible at trial under generally applicable evidentiary standards.

Accordingly, we conclude that the formulation and parameters of the fresh-complaint doctrine, as applied in this state, should be revised to reflect a more accurate understanding of the proper basis for the admission of such evidence. As we shall explain, we conclude that, under principles generally applicable to the determination of evidentiary relevance and admissibility, proof of an extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a sexual offense, disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose—namely, to establish the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure of the assault to others—whenever the fact that the disclosure was made and the circumstances under which it was made are relevant to the trier of fact’s determination as to whether the offense occurred. Under such generally applicable evidentiary rules, the timing of a complaint (e.g., whether it was made promptly after the incident or, rather, at a later date) and the circumstances under which it was made (e.g., whether it was volunteered spontaneously or, instead, was made only in response to the inquiry of another person) are not necessarily determinative of the admissibility of evidence of the complaint. Thus, the “freshness” of a complaint, and the “volunteered” nature of the complaint, should not be viewed as essential prerequisites to the admissibility of such evidence.

Therefore, in the present case, we conclude the trial court properly admitted evidence of the victim’s complaint, which was narrowly limited to the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding, her disclosure of the alleged sexual molestation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the conviction.

I

The minor, Audrey S., was bom on January 19, 1978. Her mother, Martina S., met defendant Ricky Lee Brown in 1984 and became intimately involved with him. From August 1984 through May 1990, Martina and Audrey resided with defendant, changing residences on numerous occasions. Throughout this period, Martina was employed outside the home and defendant, who received disability payments, remained at home.

At trial, Audrey testified that one night in 1985, when Martina was absent and Audrey was alone with defendant in a bedroom, he pulled her by the hand toward the bed and told her to undress. He then undressed and attempted to place his penis inside her vagina but was unable to do so. When Martina returned, Audrey did not mention the incident, because she was frightened. From 1985 through 1986, approximately six or seven similar incidents occurred, during which defendant attempted sexual intercourse and placed his mouth upon Audrey’s vagina.

From November 1986 through June 1987, Martina, Audrey, and Martina’s newly bom daughter, Angelina, resided with defendant at another residence. According to Audrey’s testimony, the incidents of molestation continued. In June 1987, and again in May 1988, the family changed residences, during which period Martina’s third daughter, Amanda, was bom. Additional incidents of molestation occurred. Audrey testified that, when she was alone with defendant, he frequently placed his penis and his finger inside her vagina and placed his mouth upon her vagina. Defendant told Audrey she never should disclose these incidents, because people would think poorly of her.

In August 1989, the family again moved to another apartment, where they resided until May 1990. During this period, Audrey attended the sixth grade of the local elementary school. On approximately six or seven occasions, when Audrey returned home from school, defendant placed his penis and his finger inside her vagina, placed his mouth upon her vagina, and asked her to touch his penis.

In May 1990, Martina and Audrey moved to another apartment and no longer resided with defendant. Audrey testified that, approximately one month before her sixth grade graduation, which took place in June 1990, she told her best friend, Maria Maisonet, about the incidents of molestation because she “was scared and wanted to tell somebody."

Audrey spent the summer of 1990 with Diana Russell and Diana’s husband, Fernando Russell, with whom Martina had had a prior relationship and whom Audrey considered her adoptive father. Audrey testified that Diana Russell was the first adult whom she told about “this,” referring to the molestation. Defense counsel objected to this testimony and, outside the presence of the jury, argued that the testimony concerning the victim’s extrajudicial statements was not admissible under the fresh-complaint doctrine, because Audrey did not complain immediately following the last incident of molestation. The prosecutor responded that Audrey’s testimony was not being offered as a fresh complaint but simply for the purpose of “establishing when this witness finally decided to tell someone in authority so that the molest allegation could be finally gotten to law enforcement. ... If I’m not allowed to ask this witness who she finally disclosed to, it’s going to be a huge mystery to the jury how we’re sitting here today other than that she told her friend and told her friend not to tell anybody.” The trial court overruled the defense objection to the admission of this evidence.

Thereafter, in the presence of the jury, on direct examination, Audrey testified that the first adult in whom she confided regarding the alleged molestation was her “stepmom,” Diana Russell. The following colloquy took place between the prosecutor and Audrey: “[Prosecutor:] How soon was it after you told Martha (verbatim)[] you told Diana Russell? . . . [