Edwards v. Edwards (162 Cal. App. 4th 136, 2008)

Opinion

KLEIN, P. J.

Oscar L. Edwards (Oscar) appeals a postjudgment order denying his motion to terminate child support or to reduce it to zero based on a change of circumstances. In response to Oscar’s motion, the trial court reduced child support for his adult son, Oscar Jr., from $700 per month to $432 per month, pursuant to the statewide uniform guideline for determining child support. (Earn. Code, § 4055.)

The essential issue presented is the applicability of the statutory support guideline to a competent adult child who has moved away to college.

We conclude that in these circumstances, where neither parent retains “primary physical responsibility” (§ 4055, subd. (b)(1)(D)) for the adult child for any percentage of time, the guideline formula, by its terms, is inapplicable. Stated another way, application of the guideline formula “would be unjust or inappropriate” under the particular circumstances of this case. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(5).) Therefore, the order is reversed with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Oscar and his former spouse, Sharon R. Edwards (Sharon) were married in 1982, had a son in 1984, and were separated in 1986.

1. The provisions for extended child support and educational support.

In 1990, Oscar and Sharon entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA included a provision for extended child support beyond the age of majority, stating: “Subject to the power of the court to modify the same, [Oscar] shall pay to [Sharon], as and for child support, the sum of $200 per month, payable on the 10th day of each month, said payments began on . . . March 15, 1990, and shall continue for the Minor Child until further order of this court or until he marries, dies, becomes self-supporting, emancipated,[] reaches the age of 25, or completes 4 years of post-secondary education, whichever occurs first.” (Italics added.)

In addition to the provision for extended child support, the MSA contained a provision for Oscar Jr.’s educational support. In that regard, the MSA provided: “[i\n addition, during the term of the support obligation for Minor Child, the parties shall equally share in the entire cost of books, tuition, incidental fees, living expenses for the Minor Child if he attends an accredited college, university, or private school. Such obligation shall end for the Minor Child either upon completion of four years of post-secondary schooling or at age 25, whichever comes first.” (Italics added.)

2. The stipulated judgment and subsequent proceedings.

On August 7, 1990, in accordance with the terms of the MSA, the trial court entered a stipulated judgment of dissolution. At that time, the judgment required Oscar to pay Sharon $200 per month in child support.

In 1991, at Sharon’s request, the county became involved in enforcing Oscar’s child support obligations.

In 1998, Oscar, Sharon and the district attorney entered into a stipulated order setting child support at $400 per month.

In 1999, following a contested hearing, the trial court issued an order increasing Oscar’s child support obligation to $700 per month.

3. Oscar’s motions to terminate and to modify child support.

On June 12, 2003, Oscar filed another motion to terminate child support on the ground support terminated by operation of law when the minor child turned 18 and graduated from high school.

On November 14, 2003, the trial court denied the motion to terminate child support. The trial court ruled there had been no change in the terms of the support order to terminate support prior to age 25.

On December 30, 2003, Oscar filed another motion to modify the existing child support order of $700 per month based on a change of circumstances. Oscar requested either a termination of child support or an order reducing it to zero until such time as circumstances warranted otherwise. Oscar indicated his annual income had declined since 1999 from $87,552 to $38,304, he has two minor children with his current spouse, Oscar Jr. was no longer in the custody of either parent and was attending a state university in Northern California on a full financial aid package.

On January 13, 2004, Oscar filed notice of appeal from the trial court’s November 14, 2003 order denying his motion to terminate support.

The trial court continued the hearing on Oscar’s motion to modify child support pending the determination of the appeal from the denial of Oscar’s motion to terminate support.

On November 22, 2005, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Oscar’s motion to terminate child support, ruling that “Oscar, having stipulated in the first instance to pay child support to age 25, is estopped to challenge the validity of the 1990 judgment in that regard.” We concluded Oscar’s “remedy is to seek a modification of support based on an alleged change of circumstances, a remedy which he apparently is pursuing.” (Edwards, supra, B172917, italics omitted.)

On March 16, 2006, the trial court held the long-delayed hearing on Oscar’s motion to modify child support. The trial court applied the statutory guideline formula for calculating child support (§ 4055) and determined that child support would be modified from $700 to $432 per month, commencing January 1, 2004. With respect to the issue of time-sharing responsibility, the trial court assigned zero percent to Oscar and 100 percent to Sharon, even though neither parent had custody of Oscar Jr., an adult who had moved away to college.

On May 11, 2006, Oscar filed notice of appeal from the order modifying child support to $432 per month.

On June 15, 2006, the trial court issued its intended statement of decision. On June 26, 2006, Oscar objected to the statement of decision as untimely. On July 14, 2006, having reviewed Oscar’s objections, the trial court filed its statement of decision.

CONTENTIONS

Oscar contends: the trial court abused its discretion in failing to vary from the presumptively correct formula support amount in light of substantial evidence of rebuttal factors that the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in this case; even assuming the guideline applies, the trial court erred in applying the time-sharing component and in using outdated financial information; the trial court abused its discretion in improperly imputing 100 percent of the time Oscar Jr. was in college to Sharon; the trial court failed to consider whether the child support payable to Sharon should be terminated because Oscar Jr. had become self-supporting; and the order must be reversed because the trial court failed to render a timely statement of decision.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of appellate review.

“ ‘ “[T]he trial court’s determination to grant or deny a modification of a support order will ordinarily be upheld on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” [Citation.] Reversal will be ordered only if prejudicial error is found after examining the record of the proceedings below. [Citation.] However, questions relating to the interpretation of statutes are matters of law for the reviewing court. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-1151 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 466] (Drake).)

To the extent Oscar challenges the trial court’s factual findings, our review follows established principles concerning the existence of substantial evidence in support of the findings. On review for substantial evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. (Drake, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)

2. Trial court erred in determining child support pursuant to the guideline formula because neither parent retains physical responsibility for Oscar Jr., rendering the guideline inapplicable.

a. Statutory scheme.

Section 4055, subdivision (a), provides: “(a) The statewide uniform guideline for determining child support orders is as follows: CS = K (HN - (H%) (TN)).”

Section 4057 provides: “(a) The amount of child support established by the formula provided in subdivision (a) of Section 4055 is presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be ordered. ['][] (b) The presumption of subdivision (a) is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by admissible evidence showing that application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case, consistent with the principles set forth in Section 4053, because one or more of the following factors is found to be applicable by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court states in writing or on the record the information required in subdivision (a) of Section 4056: F0 (1) The parties have stipulated to a different amount of child support under subdivision (a) of Section 4065. [f] (2) . . . [f] (3) The parent being ordered to pay child support has an extraordinarily high income and the amount determined under the formula would exceed the needs of the children, [f] (4) A party is not contributing to the needs of the children at a level commensurate with that party’s custodial time. [