Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (224 Cal. App. 4th 665, 2014)

Opinion

AARON, J.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Shelley Brown was injured in a bicycle accident involving her riding partner, Ronald Voigt. Voigt was riding in front of Brown when the front fork on Voigt’s bicycle failed. Voigt fell and caused Brown, who was unable to avoid Voigt, to crash as well. Brown sued the designer and distributor of the bicycle fork, American Bicycle Group, LLC (ABG), among others. A jury returned a verdict in favor of ABG. The trial court denied Brown’s motion for new trial, and Brown filed this appeal.

In the published portions of this opinion, we consider Brown’s contentions that the trial judge erred in failing to disclose his “significant financial ties with the insurance industry,” and that her due process right to an impartial judge was violated. We conclude that the trial judge was not required to disclose his ownership interests in various insurance-related companies, since none of those- companies was a party to this case or a carrier of ABG’s. We further conclude that there was no violation of Brown’s due process right to an impartial judge.

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we consider Brown’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error in denying three of her in limine motions to exclude various items of evidence at trial. We conclude that Brown’s motions in limine were not sufficient to preserve her evidentiary objections, and that Brown has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s rulings. We also conclude that Brown’s claims as to two of the three in limine motions fail because the record on appeal does not establish that any of the evidence at issue in the in limine motions was offered at trial. As to the third in limine motion, we reject Brown’s claim on the merits and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

In another unpublished portion of this opinion, we consider Brown’s contention that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial. However, Brown does not present any argument for reversing the trial court’s order denying the motion, apart from attempting to improperly incorporate her trial court pleadings into her briefing on appeal. Since it is well established both that documents filed in the trial court may not be incorporated by reference into an appellate brief, and that this court need not consider such improperly incorporated arguments, we deem this contention forfeited.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and the trial court’s order denying Brown’s motion for new trial.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brown suffered multiple injuries in the bicycle accident described in part I., ante.

In December 2011, Brown filed a first amended complaint against ABG, among others. Brown alleged that the front fork on Voigt’s bicycle was defective and that ABG had designed and distributed the fork. Brown brought claims against ABG for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.

Prior to the trial, Brown filed in limine motions to exclude evidence pertaining to Voigt’s alleged negligent maintenance of the bicycle, the lack of similar accidents involving the bicycle fork, and expert testimony to the effect that a foreign object may have struck Voigt’s bicycle fork. The trial court denied Brown’s motions.

In October 2012, a jury returned a special verdict in favor of ABG. The jury found that the bicycle fork in question contained a manufacturing defect, but that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing Brown to suffer harm. The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of AJBG pursuant to the jury’s special verdict.

In November 2012, Brown filed a motion for new trial. The following month, the trial court entered an order denying the motion.

Brown timely appealed from the judgment.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The trial judge was not required to disclose his ownership interests in various companies

Brown contends that the trial judge erred in not disclosing his ownership interests in various companies, and that she would have filed a peremptory challenge to the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 if the judge had made the disclosures. Brown’s theory appears to be that the trial judge’s ownership interests in companies related to the insurance industry evinces a bias on the judge’s part in favor of ABG because ABG was insured, and any potential judgment against ABG would be paid by an insurance company. Brown also contends that the trial judge violated her right to due process by failing to disqualify himself from presiding over the case, in light of his bias.

1. Procedural background

In her motion for new trial, Brown contended that the trial court displayed prejudice toward her and her counsel throughout the trial proceedings. In support of this contention, Brown cited numerous rulings that she contended were legally erroneous. Brown also claimed that the trial judge had been “smiling and looking over to [ABG’s] counsel during his favorable defense rulings,” and that the trial judge “snarled at [Brown’s] counsel” when her counsel attempted to provide the trial judge with a list of anticipated witnesses before court one morning during the trial.

In support of her motion for new trial, Brown lodged numerous exhibits, including copies of the trial judge’s Fair Political Practices Commission’s Statement of Economic Interests for the year 2011. On the disclosure forms, the trial judge indicated the fair market value of his ownership interests in numerous companies, including the following:

1. Berkshire Hathaway $100,001 - $1,000,000

2. RLI Corporation • $10,001 - $100,000

3. State Street Corporation $10,001 - $100,000

4. Leucadia National Corporation $10,001 - $100,000

Brown made no argument concerning the relevance of these disclosure forms in her briefing in support of her motion for new trial.

2. Governing law

a. Grounds for the disqualification of a trial judge

Section 170.1 specifies the grounds on .which a trial judge may be disqualified from a case for cause. The statute provides in relevant part:

“(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: [