Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (237 Cal. App. 4th 812, 2015)

Opinion

RICHMAN, J. —

Pursuant to its statutory authority to adopt “rules of practice and procedure” (Pub. Util. Code, § 1701, subd. (a)), the Public Utilities Commission (PUC or Commission) promulgated rule 1.1, which provides in pertinent part: “Any person who . . . transacts business with the Commission . . . agrees . . . never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, § 1.1 (Rule 1.1).)

In the aftermath of a massive 2010 explosion of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), the PUC imposed a series of reforms to be instituted by PG&E. One of those reforms was that PG&E improve its recordkeeping and information technology capabilities. PG&E was directed to keep the PUC informed of any reported pipeline leaks and any discovered information regarding the safety of continuing pipeline operations. Thereafter, following discovery of a pipeline leak, PG&E also discovered that some information it had provided to the PUC concerning the internal pressure at which certain pipelines could be safely operated might not be correct. Approximately seven months after discovery of this mistake was internally verified by PG&E, it was communicated to the PUC via a written “Errata” to a previous filing. Following extensive hearings, the PUC deemed this filing both a substantive and a procedural violation of Rule 1.1, which the Commission determined had the effect of misleading the Commission. For this dual violation of Rule 1.1, the Commission imposed civil penalties totaling $14.35 million.

We granted PG&E’s petition for a writ of review to consider (1) whether the penalties were validly imposed in the belief that Rule 1.1 does not invariably demand a scienter requirement; (2) whether the Commission correctly treated PG&E’s act and omission as “continuing” violations; (3) whether the PUC’s order to show cause provided sufficient notice of the grounds for which PG&E might be penalized; and (4) whether the penalties authorized by sections 2107 and 2108 are constitutionally excessive. With appropriate consideration for the unique powers of the PUC, we conclude that none of PG&E’s contentions has merit. We therefore affirm the decisions of the PUC imposing the penalties and denying PG&E’s request for rehearing.

BACKGROUND

The Nature, Duties, and Powers of the PUC

Our Supreme Court has described the PUC as “a state agency of constitutional origin with far-reaching duties, functions and powers. (Cal. Const., art. XII, §§ 1-6.) The Constitution confers broad authority on the commission to regulate utilities, including the power to fix rates, establish rules, hold various types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own procedures. (Id., §§ 2, 4, 6.) The commission’s powers, however, are not restricted to those expressly mentioned in the Constitution: ‘The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution but consistent with this article, to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the commission . . . .’ (Cal. Const., art. XII, § 5.)

“Pursuant to this grant of power the Legislature enacted Public Utilities Code section 701, conferring on the commission expansive authority to ‘do all things, whether specifically designated in [the Public Utilities Act] or addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient’ in the supervision and regulation of every public utility in California. (Italics added.) The commission’s authority has been liberally construed.” (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 905 [160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41].) That authority amounts to “comprehensive jurisdiction over questions of public health and safety arising from utility operations,” and “includes not only administrative but also legislative and judicial powers.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 924, 915 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724, 920 P.2d 669].)

The Legislature has also provided the PUC with extensive enforcement powers, including the imposition of monetary civil penalties: “Any public utility that violates or fails to comply with any provision of the Constitution of this state or of this part, or that fails or neglects to comply with any part or provision of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission, in a case in which a penalty has not otherwise been provided, is subject to a penalty of not less than five hundred dollars ($500), nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for each offense.” (§ 2107.) “In determining the amount of such penalty, ... the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business charged, the gravity of the violation, and the good faith of the person charged . . . shall be considered.” (§ 2104.5.) “Every violation ... is a separate and distinct offense, and in case of a continuing violation each day’s continuance thereof shall be a separate and distinct offense.” (§ 2108.)

Among the Commission’s duties is administering the regulatory authority over the intrastate “production, generation, transmission, delivery, underground storage, or furnishing of gas, natural or manufactured, except propane, for light, heat, or power.” (§ 221; see §§ 216, 222, 328.2, 2771-2775.6.) It is also authorized to exercise a measure of federal interstate power under the Pipeline Safety Act. (49 U.S.C. §§ 60104(c), 60105(b)(2), 60106(b); Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 872, 878 [“a state authority may enter into a pipeline safety agreement with the DOT [Department of Transportation], through which the DOT authorizes the state authority to participate in the oversight of interstate pipeline facilities”].) “The Commission in this capacity applies the federal pipeline safety regulations contained in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192, et seq. The Commission adopted General Order (GO) 112-C in 1971, which adopted in their entirety the federal pipeline safety rules in 49 C.F.R Part 192, also adopted in 1971.” (Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission’s own Motion into the Operations and Practices of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Jan. 12, 2012) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 1.12-01-007 [2012 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 39, p. *13] (Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 1.12-01-007).)

The San Bruno Pipeline Explosion

This proceeding traces back to what is commonly known as the San Bruno pipeline explosion, the salient details of which were described in a PUC report as follows:

“On September 9, 2010, at approximately 6:11 pm, a 30-inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline owned and operated by PG&E ruptured in San Bruno, California. Gas escaping from the rupture ignited resulting in the loss of eight lives, injuries to 58 people, destruction of 38 homes, moderate to severe damage to 17 homes and minor damage to 53 homes.

“The section of pipeline involved was Segment 180, .. . located at the intersection of Earl Avenue and Glenview Drive .... [¶] ... [¶] Energy released from the rupture created a crater about 72 feet long by 26 feet wide. A 28-foot long section of pipe weighing approximately 3,000 pounds was ejected from the crater and landed approximately 100 feet from the crater in the middle of Glenview Drive.” (Incident Investigation Rep.: September 9, 2010 PG&E Pipeline Rupture in San Bruno, Cal. (Cal.P.U.C., Jan. 12, 2012) pp. 7-8 (Investigation Report).)

“During the 50 hours following the incident, about 600 firefighting (including emergency medical service) personnel and 325 law enforcement personnel responded. Fire crews and police officers conducted evacuations and door-to-door searches of houses throughout the response. In total, about 300 homes were evacuated.” (Investigation Rep., supra, at p. 13.) “The rupture released about 47.6 million standard cubic feet of natural gas.” (Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into the Operations and Practices of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Feb. 24, 2011) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 1.11-02-016 [2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 69, p. *51] (Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 1.11-02-016).)

At the time of the explosion, the pipeline had been authorized to maintain a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 400 psig, but it had an effective MAOP of 375 psig. (Investigation Rep., supra, at pp. 7, 22.) Four days after the explosion, the Commission’s executive director directed PG&E to reduce the operating pressure of the affected pipeline by 20 percent “until such time as the Commission allows PG&E to return to . . . normal operating pressure,” and also to “Conduct an accelerated leak survey of all transmission lines in PG&E’s service territory . . . and take corrective action as required and report the results ... on or before October 12, 2010.” (Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. L-403 (Sept. 23, 2010) p. 3.) And the PUC issued a press release that it would direct PG&E to “Report immediately . . . and provide specific data on all leak reports.” (Cal. Pub. Util. Com., Press Release, CPUC Orders PG&E to Take Specific Action Related to San Bruno Explosion, Including Inspection of Natural Gas System (Sept. 12, 2010) online at [as of June 16, 2015].)

The PUC Begins to Investigate

Two weeks after the explosion, on September 23, 2010, the Commission ordered an investigation into the causes of “[t]he San Bruno explosion,” which “may be the largest transmission pipeline explosion in an urban/suburban setting in U.S. history, certainly the most catastrophic in California history.” (Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. L-403, supra, at p. 2.) The Commission adopted certain “mandates” to PG&E ordered by the Commission’s executive director, thus ratifying the 20 percent reduction of pipeline operating pressure, and reiterating that PG&E had to, among other things: “7) Preserve all records related to the incident, including work at the Milpitas Terminal during the month of September 2010; [¶] 8) Preserve all records related to the maintenance or modification of Line 132 by PG&E and/or its contractors performed within the City of San Bruno over the past ten (10) years; [and] [¶] 9) Review the classification of natural gas transmission lines and determine if the classification has changed since the initial designation and report the results to the Executive Director . . . .” (Id. at pp. 3-4.)

After conducting an extensive investigation into the pipeline explosion, the Commission’s consumer protection and safety division concluded: “[T]he San Bruno incident was caused by a combination of multiple contributing factors: [¶] 1. PG&E’s failure to follow accepted industry practices when it constructed Segment 180 in 1956; [¶] 2. PG&E’s failure to comply with the integrity management requirements; [¶] 3. PG&E’s inadequate record keeping practices; [¶] 4. Deficiencies in PG&E’s SCADA system and inadequate procedures related to the work at the Milpitas Terminal and PG&E’s failure to comply with its own procedures; [¶] 5. PG&E’s deficient emergency response . . . after the incident; and [¶] 6. PG&E’s corporate culture emphasizing profits over safety.” (Investigation Rep., supra, at p. 3.) Some of the supporting details were as follows:

“In 1956, when PG&E constructed the section of pipe that failed in San Bruno, it did not follow accepted good industry practice existing at the time. PG&E’s failure to identify deficiencies in pipe manufacturing through inspection and testing at the time of constmction resulted in the installation of defective pipe in the ground.” (Investigation Rep., supra, at p. 15.) “PG&E was unable to produce records demonstrating that a strength test was performed on Segment 180 at the conclusion of its construction, and before the Segment was placed in operation.” (Id. at p. 22.)

“The investigation found that PG&E did not comply with certain integrity management requirements in the federal pipeline safety regulations. Significant deficiencies were found in data gathering and integration, threat identification, risk assessment and assessment.” (Investigation Rep., supra, at p. 25.)

“The investigation found that, at the time of the incident, PG&E transmission pipeline records were not accurate, complete, or verifiable. PG&E’s records showed inaccurate information for Segment 180 .. . and PG&E could not identify the manufacturer of Segment 180 or locate its as-built drawings, alignment sheets, specifications and other design, material, construction, inspection, and testing records. . . . [¶] PG&E failed to follow the record keeping standards . . . which were applicable at the time Segment 180 was constructed and, in turn, violated the Public Utilities Code, Section 451 by operating its system unsafely by lacking accurate and locatable records essential for safe pipeline operation.” (Investigation Rep., supra, at p. 62.) “PG&E’s transfer of data from hard copies to electronic format was not performed adequately. Some data was not transferred accurately or was completely missed due to human error or varying software versions and file format incompatibilities.” (Id. at p. 64.)

In February 2011, the PUC, noting that the NTSB had already publicly expressed “concern about the safety implications of the PG&E record-keeping deficiencies the NTSB [had] uncovered in the San Bruno investigation,” decided to commence an expansive investigation of PG&E’s record-keeping practices, not limited to the immediate time before the explosion-— indeed, not limited to the San Bruno pipeline. (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 1.11-02-016, supra, 2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 69 at p. *12].) PG&E was warned that “The Commission is prepared to impose very significant fines [and statutory penalties pursuant to Section 2107] if the evidence adduced at the hearing establishes that PG&E’s recordkeeping policies and practices contributed to the loss of life and injuries that occurred at San Bruno.” (Id. at pp. *21 — *22].) “PG&E is therefore directed to . . . provide a report ... to identify all reasons of law and fact currently known to PG&E to establish that the company has committed no violation of law with respect to its record-keeping of data needed and appropriate for safety engineering.” (Id. at pp. *27-*28; see id. at pp. *35-*36.)

In September 2011, the PUC denied PG&E’s “motion ... to delegate authority to the Executive Director to approve requests to lift operating pressure limitations,” but “instead adopt[ed] an expedited hearing process for Commission consideration of such requests.” (Cal.P.U.C. Proposed Dec. No. 11-09-006, supra, at p. 1.) The Commission reasoned that “the process proposed by PG&E is inadequate to discharge our Constitutional and statutory duties. The public interest in PG&E’s natural gas operations is intense. Restoring MAOP in PG&E’s transmission pipelines has significant implications for public safety. The public deserves to be informed about PG&E’s proposed MAOP restoration and to have an opportunity to assess PG&E’s evidence in support of the request. Moreover, PG&E’s proposed delegation, particularly in light of the unspecified supporting analysis, goes well beyond the scope of ministerial matters for which the Commission may properly delegate its authority. The Commission ordered the operating pressure reductions . . . and the Commission should consider whether these ordered reductions should be lifted.” (Id. at p. 7.) And, PG&E was cautioned, it “must be fully accountable for the pressure test and the assertion that the line can be safely operated at the restored MAOP.” (Id. at p. 11.)

In December 2011, after PG&E had conducted the pressure test, the PUC authorized PG&E “to operate Lines 101, 132A, and 147 at a pressure no higher than 365 pounds per square inch gauge.” (Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion (Dec. 15, 2011) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 11-12-048 [2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 570, p. *1 (Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 11-12-048).) Doing so, the Commission made two findings of fact that are significant:'

“PG&E’s Vice President of Gas Transmission, Maintenance, and Construction, verified that PG&E has validated the engineering and construction of, and performed pressure tests in accordance with 49 CFR 192 Subpart J or the pressure test requirements then in effect, on all segments of Lines 101, 132A, and 147 that will be operating at or above 20% of specified minimum yield strength [(see fn. 2, ante)], and concluded that these pipelines could be safely operated at the increased maximum operating pressure of 365 psig.

“. . . CPSD [(the Commission’s consumer protection and safety division)] reviewed PG&E’s supporting information and concluded that the information presented was adequate to support the conclusion that pressure on the lines could be safely increased to 365 psig.” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 11-12-048, supra, 2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 570 at p. *13.)

Again, PG&E was cautioned that it “must be fully accountable for . . . the assertion that the line can be safe[l]y operated at the [restored MAOP].” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 11-12-048, supra, 2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 570 at pp. *8-*9.)

Meanwhile, the previous month, November 2011, the PUC — noting that “PG&E appears to have failed to comply with federal regulations concerning the protection of persons and property in areas with higher concentrations of human occupancy and activity” — formally opened an investigation into the San Bruno explosion. (Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion (Nov. 10, 2011) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 1.11-11-009 [2011 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 506, pp. *8~*9].) It began on January 12, 2012, when the PUC commenced a new, separate, and wide-ranging investigation: “This investigation will not be solely limited to the events that took place on September 9, 2010, but shall include all past operations, practices, and other events or courses of conduct that could have led to or contributed to the San Bruno explosion and fire. We will specifically consider what monetary fines and other remedies are appropriate to ensure that a catastrophe of this type does not occur again.” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 1.12-01-007, supra, 2012 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 39 at p. *4.)

In its petition, PG&E provides its explanation of what happened next:

“On October 18, 2012, a PG&E employee discovered that a portion of the pipe on Line 147 appeared to be of a different specification than that described in PG&E reports. Whereas the records indicated that the particular portion of the pipeline was of a type known as a ‘Double Submerged Arc Weld,’ the employee believed based on his visual field inspection that the pipe was instead of a type known as ‘A.O. Smith.’ The employee shared the apparent discrepancy with others at PG&E for further investigation and confirmation. Over the next several months, PG&E employees confirmed the Line 147 included ‘A.O. Smith’ pipe.

“PG&E employees determined, based on the newly-discovered specification information, that the proper MAOP of Line 147 should be 330 psig rather than 365 psig. However, . . . Line 147 was already operating at a reduced pressure of 330 psig or less, no further reduction in operating pressure was necessary ....

“Over the next several months, PG&E investigated how some of the Line 147 pipe had been incorrectly identified in the records, reviewed all other specifications, re-reviewed the information obtained from construction activities on the entire Line 147, performed field examinations on the pipe, performed what is known as ‘destructive testing’ on a portion of the pipe, and reviewed the records pertaining to the other pipelines affected by the Commission’s [Decision] 11-02-048.

“Over the same period, PG&E employees found that certain federal pipeline regulations had been incorrectly applied to a portion of Line 101, another pipeline whose pressure had been restored by D.ll-02-048. Whereas PG&E had previously relied on tests conducted in 1989 to determine the MAOP for that pipeline, employees concluded that under the regulations an earlier test conducted prior to 1974 should have been used for this purpose.

“PG&E employees determined, based on the change in regulatory classification, that the proper MAOP of that portion of Line 101 should be 330 psig rather than 365 psig. However, . . . [as] Line 101 was already operating at a reduced pressure of 330 psig or less, no further reduction in operating pressure was necessary ....

“On February 22, 2013, PG&E contacted the Commission’s staff to arrange a meeting or teleconference to [report] these findings. A teleconference was held on March 20, 2013, during which PG&E employees discussed with the Commission’s staff the corrected information relating to Lines 101 and 147. In response to requests by Commission staff during that teleconference, on May 2 and May 8, 2013, PG&E provided the staff with validation reports and other materials concerning Lines 101 and 147, and further advised that PG&E was continuing its review of records relating to these and other lines.”

PG&E Files the Errata and the PUC Response

On July 3, 2013, PG&E submitted for filing a document entitled “Errata to Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s Supporting Information for Lifting Operating Pressure Restrictions on Lines 101 and 147” (Errata). The document represented to the Commission that “After receiving Decision 11-02-048, PG&E identified errors in some of the supporting information for Lines 147 and 101. [¶] The errors do not raise a safety issue, as each affected segment has been successfully hydro tested to a pressure that supports the MAOP. However, after correcting these errors the affected segments will have a lower MAOP than approved in Decision 11-02-048. Both segments are currently operating below the new, lower MAOP.” The Errata concluded with this: “[T]he operating pressure of Line 101 has been limited to 300 psig since April 2013 and PG&E is revising the MAOP of this segment of Line 101 from 365 psig to 330 psig .... In addition to revising the MAOP of this segment, PG&E has accelerated plans to replace it. PG&E is currently planning to replace the affected portion of Line 101 in 2014-2015.”

PUC staff refused to accept this document for filing. On August 19, the PUC issued an order for PG&E to show cause (OSC) why it should not be sanctioned for violating Rule 1.1. The OSC recited that the Errata was “rejected ... as untimely to the extent that it sought to make a substantive change to issues” previously resolved by the Commission. And under the heading “Issues Revealed in PG&E’s July Document,” the OSC read as follows:

“PG&E’s July document raises procedural and substantive issues. Procedurally, parties are not allowed to file pleadings for the purpose of correcting minor typographical or computational errors in previously filed applications. Parties are allowed to file pleadings for the purpose of making substantive changes to a previously filed application, and such filing triggers the opportunity for other parties to file a responsive pleading (unless limited or prohibited . . .). Here, PG&E appears to be revealing a substantial error in an application upon which the Commission has relied in issuing a decision. Attempting to correct an application eighteen months after the Commission issued a decision appears to be an unreasonable procedural choice and could be interpreted as attempting to create an inaccurate impression of a routine correction. The timing of the attempted filing, the day before a summer holiday weekend, also raise questions.

“Substantively, as the record shows in this proceeding and others, the accuracy of PG&E’s natural gas transmission pipeline records has been and remains an extraordinarily controversial issue in which the public has an intense interest. The facts stated in PG&E’s July filing appear to directly implicate this issue, particularly the continuing inaccuracy of PG&E’s records and the happenstance means by which this most recent instance of erroneous records was discovered. Submitting this provocative information in a routine-appearing document could be seen as an attempt to mislead the Commission and the public on the significance of this new information.”

On August 30, 2013, PG&E filed a “Verified Statement” by M. Kirk Johnson, its vice-president for gas transmission, maintenance and construction, explaining how the “discrepancies” in Lines 101 and 147 were discovered and how PG&E responded.

The OSC Hearing

The OSC was the subject of a hearing held on September 6, 2013, before three PUC commissioners (Ferron, Florio, and Sandoval) and two administrative law judges (ALJ), including the chief judge. The sole witness was Joseph M. Malkin, PG&E’s lead counsel, who had practiced before the Commission for 28 years, the last three years of which were devoted exclusively to representing PG&E before the Commission. In addition to questioning by the Commissioners and ALJs, Lead Counsel was questioned by counsel for the City of San Bruno, the Commission’s safety and enforcement division (SED), and The Utility Reform Network (TURN). The gist of Lead Counsel’s testimony was that the Errata was filed on his responsibility, with no intent to mislead, but only to correct erroneous information previously provided to the PUC in good faith, in “a completely unique situation” that unquestionably had to be brought to the Commission’s attention. As for the matter of the timing of submission of the Errata for filing, Lead Counsel explained that the submission before the start of the long Fourth of July weekend was not done to escape attention, but was motivated by nothing other than his belief “we should file as quickly as we could once we had everything nailed down.” Directly asked by another attorney for PG&E “did you at any time in connection with the preparation, the titling, or the filing of the errata intend to mislead the Commission, the parties, or the public?,” Lead Counsel replied, “Absolutely not.”

Counsel for TURN asked “Can you tell us why this pleading [(i.e., the Errata)] does not include the fact that this discovery was made eight to nine months prior to the date of the pleading?” Lead Counsel answered, “For purposes of this pleading, which was to provide notice to the Commission and the parties that there were errors and how they were corrected, that seems to me like way too much information.” And responding to a question from a commissioner, Lead Counsel testified that PG&E was not “trying ... to sneak something below the radar.”

Thereafter the Commission received written submissions. PG&E filed “comments,” which for the first time raised the issue of whether a violation of Rule 1.1 required a mental state related to misleading the Commission, and arguing that PG&E had not “acted with any intent to mislead in connection with the submission of [the Errata],” or with recklessness or gross negligence. PG&E further argued that “[n]o evidence supports a Rule 1.1 violation based on the July 3rd service date.”

The City of San Bruno argued that the Errata “was submitted to the Commission as [a] mere artifice to mislead all parties in order to minimize PG&E’s responsibility for past and ongoing deficiencies in its records.” In its words; “PG&E obscured the significance of its Line 101 and 147 errors via the artifice of an ‘errata’ filing precisely because the circumstances surrounding the faulty records for and operation of Lines 101 and 147 are identical to those that precipitated the disaster in San Bruno. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars . . . PG&E’s records are still dead wrong. Those inaccuracies, along with the fact that PG&E tried to camouflage its ongoing problems with an obscure regulatory filing rather than be forthcoming ought to scare this Commission, Commission staff, and every customer in PG&E territory because PG&E’s behavior is still dangerous. [¶] . . . [¶] Not only does bad data for Lines 147 and 101 demonstrate that the Commission cannot trust PG&E’s records system, it also demonstrates that the Commission . . . cannot trust PG&E to uphold its Rule 1.1 obligations to be forthcoming, truthful and complete with its regulators.”

SED’s opening brief was uncompromising: PG&E misled the Commission. Specifically:

“PG&E’s misleading information permitted PG&E to unsafely raise its MAOP throughout the system, in violation of the Commission’s directives and standards. PG&E failed to timely and accurately inform the Commission of errors and incompleteness in its MAOP validation process violating Decision . . . 11-12-048. The decision lifted MAOP restrictions based on PG&E’s assurances that the MAOP validation process was subject to careful quality assurance procedures and had been completed.

“PG&E first learned of possible errors in its MAOP validation process on October 18, 2012 but failed to inform the Commission until July 3, 2013, more than eight months after PG&E . . . learned of these errors. When PG&E finally disclosed this information to the Commission, the utility further misled the Commission by attempting to de-emphasize and in effect hide errors in the validation process through an ‘Errata’ rather than a petition for modification of . . . [Decision] 11-02-016 for information concerning possible errors in PG&E’s MAOP validation process.

“SED contends that PG&E’s conduct in this proceeding regarding critical maximum pressure on segments in its transmission system warrants penalties for violations of Rule 1.1 because:

“PG&E knew as early as October 18, 2012, that errors and records insufficiencies existed in its Pipeline Features List used to validate maximum segment pressures;

“Rather than advising the Commission as a regulatory body in writing of these errors, PG&E first chose to communicate with a Commission staffer, who acted in an advisory capacity only. SED advocacy staff did not learn of PG&E’s contact with this individual until after the initiation of this Order to Show Cause;

“PG&E failed to provide this staffer with requested documents and information concerning the errors until the end of May 2013, and further misrepresented to the Commission in this OSC proceeding the contact’s reaction to the information provided by PG&E (no staff personnel has ratified or approved PG&E’s submissions);

“PG&E delayed notifying the Commission and parties of the potential errors in its MAOP validation process until July 3, 2013, some eight months after PG&E first recognized the potential error in its validation process;

“PG&E was aware of SED’s continuing data request concerning potential errors in PG&E’s MAOP Validation process but failed to notify SED; and

“Using an Errata to notify the Commission of errors in the pipeline features list used in PG&E’s critical MAOP Validation process — effectively disguising rather than clearly identifying the serious errors in its MAOP calculations.” (Fn. omitted.)

SED also scoffed at PG&E’s defense: “PG&E contends that using the term ‘errata’ is nothing more than ‘[lead] counsel’s good faith selection of a word that conveyed that the pleading was reporting errors . . . such as “an error in printing or writing.” ’ . . . SED strongly disagrees. The errors in PG&E’s PFL [(pipeline features list)], and the questions such errors pose for PG&E’s MAOP Validation process of the 2,088 segments that were reviewed, raise serious concerns regarding the safety of segments hydro tested blindly without sufficient knowledge . . . .” “Hydro tests performed at too high a pressure can result in failure or worse, a pinhole leak or crack that may expand in time causing a rupture. PG&E’s discovery of MAOP validation errors in its PFL should have been reported shortly after discovery .... [¶] . . . PG&E failed to provide the Commission with notice of errors in its PFL in a reasonable period of time after discovery. As a result, the Commission was led to believe that hydro tests on PG&E’s . . . [gas] lines had been performed in a safe manner, using accurate . . . data, when, in fact, the data was inaccurate leading to the possible over pressuring of lines during hydro tests.”

A crucial point of SED’s brief was that it treated each day of the eight months between October 18, 2012, and July 2, 2013 as part of a continuing violation. TURN made the same point in its brief: “PG&E should be required to pay the maximum $50,000 fine for each day of its Rule 1.1 violation. A continuing violation from October 24, 2012 to July 3, 2013, a total of 253 days, multiplied by the maximum $50,000 per violation yields a fine of $12,650,000.”

The assigned ALJ’s proposed decision concluded that PG&E “violated Rule 1.1 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure by not correcting promptly a material misstatement of fact in a pleading filed with the Commission and by mischaracterizing the correction when filed as a routine and non-substantive correction. PG&E is fined $6,750,000 for these violations.” The fine, which treated both violations as continuing and deserving of the maximum $50,000 per day, was calculated as follows: “We begin the tabulation at the day PG&E first became obligated to inform the parties of the error in its representations to the Commissions, March 20, 2013 [(the date PG&E ‘informed Commission staff of its error' and . . . correction of the pipeline features calculation’)], a delay of 105 days. We assess the maximum statutory fine of $50,000 per day for this continuing violation .... The resulting fine is $5,250,000. [¶] For submitting a misleadingly entitled document, $50,000 per day for 30 days it remained pending at the Commission, when PG&E could have retrieved and corrected it=$ 1,500.000.”

Commissioner Ferron submitted an alternate proposed decision. He disagreed with the assigned ALJ only in the manner he believed PG&E should be sanctioned. Commissioner Ferron would run the $50,000 per day penalty for not revealing the discovered information from November 16, 2012 (the date on which “senior management of PG&E” became aware of the situation), to August 30, 2013 (the date on which PG&E filed the verified statement of its vice-president of gas transmission, maintenance and construction). This was a total of 287 days, making the penalty for this violation $14,350,000. He would add a penalty for “submitting a misleadingly titled and factually incomplete document, $50,000 per day for the 58 days it remained uncorrected at the Commission=$2,900,000.”

The Full Commission Hearing

The matter was then considered by the full Commission (Commissioners Ferron, Florio, Peevey, Peterman, and Sandoval), which heard arguments at a public hearing on December 2, 2013. PG&E’s initial argument was made by Tony Earley, its chairman and CEO, to “underscore[] how seriously we take the issues at hand today.” According to him, “looking back from a safety standpoint, I think that our staff did all the right things. I found no action that constituted an intentional effort to mislead the Commission.” Earley was followed by Nick Stavropoulos, PG&E’s executive vice-president of gas transmission, maintenance and construction, who, like Earley, had joined PG&E two years before, and who emphasized the “safety culture we are nurturing at PG&E.” The Commission then heard from representatives of San Bruno and the SED, and final arguments by Earley and Stavropoulos.

On December 19, 2013, the Commission filed decision No. 13-12-053, concluding that PG&E “violated Rule 1.1 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure by not correcting promptly a material misstatement of fact in a pleading filed with the Commission and by mischaracterizing the correction submitted for filing on July 3, 2013 as a routine and non-substantive correction. PG&E is fined $14,350,000 for these violations.”

Concerning what it called “Delay in Correcting Record,” the Commission stated: “[T]he admissions by PG&E’s Vice President [of gas transmission, maintenance and construction], coupled with the serious nature of the discrepancies, the widespread knowledge throughout the gas division of this discovery, and the additional steps taken to address this problem, lead us to conclude that senior management either knew or should have known about the serious records discrepancies and pipeline flaws shortly after they were discovered and that this was a significant safety matter in the public’s interest.” Adopting a phrase that appeared in the proposed decisions of both the assigned ALJ and Commissioner Ferron, the Commission found: “It is not credible that PG&E’s engineers and executives did not recognize the provocative nature of these facts in light of the intense public interest in natural gas pipeline safety. This is particularly true where, as here, Line 147 had been the subject of a pressure increase proceeding at the Commission the previous year.”

The Commission continued:

“The date when PG&E’s top management became aware of the true nature of the pipeline is not determinative of whether PG&E should be accountable for its failure to inform the Commission promptly of the erroneous information underlying [Decision] 11-12-048. Given the importance of ensuring the integrity and safety of the transmission system, PG&E should have had internal procedures in place to ensure that incidents such as the discovery of record discrepancies for Line 147 would be relayed promptly to top management and reported to the Commission. [¶] . . . [¶]

“When the Commission has issued a decision in a formal proceeding where a key Ordering Paragraph sets a safety standard that relies on material information later found to be erroneous, the proper method for a party to bring this to the Commission’s attention would be through a prompt filing in the proceeding, which could be a motion to reopen the record or a petition for modification of the decision, depending on the circumstances. Since PG&E became aware of record discrepancies beginning on October 18, 2012, we find that PG&E should have prepared and submitted a filing to inform the Commission of this significant and material discovery no later than November 16, 2012. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Once PG&E had knowledge of material errors in its filed Supporting Information that the Commission relied upon to set a safety standard in [Decision] 11-12-048, PG&E should have brought the record discrepancies to the Commission’s attention through an appropriate filing while it investigated .... By omission, PG&E’s failure to promptly make such a filing misled the Commission by allowing a ‘false statement of fact,’ within the meaning of Rule 1.1, to remain uncorrected after PG&E had the knowledge to correct it. [¶] . . . [¶]

“Instead of informing the Commission promptly, PG&E waited over seven months to correct information that it knew to be incorrect and that it knew the Commission had relied upon in issuing [Decision] 11-12-048. PG&E did not attempt to correct the record ... or inform the parties until July 3, 2013, when it submitted the Errata document for filing and served the parties.”

“To summarize, we find that PG&E’s obligation to inform the Commission of the errors in its 2011 Supporting Information that was relied on in Ordering Paragraph 1 setting a safety standard in [Decision] 11-12-048 began no later than November 16, 2012. PG&E did not attempt to inform the Commission of the errors until July 3, 2013, a delay of 229 days. This unreasonable delay misled the Commission by allowing a ‘false statement of fact’ to persist uncorrected and was a violation of Rule 1.1. We find that this constitutes a continuing violation within § 2108. Thus, we conclude that this Rule 1.1 violation persisted for 229 days.”

The Commission then turned to a discussion of the Errata:

Concerning the “Title, Content, and Submission Date of the ‘Errata’ Document,” the Commission first noted that such a document was prohibited by Rule 1.12(c). It then reasoned: “The record on Line 147 had been closed and the Commission decision issued. At a minimum, in light of the circumstances here, the record needed to be re-opened and corrected, and for a more complete resolution. [Decision] 11-12-048 should have been modified to reflect the correct maximum allowing operating pressure.” Lead Counsel’s testimony why “he rejected using an Amendment ... [¶] ... is not credible because it is not logical. The Lead Counsel, with decades of experience, admits that notice of the corrections was ‘absolutely required.’ Then, lie dismissed use of an amendment, because the record was closed; but the record was equally closed for the errata. No explanation was offered for this flawed logic.”

“Further, the ‘Errata’ submitted for filing is a short document with only one page devoted to a brief description of the errors in the MAOP validation records submitted previously for Line 147 and the resulting need to reduce the MAOP from the 365 psig authorized by [Decision] 11-12-048 to 330 psig. The ‘Errata’ did not disclose, for example, when or how PG&E became aware of the errors, the reasons for the errors, or corrective actions that were being taken following discovery of the errors.”

“In sum, the Lead Counsel chose to submit for filing a document which, while not provided for in the Rules of Practice and Procedure, is typically used to inform parties of minor changes and corrections in documents, most commonly prior to the original document being offered for the record, but in any event before the Commission issues its decision. This submission had the effect of concealing from the Commission and the parties the actual nature of the document.... [¶] ... [¶] ... In addition to not being timely, ... we find that PG&E’s attempted July 3rd filing of the ‘Errata’ was not forthright, both because of the title and the incomplete content.

“Because the document presented by PG&E for filing with the Commission on July 3, 2013, did not clearly convey the nature or significance of the facts set forth within, we find that it was an artifice, as that term is used in Rule 1.1, and misled the Commission. The misleading nature was exacerbated by the submission date of July 3, before a holiday weekend. [¶] We conclude that PG&E’s submission of the ‘Errata’ document was a separate violation of Rule 1.1. This shortcoming remained uncorrected until PG&E filed and served the Verified Statement of its Vice President of Gas Transmission Maintenance and Construction on August 30, 2013. We find that this constitutes a continuing violation within § 2108. Thus, we conclude that this Rule 1.1 violation persisted for 58 days.”

This is how the Commission fixed the penalty:

“[T]he facts of this proceeding require that we impose the maximum fine. Natural gas transmission system safety by this operator has been one of the Commission’s highest priorities for three years. The management and legal decision-making regarding the treatment of the discovery of errors in the Line 147 Supporting Information, as reflected in this record, is profoundly disheartening in that it reflects a lack of candor and appreciation of the public interest and the regulatory process.

“Therefore we calculate the fine as follows: For delay in submitting a filing to disclose information regarding errors in pipeline specifications for Line 147, we impose the maximum amount of $50,000 per day as a continuing violation aggravated by the severity of this safety-related offense and the conduct of the utility. We begin the calculation on November 16, 2012, the date by which we find that PG&E should have prepared and submitted a filing to inform the Commission of the significant and material discovery of the records discrepancy and end the calculation on the date that PG&E submitted its Errata document for filing, July 3, 2013, a delay of 229 days. We assess the maximum statutory value [sic\ of $50,000 per day for this continuing violation based on the history of this proceeding as set forth above. The resulting fine is $11,450,000.

“For submitting a misleadingly titled and factually incomplete document on July 3, 2013, $50,000 per day for the 58 days while this shortcoming remained uncorrected = $2,900.000. Total fine = $14,350,000.” (Italics added.)

The Commission then made some “Comments on [the] Alternate Proposed Decision” of Commissioner Ferron, one of which is especially germane: “PG&E . . . argues that the Commission must show that PG&E intentionally misled the Commission. However, there is no ‘intent’ element to a Rule 1.1 violation, either implicitly or explicitly. We have previously held that Rule 1.1 violations have occurred where there has been a lack of candor, withholding of information, or failure to correct information or respond fully to data requests. [Fn. to four PUC decisions.]”

In decision No. 14-05-034, the Commission denied PG&E’s request for rehearing, rejecting PG&E’s arguments that (1) “The Commission erred in finding violations of Rule 1.1 without proof that PG&E intended to misled the Commission”; (2) “The Commission erred in finding ‘continuing violations’ of Rule 1.1 without proof that any misconduct was continuing”; and (3) the penalty imposed violated the prohibitions against excessive fines in the United States and California Constitutions, and also violated the due process clauses of those documents. These are the issues PG&E brings for review.

ANALYSIS

The Scope of Our Review

“Within 30 days after the commission issues its decision denying the application for a rehearing, . . . any aggrieved party may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal ... for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the original order or decision or of the order or decision on rehearing inquired into and determined.” (§ 1756, subd. (a).)

“[T]he review by the court shall not extend further than to determine, on the basis of the entire record . . . , whether any of the following occurred: [¶] (1) The commission acted without, or in excess of, its powers or jurisdiction. [¶] (2) The commission has not proceeded in the manner required by law. [¶] (3) The decision of the commission is not supported by the findings. [¶] (4) The findings in the decision of the commission are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [¶] . . . [¶] (6) The order or decision of the commission violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or the California Constitution.” (§ 1757, subd. (a).)

“Notwithstanding Section[] 1757 ... , in any proceeding wherein the validity of any order or decision is challenged on the ground that it violates any right of petitioner under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution, the Supreme Court or court of appeal shall exercise independent judgment on the law and the facts, and the findings or conclusions of the commission material to the determination of the constitutional question shall not be final.” (§ 1760.)

Thus, when no constitutional issue is presented, a PUC decision has the same standing as a judgment of the superior court: it is presumed correct, and any party challenging the decision has the burden of proving that it suffers from prejudicial error. (City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 523, 530 [217 Cal.Rptr. 43, 703 P.2d 381]; Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Public Utilities Com. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 529, 537 [149 Cal.Rptr. 692, 585 P.2d 491]; Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 172, 185 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].) Indeed, our Supreme Court has repeatedly called the presumption in favor of the Commission’s decision a “strong” one. (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406, 410 [67 Cal.Rptr. 97, 438 P.2d 801] [“There is a strong presumption of validity of the commission’s decisions . . . .”]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 634, 647 [44 Cal.Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353] [“strong presumption of the correctness of the findings ... of the commission, which may choose its own criteria or method of arriving at its decision”].)

But even the presence of a constitutional dispute does not require the reviewing court to adopt de novo or independent review. Even there, “the question of the weight of the evidence in determining issues of fact lies with the commission acting within its statutory authority; the ‘judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach to findings upon hearing and evidence.’ ” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com., supra, 62 Cal.2d 634, 646.) In other words, judicial reweighing of evidence and testimony is ordinarily not permitted. (See, e.g., Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 22 Cal.3d 529, 538 [“ ‘When conflicting evidence is presented from which conflicting inferences can be drawn, the commission’s findings are final.’ ”]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com., supra, at p. 647 [findings which are final include those involving “conflicting evidence [or] undisputed evidence from which conflicting inferences may reasonably be drawn”]; Cal. Portland Cement Co. v. Public Util. Com. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 171, 175 [315 P.2d 709] [“The weighing of whatever factors may have tended [to support an implied finding by the PUC] was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission.”]; The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 959 [167 Cal.Rptr.3d 747]; In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 681 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 827]; cf. SN Sands Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 185, 191 [83 Cal.Rptr.3d 885] [same approach taken to review of county public utilities commission].) The only exception is those findings or conclusions “drawn from undisputed evidence . . . from which conflicting inferences may not reasonably be drawn [and therefore] present questions of law.” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com., supra, at p. 647.)

To accomplish the overturning of a Commission finding for lacking the support of substantial evidence, the challenging party must demonstrate that based on the evidence before the Commission, a reasonable person could not reach the same conclusion. (Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 649 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 297]; The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 959.) It is for this reason that the Commission’s factual findings are almost always treated as “ ‘conclusive’ ” (American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Com. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 184, 192 [83 P.2d 1]), “final and not subject to review.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d 523, 530.)

The special respect accorded the PUC as a constitutional entity also appears in the considerable deference extended to what might otherwise appear purely judicial functions. Courts have long accepted the principle that “the commission’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code should not be disturbed unless it fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language . . . .” (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 68 Cal.2d 406, 410-411 ; accord, Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 796 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 703, 74 P.3d 795]; PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1194 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 630].) This judicial deference acknowledges a role for the Commission’s administrative expertise: “[W]e give presumptive value to a public agency’s interpretation of a statute within its administrative jurisdiction because the agency may have ‘special familiarity with satellite legal and regulatory issues,’ leading to expertise expressed in its interpretation of the statute.” (Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 718, 729 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 733]; accord, Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 172, 185; SFPP, L.P. v. Public Utilities Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 784, 794 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 10].)

The deference may, if anything, be even greater with regulations promulgated by the agency. “[T]he PUC’s interpretation of its own regulations and decisions ‘is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts. [Citation.] . . . “ ‘A court is more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation than to its interpretation of a statute, since the agency is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it authored and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation over another.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 649; see The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 958 [“The Commission’s interpretation of its own rules and regulations ‘is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts.’ ”].)

All that being said, with either statute or regulation, the ultimate decision is with the courts. (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 11-12 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 310 [118 Cal.Rptr. 473, 530 P.2d 161]; PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1194-1195.)

The Issues Presented

As shown by the captions in its petition, this is how PG&E frames the issues for decision: (1) “The Commission Erred in Holding That a Violation of Commission Rule 1.1 Does Not Require Proof of an Intent to Mislead the. Commission”; (2) “The Commission Erred in Holding That Continuing Violations of Rule 1.1 May Be Found Without Proof of Continuing Misconduct”; and (3) “The Commission’s Decision Violates PG&E’s Rights Under the California and United States Constitution,” specifically; “The Commission found PG&E guilty of Rule 1.1 violations that the Commission failed to identify in advance of the hearing, in contravention of the Due Process Clause, and imposed fines of millions of dollars for unintentional reporting and filing errors that caused no harm and were not accompanied by any improper intent, in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.”

The Commission Can Find a Rule 1.1 Violation Without Requiring a Mental State to Mislead

PG&E’s opening contention attacks the PUC’s conclusion that “there is no ‘intent’ element to . . . Rule 1.1.” PG&E asserts that this conclusipn suffers from numerous defects, in connection with which PG&E advances five supporting arguments, which will hereafter be referred to as “subarguments.” The subarguments are these: One, the Commission neglected to recognize “[t]hat Rule 1.1 incorporate[d] an intent element is . . . mandated by the language of the Rule itself,” because “[a]ll of the key terms in its provision— ‘to mislead,’ ‘artifice,’ and ‘false statement’ — denote purposefully deceptive conduct.” Two, PUC’s conclusion “breaks from the Commission’s own prior decisions.” Three, “The Commission’s interpretation . . . also conflicts directly with decisions interpreting identical language in provisions of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and [the] Business and Professions Code.” Four, “Interpreting Rule 1.1 to include an intent element is further supported by the presumption against strict liability,” which “holds that a statute or regulation defining an offense is generally presumed to require proof of intent, even when no mens rea element is specifically stated.” And five, PUC’s construction of Rule 1.1 “opens the door to new and significant risks of liability for all parties appearing before the Commission, given the ever-present possibility that a particular filing may be deemed to be procedurally improper or to have somehow ‘misled’ the Commission or its staff, potentially allowing for the imposition of fines in the millions of dollars for representations made by a party in complete good faith.”

It is clear from some of the language used by PG&E (“offense,” “strict liability,” “mens rea”), its copious citation of criminal authorities, and its invocation of constitutional provisions linking excessive fines to cruel and/or unusual punishment, that PG&E is trying to insinuate that Rule 1.1 be treated as a species of penal statute. From this premise PG&E hopes to have a mental state element implied to avoid having a Rule 1.1 violation treated as a strict liability offense. These efforts must be disappointed.

It is trae that, according to repeated pronouncements from our Supreme Court, “[t]he prevailing trend in the law is against imposing criminal liability without proof of some mental state where the statute does not evidence the Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability.” (In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 267 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906]; accord, Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 393 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, 257 P.3d 41]; People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 521 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].) But this trend does not apply to statutes imposing civil penalties for noncompliance with measures intended to protect the public health and safety. These penalties are not penal offenses, as is also shown by decisions by our Supreme Court.

“ ‘While . . . civil penalties may have a punitive or deterrent aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes and regulations imposed to assure important public policy objectives.’ ” (California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services (1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 294-295 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 872, 940 P.2d 323], quoting Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 147-148 [279 Cal.Rptr. 318, 806 P.2d 1353].) “It is . . . well accepted that a state may impose reasonable penalties as a means of securing obedience to statutes validly enacted under the police power. . . . Imposition of civil penalties has, increasingly in modern times, become a means by which legislatures implement statutory policy.” (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 398 [149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512].) “[T]he Legislature may constitutionally impose reasonable penalties to secure obedience to statutes enacted under the police power, so long as those enactments are procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal.” (Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 352 [165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877].)

Without question, the PUC operates pursuant to the state’s police power. (E.g., Gt. Northern Ry. v. Washington (1937) 300 U.S. 154, 159 [81 L.Ed. 573, 57 S.Ct. 397]; Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. R. R. Comm’n. (1929) 279 U.S. 125, 139 [73 L.Ed. 637, 49 S.Ct. 325]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1963) 60 Cal.2d 426, 428 [34 Cal.Rptr. 673, 386 P.2d 233].) And PG&E does not dispute that the Commission has the authority to impose monetary sanctions for disobedience of its orders made pursuant to the state’s police power.

When the Legislature meant to criminalize a violation of the Commission’s authority, it knew how to do so in unmistakable language. When the Legislature meant to require a mental state for an act committed before the Commission, it knew how to do so in plain language. And when the Legislature meant a party’s good faith to be considered, it knew how to say so without ambiguity. The Legislature’s decision not to include such qualifying words as “willfully” or “knowingly” when enacting section 2107 indicates that it did not mean to impose a scienter requirement for a violation of “any part or any provision of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission.” We are not authorized to insert such a requirement “ ‘to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.’ ” (Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 381 [267 Cal.Rptr. 569, 787 P.2d 976].)

The absence of such language in section 2107 compels the conclusion that a civil penalty imposed under that statute is not a penal