People v. Lazarus (238 Cal. App. 4th 734, 2015)

Opinion

MANELLA, J.

Appellant Stephanie llene Lazarus, a 25-year veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), was charged and convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Sheri Rasmussen, the wife of appellant’s former lover, John Ruetten. The 1986 crime was not solved until 2009, when a DNA profile obtained from a bite mark on Rasmussen’s arm was matched to appellant. At trial, the prosecution established that appellant had been in love with Ruetten and was emotionally devastated when she learned of his and Rasmussen’s 1985 engagement. She went to Ruetten in tears, begging him to reconsider, and later confronted Rasmussen at work. The bullets used to kill Rasmussen were of the type then used by LAPD officers, and were discharged from a gun similar to one owned by appellant, which she declared stolen two weeks after the shooting. The jury found appellant guilty, and she was sentenced to 27 years to life.

Appellant raises the following contentions on appeal: (1) the pre-accusation delay violated her due process rights; (2) the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to quash search warrants used to search appellant’s home and computers; (3) the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to traverse the search warrants; (4) the trial court erred in admitting a tape of appellant’s pre-arrest interview by LAPD detectives; (5) the trial court erred in failing to hold a Kelly hearing before admitting evidence of partial DNA profiles from material found on the victim’s fingernails developed through use of a “MiniFiler” DNA test kit; and (6) the trial court erred by failing to allow the defense to introduce evidence of a burglary that occurred in the area six weeks after the murder, and by preventing the defense from cross-examining the prosecution’s crime scene expert about the burglary. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Information

By information dated December 18, 2009, appellant was charged with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Sheri Rasmussen on February 24, 1986 (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that appellant personally used a handgun in the commission of the offense.

B. Evidence at Trial

1. Prosecution Evidence

On February 24, 1986, Rasmussen lived in a condominium on Balboa Street in Van Nuys with her husband, John Ruetten, and worked as a nurse at a Glendale hospital. Ruetten left for work at 7:20 a.m. that morning. Rasmussen called in sick. Both Ruetten and Rasmussen’s sister tried to call Rasmussen at home several times that day, beginning at approximately 10:00 a.m., but Rasmussen did not answer. At approximately 9:45 a.m., a neighbor, Anastasia Volanitis, noticed the garage to Rasmussen’s condominium was open with no cars inside. When Ruetten returned home at 6:00 p.m., he noticed the garage door was open and Rasmussen’s BMW was missing. There was broken glass on the driveway from a shattered sliding glass patio door. The door from the condominium to the garage, which Ruetten had closed and locked when he left that morning, was ajar. Rasmussen was lying dead on the living room floor, still wearing her sleep shirt and robe.

The pathologist who examined Rasmussen declared the cause of death to be three gunshots to her chest, all fatal. One was a contact wound and at least one was inflicted while she was lying on the floor or against a similar hard surface. There were abrasions on Rasmussen’s arms, near the wrist, consistent with injury from a rope or cord. There were signs that Rasmussen had struggled with her assailant, including multiple contusions, lacerations and abrasions on her hands, mouth, face, head and neck. Broken pieces of two of Rasmussen’s fingernails were found on the floor near the condominium’s front door. An injury on her face was consistent with a blow from the muzzle of a gun, with a size and configuration matching a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver. There was a blow to her head consistent with a broken vase found near her body. On Rasmussen’s left inner forearm was an apparent bite mark. The pathologist examined it under a microscope. Based on the amount of hemorrhaging and the absence of inflammation, she determined that the injury had been inflicted at or about the time of Rasmussen’s death.

Based on distinct physical characteristics, experts in the field of identifying ammunition testified at trial that bullets recovered in or near Rasmussen’s body were “.38J Plus-P” ammunition, manufactured by Federal Premium Ammunition. In 1986, LAPD officers were required to use Federal .38J Plus-P ammunition, even when off duty and carrying a personal weapon.

A sleeved quilt found near Rasmussen’s body was taken into evidence and examined. The presence of multiple bullet holes and gunshot residue on the quilt led authorities and experts to conclude that it had been wrapped around the assailant’s weapon to dampen the sound of the gunshots. At trial, a forensic firearms expert testified that based on the location of the bullet holes in relation to linear gunshot residue that appeared to have been discharged from the cylinder, the weapon was a revolver with a two-inch barrel. Any number of guns were capable of firing the bullets found at the crime scene, but less than a dozen had two-inch barrels.

Criminalist Lloyd Mahaney took samples from the bite mark on Rasmussen’s arm at the scene. Investigators and criminalists also collected the two broken fingernails found near the condominium’s front door, clippings from Rasmussen’s remaining fingernails, and samples of tissue and debris from the underside of the fingernails. Additional items and samples were collected at the scene and from the interior of the BMW, including multiple fingerprints, multiple samples of what appeared to be blood, and multiple hairs.

Stereo equipment had been pulled from a cabinet inside the condominium’s living room and stacked by the door to the garage. A drawer in a living room table had been pulled out and the contents dumped on the floor. Although there was no evidence of forced entry, and rooms containing other valuables—including additional stereo equipment—were undisturbed, the detectives who initially investigated the crime concluded that the murder was committed in the course of a burglary. Specifically, they theorized that one or two burglars had come in through an open door, were surprised by Rasmussen’s presence, and shot her during a struggle over a gun.

In December 2004, members of LAPD’s cold case unit reopened the case, asking the coroner’s office to locate the bite mark tissue sample, which had been in a freezer in the coroner’s evidence room since 1986. In 2005, Jennifer Francis, a criminalist with LAPD, examined a piece of one of the swabs under a microscope and also performed DNA testing on it. Under the microscope, she saw nucleated epithelial cells, which are found in large numbers in saliva and provide a good medium for obtaining a complete DNA profile. The DNA testing indicated the presence of two profiles: a major profile and a minor profile. The minor profile was consistent with Rasmussen’s, although there was insufficient material for a complete match. The major profile was complete. The DNA that comprised the major profile was from a female.

Authorities initially attempted to find a match by uploading the major DNA profile from the bite into a national database system. This was unsuccessful. In 2009, the investigation turned toward specific women who might have had reason to harm Rasmussen. LAPD officers surreptitiously obtained a sample of appellant’s DNA by taking possession of a drink cup and straw discarded by appellant. LAPD criminalist Michael Mastrocovo developed a partial DNA profile for the drink cup and straw. Appellant’s DNA profile matched the major profile found on the bite mark.

Appellant was arrested on June 5, 2009. A criminalist swabbed her mouth in order to develop a complete DNA profile. Francis analyzed the DNA on one of those swabs. Appellant’s DNA profile matched the major profile on the bite mark swab at 13 loci.

In 2010, Thomas Fedor, a serologist for an independent forensics laboratory, Serological Research Institute (SERI), was provided the second bite mark swab. Several persons were present when he tested it, including a representative for the defense. Fedor began by placing the swab into a solution and analyzing the resulting liquid. It contained salivary amylase. When he performed DNA testing, he detected, just as Francis had, the presence of two distinct DNA profiles, one major and one minor. The minor profile was consistent with Rasmussen’s. Fedor separately tested the swab obtained from appellant to obtain appellant’s DNA profile. Appellant’s DNA profile matched the major profile Fedor obtained from the bite mark swab at all 15 loci.

Fedor also analyzed tissue samples found on or under Rasmussen’s fingernails using a MiniFiler test ldt. Under one fingernail, he found a mixture of DNA and obtained partial profiles for at least three people. One of the partial profiles was consistent with appellant’s. Fedor found low levels of DNA under three other nails with profiles consistent with appellant’s. There were minute amounts of DNA material under six other fingernails contributed by both males and females, some of which was inconsistent with Rasmussen’s. Fedor was able to rule out appellant and Ruetten as possible contributors.

In 1986, appellant was an LAPD police officer in the Devonshire Division, having entered the police academy in 1983 and graduated in 1984. Brian McCartin, who attended the academy with appellant, described her as “the strongest, most aggressive, most persistent fighter” of the women in the class. Michael Hargreaves, appellant’s friend and former roommate and a former police officer, described her fitness level as “outstanding” and her level of strength with respect to other women as “superior.” Hargreaves also testified that appellant was an “expert” level shooter. Sometime between 1985 and 1987, appellant showed her friend and fellow police officer Jayme Weaver lock picking tools and told Weaver she had learned how to use them.

In 1986, it was common practice for LAPD officers to carry a backup weapon in addition to the weapon issued them by the department. Officers were expected to let the LAPD armorer know when they purchased a backup weapon. They were permitted to carry only guns that could be used with the Federal .38J Plus-P bullets. Records from the armorer’s office indicated that on February 29, 1984, appellant purchased a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson Model 49 revolver. It was a five-shot model. Its barrel was approximately two inches. On March 9, 1986, less than two weeks after Rasmussen’s death, appellant reported to the Santa Monica Police Department that her Smith & Wesson Model 49 revolver had been stolen from the glove compartment of her car while parked in Santa Monica. Hargreaves, appellant’s former roommate, recalled appellant telling him she had lost her revolver a few days earlier in Santa Monica while carrying it in a bag or fanny pack. She asked him how to go about reporting it. When appellant reported her gun stolen in Santa Monica, she told the officer at the front desk it had been stolen that day. There was no record indicating appellant had reported the theft to the LAPD armorer. She did, however, report to the armorer buying another gun, a different model, on March 19, 1986.

Appellant and Ruetten had met in college and dated casually in the late 1970’s. After graduation, between 1981 and 1984, they continued to date and were sexually intimate, but Ruetten did not consider her his girlfriend. In June 1984, Ruetten met Rasmussen. In May 1985, Ruetten and Rasmussen became engaged. In June 1985, appellant learned of Ruetten’s engagement and called him, upset and crying. She asked Ruetten to come to her condominium. When he arrived, appellant, still crying, told Ruetten she was in love with him. She repeatedly asked him to have sex with her, and he did.

Following this encounter, Ruetten continued his relationship with Rasmussen, and several weeks later they moved in together. Sometime after Ruetten and Rasmusssen were living together, appellant went to the hospitál where Rasmussen worked and confronted her. That evening, Rasmussen came home upset, and Ruetten confessed to having had sex with appellant after their engagement; it appeared Rasmussen already knew. Ruettan promised not to have any further contact with appellant. Ruetten and Rasmussen were married in November 1985.

Appellant told Hargreaves she was in love with “John.” On one occasion while they were roommates, sometime between late 1984 or early 1985 and February 1986, she woke Hargreaves late at night. She was crying and wanted Hargreaves to console her. She told him that John had broken up with her and was going to marry someone else. Appellant became sad and more easily upset after the breakup. Appellant told Hargreaves that she had gone to the hospital where Ruetten’s fiancée worked and had a confrontation with her. When discussing why she did not date for an extended period after the breakup, appellant told Hargreaves she was “picky” and preferred men who were “tall” and “athletic,” “like John.”

Appellant’s home was searched in June 2009. Her journal and daily planners were retrieved, along with some photographs of Ruetten. The journal covered the period between November 1984 and August 1986. An entry for November 1984 discussed a night out that “kept my mind off John for a while anyway.” An entry for April 1985 stated that appellant “saw John Ruetten’s car,” “put a note on it,” “watched [it] for one half hour and checked up on it a few times.” An entry for May 1985 mentioned visiting Ruetten and his girlfriend being there. An entry for June 1985 stated that appellant had found out Ruetten was getting married; she described herself as “very depressed” and her concentration as “negative 10.” Another entry for June 1985 stated: “Didn’t feel like working. Too stressed out about John. I’ve had a real hard time concentrating these days so I called up and said I didn’t feel well and could I have a T.O. They gave it to me.” The journal had no entry in March 1986 or at any other time mentioning that her gun had been stolen.

In August 1985, appellant wrote Ruetten’s mother, telling her she was “ ‘truly in love with John’ ” and that the past year had “ ‘really torn me up.’ ” The letter further stated: “ T wish it hadn’t ended the way it did and I don’t think I’ll ever understand John’s decision.’ ” In December 1985, appellant received a letter from Ruetten’s mother that she said in her journal made her “ ‘very, very, very sad.’ ”

Appellant was off duty on Monday, February 24, 1986, the day Rasmussen was killed. She was also off duty the three preceding days. She returned to work on February 25. An officer who shared a locker room with appellant, Jayme Weaver, did not recall observing any injuries on her on that day or on any other occasion.

Appellant did not attempt to contact Ruetten after Rasmussen’s death. Ruetten next saw appellant in 1989 when both were in Hawaii on vacation with other people. He saw her two or three times afterward and they had sexual relations, but they never became involved in a relationship. Appellant’s home computers were analyzed by a computer expert who determined that she had performed searches of Ruetten’s name in April 1998, May 1999 and December 1999.

Appellant was interviewed by LAPD Detectives Gregory Steams and Dan Jaramillo on June 5, 2009. When asked about Ruetten, appellant repeated his name twice as if trying to recall who he was before saying “Oh yeah. I went to school with him.” She first described him as a “close friendf],” and then said they dated while they were in college and “probably after college.” She was evasive when asked how long they dated or when she spoke with him last, talking instead about his age, his family, when he graduated and when she met her husband. When asked what ended her relationship with Ruetten, she said she did not consider him her boyfriend and had gone out with others when they were dating. She denied their breakup was unfriendly. When asked if she had ever met Rasmussen, she initially said, “God, I don’t know” and “I may have.” She initially claimed not to know what Rasmussen did for a living or where she worked, but later said “now that you’re bringing it up, I think she worked at a hospital somewhere. And, yeah, I may have met her at a hospital. I may have talked to her once or twice.” She later stated: “I may have gone to her and said, hey, you know what? You know what? Is he dating you? He’s . . . bothering me. And so[,] I’m thinking that we had a conversation about that, one or two maybe.” She claimed to be uncertain of Rasmussen’s first name and of how she learned of her death.

The detectives asked appellant multiple times if she knew where Ruetten and Rasmussen lived after their marriage and if she had ever been to their condominium or confronted Rasmussen there. She initially claimed not to know where they lived and not to remember if she had ever been there. She subsequently said she “may have known.” When asked if she had ever gotten into a physical fight with Rasmussen, she said “[i]f it happened I honestly don’t remember it. That’s all I can tell you” and “this is just not ringing a bell.” Toward the end of the interview, she said she was “shocked” that “somebody would be . . . saying that I did this. I mean, we had a fight and so I went and killed her? I mean, come on.”

2. Defense Evidence

Sometime in the morning or early afternoon of February 24, 1986, Evangelina Flores, a cleaning lady working in a nearby condominium, heard loud sounds, like two people fighting, and a slamming sound, as if something had fallen. She then heard a car drive off. She told officers at the time that these sounds occurred at approximately 12:30 p.m.

Andrea Dillon, a fingerprint examiner, reviewed the latent fingerprints collected from the condominium after the homicide by LAPD criminalists. She found multiple identifiable fingerprints that could not be attributed to appellant, Ruetten or Rasmussen, including fingerprints on the stereo equipment stacked by the door to the garage.

Patricia Fant, a forensics firearms examiner, testified that Smith & Wesson had manufactured over 600,000 Model 49 revolvers. In addition, a company in Brazil manufactured a cheaper copycat version. Fant expressed the opinion that the recovered bullets could not be identified as having been made by a particular manufacturer or as being .38 Special Plus-P ammunition. She further opined that the barrel length of the gun could not be determined by measuring the distance between a hole in a blanket and the position of the barrel gap discharge because that distance would vary depending on how the blanket was folded.

A Santa Monica Police Department records manager reviewed records and determined that on March 9, 1986, the day appellant reported the theft of her revolver from her car, there had been two other burglaries from automobiles in parking structures in the same area.

The defense introduced entries from appellant’s journal, one from July 1986 in which she complained about not having her keys to get into her house and one from March 1986 that mentioned taking her car in for repair.

The defense called Suzanne Mendoza, who had known appellant virtually all her life, as a character witness. Mendoza had never observed appellant to be violent toward anybody. Michael Alexander who worked with appellant at the Devonshire Division in 1985 and 1986 and observed her interacting with many people, including arrestees, testified he did not consider her to be a violent person. Kim Dittbem, who attended an LAPD program with appellant for six months, never saw any violent behavior. Sheri Huff, who had known appellant since their college days, had been friends with appellant when Ruetten dated one of Huff’s roommates. She had never observed appellant jealous or angry. She had never seen appellant act violently.

C. Verdict and Sentence

The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder, and found tme that she had personally used a handgun. The court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for the murder and two years for the weapons enhancement.

DISCUSSION

A. Pre-accusation Delay

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charges due to pre-accusation delay, in view of the time that passed between the crime and her arrest and trial, and the alleged negligence of the original investigators. For the reasons discussed, we disagree.

1. Background

The information filed on December 18, 2009, accused appellant of committing murder on February 24, 1986, over 23 years earlier. On October 20, 2009, appellant moved to dismiss on the ground that the delay in filing criminal charges prejudiced her ability to conduct her defense, and constituted a violation of her due process rights under the state and federal Constitutions. Appellant contended that LAPD investigators were negligent or reckless in failing to investigate her possible involvement in the crime in 1986. She presented evidence that, within days or weeks of Rasmussen’s death, (1) Ruetten informed the investigators that appellant was his former girlfriend, (2) Rasmussen’s father told the investigators that Rasmussen had been threatened by her husband’s former girlfriend, and (3) Rasmussen’s parents advised them to investigate appellant. Appellant also presented evidence that the investigators failed to promptly interview the woman who until June 1985 had been Rasmussen’s roommate, and who knew that appellant had confronted Rasmussen at her workplace. Appellant submitted a declaration from Adalberto Luper, a former LAPD detective, who expressed the opinion that by ignoring leads provided to them by persons close to Rasmussen and focusing on the possibility that the crime had been committed by anonymous burglars with no connection to Rasmussen, the investigators “adopted a ‘tunnel vision’ approach to the investigation, rather than exploring the possibility that an LAPD officer was involved.” According to Luper, this was “at least negligent.”

With respect to prejudice arising from the delay, appellant asserted that her ability to prepare her defense had been compromised because (1) the officers who saw or worked with appellant in the days after the homicide were unable to specifically recall whether appellant showed signs of having engaged in a physical struggle; (2) Rasmussen’s secretary, who witnessed the confrontation between Rasmussen and appellant, had died; (3) documents supporting the chain of custody of certain items of physical evidence had been lost; (4) the GSR (gunshot residue) tests taken of Rasmussen’s hands and the records of 911 calls about the crime had been destroyed; and (5) records indicating precisely when LAPD officers began using the type of ammunition the prosecution claimed had been used to shoot Rasmussen were no longer available.

Respondent contended that to prevail, appellant was required to prove not only that she was prejudiced by the pre-accusation delay but that the delay occurred as the result of deliberate action by the prosecution or LAPD investigators designed to gain a tactical advantage. With respect to justification for the delay, respondent represented that the LAPD cold case unit requested DNA testing in September 2003, that the testing was accomplished in February 2005, and that periodic attempts to match the DNA (and fingerprints) from the crime scene to criminals whose profiles were stored in national databases occurred thereafter. The case was assigned to a detective in February 2009. His investigation quickly focused on appellant, and in June 2009, one month after her DNA profile was surreptitiously obtained and matched to the bite mark swab, she was arrested.

Preliminarily, the court found that appellant had made a “minimal” showing of prejudice. The court was persuaded that due to the passage of time, appellant’s former partners and the women who dressed with her in the locker room might have been unable to recall whether appellant had scratches or bruises on her body in the days after the killing, and that the absence of such marks could have been helpful to the defense. The court further found that the missing GSR evidence could have had “plausible value to the defense,” and accepted the premise that the type of ammunition used by the LAPD in 1986 could have been more easily determined in the absence of the delay. The court did not, however, place much stock in the argument that “the police, if they’d acted quickly could have made a [ballistics] match on the gun” because appellant reported her gun missing within two weeks of the killing. Similarly, the court did not assign prejudicial value to the alleged gaps in the chain of custody of certain physical evidence—which the court found likely to be “more prejudicial to the people”—or the destruction of 911 tapes—whose potential usefulness was “speculative.”

Having found that appellant had made a “showing of prejudice,” albeit “fairly minimal,” the court ruled that the truth-in-evidence provision of the California Constitution required application of the federal standard. In line with that reasoning, the court concluded that the lack of evidence that the delay was intentional or used to gain a tactical advantage precluded granting the motion. The court nevertheless went on to resolve the matter under the presumption that negligence was sufficient to support the motion to dismiss. The court concluded there was a “plausible argument to be made” that the investigating officers had been negligent, but stated that delay resulting from negligence required a greater showing of prejudice to “tip the scales” toward a finding of a due process violation than if the delay had been intentional. The court found strong justification for the delay in the necessity of developing the DNA evidence and matching it to appellant’s DNA. Although “the police may have had some basis to suspect [appellant] shortly after the crime was committed,” the case “was not solved until May of 2009 when [appellant’s] D.N.A. was matched to the biological matter recovered from the crime scene.” Once that occurred, “the authorities moved with appropriate dispatch and arrested [appellant].” The court concluded that “while the delay in bringing the charges against [appellant] has caused some possible prejudice to her ability to defend,” the “strong justification for delay” compelled the conclusion that “there was absolutely no violation of her right to due process.” Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss.

2. Analysis

a. Negligence on the part of investigators or prosecutors triggers application of the balancing test where the defendant establishes prejudice

There is no dispute that “ ‘[d]elay in prosecution that occurs before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed may constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial and to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 185 P.3d 49] (Nelson), quoting People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) “ ‘A defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay.’ ” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1250.) Once prejudice is demonstrated, the harm to the defendant “must be balanced against the justification for the delay” to determine whether a due process violation has occurred. (Nelson, supra, at p. 1251.)

In Nelson, our Supreme Court held that “negligent, as well as purposeful, delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of prejudice, violate due process.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1255.) The court observed that the United States Supreme Court had discussed the due process implications of investigative and prosecutorial delay on multiple occasions without ever having been called on to decide whether negligent conduct might implicate a defendant’s due process rights. (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1251-1253.) It concluded that because “the exact standard under [the United States] Constitution is not entirely settled[,] ... we can and will apply California law.” (43 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed its holding in Nelson, reiterating in multiple recent cases that “ ‘ “under California law, negligent, as well as purposeful, delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of prejudice, violate due process,” ’ ” and applying that standard to its analysis of the facts in the situation before it. (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 306 P.3d 1136]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547, 271 P.3d 1040]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850, 236 P.3d 1074].)

Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2) [formerly subd. (d)]). Respondent asserts that the provision requires application of federal standards to motions to dismiss for prejudicial delay. Respondent overlooks Supreme Court decisions applying the Nelson standard where the crimes postdated Proposition 8’s passage. (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 920-921 [crime occurred in 1985]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 909 [crime occurred in 1991]; People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 431 [crime occurred in 1984].) Respondent urges us to disregard this binding authority and instead follow the reasoning of People v. Valencia (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 808 [267 Cal.Rptr. 257]. There, the motion to dismiss was based on the deportation of a witness who allegedly could have provided exculpatory evidence; the Court of Appeal held that the truth-in-evidence provision of the California Constitution required application of the federal standard of materiality. (Valencia, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 813-814, 825.) In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the provision applies not only where the defendant requests exclusion of evidence as a remedy, but also where the defendant seeks dismissal of all charges “[s]ince dismissal amounts to the exclusion of all the evidence . . . .” (Id. at p. 819.)

As our Supreme Court has since observed, however, the language of the truth-in-evidence provision “broadly eliminates rules that exclude relevant evidence from a criminal trial”; its words “do not speak beyond that subject.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1178 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372], italics added; see People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 749 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 941 P.2d 838] [The provision “was intended to eliminate judicial precedents interpreting the state Constitution to exclude otherwise admissible evidence.”]; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 500 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] [“By its terms, the Truth-in-Evidence provision affects only the admissibility of evidence . . . .”].) Accordingly, we are doubtful that the truth-in-evidence provision applies where the requested remedy is not suppression of evidence, but dismissal of all charges based on the state’s violation of a defendant’s due process rights.

More importantly, even were we persuaded that the provision applies to the dismissal of all charges, we would reject respondent’s argument that it compels a different standard for reviewing a claim of pre-accusation delay than the one articulated by our Supreme Court in Nelson. As the court found, the standard to be applied where unjustified delay has prejudiced the defense under the United States Constitution is not settled. (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251; see U.S. v. Gross (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 165 F.Supp.2d 372, 379 [observing that “[t]he Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have dismissed indictments based on a standard other than governmental intent to achieve a tactical advantage”].) The issue whether the United States Supreme Court has articulated a federal standard to supplant Nelson was recently addressed in People v. Boysen (2007) 165 Cal.App.4th 761 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 350]. There, the court explained: “Even if [the truth-in-evidence provision] applies to the dismissal of prosecutions for preaccusation delay, there is no controlling federal authority limiting such dismissal to situations in which the delay was deliberate and designed to disadvantage defendants; and there is no requirement, therefore, that we limit dismissal to those cases in which delay was undertaken to disadvantage the defendant. Since there is no controlling federal law on the subject, the courts of this state are free to independently interpret the United States Constitution. [Citation.] Our state Supreme Court and our Courts of Appeal have done so, and have chosen to apply the balancing test [(balancing actual prejudice against the justification for delay)].” (Id. at p. 776; see id. at p. 761.)

The weight of authority establishes that the trial court erred in its initial ruling that negligence alone could not support a motion to dismiss due to delay. However, its error did not affect the outcome. The court went on to analyze the justification for the delay and whether the justification outweighed the prejudice to appellant, concluding that it did. We, therefore, turn to this issue.

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the justification for the delay outweighed any prejudice to the defense

A defendant seeking dismissal of a charge on the ground of unjustifiable delay “ ‘must demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay.’ ” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1250, quoting People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107.) “ ‘[Prejudice may be shown by loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.’ ” (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107.) The prosecution must then “ ‘offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’ ” (Nelson, supra, at p. 1250, quoting People v. Catlin, supra, at p. 107.) In determining whether the delay resulted in a violation of due process, the trial court engages in “ ‘a delicate judgment’ [citation], by balancing the public interest in favor of the prosecution against the rights of the defendant.” (Penney v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 941, 954 [105 Cal.Rptr. 162].) “[T]he particular circumstances surrounding the decision not to prosecute, the length of the delay, and the reasons for the subsequent re-evaluation and prosecution must all be considered.” (Id. at p. 954.) “[W]hether the delay was negligent or purposeful is relevant to the balancing process. Purposeful delay to gain an advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process violation. If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)

“We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial prearrest delay [citation], and defer to any underlying factual findings if substantial evidence supports them [citation].” (People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 431.) In evaluating the correctness of a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s speedy trial motion, “we consider all evidence that was before the court at the time the trial court ruled on the motion. [Citation.]” (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 922.)

In the weighing process, “the seriousness of the crime for which the indictment is returned must be given appropriate consideration. The fact that the Legislature has decreed no statute of limitations for murder shows the importance that society places on governmental efforts to bring a murderer to the bar of justice.” (Penney v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 954.) “[T]he delay may be unreasonable if the prosecution delayed in filing charges when all the evidence was discovered years earlier” (People v. Hartman (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 572, 581 [216 Cal.Rptr. 641]), or where “the reason for the delay was not investigative needs but the lack of interest of the responsible agencies in prosecuting the defendants on the basis of [the] evidence.” (People v. Pellegrino (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 776, 781 [150 Cal.Rptr. 486].) On the other hand, “[i]t requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from ‘fundamental conceptions of justice’ when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty . . . .” (United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 790-791.) “The determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions.” (Id. at p. 793.)

In Nelson, the defendant had been interviewed as a suspect in a 1976 murder, but was not charged until 2002, following DNA testing of semen stains found on the victim. (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1248-1249.) Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the 26-year delay in bringing charges violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process, the court observed: “The police may have had some basis to suspect defendant of the crime shortly after it was committed in 1976. But law enforcement agencies did not fully solve this case until 2002, when a comparison of defendant’s DNA with the crime scene evidence resulted in a match, i.e., until the cold hit showed that the evidence came from defendant. Only at that point did the prosecution believe it had sufficient evidence to charge defendant.” (Id. at p. 1256.) The court emphasized that “ ‘[p]rosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899, 914—915 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 404]; see People v. Spicer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377-1378 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 158] [prosecution “first possesses ‘facts necessary to sustain [a] charge’ when it secures evidence supporting the objectively reasonable belief that it ‘ “will be able to promptly establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” ’ ” not when it has “substantial evidence of guilt” or “reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] committed the crime”].)

Appellant does not suggest the prosecution had sufficient evidence to warrant charging her before the DNA match in 2009, but contends that “DNA technology available since the 1980’s could readily have been used to evaluate appellant as a suspect.” This same argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Nelson. Responding to the defense claim that law enforcement agencies were negligent in failing to test the samples earlier for a DNA match, the court observed: “A court may not find negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its resources or how law enforcement agencies could have investigated a given case. ‘. . . [T]he difficulty in allocating scarce prosecutorial resources . . . [is] a valid justification for delay. . . .’ [Citation.] It is not enough for a defendant to argue that if the prosecutorial agencies had made his or her case a higher priority or had done things a bit differently they would have solved the case sooner.” (Nelson, supra, at pp. 1256-1257, quoting People v. Dunn-Gonzalez, supra, at p. 915.) It is clear from the record below that testing tissue samples to obtain a DNA profile is a difficult and time-consuming process. It is equally clear that there were many cold cases potentially resolvable through DNA analysis in the pipeline. Appellant has not demonstrated that law enforcement was negligent in failing to test the evidence in this case earlier.

Against the justification for the delay must be balanced the minimal prejudice identified by appellant. She claims witnesses would have been able to testify with greater certainty that she showed no sign of injury in the days following the murder. This would have been of marginal significance. The record was undisputed that no one observed appellant to have been injured in the days after the murder, and it was entirely possible that Rasmussen’s attacker suffered no visible injury, as Rasmussen was struck with a gun and another heavy object before being killed and had very little foreign tissue under her fingernails. Moreover, the areas of appellant’s body her partner and coworker could have seen were limited.

Appellant claims she could have produced her gun and established that it was not the murder weapon. But according to appellant, her gun was stolen within two weeks of the killing. The investigation could not reasonably have been concluded within that period of time.

Appellant claims a loss of evidence “to impeach” the chain of custody for the biological evidence, but identifies no such potential evidence. As the trial court observed, the passage of time was more likely prejudicial to the prosecution than the defense in demonstrating an adequate chain of custody, and appellant does not assign error to any trial court ruling based on chain of custody.

Appellant claims the loss of 911 and “police communication” tapes prejudiced her ability to show that there were other suspects. We agree with the trial court that the possibility of any exonerating evidence on such tapes was speculative in the extreme. The body was not discovered for many hours, when Ruetten returned home in the evening and called 911. He had no information about how Rasmussen died or who killed her, and could have said nothing to support the existence of other suspects. After the police arrived in response to Ruetten’s call, Volanitis and Flores were interviewed and gave written statements that were made available to the defense. There was no indication that either called 911, and no suggestion that anyone else in the area noticed anything amiss at the time of the murder.

Finally, appellant claims that the delay interfered with her ability to identify alternate suspects whose presence was allegedly demonstrated by the unidentified fingerprints and DNA found at the scene and in the BMW. Such evidence—found in locations and quantities consistent with casual contact— did not suggest the presence of another assailant. Moreover, the databases of criminals whose fingerprint and DNA samples were available for computer matching had only increased in the intervening years. In view of the minimal prejudice and the lack of indication that any significant evidence had been lost, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

B. Motion to Quash

1. Background

Two warrants were issued authorizing searches of appellant’s property. The first permitted authorities to search appellant’s residence and several vehicles registered to her. It sought electronically and digitally stored material, documents, and records related to the homicide, Rasmussen or Ruetten, including “letters, diaries, journals, writings, newspaper articles, books, correspondence, [or] greeting cards”; photographs of Ruetten and Rasmussen; items that may have belonged to Ruetten or Rasmussen; information identifying persons “who may have associated with or [may] have known” Ruetten, Rasmussen or appellant; medical or dental records tending to establish whether appellant received treatment for injuries after February 24, 1986; “bills, receipts, papers, reports or forms” from 1986 generally; and all ,38-/.357-caliber firearms in appellant’s possession. The second warrant, issued by a different magistrate, gave permission to search the “computers, storage media, computer hardware and digital evidence” seized pursuant to the first warrant, including “[e-mail], internet browsing histories, cached information, partially deleted files, records, receipts, screen captures, photographs, logs, [and] printouts.”

The first warrant was issued pursuant to a 26-page affidavit and statement of probable cause executed by Detective G. Steams, a 14-year veteran of the LAPD who had been involved in approximately 150 homicide investigations, 40 as the lead investigator. Detective Stearns related in detail the facts surrounding the homicide and the 1986 investigation. Detective Stearns also related the facts surrounding DNA testing of the bite mark swab and other tissue samples from the crime scene by LAPD criminalist Francis, and the collection and testing of appellant’s discarded straw and cup for DNA comparison purposes. He stated that in 2009, Detective Nuttal was assigned to the matter and re-interviewed Ruetten. Ruetten told the detective about his relationship with appellant and appellant’s emotional reaction to learning of Ruetten’s engagement to Rasmussen. The affidavit described appellant as “expressfing] to [Ruetten] that she wished to pursue a committed relationship with him” at their June 1985 meeting. Detective Nuttal discovered that the day of the murder was a day off for appellant. The affidavit also described two meetings between appellant and Rasmussen. In the first, at Rasmussen’s workplace, appellant had allegedly told Rasmussen about getting together with Ruetten after he had begun dating Rasmussen and said, “ ‘If I can’t have John, you can’t either.’ ” On the second occasion, reported to Detective Nuttal by Rasmussen’s father, Rasmussen “found [appellant], in full police uniform, standing in the living room area” of her condominium, and had no idea how appellant had gotten in. There was a verbal altercation between them that left Rasmussen fearful. Rasmussen also allegedly told her father two weeks before her death that she had arranged to meet someone to resolve “ ‘a serious problem’ ” she did not want to discuss with her husband.

Detective Steams stated in his original affidavit that based on the information currently available in the investigation and, specifically, the evidence that appellant’s relationship with Ruetten “was significant to her and that she was extremely upset and devastated when Ruetten became engaged to and ultimately married Rasmussen,” and the fact that the gun appellant had reported stolen on March 19, 1986, had never been recovered, it was reasonable to believe that appellant “may still be in possession of diaries, daily journals or other writings expressing her feelings towards Ruetten and Rasmussen at the time leading up to and after the murder,” as well as the weapon used to commit the homicide, and that “the locations to be searched may contain photographs, names, addresses and/or information that will identify current and former co-workers, friends or associates who may have knowledge of [appellant’s] activities and appearance from the period when the murder occurred or other material information relevant to this investigation.”

Detective Stearns also submitted a brief affidavit in support of the second warrant. He described the seizing of the electronic items pursuant to the first warrant and stated the items “may contain images, files, documents or other data related to this investigation” or information concerning “persons who might be material witnesses in this case or have other information relevant to the ongoing investigation.”

The searches of appellant’s home and computers that followed issuance of the two warrants led to the discovery of evidence introduced at trial, including appellant’s journal and planner, photographs appellant had kept of Ruetten, and evidence that appellant had conducted several online searches for information about Ruetten over the years.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to quash the warrants and suppress the evidence obtained during the searches. Focusing on the original affidavit, she contended Detective Steams had expressed unsupported opinions in it and that the information it contained was stale. She further contended both warrants were overbroad. She asserted that the “good-faith” exception set forth in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405] (Leon) was inapplicable because Detective Stearns could have had no “objectively, reasonable” belief in the warrants’ validity. Respondent opposed, contending the relationship between appellant, the victim and Ruetten, coupled with the nature of the crime, provided support for the issuance of the warrants, that the items sought were likely to have been retained by appellant, that the warrants were not overbroad, and that, in any event, the good faith exception applied.

The court denied the motion to quash. At the hearing, the court stated that the “main reason” for the denial was the evidence of the detective’s good faith. The court found nothing to suggest that Detective Stearns had tried to mislead either magistrate. The court agreed there was a plausible argument for overbreadth in the requests to search for “bills, receipts, papers, reports or forms from 1986” and for the names of all “people who may have associated with” Rasmussen, Ruetten or appellant. The court was “uncomfortable” with the request to search appellant’s computers because they were unlikely to have been in existence at the time of the crime. However, the court concluded that warrants should not be read in a hypertechnical way and that it was up to the issuing magistrates to tell the detective to “ ‘tighten [the] language’ ” or “beef it up.” With respect to staleness, the court stated that in light of its finding of good faith, it had no reason to reach any issue pertaining to probable cause. The court observed, however, that the detective had clearly laid out in the affidavit that he was looking for evidence of the relationship that was “the motivating factor for the killing,” and that it was “reasonable to conclude that there would be [such] evidence” in appellant’s home, given “the nature of the items sought,” and the fact that “the interest in maintaining the relationship was so strong that ... it [allegedly] drove the suspect to commit the murder or the killing in the first place.”

2. Analysis

a. The issuance of the warrants was supported by probable cause

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires search warrants to be issued only upon a showing of “probable cause” describing with particularity “the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.” United States Supreme Court decisions establish an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment at trial. (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 139 [172 L.Ed.2d 496, 129 S.Ct. 695].) “ ‘Probable cause sufficient for issuance of a warrant requires a showing that makes it “ ‘substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.’ ” [Citation.] That showing must appear in the affidavit offered in support of the warrant. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 369-370, quoting People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617].) Probable cause may be shown by evidence that would not be competent at trial, including “ ‘information and belief.’ ” (People v. Varghese (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1103 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 449], quoting Humphrey v. Appellate Division (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 573 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 645, 58 P.3d 476].)

The magistrate issuing the warrant “is entitled to rely upon the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers in weighing the evidence supporting a request for a search warrant as to where evidence of crime is likely to be found. [Citation.] It is not essential that there be direct evidence that such evidence will be at a particular location. Rather, the magistrate ‘ “is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sandlin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1315 [281 Cal.Rptr. 702], quoting U.S. v. Fannin (9th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 1379, 1381-1382.)

“In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, ‘[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.],’ ” giving “great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.” (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1651 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 919], quoting People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729].) “In cases where the facts are essentially undisputed, we independently determine the constitutionality of the challenged search or seizure.” (People v. Rangel (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1315 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 728].) “[B]ecause ‘[Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause,’ . . . ‘ “doubtful or marginal” ’ cases are to be resolved with a preference for upholding a search under a warrant.” (People v. French (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1315 [134 Cal.Rptr.3d 383], quoting Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 914.)

Appellant contends that because the crime occurred more than 20 years before the issuance of the warrants, the information used to support them was necessarily stale. Appellant further contends the fact that she changed residences during those years precluded a finding of any nexus between items related to the crime and her current home. Finally, she contends the search of her computers was improper because the affidavit provided no substantial evidence to support that they existed at the time of the crime or that appellant kept evidence of the crime on them. In the exercise of our independent judgment, we conclude that the information in the affidavit provided probable cause to search appellant’s current home and computers despite the passage of years.

There is no “bright-line rule defining] the point at which information is considered stale.” (People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163.) “Rather, ‘the question of staleness depends on the facts of each case.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 163.) The question turns on whether “facts supporting the warrant application establish it is substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the location at the time of the search.” (People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 370, italics omitted.) “Substantial delays do not render warrants stale where the defendant is not likely to dispose of the items police seek to seize.” (People v. Stipo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 672 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 688]; see U.S. v. McCall (4th Cir. 1984) 740 F.2d 1331, 1336 [“ ‘The vitality of probable cause cannot be quantified by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit.’ ”].) Courts have recognized that firearms are likely to be retained by a suspect long after the crime is committed. (See, e.g., People v. Bryant, at p. 369; U.S. v. Maxim (8th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 394, 397 [recognizing that firearms enthusiasts could be expected to hold onto weapons for 10 or 20 years]; U.S. v. Singer (7th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 758, 763.) “[F]irearms, unlike drugs, are durable goods useful to their owners for long periods of time.” (U.S. v. Singer, supra, at p. 763.) Courts also recognize the longevity of information stored on computers. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Lemon (8th Cir. 2010) 590 F.3d 612, 615-616; U.S. v. Newsom (7th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3d 780, 783; see U.S. v. Johnson (D.Md. 2012) 865 F.Supp.2d 702, 707 [because evidence on a computer is recoverable months or years after it has been downloaded, deleted, or viewed “the age of the information supporting a warrant is increasingly irrelevant when the object searched is stored on a computer”].)

Here, the affidavit presented strong evidence of appellant’s guilt and she does not argue otherwise. The affidavit also presented evidence of appellant’s apparent motive: her romantic obsession with the victim’s husband. Given the evidence that her obsession was powerful enough to lead her to commit murder, it was probable that she would have continued to retain items evidencing her relationship with Ruetten and her feelings toward Ruetten and Rasmussen, even after all the years that had passed. Moreover, although she claimed her Smith & Wesson Model 49 revolver, the probable murder weapon, had been stolen, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that she had instead hidden it and kept it near her. (See People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163 [magistrate could reasonably conclude that suspect’s residence was logical place to look for specific incriminating items]; U.S. v. Steeves (8th Cir. 1975) 525 F.2d 33, 38 [people who own guns generally keep them at home or on their persons].) With respect to her contention that her move from one residence to another precluded a finding of a nexus between her current home and the evidence sought, the warrants specifically sought photographs, journals and diaries. A person does not normally discard such items, even after several moves. (See U.S. v. Freeman (5th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 942, 949 [nexus between house to be searched and evidence sought may be established either through direct observation or through normal inferences as to where articles sought would be located]; U.S. v. Domingo (M.D.Fla. 2010) 2010 U.S.Dist. Lexis 124145, pp. *19-*22 [reasonable to infer that defendant would move valued materials to his new residence].)

Appellant claims that the warrant was overbroad in granting permission to search her computers, as there was no evidence she owned any of them at the time of the homicide. The fact that she may not have owned those computers at the time of the crime did not preclude the possibility that she had transferred information or records—particularly photographs—to computers owned at the time of the search. (Cf. U.S. v. Christie (10th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 1156, 1164 [observing that personal computers often hold “diaries, calendars, files, and correspondence”]; Arkansas Chronicle v. Easley (E.D.Va. 2004) 321 F.Supp.2d 776, 795 [recognizing that photographs and video preserved in computer format are “easily transferrable”].) Moreover, had she made new journal entries about Ruetten or Rasmussen years after the homicide, that would have been highly pertinent to motive. Finally, any evidence that in the ensuing years she had conducted computer searches for information about Ruetten or the homicide would have further evidenced her strong feelings for him during the relevant period. (See People v. Varghese, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106 [fact that defendant researched romantic rival on his computer was evidence of jealousy and supported that rival’s murder was “crime of passion”].) In short, probable cause supported the issuance of the warrants despite the time that had passed since the crime. Moreover, as discussed below, even were we to find otherwise, the good faith exception would have precluded application of the exclusionary rule.

b. The good faith exception precluded suppression of evidence obtained in the searches

In Leon, the Supreme Court held that when “an officer acting with objective good faith