Citations
- 31 Cal. App. 4th 13
Full opinion text
Opinion
VOGEL (C. S.), J.
Introduction
These consolidated appeals contest rulings made by the trial court at a hearing to vacate two bail forfeitures. We first reject the contention made by the two sureties (National and Ranger) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the bail forfeitures in the first instance. We affirm the trial court’s ruling denying National’s motion to vacate its forfeiture, finding that the policy provision relied upon by National does not establish that the issued bond was void. Because we agree with the district attorney that the trial court erred in holding that the court could not consider equitable principles in deciding Ranger’s motion to vacate, we reverse the order vacating that forfeiture and exonerating the bond and direct the trial court to reconsider the case in light of the views expressed herein.
Factual and Procedural Background
Jose de Jesus Gonzalez (Gonzalez) was charged with several drug offenses. The court set bail at $150,000. On August 16, 1990, two bail bonds were posted through the same bail agent, Bert Potter Bail Bonds. National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Company (National) posted a $50,000 bond. The face of that bond stated, in pertinent part: “This bond is void if limits altered or erased or if used singly or with other bonds of this company to furnish bail in excess of $50,000.00.” Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger) posted the second bond in the amount of $100,000. The face of that bond stated, in pertinent part: “This bond is void if written for an amount greater than the power of attorney attached hereto. . . The attached power of attorney provided: “This Power of Attorney is for use with Bail Bonds only. . . . This power void ... if used ... in combination with powers from any other surety company, void if used to furnish bail in excess of the stated face amount of this power [of $100,000] . . . .”
On January 9, 1991, Gonzalez entered into a negotiated disposition with the People. The court ordered Gonzalez to return on March 15 for the probation and sentencing hearing.
On March 6, the court advanced the matter. The record is unclear as to whether Gonzalez was in court on that day. The clerk’s minute order contains a check mark next to Gonzalez’s name, indicating his presence in court on that day. There are also check marks next to the names for defense counsel and the deputy district attorney. Additionally, the recitations in the minute order that Hector Gutierrez, a Spanish interpreter, was sworn and that “[defendant [was] instructed to return” on April 19 are further evidence that Gonzalez was present. However, the reporter’s transcript for a brief portion of that day’s proceedings states: “The defendant not being present in court with counsel and the People not being represented the following proceedings were held.” As the parties have proceeded upon the assumption that Gonzalez was, in fact, not present in court on March 6, we shall indulge them on that point in order to give full consideration to all claims of error.
In any event, the reporter’s transcript for March 6 recites, in toto; “The court: Jose Gonzalez. That matter was on calendar for return of property. No motion has been filed. The matter is taken off calendar. [