Burnett v. San Francisco Police Department (36 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1995)

Opinion

ANDERSON, P. J.

In this opinion, we must determine whether or not the City and County of San Francisco (City) may lawfully prevent persons between the ages of 18 and 20 from entering or remaining on the premises of after-hours clubs in the City. We conclude that the City may do so. Article 15.2 of the San Francisco Police Code (SFPC) (§§ 1070 through 1070.25) establishes entertainment regulations for cabarets. SFPC section 1070.16 precludes persons under the age of 21 from entering or remaining in cabarets in the City and requires cabaret owners to exclude persons under the age of 21 from their premises.

Zaron Burnett, Sara Lee, Frank Chung, Dimitry Dunski, Melanie Day, Brooke McGowan, and Kris Walker are all over the age of 18 years and under the age of 21. Nssr. D. Zahriya is the owner and Jordan Wells is the manager of a licensed cabaret, Z & Z Entertainment. Burnett, Lee, Chung, Dunski, Day, McGowan, Walker, Zahriya, and Wells (collectively, appellants) challenge the right of the City, the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) and Police Chief Anthony Ribera (collectively, respondents) to enforce SFPC section 1070.16.

Appellants first assert that section SFPC 1070.16 is preempted by state law which sets the age of majority at 18 years. Appellants next offer a series of constitutional challenges to section 1070.16: they argue that the statutory scheme of which it is a part is vague and overbroad and that it denies them equal protection under the law. They then assert that section 1070.16 has been enforced in a discriminatory manner. They conclude by asserting that section 1070.16 violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §51 et seq.).

I. SFPC Section 1070.16 Is Not Preempted by Family Code Provisions Establishing the Age of Majority

Local legislation which conflicts with state law is preempted by the state law and is void. (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534].) Such a conflict is present where the local legislation “duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885 [218 Cal.Rptr. 303, 705 P.2d 876], internal quotation marks omitted.) “Local legislation is ‘duplicative’ of general law when it is coextensive therewith. [Citation.] [*]fl Similarly, local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto. [Citation.] [