Citations
- 45 Cal. App. 4th 1256
Full opinion text
Opinion
NOTT, J.
The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) appeals from a judgment in favor of Loyola Marymount University (Loyola) following a hearing on Loyola’s petition for writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) The judgment ordered the LAUSD to refund school development fees of $37,483, plus interest, paid by Loyola under protest. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
Loyola is a nonprofit educational corporation and Catholic institution of higher learning located in the Westchester community of the City of Los Angeles. As an “educational institution of collegiate grade . . . not conducted for profit,” Loyola has eminent domain power to acquire “any property necessary to carry out any of its powers or functions.” (Ed. Code, § 94500.) Loyola exercised its power of eminent domain and acquired vacant land, known as the Leavey campus, adjacent to its existing campus.
Originally zoned for residential use, the Leavey campus became subject to the same zoning restrictions as the main campus after its acquisition by Loyola. The Loyola campus has a special zoning designation of (Q) R4-1, and the use conditions imposed pursuant to that designation are known as the “Q” conditions. The Q conditions limit the uses of the campus to those of universities, churches and “uses permitted in the R1 zone.”
Loyola applied for a permit to construct a new building to house a postgraduate business school known as the Hilton Business School and a parking structure on the Leavey campus. Loyola plans to move its existing business school to the new building, a change, Loyola declares through its vice-president for facilities management, that will result in no increase in students or faculty.
The permit would not issue unless Loyola paid the school development fees, authorized under Government Code section 53080. Loyola paid the fees under protest and then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court granted the petition, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review.
Decisions by school districts acting pursuant to authority granted by sections 53080 and 65995 are reviewed by ordinary mandamus, in which the court confines itself to a determination whether the agency’s action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 231 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818], quoted with approval on other points in Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 916-918 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226, 844 P.2d 545].) Because the ultimate question, whether the agency’s action was arbitrary or capricious, is one of law, the trial court’s statement of decision has no conclusive effect upon us. (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board, supra, at p. 233.)
2. Construction of the Business School Comes Within the Phrase “Commercial and Industrial Construction” as Used in the Applicable Statutes.
Section 53080, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “The governing board of any school district is authorized to levy a fee, charge, dedication, or other requirement against any development project... for the purpose of funding the construction or reconstruction of school facilities, subject to . . . limitations set forth in [section 65995 et seq.]. This fee, charge, dedication, or other requirement may be applied to construction only as follows: [¶] (A) To new commercial and industrial construction . . . [or] [¶] (B) To new residential construction.” Subdivision (a)(2) of section 53080 states, “For purposes of this section, ‘development project’ means any project undertaken for the purpose of development, and includes a project involving the issuance of a permit for construction or reconstruction . . . .”
Section 65995, subdivision (d) states, in pertinent part: “For purposes of Section 53080 and this chapter, ‘residential, commercial, or industrial development’ does not include any facility used exclusively for religious purposes that is thereby exempt from property taxation under the laws of this state, ... or any facility that is owned and occupied by one or more agencies of federal, state or local government. . . .”
The LAUSD contends that the construction of the new business school by Loyola constitutes “commercial and industrial construction” under section 53080. Both parties cite us to the rules of statutory construction stated in Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]. These rules begin with our obligation “to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
We agree with the LAUSD that by employing the words “new commercial and industrial construction” as well as “new residential construction,” and by defining the term “development project” as used in section 53080 as “any project undertaken for the purpose of development,” the Legislature intended to include virtually all construction except that exempted by section 65995 et seq.
Loyola directs us to section 53080.1, subdivision (e)(1)(A), which provides: “In the case of any commercial or industrial development, the following procedures shall also apply: [