Reclamation District No. 70 v. Sherman (11 Cal. App. 399, 1909)

HART, J.

This is a suit for the enforcement of a lien upon certain land of defendants, situated within the limits of Reclamation District No. 70, under an assessment for reclamation purposes. Judgment passed for the plaintiff, and this appeal is from said judgment under section 941b of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transcript of the proceedings, etc., as authorized by said section, is not in form as required by rule 7 of this court, and we will, therefore, take occasion to here say that hereafter no transcript in1 an appeal taken directly to this court under the section mentioned will be filed, nor the appeal, except as to such questions as may be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment on the judgment-roll alone where the judgment-roll is, as here, presented in a proper and separate and distinct form from the transcript of the proceedings, will be considered by this court, unless such transcript conforms to the requirements of said rule 7 [144 Cal. xliv, 78 Pac. ix]. It would seem scarcely necessary to say that rules laid down by the supreme court for the government, in many particulars, of the appellate practice are as much a part of our system of procedure as the rules promulgated for that purpose by the legislature, and they are, therefore, as much the necessary learning of the practicing lawyer as either the rules of procedure and practice established by the legislature or the principles of substantive law. The consequences of failure to observe these rules are upon the lawyer and not upon the court. The cumbersome and unwieldy form of the record here is excused in this instance only because the section under which the appeal is prosecuted is new, and, further, because the litigation involved in the action is of more than ordinary importance, for the reason that the defendants’ land has been decreed to be sold for the satisfaction of the assessment levied by the plaintiff.

The validity of the assessment is challenged by appellants on the grounds: 1. That the act of the legislature by which the plaintiff tv as organized as a reclamation district (Stats. 1905, p. 717) is unconstitutional and void, because, it is claimed, it is a special law, and, therefore, violative of article XII, section 1, of the constitution; 2. That embraced within the boundaries of plaintiff are two other reclamation districts, which were created under the provisions of general laws and which wrere in existence at the time of the enactment of the law establishing and organizing plaintiff; 3. That the board of trustees of plaintiff, by resolution, amended the by-laws adopted, in pursuance of section 3452 of the Political Code, by the land owners within the district; 4. That the assessment commissioners were not disinterested persons, as required by and within the meaning of the language of section 3456 of the Political Code; 5. That the commissioners “did not take into consideration the quality and grade of the lands of the district in fixing the assessments, and had nothing before them to show the relative heights of the land.”

1. Upon the first point the contention is, as stated, that a reclamation district is a “corporation” within the meaning of article XII, section 1, of the constitution, which, in part, provides: “Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act.”

In support of this contention, counsel cite a number of early California cases in which reclamation districts are declared to be corporations: Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 410; People v. Reclamation District 108, 53 Cal. 348; People v. Williams, 56 Cal. 647; People v. Larue, 67 Cal. 526, [8 Pae. 84]; Irrigation Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 353, [21 Pac. 825]. And as late as Angus v. Browning, 130 Cal. 503, [62 Pac. 827], it was held that Reclamation District 108 was a corporation, citing People v. District 108, supra, but it is not therein expressly declared, nor do we think the court intended to hold in that ease, that reclamation districts belong to any of the classes of corporations defined by section 284 of the Civil Code, or that they come within the purview of the article and section of the constitution enjoining the creation of corporations except by general laws. Long before the decision in Angus v. Browning, 130 Cal. 503, [62 Pac. 827], the supreme court declared in the case of People v. Reclamation Dist. No. 551, 117 Cal. 121, [48 Pac. 1016], that reclamation districts, even if, for the want of a better term, they may be called corporations, were not within the definition of “corporations” as given by section 284 of the Civil Code, and this view has not only been adopted by the supreme court in a case decided subsequently to the case of Angus v. Browning, 130 Cal. 503, [62 Pac. 827], but it has been expressly held that such districts may be formed and organized by special acts. (People v. Levee Dist. No. 6, 131 Cal. 30, [63 Pac. 676].)

In People v. Reclamation District No. 551, 117 Cal. 121, [48 Pac. 1016], the court, referring to the corporations defined by the section of the . Civil Code referred to, says: “These [reclamation] districts, in my opinion, belong to neither of these classes. They are special organizations, formed to perform a certain work, which the policy of the state requires or permits to be done, and to which the state has given a certain degree of discretion in making the improvements contemplated. They are described by Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations, sections 24, 25 and 26. He calls them quasi corporations. Perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that they are not corporations at all, but are so classed because many of the presumptions and rules which apply to corporations have been made applicable to them. They are public agencies, which would cease to exist when the policy of the state has changed so that they are no longer required,. or when there is no further function for them to perform. And there is nothing in the constitution relating to municipal corporations which would prevent the state from so changing its policy as to put them out of existence.” (See Hensley v. Reclamation Dist. No. 556, 121 Cal. 96, [53 Pac. 401].) ,

The case of People v. Levee Dist. No. 6, 131 Cal. 30, [63 Pac. 676], before referred to, sets at rest and completely dissipates all doubt which may have existed as to the nature of reclamation and irrigation districts and the extent of the power of the legislature in forming them. It is there said: “Section 1 of article XII of the constitution, having reference to private corporations, provides that they may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by a special act. Article XI, section 6, of the constitution, declares that corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. The act of 1891 [Stats. 1891, p. 235] is unquestionably a special law. If Levee District No. 6 be a corporation, it is certainly not a private corporation, and must, if it be recognized by the constitution at all, come under the designation of article XI, section 6—‘a corporation for municipal purposes.’ And if it be a corporation for municipal purposes within the meaning of that article and section, then indubitably, the act of March, 1891, forcing upon it a new, distinct, and different organization, is special and inhibited legislation. But is Levee District No. 6 a corporation for municipal purposes within the meaning of the constitution? Expressions will be found in the cases where such organizations have been designated ‘corporations for municipal purposes,’ or ‘public corporations,’ or ‘corporations for public purposes,’ but these were convenient phrases of designation and description, rather than judicial declarations as to the nature and character of these agencies. The question propounded is conclusively answered by People v. Reclamation Dist. No. 551, 117 Cal. 114, [48 Pac. 1016].' It is there held that a reclamation district, conceding it to be a corporation, is not a corporation for municipal purpose within the meaning of the constitution. But as such levee districts, or reclamation districts, are distinctly not private corporations, they are corporations in a class by themselves, and the general ■ powers of the legislature for their creation, organization and control are in no wise limited by the constitution of the state. ’ ’ (See, also, Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. County of Sacramento, 134 Cal. 478, [66 Pac. 668], and People ex rel. Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373, [103 Pac. 207].) In the last-mentioned case it is said:

“The act does no violence to article I, section 11, nor to article IV, section 25, nor to article XI, section 6, of the constitution of the state. That the district here organized, if it be considered a corporation at all, is not a corporation organized for municipal purposes within the contemplation of article XI, section 6, of the constitution, must be taken as well settled. (People v. Reclamation District 551, 117 Cal. 114, [48 Pac. 1016]; People v. Levee District No. 6, 131 Cal. 30, [63 Pac. 676]; Reclamation District v. County of Sacramento, 134 Cal. 477, [66 Pac. 668].) It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons set forth in the decisions in those cases by which the conclusion there reached was expressed, to the effect that such districts are, in strictness, not corporations at all, but rather governmental agencies to carry out a specific purpose—the agency ceasing with the accomplishment of the purpose. But, additionally, it may be said that the likeness of these agencies to corporations is superficial, and that the similitude—for it is no more than this—ceases if consideration be paid to the fact that the state could accomplish this very work without organizing a district as such at all, and without giving the land owners within the district any voice in the selection of the managers or trustees. Thus it would be perfectly legal and competent for the legislature, delimiting a tract of land, itself to appoint a commissioner or commissioners to perform all of the functions which, under the existing schemes, are performed by the trustees and the assessors. . . .

“Nor, while a special act, is the law obnoxious to the other sections of the constitution above cited. The considerations, dictating the necessities of a special law are plain as above set forth. It would require a clear showing upon the face, of the law itself that a special act was not required, before a court would, interfere with the determination of a coordinate branch of the government upon this subject, and, generally, as is said in People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, [15 Am. St. Rep. 66, 22 Pac. 851], the determination of such a matter ‘depends upon questions of fact which this court has no means of investigating, and upon the solution of which it would not attempt to substitute its- judgment in place of that of the legislature. ’ ” ,

Nothing more can be said upon the point under consideration than is expressed in the foregoing authorities, which, it. is clear, conclusively settle the proposition adversely to the-claim of the appellant.

2. The proposition that the assessment is invalid because-the act creating plaintiff embraced within the limits of the-latter two reclamation districts existing at the time of the-creation of plaintiff cannot be maintained. Counsel argue-that the destruction of the two districts in the manner suggested must result in the taking of the property of the land, owners within the old districts without due process of law. In reply to this argument, it -is to be said that, even if the-point were one which could be appropriately urged against the validity of the assessment in the case at bar, there is nothing in the record before us showing, or tending to show in-the slightest degree, that the property of the land owners in. the old districts has been taken without just compensation having been paid for it, or without due process of law, by the act of the legislature establishing the boundaries of plaintiff and authorizing its organization as a reclamation district.

But the point is one which the defendants cannot urge in this proceeding against the legality of the assessment. If' the legislature has, by its act creating the plaintiff, trespassed upon or usurped any of the rights of other reclamation districts existing before and at the time of the establishment of the boundaries of plaintiff, the matter is one for the attorney general, upon the relation of some land owner of one- or both of the old districts, to inquire into through appropriate legal proceedings. In other words, the point under-consideration involves a collateral attack upon the legal existence of plaintiff, and such an attack is not within the right of the defendant in this case to interpose, for, if it be a fact-that plaintiff has no legal existence for the reason here suggested by appellants, it does not so appear from the face of the act creating plaintiff, and, therefore, such fact cannot, obviously, constitute a defense against the legality of the assessment. (People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526, [8 Pac. 84].) The act creating the plaintiff is, upon its face, in all respects, perfectly valid, and if facts extrinsic to the act itself may disclose the invalidity of the enactment and consequently the illegality of the district, an inquiry to that end, if there exists authority for any such inquiry, must be prosecuted directly against the district and not against any of the acts of its own officers or the other public officers who are charged with the administration of its affairs. It is well settled that the legality of reclamation districts and like q-ti