Citations
- 130 Cal. 555
Full opinion text
GAROUTTE, J.
This action is brought by the assignee of the real estate firm of Hooker & Lent, and is based upon a broker’s contract entered into by defendant April 10, 1897. Tire material parts of this contract are as follows: “For and in consideration of the services to be performed by Messrs. Hooker & Lent, I hereby employ them as my sole and exclusive agents to sell for me that certain real property..... This employment and authority shall continue for the full period of thirty days from the date hereof and thereafter until withdrawn by me in writing; and I agree to pay to said Hooker & Lent, in the event of the sale of said real property by them or by anyone else, including myself, while this contract is in force, two thousand two hundred and fifty dollars as and for their compensation hereunder.” Some weeks after the expiration of the thirty-day period specified in the instrument, but before any withdrawal of the employment of the brokers by defendant in writing had been-made, defendant sold the property. This action was then brought and judgment recovered for the sum of two thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. It is conceded that the brokers found no purchaser .for the property, but the evidence shows and the findings of fact are to the effect that they spent time and money in an attempt to find a purchaser.
As far as the merits of this litigation are concerned, it is not material that the sale made by defendant took place after the expiration of the thirty-day period named in the contract; for the contract was in force for thirty days, and thereafter until a certain written notice was served on the brokers revoking it, and this notice had not been served when the sale was made. For this reason the contract was in full force and effect at that time. It had exactly the same binding effect upon defendant at the time of the sale, as it would have had if the sale had been made within the first thirty days of its life. If the brokers had found a purchaser at any time prior to the sale made by defendant, then clearly they would have been entitled to their commission; and this circumstance alone shows that the contract was in full force and effect when the sale was made.
It is suggested by appellant that the sale by her was in effect a withdrawal in writing of the employment of the brokers, and thereby put an end to the contract. This contract cannot bear that construction. A sale by the defendant, followed by h'er deed, was not the writing contemplated by the terms of the instrument. This is doubly apparent, for defendant agreed by its terms to pay the brokers the amount specified if she herself sold the property; again, if this deed