Citations
- 72 Cal. 78
Full opinion text
Belcher, C. C.
This is a joint action brought by William Tredennick and twenty-nine other persons, as plaintiffs, to enforce liens for labor severally performed by them in and upon a mining claim known as the Red Cloud Mine. The mine was situate in Mono County, and was owned and worked by the defendant the Red Cloud Consolidated Mining Company. Henry Wads-worth was joined as a defendant in the action, because he had a judgment lien against the mine, which, as alleged by plaintiffs, was subsequent and subordinate to their liens.
In the court below judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants separately moved for a new trial, and their motions being denied, separately appealed from the judgment and order.
The two appeals may be considered together.
The Code provides that when one seeks to fasten a ¡lien upon another’s property, he must file with the county recorder his claim, containing, among other things, “ a statement of the terms, time given, and conditions of his contract, and also a description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification.” (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1187.)
It is urged for the appellants that the claims filed iby the plaintiffs do mot .contain the statement and description required by the statute, and are therefore fatally defective and insufficient.
The provisions of the Code referred to “ are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect its objects,-and to promote justice,” and not strictly, as claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 4.)
So construed, were the claims sufficient to create valid liens?
We think they were. In each of them was set forth the kind and number of days of labor performed, with the dates between which it was performed, the price agreed to be paid for the labor per day, with the aggregate amount then due, and “ that the terms of payment for said labor were cash, as soon as said labor was performed.” This was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute as to the statement of the terms, time given, and conditions of the contract. (Blackman v. Marsicano, 61 Cal. 638; Hills v. Ohlig, 63 Cal. 104.)
The property on which the labor was performed was described as “ that certain mine, commonly called the Red Cloud Mine, situate in the Bodie Mining District, Bodie. township, in Said county, and hereinafter more particularly described.” The particular description is by sixteen courses and distances, commencing at a point easily ascertainable, and running around to the place of beginning, “ containing 35.31 acres, and known as the-Red Cloud Mine.” The fourth course reads: “ Thence, 4th, 67° 45' E., 1.51 chains to N. E. cor. Gibraltar,” when it should have been: “ Thence, 4th, S. 67° 45' E.,” etc. The fifth course reads: “ Thence, 5th, S. 220, 15' 1ST., 11.07 chains to N. boundary Top Gallant Royal,” when it should have been: “ Thence, 5th, S. 22° 15' W.,” etc. The twelfth course reads: “ Thence, 12th, S. 49° 30' E., 1.06 chains to N. E. cor. Westchester,” when it should have been: “ Thence, 12th, S. 49° 30' E., 1.86 chains,” etc.
It is claimed for the appellants that, on account of these errors, it becomes impossible to trace all of the exterior lines of the mine, and for that reason the description is insufficient. On the other hand, it is contended for the respondents that “ Gibraltar,” “ Top Gallant Royal,” and “ Westchester ” are names of adjoining, well-known, and defined mining claims, which are monuments, and must control the courses and distances. As they are used, these names seem to have been intended to represent monuments of some kind, and we cannot know judicially that they do not efficiently serve the purpose claimed for them.
But however this may be, we think the description by name was sufficient for the identification of the property. It appears from the evidence that the mine was well-known, and commonly spoken of as the “ Red Cloud Mine”; and by the word “mine” was not meant “a subterranean cavity or passage, especially a pit or excavation in the earth, from which metallic ores or other mineral substances are taken by digging,” as that word is defined by Webster, but the whole claim or body of mining ground.
In Hotaling v. Cronise, 2 Cal. 63, which was an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, the notice filed described the property as “ the wharf situated on Battery Street, between Pacific and Jackson streets, in San Francisco.” The court said: “We think the description of the property sufficiently certain.....It is sufficient if' the claim be set forth with convenient certainty.”
In Tibbetts v. Moore, 23 Cal. 212, which was a similar action, the property was described in the notice filed as a quartz mill, being at or near the town of ScottsvilIe,.in Amador County, known as “ Moore's New Quartz Mill;”' There was no evidence that there was any other quartz: mill- at the place named so designated as to render it uncertain which was intended, and it was held that the description was sufficient to identify the property and’ uphold the lien. In Haley v. Amestoy, 44 Cal. 132, the action was ejectment, and the principal question in the case related to the description of the premises found in the deed .under which the defendants claimed. There were two .descriptions, one by name, and the other by courses, distances,, and monuments. It appeared from the evidence .that the property was well known by the name given to ¡it, but the description by courses and distances was so (erroneous that the lines could not thereby be traced. It was held that the description by name was sufficient,