Glossip v. Oklahoma (604 U.S. 226, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 Pages 226–304 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT February 25, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 226 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA certiorari to the court of criminal appeals of oklahoma No. 22–7466. Argued October 9, 2024—Decided February 25, 2025 In 1997, Justin Sneed beat Barry Van Treese to death with a baseball bat at an Oklahoma hotel owned by Van Treese and managed by petitioner Richard Glossip. Glossip initially made inconsistent statements to the police about Sneed's role in the murder, but he ultimately told police that Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese. Sneed later claimed Glossip had asked him to murder Van Treese because, among other things, Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip maintained his innocence and refused a plea deal that would have had him avoid the death penalty in return for testifying against Sneed. Sneed then testi- fed against Glossip at trial in exchange for avoiding the death penalty, and Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence connecting Glossip to the murder. The jury convicted Glossip and sentenced him to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned that con- Page Proof Pending Publication viction because the defense had been ineffective in challenging Sneed's testimony and the remainder of the evidence only weakly corroborated Sneed's account. At the retrial, Sneed provided inconsistent testimony on potential motives for Glossip's murder. Sneed also denied that he had been prescribed lithium or seen a psychiatrist. After the defense established (through the State's medical examiner) that Van Treese had been attacked with a knife as well as a bat, Sneed testifed that he had repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a pocket knife. But Sneed had previously denied stabbing Van Treese both when ques- tioned by the police as well as at Glossip's frst trial. Glossip moved for a mistrial based on the prosecution's failure to notify the defense about Sneed's change in testimony, which the trial court denied after the prosecution disclaimed any knowledge about the change. Glossip was again convicted and sentenced to death, and a closely divided OCCA affrmed, holding that circumstantial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the hotel, combined with Glossip's concession that he had been dishonest in his initial statements after the murder, suffciently corroborated Sneed's testimony that he killed Van Treese at Glossip's direction. Glossip subsequently fled several unsuccessful habeas petitions. Concerns over the integrity of his conviction led a bipartisan group of Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 227 Syllabus Oklahoma legislators to commission an independent investigation by a law frm, Reed Smith. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported “grave doubt” about Glossip's conviction, citing factors such as the prosecution's deliberate destruction of key evidence and the false portrayal of Justin Sneed as a non-violent “puppet.” The State then disclosed seven boxes of previously withheld documents, including letters suggesting Sneed had considered recanting and a note from prosecutor Connie Smother- mon to Sneed's lawyer noting they should “get to” Sneed to discuss his problematic testimony about a knife found in Van Treese's room. Glossip fled for post-conviction relief based on this evidence and evi- dence revealed by Reed Smith. Glossip also argued that, during his second trial, Smothermon had interfered with Sneed's testimony about the knife in violation of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits wit- nesses from hearing each other's testimony. Oklahoma waived any pro- cedural defenses to Glossip's claims, and asked the OCCA to deny the claims on their merits. The OCCA denied Glossip's claims as procedur- ally barred and meritless. The State then discovered additional documents revealing that Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium, contra- dicting his trial testimony. The attorney general determined that Page Proof Pending Publication Smothermon had knowingly elicited false testimony from Sneed and failed to correct it, violating Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct false testi- mony. Glossip fled a successive petition for post-conviction relief, which the attorney general supported, conceding multiple errors that warranted a new trial. The OCCA denied the unopposed petition with- out a hearing, holding that Glossip's claims were procedurally barred under Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), and further that the State's concession was not “based in law or fact” because it did not create a Napue error. This Court stayed Glossip's execution and granted certiorari. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA's judgment. The independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes the Court from considering a federal question if the state court's decision rests on an independent and adequate state-law ground. The OCCA's applica- tion of the PCPA was not such a ground, because the OCCA's decision to apply the PCPA depended on its antecedent rejection of the attorney general's confession of a Napue error, which was based solely on federal law. The OCCA held that the confession could not overcome the PCPA's limitations because it lacked a basis in law or fact, specifcally fnding no Napue error. 228 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Syllabus Oklahoma precedent confrms that the OCCA normally rejects an at- torney general's confession of error only after fnding it unsupported by law and the record. By making the application of the PCPA contingent on its determination that the attorney general's confession of federal constitutional error was baseless, the OCCA made the procedural bar dependent on an antecedent ruling on federal law. To the extent that the OCCA's reasoning on this point is insuffciently “clear from the face of the opinion,” the Court presumes reliance on federal law under Mich- igan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040–1041. Pp. 242–246. 2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony. Pp. 246–258. (a) Under Napue, a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false testimony to go uncorrected. If a violation is established, a new trial is warranted if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the jury's judgment; meaning, ordinarily, that the prosecution must estab- lish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 680, n. 9; Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24. Here, Page Proof Pending Publication Oklahoma's attorney general joins Glossip in asserting a Napue error, conceding that Sneed's testimony about his lithium prescription was false and that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct it. The rec- ord supports that confession of error. Evidence showed that Sneed was prescribed lithium to treat bipolar disorder, not after asking for cold medicine as he claimed at trial. The evidence likewise establishes that the prosecution knew Sneed's testimony was false. The prosecution al- most certainly had access to Sneed's medical fle through Sneed's compe- tency evaluation. And Smothermon's notes show that she had a pre- trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned “lithium” and “Dr. Trumpet.” The straightforward inference is that Smothermon was aware before trial that Sneed had received his lithium prescription from Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist and the sole medical professional at the Oklahoma County jail authorized to prescribe lithium. Because Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence of Glossip's guilt, the jury's assessment of Sneed's credibility was material and nec- essarily determinative. Correcting Sneed's lie would have undermined his credibility and revealed his willingness to lie under oath. The false testimony also bore on Glossip's guilt because evidence of Sneed's bipo- lar disorder, which could trigger impulsive violence when combined with his drug use, would have contradicted the prosecution's portrayal of Sneed as harmless without Glossip's infuence. Hence there is a reason- Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 229 Syllabus able likelihood that correcting Sneed's testimony would have affected the judgment of the jury. Napue, 360 U. S., at 271. Additional prose- cutorial misconduct, such as violating the rule of sequestration, destroy- ing evidence, and withholding witness statements, further undermines confdence in the verdict. Consequently, the prosecution's failure to correct Sneed's false testimony entitles Glossip to a new trial under Napue. Pp. 246–252. (b) The OCCA's contrary holding rests on a mistaken interpretation of Napue. The OCCA held that there was no violation because the defense was aware or should have been aware that Sneed was taking lithium. But Sneed's false testimony concerned the reasons for his pre- scription, not merely the fact that he had taken lithium. Moreover, the Due Process Clause imposes the duty to correct false testimony on the State, not the defense. The OCCA's holding that Sneed was likely in de- nial of his mental health disorders is beside the point; what matters is that the testimony was false and the prosecutor knowingly allowed it to stand. Additional arguments in support of the OCCA's position are unpersua- sive. Napue does not require that the false testimony itself must have directly affected the trial's outcome; Napue requires assessing whether the prosecutor's failure to correct the testimony could have contributed to the verdict. Also unpersuasive are arguments based on extra-record Page Proof Pending Publication materials and insuffcient time spent interviewing the prosecutor. Because the attorney general's confession of error is supported by ample evidence, the Court declines to remand this case for further evi- dentiary proceedings. When the Court has jurisdiction, a new trial is the appropriate remedy for a violation of Napue. Pp. 252–258. 529 P. 3d 218, reversed and remanded. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined, and in which Barrett, J., joined as to Part II. Barrett, J., fled an opinion concur- ring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 258. Thomas, J., fled a dis- senting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, and in which Barrett, J., joined as to Parts IV–A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3, post, p. 262. Gorsuch, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Catherine M. A. Carroll, Zaki Anwar, Donald R. Knight, Amy P. Knight, John R. Mills, and Joseph J. Perkovich. Paul D. Clement argued the cause for respondent under this Court's Rule 12.6. With him on the briefs were Gentner F. Drummond, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Garry M. 230 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Syllabus Gaskins II, Solicitor General, Matthew D. Rowen, and Jo- seph J. DeMott. Christopher G. Michel, by invitation of the Court, 601 U. S. 1010, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Rachel G. Frank, Alex Van Dyke, and Nicholas J. Caluda.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the District of Columbia et al. by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General, and Elissa R. Lowenthal, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown of Mary- land, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, and Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by William R. Weaver, David D. Cole, Brian W. Stull, Randy Alan Bauman, and Megan Page Proof Pending Publication Lambert; for Former Members of the Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission by Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and Jacqueline G. Cooper; for the Innocence Project by Andrianna D. Kastanek; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Barbara E. Berg- man and Hassan Ahmad; for R. Michael Cassidy et al. by Meaghan VerGow, Joshua Revesz, and Bruce A. Green; for Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, by Emmet T. Flood; and for Rep. Kevin McDugle et al. by Gregory G. Garre. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Texas by Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General, Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Philip A. Lionberger, Assistant Solicitor General, and Matthew Ottoway and J. Andrew Mackenzie, Assist- ant Attorneys General; for the State of Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Stanford E. Purser, Solicitor General, Andrew F. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, and Ginger Jarvis and Mark C. Field, Assistant Solicitors General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; for Current and Former State and Federal Prosecutors by David A. Senior and Ann K. Tria; for Federal Courts Scholars by Melanie L. Bostwick, Thomas M. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 231 Opinion of the Court Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. An Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Richard Glossip of paying Justin Sneed to murder Barry Van Treese and sen- tenced him to death. At trial, Sneed admitted he beat Van Treese to death, but testifed that Glossip had offered him thousands of dollars to do so. Glossip confessed he helped Sneed conceal his crime after the fact, but he denied any involvement in the murder. Nearly two decades later, the State disclosed eight boxes of previously withheld documents from Glossip's trial. These documents show that Sneed suffered from bipolar dis- order, which, combined with his known drug use, could have caused impulsive outbursts of violence. They also estab- lished, the State agrees, that a jail psychiatrist prescribed Sneed lithium to treat that condition, and that the prosecu- tion allowed Sneed falsely to testify at trial that he had never seen a psychiatrist. Faced with that evidence, Okla- homa's attorney general confessed error. Before the Okla- Page Proof Pending Publication homa Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the State conceded that the prosecution's failure to correct Sneed's testimony violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct false testimony. The attorney general accordingly asked the court to grant Glossip a new trial. The OCCA declined to grant relief because, it held, the State's concession was not “based in law or fact.” 2023 OK CR 5, ¶25, 529 P. 3d 218, 226. Because the prosecution violated its obligations under Napue, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for a new trial. I A Barry Van Treese owned a Best Budget Inn in Tulsa and in Oklahoma City. Richard Glossip managed the Oklahoma Bondy, and Katherine M. Kopp; and for Derek Van Treese et al. by Paul G. Cassell. 232 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court City hotel and lived there with his girlfriend. In the sum- mer of 1996, Justin Sneed and his stepbrother approached Glossip and asked him about working for a room. 2 App. 648. Glossip agreed to let them stay in return for help with maintenance and housekeeping. Sneed, however, had a his- tory of violence, angry outbursts, and substance abuse that included marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and acid. Id., at 700–701. When, on January 6, 1997, Van Treese vis- ited the inn to collect cash deposits there, Sneed beat him to death with a baseball bat. See 2007 OK CR 12, ¶¶4–5, 157 P. 3d 143, 147–148 (Glossip II). After killing Van Treese, Sneed evaded law enforcement for several days. Police did promptly interview Glossip, who told them that Sneed had knocked on his door that night with a bump on his head “like somebody punched him.” App. to Response to Petitioner's Succ. Application for Post- Conviction Relief in No. PCD–2022–819, Tr. of Glossip Police Page Proof Pending Publication Interview 15 (Jan. 8, 1997). Glossip added that Sneed had told him he slipped in the shower. Ibid. Glossip disclaimed any knowledge of Van Treese's murder, but admitted that he helped Sneed replace (from the outside) the broken window of the room where Van Treese's body was later found. The next day, offcers arrested Glossip in front of an attorney's offce with approximately $1,700 in cash on him. 1 App. 291– 292. Glossip then admitted Sneed had told him “that he killed Barry.” Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9, 1997). When confronted with his prior inconsistent state- ments about the murder and Van Treese's whereabouts, Glossip said that he had been scared to tell the truth because he feared his failure to notify the police immediately meant he was “already involved in it.” Id., at 29–30. The State thereafter charged Sneed with capital murder and Glossip as an accessory after the fact based on his inac- curate statements to the police. Eventually, police located and interviewed Sneed, who had $1,680 in bloody cash on him. See 14 Tr. 18 (May 28, 2004); 15 Tr. 170 (June 1, 2004). Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 233 Opinion of the Court The offcers told Sneed that before he “ma[de] up [his] mind on anything” they wanted him “to hear some of the things” they “[had] to say,” including that they did not think Sneed had acted alone and that he should not “take the whole thing” himself. 2 App. 645–646. “[E]verybody” was mak- ing Sneed “the scapegoat in this,” they told him—especially Glossip, who was “putting it on [him] the worst.” Id., at 655. Sneed initially responded to the offcers' prompts by at- tempting to implicate his brother, ibid., but eventually said that Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese's money and that Van Treese's death had been the result of a robbery gone wrong. Id., at 655–660. Sneed described breaking into Van Treese's room and beating him with a baseball bat until he “fgured he was knocked out.” Id., at 665. Accord- ing to Sneed, he then took Van Treese's car keys, stole an envelope with approximately $4,000 in cash from his car, and split the money with Glossip. Id., at 665–669. When off- Page Proof Pending Publication cers pressed him on the state of Van Treese's body, Sneed asserted that, “[a]ctually,” Glossip had asked him to kill Van Treese so that he “could run the motel without him being the boss.” Id., at 675. Following Sneed's interview, Oklahoma charged Glossip, too, with capital murder. The prosecution offered Glossip a deal: plead guilty and avoid the death sentence in return for testifying against Sneed. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–6500, p. 144a. When Glossip refused, maintaining his in- nocence, the State offered Sneed the same deal, and Sneed accepted. 2001 OK CR 21, ¶5, 29 P. 3d 597, 599 (Glossip I). Sneed then testifed at Glossip's trial that he beat Van Treese to death “because [Glossip] asked him to do it.” Ibid. When asked whether there was any “particular reason why [Glossip] wanted to kill [Van Treese]” that night, Sneed re- plied, “Not that I know of. Every time that Mr. Van Treese showed up, [Glossip] was wanting me to kill him.” 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998). In closing, the prosecution argued that Glossip had asked Sneed to kill Van Treese because he be- 234 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court lieved Van Treese planned to fre him for embezzling hotel profts. 8 Tr. 14–15 (June 10, 1998). The jury convicted Glossip and sentenced him to death. The OCCA unanimously reversed. Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence connecting Glossip to the murder, it held, and “[t]he evidence at trial tending to corroborate Sneed's testimony was extremely weak.” Glossip I, 29 P. 3d, at 599. Defense counsel's failure to cross-examine Sneed on his many inconsistent statements was therefore “so ineffective” as to undermine any “confdence that a reliable adversarial proceeding took place.” Ibid. In 2004, after Glossip rejected another plea offer, 3 App. 720, the State tried him a second time. Several witnesses confrmed what Glossip had told the police in his second in- terview: In the hours following Van Treese's killing, Glossip feigned ignorance and lied about Van Treese's whereabouts. As in the frst trial, however, only one witness, Justin Sneed, testifed that Glossip was involved in anything more.1 Page Proof Pending Publication This time, moreover, the defense established (through the State's medical examiner) that Van Treese had been attacked 1 The dissent's narrative, which presents as historical fact the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses at Glossip's second trial, relies heavily on Sneed's testimony to suggest that Glossip directed the crime and an elabo- rate coverup. See post, at 262–267 (opinion of Thomas, J.). To the ex- tent the dissent relies on witnesses other than Sneed, their testimony con- frms no more than what Glossip himself admitted to the police. As for Sneed's testimony, the dissent constructs its favored narrative from among his multiple inconsistent accounts of the murder. See supra, at 232–235; compare post, at 264 (dissent asserting that “Sneed left [Van Treese's room] when he thought that he had killed Van Treese”), with 2 App. 665 (Sneed telling police he left Van Treese's room when he thought Van Treese was “knocked out”); compare post, at 264 (dissent asserting Glossip told Sneed “they would both be evicted if Glossip lost his job”), with 2 App. 655–665 (Sneed telling police that Van Treese's death was the acci- dental result of a robbery gone wrong), 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998) (Sneed testifying that he did not know why Glossip wanted him to kill Van Treese), and 12 Tr. 75 (May 26, 2004) (Sneed testifying that Glossip had wanted to rob Van Treese). Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 235 Opinion of the Court with a knife as well as with a baseball bat. 1 id., at 239– 245. Although Sneed had denied stabbing Van Treese to the police and at Glossip's frst trial, he now said that he had repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a pocket knife. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 148–149. Because the prosecution had not notifed the defense about this change in testimony, Glossip moved for a mistrial. 12 Tr. 105 (May 26, 2004). The trial court denied that motion after the prosecution attested that the change was news to them, too. Id., at 107–108 (“The chest thing we're all hearing at the same time”). The prosecution also asked Sneed whether anyone had prescribed him any medication: “Q. After you were arrested, were you placed on any type of prescription medication? “A. When I was arrested I asked for some Sudafed be- cause I had a cold, but then shortly after that somehow Page Proof Pending Publication they ended up giving me Lithium for some reason, I don't know why. I never seen no psychiatrist or anything. “Q. So you don't know why they gave you that? “A. No.” Id., at 64. Sneed then confrmed that he used illegal drugs including marijuana and “crank” (methamphetamine) “twice a week” prior to his arrest. Id., at 64–65. Finally, Sneed testifed about Glossip's purported motives for killing Van Treese. He asserted that Glossip had suggested “robbing Barry of his money,” id., at 75, that he had “told [Sneed] at one point that with Mr. Van Treese out of the way . . . he would be able not only [to] manage the motel on Council but also an- other one they had [in Tulsa],” id., at 89, and that he had worried he “was going to get fred” because “a couple of the rooms that were already supposed to be remodeled . . . weren't,” id., at 95. The prosecution weaved these suggestions into its closing argument along with its original theory that Glossip had 236 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court wanted Van Treese dead to avoid being fred for embezzle- ment. See 15 Tr. 65 (June 1, 2004) (arguing Glossip's motive was “a big wad of around 4,000 bucks of American good Yan- kee dollars to split with the kid”); id., at 153, 163 (arguing Glossip was going to be fred because of “missing money”); id., at 164–165 (arguing Glossip was going to be fred because of the condition of the rooms). It then argued that Sneed, “satisfed and contented with [his] humble life,” id., at 68, had no propensity to violence except at Glossip's direction: “[I]t's as if Justin Sneed was a Rottweiler puppy, let's say 11 months old, and Richard Glossip was the dog trainer. You can sure sick a dog on somebody, but if you're going to do that and you send a dog that's not trained or is a little bit too young, he might trip and fall, he might get scared and run away, he might do some- thing stupid, he might not do a good job. But no matter how you slice it, no matter how you parse it, the person Page Proof Pending Publication that says `sick `em' is the person that makes the deci- sion.” Id., at 73. The jury again convicted Glossip of capital murder and again sentenced him to death. A closely divided OCCA affrmed, holding that circumstan- tial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the hotel, combined with the concession that Glossip had been dishon- est in his initial statements after the murder, suffciently cor- roborated Sneed's testimony that he killed Van Treese at Glossip's direction. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 151–153. In dissent, Judge Chapel and Judge A. Johnson argued that the majority “overstate[d] the strength of the accomplice corrob- oration evidence.” Id., at 164–165, 175. B Glossip continued to maintain his innocence in the years after his conviction, fling several habeas petitions in state and federal court. Although that litigation did not result in relief, mounting concerns over the integrity of Glossip's Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 237 Opinion of the Court conviction drew the attention of the Oklahoma Legislature. A bipartisan group of 62 Oklahoma legislators retained a law frm, Reed Smith, to conduct an independent investigation into the case. Pet. for Cert. 12; App. to Pet. for Cert. 390a– 391a. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported its “grave doubt as to the integrity of Glossip's murder conviction and death sentence.” Independent Investigation of State v. Richard E. Glossip 6 (June 7, 2022). Among other things, Reed Smith concluded the prosecution had deliberately destroyed “key physical evidence” before Glossip's retrial, including several items from the crime scene and the inn's receipts and deposit books, which could have helped Glossip address the accusa- tions of embezzlement. Id., at 7, 9, n. 25, 34, 48. Reed Smith further concluded that the State had “falsely por- trayed Sneed at trial as a meek and non-violent `puppet,' ” id., at 10, and that key testimony about Glossip's motive and actions on the morning after the murder had been provided Page Proof Pending Publication by a former police offcer of “ `very limited honesty and in- tegrity' ” who was jailed for making false statements shortly after Glossip's second trial, id., at 6–12. Two months after Reed Smith's report, the State disclosed seven boxes of previously withheld documents from Glossip's trials. Those boxes contained a note the head prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, sent to Sneed's lawyer before Sneed testifed at the second trial. Smothermon's note concerned “a few items that have been testifed to that I needed to discuss with Justin,” including the “biggest problem,” which (the note said) was “still the knife.” 3 App. 953. The exam- iners' testimony about the knife was problematic, Smother- mon's note explained, because “Justin [told] the police that the knife fell out of his pocket and that he didn't stab the victim with it,” yet the victim had “ `lacerations' ” consistent with the “knife blade.” Ibid. It did not “make much sense” to Smothermon, moreover, “that Justin could have control of the bat and a knife” on his own. Ibid. “[W]e should get to him this afternoon,” the note concluded. Ibid. 238 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court The boxes further contained letters from Sneed to his at- torney suggesting he had expressed a desire to recant his testimony prior to Glossip's second trial. See id., at 811– 816. For example, in a letter dated May 15, 2003, Sneed wrote to his attorney asking “ `do I have the choice of recant- ing my testimony at any time during my life,' ” and is “ `there . . . anything you know, on [Glossip's] court date and about re-canting.' ” Id., at 815 (emphasis deleted); App. to Pet. for Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, No. 22–6500, at 192a.2 Based on this new evidence and the evidence revealed by Reed Smith, Glossip fled another motion for post-conviction relief with the OCCA. Among other things, Glossip argued that, during his second trial, Smothermon had interfered with Sneed's testimony about the knife in violation of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits witnesses from hear- ing each other's testimony. 3 App. 785–882. Oklahoma re- sponded that Glossip's claims were meritless, but that it Page Proof Pending Publication would nonetheless waive any procedural defenses in order to mitigate the damage from a “media campaign” on Glossip's behalf. Id., at 717–718. Oklahoma further asked the OCCA to deny Glossip's claims on their merits so as “to trigger the state court deference anticipated in [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]” in any future federal review. Id., at 718, n. 7. Noting that it alone would “determine whether the rules of this Court should be abandoned,” the OCCA held that Glossip's claims were procedurally barred as well as meritless. Id., at 775–783. 2 The dissent claims Sneed thought the phrase “ `recan[t] my testimony' ” meant “ `refuse to testify,' ” post, at 272, n. 2, meaning (on the dissent's view) Sneed asked his lawyer: “If I [testify] again, do I have the choice of [refusing to testify] at any time during my life?” The dissent further points to an interview Sneed gave decades later, where (with Glossip's execution imminent) he denied ever “ `want[ing] to change the truth.' ” Post, at 271, n. 2. Of course, Sneed's much later denials do not erase his prior statements about recanting. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 239 Opinion of the Court Shortly thereafter, the State “unearthed disturbing reve- lations about the contents of ” an eighth box of trial docu- ments “consisting of material it previously prevented the de- fense from obtaining.” Brief for Respondent 10. “Buried inside Box 8,” the State says, “was a page of notes handwrit- ten by Smothermon during a pretrial interview with Sneed,” indicating “that Sneed had told Smothermon that he was `on lithium' not by mistake, but in connection with a `Dr. Trum- pet.' ” Ibid. Oklahoma's attorney general “deduced the import of these notes in short order”: Only a single psychia- trist worked in the Oklahoma County jail when Sneed was held there, and his name was Dr. Larry Trombka. Ibid.; see also 3 App. 930. A summary of Sneed's medical records (previously withheld from Glossip's counsel after motion practice seeking their discovery) showed that Sneed had re- ceived lithium to treat his undisclosed bipolar disorder. Brief for Respondent 10; 3 App. 1005. After this discovery, Page Proof Pending Publication Dr. Trombka signed an affdavit attesting that he was the only medical professional at the jail who would have pre- scribed Sneed lithium. Id., at 1003. The attorney general accordingly determined that Sneed “was not in fact mis-prescribed lithium, but rather diagnosed with bipolar disorder and treated with lithium under the care of a psychiatrist”—and “despite her knowledge of these facts,” Smothermon “elicited false testimony from Sneed” on that subject. Brief for Respondent 11.3 3 Also included in Box 8 were prosecutors' witness interview notes sug- gesting the State may have omitted certain details from the summaries it turned over to the defense. For example, one witness apparently told the prosecution that Glossip had sold him a big screen TV and a couch for $900, 3 App. 952—a sum that would account for much of the cash Glossip had on his person at his arrest. That same witness testifed at trial that he did not know how much money Glossip had received for those sales. 1 id., at 286. Glossip's girlfriend later explained in a post-trial affdavit that Glossip had been selling their possessions to pay for an attorney. 2 id., at 706. 240 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court The attorney general thereafter disclosed Box 8 to Glossip and retained an independent counsel to conduct another re- view of Glossip's conviction. As relevant here, the inde- pendent counsel concluded that Smothermon's attempt to in- terfere with Sneed's testimony about the knife violated the rule of sequestration, that her failure to turn over Sneed's statements about his mental health treatment violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and that her failure to correct Sneed's false trial testimony that he had been given lithium after asking for cold medicine violated Napue, 360 U. S. 264. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, 58a. His report concluded: “[T]he State must vacate Glossip's conviction due to its decades-long failure to disclose what I believe is Brady material, correct what I believe was false trial testi- mony of its star witness, and what I believe was a viola- tion of the Court ordered Rule of Sequestration of wit- Page Proof Pending Publication nesses. . . . In my view, this case is also permeated by failures to secure, safeguard and maintain evidence in a capital murder case.” Id., at 62a. Following the Box 8 disclosure and the independent coun- sel's recommendation, Glossip fled a successive petition for post-conviction relief with the OCCA asserting Brady, Napue, cumulative error, and actual innocence claims.4 The attorney general fled a “Response in Support of Petitioner's Successive Application for Post-Conviction Relief.” 3 App. 973. Although the attorney general did not endorse Gloss- ip's actual innocence claim, he represented that his offce had “concluded that Justin Sneed . . . made material misstate- ments to the jury regarding his psychiatric treatment and 4 The dissent faults Glossip for “ignor[ing] the lithium issue on direct appeal” years earlier. Post, at 269. Glossip had no reason to know at the time of his direct appeal that Smothermon knowingly failed to correct Sneed's false testimony about why he had been given lithium, however, so he would have had no occasion to raise his Napue or Brady claims then. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 241 Opinion of the Court the reasons for his lithium prescription,” which the State had failed to correct in violation of Napue. 3 App. 974. In addition, the State indicated it was “concerned that there were multiple and cumulative errors, such as violation of the rule of sequestration and destruction of evidence, that when taken together with Sneed's misstatements warrant” a new trial. Ibid.; see also id., at 977 (“[T]he State believes Glossip is entitled to post-conviction relief ”); id., at 978 (State is “compelled, consistent with Napue,” to correct mis- statements); id., at 979 (“[T]he State requests that the Court vacate Glossip's conviction and that the case be remanded to the district court”). Because Oklahoma agreed with Glossip on the pertinent facts, it did not request an evidentiary hearing. The OCCA denied Glossip's unopposed petition without a hearing. It acknowledged the attorney general's request that Glossip's conviction be vacated, noting that this conces- sion alone could not “directly” provide a ground for relief. Page Proof Pending Publication 529 P. 3d, at 223. The court said the following about the State's confession of Napue error: “Glossip claims that the State failed to disclose evidence of Justin Sneed's mental health treatment and that Sneed lied about his mental health treatment to the jury. Though the State in its response now concedes that this alleged false testimony combined with other unspecifed cumulative errors warrant postconviction relief, the con- cession alone cannot overcome the limitations on succes- sive post-conviction review. See 22 O.S. Supp. 2022, § 1089(D)(8). The State's concession is not based in law or fact.” 529 P. 3d, at 226 (footnote omitted). The OCCA then applied Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Proce- dures Act (PCPA) to hold that Glossip's claims were proce- durally barred. It concluded separately that the evidence presented by the parties did not “create a Napue error.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). 242 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court This Court thereafter stayed Glossip's execution at the joint request of the parties and granted certiorari to consider Glossip's Brady and Napue claims and the effect of the attor- ney general's confession of error.5 601 U. S. 999 (2024). The Court also requested argument on an additional ques- tion: whether the OCCA's holding that the PCPA precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state- law ground for the judgment. Because Oklahoma agrees with Glossip on the merits of his appeal, the Court appointed Christopher Michel as ami- cus curiae to defend the judgment below. 601 U. S. 1010 (2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities. II A We begin with this Court's jurisdiction to review the Page Proof Pending Publication OCCA's judgment. “ `This Court will not take up a question of federal law presented in a case “if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judg- ment.” ' ” Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U. S. 17, 25 (2023) (quoting Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 375 (2002)). “In the context of direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991). A state ground of decision is independent only when it does not depend on a federal holding, Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. 488, 498 (2016), and also is not intertwined with questions of federal law, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040–1041 (1983). “[W]hen the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state 5 Because the Court grants relief under Napue, the Court need not reach the merits of Glossip's Brady claim. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 243 Opinion of the Court court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” Ibid. Amicus argues this Court lacks jurisdiction because the OCCA held that Glossip's claims were barred under the PCPA, and the PCPA is “a paradigmatic independent and adequate state-law ground.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 13. That argument fails because it over- looks an antecedent holding that turned on federal law. The OCCA frst rejected the attorney general's confession of Napue error, deeming it meritless and therefore incapable of “overcom[ing]” application of the PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226. Only then did it apply the PCPA to Glossip. Because the OCCA's decision to reject the attorney general's confession of error rested exclusively on federal law, so too did its sub- sequent decision to apply the PCPA. In his brief to the OCCA, the attorney general disclaimed reliance on any procedural defenses, including the PCPA. Page Proof Pending Publication Instead, the attorney general “concede[d] error under Napue,” 3 App. 978, acknowledging that, as a matter of fed- eral law, the prosecution's knowing failure to correct Sneed's “material misstatements” entitled Glossip to a new trial. Id., at 977, 978, 979. The OCCA held that this confession of Napue error could not “overcome the [PCPA's] limitations on successive post-conviction review” because it was “not based in law or fact.” 529 P. 3d, at 226. Specifcally, the OCCA concluded that the underlying evidence “d[id] not create a Napue error.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). Thus, the OCCA's application of the PCPA over the attorney general's confes- sion of error depended on its determination that no Napue violation had occurred. That was a federal holding, and it was the only reason the OCCA provided for its conclusion that the attorney general's confession could not “overcome” the PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226. The PCPA therefore poses no impediment to our review in this case. Oklahoma precedent involving confessions of error by an attorney general confrms this reading. As the OCCA has 244 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court repeatedly explained, it will normally reject an attorney general's confession of error only after fnding that it lacks a basis in the law and in the record. See, e. g., Bindrum v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 372, 228 P. 168 (1924) (“Where the At- torney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in law, the conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)).6 Otherwise, if the confession of error is sup- ported by the law and the record, the OCCA will reverse the underlying conviction and remand for a new trial.7 Ibid. The OCCA applied that same rule here: It rejected the attor- ney general's confession of error as having no basis “in law or fact,” and explained that it would therefore apply the PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226. In doing so, the OCCA “made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal constitutional error ha[d] been committed.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75 Page Proof Pending Publication (1985). After all, it made application of the PCPA contin- 6 See also Raymer v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 398, 228 P. 500 (1924) (“Where the Attorney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby and is well founded in law, the conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Dorsett v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 65, 69, 180 P. 557, 558 (1919) (reversing conviction because “the confession of error [of the attorney general] is well founded” in law); Whittemore v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 338, 223 P. 890 (1924) (per curiam) (same); Day v. State, 352 P. 2d 935 (OCCA 1960) (“Where the Attorney General confesses error, Court of Criminal Appeals will examine the rec- ord, and, if confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in law, conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Casey v. State, 440 P. 2d 208, 209 (OCCA 1968) (“When the Attorney General confesses error, this Court will carefully examine the record for fundamental error”); Mc- Connell v. State, 485 P. 2d 764, 765 (OCCA 1971) (similar); One Ford Tour- ing Car v. State, 100 Okla. 267, 268, 229 P. 231, 232 (1924) (establishing identical rule in civil forfeiture context). 7 The PCPA would not stand in the way of a reversal under this rule because it is not a jurisdictional bar. See Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR 20, ¶¶24–28, 46 P. 3d 703, 710. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 245 Opinion of the Court gent on its determination that the attorney general's confes- sion of federal constitutional error had no basis in law or fact. To the extent that the OCCA's reasoning on this point is insuffciently “clear from the face of the opinion,” we none- theless presume reliance on federal law under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S., at 1040–1041. This Court therefore has ju- risdiction to review the judgment below. B The dissent dismisses all this as an “invent[ed] . . . federal holding that the OCCA never made.” Post, at 279. As the dissent sees it, the OCCA rejected the attorney general's confession of error because (the dissent says) the State failed adequately to address all of the PCPA's procedural require- ments. See post, at 280. The OCCA plainly held that the attorney general's confession was “not based in law or fact,” 529 P. 3d, at 226, however, forcing the dissent to provide Page Proof Pending Publication an awkward explanation that this holding about a federal confession of error on the merits was only about the PCPA's state-law, procedural requirements. Post, at 280. Yet the State expressly attempted to waive those procedural re- quirements by arguing that Glossip was entitled to a new trial. 3 App. 979 (“[T]he State requests that the Court va- cate Glossip's conviction and that the case be remanded to the district court”). So to explain away the “based in law or fact” language, the dissent must proceed on the assump- tion that Oklahoma law requires applicants to satisfy the PCPA's nonjurisdictional provisions even when the State waives them and even if the State's confession of constitu- tional error is otherwise meritorious—notwithstanding the many other contexts where the OCCA privileges meritorious confessions of error. See n. 6, supra (collecting cases); App. to Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law- yers as Amicus Curiae 1a–21a (cataloging the OCCA's deci- sions in the 298 confession-of-error cases predating Glossip's, all of which resulted in relief). 246 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court That assumption is hardly “clear from the face of the opin- ion” below. Long, 463 U. S., at 1041. Thus, we must “ac- cept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that fed- eral law required it to do so.” Ibid. III A Turning to the merits, we conclude that the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony. In Napue v. Illinois, this Court held that a conviction knowingly “obtained through use of false evidence” violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 360 U. S., at 269. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false tes- timony or knowingly allowed it “to go uncorrected when it Page Proof Pending Publication appear[ed].” Ibid. If the defendant makes that showing, a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony “may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial,” id., at 272— that is, if it “ `in any reasonable likelihood [could] have af- fected the judgment of the jury,' ” Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U. S., at 271). In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ` “the benef- ciary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reason- able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ' ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 680, n. 9 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967)). Here, Oklahoma's attorney general joins Glossip in assert- ing a Napue error, conceding both that Sneed's testimony was false and that the prosecution knowingly failed to cor- rect it. The record supports that confession of error. A summary of Sneed's medical records created by the local sheriff 's department establishes that someone diagnosed Sneed with bipolar disorder and prescribed him lithium. 3 Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 247 Opinion of the Court App. 1005. Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist, attested in a sworn affdavit that he was the only medical professional at the Oklahoma County jail who would have issued Sneed that pre- scription. Id., at 930–931. Dr. Trombka also confrmed, and nobody contests, that lithium is used only in psychiatric treatments and not for dental pain (as Sneed said at a pre- trial hearing) or a cold (as Sneed testifed at Glossip's trial). Ibid. Nor would anyone confuse lithium with Sudafed, which is a cold medication. Ibid. Sneed's trial testimony that he had been given lithium after asking for Sudafed and had “never seen no psychiatrist or anything” was therefore false. The evidence likewise establishes that the prosecution knew Sneed's statements were false as he testifed to them. The prosecution almost certainly had access to Sneed's medi- cal fle, which would have listed both the lithium prescription and the bipolar diagnosis. Among other things, those rec- Page Proof Pending Publication ords would have been provided to the State as part of Sneed's competency evaluation, id., at 931, and the State op- posed Glossip's discovery request of Sneed's medical fles on its merits, 2 id., at 622–623; 3 id., at 933. As amicus and the dissent emphasize, moreover, “[l]ithium is prescribed only for mood disorders.” Brief for Court-Appointed Ami- cus Curiae 14; post, at 268 (“It is undisputed that lithium's sole medical purpose, both in 1997 and today, is to treat bipo- lar disorder and other mental health disorders”). Yet the prosecution knew that Sneed had previously told a compe- tency evaluator that he had been prescribed lithium “after his tooth was pulled,” 2 App. 700; that statement was part of a competency record to which both the State and Glossip had access, id., at 698–703. Prosecutors then heard Sneed testify to a different version of events at trial: that the lith- ium had been given to him after he asked for Sudafed be- cause he had a cold. 1 id., at 312. In addition, Smothermon's notes show that she had a pre- trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned “lith- 248 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court ium” and “Dr. Trumpet.” 3 id., at 927. Glossip argues, and the attorney general admits, that this shows Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trumpet (meaning Dr. Trombka) had prescribed him lithium. As just discussed, the record shows that, in fact, Dr. Trombka did diagnose Sneed with bipolar disorder and prescribe him lithium. Sneed plainly discussed these matters with the prosecution. In that private conver- sation, he would have had little to gain from prevaricating about his prescriptions, nor do the notes suggest he did any- thing of the kind. The straightforward inference is that Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trombka had prescribed him the lithium.8 That leaves materiality. Evidence can be material even if it “goes only to the credibility of the witness,” Napue, 360 U. S., at 269; indeed, “[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” ibid. Because Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence of Glossip's guilt of capital murder, Page Proof Pending Publication the jury's assessment of Sneed's credibility was necessarily determinative here. Besides Sneed, no other witness and no physical evidence established that Glossip orchestrated Van Treese's murder. Thus, the jury could convict Glossip only if it believed Sneed. Had the prosecution corrected Sneed on the stand, his credibility plainly would have suffered. That correction would have revealed to the jury not just that Sneed was untrustworthy (as amicus points out, the jury already knew he repeatedly lied to the police), but also that Sneed was 8 The dissent claims Sneed instead repeated his prior false statement that he had been given the lithium after having his tooth pulled. See post, at 273, 274, n. 3, 286, n. 6, 302–303. Yet the dissent's only source for this theory, Smothermon's co-counsel Gary Ackley, acknowledged under oath that he knew lithium was not a pain medication, 3 App. 940, meaning he would have known this story, too, to be wrong. In any event, even if the prosecution did believe Sneed had been given lithium for a toothache, that still would have put them on notice that Sneed's testimony at trial (about receiving lithium after asking for cold medication) was false. Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 249 Opinion of the Court willing to lie to them under oath. Such a revelation would be signifcant in any case, and was especially so here where Sneed was already “nobody's idea of a strong witness.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 37. Even if Sneed's bipolar disorder were wholly irrelevant, as amicus argues, his willingness to lie about it to the jury was not. “ `A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject.' ” Napue, 360 U. S., at 269–270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d 554, 557, 136 N. E. 2d 853, 854–855 (1956)). Sneed's false testimony also bore on Glossip's guilt in a more direct way. As Smothermon's co-counsel Gary Ackley has conceded, it “would have been an important fact for the defense to know” that Sneed had been prescribed lithium to treat bipolar disorder. 3 App. 940. After the Box 8 disclo- sures, Dr. Trombka explained to Glossip's counsel that bipo- lar disorder symptoms “can be exacerbated by illicit drug use, such as methamphetamine,” to “cause an individual to be Page Proof Pending Publication more paranoid or potentially violent.” Id., at 932. Sneed admitted at trial that he regularly used drugs, including methamphetamine. His diagnosis with a disorder that could trigger impulsive violence when combined with drug use thus would have undermined the prosecution's theory that Sneed was harmless on his own—a Rottweiler puppy be- holden to his trainer. 15 Tr. 73 (June 1, 2004). That theory was an important part of the prosecution's case and featured prominently in its opening and closing statements. See, e.g., 3 Tr. 209 (May 13, 2004) (arguing in opening that Sneed was “pretty content . . . to do whatever it is that Richard Glossip wanted him to do”); 15 Tr. 69–74 (June 1, 2004) (emphasizing in closing that Sneed would have never committed murder without Glossip). Hence there is a reasonable likelihood that correcting Sneed's testimony would have affected the judgment of the jury. Napue, 360 U. S., at 271. Amicus objects that “the jury already knew that Sneed had been prescribed lithium, used illegal drugs, and behaved impulsively; he admitted that he beat a man to death with a 250 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court baseball bat in the middle of the night with no advanced planning.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 36. As amicus sees it, the additional evidence provided by Sneed's lie and his treatment for bipolar disorder could hardly have made a difference in light of so much other im- peaching evidence. Id., at 36–37. Of course, at trial, the prosecution urged the jury to believe just the opposite: that despite his prior dishonesty and violence, Sneed was now telling the truth. See, e. g., 15 Tr. 153–155 (June 1, 2004). A prosecutor's midtrial revelation that Sneed lied on the stand would have signifcantly undercut that argument. In any event, amicus's position is self-defeating. If the evidence impeaching Sneed's credibility was already over- whelming, then no reasonable jury could have convicted Glossip in the frst place, given that the prosecution's case rested centrally on Sneed's credibility. Amicus appears to assume the jury would have believed Sneed no matter what. Page Proof Pending Publication Such an assumption has no place in a materiality analysis, which asks what a reasonable decisionmaker would have done with the new evidence. See Wearry v. Cain, 577 U. S. 385, 393–394 (2016) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that evidence was immaterial because witness's credibility was “already impugned”); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984). Although the prosecution's failure to correct Sneed's false testimony was a material Napue violation on its own, addi- tional conduct by the prosecution further undermines conf- dence in the verdict. The attorney general has confessed to “ `violation of the rule of sequestration' ” with respect to Smothermon's apparent midtrial attempt to speak with Sneed about the knife, as well as to “ `destruction of evi- dence,' ” including the hotel's fnancial records and items Glossip and Sneed allegedly handled in Van Treese's room. See Brief for Respondent 13; 3 App. 935 (prosecutor Ackley attesting under oath that “I was informed that a box of evi- dence containing 10 items was destroyed by the Oklahoma Cite as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025) 251 Opinion of the Court City Police Department. . . . It is likely that I was aware of that fact during the 2004 retrial . . . . That this happened horrifes me”); Independent Investigation of State v. Richard E. Glossip, at 7, 12–13, 41–43 (cataloging destroyed items). In addition, the eight boxes of documents released to Glossip included statements from Sneed evincing a desire to recant his testimony and witness notes with details not previously turned over to the defense. For example, the fles suggest one witness told the prosecution (contrary to his trial testi- mony) that Glossip sold him a couch and a TV for $900. 3 App. 952. That evidence would have supported Glossip's ac- count of the cash he carried at his arrest outside an attor- ney's offce: that he had sold his possessions to pay for an attorney. See 2 id., at 706. Because prejudice analysis re- quires a “cumulative evaluation” of all the evidence, whether or not that evidence is before the Court in the form of an independent claim for relief, these documents reinforce our conclusion that the Napue error here prejudiced the defense. Page Proof Pending Publication Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 441 (1995).9 9 The dissent's attempts to minimize these issues are unpersuasive. Sneed's letter inquiring about “ `the choice of recanting my testimony,' ” 3 App. 815, disproves the dissent's assertion that “there is no evidence that Sneed wished to `recant' his testimony.” Post, at 293. That Glossip re- called receiving only $490 for his possessions during his frst trial does not absolve the prosecution from its ordinary duty to disclose inconsistent statements by its witnesses. Contra, ibid. The State's conceded seques- tration violation also is not merely an insignifcant state-law issue, post, at 292; like any other attorney, a prosecutor may not seek to infuence the content of a witness's testimony. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80, 90, n. 3 (1976) (“An attorney must respect the important ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking improperly to in- fuence it”). The dissent labors to discredit certain “handwritten notes” on which neither Glossip nor this Court relies, see post, at 293, n. 8, but Smothermon undisputedly wrote to Sneed's counsel that she needed to “get to” him “to discuss” his problematic testimony about the knife. 3 App. 953. The next day, Sneed's testimony corrected the very problem raised by Smothermon's letter. Smothermon nonetheless disclaimed any knowledge of Sneed's change in testimony when Glossip objected. 12 Tr. 252 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA Opinion of the Court For these reasons, we conclude that the prosecution's fail- ure to correct Sneed's trial testimony violated the Due Proc- ess Clause. Glossip is entitled to a new trial. B The OCCA's contrary holding rested on a mistaken inter- pretation of Napue. According to the OCCA, there was no violation because the defense “was aware or should have been aware that Sneed was taking lithium at the time of trial,” and the prosecution could not have “knowingly con- cealed” something the defense already knew. 529 P. 3d, at 226. As an initial matter, Sneed's false testimony concerned the reasons for his lithium prescription, not the mere fact that he had taken it. Gloss