Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi (604 U.S. 712, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 604 U. S. Part 2 Pages 712–760 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT April 22, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 712 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 23–929. Argued November 12, 2024—Decided April 22, 2025 The federal government initiated removal proceedings against petitioner Monsalvo Velázquez, who asked the government to suspend its removal efforts or, alternatively, to permit him to leave the United States volun- tarily. The immigration judge concluded Monsalvo was removable but granted him an opportunity to voluntarily depart within 60 days. After the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his appeal, it granted Monsalvo a new 60-day voluntary departure period. The 60th day fell on Saturday, December 11, 2021. Monsalvo fled a motion to reopen proceedings on Monday, December 13. The Board rejected that motion, concluding that the voluntary departure period had expired on Satur- day, and Monsalvo's motion was therefore too late. Monsalvo asked the Board to reconsider that conclusion, but the Board refused. Monsalvo Page Proof Pending Publication then petitioned for judicial review in the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Cir- cuit agreed with the Board, holding that the voluntary departure dead- line in 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(2) refers to calendar days with no extension for deadlines that fall on weekends or holidays. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review Monsalvo's petition. Under § 1252, courts may review “fnal order[s] of removal” and “all questions of law” arising from them. Monsalvo's petition sought judicial review of a legal question about the meaning of a term in his fnal removal order—specifcally, the meaning of “60 days” for voluntary departure. Although Monsalvo did not challenge his removability, nothing in § 1252 requires an individual to press a challenge to one term in a fnal order of removal just to secure judicial review of another. This Court rejects the government's argument that a petition must include a challenge to removability to secure judicial review. Such an interpretation would force litigants to assert meritless claims simply to obtain jurisdiction. Pp. 719–724. 2. Under § 1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day. The Board and the Tenth Circuit understood “days” to bear the ordinary meaning of calendar days, no more or less. But evidence suggests a specialized meaning in legal settings where the term “days” is often understood to Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 713 Syllabus extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next busi- ness day. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a “longstanding administrative construction,” the Court generally pre- sumes the new provision works in harmony with what came before. Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297–298. Since at least the 1950s, immigra- tion regulations have provided that when calculating deadlines, the term “day” carries its specialized meaning by excluding Sundays and legal holidays (and later Saturdays) if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. Congress enacted § 1229c(b)(2) as part of § 304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) against this consistent regulatory backdrop. The gov- ernment concedes that other deadlines in the same section of IIRIRA, such as deadlines for motions to reopen or reconsider, are subject to this rule. The identical term “days” should be given the same meaning throughout § 304, especially when the provisions were enacted at the same time in the same section of the law. Three principal counterarguments are insuffcient to overcome the presumption that § 1229c(b)(2) follows the government's own longstand- ing practice of extending deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. First, the fact that the regulatory defnition of “day” applies directly only to regulatory deadlines and not to statu- Page Proof Pending Publication tory deadlines like the one found in § 1229c(b)(2) is irrelevant. The question here is not whether a regulation can trump a statute but whether Congress's work in § 304 of IIRIRA should be read in light of the government's longstanding regulatory practice. Second, the argu- ment that Congress intended different treatment for voluntary depar- ture because it selected 60 days rather than adopting a pre-existing regulatory deadline of 90 or 30 days is unpersuasive, as nothing in § 304 hints that deadlines should operate differently, and the government it- self did not advance this view when promulgating rules to enforce the deadline. Third, nothing in the text supports the government's pro- posed distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” deadlines, as § 304 does not draw such lines, nor does the regulatory background sug- gest this distinction. Pp. 724–731. 88 F. 4th 1301, reversed and remanded. Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, and in which Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II, post, p. 731. Alito, J., post, p. 748, and Barrett, J., post, p. 758, fled dissenting opinions, in which Kavanaugh, J., joined. 714 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court Gerard J. Cedrone argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David J. Zimmer and Sierra J. Perez-Sparks. Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solic- itor General Gannon, John W. Blakeley, Melissa Neiman- Kelting, and Andrew C. MacLachlan.* Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. This case poses a question about how to calculate a dead- line. Often, the government may detain and deport an individual after properly determining he is unlawfully pres- ent in this country. But, under 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b), the gov- ernment will sometimes delay detention and deportation for up to “60 days” to allow those of “good moral character” to leave the country on their own terms. When it comes to many other deadlines in immigration law, if the fnal day per- Page Proof Pending Publication mitted for taking an action falls on a weekend or legal holi- day, the deadline rolls over to the next business day. The question for us is whether § 1229c(b)(2)'s 60-day voluntary- departure deadline works that same way. I A Born in Mexico, Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez entered the United States unlawfully as a teenager about 20 years ago. Since then, he has made his life in Colorado. Pet. for Cert. 15. There, he attended high school, some college, and met and married his wife. Ibid. The couple has an 11-year-old son and a 9-year-old daughter, both U. S. citizens. Ibid. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Amanda K. Rice; for the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges by Scott H. Angstreich; and for Thomas Fuller Ogden, pro se. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 715 Opinion of the Court Mr. Monsalvo and his wife have raised their family in a home they own outside Denver, where he also owns and operates a small business. Ibid. In 2011, the federal government initiated proceedings to remove Mr. Monsalvo from the country. Velazquez v. Gar- land, 88 F. 4th 1301, 1303 (CA10 2023). In response, Mr. Monsalvo did not dispute that he had entered the coun- try unlawfully, but he asked the government to suspend its removal efforts because he would face persecution if re- turned to Mexico. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–50a. Alterna- tively, he sought permission to leave the country voluntarily. Id., at 50a. That second request was important to him. As a rule, individuals lawfully determined to be deportable from this country are not entitled to leave on their own terms but in- stead face detention and forcible removal. See Dada v. Mu- kasey, 554 U. S. 1, 11 (2008). In certain circumstances, how- Page Proof Pending Publication ever, the government can afford the option of a “voluntary departure” to those “of good moral character.” § 1229c(b) (1)(B). When the government extends this option, it effec- tively makes detention and removal contingent: Offcials may detain and remove the individual only if he remains in the country after his voluntary-departure period has expired. Suspending removal in this way can beneft both the govern- ment and the individual. For the government, an individu- al's voluntary departure saves the cost and effort associated with detention and removal. Id., at 11. For the individual, it not only allows him to choose how and when he leaves the country. It also allows him to avoid substantial penalties associated with a forcible removal. Id., at 11–12 (citing § 1182(a)(9)(A)). In 2019, an immigration judge issued a decision in Mr. Monsalvo's case. The judge rejected his claim that he would face persecution if returned to Mexico. But the judge also found Mr. Monsalvo eligible for voluntary departure and gave him 60 days to leave the country, the maximum allowed 716 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court by law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. As it happened, the end of that 60-day period fell on a Saturday. So, the judge specifed, Mr. Monsalvo's deadline for departing voluntarily would extend to the following Monday. Id., at 70a. Should he fail to leave within that period, the immigration judge further ordered, Mr. Monsalvo would face removal and the penalties associated with it. Id., at 51a. Mr. Monsalvo responded by appealing to the Board of Im- migration Appeals. By regulation, that appeal stayed the immigration judge's order. See 8 CFR § 1003.6 (2019); Dada, 554 U. S., at 10. On October 12, 2021, the Board is- sued its own decision. In it, the Board rejected Mr. Monsal- vo's argument that he would face persecution in Mexico and gave him a (new) period of “60 days to voluntarily depart” the United States, “ the maximum period allowed by” § 1229c(b)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. If he “fail[ed] to voluntarily depart” within that period, the Board added, he “shall be removed.” Id., at 42a. Summing up, the Board Page Proof Pending Publication explained its disposition this way: “ORDER: The respondent's appeal is dismissed. “FURTHER ORDER: . . . the respondent(s) is (are) permitted to voluntarily depart . . . within 60 days . . . . In the event a respondent fails to voluntarily depart . . . the respondent shall be removed as provided in the Im- migration Judge's order.” Ibid. The Board's decision also included two other salient provi- sions. In one, the Board warned Mr. Monsalvo that he would face serious penalties if he overstayed his voluntary- departure deadline. Those penalties could include not just removal and monetary fnes, but also ineligibility for most forms of immigration relief for a period of 10 years. Id., at 42a–43a; 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(d)(1). In the other provision, the Board advised Mr. Monsalvo of his right to fle a motion to reopen his removal proceedings if he thought he had new and previously unavailable evidence that could alter the Board's Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 717 Opinion of the Court assessment of his case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a. If he fled such a motion before the expiration of his 60-day voluntary-departure period, the Board continued, the penal- ties associated with failing to depart would “not apply.” Ibid.; 8 CFR § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii) (2021). B Consistent with the Board's direction, Mr. Monsalvo fled a motion to reopen. On Friday, December 10, 2021, his at- torney served the government with a copy and sent the orig- inal to the Board using an overnight delivery service. Brief for Petitioner 12. On the following Monday, December 13, 2021, the Board accepted the motion for fling. Ibid. The motion drew the Board's attention to this Court's then-recent decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021), and argued that, under its terms, Mr. Monsalvo was entitled to have his order of removal canceled. Brief for Petitioner 12. Page Proof Pending Publication The Board denied the motion to reopen for two reasons. First, it held that Niz-Chavez did not justify reopening Mr. Monsalvo's removal proceedings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. Second, and without prompting from the government, the Board held that his motion to reopen had arrived too late. Id., at 38a. The Board's second holding rested on an interpretation of § 1229c(b)(2)'s voluntary-departure deadline. The Board began by observing that it had given Mr. Monsalvo “60 days” to depart voluntarily, the maximum allowed by § 1229c(b)(2). Interpreting that statute, the Board read its use of the term “days” to refer to calendar days. Here, that meant Mr. Mon- salvo's voluntary-departure period began on October 12, 2021, when the Board issued its removal order, and expired on Saturday, December 11, 2021. The Board did not ques- tion that Mr. Monsalvo served his motion to reopen the day before, on Friday, December 10, 2021. But, the Board stressed, the motion was not fled until the following busi- ness day, Monday, December 13, 2021. And, as the Board 718 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court saw it, that created a problem. Because Mr. Monsalvo had neither left the country nor fled a motion to reopen before the expiration of his voluntary-departure period, the Board said, the penalties it had previously warned Mr. Monsalvo about now applied. See supra, at 716. Accordingly, the Board held, it was powerless to entertain his motion—or nearly any request for immigration relief he might wish to pursue for the next decade. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a (cit- ing § 1229c(d)); see also id., at 43a. Mr. Monsalvo fled a motion asking the Board to reconsider this second holding. Pet. for Cert. 19. His reason for fo- cusing on it was obvious. Not only did that holding prevent him from seeking to reopen his case; the Board's reasoning had the potential to foreclose for years almost any avenue of lawful immigration relief he might hope to pursue. Ad- dressing the Board's holding, Mr. Monsalvo argued that it misconstrued § 1229c(b)(2). As a matter of law, he submit- ted, that statute operates to extend any deadline that falls Page Proof Pending Publication on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. The immigration judge handling his case had understood § 1229c(b)(2) to work just this way. See supra, at 716; App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a. And under that view of the law, Mr. Monsalvo contended, his voluntary-departure deadline did not expire until Monday, December 13, 2021. As a re- sult, his motion to reopen was timely fled that same day, and the penalties associated with failing to fle a motion to reopen or to depart voluntarily did not apply. See 88 F. 4th, at 1305. Ultimately, however, the Board disagreed, stood by its earlier decision, and denied Mr. Monsalvo's motion for re- consideration. Ibid. C Having failed before the agency, Mr. Monsalvo turned to court, petitioning the Tenth Circuit to review the Board's order denying his motion for reconsideration. § 1252(a)(1). But that effort failed too. Like the Board, the Tenth Circuit thought that the provision in his fnal order of removal grant- Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 719 Opinion of the Court ing him “60 days” to depart voluntarily was “[c]onclusively . . . governed by” § 1229c(b)(2). Id., at 1308. And, like the Board, the court read the statute as speaking in terms of “calendar days.” Id., at 1303. From this, the court rea- soned, it followed that Mr. Monsalvo's voluntary-departure deadline expired on Saturday, December 11, 2021, and his failure to fle a motion to reopen or to depart voluntarily by that date made it impossible for the Board to entertain either his motion or perhaps any other application from him for years. Id., at 1309–1310. We agreed to take up the case because the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of § 1229c(b)(2) opened a circuit split. 603 U. S. 903 (2024). While the Tenth Circuit has construed the statute to afford an individual no more than 60 calendar days to leave the country voluntarily, the Ninth Circuit has read it to extend a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. See Meza-Vallejos v. Holder, 669 F. 3d 920 (2012). Who is right on this question of statutory Page Proof Pending Publication interpretation matters greatly to people like Mr. Monsalvo. Not only does it affect the time one may have to reopen im- migration proceedings. As we have seen, it also affects an individual's exposure to detention, removal, and fnes, and carries with it serious ramifcations for his ability to seek lawful status for years into the future. §§ 1229c(d)(1), 1182(a)(9); 8 CFR § 1240.26(a). II Before we can address that question, however, we must attend to an antecedent one. In the Tenth Circuit, the gov- ernment argued that court lacked statutory jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Monsalvo's petition. Here, the government renews its claim. On its view, we cannot pass on who has the better reading of § 1229c(b)(2), but must instead vacate the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remand Mr. Monsalvo's pe- tition to that court with instructions to dismiss it. See Brief for Respondent 15–20. 720 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court A The Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction hinged on § 1252(a)(1). That provision allows an individual to petition for “[j]udicial review of a fnal order of removal” in the appropriate court of appeals. Ibid. Such a petition supplies the exclusive means for obtaining “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceed- ing brought to remove an alien from the United States.” § 1252(b)(9). The Tenth Circuit held that it had statutory jurisdiction to consider Mr. Monsalvo's petition, and we agree. On October 12, 2021, the Board issued an order which petitioner con- tends, and the government does not dispute, constituted a fnal order of removal. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a–43a; Reply Brief 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38, 64–65. That order conditionally authorized Mr. Monsalvo's detention and removal, providing that “[i]n the event” he failed to leave Page Proof Pending Publication voluntarily “within 60 days,” the “maximum period allowed by” § 1229c(b)(2), authorities could detain and “remov[e]” him. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a, 42a; supra, at 716. In later administrative proceedings, the parties disagreed about what that order meant. The government read § 1229c(b)(2), and thus the order, as affording Mr. Monsalvo 60 calendar days before authorities could detain and remove him— and thus before his time to fle a motion to reopen effectively expired. Mr. Monsalvo interpreted the statute, and thus his order, to extend his 60-day deadline, which fell on a week- end, to the next business day. Mr. Monsalvo's petition to the Tenth Circuit asked that court to resolve the parties' dispute. Or, to put it in § 1252's terms, he asked the court to review his “fnal order of removal” and address a “ques- tio[n] of law . . . arising from” its terms. Exactly as the law allows. It is true that Mr. Monsalvo did not seek judicial review immediately after the Board entered its fnal order of re- moval. But, at that stage, he had no reason to do so. The Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 721 Opinion of the Court Board had given him “60 days” to leave the country, and the immigration judge had already explained to him that a voluntary-departure deadline falling on a weekend rolls over to the next business day. Supra, at 715–716. The dispute over the meaning of “60 days” arose only later, when, in rul- ing on his motion to reopen and without prompting from the government, the Board held that his voluntary-departure deadline expired on a Saturday. See supra, at 717; App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. Understandably, Mr. Monsalvo asked the Board to reconsider that conclusion before he proceeded to court, giving the agency in the frst instance the chance to address his argument that the phrase “60 days” in § 1229c(b)(2) and his order of removal extends a deadline fall- ing on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. See supra, at 718. It was only after the Board rejected that view that he required judicial intervention. And nothing prevented him from seeking it in a challenge to the Board's reconsideration order, for that order expressly interpreted a Page Proof Pending Publication term in his fnal order of removal and Mr. Monsalvo's judicial petition contested that interpretation as a matter of law. B The government does not dispute that Mr. Monsalvo pre- sented the Tenth Circuit with a legal question about how long he had to depart before facing removal. See Brief for Respondent 18–20. But, the government insists, § 1252(a)(1) requires more. To secure judicial review, the government says, an individual must include in his petition some chal- lenge to his “removability” from this country. Ibid. And because Mr. Monsalvo's petition didn't do that, but pressed only a question about his voluntary-departure deadline, the court was powerless to hear his case. To be sure, the government emphasizes, things could have worked out differently for Mr. Monsalvo. All he had to do, the government says, was bundle his question about the op- eration of his voluntary-departure deadline with some chal- 722 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court lenge to the Board's conclusion that he was removable. Id., at 20. So, for example, in addition to asking the Tenth Cir- cuit to review the Board's order denying his motion for reconsideration (and re jecting his interpretation of § 1229c(b)(2)), he could have asked for review of the Board's order denying his motion to reopen (and concluding he was not entitled to have his removal canceled). Had he done that, the government assures us, the Tenth Circuit would have had jurisdiction over his petition and could have ad- dressed both questions. Id., at 20. The government does not deny that, under its view, some people will have to “make up a completely meritless claim in order to get jurisdiction.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–58. By the conclusion of administrative proceedings, individuals like Mr. Monsalvo may no longer think they have a viable chal- lenge to their removability, only some other colorable and consequential question about their fnal orders of removal. Page Proof Pending Publication But, as the government sees it, they cannot simply bring that live question to court. They must either adorn their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge to their remov- ability or forfeit the right to review altogether. We see nothing in § 1252 that puts litigants to that kind of choice. The statute does not say that an individual must press a challenge to one term in a fnal order of removal (a fnding of “removability”) just to secure judicial review of another (like a voluntary-departure deadline). In fact, the word “removability” does not even appear in the statute. Instead, § 1252 authorizes courts to review “fnal order[s] of removal” and address “questions of law . . . arising from” them. §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9). And pretty plainly, that lan- guage permits a court to review all terms in a fnal order of removal without anything like the qualifcation the govern- ment imagines. Our dissenting colleagues see things differently. In their view, this Court's decision in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 723 Opinion of the Court 573 (2020), requires us to adopt the government's jurisdic- tional theory. See post, at 738–740 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 758–759 (opinion of Barrett, J.). But, if anything, that case supports our conclusion. Nasrallah described a “fnal order of removal” subject to judicial review as a fnal order “ `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” 590 U. S., at 581. And (again) that is ex- actly what we have here: a fnal order specifying that the government may remove Mr. Monsalvo if he fails to depart voluntarily within 60 days, and a petition asking the courts to settle a dispute over what that order means. Justice Thomas highlights Nasrallah's holding that a Board order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in that case was “not part of the removal order.” Post, at 739 (dissenting opinion). But we fail to see the relevance of that holding to this case. A CAT order pro- vides that, “notwithstanding” a removal order, the govern- Page Proof Pending Publication ment may not remove an individual to a particular “desig- nated country.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 582. CAT orders, moreover, have a distinct statutory basis from removal or- ders, and different statutes govern their review. Id., at 579–580. No such order is in play here. Mr. Monsalvo has not sought judicial review of a CAT order, only review about the meaning of his fnal order of removal. Justice Barrett, for her part, reads Nasrallah as sug- gesting that an individual like Mr. Monsalvo may not chal- lenge the Board's interpretation of a term in his removal order. Instead, he may ask a court only to change or excise a term in his removal order. See post, at 759 (dissenting opin- ion). But Nasrallah held nothing of the kind. Nor is it pos- sible to square such a view with the statutory text. Section 1252 permits individuals to petition for judicial review of “fnal orders of removal” and indicates that those petitions supply the exclusive means for securing “[j]udicial review of all questions of law.” § 1252(b)(9). Nothing in the statu- 724 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court tory text contains anything like the limitation the dissent supposes, permitting judicial review of only certain kinds of legal errors.1 III A That takes us to the merits. The Board's fnal order of removal permitted the government to detain and remove Mr. Monsalvo if he failed to leave the country within “60 days . . . , the maximum period allowed by” § 1229c(b)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. Everyone agrees the proper con- struction of that order is “governed by” the proper construc- tion of § 1229c(b)(2). 88 F. 4th, at 1308. Like Mr. Monsal- vo's fnal order of removal, that statute sets forth a deadline expressed in terms of a number of “days.” See § 1229c(b)(2) (“Permission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days”). But what does that mean: Does every calendar day count? Or Page Proof Pending Publication does the statute operate to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day? 1 Separately, the dissents suggest that we should remand this case to the Tenth Circuit to address the government's “late-breaking” jurisdictional objection. Post, at 736 (opinion of Thomas, J.); see also post, at 760 (opin- ion of Barrett, J.). But the government's objection is not a new one— it has challenged statutory jurisdiction throughout the life of this litiga- tion, even if it has pursued various and shifting theories to support its objection. See Brief for Respondent in No. 22–9576 (CA10), pp. 36–38; Brief for Respondent 15–20. Nor do the dissenters dispute that this Court may “dispose of . . . recently raised jurisdictional argument[s].” Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U. S. 399, 412, n. 5 (2012). Separately still, Justice Thomas suggests that we have developed an argument for jurisdiction that Mr. Monsalvo did not present. See post, at 743 (dissenting opinion). That charge is mistaken. Our analysis here tracks Mr. Monsalvo's contention that his case satisfes § 1252 because he sought judicial review of the Board's “resolution of the disputed timeliness issue,” which turned on the “terms of [his] fnal removal order.” Reply Brief 4–5. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 725 Opinion of the Court In truth, the statute is susceptible to both understandings. An ordinary reader might understand “days” to mean calen- dar days, no more or less. That is how the Board and the Tenth Circuit saw it. See supra, at 717–719. And, to be sure, we usually assume statutory terms bear their ordinary meaning “until and unless someone points to evidence sug- gesting otherwise.” Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 163. But here, evidence suggesting the possibility of specialized mean- ing does exist. In legal settings, the term “days” is often understood to extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. Various federal rules re- fect this understanding. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(a)(1)(C). As do our own. See this Court's Rule 30(1). The Ninth Circuit and the immigration judge in this case thought § 1229c(b)(2) of a piece with that practice. See supra, at 715–716, 719. The question before us thus boils down to whether § 1229c(b)(2) uses the term “days” in its Page Proof Pending Publication ordinary or specialized sense. To resolve that question, we turn to one of this Court's customary interpretive tools. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a “longstanding administrative construction,” this Court generally presumes the new provi- sion should be understood to work in harmony with what has come before. Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297–298 (1981); accord, United States v. Hill, 506 U. S. 546, 553–554 (1993); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 437 (1986). That presumption is all but dispositive here. For many years, Congress has authorized the executive branch to draw up regulations to enforce the immigration laws. See 8 U. S. C. § 1103(a)(3). And since at least the 1950s, those reg- ulations have provided that, when calculating the deadline for the “taking [of] any action,” the term “day” carries its specialized meaning by excluding Sundays and legal holidays if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. 8 CFR § 1.1(a)(6) (1958) (emphasis added). In all the years since, the only notable change to this rule has been the addi- 726 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court tion of Saturdays to the list of excluded days. 52 Fed. Reg. 2935 (1987). Congress adopted § 1229c(b)(2) against the backdrop of this consistent, longstanding administrative con- struction. And, given that, we presume the statute employs the same understanding.2 Nor do we see anything in the statute that might overcome our usual presumption. To the contrary, what evidence we have before us only supports its application. Congress set forth the maximum number of “days” allowed for voluntary departure in § 304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). In the same section of that law, Congress also provided individuals a certain number of “days” to fle motions to reopen or to reconsider. 110 Stat. 3009–593; 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)(B), (c)(7)(C)(i). When it comes to those latter provisions, the government concedes, the term “days” is best read in light of pre-existing regulatory practice and thus takes its special- ized meaning. Brief for Respondent 43–44. Everyone Page Proof Pending Publication agrees, then, that two provisions in § 304 operate to roll a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday over to the next business day. And if two provisions in a single section of an Act of Congress use the term “days” this way, it is all the more sensible to think a third provision in the same sec- tion does as well. After all, “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007). And, if anything, that maxim may be “doubly appropriate” where, as here, Congress employed the same term in multiple places “at the same time” in the “same section of the [same] public law.” Id., at 231–232. Tellingly, too, if Congress meant to depart from settled immigration practice when it adopted the voluntary- 2 Though § 1229c(b)(2) uses the plural “days,” and the regulation uses the singular “day,” no one before us has suggested that distinction makes a difference. Cf. 1 U. S. C. § 1 (“[W]ords importing the plural include the singular,” and vice versa). Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 727 Opinion of the Court departure deadline in 1996, the government itself seems not to have noticed. After Congress enacted IIRIRA, the gov- ernment promulgated a new rule to enforce § 1229c(b)(2)'s terms. See 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10372 (1997). Tracking the statute, that rule allows an immigration judge to grant a voluntary-departure period of up to “60 days.” 8 CFR § 240.26(e) (1999). And under the government's own regula- tions, remember, regulatory deadlines defned in terms of days do not expire on weekends or legal holidays. § 1001.1(h) (2021). Nowhere does the government's rule en- forcing § 1229c(b)(2) suggest that it is exempt from these reg- ulations.3 Perhaps for this reason, the immigration judge in Mr. Monsalvo's own case understood his voluntary-departure deadline to extend past a weekend to a Monday. See supra, at 716. Perhaps for this reason, as well, many other immi- gration judges have done the same in other cases. See Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae 4 (collecting examples). Page Proof Pending B Publication In response to our merits analysis, the government and Justice Alito offer three principal counterarguments. But, thoughtful as they are, we fnd none suffcient to over- come the presumption that § 1229c(b)(2) follows the govern- ment's own longstanding practice. First, the government and Justice Alito stress the lim- ited reach of the regulation defning the term “day.” Yes, they admit, that rule has long indicated that deadlines ex- 3 Justice Alito notes that the government's rule provides that “ `the total period of time [to voluntarily depart shall not exceed] 60 days as set forth in Section 240B of the Act.' ” Post, at 757, n. 3 (dissenting opinion) (quoting 8 CFR § 1240.26(f) (2024)). But we fail to see how the language he emphasizes moves the needle. As we have seen, the relevant section of the Act does not defne “days.” Meanwhile, the government's own rules instruct that regulatory deadlines like this one should be construed consistent with the specialized meaning of the term “day.” Nor does any- thing in this regulation disavow that approach. 728 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court pressed in days do not expire on weekends or legal holidays. And yes, they agree, the defnition applies for “computing the period of time for taking any action provided in this chapter.” 8 CFR § 1.1(h) (1996) (emphasis added). But, they observe, that rule applies only to regulatory deadlines and does not purport to control statutory deadlines like the one found in § 1229c(b)(2). Brief for Respondent 43; post, at 752 (dissenting opinion). That much is true, but also irrelevant. The question be- fore us isn't whether a regulation can trump a statute (of course not). It is whether Congress's work in § 304 of IIRIRA should be read in light of the government's long- standing regulatory practice. And, again, even the govern- ment concedes that the answer is (mostly) yes. Supra, at 726. When speaking of the “days” available for fling mo- tions to reopen or to reconsider in § 304, the government ad- mits, Congress meant to follow the pre-existing regulatory practice rolling over deadlines falling on weekends and legal Page Proof Pending Publication holidays to the next business day. Brief for Respondent 43– 44. Nothing in the government's argument here supplies a reason to suppose Congress meant the term “days” to work differently when it comes to the voluntary-departure dead- line found in the same section of IIRIRA.4 Second, and attempting to address this defciency, the gov- ernment and Justice Alito highlight the fact that, when setting the deadlines for motions to reopen or to reconsider in § 304, Congress codifed pre-existing deadlines found in immigration regulations (90 days and 30 days, respectively). By contrast, when Congress selected 60 days as the voluntary-departure deadline, it did not pull that number 4 Justice Alito questions our reliance on the government's concession that the specialized meaning of “days” applies to other deadlines in § 304 of IIRIRA. See post, at 754–755 (dissenting opinion). But our colleague does not dispute the correctness of that concession and, in the end, seems to embrace it. See post, at 753, 756 (endorsing the specialized meaning of “days” for § 304's “fling” deadlines). Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 729 Opinion of the Court from a pre-existing regulatory deadline. Given that differ- ence, the argument goes, Congress must have meant the word “days” to work differently when it comes to the voluntary-departure deadline alone. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 756–757 (dissenting opinion). That conclusion, however, does not follow from its premise. Exactly nothing in § 304 hints that deadlines found there should operate differently. Nor does the regulatory back- drop against which Congress legislated. Recall that, by 1996, the government's regulations had long provided—cate- gorically and without exception—that the term “day” ex- cludes certain weekends and legal holidays when it comes to calculating the deadline for “taking any action,” of whatever kind, required by regulation. 8 CFR § 1001.1(h) (emphasis added). Again, too, if Congress meant to pursue a more par- simonious approach for the voluntary-departure deadline in § 304, it is curious that the government itself did not seem to Page Proof Pending Publication advance that view when it promulgated its own rule to en- force that deadline. See 8 CFR § 1240.26(e); supra, at 727, and n. 3. Third, coming at the problem from a different direction, the government and Justice Alito suggest that we should divide § 304's deadlines into “procedural” and “substantive” categories. Brief for Respondent 15, 22; post, at 751, 753, 756 (dissenting opinion). For “procedural” deadlines, like those for motions to reopen and reconsider, the government and dissent concede, it makes sense to think Congress legis- lated against the administrative backdrop we have described, given that the agencies and courts where those motions must be fled are usually closed on weekends and legal holidays. But that consideration is immaterial, the government and Justice Alito insist, for the “substantive” duty of voluntary departure. After all, an individual can leave the country almost anytime; even if agencies and courts close for the weekend or a legal holiday, airports and roads generally re- main open. 730 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Opinion of the Court Maybe the procedural/substantive distinction the govern- ment and dissent propose would make for good policy. But if Congress had something like that in mind, it never said so. Section 304's text does not draw any lines between proce- dural and substantive duties. Nor does the regulatory back- ground against which the statute was adopted hint at such a distinction. As we have seen, the government's longstand- ing defnition of the term “day” excludes certain weekends and holidays when calculating the time for taking “any ac- tion” under immigration regulations—including when it comes to various “substantive” actions that can plainly be accomplished on a weekend or holiday, like “getting married after entering the United States on a fancé(e) visa.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Notably, as well, the government's own regulations enforcing § 304 make no mention of a procedural/ substantive distinction either. Supra, at 724–726. Perhaps, too, Congress had good reason for eschewing the line the government and dissent would have us draw. Often Page Proof Pending Publication enough, as it happens, a “substantive” duty that can be per- formed on any given day will be intertwined with a “proce- dural” duty that can be discharged only on days when agen- cies and courts are open. Mr. Monsalvo's case refects this reality. In it, the effective (procedural) deadline for his mo- tion to reopen turned on the calculation of the (substantive) deadline for voluntary departure. See supra, at 717–718. In light of that reality, a rational Congress might have thought it sensible to extend the same rule to both the proce- dural and substantive deadlines in § 304. Of course, whether anyone in Congress gave so much as a passing thought to questions like that is anyone's guess. But one thing is certain: The statutory text Congress chose in § 1229c(b)(2) shows no more sign of a procedural/substantive distinction than the government's own longstanding rules.5 5 Briefy advancing a separate argument that the government has not advanced for itself, Justice Alito suggests that the specialized meaning of “days” cannot be applied sensibly to other deadlines governing, for ex- Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 731 Thomas, J., dissenting * As we see it, § 1229c(b)(2)'s deadline works like others found in § 304 of IIRIRA—and so many others in immigra- tion law. Here, as elsewhere, the term “days” operates to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. Because the Tenth Circuit held otherwise in addressing Mr. Monsalvo's petition, its judg- ment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, and with whom Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett join as to Parts I and II, dissenting. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether the dead- line for a removable alien to voluntarily depart the United States extends to the next business day if it would otherwise Page Proof Pending Publication fall on a weekend or public holiday. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(2). But, the merits-stage briefng revealed a seri- ous, novel jurisdictional objection that may bar our review. Given that complication, we should have vacated and re- manded for the Tenth Circuit's consideration in the frst in- stance. Instead, the majority reaches the merits after fnd- ing jurisdiction based on a fawed theory of its own creation. I respectfully dissent. I The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., “governs how persons are admitted to, and removed from, the United States.” Pereida v. Wil- kinson, 592 U. S. 224, 227 (2021). In 1996, Congress enacted “comprehensive amendments” to the INA through the Illegal ample, how long an “alien crewman” may remain in this country. Post, at 752 (dissenting opinion) (discussing 8 U. S. C. § 1282(a)). But, as we have sought to stress, different statutes passed at different times against differ- ent regulatory backdrops may bear different meanings, and all we address today is the meaning of § 1229c(b)(2). 732 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Thomas, J., dissenting Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 292 (2001). This case concerns two of IIRIRA's reforms: its imposition of strict deadlines for voluntary departure, and its curtailment of an alien's right to judicial review. A “Voluntary departure” is a discretionary form of immigra- tion relief under which “certain favored aliens” can “leave the country willingly,” in lieu of deportation. Dada v. Mu- kasey, 554 U. S. 1, 8 (2008). This relief strikes a bargain between the Government and eligible aliens. The Govern- ment saves time and money by shifting the costs of depar- ture onto the alien. In exchange, the alien retains some con- trol over the timing and destination of his departure and escapes the penalties that follow formal deportation. Ante, at 715. Page Proof Pending Publication IIRIRA tightened this bargain by “curtail[ing] the period of time during which an alien may remain in the United States pending voluntary departure.” Dada, 554 U. S., at 9. Gone are the days when aliens permitted to voluntar- ily depart could “ `continue their illegal presence in the United States for months, and even years.' ” Ibid. Now, a voluntary-departure period granted at the end of an alien's removal proceedings cannot “excee[d] 60 days.” § 1229c(b)(2). Aliens who fail to timely depart face stringent penalties, including a 10-year period of ineligibility for vari- ous forms of immigration relief. § 1229c(d)(1); ante, at 716. To enforce the voluntary-departure deadline, the immigra- tion judge (IJ) or Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) must enter an “alternate order of removal” alongside any grant of voluntary departure. 8 CFR §§ 1240.26(d), (k)(1) (2024). That order goes into effect automatically if an alien does not depart by the deadline. IIRIRA also permits an alien to give up his grant of vol- untary departure and pursue other administrative relief. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 733 Thomas, J., dissenting Dada, 554 U. S., at 21. The alien may at any time before his voluntary-departure deadline move to reopen his removal proceedings or move for reconsideration of his case. § 1240.26(e)(1). If the alien acts before the deadline, then his motion will “automatically terminat[e] the grant of voluntary departure” and cause the “alternate order of removal [to] take effect,” but the alien will not be subject to the penalties for failure to timely depart. §§ 1240.26(c)(3)(iii), (e)(1). If the deadline “has already expired,” however, then a fling “does not in any way impact the period of time allowed for voluntary departure” or, outside an exception not rele- vant here, the penalties for failing to timely depart. § 1240.26(e)(2). B Beyond its substantive constraints, IIRIRA also “instituted a new” and “signifcantly more restrictive” scheme for judi- cial review. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Page Proof Pending Publication Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 475 (1999) (AADC). That scheme makes the “fnal order of removal” the linchpin of an alien's right to judicial review. 8 U. S. C. § 1252. A fnal order of removal is “a fnal order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” Nas- rallah v. Bar r, 590 U. S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting § 1101(a)(47)(A)). Under § 1252, an alien can obtain judicial review of such an order by fling a petition for review in a federal court of appeals. § 1252(a)(1). That section also makes review of “all questions of law and fact” arising from an alien's removal proceedings available “only in judicial re- view of a fnal order” of removal, unless there is an independ- ent jurisdictional basis. § 1252(b)(9). Our precedents have interpreted § 1252 to permit judicial review only of the fnal order of removal itself and two closely related categories of orders. First, “rulings that af- fect the validity of the fnal order of removal,” such as an IJ's evidentiary rulings, “merge into the fnal order of re- moval for purposes of judicial review.” Id., at 582. Second, 734 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Thomas, J., dissenting certain rulings that have an independent jurisdictional basis, such as an order regarding Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief, “may be reviewed together with the fnal order of removal.” Id., at 582–583, 585. Beyond these catego- ries, however, the federal courts lack jurisdiction over removal-related determinations. See Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 576 U. S. 143, 147 (2015). C Petitioner Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez is an alien who was granted voluntary departure at the end of his removal pro- ceedings. Before the IJ, he conceded removability but sought CAT relief or withholding of removal based on an alleged risk of future persecution. He asked for voluntary departure in the alternative. The IJ granted only voluntary departure, while also entering the requisite alternate order of removal. On appeal, the BIA reset the voluntary- departure period after it affrmed the IJ's denial of other Page Proof Pending Publication relief. The BIA set Monsalvo's new voluntary-departure period to run for the 60 days following its decision, which issued on October 12, 2021. Measured by calendar days, a 60-day pe- riod would end on Saturday, December 11, 2021. On Friday, December 10, 2021, Monsalvo submitted a mo- tion to reopen his removal proceedings via overnight de- livery service. The motion asserted that, following this Court's decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021), Monsalvo was newly eligible for cancellation of re- moval. Pursuant to a BIA policy not challenged here, this after-hours motion was not deemed fled until Monday, De- cember 13, 2021, when the BIA was next open to receive flings. See BIA Practice Manual § 3.1(a)(1), https://www .justice.gov/eoir/reference-materials/ bia. The BIA denied Monsalvo's motion both on the merits of his Niz-Chavez claim and based on the timing of his fling. On its view, “[t]he 60-day period of voluntary departure ter- minated on December 11, 2021.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 735 Thomas, J., dissenting Because Monsalvo had failed to depart by that deadline, his December 13 reopening motion came when he was already subject to IIRIRA's penalties for failing to timely depart, including “ineligibil[ity] for . . . cancellation of removal.” Ibid. Thus, Monsalvo was ineligible for his requested relief. After Monsalvo moved for reconsideration of only the tim- ing holding, the BIA reaffrmed its position. “[N]o provi- sion[,] statute[,] or regulation extend[s] the last day of the voluntary departure period f[a]lling on a weekend or a legal holiday to the next business day,” it explained, so 60 days means 60 calendar days. Id., at 34a–35a. Monsalvo petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the BIA's reconsideration ruling. He argued that, when the voluntary-departure deadline would otherwise fall on a weekend or holiday, it rolls over to the next business day. In deciding his petition, the Tenth Circuit frst rejected the Government's arguments for why it lacked statutory juris- Page Proof Pending Publication diction under § 1252 to review the petition. On the merits, the court ruled for the Government, agreeing with the BIA that 60 days means 60 calendar days. We granted certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's merits holding. 603 U. S. 903 (2024). But, since then, much of the briefng—and our focus at oral argument—has centered on the threshold issue of statutory jurisdiction. The Government raised before this Court a new objection to the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction: that Monsalvo's petition could not support jurisdiction because it did not bear on his removability. The Government emphasized that Monsalvo had asked the Tenth Circuit to review only the denial of his motion for reconsideration, which, unlike his motion for re- opening, did not ask the BIA to reopen his removal proceed- ings. Accordingly, he was asking only “to alter a nondispos- itive portion of the Board's reasoning in its prior decision declining to reopen proceedings.” Brief for Respondent 19. That unusual request, the Government contended, did not fall into any category cognizable under § 1252. 736 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Thomas, J., dissenting II In view of the Government's serious, late-breaking juris- dictional objection, we should have vacated and remanded for the Tenth Circuit's review. Although “[o]bjections to a tribunal's jurisdiction can be raised at any time,” Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013), we need not resolve a belated objection ourselves. Our “usual practice” is to refrain from deciding “legal . . . questions in the frst instance.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U. S. 419, 435 (2016). “[W]e are a court of review, not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). Accordingly, we ordinarily wait to see if “the crucible of adversarial testing . . . , along with the experience of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and circuit benches, [can] yield insights (or reveal pitfalls) we can- not muster guided only by our own lights.” Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U. S. 335, 354 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concur- Page Proof Pending Publication ring in part and concurring in judgment). This Court has routinely vacated and remanded cases so that lower courts can be the frst to address signifcant new developments. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U. S. 403, 408–409 (2016) (per curiam) (collecting cases). In a number of cases, we have taken this course based on emergent jurisdictional matters specifcally. See, e. g., Frank v. Gaos, 586 U. S. 485, 488, 492–493 (2019) (per curiam); Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 498 U. S. 964 (1990). I would do the same here. Not only was the jurisdictional issue before us not raised below, but until this point it has not been passed upon by any court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 67.1 Caution is also especially important for jurisdictional mat- ters. “Congress' power over federal jurisdiction is `an es- 1 The majority cannot sidestep the novelty of the jurisdictional issue before us by highlighting that the Government raised other objections to statutory jurisdiction below. Ante, at 724, n. 1. The point remains that the Government did not raise, and the Tenth Circuit had no opportunity to consider, the important objection contested before this Court. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 737 Thomas, J., dissenting sential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.' ” Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U. S. 244, 254 (2018) (plu- rality opinion) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Envi- ronment, 523 U. S. 83, 101 (1998)). When we assume juris- diction too hastily, we risk aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of the political branches. There is no reason for the Court's intervention today. We did not grant certiorari to address jurisdiction, and—as its novel status refects—the jurisdictional question plainly is not so pressing as to require immediate resolution. Nor is the underlying question presented so important as to require resolution in this case. That question too arises only rarely: As the Tenth Circuit recognized, its decision below resolved “an issue of frst impression in th[at] court,” which had been “addressed before by only one other circuit.” Velazquez v. Garland, 88 F. 4th 1301, 1305 (2023). Page Proof Pending Publication Of course, we should not hesitate to brush aside baseless jurisdictional objections. But, the issue here cannot be dis- missed on that ground. The Government has raised a seri- ous objection based on the tension between § 1252's removal- focused jurisdictional framework and Monsalvo's choice to seek review only of a claim unrelated to removability. We should not be “the frst”—and only—“court in the Nation” to address that tension. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 538 (1992). III If required to decide the jurisdictional question, however, I would conclude that the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over Monsalvo's petition. “[T]he party invoking federal ju- risdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence,” and, on the admittedly limited briefng before us, Monsalvo has not met his burden. Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 104. In con- tending otherwise, Monsalvo and the majority offer two dis- tinct theories of jurisdiction, but neither holds up. 738 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI Thomas, J., dissenting A The diffculty for Monsalvo stems from his litigation strat- egy below. He asked the Tenth Circuit to review only the BIA's denial of his reconsideration motion. Supra, at 735. That motion, in turn, challenged only one of the BIA's two bases for denying his reopening motion. Supra, at 734–735. Monsalvo objected to the BIA's conclusion that the motion was untimely, but not its conclusion that it also failed on the merits. Ibid. In other words, the Government is right to say that, before the Tenth Circuit, he sought only “to alter a nondispositive portion of the Board's reasoning” for denying reopening. Brief for Respondent 19. That framing fts poorly with § 1252, which ties jurisdiction to a narrow version of the term “fnal order of removal.” Before IIRIRA, the predecessor term “fnal order of depor- tation” covered “ `all determinations made during and inci- dent to the administrative proceeding' on removability.” Page Proof Pending Publication Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 584 (quoting Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 229 (1963)). But, under IIRIRA, a “fnal order of re- moval” is only the “fnal order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” 590 U. S., at 579 (quoting § 1101(a)(47)(A)). Nasrallah made clear that a “fnal order of removal” refers only to the portion of an IJ or BIA decision that fnds or orders removability, not the entirety of that decision. In that case, we considered whether an alien barred under § 1252(a)(2)(C) from raising a factual challenge to his fnal order of removal could still factually challenge the denial of CAT relief. Id., at 576. We began by considering the nature of the CAT denial. In the underlying BIA decision, that denial immediately pre- ceded the alien's removal order: “FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge's order granting the respondent's application for deferral of re- moval under the Convention Against Torture is vacated. Cite as: 604 U. S. 712 (2025) 739 Thomas, J., dissenting “FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is ordered re- moved from the United States to Lebanon pursuant to the Immigration Judge's August 11, 2016, order.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in Nasrallah v. Barr, O. T. 2019, No. 18–1432, p. 21a. Still, every Member of this Court recognized that the CAT denial was a distinct order, and not part of the removal order. 590 U. S., at 582; id., at 591 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Nasrallah majority then concluded that the distinct status of a CAT order preserved Nasrallah's factual chal- lenge to that order. On its understanding, § 1252(a)(2)(C) constrained only Nasrallah's ability to challenge his fnal order of removal itself, plus any “rulings that affect[ed] the validity of the fnal order of removal” and so “merge[d] into the fnal order of removal for purposes of judicial review.” Id., at 582. Because the CAT order fell into neither cate- gory, and instead had a separate jurisdictional basis, Nas- Page Proof Pending Publication rallah could still pursue his factual challenge to the CAT order “together with the fnal order of removal.” Id., at 582–583.2 Although this conclusion aided Nasrallah, it cuts against Monsalvo. Unlike a CAT claimant, Monsalvo cannot point to any basis for jurisdiction other than § 1252(a)(1). To es- tablish jurisdiction, he must show that his petition before the Tenth Circuit challenged either the fnal order of removal 2 I adhere to my disagreement with Nasrallah's disposition. See 590 U. S., at 589–591 (dissenting opinion). On my view, the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar applies to all claims governed by § 1252(b)(9)'s “zipper clause.” Ibid. That clause “consolidates `all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien' ” into review of the fnal order of removal, where they are equally subject to § 1252's “limitations on fnal orders of removal.” Id., at 591–592. “ `Arising from' ” is a sweeping term, and a CAT order issued during a removal proceeding falls within its ambit. Id., at 591. Regardless, because this case turns on jurisdictional categories to which the Nasrallah majority agreed that the zipper