NRC v. Texas (605 U.S. 665, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 2 Pages 665–713 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 18, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 665 Syllabus NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION et al. v. TEXAS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 23–1300. Argued March 5, 2025—Decided June 18, 2025* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally prohibits the private possession of nuclear materials, including spent nuclear fuel, without a license. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may license the possession of nu- clear materials, subject to statutory and procedural requirements. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2073(a), 2092–2093(a), 2111(a), 2231, 2239. Here, Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a facility in West Texas to store spent nuclear fuel. During ISP's licensing proceeding, a Texas government agency submitted comments, including comments on a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Commis- sion for the proposed facility. Fasken Land and Minerals, a private West Texas business, similarly submitted comments, and it also sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding. The Commission denied Page Proof Pending Publication Fasken's petition to intervene. Fasken then unsuccessfully challenged that denial of intervention before the full Commission and the D. C. Circuit. In September 2021, the Commission granted ISP a license to build and operate its proposed storage facility. Texas and Fasken sought re- view of the Commission's licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP's license. Held: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision. Pp. 674–690. (a) In the Hobbs Act, Congress specifed that only a “party aggrieved” by a licensing order of the Commission may seek judicial review. Texas and Fasken argue they qualify as parties because they participated in the licensing proceeding by submitting comments on the draft EIS and, in Fasken's case, by attempting to intervene. But the text of the Atomic Energy Act indicates that one must be the license applicant or successfully intervene in order to obtain party status in a Commission licensing proceeding. The Act provides: “[T]he Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected *Together with No. 23–1312, Interim Storage Partners, LLC v. Texas et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 666 NRC v. TEXAS Syllabus by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.” 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). That text means that a “per- son” becomes a “party” only after that person requests to participate in a hearing before the Commission—that is, requests to intervene—and is actually “admit[ted] . . . to such proceeding” by the Commission. Ibid. And if the Commission fails to “admit” someone “as a party,” that person is not a party. Pp. 674–678. (b) Fasken contends that it can maintain this suit because it satisfed the statutory criteria for intervention under the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission erroneously denied its intervention petition. Fasken also argues that the Commission's intervention regulations set a higher bar for intervention than the Atomic Energy Act contemplates. But Fasken could (and already did) obtain judicial review in the D. C. Circuit of the denial of its petition to intervene. See § 2239(b)(1). In the D. C. Circuit, Fasken did not question the legality of the Commission's inter- vention regulations. Fasken simply challenged how the Commission applied its regulations in this case. But the D. C. Circuit rejected Fasken's arguments and upheld the Commission's denial of Fasken's pe- tition to intervene. And Fasken did not seek en banc review in the D. C. Circuit or certiorari in this Court. The decision on intervention is fnal. Fasken cannot now use a new Hobbs Act suit to collaterally Page Proof Pending Publication attack the D. C. Circuit's prior ruling on intervention. Pp. 678–680. (c) Texas and Fasken alternatively argue that they need not be par- ties to challenge ultra vires agency action. Because ultra vires review could easily circumvent judicial-review statutes, this Court's cases have strictly limited nonstatutory ultra vires review. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481. The Court's leading case on ultra vires review is Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, holding that nonstatutory review was available because the agency order “was an attempted exercise of power that had been specifcally withheld” and violated a “specifc prohibition” in the National Labor Relations Act. Id., at 188–189. “The Kyne ex- ception is a narrow one” that does not apply simply because an agency arguably reached “a conclusion which does not comport with the law.” Boire, 376 U. S., at 481. Rather, it applies only when an agency acts entirely “in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specifc prohibition” in a statute. Railway Clerks v. Association for Beneft of Noncontract Employees, 380 U. S. 650, 660. For at least two reasons, Texas's and Fasken's ultra vires claims fall short. First, Texas and Fasken basically dress up a typical statutory- authority argument as an ultra vires claim. Second, ultra vires review is unavailable where a statutory review scheme provides aggrieved per- sons with an adequate opportunity for judicial review. See Board of Governors, FRS v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502 U. S. 32, 43–44. Here, entities like Texas and Fasken seeking intervention are guaranteed judi- Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 667 Syllabus cial review of either the Commission's intervention denial or, if interven- tion is granted, the Commission's fnal licensing order. Additionally, no precedent supports bringing an ultra vires claim in a court of appeals rather than frst in a district court. Pp. 680–683. (d) Because Texas and Fasken have no right to judicial review of the licensing proceeding, the Court today does not decide whether the Commission possessed statutory authority to issue a license to ISP. Pp. 683–687. 78 F. 4th 827, reversed and remanded. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gor- such, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 690. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for petitioners in No. 23–1300. With him on the briefs in both cases were Acting Solicitor General Harris, former Solici- tor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Ni- cole Frazer Reaves, Jennifer S. Neumann, Michael T. Gray, Page Proof Pending Publication Justin D. Heminger, and Andrew P. Averbach. Brad Fagg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 23–1312. With him on the briefs in both cases were Timothy P. Mat- thews, Michael E. Kenneally, and Ryan K. Lighty. David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. With him on the brief in both cases were Scott H. Angstreich, Christopher C. Good- now, Matthew J. Wilkins, Ryan M. Folio, Allan Kanner, Annemieke M. Tennis, and Monica Renee Perales. Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent Texas et al. With him on the brief in both cases were Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Brent Web- ster, First Assistant Attorney General, Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Benjamin W. Men- delson and Sara B. Baumgardner, Assistant Solicitors General.† †Anne R. Leidich and Jay E. Silberg fled a brief in both cases for Holtec International as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the State of Idaho by Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General of Idaho, Alan 668 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. More than 50 nuclear power plants in the United States produce electricity for American homes and businesses. But those plants also generate dangerous spent nuclear fuel, which is usually stored on site. Because some plants are shutting down or no longer operating, on-site storage is not a viable long-term solution. To address the storage prob- lem, federal law has long designated the Yucca Mountain Nu- clear Waste Repository in Nevada as the future permanent site for disposal of spent nuclear fuel. But the Nevada proj- ect has caused signifcant political controversy and has stalled. To fll the void, some private businesses have sought to build and operate facilities to store spent nuclear fuel “off site”—that is, off the site of a nuclear power plant. To do so, however, they need to obtain licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Page Proof Pending Publication Hurst, Solicitor General, Michael A. Zarian, Deputy Solicitor General, and Robert M. Follett and Ann N. Yribar, Deputy Attorneys General; for the State of New Mexico et al. by Raúl Torrez, Attorney General of New Mexico, and by Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, Aletheia V. P. Allen, Solicitor General, William Grantham, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, Lawrence Marcus, Assistant Solicitor General, and Esther Jamison, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Utah et al. by Derek E. Brown, Attorney General of Utah, Stanford E. Purser, Solicitor General, and Haley Sousa, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen- eral for their respective States as follows: Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Gentner F. Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, and John B. Mc- Cuskey of West Virginia; for Beyond Nuclear, Inc., by Diane Curran and Mindy Goldstein; for Don't Waste Michigan et al. by Wallace L. Taylor and Terry J. Lodge; for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by Oliver J. Dunford; for the Permian Basin Petroleum Association et al. by James R. Conde; and for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by Jason R. LaFond. Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the City of Fort Worth by Laetitia Coleman Brown; and for the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc., by Paul D. Clement, Andrew C. Lawrence, Ellen C. Ginsberg, and Jonathan M. Rund. Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 669 Opinion of the Court Here, the Commission granted a renewable 40-year license to a private entity seeking to store spent nuclear fuel at an off-site facility in West Texas. The State of Texas and a private West Texas business known as Fasken Land and Minerals objected to the project and sued in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued that federal law does not authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel at pri- vate off-site facilities. The threshold question here is whether Texas and Fasken may maintain this suit. The Court of Appeals said yes. We disagree. Under the Hobbs Act, only an aggrieved “party” may obtain judicial review of a Commission licensing deci- sion. To qualify as a party to a licensing proceeding, the Atomic Energy Act requires that one either be a license ap- plicant or have successfully intervened in the licensing pro- ceeding. In this case, however, Texas and Fasken are not license applicants, and they did not successfully intervene in the licensing proceeding. So neither was a party eligible to Page Proof Pending Publication obtain judicial review in the Fifth Circuit. For that reason, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and do not decide the underlying statutory dispute over whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission possesses authority to li- cense private off-site storage facilities. I A In 1954, Congress passed and President Eisenhower signed the Atomic Energy Act. 68 Stat. 919, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. The Act allowed for private commercial nu- clear power plants. Today, more than 50 nuclear power plants—along with coal, natural gas, and renewable energy sources—produce electricity for American homes and busi- nesses. In all, nuclear power plants generate almost 20 per- cent of the electricity in America. Nuclear power plants also create radioactive waste—as relevant here, spent nuclear fuel. To lawfully store that 670 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court waste, nuclear power plants and storage facilities must ob- tain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. §§ 2073(a), 2092–2093(a), 2111(a). A license application initiates an adjudicatory proceeding where the Commission determines whether the applicant has met the statutory and regulatory criteria. §§ 2231, 2239. Section 2239 governs intervention in those proceedings. It states: “In any proceeding” for “the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license . . . any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding” may request to intervene and participate in a hearing, and the Commission “shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.” § 2239(a)(1)(A). The Commission in turn has promulgated regulations specifying when a person may intervene under § 2239. Among other things, the Commission directs inter- venors to proffer a “contention” that shows a “genuine dis- pute . . . on a material issue of law or fact.” 10 CFR § 2.309(f) (2024). In 1990, the D. C. Circuit upheld the Com- Page Proof Pending Publication mission's intervention regulations as consistent with the Atomic Energy Act. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F. 2d 50, 51–56. The licensing proceeding culminates with a fnal order by the Commission that either grants or denies the license. The fnal orders of the Commission are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950, commonly known as the Hobbs Act. Ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129, as amended; see § 2239(b). The Hobbs Act provides that any “party aggrieved by the fnal order may, within 60 days after its entry, fle a petition to review the order” in a court of appeals. 28 U. S. C. § 2344 (emphasis added). B For decades, the question of how best to store and dispose of spent nuclear fuel has sparked contentious American pol- icy and political debates, and intermittent legislative and regulatory efforts. More than 50 commercial nuclear power Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 671 Opinion of the Court plants in the United States now store spent nuclear fuel on site at the plants themselves. That waste must be carefully stored in pools or casks. Safe storage requires substantial space and resources. In 1980, acting pursuant to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgated regula- tions governing the licensing of private spent fuel storage facilities. 45 Fed. Reg. 74693 (1980); see 10 CFR pt. 72. In adopting those regulations, the Commission emphasized that it was not claiming new authority, but instead was codifying “certain existing regulatory practices and better defn[ing] licensing requirements covering” off-site storage under the Atomic Energy Act. 45 Fed. Reg. 74693. Under the Com- mission's regulations, private storage facilities for spent nu- clear fuel may be located either on site or off the site of a commercial nuclear power plant. Id., at 74696. Eligible storage facilities can obtain renewable 40-year licenses for Page Proof Pending Publication interim storage of spent nuclear fuel “pending its ultimate disposal.” Id., at 74694, 74703; 10 CFR § 72.42. Soon thereafter, Congress passed and President Reagan signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 2201, 42 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. That Act directed the Department of Energy to build a geologic repository to permanently dis- pose of the Nation's spent nuclear fuel. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 10131–10145. Importantly, the Act did not disturb the Commission's 1980 regulations allowing both on-site and off- site private storage facilities. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit subse- quently upheld the Commission's 1980 regulations for the li- censing of private off-site storage facilities. See Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F. 3d 536, 537–538, 541–543 (2004). The D. C. Circuit reasoned that the 1980 regulations were authorized by and consistent with the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, and that the 1982 Act did not deny or repeal the Commission's author- ity to license private off-site storage facilities or otherwise disturb the 1980 regulations. Ibid. Under licenses granted 672 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court by the Commission, spent nuclear fuel is currently being stored at about 10 privately owned storage sites in the United States where there are no active nuclear reactors. Brief for United States 6. Meanwhile, in 1987, Congress amended the 1982 Act to specify Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the permanent reposi- tory site for spent nuclear fuel. See 101 Stat. 1330–227 to 1330–228 (codifed at 42 U. S. C. § 10172). But Nevada's ob- jections and the (not coincidental) lack of appropriated funds slowed progress on the Yucca Mountain repository. And the U. S. Government eventually suspended the Yucca Mountain project. Most of the Nation's spent nuclear fuel continues to be stored on site at nuclear power plants. C In 2018, Interim Storage Partners, a business known as ISP, applied for a license to build a private off-site storage Page Proof Pending Publication facility in Andrews County, Texas. Andrews County is in West Texas, northwest of Midland and north of I–20 adjacent to the Texas–New Mexico border. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a notice in the Federal Register. 83 Fed. Reg. 44070 (2018). Several entities sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding, including Fasken, which grazes cattle and operates oil and gas wells in West Texas. Fasken objected to the proposed facility and raised various concerns, including possible environmental contamination and harm to endangered species. The Commission denied Fasken's petition to intervene. The Commission's regulations require would-be intervenors to, among other things, proffer a suffcient “contention,” which means “suffcient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact.” 10 CFR § 2.309(f). After holding two days of oral argument on various intervention petitions, the Com- mission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel ruled that Fasken (and several other would-be intervenors) had Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 673 Opinion of the Court not satisfed the requirements for intervention. The full Commission affrmed. Fasken then sought review in the D. C. Circuit, challeng- ing the Commission's denial of intervention. Fasken did not argue that the regulations were inconsistent with the stat- ute. Rather, it contended that, under the regulations, it had a right to intervene. The D. C. Circuit decided that Fasken was not entitled to intervene. Don't Waste Mich. v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030 (Jan. 25, 2023). Fasken did not seek en banc review of the denial of intervention, nor did it petition for certiorari in this Court. In May 2020, the Commission issued a draft environmental impact statement, or EIS, as required by the National Envi- ronmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. See 10 CFR § 51.10 et seq. A Texas govern- ment agency and Fasken both commented on the draft EIS. App. 125, 205. The Texas agency contended that the pro- Page Proof Pending Publication posed facility was creating “signifcant unease with the pub- lic” and that the Commission had done too little to prevent the facility from becoming a de facto permanent storage site. Id., at 205. Fasken argued that the facility created an unac- ceptably high risk of environmental contamination. Id., at 126; see also id., at 128–146, 198–199. In July 2021, the Commission published its fnal EIS. In September 2021, the Commission granted ISP a license to build and operate its proposed off-site facility for storage of spent nuclear fuel. Id., at 284–287. Texas and Fasken then sued in the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the Commission lacked statutory authority to license storage of spent nuclear fuel at a private off-site facility. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP's license. 78 F. 4th 827, 831 (2023). First, notwithstanding that the Hobbs Act limits ju- risdiction to a “party” aggrieved and that neither Fasken nor Texas successfully intervened as a “party” under the Atomic Energy Act, the court ruled that it could reach the merits. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Texas and Fasken could chal- 674 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court lenge ultra vires agency action—that is, action entirely out- side the Commission's authority—regardless of whether they qualifed as parties aggrieved under the Hobbs Act. Id., at 839–840. Second, on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the Commission lacked statutory authority to license a pri- vate off-site facility for storage of spent nuclear fuel. Id., at 840. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the D. C. Circuit's 2004 Bullcreek decision, which had held to the con- trary. 78 F. 4th, at 841–842. By a 9-to-7 vote, the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 95 F. 4th 935 (2024). The Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission and ISP both sought review in this Court, and we granted certiorari. 603 U. S. 949 (2024). II The Hobbs Act generally allows any “party aggrieved” by a licensing order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Page Proof Pending Publication obtain judicial review in a federal court of appeals. 28 U. S. C. § 2344. The threshold question here is whether Texas and Fasken qualifed as parties to the Commission proceeding who could obtain judicial review in the Fifth Circuit. The Commission argues that, to become a party to a Com- mission licensing proceeding for purposes of the Hobbs and Atomic Energy Acts, a person or entity must either be the license applicant or successfully intervene in the proceeding. Because Texas and Fasken are not the license applicants and did not successfully intervene, the Commission contends that Texas and Fasken are not parties and cannot maintain this suit. Texas and Fasken disagree and advance three alternative arguments for why they can pursue this case. First, according to Texas and Fasken, they were parties because both of them submitted comments to the Commis- sion. Fasken also separately argues that it was a party be- Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 675 Opinion of the Court cause it sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding, even though it did not successfully intervene. Second, Fasken contends that the Commission erroneously denied Fasken's intervention petition. Specifcally, Fasken contends that the Commission's regulations governing inter- vention are inconsistent with the text of the Atomic Energy Act and set too high a bar for intervention. Fasken says that the D. C. Circuit's decision affrming the Commission's denial of Fasken's intervention petition does not preclude Fasken from relitigating the intervention issue in this litigation. Third, Texas and Fasken claim that their statutory claims are reviewable even if they were not parties to the Commis- sion's licensing proceeding. Agreeing with the Fifth Cir- cuit, they argue that the Commission acted ultra vires by issuing a license to ISP, so a court may invalidate the license even if no statutory avenue for judicial review like the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act or the Hobbs Act is available. Page Proof Pending Publication We disagree with each of Texas's and Fasken's arguments. They were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceed- ing and therefore cannot obtain judicial review of the Com- mission's licensing decision. A First, Texas and Fasken contend that simply submitting comments or attempting to intervene in the Commission's licensing proceeding suffces to qualify as a party under the Hobbs Act. Not so. Under the Hobbs Act, only a “party” aggrieved by the li- censing proceeding may seek judicial review. Importantly, a “party” aggrieved is not synonymous with a “person” ag- grieved. In the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Con- gress created a general cause of action for any “person . . . aggrieved” by agency action. 5 U. S. C. § 702. But as then- Judge Scalia explained, when Congress enacted the Hobbs 676 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court Act in 1950, it “did not adopt the `person aggrieved' standard used in the general judicial review provision of the APA, even though the features of that legislation adopted four years earlier were prominently in mind.” Simmons v. ICC, 716 F. 2d 40, 43 (CADC 1983). Therefore, as Judge Scalia stated, “we must read `party' as referring to a party before the agency.” Ibid. Other Courts of Appeals agree with the D. C. Circuit on that point. See, e. g., Blackstone Valley Nat. Bank v. Board of Governors of FRS, 537 F. 2d 1146, 1147 (CA1 1976); Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F. 2d 774, 776, n. 1 (CA5 1984); Packard Elevator v. ICC, 808 F. 2d 654, 655 (CA8 1986); Sierra Club v. NRC, 825 F. 2d 1356, 1360 (CA9 1987). The question then is how one becomes a party in a Com- mission licensing proceeding. Texas and Fasken emphasize ordinary dictionary defnitions of “party,” such as “participa- tor.” E. g., 11 Oxford English Dictionary 281–282 (2d ed. Page Proof Pending Publication 1989); see Random House Dictionary of the English Lan- guage 1052–1053 (1966) (“participant”). According to Texas and Fasken, they “participated” and became parties by fling comments or attempting to intervene. But the text of the Atomic Energy Act indicates that one must be the license applicant or successfully intervene in order to obtain party status in a Commission licensing pro- ceeding. That Act provides: “In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting . . . of any license . . . the Com- mission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any per- son whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceed- ing.” 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). That text means that a “person” becomes a “party” only after that person requests to participate in a hearing before the Commission—that is, requests to intervene—and is actu- ally “admit[ted] . . . to such proceeding” by the Commis- sion. Ibid. It follows that if the Commission fails to Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 677 Opinion of the Court “admit” someone “as a party,” that person or entity is not a party.1 Texas responds that the text of the Hobbs Act does not distinguish between rulemaking and adjudicative proceed- ings. So as Texas sees it, the same participation that con- fers party status in an agency rulemaking—namely, fling a comment—should suffce to qualify for party status in an agency adjudication such as a Commission licensing proceed- ing. We disagree with that “lowest common denominator” approach to party status. Tr. of Oral Arg. 85. The Hobbs Act applies to a variety of agency actions, and what suffces for party status in one category of proceeding may be inade- quate in another. Here, the text of the Atomic Energy Act makes clear that a person or entity must be granted inter- vention in order to become a “party” to a Commission licens- ing proceeding, even if something less than intervention may suffce in other proceedings such as rulemakings (or perhaps certain less-formal agency adjudications) that are also gov- Page Proof Pending Publication erned by the Hobbs Act. Because the Atomic Energy Act confnes party status to license applicants and intervenors, we also reject Texas's ar- gument, advanced for the frst time at oral argument, that the Commission in effect offered party status to those who submitted comments on the draft EIS. Id., at 86–88. By way of comparison, participation by amici in a court proceed- ing does not make the amici parties, even if the court invited such participation. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U. S. 928, 933 (2009). So too in Com- mission licensing proceedings under the Atomic Energy Act. 1 To be sure, if the Commission errs in denying intervention, the denied person or entity may obtain judicial review of the denial of intervention (as Fasken did here in the D. C. Circuit). But until one is granted inter- vention either by the Commission directly or following a reviewing court's decision, that person or entity is not a “party” and cannot obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision under the Hobbs Act. 678 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court Where judicial review of an underlying agency action is not otherwise available, an entity cannot bootstrap its way into judicial review of that action simply by commenting on a draft EIS, even if invited to do so. To be clear, Texas and Fasken could (and did) submit infor- mation and views to the Commission that the Commission could analyze in its decisionmaking process—not unlike an amicus brief in a court proceeding. But that level of partici- pation does not equate to party status in this statutory scheme. In light of the statutory text and context, those who were not license applicants or granted intervention in the Commis- sion's licensing proceeding do not qualify as parties who can obtain judicial review under the Hobbs Act. B Second, Fasken asserts (as does the dissent) that, in any Page Proof Pending Publication event, Fasken satisfed the statutory criteria for intervention under the Atomic Energy Act—and thus should have been granted intervention by the Commission. And Fasken con- tends that the D. C. Circuit's decision upholding the Commis- sion's denial of intervention in earlier litigation does not pre- clude it from now relitigating that issue in the Fifth Circuit and this Court. We disagree. The Atomic Energy Act generally provides that the Com- mission “shall admit” any person who requests a hearing and “whose interest may be affected by the proceeding.” 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). The Commission's regulations gov- erning intervention in turn require intervenors to meet sev- eral specifc criteria. For example, the Commission directs intervenors to proffer a “contention” that creates a “genuine dispute . . . on a material issue of law or fact.” 10 CFR § 2.309(f) (2024). In 1990, the D. C. Circuit upheld the Com- mission's intervention regulations as consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, including § 2239. See Union of Con- cerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F. 2d 50, 51–56. Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 679 Opinion of the Court According to Fasken (and the dissent), the Commission's regulations set a higher bar for intervention than the Atomic Energy Act contemplates. In 1990, the D. C. Circuit re- jected that argument. See ibid. In any event, that ques- tion is not before us in this case. Fasken could (and already did) obtain judicial review in the D. C. Circuit of the denial of its petition to intervene. See § 2239(b)(1). In the D. C. Circuit, Fasken did not question the legality of the Commis- sion's intervention regulations. See Don't Waste Mich. v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030 (Jan. 25, 2023). Fasken simply chal- lenged how the Commission applied its regulations in this case. But the D. C. Circuit rejected Fasken's arguments. And Fasken did not seek en banc review in the D. C. Circuit or certiorari in this Court. The decision on intervention is fnal. Fasken cannot now use a new Hobbs Act suit to collater- ally attack the D. C. Circuit's prior ruling on intervention. Page Proof Pending Publication An analogy to judicial proceedings is instructive. In the ju- dicial context, “intervention is the requisite method for a nonparty to become a party to a lawsuit.” Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 933. And “only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam). Therefore, a nonparty who wishes to appeal from a district court decision ordinarily must seek to intervene in the dis- trict court proceeding. If the district court denies that intervention motion, the nonparty may appeal the denial of intervention. But the nonparty may not obtain appellate review of any fnal order of the district court in the underly- ing proceeding unless and until the denial of intervention is reversed. See ibid. So too in Commission proceedings. If a request to inter- vene fails before the Commission, the would-be intervenor may seek judicial review of that decision—as Fasken did in the D. C. Circuit. But a person who has not successfully intervened before the Commission may not, as a nonparty, 680 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court bring a Hobbs Act suit contesting the merits of orders issued in the underlying Commission proceeding. Texas and Fasken complain that the Commission is unilat- erally denying access to judicial review by limiting interven- tion. That charge rings hollow. Texas did not even seek to intervene in the Commission's licensing proceeding. As for Fasken, the Commission's gatekeeping decision denying it intervention was subject to judicial review in the D. C. Cir- cuit. After losing there, Fasken chose not to seek en banc review or further review in this Court. In short, the Hobbs Act affords judicial review to those who were parties before the Commission. Here, obtaining party status required Texas or Fasken to successfully inter- vene in the Commission proceeding. Because neither Texas nor Fasken successfully intervened, they may not obtain ju- dicial review of the Commission's licensing decision under the Hobbs Act. C Page Proof Pending Publication Third, Texas and Fasken alternatively argue that they need not be parties in order to bring claims of ultra vires agency action. That argument was the basis of the Fifth Circuit's decision. (Notably, the dissent today does not adopt that argument.) Before enactment of the APA, those challenging agency action often lacked a statutory cause of action. Yet courts sometimes entertained “a bill in equity to attack administra- tive action when no statutory review was available.” 3 K. Hickman & R. Pierce, Administrative Law § 20.7, p. 2600 (7th ed. 2024). In particular, courts recognized a right to equita- ble relief where an agency's action was ultra vires—that is, “unauthorized by any law and . . . in violation of the rights of the individual.” American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 110 (1902). According to Texas and Fasken, judicial-review statutes like the Hobbs Act and the APA did not displace pre-existing nonstatutory ultra vires review. And they say that they Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 681 Opinion of the Court may assert ultra vires claims here. They contend that the Commission's issuance of a license to ISP was ultra vires because the Commission's licensing authority, in their view, does not extend to private off-site facilities for the storage of spent nuclear fuel. This Court's leading case on post-APA ultra vires review is Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958). That case arose from an improper agency certifcation of a collective bargain- ing unit—an interlocutory order not subject to review under the judicial-review provisions of the APA or the National Labor Relations Act. See id., at 185, 187. This Court held that nonstatutory review was available because the agency order at issue “was an attempted exercise of power that had been specifcally withheld,” and the agency's order violated a “specifc prohibition” in the Act. Id., at 188–189. Because ultra vires review could become an easy end-run around the limitations of the Hobbs Act and other judicial- Page Proof Pending Publication review statutes, this Court's subsequent cases have strictly limited nonstatutory ultra vires review to the “painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of Kyne.” Boire v. Grey- hound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481 (1964). “The Kyne exception is a narrow one,” and it does not apply simply because an agency has arguably reached “a conclusion which does not comport with the law.” Ibid. Rather, it applies only when an agency has taken action entirely “in excess of its dele- gated powers and contrary to a specifc prohibition” in a statute. Railway Clerks v. Association for Beneft of Non- contract Employees, 380 U. S. 650, 660 (1965). Ultra vires review is also unavailable if, as is usually the case, a statutory review scheme provides aggrieved persons “with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial re- view,” or if a statutory review scheme forecloses all other forms of judicial review. Board of Governors, FRS v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502 U. S. 32, 43 (1991); see id., at 44. Given all that, “a Leedom v. Kyne claim is essentially a Hail Mary pass—and in court as in football, the attempt 682 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court rarely succeeds.” Nyunt v. Chairman, Broadcasting Bd. of Governors, 589 F. 3d 445, 449 (CADC 2009). For at least two reasons, Texas's and Fasken's ultra vires claims under Leedom v. Kyne fall far short here. First, Texas and Fasken basically dress up a typical statutory-authority argument as an ultra vires claim. That is a fairly common maneuver when a litigant tries to squeeze its arguments into the Leedom v. Kyne box—and is in large part why those claims rarely succeed. Here, Texas and Fasken contend that the Commission's general authority to license storage of spent nuclear fuel does not extend to the licensing of private off-site storage. In 2004, the D. C. Cir- cuit rejected that statutory argument. See Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F. 3d 536, 537–538, 541–543. Even if one were to disagree with the D. C. Circuit's conclusion, the statutory argument falls well shy of a meritorious Leedom v. Kyne claim. See 358 U. S., at 189. Page Proof Pending Publication Second, and alternatively, ultra vires review is not avail- able because Texas and Fasken had an alternative path to judicial review. Entities like Texas and Fasken who seek to intervene are guaranteed judicial review of either the Com- mission's denial of intervention or, if intervention has been granted, the Commission's fnal order arising from the licens- ing proceeding. Also, Texas and Fasken's theory of ultra vires review would lead to major anomalies. For example, the Fifth Cir- cuit purported to exercise original—rather than appellate— jurisdiction over these ultra vires claims. But as counsel for Fasken acknowledged at oral argument, no precedent sup- ports bringing an ultra vires claim in a court of appeals in the frst instance, rather than in a district court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 76. In addition, Fasken argues (and Texas does not dispute) that the Hobbs Act's 60-day time limit for seeking judicial review would apply even under its ultra vires theory. Brief Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 683 Opinion of the Court for Respondent Fasken 45. But Fasken does not explain how it makes sense for an ultra vires claim to be limited by the 60-day requirement yet not by the “party aggrieved” requirement in the very same sentence of the Hobbs Act. We need not further prolong the discussion. Texas and Fasken may not maintain a nonstatutory ultra vires claim. D 1 The dissent primarily focuses not on the threshold Hobbs Act reviewability issue on which we rest our decision, but rather on the ultimate merits question raised by Texas and Fasken: Whether the Commission possessed statutory au- thority to issue a license to ISP. According to the dissent, that merits question is “not hard” because, in its view, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 authorizes the storage of spent fuel only at private on-site facilities or at federal facili- Page Proof Pending Publication ties—but not at private off-site facilities. Post, at 698 (opin- ion of Gorsuch, J.). Because Texas and Fasken have no right to judicial review of the licensing proceeding, the Court today need not and does not decide that statutory interpretation question. But we do briefy note, in response to the dissent's narrative, that history and precedent offer signifcant support for the Com- mission's longstanding interpretation. Contrary to the dis- sent, the Commission for about 50 years has read the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel at private off-site facilities. And this Court in 1983 and several Courts of Appeals have similarly interpreted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize licenses for the stor- age of spent nuclear fuel. See Pacifc Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 207, 217 (1983); Bullcreek, 359 F. 3d, at 538 (collecting cases and stating that “it has long been recognized that the AEA confers on the NRC authority to 684 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court license and regulate the storage and disposal of ” spent nu- clear fuel).2 To spell it out some more: In 1980, the Commission adopted regulations that interpreted the 1954 Atomic En- ergy Act to authorize storage at private off-site facilities. Those regulations established licensing procedures for pri- vate on-site and off-site facilities. See 10 CFR pt. 72. In adopting those regulations, the Commission made clear that it was not claiming new authority, but instead was codifying “certain existing regulatory practices and better defn[ing] licensing requirements covering the storage of spent fuel in” on-site and off-site facilities under the Atomic Energy Act. 45 Fed. Reg. 74693 (1980). In the ensuing 45 years, the Commission's regulations have continued to authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel, including at private off-site facilities. And both before and after the Commission's 1980 regulations, the Commission has in fact licensed those facilities. For example, one such facil- Page Proof Pending Publication ity, the GE Morris facility in Morris, Illinois, received a li- cense in 1971 and obtained a renewed license following the 1980 regulations. See In re General Elec. Co., 22 N. R. C. 851, 853–854 (1985). Today, there are about 10 privately owned storage sites where there are no active nuclear reactors. 2 The dissent says that Pacifc Gas “never decided that question” and Bullcreek “had no occasion to resolve” it. Post, at 704. In Pacifc Gas, however, this Court noted that the Commission extensively regulates spent fuel storage under the Atomic Energy Act, and the Court relied on that fact in reasoning that “nuclear waste disposal” is a regulatory “feld . . . occupied by the Federal Government.” 461 U. S., at 219; see also id., at 217. And Bullcreek reaffrmed—without relying on Chevron defer- ence—that the Commission has “authority under the AEA to license and regulate private use of private away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facili- ties.” 359 F. 3d, at 542; see also id., at 541 (disclaiming any reliance on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)). Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 685 Opinion of the Court Importantly, in 1982 when enacting the heavily negotiated Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Congress was of course fully aware of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's 1980 regulations authorizing private off-site storage of spent nuclear fuel—as well as the existence of private off-site stor- age facilities like the GE Morris facility. See S. Rep. No. 97–282, pp. 44, 65 (1981); In re Private Fuel Storage, LLC, 56 N. R. C. 390, 400 (2002) (“Members of Congress clearly were well aware that `other provisions of law' authorized private AFR [away-from-reactor] storage facilities, as the existence, and fate, of such facilities was discussed in con- gressional committee debates”). In that 1982 Act, Congress did not disturb the Commis- sion's 1980 regulations or its practice of licensing temporary private off-site facilities under the Atomic Energy Act. In § 135(h) of that Act (which the dissent cites, see post, at 692, 698), Congress set forth guidelines for construing “this chap- Page Proof Pending Publication ter” of the 1982 Act but did not speak one way or another about the Commission's existing licensing authority under the 1954 Act. 42 U. S. C. § 10155(h). Instead, in the 1982 Act, Congress primarily focused on authorizing a permanent nu- clear waste repository that would exist for thousands of years. When a license for a private off-site storage facility was later challenged in the D. C. Circuit, that court upheld the license and the Commission's 1980 regulations, fnding them to be consistent with the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and the 1982 Act. Bullcreek, 359 F. 3d, at 537–538, 541–543. The D. C. Circuit reasoned that courts, including the Supreme Court, had “long . . . recognized” that the Atomic Energy Act “confers on the NRC authority to license and regulate the storage and disposal of such fuel,” including at private off-site facilities. Id., at 538. Then, after considering the text and structure of the 1982 Act, the D. C. Circuit further concluded that the 1982 Act's “text . . . demonstrates that Congress did not intend to repeal or supersede the NRC's 686 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court authority under the AEA to license and regulate private use of private away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facilities.” Id., at 542. The dissent today frst argues, however, that the Commis- sion never had authority under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to license on-site or off-site storage facilities. See post, at 699–702. But this Court has already rejected that interpre- tation of the Act. See PG&E, 461 U. S., at 207, 217; see also Bullcreek, 359 F. 3d, at 538. And the dissent's theory that the Atomic Energy Act does not authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel anywhere would have extraordinary consequences. As was pointed out at oral argument, if that interpretation were correct, then it also would necessarily mean that private off-site facilities actually do not need a license to store spent nuclear fuel in the frst place. (That is because, if spent nuclear fuel is not covered by the 1954 Act, then it follows that the Act does not prohibit its possession or use.) If that were the case, Page Proof Pending Publication petitioner ISP could build the West Texas facility without even bothering to seek a license from the Commission. Al- though ISP might beneft somewhat from such a novel read- ing, it forthrightly stated at oral argument that “that's not a credible interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.3 Regardless of the scope of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the dissent next says that the 1982 Act restricted storage of spent nuclear fuel to on-site and federal facilities. But as the D. C. Circuit explained in Bullcreek, the 1982 Act care- fully avoided denying or repealing the Commission's author- ity to license private off-site facilities. See 359 F. 3d, at 542. 3 The dissent responds that the 1982 Act “addressed spent nuclear fuel directly, and that statute authorizes its storage in only two locations.” Post, at 705. But the 1982 Act in relevant part simply grants the Commis- sion authority additional to the 1954 Act to authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel. See 42 U. S. C. § 10155(a). Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 687 Opinion of the Court On that issue, the 1982 Act left the law where it was— namely with the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and the 1980 Com- mission regulations authorizing licensing of private off-site storage facilities. See ibid. In short, the 1982 Act did not withdraw or displace the Commission's authority under the Atomic Energy Act (and the 1980 regulations) to authorize private off-site storage. On the contrary, the 1982 Act preserved pre-existing law on that issue. Simply put, the dissent seems to underread the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and to overread the 1982 Act. Given all of that, it is perhaps no surprise that neither Fasken's intervention petition to the Commission nor Texas's comments to the Commission questioned the Commission's statutory authority to license private off-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. They raised other issues, but they did not question the Commission's statutory authority to issue a license for private off-site storage. To be clear, because Texas and Fasken's claims are not Page Proof Pending Publication judicially reviewable, we need not and do not decide the ulti- mate question of statutory authority that the dissent focuses on. So that there is no confusion, however, we underscore that in resting on the threshold reviewability issue, we are not somehow assuming or buying into a premise that the Commission is wrong on the underlying merits. The dis- sent's description of an agency that is fagrantly violating its governing statutes seems to be in substantial tension with about 50 years of consistent congressional action, agency practice, and judicial interpretation. 2 When it turns to the Hobbs Act reviewability question on which our decision rests, the dissent's analysis is unpersua- sive, in our respectful view. Under the Hobbs Act, as we have explained and the dis- sent acknowledges, Texas and Fasken may obtain judicial re- 688 NRC v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court view of the licensing decision only if they were parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding. See post, at 707. The Atomic Energy Act—in particular, 42 U. S. C. § 2239—pre- scribes how one becomes a party to a Commission licensing proceeding. Under § 2239, to be a party, one must either be the license applicant or be admitted by the Commission as a party (that is, be granted intervention). The dissent claims that § 2239 is not the exclusive way to become a “party” to a Commission licensing proceeding. See post, at 709. We disagree. Section 2239 provides that “[i]n any proceeding” for granting a license, “the Commis- sion shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.” § 2239(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As the dissent seems to acknowledge, when § 2239 uses the word “proceeding” rather than “hearing,” it refers to the Commission's “overall licens- ing proceeding”—not merely one subpart of that proceeding. Page Proof Pending Publication Post, at 709. And § 2239 specifes intervention as the mecha- nism for a person other than the license applicant to become “a party to such proceeding”—that is, to the Commission's overall licensing proceeding. For that person or entity to qualify as a party, the Commission must admit that person or entity as a party.4 4 Even if § 2239 were not the exclusive path to party status in Commis- sion licensing proceedings, Texas and Fasken would still not be parties under the Hobbs Act. The dissent suggests that Texas and Fasken could achieve party status for purposes of the Hobbs Act merely by commenting on the Commission's draft EIS. See post, at 707–708. That contention— that every interested commenter in an agency adjudication is a party for purposes of the Hobbs Act—is, as best as we can tell, unprecedented. See supra, at 677–678. The dissent points to no authority suggesting that a person who is not involved in an agency adjudication can bootstrap his way under the Hobbs Act into plenary judicial review of the legality of that adjudication merely by commenting on a related EIS. Rather, Courts of Appeals have long held that litigants cannot use collateral envi- Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 689 Opinion of the Court Section 2239 is thus the exclusive path to party status in Commission licensing proceedings. To be a party, one must be admitted by the Commission as a party. As we noted above, the Commission applied its regulations implementing § 2239 and denied Fasken intervention. Importantly, if a person or entity believes that the Com- mission wrongly denied it intervention, then it may obtain judicial review of the intervention decision. Here, Fasken obtained such judicial review in the D. C. Circuit, but lost. It cannot get a second bite at the apple on intervention in this litigation. The dissent responds that the Commission's intervention regulations misinterpret § 2239 and set too high a bar for intervention. See post, at 711. The D. C. Circuit rejected that argument 35 years ago in Union of Concerned Scien- tists. See 920 F. 2d, at 51–56. And in any event, we need not delve into that question here because, to reiterate, Fasken had an opportunity to raise that argument to the Page Proof Pending Publication D. C. Circuit when it challenged the Commission's denial of intervention. But Fasken, though it appealed to the D. C. Circuit, did not even raise that argument in that court. Rather, it argued that it should have been admitted under the Commission's existing intervention regulations. Fasken did not prevail in the D. C. Circuit on that intervention argu- ment. See Don't Waste Mich. v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030. And it did not seek either en banc review or certiorari. Having lost in the D. C. Circuit, Fasken cannot collaterally ronmental claims to evade the limits on judicial review imposed by an exclusive judicial-review provision like the Hobbs Act. See, e. g., Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F. 3d 174, 186 (CADC 2017); Ameri- can Bird Conservancy v. FCC, 545 F. 3d 1190, 1194–1195 (CA9 2008). In these Commission proceedings, a person or entity who comments on the EIS can petition to intervene, and if denied intervention, may appeal that denial—as Fasken did to the D. C. Circuit, where it did not prevail. But commenting on an EIS in an adjudication does not automatically make one a party under the Hobbs Act. 690 NRC v. TEXAS Gorsuch, J., dissenting attack that decision here, as we have explained. See supra, at 679–680. (For its part, Texas did not even try to inter- vene in the Commission's licensing proceeding.) The dissent exudes a sense that Texas and Fasken have been treated unfairly. But the dissent wants to give Texas and Fasken a second or third bite at the apple on the inter- vention issue. To review: Texas and Fasken had ample op- portunity to present their views on the proposed storage site to the Commission. They did so. And they had the oppor- tunity to try to intervene before the Commission and become a party—and after being denied, to raise their arguments for intervention on appeal to the D. C. Circuit, and if unsuccess- ful there, to this Court. They did not prevail (or did not try) in those forums. And having not secured intervention, they were not parties to the licensing proceeding under § 2239— and therefore under the Hobbs Act cannot obtain judicial re- view of the licensing decision in this litigation. Page Proof Pending * * * Publication Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding and are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review. It is so ordered. Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and Jus- tice Alito join, dissenting. By law, spent nuclear fuel may be stored on an interim basis in only two places: at a nuclear reactor or a federally owned facility. Disregarding those instructions, the Nu- clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an interim stor- age license to a private company, Interim Storage Partners, LLC (ISP), allowing it to store thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel on its private property in Texas, hundreds of Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 691 Gorsuch, J., dissenting miles from the nearest reactor. The agency's decision was unlawful. Still, the Court says, there is nothing we can do about it. Why? Because neither of the respondents before us is a “party aggrieved” by the agency's decision. Yes, the re- spondents are the State of Texas and Fasken Land and Min- erals, Ltd., a landowner with property near the proposed facility. And, yes, they are “aggrieved” by the NRC's deci- sion. Radioactive waste poses risks to the State, its citi- zens, its lands, air, and waters, and it poses dangers as well to a neighbor and its employees. But, the Court insists, the agency never admitted Texas or Fasken as “parties” in a hearing it held before issuing ISP's license—and that's the rub. Maybe the agency's internal rules governing who can participate in its hearing are highly restrictive. Maybe those rules are themselves unlawful. But, the Court rea- sons, its hands are tied: The agency did not admit Texas or Fasken as parties in its hearing, and that is that. Page Proof Pending Publication I cannot agree. Both Texas and Fasken participated ac- tively in other aspects of the NRC's licensing proceeding. No more is required for them to qualify as “parties ag- grieved” by the NRC's licensing decision. Both are entitled to their day in court—and both are entitled to prevail. I A At the dawn of the atomic age, few worried about where to store spent nuclear fuel. The “prevailing expectation” was that it would be reprocessed and reused. Brief for Fed- eral Petitioners 3 (citing Idaho v. Department of Energy, 945 F. 2d 295, 298 (CA9 1991)). Perhaps for that reason, Con- gress's frst piece of major legislation regulating the nuclear power industry, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), 68 Stat. 919, did not address the storage of spent nuclear fuel. In fact, the AEA didn't mention spent nuclear fuel at all. 692 NRC v. TEXAS Gorsuch, J., dissenting The statute spoke about nearly everything else—from the construction of commercial nuclear reactors to their owner- ship and operation—but not spent nuclear fuel or its storage. Pacifc Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva- tion and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 206–207 (1983). By the 1970s, things looked very different. Spent nuclear fuel was piling up, and there was nowhere to put it. The reprocessing industry had “collapsed.” Idaho, 945 F. 2d, at 298. Those developments presented the Nation with an acute problem. Spent nuclear fuel is “radioactive, explosive, and highly volatile,” and it can remain so for thousands of years. Brief for State of Idaho as Amicus Curiae 7. It can poison people and animals, render land and water unusable, and, should it fall into the wrong hands, it can be weaponized. See id., at 8. In 1982, Congress reentered the picture to address the Page Proof Pending Publication problem, passing a new law appropriately named the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), 96 Stat. 2201, 42 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. In it, Congress tasked the Department of Energy with selecting a permanent federally owned repository for spent nuclear fuel. See §§ 10132, 10134. In the meantime, the NWPA authorized the “interim” storage of spent nuclear fuel in two—and only two—places. Spent fuel, Congress said, could be stored either “at the site of each civilian nu- clear reactor” or at “facilities owned by the Federal Govern- ment.” § 10151(b). In case those instructions left any room for doubt, Congress added that “nothing” in its new law “shall be construed to encourage [or] authorize” storage at offsite, private facilities. § 10155(h). Eventually, the Department of Energy selected Yucca Mountain in Nevada to serve as the permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel. And, in 1987, Congress amended the NWPA to endorse that choice, directing that Yucca Mountain should begin operations no later than January 31, 1998. See 101 Stat. 1330–227 to 1330–228, 42 U. S. C. § 10172. Despite Cite as: 605 U. S. 665 (2025) 693 Gorsuch, J., dissenting that mandate, and “more than $15 billion” spent on the proj- ect, the Yucca Mountain repository remains today more a dream than a reality. App. 2; see National Assn. of Regula- tory Util. Comm'rs v. United States Dept. of Energy, 680 F. 3d 819, 821 (CADC 2012). That leaves the question what to do. Spent fuel must be stored somewhere. And, until recently, that somewhere has usually been where Congress directed—at reactors or feder- ally owned facilities. Now, however, the NRC