Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (606 U.S. 1, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 1–45 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 20, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 2024 FULD et al. v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit Page Proof Pending Publication No. 24–20. Argued April 1, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025* Before the Court are two separate lawsuits fled in the United States Dis- trict Court for the Southern District of New York under the Antiterror- ism Act of 1990 (ATA). The ATA creates a federal civil damages action for U. S. nationals injured or killed “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” 18 U. S. C. § 2333(a); see also § 2333(d)(2) (permitting aiding and abetting liability). Respondents (defendants below) are the Pales- tine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA)— entities responsible for carrying out governmental functions for parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The question presented is whether the exercise of personal jurisdic- tion over respondents under the Promoting Security and Justice for Vic- tims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The PSJVTA names the PA and PLO specifcally and provides that they “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in ATA cases under two circumstances. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5). The frst jurisdictional predicate relates to respondents' practice of pay- ing salaries to terrorists in Israeli prisons and to families of deceased *Together with Waldman et al. v. Palestine Liberation Organization et al. (see this Court's Rule 12.4) and No. 24–151, United States v. Pales- tine Liberation Organization et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 1 2 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Syllabus terrorists—conduct Congress has condemned as “an incentive to commit acts of terror.” 132 Stat. 1143. The second ties jurisdiction to re- spondents' activities on U. S. soil. § 2334(e)(1)(B). Petitioners alleged that respondents engaged in conduct triggering both jurisdictional predicates. The Second Circuit held that the PSJVTA could not, consistent with constitutional due process, establish personal jurisdiction over the PLO or PA. Held: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involv- ing the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. Pp. 11–25. (a) Courts must have personal jurisdiction over parties before resolv- ing cases. Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580 U. S. 82, 95. The Court's modern personal jurisdiction cases have addressed the limita- tions imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the jurisdiction of state courts, but the Court has reserved whether the Fifth Amendment im- poses the same restrictions on federal courts. Pp. 11–18. (1) The Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction framework derives from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, and Page Proof Pending Publication requires that a defendant have suffcient “contacts” with the forum State so that maintaining suit is “reasonable” and “does not offend tradi- tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 358 (quoting Inter- national Shoe). Respondents urge application of this familiar frame- work here, noting that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four- teenth Amendments are textually similar. The Court has recognized, however, that the Amendments “were engrafted upon the Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances” and thus that “questions may arise in which different constructions and applications of their provisions may be proper.” French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328. Pp. 12–13. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment's due process limitations are driven by two principles: (1) treating defendants fairly and (2) pro- tecting interstate federalism, the latter of which ensures “that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 292. These interstate federalism concerns do not apply to the Fifth Amendment's limitations on the power of the Federal Government and the corollary authority of the federal courts. The Constitution empowers the Fed- eral Government—and it alone—with both nationwide and extraterrito- Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 3 Syllabus rial authority. Because the State and Federal Governments occupy dramatically different sovereign spheres, the Court declines to import the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the Fifth Amendment permits a more fexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the Federal Government's broader sovereign authority. Pp. 13–16. (3) While acknowledging that interstate federalism concerns are irrelevant under the Fifth Amendment, respondents argue that fairness and individual liberty considerations justify applying equivalent juris- dictional limitations. But the Court has observed in the Fourteenth Amendment context that interstate federalism concerns may be deci- sive. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U. S., at 294. Accord- ingly, while these “general fairness considerations” are relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, they do not compel applying equivalent jurisdictional limits here. Pp. 17–18. (b) The Court does not delineate the full scope of the Federal Govern- ment's power to hale foreign defendants into U. S. courts. Whatever the Fifth Amendment's outer limits, the PSJVTA—which ties federal jurisdiction to conduct closely related to the United States that impli- cates important foreign policy concerns—does not transgress them. Pp. 18–25. Page Proof Pending Publication (1) The Federal Government's foreign affairs power must be exer- cised within constitutional bounds. See American Ins. Assn. v. Gara- mendi, 539 U. S. 396, 416–417, n. 9. The Court accordingly reviews even legislation implicating foreign policy issues to ensure that it has not crossed a constitutional line. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 34. Here, in passing and signing the PSJVTA into law, Congress and the President made a considered judgment to subject the PLO and PA to liability in U. S. courts as part of a comprehensive legal response to deterring international terrorism that threatens the life and limb of American citizens. The PSJVTA refects the political branches' balanced judgment of competing concerns over national secu- rity, foreign affairs, and fairness to these defendants—entities with which the Federal Government has complex, longstanding relationships in which concerns over terrorism have been paramount. The PSJVTA is suitably limited to these ends. It does not broadly expose respondents to myriad civil actions, but applies only to ATA cases. The Federal Government may craft a narrow jurisdictional pro- vision ensuring Americans injured or killed by acts of terror have an adequate forum in which to vindicate their right to ATA compensation. The statute's jurisdictional predicates are likewise narrow. The pay- ments prong furthers the Federal Government's longstanding policy of deterring payments that promote acts of overseas terror that may po- 4 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Syllabus tentially injure or kill Americans. The activities prong, in predicating jurisdiction on respondents' U. S. conduct, is a continuation of the Fed- eral Government's longstanding, nuanced policy governing the opera- tions that respondents may conduct on U. S. soil. The PSJVTA thus ties jurisdiction to specifc, narrow conduct directly implicating sensitive and ongoing concerns in respondents' relationships with the United States. And the statute's targeted applicability to only two enumer- ated nonsovereign foreign entities put the PLO and PA on full notice that they could be subject to personal jurisdiction in ATA suits in U. S. courts. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5). Pp. 18–23. (2) Because the Court holds that the PSJVTA ties jurisdiction to predicate conduct bearing a meaningful relationship to the United States, the Court need not consider whether the statute comports with cases addressing when defendants may be deemed to have consented to jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U. S. 122. P. 23. (c) Although the Fifth Amendment does not incorporate the Four- teenth Amendment minimum contacts standard, the Fifth Amendment might still require a “reasonableness” inquiry. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 115. Even assuming such analysis is constitutionally required, the PSJVTA easily Page Proof Pending Publication satisfes the factors previously applied to determine “the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 113. Reasonableness depends on evaluating “the burden on the de- fendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.” Ibid. The PSJVTA satisfes all three. The Federal Government has an exceedingly compelling interest in providing a forum for American victims to hold accountable the perpetrators of acts of international terror that harm U. S. citizens. American plaintiffs have a strong interest in seeking justice through ATA damages actions in U. S. courts. Finally, respondents do not assert lack of notice or contend that litigating in the United States forces them to bear an unfair or unmanageable burden. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the PSJVTA's jurisdictional rule makes litigation so “gravely diffcult and inconvenient,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 478, as to render the exercise of personal jurisdiction “unreasonable and unfair,” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 116. Pp. 23–25. 82 F. 4th 64 (second judgment) and 74 (frst judgment), reversed and remanded. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Gorsuch, J., joined as to Part II, post, p. 25. Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 5 Opinion of the Court Kent A. Yalowitz argued the cause for petitioners in No. 24–20. With him on the briefs were Nicole L. Masiello, Allon Kedem, John P. Elwood, Dirk C. Phillips, Stephen K. Wirth, Daniel Yablon, Samuel Silverman, Jeffrey Fleisch- mann, and Brian M. Williams. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States in No. 24–151. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Acting Assistant At- torney General Shumate, Kevin J. Barber, Benjamin H. Tor- rance, Sharon Swingle, and Courtney L. Dixon. Mitchell R. Berger argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Gassan A. Baloul.† Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act in 2019. The Act deems the Pales- tine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority— Page Proof Pending Publication if they engage in specifed conduct—to have consented to personal jurisdiction in civil suits brought in the United †Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for Agudath Israel of America et al. by Mark I. Pinkert, Jason Torchinsky, Nathan J. Diament, Steven C. Sheinberg, Steven M. Freeman, Marc Stern, Susan B. Tuchman, Kenneth Marcus, Alyza Lewin, Richard A. Rosen, Clifford A. Rieders, Jonathan L. Sherman, and Steven Orlow; for the America First Legal Foundation by R. Trent McCotter and Reed D. Ru- binstein; for the American Association for Justice by Robert S. Peck and Jeffrey R. White; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, and Benjamin P. Sisney; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Peter B. Rutledge, Hillary K. Lukacs, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Jonathan D. Urick; for Scholars of Civil Procedure et al. by Kevin D. Benish; for Michael Pompeo by Douglass Mitchell and Andri- anna D. Kastanek; for Stephen E. Sachs, pro se; and for Abraham D. So- faer et al. by Tejinder Singh and Alan B. Morrison. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 24–20 were fled for Sen. Charles Grassley et al. by J. Carl Cecere; and for the U. S. House of Repre- sentatives by Matthew B. Berry. Alan Mygatt-Tauber, pro se, fled a brief of amicus curiae in both cases. 6 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court States under the Antiterrorism Act. The question pre- sented is whether this personal jurisdiction provision vio- lates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I A Before us are two separate lawsuits against respondents, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA)—entities responsible for carrying out, re- spectively, foreign and domestic governmental functions for parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See 82 F. 4th 74, 80 (CA2 2023). Although the United States does not recognize respondents as sovereign, other nations do, and respondents maintain consular facilities and diplomatic missions around the world. The PLO also maintains an offce in New York City as part of its mission to the United Nations, in which the PLO participates as a “Permanent Observer.” Ibid. Page Proof Pending Publication Motivated by concerns over respondents' support for over- seas terrorism, Congress has for decades restricted their ac- tivities on U. S. soil. For example, in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 1406, 22 U. S. C. § 5201 et seq., Congress found that the PLO and its constituent groups “ha[d] taken credit for, and been implicated in, the murders of dozens of American citizens abroad.” § 5201(a)(4). Congress accord- ingly limited the PLO's operations in the United States. §§ 5201(b), 5202. Congress has similarly restricted the PA's ability to conduct activities on U. S. soil. See Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, § 7, 120 Stat. 3324, 22 U. S. C. § 2378b. It has also placed limits on the distribution of for- eign aid and other assistance to respondents. See Taylor Force Act, § 1004(a), 132 Stat. 1144, 22 U. S. C. § 2378c–1(a). As part of its comprehensive legal response to interna- tional terrorism, Congress also enacted the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), § 132, 104 Stat. 2250–2252, 18 U. S. C. § 2331 et seq.; see H. R. Rep. No. 102–1040, p. 5 (1992). The ATA creates a civil treble damages cause of action for any Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 7 Opinion of the Court U. S. national injured or killed “by reason of an act of inter- national terrorism.” § 2333(a); see also § 2333(d)(2) (permit- ting aiding and abetting liability). The ATA provides for nationwide service of process and venue and exclusive juris- diction in federal courts. §§ 2334(a), 2338. B The ATA supplied the underlying cause of action in both lawsuits now before us. The frst was brought by a group of American citizens (and their estates and survivors) in- jured in terror attacks in Israel. It was fled in 2004 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 1:04–cv–397, 1 App. 1–51.1 The case went to trial, and in 2015 a jury found respondents liable under the ATA. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $218.5 million in damages, which was trebled to $655.5 million. Page Proof Pending Publication That victory was short lived. The next year, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and directed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondents were not subject to jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held, because the complained of “killings and related acts of ter- rorism . . . were unconnected to the forum and were not expressly aimed at the United States.” 835 F. 3d 317, 337 (2016); accord, Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F. 3d 45, 57– 58 (CADC 2017). Congress responded by enacting the Anti-Terrorism Clari- fcation Act of 2018 (ATCA), 132 Stat. 3183. The ATCA added a new provision to the ATA, which deemed defendants “to have consented to personal jurisdiction” if they engaged in certain activities in the United States or accepted particu- 1 This case was recaptioned Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion in the Second Circuit. 82 F. 4th 64, 69, n. 2 (2023) (per curiam). Like the parties, we refer to the case as Sokolow, which is how it was captioned in the District Court. See Brief for Petitioner Miriam Fuld et al. 9–11; Brief for United States 2, n. 2; Brief for Respondents 5–9. 8 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court lar forms of U. S. foreign assistance. See § 4(a), id., at 3184. The Sokolow plaintiffs moved for the Second Circuit to recall its mandate in light of the ATCA. The Court of Appeals declined to do so, 925 F. 3d 570, 574–576 (2019) (per curiam), and the plaintiffs fled a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, see Pet. for Cert. in Sokolow v. Palestine Libera- tion Org., O. T. 2019, No. 19–764. C While the Sokolow certiorari petition was pending, the landscape changed again—this time, through Congress's en- actment in December 2019 of the law at issue here: the Pro- moting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), § 903, 133 Stat. 3082–3085, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2333, 2334. Section 903(c) of the PSJVTA, subtitled “Jurisdic- tional Amendments to Facilitate Resolution of Terrorism- Related Claims of Nationals of the United States,” super- seded the ATCA's jurisdictional provisions. 133 Stat. 3083. Page Proof Pending Publication Under the PSJVTA's now operative provision, which refers to the PA and PLO by name, respondents “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in ATA cases in two specifed circumstances. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5). The frst jurisdictional predicate relates to respondents' practice “of paying salaries to terrorists serving in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists”— conduct which Congress has condemned as “an incentive to commit acts of terror.” Taylor Force Act, § 1002(1), 132 Stat. 1143. Jurisdiction is triggered under this prong if, after a specifed time, respondents “mak[e] any payment, di- rectly or indirectly”: “(i) to any payee designated by any individual who, after being fairly tried or pleading guilty, has been im- prisoned for committing any act of terrorism that in- jured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of such imprisonment; or Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 9 Opinion of the Court “(ii) to any family member of any individual, following such individual's death while committing an act of ter- rorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of the death of such individual.” § 2334(e)(1)(A). The PSJVTA's second predicate ties jurisdiction to re- spondents' activities on U. S. soil. The PLO and PA are deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if, after a specifed period, either “continues to maintain,” “estab- lishes[,] or procures any offce, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments in the United States,” or otherwise “conducts any activity while physically present in the United States.” § 2334(e)(1)(B). The statute expressly excludes respondents' United Nations mission and its ancil- lary activities. § 2334(e)(3). D Page Proof Given this legislativePending development, wePublication granted the Soko- low plaintiffs' pending certiorari petition, vacated the judg- ment of the Second Circuit, and remanded for “further con- sideration in light of the [PSJVTA].” 590 U. S. 921 (2020). A few days after our remand, a different set of plaintiffs— the family of an American citizen stabbed in a 2018 attack in the West Bank—sued respondents under the ATA in the Southern District of New York, and invoked the PSJVTA as the basis for personal jurisdiction. See Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 1:20–cv–3374, 2 App. 383–439. Both sets of plaintiffs—the Sokolow plaintiffs back in Dis- trict Court and the Fuld plaintiffs there for the frst time— alleged that respondents had engaged in conduct suffcient to trigger both PSJVTA predicates. In response, respondents contended that the PSJVTA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in both cases to defend the law's constitutionality. See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5.1(c). 10 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court Both District Courts found evidence that respondents had engaged in conduct suffcient to satisfy at least the payments prong. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp. 3d 323, 325 (SDNY 2022); 578 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583, and n. 3 (SDNY 2022). But both courts agreed with respond- ents that “an exercise of jurisdiction under either of the PS JVTA's factual predicates is unconstitutional. ” 607 F. Supp. 3d, at 326; see also 578 F. Supp. 3d, at 595–596. The Second Circuit consolidated the cases and affrmed. Following Circuit precedent “holding that the due process analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments paral- lel one another in civil cases,” the panel explained that the statute's factual predicates involve conduct insuffcient to es- tablish personal jurisdiction. 82 F. 4th, at 91, 102. And so, it reasoned, “those same activities” could not “reasonably be interpreted” under the deemed consent language as signal- ing respondents' intent to submit to “the authority of ” U. S. Page Proof Pending Publication courts. Id., at 91; see also id., at 102–104. The court there- fore held that the PSJVTA could not, consistent with “the requirements of constitutional due process,” “establish per- sonal jurisdiction over the PLO or the PA.” Id., at 80; 82 F. 4th 64, 73 (2023) (per curiam). The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Judge Menashi, joined by two other judges in full and one judge in part, dissented. In his view, the panel had construed too narrowly the circumstances under which a foreign entity may be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction. See 101 F. 4th 190, 204–205 (2024). The dissent also dis- agreed that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend- ment imposes the same limits on the jurisdiction of the fed- eral courts that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the jurisdiction of the state courts.” Id., at 205. In the dissent's view, “the federal government is not similarly situated to the state governments in the ex- traterritorial reach of its courts,” and so “the due process Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 11 Opinion of the Court standards limiting the exercise of personal jurisdiction are not the same.” Ibid. We granted certiorari to decide whether the PSJVTA vio- lates the Fifth Amendment. 604 U. S. 1041 (2024). II We have long held that a “court must have . . . power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580 U. S. 82, 95 (2017). This requirement, we have stated, “fows . . . from the Due Process Clause.” Insurance Corp. of Ire- land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982). Our modern personal jurisdiction cases, how- ever, have grappled only with the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on state courts. See 4 C. Wright, A. Miller, & A. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068.1, pp. 696–699 (4th ed. 2015). We have expressly re- Page Proof Pending Publication served “the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 269 (2017) (emphasis added); see also Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987). To be sure, this is not our frst personal jurisdiction case to have originated in federal court. But under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[f]ederal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Rule 4(k)(1)(A)) (applying Fourteenth Amendment analysis to evaluate personal jurisdiction in Federal District Court). Any difference between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is therefore implicated in only a subset of fed- eral cases, such as those in which personal jurisdiction is— as in the PSJVTA—“authorized by a federal statute.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(C). Because we must determine in 12 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court these cases the constitutionality of such a statute, the ques- tion we have long reserved is now squarely before us. A Our current framework for assessing personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment derives from Interna- tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). Under that framework, “a tribunal's authority” over a defendant “depends on the defendant's having such `contacts' with the forum State that `the maintenance of the suit' is `reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,' and `does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan- tial justice.' ” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316–317). Since International Shoe, “our decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: `general' . . . and `spe- Page Proof Pending Publication cifc.' ” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. General jurisdiction lies in the forum where the defendant is domi- ciled or “fairly regarded as at home.” Ibid. (quoting Good- year Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 924 (2011)). A court in such a forum “may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. No one contends, however, that the PLO and PA are subject to general jurisdiction in the United States. “Specifc jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 359. A state court may exercise specifc jurisdiction “over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist `minimum contacts' be- tween the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316). The requi- site contacts “for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 13 Opinion of the Court name `purposeful availment.' ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 359. “The defendant, we have said, must take `some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct- ing activities within the forum State.' ” Ibid. (quoting Han- son v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958); alteration omitted). And the plaintiff's claims, we have held, must “deriv[e] from, or [be] connected with,” those activities. Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919. Respondents urge us to apply this familiar Fourteenth Amendment framework here. See Brief for Respondents 49–50. They point out that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are, textually speaking, nearly identical. Compare Amdt. 5 (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”) with Amdt. 14, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).2 We have long recognized, however, that “[w]hile the lan- Page Proof Pending Publication guage of [the two] amendments is the same,” “they were en- grafted upon the Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances of our national life.” French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328 (1901). We have therefore anticipated that “questions may arise in which different constructions and applications of their provi- sions may be proper.” Ibid. B We have repeatedly described the due process limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment as driven by two principles: (1) “treating defendants fairly,” and (2) “protect- ing `interstate federalism.' ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 360 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293); see also, e. g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 263. We have 2 Neither the private petitioners nor the United States asks us to revisit the Second Circuit's determination that respondents, as nonsovereign enti- ties, have due process rights. See 835 F. 3d 317, 329 (2016). 14 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court emphasized, therefore, “that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed `in the con- text of our federal system of government,' and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the `orderly administration of the laws.' ” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293–294 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317, 319; citation omitted). The require- ment that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum, we have said, “can be seen to perform [these] two related, but distinguishable, functions.” World-Wide Volks- wagen, 444 U. S., at 291–292. This framing follows from “the principles of interstate fed- eralism embodied in the Constitution,” id., at 293, and the related protections of due process which ensure that individ- uals are “subject only to lawful power,” J. McIntyre Machin- ery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opin- ion). State sovereign authority is bounded by the States' Page Proof Pending Publication respective borders. We explained as much nearly one hun- dred years ago in Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 404 (1933): “The application to the States of the rule of due process . . . comes from the fact that their spheres of activity are en- forced and protected by the Constitution.” “Due process requires that the limits of jurisdiction shall not be trans- gressed,” and in our constitutional system, “[t]he limits of State power are defned in view of the relation of the States to each other in the Federal Union.” Id., at 401. Our Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction stand- ards emerged in that vein, as “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” Hanson, 357 U. S., at 251. Those standards—and in particular, the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum State—functionally “ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 292. Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 15 Opinion of the Court These interstate federalism concerns, however, do not apply to limitations under the Fifth Amendment upon the power of the Federal Government and the corollary author- ity of the federal courts. The Constitution confers upon the Federal Government—and it alone—both nationwide and ex- traterritorial authority. While “the limitations of the Con- stitution are barriers bordering the States and preventing them from transcending the limits of their authority,” there is no equivalent “ground for constructing an imaginary con- stitutional barrier around the exterior confnes of the United States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion of powers which inherently belong to it by vir- tue of its sovereignty.” United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299, 306 (1914). We observed in Burnet, for example, that the geographical limitations on “the taxing power of the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not equiva- Page Proof Pending Publication lently “restrict the taxing power of the Federal Govern- ment,” because “[t]he Constitution creates no such relation between the United States and foreign countries as it creates between the States themselves.” 288 U. S., at 400–401, 403, 405; accord, Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 55–56 (1924). That same year, we recognized—in light of Congress's “constitu- tional authority `to regulate commerce with foreign na- tions' ”—the Federal Government's exclusive authority “[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign inter- course and trade.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 56, 59 (1933) (quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (rejecting contention that state instrumentality was immune from paying import duties). Of particular salience here, we have also recognized the National Government's interest in holding accountable those who perpetrate an “act of violence against” U. S. nationals— who, even when physically outside our borders, remain “under the particular protection” of American law. Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 687 (2019). So too the Na- 16 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court tional Government's corresponding authority to make “the killing of an American abroad” punishable as a federal of- fense “that can be prosecuted in [U. S.] courts.” Ibid. (citing 18 U. S. C. § 2332(a)(1)); see also Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Con- gress power to “defne and punish” certain extraterritorial offenses). Indeed, that background context informed the enactment of the ATA, which legislators hoped would “ope[n] the courthouse door to victims of international terrorism” by “extend[ing] the same jurisdictional structure that under- girds the reach of American criminal law to the civil reme- dies that it defnes.” S. Rep. No. 102–342, p. 45 (1992). Given the distinct territorial reach of the Federal Govern- ment's sovereign power, it makes little sense to mechanically import the limitations that the Fourteenth Amendment im- poses on the authority of state courts, which is restricted consonant with the States' more constrained sovereign spheres. See Burnet, 288 U. S., at 401. Indeed, when eval- Page Proof Pending Publication uating state court jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amend- ment, we have emphasized that “personal jurisdiction re- quires” a “sovereign-by-sovereign . . . analysis.” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 884 (plurality opinion). And we have acknowl- edged the straightforward premise that “the United States is a distinct sovereign.” Ibid. That distinction makes a difference. Accordingly, to the extent that the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments both implicitly limit the jurisdictional authority of courts, they do so with respect to the distinct sovereignties from which those courts derive their authority. Because the State and Federal Govern- ments occupy categorically different sovereign spheres, we decline to import the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily per- mits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the Federal Government's broader sovereign authority. Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 17 Opinion of the Court C In the cases before us the Second Circuit, relying on Cir- cuit precedent, declined to apply a different jurisdictional test from the one required under the Fourteenth Amend- ment. See 82 F. 4th, at 102–105. The PLO and PA likewise urge us not to diverge from Fourteenth Amendment princi- ples. They acknowledge that concerns of interstate federal- ism cease to be relevant in the Fifth Amendment context, but nonetheless take the view that related considerations of fairness and individual liberty justify the application of equivalent jurisdictional limitations here. To be sure, we have occasionally framed the personal juris- diction limits on state courts as “represent[ing] a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” protecting a defendant from the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum with which he has little connection. Omni, 484 U. S., at 104 (quoting In- Page Proof Pending Publication surance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 702). These state- ments are best understood, however, to refect the principle that “due process protects the individual's right to be subject only to lawful power.” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 884 (plurality opinion). And “whether a judicial judgment is lawful de- pends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.” Ibid. Interstate federalism concerns accordingly may be deci- sive for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., for instance, we stressed that “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State . . . , the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” 444 U. S., at 294. We echoed the point in Bristol-Myers Squibb. After ac- knowledging that “the `primary concern' is `the burden on the defendant,' ” we emphasized that “[a]ssessing this bur- 18 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court den” requires not only “consider[ing] the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum,” but also “the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.” 582 U. S., at 263. And so we clarifed again: “[A]t times, this federalism interest may be decisive.” Ibid. While certainly germane to the Fourteenth Amendment in- quiry, the “general fairness considerations” invoked by re- spondents do not compel the application of equivalent jur- isdictional limits here. Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 883–884 (plurality opinion) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 294). III Although we hold today that the Fifth Amendment does not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Four- teenth, we do not purport to delineate the outer bounds of the Federal Government's power, consistent with due proc- Page Proof Pending Publication ess, to hale foreign defendants into U. S. courts. On this score, the private petitioners argue that the Fifth Amend- ment imposes no territorial limits on personal jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner Miriam Fuld et al. 20. The United States, however, asks us not to embrace—at least for now— this maximalist theory of federal jurisdiction. The Govern- ment cautions that the theory is “not easily confrmed as a historical matter,” and points to “strong policy reasons . . . against reaching” it, including the possibility that other na- tions might respond in kind by haling Americans into their courts under expansive theories of jurisdiction. Brief for United States 47–48. We agree with the Government that we need not address the private petitioners' unbounded jurisdictional theory today. The PSJVTA ties federal jurisdiction to conduct closely related to the United States that implicates impor- tant foreign policy concerns. We are wary to reach further and bless more attenuated assertions of jurisdiction when the cases before us do not require doing so. Cf. Asahi Metal Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 19 Opinion of the Court Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 115 (1987) (“Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international feld.” (quoting United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 379 U. S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). It is suffcient unto the day that, whatever the Fifth Amend- ment's outer limits on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts, the PSJVTA does not transgress them. A 1 The Federal Government's “ `inherent' foreign affairs power,” “like every other governmental power, must be ex- ercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” American Ins. Assn. v Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 416–417, n. 9 (2003) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936)). We Page Proof Pending Publication accordingly review even legislation implicating foreign policy issues to ensure that it has not crossed a constitutional line. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 34 (2010). We will not, however, cavalierly interfere with the political branches' “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign affairs. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 273 (2018) (plurality opinion); see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. 212, 215 (2016) (emphasizing that action in this realm “war- rants respectful review by courts”). And when the Execu- tive and Congress have spoken with one voice in that sphere, their coordinate action is “supported by the strongest of pre- sumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw- yer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In respectively passing and signing the PSJVTA into law, Congress and the President made a considered judgment to subject the PLO and PA to liability in U. S. courts as part of a comprehensive legal response to “halt, deter, and disrupt” 20 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court acts of international terrorism that threaten the life and limb of American citizens. H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, pp. 7–8 (2018). Combating terrorism is, we have recognized, “an ur- gent objective of the highest order.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 28. The Federal Government, relat- edly, has a strong interest in permitting American victims of international terror to pursue justice in domestic courts. Cf. Gamble, 587 U. S., at 687 (recognizing interest of United States in prosecuting “the killing of an American abroad . . . in [U. S.] courts”). Indeed, a “key premise” of the PSJVTA was Congress's desire to facilitate “the adjudication of ATA claims like the plaintiffs',” which it views as “vital” to “fur- thering the safety of Americans abroad, facilitating compen- sation for injuries or death, and deterring international ter- rorism.” Brief for United States 29, 36 (citing Brief for Sen. Charles Grassley et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 18–19; H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, at 3–4, 7–8); see also Page Proof Pending Publication § 903(d)(1)(A), 133 Stat. 3085 (providing that the PSVJTA “should be liberally construed to carry out the purposes of Congress to provide relief for victims of terrorism”). The PSJVTA thus refects the political branches' balanced judg- ment of competing concerns over “sensitive and weighty in- terests of national security and foreign affairs” and fairness to these particular defendants—entities with which the Fed- eral Government has complex, longstanding relationships in which concerns over terrorism have long been at the fore. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 33–34; see Brief for United States 38, 43. The PSJVTA is also suitably limited to those ends. It does not put respondents at broad risk of being haled into U. S. courts for myriad civil liability actions. Rather, the statute applies only to ATA cases, a narrow category of claims that provide civil remedies only for Americans injured by acts of international terrorism. See 4 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068.1, at 733 (“[W]hen Congress has undertaken to enact a nationwide service statute appli- Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 21 Opinion of the Court cable to a certain class of disputes, that statute should be afforded substantial weight as a legislative articulation of federal social policy.”). It is permissible for the Federal Government to craft a narrow jurisdictional provision that ensures, as part of a broader foreign policy agenda, that Americans injured or killed by acts of terror have an ade- quate forum in which to vindicate their right to ATA compensation. The statute's jurisdiction triggering predicates are like- wise narrow. The payments prong furthers the Federal Government's longstanding policy of deterring these sorts of payments, which the United States has determined promote acts of terror that may injure or kill Americans. See Taylor Force Act, 132 Stat. 1143; Reply Brief for United States 2.3 And the activities prong—which predicates jurisdiction on respondents' conduct within the United States—represents a continuation of the Federal Government's longstanding, nu- anced policy delineating the operations in which respondents Page Proof Pending Publication may permissibly engage on U. S. soil. See Brief for United States 43. Far from an anything-goes approach, then, the PSJVTA ties jurisdiction to specifc and narrow conduct that directly implicates issues of sensitive and ongoing concern in respondents' relationships with the United States. The PSJVTA also limits jurisdiction to only two enumer- ated nonsovereign foreign entities, both of which have been subject to a series of congressional enactments aimed at de- terring terrorism and accomplishing other foreign relations objectives. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(3)(B); 22 U. S. C. 3 Respondents dispute that such payments reward or incentivize terror- ism, and instead characterize the payments as part of a general welfare system. See Brief for Respondents 32–33. Congress has suggested it thinks otherwise. See Taylor Force Act, 132 Stat. 1143. We express no view on the proper characterization of the program. See Holder v. Hu- manitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 35 (2010). Nor do respondents' statements that they “formally revoked” the payments program in Febru- ary 2025 bear on our analysis. See Brief for Respondents 31–32; Reply Brief for United States 11. 22 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court §§ 286w, 2227(a), 2378b(a) and (b), 2378c(a), 2378c–1(a), 5201, 5202. Far from haling just any run-of-the-mill private de- fendant into American courts, the PSJVTA represents but one targeted aspect of a multifaceted foreign policy toward these two sui generis foreign entities, both of which exercise governmental functions in a geopolitically sensitive region and have decades of “meaningful `contacts, ties, [and] rela- tions' ” with the United States. Burger King Corp. v. Rud- zewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319). 2 Respondents, for their part, contend that petitioners “greatly overstate the signifcance of the PSJVTA” to Con- gress's antiterror efforts. Brief for Respondents 45. They point out that the statute only applies to them, but not any “other terrorist group or state-sponsor of terrorism.” Id., at 46; see also id., at 69–70. If anything, though, this sup- Page Proof Pending Publication posed underinclusiveness only serves to reinforce that the statute refects “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign policy that are in “the prerogative of the political branches to make.” Jesner, 584 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). “Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make principled distinctions between activities that will fur- ther terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign policy, and those that will not.” Humanitarian Law Proj- ect, 561 U. S., at 35. Rather than subject to jurisdiction in its courts a broader range of potential defendants—each of which presumably would implicate distinct foreign affairs concerns—the Federal Government took a narrower tack. We decline to second guess why Congress did not use a blunter remedial tool to achieve its desired foreign policy ends. And moreover, the statute's targeted applicability put the PLO and PA on full notice that they could be subject “to personal jurisdiction” in ATA suits in U. S. courts. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5). Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 23 Opinion of the Court In respondents' view, deference to the political branches is also unwarranted here because “Congress's explicit purpose [was] to reverse federal decisions” holding that the same ac- tivities that trigger jurisdiction under the PSJVTA were “in- suffcient to support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” Brief for Respondents 14, 45. But we hold today that those lower courts applied the wrong con- stitutional test. 3 We need not separately consider whether the statute com- ports with our cases addressing the circumstances under which a defendant may be deemed, consistent with due proc- ess, to have consented to jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U. S. 122 (2023). Respondents' consent-based arguments rest on the premise that Con- gress could not in the PSJVTA “transform constitutionally- insuffcient conduct overseas into grounds for `deemed con- Page Proof Pending Publication sent' to personal jurisdiction in the United States.” Brief for Respondents 31. The Court of Appeals thought simi- larly. See 82 F. 4th, at 91. Since we hold that the statute ties the assertion of jurisdiction to predicate conduct that in and of itself bears a meaningful relationship to the United States, we need not further consider the matter through the lens of consent. B Although we have already made clear that the Due Proc- ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard, the prospect remains that the Fifth Amendment might entail a similar “inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case.” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 115. We need not determine whether such analysis is constitu- tionally required because, even if it were, the PSVJTA easily comports with the factors we have previously applied to de- 24 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court termine “the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction” even under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 113. Rea- sonableness, we have explained, will depend in each case “on an evaluation of several factors,” including “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.” Ibid. The PSJVTA ticks all three boxes. For largely the same reasons that we conclude there is a close connection between the PSJVTA's predicate conduct and the United States, it follows that the forum sovereign has a substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute. We will not belabor that the Federal Government has an exceed- ingly compelling interest, as part of its comprehensive ef- forts to deter international terrorism, in providing a forum for American victims to hold the perpetrators of such acts accountable. For similar reasons, American plaintiffs have a strong interest in seeking justice through an ATA damages Page Proof Pending Publication action in U. S. courts. Cf. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 368 (recognizing the “signifcant interests” of a forum State in “providing [its] residents with a convenient forum for re- dressing injuries inficted by out-of-state actors” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Respondents, moreover, “do not complain of any lack of notice or contend that litigating these cases in the United States would force them to bear an unfair or unmanageable burden.” Reply Brief for United States 9. And as the United States points out, it seems implausible to think other- wise. See Brief for United States 38. Respondents are “so- phisticated international organizations” that operate “billion- dollar budgets” and “govern a territory recognized as a sovereign state by many other countries.” Ibid.; 101 F. 4th, at 208 (Menashi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). They maintain embassies, missions, and delegations around the world and a longstanding “presence in the United States” which continues to this day. Brief for United States 3, 38. Nor could it have come as much of a surprise that Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 25 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment respondents were haled into U. S. courts in these cases. They have litigated ATA suits here for decades, and in the PSJVTA were put on clear notice—far more than most de- fendants in the mine-run of litigation—that continuing to engage in certain specifed conduct would open them up to potential federal court jurisdiction. See ibid. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the PSJVTA's jurisdictional rule makes “litigation `so gravely diffcult and inconvenient,' ” Burger King, 471 U. S., at 478, as to render the “exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . unrea- sonable and unfair,” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 116. * * * The PSJVTA reasonably ties the assertion of federal juris- diction over the PLO and PA to conduct that involves the United States and implicates sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. We hold Page Proof Pending Publication that the statute's provision for personal jurisdiction com- ports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- cuit are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to Part II, concurring in the judgment. The Court properly holds that the personal-jurisdiction provisions of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), § 903, 133 Stat. 3082–3085, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2333, 2334, do not violate respondents' claimed rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend- ment. See ante, at 18–25. In reaching this conclusion, the majority recognizes that the Fourteenth Amendment's “min- imum contacts standard” does not apply to the Fifth Amend- ment's Due Process Clause. Ante, at 16. But, rather than decide what standard does apply, the Court holds only that 26 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Thomas, J., concurring in judgment the Fifth Amendment at least permits a statute such as the PSJVTA that “ties federal jurisdiction to conduct closely re- lated to the United States that implicates important foreign policy concerns.” Ante, at 18. The Court leaves for another day the task of defning “the Fifth Amendment's outer limits on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts.” Ante, at 19. I would take a different approach. When interpreting constitutional provisions, we must look to “the text of the Constitution” as well as “historical evidence from the fram- ing” that can illuminate “the intent of those who drafted and ratifed it.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). The critical question in these cases is what boundaries the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee, as originally under- stood, places on the Federal Government's power to extend personal jurisdiction over respondents. Historical evidence demonstrates that the answer is “none.” “Because the ma- jority has adopted an analysis that is largely unconnected Page Proof Pending Publication to the Constitution's text and history, I concur only in the judgment.” Id., at 371. I “We start with the text of the Fifth Amendment” and in- terpret its provisions in light of how they were “ `understood in 1791.' ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 683 (2019); see also McIntyre, 514 U. S., at 370–371 (opinion of Thomas, J.). The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Thus, to show that the PSJVTA's jurisdictional provisions run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's due process protections, respondents must establish both that they are “person[s]” protected by the Fifth Amendment and that the PSJVTA transgresses their due process rights. These requirements in turn raise two threshold issues: whether respondents enjoy constitu- tional rights in the frst place, and what “due process of law” requires. While my conclusions as to both threshold issues Cite as: 606 U. S. 1 (2025) 27 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment remain tentative, there are strong reasons to think that each poses an independently fatal problem for respondents. At a minimum, however, I would conclude today that the PSJVTA's jurisdictional provisions do not violate any plausi- ble understanding of due process. A I am skeptical that entities such as the Palestine Libera- tion Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) enjoy any constitutional rights at all, let alone qualify as “person[s]” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 1 The PLO and the PA are foreign bodies that are not recog- nized as sovereign by the United States, but that neverthe- less carry out governmental functions. Ante, at 6. Al- though the Federal Government does not take a position on Page Proof Pending Publication the question whether such foreign nonsovereign governmen- tal bodies have constitutional rights, Tr. of Oral Arg. 43–45, the Executive Branch has for decades endorsed principles that suggest that the Constitution does not protect these types of entities. Begin with the Executive's approach to “the nature of for- eign sovereigns.” Constitutionality of Closing the Palestine Information Offce, an Affliate of the Palestine Liberation Org., 11 Op. OLC 104, 106 (1987). To be sure, the United States does not recognize respondents as sovereign states, ante, at 6, but the Executive's view of foreign nations' consti- tutional rights nevertheless may shed light on respondents' assertion of constitutional rights here. Foreign sovereigns, the Offce of Legal Counsel has explained, each “interac[t] with the United States as a foreign, co-equal sovereign.” 11 Op. OLC, at 106. “[T]he United States interacts with for- eign states not within the constitutional system, but as a juridical equal, on the level of international law and diplo- macy.” Id., at 107. It follows that no sovereign can be 28 FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Thomas, J., concurring in judgment “ `amenable,' or subject to the other,” ibid., for such an ar- rangement would violate the precept that “the body of the nation, the State, remains absolutely free,” E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries, § 4, p. lv (J. Chitty ed. 1854).1 Thus, “[a] foreign nation, . . . unlike a foreign national, does not have rights under the Fifth Amendment.” Presidential Authority To Settle the Iranian Crisis, 4A Op. OLC 248, 260, n. 9 (1980). The Executive Branch has reached the same conclusion regarding domestic nonsovereign governing bodies, such as United States Territories. See Mutual Consent Provisions in the Guam Commonwealth Legislation, 1994 WL 16193765, *5 (OLC, July 28, 1994) (“non-state areas” are “governmental bodies” that “are not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). “Territories are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States” and thus relate to the Federal Government similarly to the way in which municipalities relate “to the respective States.” Page Proof Pending Publication National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 133 (1880). Given that a municipality is “created by a state for the better ordering of government,” and thus has “no privi- leges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator,” Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 40 (1933); see also New- ark v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 192, 196 (1923), the Exec