Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA (606 U.S. 100, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 100–145 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 20, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 100 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC, et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 24–7. Argued April 23, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025 Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations that require automakers to manufac- ture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles with a goal of decreasing emissions from liquid fuels. The regulations require automakers to limit average greenhouse-gas emissions across their vehi- cle feets and manufacture a certain percentage of electric vehicles. Several producers of fuels such as gasoline and ethanol sued EPA in the D. C. Circuit, arguing that EPA lacked authority to approve the Califor- nia regulations because they target global climate change rather than local California air quality problems as required by the Clean Air Act. They submitted standing declarations explaining that California's regu- lations depress demand for liquid fuel by requiring vehicles that use less Page Proof Pending Publication or no liquid fuel, causing the fuel producers monetary injury. Califor- nia's own estimates indicated the regulations would cause substantial reductions in demand for gasoline exceeding $1 billion beginning in 2020 and increasing to over $10 billion in 2030. EPA did not challenge the fuel producers' standing in the D. C. Cir- cuit. California, as well as other States adopting California's regula- tions, intervened to defend EPA's approval. California argued that the fuel producers lacked standing because automobile manufacturers would not change course if EPA's decision were vacated given the “surging consumer demand” for electric vehicles. The D. C. Circuit held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing, fnding they failed to estab- lish that automakers would likely respond to invalidation of the regula- tions by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Held: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations. Pp. 110–126. (a) Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Con- troversies,” requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate standing by showing three elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Injury in fact requires a “ `concrete,' ” “particularized” injury that is “actual or imminent.” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 381. Causation requires showing “the injury was likely caused by the Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 101 Syllabus defendant.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 423. Re- dressability requires demonstrating that judicial relief would likely re- dress the injury. Ibid. When a plaintiff is not the direct object of government regulation, causation and redressability often depend on how third parties not before the court will predictably respond to the regulation or judicial relief. Pp. 110–113. (b) The fuel producers' injury in fact and causation are straightfor- ward and undisputed. The fuel producers make money by selling fuel, so decreased purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels resulting from California's regulations constitute monetary injury. EPA's approval au- thorized California and 17 other States to enforce regulations requiring lower emissions and vehicle electrifcation, thereby reducing liquid fuel purchases. The regulations likely cause the fuel producers' monetary injuries because reducing gasoline and diesel fuel consumption is the whole point of the regulations. The fuel producers also satisfy redressability. Even minimal addi- tional revenue would satisfy this requirement, and invalidating the regulations would likely result in more revenue from additional fuel sales based on commonsense economic principles and record evidence. Pp. 113–124. (1) The fuel producers might be considered direct objects of the Page Proof Pending Publication California regulations because the regulations explicitly seek to restrict gasoline and other liquid fuel use in automobiles. When the govern- ment prohibits or impedes one company from using another company's product or service, both companies might be deemed objects of the regu- lation. See, e. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535–536; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 422. The Court need not resolve this question because the record evi- dence in this case establishes the fuel producers' standing in any event. Pp. 114–116. (2) This case presents the “familiar” circumstance where govern- ment regulation of one business “may be likely” to cause injuries to other linked businesses. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 384. California's regulations force automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles, likely causing downstream economic injuries to fuel producers. Invalidating these regulations would likely mean more gasoline-powered automobiles and more fuel sales. EPA and California argue this case is unusual because the vehicle market has developed such that automakers would not manufacture more gasoline-powered cars even if regulations were invalidated. This argument is undermined by their own actions—if invalidating the regu- lations would change nothing, why are they enforcing and defending 102 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Syllabus them? The whole point of the regulations is to increase electric vehi- cles beyond what consumers would otherwise demand and manufactur- ers would otherwise produce. Record evidence confrms that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the fuel producers' monetary injury. First, the fuel pro- ducers' declarations quote California's own estimates of substantial re- ductions in gasoline demand and note California's recognition that fuel providers would be “most adversely affected.” App. 137. Second, Cal- ifornia stated in 2021 that the regulations are “critical” for future emis- sions reductions and submitted expert declarations in 2022 stating that without the regulations, fewer electric vehicles would be sold and more gasoline-fueled vehicles would be sold. Id., at 66, 115. Third, EPA affrmed that California “needs” its standards and credited California's estimates that the regulations would continue reducing emissions through at least 2037. 87 Fed. Reg. 14334; 89 Fed. Reg. 82558. Fourth, fve automakers who invested heavily in electric vehicles intervened to defend the regulations and predicted that without California's reg- ulations, other automakers would seek a competitive advantage by sell- ing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Pp. 116–120. (3) EPA and California argue the fuel producers needed more evi- Page Proof Pending Publication dence, such as affdavits from expert economists or directly regulated automakers. This Court has not demanded such evidence to show how third parties would likely respond to government regulations. Plain- tiffs must simply “show a predictable chain of events” that would likely result from judicial relief. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 385. Requiring affdavits from regulated third parties would make standing dependent on whether the plaintiff and third parties share litigation interests and whether third parties are willing to pub- licly oppose the government regulator. Such a heightened requirement would close the courthouse doors to many traditional challenges to agency action. Pp. 120–121. (4) This case does not involve the rare instance where a market has likely permanently changed such that invalidating a challenged regula- tion would have no effect on that market. Such instances are rare for two reasons. First, governments do not usually continue enforcing and defending regulations that have no continuing effect. Second, the ef- fect of regulations like these depend on interrelated economic forces that change over time, so courts should be wary of claims that invalidat- ing important regulations would have zero impact on dynamic, heavily regulated markets. The evidence that some automakers are in compli- ance with California's mandates suggests regulatory effect, not absence Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 103 Syllabus of effect, and does not demonstrate how all automakers would respond to invalidation. Pp. 121–124. 98 F. 4th 288, reversed and remanded. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., post, p. 126, and Jackson, J., post, p. 128, fled dissenting opinions. Jeffrey B. Wall argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Morgan L. Ratner, Leslie B. Arffa, Brittany M. Pemberton, Eric D. McArthur, Carter G. Phil- lips, Matthew W. Morrison, Shelby L. Dyl, Michael Busch- bacher, Jared M. Kelson, and Richard S. Moskowitz. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for federal respondents. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Acting Assistant Attorney General Gustaf- son, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Matthew Guarnieri, and James Payne. Page Proof Pending Publication Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General of California, argued the cause for state respondents. With him on the brief were Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael J. Mon- gan, Solicitor General, Tracy Winsor, Senior Assistant At- torney General, Teresa A. Reed Dippo, Deputy Solicitor General, Theodore McCombs, Caitlan McLoon, Elaine Meckenstock, and Jonathan Wiener, Deputy Attorneys Gen- eral, and Haley L. Amster, Associate Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective juris- dictions as follows: Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Jeff Jackson of North Carolina, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha 104 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Nicholas W. Brown of Washington.* Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency approved California regulations requir- ing automakers to alter their feets of new vehicles. Under those California regulations, automakers must manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. The goal is to decrease emissions from the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels. Producers of gasoline and other liq- uid fuels sued EPA, arguing that EPA's approval of the Cali- fornia regulations violated the Clean Air Act. The sole issue before this Court is whether the fuel pro- ducers have standing to maintain their suit. The fuel producers assert that the California regulations reduce the manufacture and sale of cars powered by gasoline and other liquid fuels, thereby causing a decrease in sales Page Proof Pending Publication of those fuels by the fuel producers. So fuel producers take *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Petroleum Institute by Paul D. Clement and C. Harker Rhodes IV; for the Cato Institute by Thomas A. Berry and Brent Skorup; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Jaime A. Santos, William M. Jay, Benjamin Hayes, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Andrew R. Varcoe; for the Foothill Church et al. by Rory T. Gray and John J. Bursch; for the Sulphur Institute by Patrick F. Philbin and Chase Harrington; for the Texas Oil & Gas Association et al. by James K. Vines and Samuel P. Funk; for the Texas Royalty Council et al. by Ivan L. London; for The Two Hundred for Homeownership by Rafe Petersen; and for the Western States Petroleum Association et al. by Katherine C. Yarger. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the International Council on Clean Transportation et al. by Matthew D. Zinn; and for F. Andrew Hessick, pro se, and Richard A. Simpson. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Advancing American Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for ConservAmerica Inc. by John A. Sheehan; for Our Children's Trust et al. by Julia A. Olson, Andrea K. Rodgers, Philip L. Gregory, and Lucia Goin; and for Heather Elliott et al. by Benjamin W. Berkowitz and Andrew F. Dawson. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 105 Opinion of the Court in less revenue than they would in a free market. Invali- dating the regulations, they say, would remove a regulatory impediment to their ability to fully compete in the market. And without California's regulations in effect, manufacturers would likely make more cars powered by gasoline and other liquid fuels, thereby increasing purchases of those fuels and redressing the fuel producers' injury. EPA and California dispute redressability. They suggest that, even if the regulations are invalidated, car manufactur- ers nonetheless would not manufacture more gasoline- powered cars. They posit that the California regulations no longer have any impact because, in a free market, consumer demand for and manufacturers' supply of electric vehicles would still supposedly exceed what the California regula- tions mandate. Based on this Court's precedents and the evidence in the record, we hold that the fuel producers have standing. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the U. S. Court Page Proof Pending Publication of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and remand for that court to consider the merits of the fuel producers' legal claims. I A As relevant here, the Clean Air Act requires the Environ- mental Protection Agency, or EPA, to periodically “pre- scribe . . . standards” that limit emissions of certain air pol- lutants from new motor vehicles. 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1). To promote uniformity in vehicle emissions regulations, the Act also preempts state standards “relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.” § 7543(a). But the Act's preemption provision exempts California. Under certain circumstances, California may adopt emissions standards for new motor vehicles that are more stringent than EPA's. California may do so when it concludes that more stringent standards are needed to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.” § 7543(b)(1)(B). Other 106 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court States may also adopt California's stricter limits on emis- sions from new motor vehicles, but may not adopt or enforce state standards that differ from California's. § 7507. The upshot of this system is that EPA sets nationwide emissions standards for new motor vehicles; California in limited circumstances may set more stringent emissions standards for vehicles sold in the State; and other States may either follow EPA's standards or adopt California's but may not set their own. Over the years, California has often requested and re- ceived EPA approval for stricter emissions standards to combat local California air-quality problems like smog. See, e. g., 38 Fed. Reg. 10319 (1973). Beginning in 2005, California also attempted to use its unique preemption exception as one means to address global climate change. As relevant here, the State asked EPA for approval of regulations that limit greenhouse-gas emissions Page Proof Pending Publication and force electrifcation of the new vehicle feet sold in the State. See 73 Fed. Reg. 12157 (2008). In 2008, under the George W. Bush administration, EPA denied California's frst such request. EPA explained that the Clean Air Act permits California to enact standards to address local and regional pollution where the causal factors are tied to California. But EPA reasoned that the authority granted to California did not extend to efforts to combat global climate change. See id., at 12156–12157, 12168. Since then, as Presidential administrations have come and gone, EPA has repeatedly altered its legal position on whether the Clean Air Act authorizes California regulations targeting greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles. This case involves California's 2012 request for EPA ap- proval of new California regulations. As relevant here, those regulations generally require automakers (i) to limit average greenhouse-gas emissions across their feets of new motor vehicles sold in the State and (ii) to manufacture a Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 107 Opinion of the Court certain percentage of electric vehicles as part of their vehicle feets. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1961.3, 1962.2 (2022). The greenhouse-gas emissions limits remain in force indef- nitely into the future, and the specifc requirements for elec- tric vehicles in new vehicle feets run through model year 2025. See ibid. (EPA has separately approved a new Cali- fornia electric-vehicle mandate that applies through model year 2035 and beyond; that separate set of regulations is not at issue in this suit.1) Under President Obama, EPA reversed its legal position and, in 2013, allowed the California regulations to take ef- fect. 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (2013). Then in 2019, under Presi- dent Trump, EPA fipped back and rescinded approval of the California regulations. 84 Fed. Reg. 51328 (2019). In 2022, under President Biden, EPA again reversed course and rein- stated approval of California's regulations. 87 Fed. Reg. 14333 (2022). That is where things stand as of now, al- though President Trump has directed EPA to again recon- Page Proof Pending Publication sider its approval of California's standards. Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353–8354 (2025). To date, acting pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 17 States and the District of Columbia have copied California's greenhouse-gas emissions standards for new motor vehicles, the electric-vehicle mandate, or both. Together with Cali- fornia, those jurisdictions account for about 40 percent of America's market for new cars and light-duty trucks. B In 2022, after EPA reinstated approval of California's 2012 regulations, several fuel producers sued EPA in the D. C. Circuit. The fuel producers primarily argued that EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to approve the Cal- ifornia regulations. They reasoned that the regulations did 1 Acting under the Congressional Review Act, Congress recently passed and the President signed legislation to block that separate set of California regulations. See H. J. Res. No. 88, 119th Cong., 1st Sess. (2025). 108 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court not target a local California air-quality problem—as they say is required by the Clean Air Act—but instead were de- signed to address global climate change. The fuel producers manufacture and sell automobile fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and ethanol. For example, Ameri- can Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers is a national trade association that represents many American fuel companies that produce and sell gasoline and other liquid fuels for auto- mobiles. Diamond Alternative Energy sells renewable die- sel, an alternative to traditional petroleum-derived diesel. Valero Renewable Fuels Company manufactures and sells ethanol. To establish Article III standing for their D. C. Circuit challenge, the fuel producers submitted 14 declarations and devoted two pages of their opening brief to standing. In one declaration, for example, an analyst for American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers explained that “the demand Page Proof Pending Publication for gasoline and diesel fuel will be depressed” by California's regulations (also adopted by 17 other States) because they “require the sale of vehicles that use less gasoline and diesel fuel” or “use no liquid fuel at all.” App. 172–174. As sup- port, the declaration quoted California's own estimate that “its regulations would cause `substantial reductions in de- mand for gasoline exceeding $1 billion beginning in 2020 and increasing to over $10 billion in 2030.' ” Id., at 173. Vari- ous fuel producers further stated that those “injuries would be substantially ameliorated if EPA's decision” to reinstate the waiver “were set aside.” Id., at 137, 181. Notably, in the D. C. Circuit, EPA did not argue that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. EPA's silence on standing was telling—the proverbial dog that did not bark— because EPA routinely challenges a party's standing when the agency believes that injury in fact, causation, or redress- ability is questionable. So EPA's failure to do so here tends to suggest that EPA believed that the fuel producers had standing. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 109 Opinion of the Court California, along with other States that chose to adopt Cal- ifornia's regulations, intervened in the D. C. Circuit to defend EPA's approval of those regulations. To support its motion to intervene, California submitted declarations emphasizing the importance of the regulations—now and in the future— to meeting California's emissions-control goals. For exam- ple, a California offcial responsible for Clean Air Act compli- ance stated that, without the regulations, “it is reasonable to expect that there would be fewer ” electric vehicles “produced and sold . . . , and thus additional gasoline-fueled vehicles produced and sold during these model years.” Id., at 110. All of that “would increase criteria pollutant emis- sions,” as California's own “modeling has confrmed.” Ibid. Another California offcial explained that invalidating the feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate “would result in higher greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions” from the “additional gasoline-fueled cars” that Page Proof Pending Publication would be produced and sold. Id., at 115. After the D. C. Circuit granted California's motion to in- tervene, however, California completely changed its tune about the continuing impact of the regulations. In its mer- its briefng in that court, California suddenly argued that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing because they had not “established any probability” that automobile “manu- facturers would change course if EPA's decision were va- cated.” Brief for State and Local Government Respondent- Intervenors in No. 22–1081 (CADC), p. 15. Specifcally, California suggested that because of supposed “surging con- sumer demand” for electric vehicles, invalidating the feet- wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate would not cause vehicle manufacturers to make more gasoline-powered vehicles. Id., at 14. Therefore, Califor- nia argued that judicial invalidation of the California regula- tions was not likely to redress the fuel producers' injuries. The D. C. Circuit agreed with California and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. Ohio v. EPA, 98 110 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court F. 4th 288, 300 (2024). The court explained that redressabil- ity depended on how third-party automakers would act in the absence of California's feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate. According to the D. C. Cir- cuit, the fuel producers failed to “cite any record evidence” or “fle additional affdavits or other evidence” demonstrat- ing that automakers would respond to invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Id., at 303 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).2 This Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the fuel producers have Article III standing. 604 U. S. 1065 (2024). II Article III of the Constitution confnes the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” § 2, cl. 1. For a lawsuit to constitute a case within the meaning of Arti- Page Proof Pending Publication cle III, the plaintiff must have standing to sue. To demon- strate standing, plaintiffs must answer a basic question— “ `What's it to you?' ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379 (2024) (quoting A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa- tion of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983)). In other words, plaintiffs must show that they possess “a `per- sonal stake' in the dispute” and are not mere bystanders. 2 The D. C. Circuit opined that the California regulations expire after model year 2025, making it unlikely that automakers would “change course” even if the court “were to vacate the waiver.” 98 F. 4th, at 302. In its briefng before this Court, EPA acknowledged that the D. C. Circuit was factually incorrect on that point—California in fact may keep its feet- wide emissions standards in place indefnitely into the future. Brief for Federal Respondents in Opposition 12–13; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, § 1961.3(a). It may be that some of the D. C. Circuit's standing analysis stemmed from a misunderstanding about when the California feet-wide emissions standards expire. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 111 Opinion of the Court 602 U. S., at 379 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 423 (2021)). “By limiting who can sue, the standing requirement imple- ments `the Framers' concept of the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.' ” 602 U. S., at 380 (quoting J. Roberts, Article III Limits on Statu- tory Standing, 42 Duke L. J. 1219, 1220 (1993)). Standing doctrine also “ `tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarifed atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the conse- quences of judicial action.' ” 602 U. S., at 379 (quoting Val- ley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa- ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982)). This Court's “cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three ele- ments”: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan Page Proof Pending Publication v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The frst requirement, injury in fact, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an injury that is “concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not speculative.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381 (quotation marks omitted). “Monetary costs are of course an injury. ” United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 676 (2023). The second and third requirements, causation and redress- ability, are usually “fip sides of the same coin.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (quotation marks omitted). Causation requires the plaintiff to show “that the injury was likely caused by the defendant,” and redressabil- ity requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 594 U. S., at 423. “If a defendant's action causes an injury, enjoining the action or awarding damages for the action will typically redress that injury.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381. To be sure, redressability “can 112 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court still pose an independent bar in some cases,” but “the two key questions in most standing disputes are injury in fact and causation.” Id., at 381, and n. 1. The additional re- dressability requirement generally serves to ensure that there is a suffcient “relationship between `the judicial relief requested' and the `injury' suffered.” California v. Texas, 593 U. S. 659, 671 (2021) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 753, n. 19 (1984)); see Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 292–293 (2023). Importantly, if a plaintiff is “an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue,” then “there is ordinarily little ques- tion that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will re- dress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. When the plaintiff is not the object of a government regu- lation, however, causation and redressability often depend on how regulated third parties not before the court will act in response to the government regulation or judicial relief. Page Proof Pending Publication See Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383. Courts must distinguish the “predictable” from the “specula- tive” effects of government action or judicial relief on third parties. Ibid.; see also Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 768 (2019). With respect to causation (and redressability), a court must conclude that “ `third par- ties will likely react' ” to the government regulation (or judi- cial relief) “ `in predictable ways' ” that will likely cause (or redress) the plaintiff's injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383 (quoting California, 593 U. S., at 675). Here, the fuel producers say that they suffered injury in fact caused by the California regulations. They point out that the entire purpose of California's feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate is to reduce the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels in motor vehicles as com- pared to what otherwise would occur in a free market. The regulations cause automakers to, among other things, pro- duce fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. That in turn causes Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 113 Opinion of the Court fewer gasoline sales, leading to a monetary injury in fact for producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels. As to redressability, the fuel producers say that invalidat- ing the California regulations would likely redress their in- jury because it would remove a regulatory impediment to the sale and use of their products. They further contend that, absent the regulations, automakers would likely produce fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Production of those vehicles would predictably lead to more purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels sold by the fuel producers. In short, they argue that when the government tells automakers to make more cars that use less gasoline, there should be little question that the gasoline pro- ducers have standing to sue. In this Court, neither EPA nor California meaningfully disputes injury in fact or causation. But they argue that the fuel producers did not establish redressability. According to EPA and California, even if the California regulations are Page Proof Pending Publication invalidated, the fuel producers have not shown that vehicle manufacturers would reduce the percentage of their feets that consist of electric vehicles (or otherwise stated, increase the percentage that consists of gasoline-powered vehicles). EPA and California suggest that the automobile market has changed—apparently permanently in their view—and strong consumer demand for (and manufacturers' supply of) electric vehicles means that automakers are unlikely to manufacture or sell any additional gasoline-powered cars even if the Cali- fornia regulations are invalidated. III We hold that the fuel producers have standing to sue. To begin, the injury in fact and causation elements of the fuel producers' standing, which no party disputes, are straightforward. As for injury in fact, the fuel producers make money by selling fuel. Therefore, the decrease in purchases of gaso- line and other liquid fuels resulting from the California regu- 114 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court lations hurts their bottom line. Those monetary costs “are of course an injury.” United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 676 (2023). As for causation, EPA's approval authorized California (and ultimately 17 other States) to enforce regulations that require lower feet-wide greenhouse-gas emissions and the electrifcation of automakers' vehicle feets, thereby reducing purchases of liquid fuels such as gasoline. The regulations likely cause fuel producers' monetary injuries because the regulations likely cause a decrease in purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels for automobiles. Indeed, that is the whole point of the regulations. As for redressability, invalidating the California regula- tions would likely redress at least some of the fuel producers' monetary injuries.3 Even “one dollar” of additional revenue for the fuel producers would satisfy the redressability com- ponent of Article III standing. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U. S. 279, 292 (2021). And as we will explain, it is Page Proof Pending Publication “likely” that invalidating the California regulations would result in more revenue for the fuel producers from additional sales of gasoline and other liquid fuels. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 380 (2024). A When a plaintiff is the “object” of a government regula- tion, there should “ordinarily” be “little question” that the regulation causes injury to the plaintiff and that invalidating the regulation would redress the plaintiff's injuries. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992). The fuel producers here might be considered an object of the California regulations because the regulations explicitly 3 In this opinion, we use the term “invalidated” as shorthand to describe the result from setting aside EPA's approval of the California regulations. Under D. C. Circuit precedent, setting aside EPA's approval would mean that California may not enforce its greenhouse-gas emissions limits and electric-vehicle mandate for new vehicle feets. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 115 Opinion of the Court seek to restrict the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels in automobiles. When the government prohibits or impedes Company A from using Company B's product, then both Company A and Company B might be deemed objects of the government action at issue. For example, if the govern- ment bans hot dog sales in stadiums, then hot dog manufac- turers, not just stadiums, might be considered objects of the regulation. If the government prohibits aluminum bats in Little League, then aluminum bat manufacturers, not only Little League, might be objects of the regulation. If the government bans bookstores from selling certain publishers' books, then those publishers, not just bookstores, might be objects of the regulation. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 169 (1997); Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F. 3d 141, 144–145 (CADC 2015). This Court has applied principles of that kind in various contexts. For example, when a State prohibited parents Page Proof Pending Publication from sending their children to private schools, affected schools had standing to sue, even though parents were the directly regulated parties. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535–536 (1925). And when the Federal Com- munications Commission announced that it would deny a li- cense to any broadcasting station that conducted certain business with broadcasting networks, a broadcasting net- work (CBS) had standing to sue even though broadcasting stations were the directly regulated parties. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 422 (1942). According to the fuel producers, when a regulation targets the provider of a product or service by limiting another enti- ty's use of that product or service, the targeted provider or- dinarily has standing—without the need for much additional analysis. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 169. So too here, ac- cording to the fuel producers. As they see it, the govern- ment is targeting the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels by regulating at the assembly line rather than the gas pump. 116 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court Either way, they say that the California regulations pose a legal barrier to the fuel producers' sale of their products and deny them the opportunity to compete in the marketplace without government interference. And the fuel producers assert that removing a coercive government standard that restricts the use of their products would allow them to com- pete more fully in the marketplace and thus provide redress for purposes of Article III. See ibid.; Energy Future Coali- tion, 793 F. 3d, at 144–145. That argument is not without force and, at a minimum, highlights how the government might seek to indirectly tar- get a product or service “through a conduit” in addition to regulating it directly. Brief for Petitioners 43. But we ul- timately need not further consider that argument in this case because, regardless, the fuel producers have readily demon- strated their standing. B Page This caseProof Pending presents what Publication the Court has described as the “familiar” circumstance where government regulation of a business “may be likely” to cause injuries to other linked businesses. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 384. As the Court has explained, “when the government regulates (or under-regulates) a business, the regulation (or lack thereof) may cause downstream or upstream economic injuries to others in the chain, such as certain manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, competitors, or customers.” Ibid. In cases of that kind, this Court's analysis of causation and redressability has recognized commonsense economic reali- ties. When third party behavior is predictable, common- sense inferences may be drawn. Importantly, EPA agrees that “commonsense economic principles” can be useful when evaluating Article III standing. Brief for Federal Respond- ents 39. In this case, those commonsense economic principles sup- port the fuel producers' standing. The California regula- tions force automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 117 Opinion of the Court and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 169.4 The standards force automakers to produce a feet of vehicles that, as a whole, uses signifcantly less gaso- line and other liquid fuels. California's regulation of auto- makers' vehicle feets in turn will likely “cause downstream or upstream economic injuries to others in the chain,” such as producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 384. By the same token, the fuel producers persuasively con- tend that invalidating California's regulations would likely mean more gasoline-powered automobiles, which would in turn likely mean more sales of gasoline and other liquid fuels by the fuel producers. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 170–171. Because the fuel producers have suffered classic monetary injury caused by a government regulatory action, it would be surprising and unusual if invalidating the regulations did not redress the fuel producers' injuries. See Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381 (“If a defendant's ac- Page Proof Pending Publication tion causes an injury, enjoining the action . . . will typically redress that injury”). After all, the fact that a regulation was designed to produce a particular effect on the market ordinarily means that the likely result of vacating that regu- lation would be to reduce that effect on the market. Cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. EPA and California push back on that reasoning, asserting that this case is unusual and does not ft the typical pattern. They suggest that the new vehicle market has developed in a way that even if the California regulations are invali- 4 Recall that the California regulations at issue impose a direct electric- vehicle mandate along with feet-wide limits on average greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles. Automakers may comply with the feet-wide emissions limits by producing more electric vehicles, more low- emission vehicles, or both. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1961.3(a)(1), (a)(4). For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the production of additional electric vehicles, recognizing that some manufacturers may also (or alter- natively) manufacture additional low-emission vehicles to comply with Cal- ifornia's feet-wide emissions limits. 118 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court dated, automakers would not likely manufacture or sell more gasoline-powered cars than they do now. To begin with, that is an odd argument for EPA and Cali- fornia to advance. After all, if invalidating the regulations would change nothing in the market, why are EPA and Cali- fornia enforcing and defending the regulations? The whole point of the regulations is to increase the number of electric vehicles in the new automobile market beyond what consum- ers would otherwise demand and what automakers would otherwise manufacture and sell. And EPA and California are presumably defending the regulations because they think that the regulations still make a difference in the market. In all events, record evidence confrms what common sense tells us: Invalidating the regulations likely (not certainly, but likely) would make a difference for fuel producers because automakers would likely manufacture more vehicles that run on gasoline and other liquid fuels. Page Proof Pending Publication First, the fuel producers' standing declarations explain that California's regulations have historically harmed the fuel producers by causing a decrease in purchases of fuel. The declarations further quote California's estimate that its standards would produce “ `substantial reductions in demand for gasoline exceeding $1 billion beginning in 2020 and in- creasing to over $10 billion in 2030.' ” App. 173 (emphasis added). The fuel producers' declarations emphasize, more- over, that California itself asserted that the State's stand- ards would reduce emissions partly through “ `reductions in fuel production.' ” Id., at 148. The declarations also note that California recognized that the “oil and gas industry” and “fuel providers” would likely be “most adversely affected” by the regulations due to “the resulting substantial reduc- tions in demand for gasoline.” Id., at 137 (quotation marks omitted). Second, the record reveals that California itself stated in 2021, when asking EPA to reinstate the regulations, that the regulations are “critical not just for immediate emissions re- Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 119 Opinion of the Court ductions” but also for “greater emission reductions in the future.” Id., at 66 (emphasis added). And after the fuel producers sued EPA in 2022, California moved to intervene and attached expert declarations stating that California's standards are likely to decrease fuel use. Specifcally, Cali- fornia's experts opined that absent California's regulations, “fewer” electric vehicles “are likely to be sold than would otherwise have been . . . and thus additional gasoline-fueled vehicles would be sold.” Id., at 115; see also id., at 110. California itself therefore acknowledged that its regulations were still having an impact and that invalidating the regula- tions would likely affect the automobile market and increase demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. Third, EPA too has stated that the California regulations are likely to reduce consumption of fuel. When approving California's regulations, EPA repeatedly affrmed that Cali- fornia “needs” its standards “to address compelling and Page Proof Pending Publication extraordinary air quality conditions in the state.” 87 Fed. Reg. 14334; see id., at 14353. And in proposing to amend California's state implementation plan under the Clean Air Act more than two years after this suit was fled, EPA credited California's estimates that the regulations would continue reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in California through at least 2037. 89 Fed. Reg. 82558 (2024). Fourth, fve automakers who have invested heavily in elec- tric vehicles—and thus have an interest in the government continuing to support and favor that market—intervened on the side of EPA and California in the Court of Appeals. Their motion to intervene predicted that, absent California's regulations, other automakers would seek a competitive ad- vantage over them by selling fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. See Motion To Intervene of Ford Motor Co. et al. in No. 22–1081 (CADC), pp. 4, 11–12, 14. As with California's motion to intervene, the automakers' assessment that the regulations make a differ- ence—and that invalidating them would make a difference— 120 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court indicates that the regulations are still likely having a real- world impact on the automobile market. In short, the commonsense economic inferences about the operation of the automobile market—combined with the statements of the fuel producers, California, EPA, and the vehicle manufacturers—make it suffciently “predictable” that invalidating California's regulations would likely re- dress the fuel producers' injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383. Article III's redressability requirement serves to align in- juries and remedies. The primary goals of that requirement are to ensure that plaintiffs do not sue the wrong parties and that courts do not issue advisory opinions. The redressabil- ity requirement should not be misused, however, to prevent the targets of government regulations from challenging reg- ulations that threaten their businesses. EPA and California cite no case where Article III's redressability requirement has been applied to prevent challenges to a regulation set- Page Proof Pending Publication ting a permanent ceiling on the sale or use of a business's products. Here, the fuel producers have established their standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.5 C EPA and California further argue, however, that the fuel producers had to introduce still more evidence—for example, affdavits either from expert economists or from directly reg- ulated automakers explaining how they would respond to a court order invalidating California's regulations. See Brief for Federal Respondents 17–18, 43–44; Brief for State Re- spondents 13. We disagree. This Court has not demanded that plaintiffs introduce evidence from expert economists or from directly regulated third parties to show how third parties would 5 We need not decide whether every piece of record evidence described above is necessary to establish standing here. The totality of record evi- dence, along with commonsense inferences about market realities, readily suffces to demonstrate standing. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 121 Opinion of the Court likely respond to a government regulation or invalidation thereof. Rather, to show redressability, the plaintiff must simply “show a predictable chain of events” that would likely result from judicial relief and redress the plaintiff's injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 385. In De- partment of Commerce v. New York, to take just one exam- ple, this Court considered a challenge by several States and other plaintiffs to the Government's decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the census. 588 U. S. 752, 758–759 (2019). The States argued that reinstating the question would likely cause noncitizens to respond to the census at lower rates, thereby causing noncitizen residents of the States to be undercounted, and in turn leading to reduced representation and other harms for those States. Id., at 766–767. The Court did not require the States to produce affdavits or testimony from noncitizens explaining that they would not respond to the census in light of the citizenship question. Page Proof Pending Publication Requiring the plaintiff to produce affdavits from regu- lated parties would be especially problematic in cases of this kind. It would render the plaintiff 's ability to obtain judi- cial review dependent on the happenstance of whether the plaintiff and the relevant regulated parties are aligned and share litigation interests—and whether the regulated party is willing to publicly oppose (and possibly antagonize) the government regulator by supporting the plaintiff's suit. Such a rule would create incentives for gamesmanship and could make it diffcult or impossible to establish standing in cases where the standing analysis should be straightforward. A heightened “proof of redressability” requirement of that kind would ultimately close the courthouse doors to many traditional challenges to agency action. Cf. id., at 768. Such a rule has little to commend it, and we decline to adopt it. D In ruling against EPA and California, we recognize that there may conceivably be some atypical instances where a 122 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court market has permanently and dramatically changed such that invalidating a challenged regulation would have no effect on the market in question, thereby defeating redressability.6 But that is likely to be a fairly rare and unusual scenario, for a couple of reasons. First, we can assume that governments do not usually con- tinue to enforce and defend regulations that have no continu- ing effect in the relevant market. EPA and California con- tinue to enforce these regulations, and for three years, EPA and California have tenaciously defended them in court. So it is diffcult to put much stock in their suggestion that invali- dating the regulations (in California and 17 other States) would have zero effect on the new vehicle market in America both now and in the future. Simply put, EPA's and Cali- fornia's own actions—their statements, their enforcement decisions, their litigation positions—undermine the central premise of their redressability argument. When as here a government seeks to justify its regulatory actions by, on the Page Proof Pending Publication one hand, touting the consequences for fuel usage and emis- sions while, on the other, maintaining that those same regu- lations are unreviewable because there are no consequences, courts can appropriately be skeptical. Judges “are `not re- quired to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.' ” Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 785 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.)). Second, EPA and California's view of redressability fails to account for dynamic markets and the effects of interrelated economic forces and regulatory programs that change over time. Supply and demand may depend on, among other things, the strength of the overall economy, regulatory emis- sions standards, international developments, government subsidies to particular industries, and tax incentives, among many other factors. Predicting developments in complex 6 Or a regulation may have expired, making the legal challenge moot. But that scenario is covered by mootness doctrine, not redressability. Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 123 Opinion of the Court markets can be a diffcult and uncertain endeavor, particu- larly when various governments' regulatory, spending, and tax policies are at play.7 To deny standing based on a theory that invalidating an important regulation would actually have zero impact on a dynamic and heavily regulated market requires a degree of economic and political clairvoyance that is diffcult for a court to maintain. That is particularly so when the government regulation itself may be skewing the market at issue. So courts should exercise caution before denying standing be- cause of a claimed lack of redressability rooted in question- able economic speculation. In advancing their argument, EPA and California also point out that some automakers are now in compliance with California's regulatory mandates. But that is not surpris- ing. Compliance with government regulation usually sug- gests regulatory effect, not the absence of effect. Nor is Page Proof Pending Publication such compliance especially probative of how all automakers are acting or would respond to a court order invalidating California's regulations—including in the 17 other States that have adopted those regulations. In the D. C. Circuit, California pointed to evidence that seven automakers had announced future plans to sell more electric vehicles than 7 Even if it appears that a market may have temporarily rendered a regulation irrelevant, the market may shift again. This market may be an example. Even supposing that California's regulations as of 2022 were momentarily having no continuing effect on the automobile market due to surging consumer demand for electric vehicles, the demand for electric vehicles may have slowed or at least not matched what might have been anticipated. See, e. g., I. Penn, Electric Vehicles Died a Century Ago. Could That Happen Again? N. Y. Times, May 27, 2025, section B, p. 1; R. Felton, EV Sales Streak Grinds to a Sudden Halt, Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2025; Carmakers Scale Down Electrifcation Plans as EV Demand Slows, Reuters, Sept. 12, 2024; C. Otts, GM Delays Electric Vehicle Build- out in New Sign of Weakening Demand, Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2024; J. Ewing, Carmakers Downshift on E.V. Spending as Sales Growth Slows, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2023, section B, p. 1. 124 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Opinion of the Court California's regulations required. Brief for State and Local Government Respondent-Intervenors in No. 22–1081, at 14. But California offered no evidence that the cited press re- leases from seven automakers represented commitments defnite enough to withstand potential future market fuctu- ations and regulatory changes. Nor did California offer evi- dence that the statements of those seven automakers repre- sented the likely behavior of the entire automaking industry, including potential new market entrants. Recall that the automakers' own motion to intervene in the Court of Appeals suggested otherwise—that if the regulations were invali- dated, other automakers would seek a competitive advantage by manufacturing more gasoline-powered cars. In sum, this case does not present the unusual scenario where invalidating a challenged government restriction on businesses in a competitive market is not likely to have any effect. Here, it may not be certain, but it is at least “pre- dictable” that invalidating the California regulations would Page Proof Pending Publication likely result in the fuel producers ultimately selling more gasoline and other liquid fuels. See Alliance for Hippo- cratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383. E Two of our colleagues have filed dissenting opinions. They primarily object to the Court's decision to grant certio- rari in this case. But having granted certiorari, we proceed to decide the question presented for our review. Justice Sotomayor suggests that the D. C. Circuit's erro- neous standing analysis was attributable to its misunder- standing about the duration of California's feet-wide emis- sions standards. See post, at 127 (dissenting opinion). So in her view, the Court need only correct that factual misunder- standing and remand the case to the D. C. Circuit. See post, at 128. But the D. C. Circuit's standing analysis did not rest entirely on that misunderstanding. And neither EPA nor California asked for such a remand—even though they ac- Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 125 Opinion of the Court knowledged the D. C. Circuit's misunderstanding. More- over, because this litigation has gone on for three years, we see no good reason to waste the parties' time and resources by remanding for further analysis of the standing issue in the Court of Appeals when the parties have comprehensively briefed it and we can readily resolve it now. Justice Jackson separately argues that the Court does not apply standing doctrine “evenhandedly.” Post, at 128 (dissenting opinion). A review of standing cases over the last few years disproves that suggestion. See, e. g., Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 374; United States v. Texas, 599 U. S., at 674; Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 291–292 (2023); Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 234 (2023); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 417–418 (2021); California v. Texas, 593 U. S. 659, 666 (2021); Uzuegbunam, 592 U. S., at 282–283; Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. 538, 541–542 (2020); Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 766–768. In this case, as we have explained, this Court's Page Proof Pending Publication recent standing precedents support the conclusion that the fuel producers have standing. * * * This case concerns only standing, not the merits. EPA and California may or may not prevail on the merits in de- fending EPA's approval of the California regulations. But the justiciability of the fuel producers' challenge to EPA's approval of the California regulations is evident. Courts should not “make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.” Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. 538, 547 (2020). The government generally may not target a busi- ness or industry through stringent and allegedly unlawful regulation, and then evade the resulting lawsuits by claiming that the targets of its regulation should be locked out of court as unaffected bystanders. In light of this Court's precedents and the evidence before the Court of Appeals, the fuel producers established Article III standing to challenge 126 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Sotomayor, J., dissenting EPA's approval of the California regulations. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. In May 2022, several businesses in the fuel industry chal- lenged the Environmental Protection Agency's effective re- instatement of two California vehicle-emissions rules. The rules in question aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by requiring vehicle manufacturers to produce more fuel- effcient cars. Before the D. C. Circuit, petitioners argued, relying in part on statements from California regulators and the EPA, that this shift toward fuel effciency would reduce demand for the fossil fuels they produce, thereby causing a fnancial injury. Petitioners did not meaningfully address redressability, likely because they assumed it would follow Page Proof Pending Publication naturally from the evidence about injury and causation. With no dispute over those elements, the case appeared ready to proceed to the merits. Then, a factual complication arose. California, which had intervened to defend its regulations before the D. C. Circuit, explained that by the time this suit was fled, car manufac- turers could no longer change their manufacturing schedule for cars with model years up to 2025. See Brief for Petition- ers 13–14, 41; Brief for State Respondents 10–11. Evidence in the record overwhelmingly supported that contention. See Ohio v. EPA, 98 F. 4th 288, 302–303 (CADC 2024) (per curiam) (recounting statements to that effect from Ford, Tesla, Toyota, Chrysler, Hyundai, and Mitsubishi). As the car manufacturers explained to the court, production plans are set years in advance and cannot be changed on short notice. Ibid. Due in part to petitioners' own briefng, the D. C. Circuit thought that neither of California's regulations would apply beyond model year 2025. See Brief for Private Petitioners Cite as: 606 U. S. 100 (2025) 127 Sotomayor, J., dissenting in No. 22–1081 (CADC), p. 9 (“The program covers vehicles from model years 2015 through 2025 . . . ”). So, when the court considered redressability, it asked only whether vaca- tur of the rules “would be substantially likely to result in any c