Esteras v. United States (606 U.S. 185, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 185–225 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 20, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 185 Syllabus ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 23–7483. Argued February 25, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025* Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, and the District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison followed by a 6- year term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Esteras was arrested and charged with domestic violence and other crimes. The District Court revoked Esteras's supervised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, explaining that Esteras's earlier sentence had been “rather lenient” and that his revocation sentence must “pro- mote respect for the law,” a consideration enumerated in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit affrmed, holding that a district court may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. Held: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers Page Proof Pending Publication retribution vis-à-vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense. Pp. 191–204. (a) In determining the appropriate sentence for a federal defendant, a district court must consider 10 factors set forth in § 3553(a). Among those factors is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which references “the need for the sen- tence imposed” “to refect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” This provision speaks to the retributive purpose of punishment. A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may also impose a post- imprisonment term of supervised release. Section 3583(c) enumerates the factors that a court must consider when deciding to impose super- vised release. Eight of the ten § 3553(a) factors are listed. Signifcant here, § 3583(c) excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à- vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense. When a court decides whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release, § 3583(e) provides that the same eight factors apply. So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke supervised release, may a district court account for these omitted factors—and specifcally § 3553(a)(2)(A)? Es- teras says no; the Government says yes. Pp. 191–195. *Together with Jaimez, fka Watters v. United States and Leaks v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.4). 186 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Syllabus (b) The Court agrees with Esteras. District courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. That conclusion fol- lows from the well-established canon of statutory interpretation—“ex- pressio unius est exclusio alterius”—which means that expressing one item of an associated group excludes another item not mentioned. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 73, 80. While Congress elsewhere set forth 10 factors that must generally inform a district court's sentencing decisions, it provided in § 3583(e)—the provision gov- erning the revocation of supervised release—that courts must consider only 8 of those 10 factors. The natural implication is that Congress did not intend courts to consider the other two factors, including § 3553(a)(2)(A). The statutory structure confrms this negative inference. Neighbor- ing provisions governing the imposition and revocation of other kinds of sentences instruct courts to consider all the § 3553(a) factors. But for supervised release—and supervised release only—Congress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A). This is a distinction with a difference. And Congress's decision to exclude retribution from the calculus also comports with su- pervised release's role in the criminal justice scheme. Supervised re- lease “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Page Proof Pending Publication Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 50. Rather, it “fulflls rehabilitative ends” and “provides individuals with postconfnement assistance.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60. So when a defendant violates a condition of supervised release, courts must consider the forward- looking sentencing ends, but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution. The Court has twice interpreted the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the provision governing the imposition of supervised release to mean that district courts may not consider that factor. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319; Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481. Al- though Tapia and Concepcion both deal with the imposition of super- vised release under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to revocation under § 3583(e): the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) means that courts may not consider it. Pp. 195–197. (c) The Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive. The Gov- ernment reads the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) to mean that district courts must consider enumerated factors and need not (but may) consider unenumerated ones. Given sentencing judges' discre- tion, the Government argues, Congress would have been more explicit had it intended to foreclose the consideration of retributive aims when revoking supervised release. But what Congress said is clear: The itemized list in § 3583(e) is exhaustive and supplies the entire universe of factors courts may consider. And the Government's reading trivial- izes the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A): As the Government recognizes, a Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 187 Syllabus court may “consider” an enumerated factor but give it no weight. Yet there is negligible difference between saying that a court must consider a given factor (but may give it no weight) and saying that a court may consider a given factor (if the court so chooses). Next, the Government argues that Esteras's reading is unworkable because considering other enumerated factors—such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense” under § 3553(a)(1)—will necessarily imply consideration of the retributive principles captured by § 3553(a)(2)(A). While the Government asks how a court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense without also considering the retributive principles captured by § 3553(a)(2)(A), the answer is straightforward. Courts may consider the offense's nature and circumstances to inform the considerations set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But courts cannot consider them as relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive focus. Finally, the Government interprets § 3583(g), which mandates revoca- tion in certain circumstances, as subject to the full list of § 3553(a) fac- tors. And it would be anomalous, the Government says, if courts could consider retribution in mandatory revocations under § 3583(g) but not in discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3). The correct reading of Page Proof Pending Publication § 3583(g) does not affect the Court's analysis. That § 3583(e) might op- erate differently from § 3583(g) is no reason to disregard § 3583(e)'s plain meaning. Pp. 197–202. (d) When appellate courts review a claim that the district court has impermissibly relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A), much will turn on whether the defendant has properly objected to the district court's impermissible reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A). If not, the defendant's appeal will be gov- erned by plain-error review. But if a court considers retribution for the original offense over the defendant's objection, and the error was not harmless, then the court of appeals should vacate the order and remand for the court to apply the correct standard. None of this turns the Court's reading of § 3583(e) into a “substance-free reverse magic-words requirement,” as the Government suggests. Brief for United States 37. The Government confates the proper interpretation of § 3583(e) with an appellate court's ability to enforce that interpretation. Pp. 202–204. 88 F. 4th 1163, 95 F. 4th 1004, vacated and remanded. Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, and in which Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Jackson, J., joined, post, p. 204. Jackson, J., fled an opinion con- curring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 206. Alito, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 208. 188 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Christian J. Grostic argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Stephen C. Newman, Lori B. Riga, Jeffrey B. Lazarus, Catherine Adinaro Shusky, and Kevin M. Schad. Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Pre- logar, Pr incipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wible, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, and Mahogane D. Reed.† Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court. A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and a term of supervised release. 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a). Super- vised release comes with conditions—for instance, the de- fendant must refrain from committing another crime. § 3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised Page Proof Pending Publication release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” § 3583(e). Conspicuously missing from this list is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which directs a district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed” “to refect the seriousness of the offense, to pro- mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” The Sixth Circuit held that a district court may consider that factor nonetheless. We disagree. Congress's decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting § 3553(a)(2)(A) raises a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised re- lease. This inference is consistent with both the statutory structure and the role that supervised release plays in the sentencing process. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings. †Jacob Schuman, pro se, and Ed Spreha fled a brief for Criminal Law Scholars as amici curiae urging reversal. Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 189 Opinion of the Court I In 2018, Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin. Varying downward from the 15-to-21- month sentencing range, the District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison, to be followed by a 6-year term of supervised release. When Esteras completed his term of imprisonment, his period of supervised release began. Three years in, the pro- bation offce notifed the District Court that Esteras had been arrested. According to the mother of his children, Es- teras had threatened to kill her and had fred three rounds into her vehicle. Esteras was charged in municipal court with domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and criminal damaging, although the charges were ultimately dismissed at the request of the victim. The District Court held a revocation hearing, at which it found that Esteras had violated the conditions of his super- Page Proof Pending Publication vised release. The District Court remarked that Esteras was “no stranger to law violations and no stranger to federal court” and that his previous drug sentences had been “rather lenient.” App. 96a. The District Court revoked his super- vised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, an upward variation from the advisory 6-to-12-month range, with three more years of supervised release to follow. At this point, Esteras's counsel objected, arguing that the District Court had impermissibly considered “the factor in Section 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id., at 105a. While Esteras's coun- sel lodged his objection for the record, he recognized that Sixth Circuit precedent allows district courts to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised release. See United States v. Lewis, 498 F. 3d 393, 399–400 (2007). The District Court in turn acknowledged that part of its de- cision “certainly [was] the need for the sentence imposed, to promote respect for the law.” App. 105a. In a subsequent written order, the District Court explained that it had “con- sidered the factors and conditions for sentencing listed in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)” and had imposed the term of reimprison- 190 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ment in part to “promote respect for the law.” Id., at 115a–116a. The Sixth Circuit affrmed, providing two justifcations for its view that district courts may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised release. See 88 F. 4th 1163 (2023). First, § 3583(e) does not say “that the court may consider `only' those factors” specifcally enumerated, so there was no indication that Congress meant to displace the “considerable discretion” that district courts typically enjoy “over supervised-release decisions.” Id., at 1167. Second, a rule prohibiting district courts from considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) would be unworkable. As the panel saw it, “the purportedly forbidden considerations mentioned in § 3553(a)(2)(A) tend to be `essentially redundant' with the permitted ones,” so “[t]o think about the one requires the judge to think about the other.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 498 F. 3d, at 400). Page Proof Pending Publication The circuits are divided as to whether district courts may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised release.1 We granted certiorari to resolve this split. 604 U. S. 997 (2024).2 1 In addition to the Sixth Circuit, the First, Second, and Third Circuits have held that district courts may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Vargas-Dávila, 649 F. 3d 129, 131–132 (CA1 2011); United States v. Williams, 443 F. 3d 35, 47–48 (CA2 2006); United States v. Young, 634 F. 3d 233, 238–242 (CA3 2011). By contrast, the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a court may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Crudup, 461 F. 3d 433, 439 (CA4 2006); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F. 3d 1173, 1182 (CA9 2006); United States v. Booker, 63 F. 4th 1254, 1259–1260 (CA10 2023). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have taken intermediate positions. See United States v. Sanchez, 900 F. 3d 678, 684, and n. 5 (CA5 2018) (while § 3553(a)(2)(A) is an impermissible factor for a district court to consider, “the forbidden factor must be `dominant' ” to constitute reversible error); United States v. Clay, 752 F. 3d 1106, 1108– 1109 (CA7 2014) (allowing consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) if the district court “relies primarily” on the enumerated factors). 2 Timothy Jaimez and Toriano Leaks joined Esteras's petition for certio- rari. Jaimez and Leaks, like Esteras, argued that the District Courts Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 191 Opinion of the Court II A When a district court sentences a federal defendant, the judge may impose a term of imprisonment, a term of proba- tion, or a fne. See § 3551(b). In determining the appro- priate sentence, the court must consider certain factors set forth in § 3553(a). Some are obvious: The court must con- sider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the his- tory and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the kinds of sentences available.” §§ 3553(a)(1), (3). Others require courts to consider guidelines or policies issued by the Sen- tencing Commission. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5). And still others re- fect discrete policy aims, such as “the need to avoid un- warranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants and “the need to provide restitution to any vic- tims of the offense.” §§ 3553(a)(6)–(7). While all these factors are important, § 3553(a)(2) captures Page Proof Pending Publication the traditional heartland of criminal sentencing. It requires courts to consider: “the need for the sentence imposed— “(A) to refect the seriousness of the offense, to pro- mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; “(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; “(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and “(D) to provide the defendant with needed educa- tional or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” “These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, inca- pacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of sen- in their revocation proceedings had improperly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit held that these arguments were foreclosed by Esteras and Lewis. See United States v. Jaimez, 95 F. 4th 1004, 1007 (2024); United States v. Leaks, 2024 WL 2196795, *1 (Mar. 6, 2024). 192 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court tencing generally.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 325 (2011). They speak to the questions at the core of any system of criminal justice: What sentence does the defendant deserve? What sentence will deter criminal conduct in the future? What sentence will protect the public? And what sentence is most likely to help the defendant rehabilitate for transition back into society? A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may—and sometimes must—impose a postimprisonment term of super- vised release. § 3583(a). “Supervised release is `a form of postconfnement monitoring' that permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by allowing him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison,” subject to conditions on his be- havior. Mont v. United States, 587 U. S. 514, 523 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 697 (2000)). Some conditions are mandatory, such as requiring that the defendant not commit additional crimes and, in most cases, Page Proof Pending Publication that the defendant submit to drug testing. § 3583(d). Oth- ers are up to the discretion of the court. Ibid. When a court “determin[es] whether to include a term of su- pervised release,” as well as the length and conditions of such a term, it must “consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” § 3583(c). Only two of the § 3553(a) factors are ab- sent from this list. The frst is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which requires the court to consider the need for the sentence imposed to “refect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” i. e., the retributive purposes of sentencing. The second is § 3553(a)(3), which requires the court to consider “the kinds of sentences available.” When a court decides whether to re- voke a defendant's supervised release, the very same subset of § 3553(a) factors—that is, all but two—applies. § 3583(e)(3).3 3 The same list of factors also applies when a district court modifes the terms of supervised release, such as by terminating supervised release early, by extending the term of supervised release, or by altering the conditions of supervised release. §§ 3583(e)(1)–(2), (4). Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 193 Opinion of the Court The reason for excluding § 3553(a)(3) from the list is self- evident: When a district court decides whether to revoke a term of supervised release, there is no need to consider “the kinds of sentences available,” because supervised release is the only matter at issue.4 The exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) is more signifcant—and here, controversial. Esteras argues that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose articulated in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised re- lease. The Government insists that courts can consider it, although they are not required to do so. B To see what is at stake, keep in mind that § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not speak of retribution generally—it references the need for the sentence “to refect the seriousness of the of- fense” and to “provide just punishment for the offense.” (Emphasis added.) In the context of a revocation hearing, Page 4 Proof The dissent Pending offers a different Publication view of § 3553(a)(3). In its view, the termination, extension, modifcation, and revocation of supervised release are all different “kinds of ” sentences. Post, at 214 (opinion of Alito, J.). The Government never makes this argument—and for good reason. To begin, it is textually implausible. As the statute articulates, there are three “kinds of sentences available” for an individual “found guilty of an offense”: “a term of probation,” “a fne,” and “a term of imprisonment.” §§ 3551(b)(1)–(3); § 3553(a)(3). In fact, a term of supervised release is not itself a “sentence” at all; it is a component of a defendant's prison sentence. See § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprison- ment . . . , may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment” (emphasis added)). Thus, to the extent the dissent thinks that the termi- nation, extension, modifcation, and revocation of supervised release are different “kinds of sentences available” to the court, it is mistaken. § 3553(a)(3). The dissent's interpretation is perplexing for another reason too: It treats Congress's omission of § 3553(a)(3) from the set of factors that gov- ern revocation proceedings as nothing more than an inexplicable drafting error; under its view, not only may district courts consider § 3553(a)(3), they must do so. See post, at 214 (a judge “must consider exactly what is set out in § 3553(a)(3)”). Silence is an unusual way to convey such an instruction. 194 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the “offense” is the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release conditions. The opening provision of Title 18's sentencing chapter clearly uses “of- fense” to refer to a criminal conviction. See § 3551(a) (stat- ing that the sentencing provisions apply to “a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal statute”). Yet conduct that constitutes a violation of super- vised release “need not be criminal.” Johnson, 529 U. S., at 700; see, e. g., § 3583(g)(3) (mandating revocation when a defendant fails to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of release). Furthermore, neighboring provisions in § 3583 consistently use the word “offense” to refer to the defendant's original crime of conviction, while using the word “violation” to refer to the conduct that triggers revoca- tion. Compare § 3583(e)(3) (referencing the “offense that resulted in the term of supervised release”); § 3583(h) (“the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised re- Page Proof Pending Publication lease”), with § 3583(d) (referencing a “violation of a condition of supervised release”); § 3583(i) (same).5 So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release (per § 3583(e)), may a district court account for the need to exact retribution for 5 Because § 3553(a)(2)(A) speaks only to the “offense,” and “offense” here can mean only the underlying criminal conviction, we address only whether § 3583(e) precludes the court from considering retribution for the underlying criminal conviction. “Offense” aside, the Government argues that § 3553(a)(4)(B) and § 3553(a)(5) authorize courts to consider policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission that sound in retribution for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release. See Brief for United States 11, 34; § 3583(e) (requiring courts to consider § 3553(a)(4) and § 3553(a)(5)). The Commission has adopted the view that “the sen- tence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024); see also ibid. (in revocation proceedings, a court may “sanction” an offender's “breach of trust”). We take no position on whether this is a permissible consideration. Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 195 Opinion of the Court the defendant's underlying crime (per § 3553(a)(2)(A))? Es- teras says no; the Government says yes. III A We agree with Esteras: District courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. This con- clusion follows directly from the application of a well estab- lished canon of statutory interpretation: “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”—in plain English, “ `expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left un- mentioned.' ” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 65 (2002); alteration in original). Here, § 3553(a) lays out 10 factors that inform a district court's sentencing decision.6 Section 3583(e) provides that a district court may revoke a Page Proof Pending Publication term of supervised release “after considering” 8 of these 10 factors. The natural implication is that Congress did not intend for courts to consider the other two factors, § 3553(a)(2) (A) and § 3553(a)(3). Indeed, the expressio unius canon has particular force here because the § 3553(a) sentencing factors constitute an “established series,” such that any “omission” from that series necessarily “bespeaks a negative impli- cation.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 536 U. S., at 81. And the fact that Congress included almost the entire list makes the ex- clusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(3) all the more glaring. The statutory structure confrms this negative inference. Neighboring provisions that govern the imposition and revo- cation of sentences other than supervised release instruct the court to consider all the factors in § 3553(a). For in- stance, when imposing a term of probation, the court “shall consider the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a) to the extent that 6 For those counting: the six factors enumerated in §§ 3553(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7), plus the four factors separately enumerated in §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). 196 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court they are applicable.” § 3562(a). And the court may revoke such a term “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” § 3565(a); see also § 3582(a) (same for imposition of term of imprisonment); § 3572(a) (same for imposition of a fne). So for supervised release—and for supervised release only—Congress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A). This, we think, is a distinction with a difference. After all, our task is to “give effect to, not nullify Congress' choice to include” that factor “in some provisions but not others.” Gallardo v. Marstiller, 596 U. S. 420, 431 (2022). Congress's decision to exclude retribution from the calcu- lus also comports with the role of supervised release in our current criminal justice scheme. Fines, probation, and im- prisonment are a court's primary tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original of- fense. Supervised release, by contrast, “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Granderson, 511 Page Proof Pending Publication U. S. 39, 50 (1994). Rather, it “fulflls rehabilitative ends” and “provides individuals with postconfnement assistance.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000). So when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacita- tion, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward- looking purpose of retribution. Finally, our conclusion is consistent with this Court's prec- edent. We have twice interpreted the omission of § 3553(a) (2)(A) from the provision governing the imposition of super- vised release (§ 3583(c)) to mean that district courts may not consider that factor when imposing supervised release. In Tapia, we stated that, “when imposing a term of supervised release,” “a court may not take account of retribution (the frst purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)).” 564 U. S., at 326.7 So 7 The dissent suggests that when we said that “ `a court may not take account of retribution,' ” we may have actually meant that “a judge, as a matter of discretion, may choose not to take retribution into account.” Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 197 Opinion of the Court too, in Concepcion v. United States, we remarked that “in determining whether to include a term of supervised release, and the length of any such term, Congress has expressly pre- cluded district courts from considering the need for retribu- tion.” 597 U. S. 481, 494 (2022). Although Tapia and Con- cepcion both deal with the imposition of supervised release under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to the revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e): The omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of factors means that courts may not consider it. Text, structure, and precedent all point in the same di- rection: Congress's decision to exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e)'s list of sentencing factors means that district courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to re- voke supervised release. B Page ProofFirst,Pending Publication We are unpersuaded by the Government's and the dissent's counterarguments. the Government and the dissent read the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) as supporting a different inference—namely, that a district court must consider the enumerated factors but need not consider the unenumerated ones, such as § 3553(a)(2)(A). Because “sentencing judges `enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they may con- sider,' ” the Government argues, Congress would have used more explicit language had it wanted to foreclose courts from considering retribution when revoking supervised release. Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491 (quoting Dean v. United States, 581 U. S. 62, 66 (2017); alteration in original). For example, Congress could have said that courts may revoke supervised release “after considering only” the enumerated factors. Brief for United States 23; see also post, at 210–213 (Alito, J., dissenting). Post, at 220–221. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this is a plausible interpretation. 198 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court When interpretive disputes arise, it is easy to imagine how Congress could have drafted the statute to avoid them. But Congress cannot anticipate (much less account for) every fu- ture statutory skirmish—and even if it could, courts have no authority to hold Congress to a “perfect as we see it” stand- ard of drafting. On the contrary, we have “routinely con- strued statutes to have a particular meaning” even when “Congress could have expressed itself more clearly.” Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U. S. 452, 472 (2016). What Congress said here gets its point across just fne: The itemized list in § 3583(e) is exhaustive. As we explained, the provision allows district courts to consider all but two of the § 3553(a) factors, and because one is inapplicable in this context (§ 3553(a)(3)), § 3553(a)(2)(A) is the only consequential omis- sion. So it makes sense to read § 3583(e) as supplying the universe of factors that the district court can consider. And while the Government is right that district courts generally Page Proof Pending Publication enjoy discretion over sentencing, see Brief for United States 21–22, Congress chose to limit that discretion here. It makes much less sense to read § 3583(e) as the Govern- ment does—that is, as listing only the factors that a court must consider, while leaving room for the court to consider an additional factor if it so chooses. This reading of § 3583(e) trivializes the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A). After all, on the Government's view, a court may “consider” an enumerated factor but give it no weight. Tr. of Oral Arg. 61. The dif- ference between saying that a court must consider a given factor (but may give it no weight) and saying that a court may consider a given factor (if the court chooses) is negli- gible. Why would Congress have bothered to exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list? The dissent has no response to this point, so it instead analogizes to different—and inapposite—contexts. For ex- ample, the dissent says, suppose that a law clerk is directed to complete a certain number of bench memos before a dead- line; surely that instruction would not carry the inference that the law clerk may not complete more work too. Post, Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 199 Opinion of the Court at 211–212. But the important difference between that con- text and this one is that sentencing considerations, unlike bench memos, can be zero sum: Adding a new consideration to the mix reduces the role that the enumerated considera- tions play. In fact, the new consideration might lead to a different result altogether. A play on the dissent's own analogy reveals its weak- nesses. Imagine that a judge tells her hypothetical law clerk to prepare a bench memo with a recommendation formed “after considering” statutory text, context, and structure, as well as any relevant precedent. Having looked at these sources, the law clerk is inclined to recommend that the judge reverse the court below. But the law clerk de- cides to look elsewhere—say, to social science studies—and she uses these sources to inform her recommendation. In the end, she submits a memo recommending that the judge vote to affrm the lower court's decision. According to the Page Proof Pending Publication dissent, the law clerk has obeyed her boss's instructions. Needless to say, we disagree. More to the point, the dissent never explains why Con- gress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of considerations applicable to a revocation proceeding. After all, in the dis- sent's view, district courts will almost inevitably consider that factor. See post, at 210, 214–217, 219–220, n. 7. So why did Congress exclude it? In the dissent's view, the omission is just hortatory: “Congress may have sought to encourage sentencing courts to give greater weight to the remaining purposes of sentencing.” Post, at 219, n. 7.8 But omitting consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) altogether would be an odd 8 Alternatively, the dissent posits that Congress may have understood each of the three § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors to “apply in some, though not all, hearings regarding the alteration of supervised release.” Post, at 219, n. 7. Which hearings make the cut? Frankly, we are not sure. Some parts of the dissent's lengthy footnote suggest all; others suggest none; and still others suggest that it “depends on context.” Ibid. In our view, however, “[t]he Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament.” Post, at 208. 200 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court way of accomplishing that very limited goal. And one need not “live in a world of airy abstractions,” post, at 208, to recog- nize that Congress's drafting decisions have signifcance. Next, the Government and the dissent argue that Ester- as's reading of § 3553(a)(2)(A) is unworkable, because consid- eration of the other enumerated factors will necessarily imply consideration of the retributive principles captured by § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Government relies primarily on § 3553(a)(1), which references “the nature and circumstances of the offense.” How, the Government asks, is a court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense without also considering the “need for the sentence imposed” “to re- fect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”? § 3553(a)(2)(A). The answer is straightforward. A court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant for the Page Proof Pending Publication considerations set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)— namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—but a court cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive focus. For instance, if the defendant's original offense was particularly violent, that fact might inform the court's judgment as to whether revocation is necessary “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” § 3553(a)(2)(C). But the court could not revoke based on the view that, given the violent nature of the underlying offense, the defendant de- serves additional punishment.9 9 The dissent suggests that this will be an impossible task for district courts. See post, at 208 (Courts must “engage in mind-bending exer- cises”); post, at 216 (They must “probe their mental processes to ensure that no thoughts of retribution entered in”); post, at 217 (We require a “soul- searching obligation”). Not so. We routinely require judges and juries to attend to some considerations while ignoring others. See, e. g., Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 646 (2023) (“Evidence at trial is often ad- mitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting instruction,” and “our legal system presumes that jurors will ` “attend closely the particular Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 201 Opinion of the Court The dissent, for its part, argues that we are simply wrong to understand § 3553(a)(2)(A) as synonymous with retribu- tion. Post, at 214–217. Under the dissent's view, § 3553(a) (2)(A) serves an extensive (if amorphous) role: The phrase “ `to promote respect for the law' ” encompasses “the whole point of deterrence,” while the reference to the “ `seriousness of the offense' ” invokes the “heightened need for deterrence and incapacitation.” Post, at 215–216. But this approach renders § 3553(a)(2)(A) largely duplicative of the clear refer- ences to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation that follow in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D). Recall, too, that there are four traditional purposes of sentencing. Given that §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and(D) set forth three of these purposes, it is no wonder that § 3553(a)(2)(A) provides the fourth. Not to mention that the provision speaks in retributive terms: the “seriousness of the offense,” the need “to promote re- spect for the law,” and, in particular, the need “to provide Page Proof Pending Publication just punishment for the offense.” § 3553(a)(2)(A). In any event, we say nothing about the meaning of § 3553(a)(2)(A) today that we have not already said before. See Tapia, 564 U. S., at 326 (“retribution” is “the frst purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)”); Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 494. Finally, the Government suggests that § 3583(g), which mandates revocation in certain circumstances, undermines Esteras's interpretation of the statute. Section 3583(g) does not specify which factors apply when a court determines the length of the defendant's postrevocation term of imprison- ment.10 So, the Government reasons, reimprisonment under § 3583(g) must be subject to the general rule for prison sen- language of [such] instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow” ' them” (alteration in original)). 10 Section 3583(g) states that, if the defendant violates certain conditions of supervised release, “the court shall revoke the term of supervised re- lease and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).” (Emphasis added.) 202 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court tences articulated in § 3582(a), and that provision directs courts to the full list of § 3553(a) factors. It would be anom- alous, the Government says, if a district court could consider retribution as part of a mandatory revocation under § 3583(g) but not as part of a discretionary revocation under § 3583(e)(3). Esteras, for his part, argues for consistency in the other direction: He argues that § 3583(e)'s abbreviated list governs in both contexts. We need not resolve the dispute because it does not affect our analysis. To begin, the Government's reading of § 3583(e) does not solve the problem that the Government has identifed. As the Government sees it, if revocation is discretionary and thus governed by § 3583(e), the court may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), but if revocation is mandatory and thus governed by § 3583(g), the court must consider § 3553(a) (2)(A). So while the Government says that it would be “highly anomalous to have different regimes for determining Page Proof Pending Publication the length of prison terms under Sections 3583(e)(3) and 3583(g),” that anomaly persists under the Government's own reading of the statute. Brief for United States 26. In any event, that § 3583(e) might operate differently from § 3583(g) is not reason to disregard § 3583(e)'s plain meaning. IV At oral argument, the Government expressed concern that it would be diffcult for appellate courts to determine whether a district court has impermissibly relied on § 3553(a) (2)(A). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50. So we conclude with a few observations about appellate review. Much will turn on whether the defendant objects. If the defendant does not make the district court aware that it may be impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), then the defend- ant's appeal will be governed by plain-error review. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). In that event, the district court's order revoking supervised release and requiring re- Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 203 Opinion of the Court imprisonment will be affrmed unless it is “ `clear' ” or “ `obvi- ous' ” that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a) (2)(A)—because it did so either expressly or by unmistakable implication. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 (1993). If the defendant does object to the district court's reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), we anticipate that the district court will recognize its potential error and clarify its revocation deci- sion to make clear that it is not taking account of § 3553(a) (2)(A). For example, the district court could withdraw any impermissible justifcation or explain that a stray reference to a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor was intended to bear on another § 3553(a) factor or merely prefatory. If the court nonethe- less considers the need to exact retribution for the defend- ant's original criminal offense, and if the error was not harm- less, then the court of appeals should vacate the court's order and remand for the court to apply the correct standard. See Page Proof Pending Publication Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a). This does not mean, as the Government suggests, that our reading of § 3583(e) amounts to a “substance-free reverse magic-words requirement.” Brief for United States 37. The Government confates the proper interpretation of § 3583(e) with an appellate court's ability to enforce that in- terpretation. The “requirement” here is very much sub- stantive: District courts may not consider the retributive purpose of § 3553(a)(2)(A) before revoking supervised re- lease. We trust that district courts will heed that instruc- tion regardless of the practical likelihood of reversal.11 11 The dissent takes a curious tack here. It suggests that we lack the courage of our convictions because we explain that defendants bear the burden of preserving objections, that district courts will generally comply with the law once an objection is raised, and that plain-error review ap- plies to unpreserved claims. See post, at 224–225. But there is nothing “remarkable” about our explanation, which simply articulates orthodox principles of party presentation and appellate review. Post, at 224. And it is surprising that the dissent opens its discussion by suggesting that we 204 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Sotomayor, J. * * * District courts may revoke a term of supervised release after considering the factors enumerated in § 3583(e). Be- cause § 3553(a)(2)(A) is excluded from that list, district courts may not consider it. The judgments of the Sixth Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join all but Part II–B of the Court's opinion. I agree that district courts may not rely on the retributive sentenc- ing factor set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) to revoke supervised release. In my view, however, district courts re- voking a term of supervised release should not consider ret- ribution for any purpose. Page Proof Pending Publication The question in these cases is whether, despite Congress's omission in the supervised-release statute of any reference to retribution, courts may consider retribution when they decide whether to revoke a term of supervised release. The answer is no. In specifying the factors courts should con- sider before revoking a term of supervised release, Congress cross-referenced eight out of the ten familiar § 3553(a) fac- tors, including three of the four purposes of sentencing: de- terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. “Conspicuously missing” from the supervised-release statute, however, “is § 3553(a)(2)(A),” which describes the retributive purpose of punishment. Ante, at 188. The straightforward inference, as we have said twice before, is that “Congress has expressly precluded district courts from considering the need for retri- bution” in supervised release proceedings. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, 494 (2022); see also Tapia v. are insuffciently attuned to “the practical effec[t] of [our] holdin[g],” post, at 208, yet closes by complaining that we are overly sensitive to its conse- quences, post, at 224–225. Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 205 Opinion of Sotomayor, J. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 326 (2011). That resolves these cases. The majority approaches the question differently. “In the context of a revocation hearing,” it reasons, the word “ `of- fense' ” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release condi- tions.” Ante, at 193–194. So (the majority continues) by excluding § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the supervised-release stat- ute, Congress precluded courts from accounting “for the need to exact retribution for the defendant's underlying crime.” Ante, at 194–195. The problem with that framing is that it relies on an inter- pretive question with no clear answer. The term “offense” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) has no meaning “[i]n the context of a revo- cation hearing,” because the supervised-release statute con- tains no reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) or its directive to “pro- vide just punishment for the offense.” Cf. ante, at 193–194. Page Proof Pending Publication At most, then, the majority could ask what Congress would have meant by “offense” if it had included a reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) in this statute. Yet such speculation is un- necessary to resolve these cases. Congress studiously omit- ted all reference to retribution from the supervised-release statute, so retribution should play no role in revocation hearings. Because the majority frames the question as one about retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exact- ing retribution for the defendant's supervised-release viola- tion. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward. As the Court holds today, the supervised-release statute does not permit consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A). That means courts may consider only the remaining eight enumer- ated factors, none of which contain any reference to retribu- tion. See § 3583(e). As the majority recognizes, moreover, the retributive interest in punishment is ill suited to supervised-release proceedings. Supervised release “ `ful- 206 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Jackson, J. flls rehabilitative ends' and `provides individuals with post- confnement assistance.' ” Ante, at 196 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000)); see also S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 124 (1983) (Senate Report noting that “the primary goal” of supervised release “is to ease the defend- ant's transition into the community . . . or to provide rehabili- tation”). Thus, “when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must con- sider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, in- capacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Ante, at 196. In sum, when a court considers whether a supervised- release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment (its primary task during revocation hearings), it must look only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute. As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of Page Proof Pending Publication bounds. Although I would have made this point explicit, nothing in the Court's opinion is inconsistent with it. Ac- cordingly, I otherwise join the Court's opinion. Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The question presented in this litigation is whether sen- tencing courts can reference and rely upon the retributive concerns outlined in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a previously imposed term of supervised release. “Esteras argues that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose articulated in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking super- vised release,” while “[t]he Government insists that courts can consider it, although they are not required to do so.” Ante, at 193. Like the Court, I agree with Esteras: Courts cannot consider this omitted sentencing purpose when revok- ing supervised release. That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 207 Opinion of Jackson, J. contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has taken off the table. Ante, at 193–195. Venturing into this terri- tory is not necessary in the context of this litigation. As Justice Sotomayor explains, whatever § 3553(a)(2)(A) calls for when Congress has authorized its use, all that the Court properly decides today is that Congress has forbidden sen- tencing judges to rely on that same set of considerations in the supervised-release-revocation context. I disagree with the Court's discussion of the scope of “of- fense” in § 3553(a)(2)A) as it relates to § 3583(e) because, in my view, that part of the opinion confuses more than it clari- fes. As sentencing judges know, revocation of supervised release occurs in response to new—often criminal—conduct. It is entirely conceivable, and perhaps even likely, that when Congress removed from the list of permissible revocation considerations § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s “need for the sentence im- posed” to exact retribution, it sought to prevent the promo- Page Proof Pending Publication tion of retribution with respect to whatever new offense trig- gered the call for revocation of supervised release. At the very least, that possibility counsels against defnitively as- serting that § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s conspicuous omission only speaks to whether a district court can “account for the need to exact retribution for the defendant's underlying crime.” Ante, at 194–195 (emphasis added). In any event, because § 3553(a) requires district courts to impose sentences that are “suffcient, but not greater than necessary” to promote certain purposes of punishment, the kind of hairsplitting that the majority's opinion invites is entirely impractical. Sentences either “refect,” “afford,” or “provide” for the listed purposes of punishment (retribu- tion, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation) or they don't. § 3553(a)(2). It is hard to fathom that Congress meant for retribution to be both operable and inoperable as it relates to the imposition of a single revocation sanction, and it is even harder to imagine how a sentencing court can effec- tively achieve that binary objective. 208 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Alito, J., dissenting Part II–B of the majority's opinion is both unnecessary to the outcome of this litigation and inscrutable in light of how revocation sentences are actually determined and imposed. Therefore, I cannot join that Part of the opinion. Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, dissenting. Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings. Today's decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit A in the trial bench's catalog of appellate otherworldliness. The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that a federal district-court judge, when considering whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in mind-bending exercises. The judge must take into account “the nature and circumstances” of a defendant's offense but Page Proof Pending Publication is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). The judge must consider what is needed to “dete[r]” violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defend- ant, i. e., to cause him to lead a law-abiding life, but cannot be infuenced by a desire “to promote respect for the law.” Ibid. The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the in- terpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure of the Act supports the Court's interpretation. I A In order to understand these cases and the points on which the majority and I disagree, some background information about federal sentencing is required. When a defendant is “found guilty of an offense,” he may be sentenced to “a term of probation,” “a fne,” or “a term of imprisonment.” § 3551(b). And in crafting a sentence, the court is required Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 209 Alito, J., dissenting to consider the 10 factors that are set out in § 3553(a). (For convenience, I will call these the sentencing factors.) If a sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment, the court generally has discretion to include “as a part of the sentence” a term of supervised release. § 3583(a).1 “Super- vised release is `a form of postconfnement monitoring' that permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by allowing him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison.” Mont v. United States, 587 U. S. 514, 523 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 697 (2000)). In deciding whether to impose and in devising a term of supervised re- lease, a judge is required to consider 8 of the 10 sentencing factors noted above, specifically, §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). (For con- venience, I will call these the supervised-release factors.) During a term of supervised release, a defendant must comply with certain standard conditions, such as reporting Page Proof Pending Publication to a probation offcer, as well as any special conditions that are “tailored specifcally” to “the individual case.” Adminis- trative Offce of the U. S. Courts, Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions 8 (2024). If a defendant fails to comply with these conditions, revocation of supervised re- lease is sometimes mandatory, see, e. g., § 3583(g), but in most cases, the court has discretion to choose the appropriate re- sponse. For example, it may “extend” supervised release “if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed”; “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of super- vised release”; or, more seriously, “revoke” supervised re- lease and “require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised re- lease.” §§ 3583(e)(2), (3). In deciding whether to alter a term of supervised release, the court is required to consider 1 In some cases, the imposition of supervised release is mandatory. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3583(k) (kidnapping offenses); § 3583( j) (terrorism of- fenses); 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b), 960(b) (drug-traffcking offenses). 210 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Alito, J., dissenting the same eight factors that had to be taken into account in imposing the term of supervised release in the frst place. In these cases, the lead petitioner, Edgardo Esteras, vio- lated a term of his supervised release by assaulting the mother of his children and shooting at her vehicle. The sen- tencing judge revoked supervised release and, in doing so, referred to Esteras's criminal history and the need to “en- courage [him] to be respectful of the law.” App. 96a. Cit- ing these remarks, Esteras contends that the judge based her decision on an impermissible factor, namely, a desire to “promote respect for the law.” This factor, which appears in § 3553(a)(2)(A), is one of the two sentencing factors omit- ted from the list of supervised-release factors. Esteras argues, and the Court now agrees, that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release factors means that it cannot be considered. In other words, the judge in Esteras's case was obligated to put out of her mind Page Proof Pending Publication any desire “to promote respect for the law.” Before today, one might have thought that every aspect of a federal judge's work should aim to “promote respect for the law.” Appar- ently, that is no longer true. B The question in these cases is what to make of the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release factors. The Court infers that consideration of this factor is forbid- den, and, in so doing, relies almost entirely on a canon of interpretation that bears the Latin name expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In English, that means “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). To modify a classic example slightly, suppose a sign at the entrance of a park said: “No gasoline- or electric-powered vehicles allowed.” Under the expressio unius canon, it would be fair to infer that standard bikes are permitted. See H. Hart, Positivism and the Sepa- ration of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958). Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 211 Alito, J., dissenting Although this canon has its place, Reading Law empha- sizes that it “must be applied with great caution, since its application depends so much on context.” Scalia & Garner 107. Our cases have made the same point and have often rejected use of the canon because of the context in which the expression appeared. See, e. g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (“The expressio unius canon applies only when circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded” (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[T]he canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping”). Reading Law also contains this important warning: “Even when an all-inclusive sense seems apparent, one must still identify the scope of the inclusiveness (thereby limiting [the] implied exclusion).” Scalia & Garner 108 (em- phasis added). Page Proof Pending Publication In these cases, I agr