Stanley v. City of Sanford (606 U.S. 46, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 46–99 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 20, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 46 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD, FLORIDA certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 23–997. Argued January 13, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025 Karyn Stanley worked as a frefghter for the City of Sanford, Florida, starting in 1999. When Ms. Stanley was hired, the City offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those with 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the City changed its policy to provide health insurance up to age 65 only for retirees with 25 years of service, while those who retired earlier due to disability would receive just 24 months of coverage. Ms. Stanley later developed a disability that forced her to retire in 2018, entitling her to only 24 months of health insurance under the revised policy. Ms. Stanley sued, claiming the City violated the Americans with Disa- bilities Act by providing different health-insurance benefts to those who retire with 25 years of service and those who retire due to disability. The district court dismissed her ADA claim, reasoning that the alleged Page Proof Pending Publication discrimination occurred after she retired, when she was not a “qualifed individual” under Title I of the ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a), because she no longer held or sought a job with the defendant. The Eleventh Cir- cuit affrmed. Held: The judgment is affrmed. 83 F. 4th 1333, affrmed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that, to prevail under § 12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination. Pp. 51–59. (a) Section 12112(a) makes it unlawful for a covered employer to dis- criminate against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in re- gard to compensation. The parties agree that retirement benefts qual- ify as “compensation” and assume the City's policy revision constituted disability-based discrimination. The disagreement centers on whether § 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees. A “qualifed individual” is someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” § 12111(8). Congress's use of present-tense verbs (“holds,” “desires,” “can perform”) signals that Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 47 Syllabus § 12112(a) protects individuals able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination, not retirees who neither hold nor desire a job. The statute's defnition of “reasonable accommodation”—“job restruc- turing,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies,” § 12111(9)—makes sense for current em- ployees or applicants but not for retirees. Section 12112(b)'s examples of discrimination, such as “qualifcation standards” and “employment tests,” similarly aim to protect job holders and seekers, not retirees. Comparing Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforces this reading. Title VII protects “employee[s],” § 2000e(f), without temporal qualifcation, sometimes covering former employees. But where Title VII links “employee” to present-tense verbs, it refers to current employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341, n. 2, 343. Similarly the ADA's “qualifed individual” yoked to present-tense verbs suggests current job holders or seekers. Court precedent supports this interpretation. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, the Court noted that a plaintiff 's assertion she is “ `unable to work' will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case,” anticipating that someone may fall outside Page Proof Pending Publication § 12112(a)'s protections if she can “no longer do the job.” 526 U. S. 795, 799, 806. Pp. 51–55. (b) Ms. Stanley argues that § 12112(a)'s “qualifed individual” require- ment is a conditional mandate—applicable only if a plaintiff holds or seeks a job. If neither, she contends, there are no “essential functions” to perform, making every retiree automatically “qualifed.” The Court rejects this conceivable-but-convoluted interpretation in favor of the or- dinary one. Ms. Stanley's surplusage argument—that the Court's reading renders § 12112(b)(5)(A)'s reference to “applicant or employee” meaningless— also fails. That phrase may still serve a narrowing function, and “[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385. Ms. Stanley argues that Title I's broad language allowing “any person alleging discrimination” to sue makes the “qualifed individual” lan- guage irrelevant. But the statute protects people, not benefts, from discrimination—specifcally, qualifed individuals. Finally, Ms. Stanley invokes the ADA's purpose of eradicating disability-based discrimination. She argues this goal would be best served by a judicial decision extending Title I's protections to retirees. But “legislation [does not] pursu[e] its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525–526, and other laws may protect 48 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Syllabus retirees from discrimination. If Congress wishes to extend Title I to retirees, it can do so. Pp. 55–59. Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kava- naugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Bar- rett, J., joined, post, p. 66. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 74. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12, post, p. 75. Deepak Gupta argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Eric F. Citron, Robert Friedman, Jenni- fer D. Bennett, Jessica Garland, and Patricia R. Sigman. Frederick Liu argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Page Proof Pending Publication Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Tovah R. Calde- ron, Sydney A. R. Foster, Karla Gilbride, Jennifer S. Gold- stein, Anne Noel Occhialino, and James M. Tucker. Jessica C. Conner argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Douglas T. Noah and Patricia M. Rego Chapman.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for AARP et al. by Louis Lopez, William Alvarado Rivera, and Rebecca Rodgers; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Harold C. Becker and Matthew Ginsburg; for the Constitutional Ac- countability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for the Disability Rights Legal Center et al. by J. Carl Cecere; for the Georgia Advocacy Offce et al. by Paul Koster; for the International Association of Fire Fighters by John R. Mooney; and for Main Street Alliance by Brad- ley Girard, Rachel L. Fried, Robin F. Thurston, and Sunu Chandy. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Center for Workplace Compliance by Michael J. Eastman; for the Chamber of Com- merce of the United States of America by Michael E. Kenneally and James D. Nelson; and for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by Meaghan VerGow, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt. Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 49 Opinion of the Court Justice Gorsuch announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act bars employ- ers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation” and other matters. 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statute defnes a “qualifed individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func- tions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8). The question before us concerns whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “qualifed individual.” I Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we Page Proof Pending Publication take as true the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff 's com- plaint, National Rife Association of America v. Vullo, 602 U. S. 175, 181 (2024), and do not consider evidence beyond that pleading, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972) (per curiam). With those con- straints in mind, we begin by setting out the facts as the plaintiff, Karyn Stanley, has alleged them. Ms. Stanley started working as a frefghter for the city of Sanford, Florida (City), in 1999. At frst, she planned to serve for 25 years. Complaint in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13, 16 (Complaint). Part of the reason for that had to do with health insurance. At the time the City hired her, it offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those who retired with 25 years of service, and those who retired earlier because of a disabil- ity. Id., ¶ 19. In 2003, though, the City changed its policy. Going forward, it said, it would continue to pay for health insurance up to age 65 for retirees with 25 years of service. Id., ¶¶ 20–21. But for those who retired earlier due to dis- 50 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of the Court ability, the City announced, it would now provide health in- surance for just 24 months, unless the retiree started receiv- ing Medicare benefts sooner. Id., ¶ 20. At some point after the City revised its policy, Ms. Stanley's complaint does not say when, she began to suffer from an unspecifed disabil- ity. Id., ¶ 16. And, in 2018, that “disability forced her to retire” earlier than she had planned. Ibid. Under the City's revised policy, that meant she was entitled to at most 24 months of health insurance. Based on these facts, Ms. Stanley brought suit claim- ing that the City had violated the ADA and a number of other state and federal laws. Providing different health- insurance benefts to those who retire with 25 years of serv- ice and those who retire earlier due to disability, she con- tended, amounted to impermissible discrimination based on disability. The City responded by fling a motion to dismiss Ms. Stanley's complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court denied that motion in part, allowing Page Proof Pending Publication some of Ms. Stanley's claims to proceed. But with respect to her ADA claim, the district court saw things differently. Ms. Stanley's complaint, the court observed, alleged that the City had treated her worse than other similarly situated indi- viduals because of her disability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a– 22a, what is known as a disparate-treatment claim, see Ray- theon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U. S. 44, 53 (2003). To state such a claim under the ADA, the court continued, § 12112(a) required her to allege, among other things, facts suffcient to show that she was a “qualifed individual” at the time of the City's alleged discrimination. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. But in this case, the court reasoned, the discrimination Ms. Stanley alleged—reduced healthcare benefts—did not take place until after she retired. And by that point, she was not a “qualifed individual” under the ADA because she was not someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment posi- tion that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. As a result, the court held, it Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 51 Opinion of the Court had no choice but to grant the City's motion to dismiss her ADA claim. Id., at 26a. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed. It, too, concluded that § 12112(a) does not reach allegations of discrimination against a retiree “who does not hold or desire to hold an employment position” that she is capable of performing with reasonable accommodation. 83 F. 4th 1333, 1337 (2023). But, the court acknowledged, not every court of appeals would agree. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have said that Title I's antidiscrimination provision “does not protect people who neither held nor de- sired a job with the defendant at the time of discrimination.” Id., at 1341. But the Second and Third Circuits take a dif- ferent view. As those courts see it, the ADA's defnition of “qualifed individual” is “ambiguous,” and they have resolved that ambiguity “in favor of ” extending the statute to reach retirees like Ms. Stanley. Ibid. Page Proof Pending Publication We granted certiorari to resolve the circuits' disagreement over whether § 12112(a) reaches discrimination against re- tirees who neither hold nor desire a job whose essential tasks they can perform with reasonable accommodation. 602 U. S. 1038 (2024). II A The ADA contains fve titles separately addressing em- ployment, public entities, public accommodations, telecom- munications, and miscellaneous matters. 104 Stat. 327–328. Ms. Stanley brought her suit under Title I, which speaks to employment. Section 12112(a) provides Title I's general liability rule for disability discrimination. It makes it un- lawful for a covered employer to “discriminate against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation,” among other things. The parties disagree about the meaning of this language, but their dispute is a narrow one. They take as given that retirement benefts, like those at issue here, qualify as “com- 52 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of the Court pensation.” See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 77 (1984); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682 (1983). For purposes of our re- view, we may also assume that the City's revision to its retirement-benefts plan constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . on the basis of disability.” The only question that separates the parties is whether § 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees like Ms. Stanley. She (and two circuits) think the answer is yes; the City (and several other circuits) believe otherwise. To resolve that disagreement, we turn, as we must, to the statutory terms Congress has given us. Section 12112(a) tells us that Title I prohibits discrimination against “quali- fed individual[s].” And a qualifed individual, Title I contin- ues, is someone “who, with or without reasonable accom- modation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” § 12111(8). Page Proof Pending Publication From these directions, one clue emerges immediately. “[T]o ascertain a statute's temporal reach,” this Court has “frequently looked to Congress' choice of verb tense.” Carr v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). And here, Con- gress has made it unlawful to “discriminate against” some- one who “can perform the essential functions of ” the job she “holds or desires.” Those present-tense verbs signal that § 12112(a) protects individuals who, with or without reason- able accommodation, are able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination. Conversely, those verbs tend to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination. Reinforcing this assessment is the statute's defnition of “reasonable accommodation.” Title I, recall, prohibits dis- crimination against an individual who can perform essential job functions “with or without reasonable accommodation.” § 12111(8); see § 12112(a). And a “reasonable accommoda- tion,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restruc- Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 53 Opinion of the Court turing,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies.” § 12111(9). Those kinds of accommodations make perfect sense when it comes to current employees or applicants. But it is hard to see how they might apply to retirees who do not hold or seek a job. Section 12112(b) conveys a similar message. That provi- sion offers examples of what constitutes “ `discriminat[ion] against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability.' ” So, for instance, subsection (b)(6) defnes discrimination to in- clude using certain “qualifcation standards, employment tests or other selection criteria” unless they are “job-related for the position in question.” Plainly, that mandate aims to protect jobseekers. But it makes no sense in the context of retirees who do not seek employment. The same goes for subsection (b)(7), which requires that “tests concerning em- ployment . . . accurately refect the skills” and “aptitude” of Page Proof Pending Publication an “employee or applicant.” It would be strange for em- ployers to test the job skills of former employees who do not plan to return to work. This pattern repeats itself through- out § 12112(b), underscoring § 12112(a)'s focus on current and prospective employees—not retirees. Instructive, too, is the fact that another part of the statute speaks differently. Where § 12112(a) prohibits certain acts of employment discrimination against “a qualifed individual,” § 12203(a) prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who opposes a discriminatory act. That Congress used different language in these two provisions strongly suggests that it meant for them to work differently. After all, when a docu- ment uses a term in one place and a materially different term in another, “ `the presumption is that the different term de- notes a different idea.' ” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)). Further evidence still comes from examining Title I of the ADA in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 54 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of the Court Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The two statutes share much in common, not least the fact that they both address employment discrimination. See Mount Lem- mon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 586 U. S. 1, 4, n. 1 (2018). But the statutes also bear differences we have found illuminating in the past. See, e. g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 773 (2015). And one difference concerns the class of people the statutes protect. Title VII protects “employees,” § 2000e–3(a), a term that law defnes without “any temporal qualifer,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 342 (1997). In keeping with that unqualifed term, Title VII sometimes bars discrimination against former employ- ees as well as current ones. Id., at 341. But elsewhere in Title VII, context clarifes that “the term `employee' refers unambiguously to a current employee.” Id., at 343. That is true, for instance, where the statute links the term “em- ployee” to present-tense verbs like work and has. Id., at Page Proof Pending Publication 341, n. 2, 343. The upshot? Even if the ADA's reference to a “qualifed individual,” like Title VII's reference to an “employee,” might be read in isolation to encompass retirees, once Congress yokes those kinds of terms to present-tense verbs—such “holds,” “desires,” and “can perform”—that as- sumption becomes considerably less plausible. Beyond all this textual evidence lies our precedent. Con- struing an earlier version of Title I in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., this Court explained that “[a]n ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a `qual- ifed individual with a disability'—that is, a person `who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es- sential functions' of her job.” 526 U. S. 795, 806 (1999) (quot- ing 42 U. S. C. § 12111(8)). Accordingly, the Court con- cluded, “a plaintiff's sworn assertion” that she is “ `unable to work' will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case.” 526 U. S., at 806. In saying as much, the Court an- ticipated the possibility that someone may fall outside the protections of § 12112(a) if she can “ `no longer do the job.' ” Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 55 Opinion of the Court Id., at 799; accord, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 567 (1999).1 B Against this evidence of statutory meaning, Ms. Stanley and the dissent offer several replies. They begin by sug- gesting that we should interpret § 12112(a)'s “qualifed indi- vidual” requirement as imposing only a “conditional man- date.” Brief for Petitioner 28; post, at 87–88 (opinion of Jackson, J.). As Ms. Stanley and the dissent see it, if a plaintiff claims discrimination with respect to a job she seeks or holds, then she must show that she is able to perform that job's essential functions. Brief for Petitioner 28. But if the plaintiff neither holds nor desires a job, the argument goes, then she must make no such showing. In that case, the plaintiff is necessarily a “qualifed individual,” because it is impossible for someone to be unqualifed for a nonexistent position. Id., at 40. Through this series of steps, we are Page Proof Pending Publication asked to conclude, every retiree is a “qualifed individual.” As easy as it may be to imagine a statute like the one Ms. Stanley and the dissent outline, it bears scant resemblance to the one Congress enacted. Title I might have said, for example, that a qualifed individual is one who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position, if any, that such individual holds or desires.” See Brief for Cham- ber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 9. But nothing like that italicized language appears in § 12112(a). And even supposing Ms. Stanley's conditional- mandate theory were a textually permissible way to under- stand the statute, we do not usually pick a conceivable-but- 1 After Cleveland, Congress amended the ADA so that it no longer requires a plaintiff to show that she was a qualifed individual “ `with a disability' ” at the time of the defendant's discrimination. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 3557 (emphasis added). But this change in statutory directions does nothing to call into question Cleve- land's insight that a plaintiff must plead and prove that she was a “quali- fed individual” when the defendant's discrimination took place. 56 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of the Court convoluted interpretation over the ordinary one. Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 277 (2018); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15 (Ms. Stanley acknowledging that her reading may “not [be] the most intuitive” one). Separately, Ms. Stanley attempts a surplusage argument. Brief for Petitioner 32–33, 46. She contends that our inter- pretation of “qualifed individual” would render meaningless part of § 12112(b)(5)(A), which defnes discrimination to in- clude the failure to reasonably accommodate “an otherwise qualifed individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee.” (Emphasis added.) After all, Ms. Stanley suggests, if every “qualifed individual” holds or desires a job, then § 12112(b)(5)(A)'s reference to “applicant or em- ployee” performs no real work. To avoid that outcome, she submits, the class of qualifed individuals must include retirees. Diffculties attend this argument as well. To start, our Page Proof Pending Publication reading of “qualifed individual” may still leave work for “applicant or employee” to perform in § 12112(b)(5)(A). It might be, for example, that the phrase “applicant or em- ployee” narrows the provision, so that it does not refer to a “nonapplicant” who desires but does not apply for a job. Cf. Davoll v. Webb, 194 F. 3d 1116, 1132 (CA10 1999); Daugherty v. El Paso, 56 F. 3d 695, 699 (CA5 1995). But even if the phrase “applicant or employee” is redundant, serving only to underscore that § 12112(b)(5)(A) extends beyond existing employees to those seeking work, “[t]he canon against sur- plusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013). And it certainly does not require us to favor “an unusual meaning that will avoid sur- plusage” over a more natural one. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 176. Perhaps sensing that Title I's defnition of “qualifed indi- vidual” goes against them, Ms. Stanley and the dissent next effectively ask us to strike it from the statute. As they point out, Title I allows “any person alleging discrimination Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 57 Opinion of the Court on the basis of disability” to sue. § 12117(a). And a plaintiff may fle that suit whenever she “is affected by” discrimina- tion. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Finally, such suits can challenge discriminatory “compensation.” § 12112(a); see Brief for Petitioner 21. Putting this all together, Ms. Stanley and the dissent reason, this case checks all the boxes: Ms. Stanley is a “person” suing about discriminatory “compensation” that “affected” her during retirement. And that is all Title I re- quires—making “the `qualifed individual' language . . . largely beside the point.” Id., at 21; see post, at 95–96 (opin- ion of Jackson, J.). This argument misapprehends the nature of Title I's pro- tections. It may be that “retirement benefts are `compen- sation' protected by the Act.” Brief for Petitioner 21. No one before us disputes that point. But § 12112(a) does not protect “compensation” as such. Instead, it bars employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation.” (Empha- Page Proof Pending Publication sis added.) In other words, the statute protects people, not benefts, from discrimination. And the statute also tells us who those people are: qualifed individuals, those who hold or seek a job at the time of the defendant's alleged discrimi- nation. § 12111(8). So rather than resolve anything, this argument takes us right back to where we started.2 Failing all else, Ms. Stanley and the dissent ask us to look beyond text and precedent. Brief for Petitioner 29, 47; post, at 92–93 (opinion of Jackson, J.). Finding “pure textualism” insuffciently pliable to secure the result they seek, they in- voke the statute's “primary purpose” and “legislative his- 2 Seeking to downplay § 12111(8)'s defnition of “qualifed individual” in yet another way, the dissent suggests it does not “make any sense” to think Congress used that “provision to moonlight as . . . a temporal re- striction” on antidiscrimination protections. Post, at 90–91 (opinion of Jackson, J.). But § 12111(8)'s express terms can hardly be so casually dismissed. Their day job is to work together with § 12112(a) to defne the reach of Title I's protections. 58 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of the Court tory.” Post, at 75, 89–90, 96. As they see it, the ADA's goal of eradicating disability-based discrimination would be best served by a decision extending Title I's protections beyond those who hold or seek a job to retirees. But this submission falters, too. For one thing, and as this Court has “emphasized many times,” what Congress (possibly) expected matters much less than what it (cer- tainly) enacted. Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 346 (2022). Nobody disputes the ADA's stated ambition to root out “discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” § 12101(b)(1). But it is “quite mistaken to assume . . . that any interpretation of a law that does more to advance a stat- ute's putative goal must be the law.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U. S. 142, 150 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Legislation is, after all, the art of compro- mise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the price of passage, and no statute yet known pursues its stated purpose at all costs.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Page Proof Pending Publication Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly, this Court has long recog- nized that the “textual limitations upon a law's scope” must be understood as “no less a part of its purpose than its sub- stantive authorizations.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 252 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). For another, we cannot say Title I's textual limitations necessarily clash with the ADA's broader purposes. One court of appeals, for example, has predicted that judicial in- novations extending § 12112(a)'s protections to retirees might “create perverse incentives” by encouraging employers to reduce retirement healthcare benefts for people with disabil- ities. Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co. and AFL-CIO-CLC, 268 F. 3d 456, 458 (CA7 2001). See how that dynamic might play out in this case. The 24-month health-insurance beneft at issue here bridges the typical gap between disability retirement and the start of Medicare eligibility. Brief for Respondent 7 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 426(b)(2)(A)); see Becerra v. Empire Health Foun- Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 59 Opinion of the Court dation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center, 597 U. S. 424, 428 (2022). Responding to a decision holding that § 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees, the City might simply delete any reference to disability from its retirement policy to ensure that it contains no “disability-based distinc- tion.” Complaint ¶30. The result? Anyone who served 25 years would get subsidized health insurance. Everyone else, regardless of disability, would get nothing. Cf. App. 42–44. Whether adopting Ms. Stanley's and the dissent's view of the statute would encourage outcomes like that is anyone's guess. But the possibility underscores why Congress's deci- sion to limit the scope of Title I's antidiscrimination provi- sion is not necessarily at war with the ADA's broader aims. Nor, of course, do the law's present limitations preclude fu- ture legislation from going further. If Congress wishes to extend Title I to reach retirees like Ms. Stanley, it can. But the decision whether to do so lies with that body, not this Page Proof Pending Publication one. See, e. g., National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U. S. 356, 382 (2023) (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). For another thing yet, other avenues may exist for retirees like Ms. Stanley to seek relief. As her own complaint sug- gests (but the dissent neglects), a variety of other laws be- sides Title I of the ADA may protect retirees from discrimi- nation with respect to postemployment benefts. Complaint ¶1 (alleging claims under state law and the Rehabilitation Act, and an equal protection claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983); see also Brief for Local Government Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14 (discussing state-law remedies); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F. 3d 1104, 1112 (CA9 2000) (discussing other potential reme- dies). As we discuss below, too, even Title I, with its “quali- fed individual” limitation, may reach many claims involving discrimination with respect to retirement benefts.3 3 In a fnal line of attack, the dissent criticizes us for “reach[ing] out” to decide whether the ADA addresses discrimination against retirees who neither hold nor desire a job. Post, at 98–99 (opinion of Jackson, J.). But 60 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Gorsuch, J. III We took this case to resolve a circuit split over whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “quali- fed individual” under Title I. In her merits briefng, Ms. Stanley invites us to address not just that question but an- other one, too. Even if § 12112(a) protects only those who hold or seek a job when a challenged act of discrimination occurs, she says, we should decide whether her complaint satisfes that standard. The government, as amicus, joins in this request. See Brief for United States as Amicus Cu- riae 26–28. Ordinarily, of course, this Court rejects at- tempts to inject “an entirely new question at the merits stage.” Post, at 71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con- curring in judgment). But we fnd it proftable to make an exception in this case, for while taking up Ms. Stanley's addi- tional question reveals some problems with her pleading, it also highlights how Title I might provide relief for retirees Page Proof Pending Publication like her. In addressing this additional question, we take as given the Court's holding above that a plaintiff pursuing a claim under § 12112(a) must plead and prove that she held or here is the truth of it. Ms. Stanley petitioned this Court for certiorari, asking us to resolve a “long-running” circuit split concerning whether an individual who “no longer holds or seeks to hold” a job may sue under the Title I “for discrimination that harms her post-employment.” Pet. for Cert. 15. After we granted her petition, Ms. Stanley renewed her argu- ment that she had suffered actionable postemployment discrimination. Brief for Petitioner 24, 47. The City disagreed. Brief for Respondent 27–36. There is nothing remarkable about this Court resolving that dis- pute and the question presented. To be sure, after we granted review, Ms. Stanley's merits briefs sought to inject an additional issue into the case, now arguing that she also suffered discrimination “while she was still employed.” Post, at 66 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur- ring in judgment). But to suggest that the case before us does not in- volve a postemployment discrimination, and that the Court “reaches out” to issue an “ `advisory opinio[n]' ” on the subject, ignores both why we took this case and the arguments of the parties before us. Post, at 76, 84, 98– 99 (opinion of Jackson, J.). Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 61 Opinion of Gorsuch, J. sought a job when the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of disability. We take as given, too, that unlaw- ful discrimination can take place at any one of three points in time: When a defendant “adopt[s]” a “discriminatory . . . practice,” when an individual “is affected by application of a discriminatory . . . practice,” or when she “becomes subject to” such a practice. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). With all that in mind, we turn to consider whether Ms. Stanley's pleading states a claim. Start with the frst option. Unlawful discrimination oc- curs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Here, Ms. Stanley alleges that happened in 2003, when the City revised its health-insurance policy for employees who retire because of disability. Complaint ¶¶ 20–21. At that point, her allega- tions show, she was a “qualifed individual,” working as a frefghter and able to perform the job's essential functions. Page Proof Pending Publication See id., ¶¶ 13–15. The trouble for Ms. Stanley is that § 12112(a) does not pro- hibit disability-based discrimination in the abstract. In- stead, it bars an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) “ `Discriminate against' means treat worse,” Muld- row v. St. Louis, 601 U. S. 346, 355 (2024), and “refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals,” Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 59 (2006). And Ms. Stanley's complaint provides no basis for inferring that the City's policy injured her in 2003. To the contrary, her complaint suggests that, when the City frst issued its policy, she was not disabled and still expected to complete 25 years of service. See Complaint ¶ 15; see also Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002 (CA11), p. 22, n. 5 (Ms. Stanley representing that she was “unaffected by” the City's actions as of 2003). So the frst option is off the table for Ms. Stanley. Even so, it may be available to others who hap- pen to be retired at the time they sue, if they can plead and 62 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Gorsuch, J. prove they were both disabled and “qualifed” when their employer adopted a discriminatory retirement-benefits policy.4 Turn next to the second option. Unlawful discrimination also occurs “when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Ms. Stanley alleges that happened to her in 2020, when her subsidized health insurance ran out. Complaint ¶ 26; see also Brief for Petitioner 24 (Ms. Stanley was “ `affected by application of ' the policy” in “2020 when . . . she was denied the health care subsidy”); 83 F. 4th, at 1343. By then, however, she had been retired for two years, could not satisfy the “requirements of ” her job, and was not seeking employment. Complaint ¶ 16. So this option, too, cannot help Ms. Stanley. But, once more, it might help oth- ers who can show that they were affected by a policy change while they were “qualifed individuals,” even if they happen to be retired by the time they bring suit. Page Proof Pending Publication Now turn to the third option. Unlawful discrimination takes place when “an individual becomes subject to a dis- criminatory compensation decision or other practice. ” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). This option might be especially promis- ing for plaintiffs in Ms. Stanley's shoes. But, for reasons that take a little unpacking, it cannot form a basis for revers- ing the Eleventh Circuit's judgment in this particular case. 4 To be clear, not every Title I plaintiff must plead and prove she had a disability when she suffered discrimination. As we have seen, § 12112(a) in its present form prohibits discrimination “against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) That provision does not require a qualifed individual to be disabled. So, for instance, Title I de- fnes discrimination “on the basis of disability” to include associational discrimination—that is, discriminating against a qualifed individual “be- cause of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualifed individual is known to have a relationship or association.” § 12112(b)(4). In such cases, it does not matter whether the qualifed individual also happened to have a disability. The diffculty for Ms. Stanley, however, is that her complaint does not allege anything along those lines either. Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 63 Opinion of Gorsuch, J. Recall that Ms. Stanley's complaint does not allege what her disability is or when it emerged. As it happens, those facts came out later, after the district court dismissed her ADA claim, and after the parties proceeded to discovery and summary judgment on the remaining counts of her com- plaint. From this later-developed record, it appears that Ms. Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 2016. 83 F. 4th, at 1336. The government argues that these later-developed facts are suffcient to state a claim. After all, during the 2-year period between her diagnosis in 2016 and her retirement in 2018, Ms. Stanley was both “an individual with a disability” and a “qualifed individual” who “could still perform the es- sential functions of her job.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–27. During that critical window, too, the government submits, Ms. Stanley was “subject to” an “alleg- edly discriminatory benefts policy” that reduced her future Page Proof Pending Publication retirement compensation. Id., at 26; see also Brief for Peti- tioner 25–26; post, at 79–80 (Jackson, J., dissenting). As promising as that theory may be, however, a number of case-specifc problems prevent it from helping Ms. Stanley here. For starters, because this dispute comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we cannot look beyond the pleadings. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d). And her complaint says nothing about the timing or nature of her diagnosis, nor does it allege that she worked for any period of time with a dis- ability. To be sure, a court might, with a little more, draw a “plausible inference” that Ms. Stanley suffered discrimina- tion between 2016 and 2018. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 682 (2009). So, for instance, if she had alleged that she developed Parkinson's disease before 2018, or that she worked for any period with some disability, then her case could likely proceed. But the complaint before us does not contain any of those facts. Even assuming we could overcome that problem, we would only face another. The Eleventh Circuit held that Ms. Stan- 64 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Gorsuch, J. ley had affrmatively disavowed the government's theory. For support, the court pointed to Ms. Stanley's representa- tion in her brief below that she did “not claim she was im- pacted by the discriminatory” City policy “during her em- ployment.” Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002, at 22. To be sure, at oral argument Ms. Stanley told the court of ap- peals otherwise. Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 22–10002 (CA11, Aug. 24, 2023), at 2:45–2:58. And she attempted to adopt an amicus brief the government submitted to the Eleventh Circuit, advancing a theory much like the one it presses here. See Brief for United States as Amicus Cu- riae in No. 22–10002 (CA11), pp. 11–12. But applying its own rules of argument preservation, the Eleventh Circuit declined to pass on the government's theory because Ms. Stanley had not presented it to the district court and had “specifcally disclaimed” it in her “own brief ” on appeal. 83 F. 4th, at 1344.5 Complicating matters further yet, Ms. Stanley has not ex- Page Proof Pending Publication pressly asked us to address the Eleventh Circuit's preserva- tion rules. Nor has she asked us to reconsider our own gen- eral practice of allowing the courts of appeals to determine for themselves what arguments they deem properly before them. See, e. g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 487 (2008); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976); cf. Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 589 U. S. 49, 52– 53 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court of Appeals may of course determine that under its usual rules of waiver or forfeiture, it will not consider those arguments”). So even if Ms. Stanley's complaint contained suffcient facts to 5 While Ms. Stanley disclaimed being “impacted” by the City's policy during her employment, Justice Jackson believes that Ms. Stanley some- how still preserved the government's theory that she was “subject to” discrimination before she retired. Post, at 80–81. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not see it that way. Nor does the dissent explain how, con- sistent with Article III, an individual can challenge a policy that she is “subject to” but that does not injure (or “impact”) her. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25, n. 5 (acknowledging the injury requirement). Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 65 Opinion of the Court sustain the theory the government now advances, and even if she had preserved that theory below, we would still face serious obstacles to reaching it. In saying as much, we stress that nothing we say today prevents future plaintiffs—or perhaps even Ms. Stanley her- self in a future proceeding—from pursuing a theory along the lines the government proposes. It is simply that the theory cannot help Ms. Stanley in the present posture of this case.6 * To sum up, we hold that, to prevail under § 12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without rea- sonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination. A variety of suits in- volving retirement benefts might well proceed under that rule. But, given how this particular case comes to us, we Page Proof Pending Publication cannot say that the court of appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of Ms. Stanley's complaint. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is affrmed. It is so ordered. 6 One Member of the Court suggests that the government's theory can save Ms. Stanley's complaint because it “supplies the answer” to this case. Post, at 79 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But to proceed as Justice Jackson suggests, we would have to abandon our precedents generally entrusting questions of issue and argument preservation to the courts of appeals. We would have to overrule the Eleventh Circuit's waiver ruling without an express invitation to do so. See post, at 75 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And we would have to fault the Eleventh Circuit for failing to consider facts outside the pleading before it. All to address a question that no court passed on below and that we did not take this case to resolve. The dissent may be willing to blow past all those complications to reach its chosen destination. But we do not see how we might. Indeed, we have already gone out of our way—too far, some of our colleagues would say, see post, at 71–73 (opin- ion of Thomas, J.)—to address Ms. Stanley's late-raised argument in order to help future plaintiffs understand how they might avoid her missteps. 66 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Thomas, J. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Barrett joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I write sepa- rately to express my concern with the increasingly common practice of litigants urging this Court to grant certiorari to resolve one question, and then, after we do so, pivoting to an entirely different question. This case exemplifes the prob- lem. We granted review to resolve a Circuit split regarding whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) permits suits by former employees who are no longer able to perform the essential functions of their jobs at the time of the alleged discrimination. For the frst time at the merits stage, peti- tioner Karyn Stanley urged us to decide a different question: whether Stanley could sue based on discrimination that oc- curred while she was still employed and able to work. But, that theory of liability was not passed upon below because the Eleventh Circuit determined that Stanley had disavowed Page Proof Pending Publication it, and Stanley did not seek review of the Eleventh Circuit's issue-preservation ruling. We ordinarily respect a lower court's application of its own preservation rules. I therefore would not opine on the additional question that Stanley raised for the frst time in earnest at the merits stage. I The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating “against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in regard to [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employ- ment.” 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statute defnes a “ `qual- ifed individual' ” as someone who, “with or without reason- able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or de- sires.” § 12111(8). Stanley began working as a frefghter for the city of San- ford, Florida (City), in 1999. In 2016, Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease. And, in 2018, after 19 years of Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 67 Opinion of Thomas, J. service, that “disability forced her to retire” early. Com- plaint in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 16. When she retired, Stanley expected to continue receiving the City's health insurance subsidy until she turned 65. At the time of her hiring, the City's policy had been to pay a subsidy until age 65 to employees who retired after 25 years of service, as well as to employees who retired early because of disability. But, unbeknownst to Stanley, the City had changed its policy in 2003. Starting in 2003, the City paid the full subsidy for retirees with 25 years of service, but for those who retired earlier due to disability, it provided the subsidy for a maximum of 24 months. Stanley sued the City, alleging discrimination under the ADA. The District Court understood Stanley to have al- leged harm caused by discrimination that occurred after her retirement. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a–25a. In ruling on the City's motion to dismiss, the District Court explained Page Proof Pending Publication that to recover under the ADA, an individual must be a “qualifed individual” at the time of the alleged discrimina- tion. Id., at 24a. The District Court determined that Stan- ley was not a “qualifed individual” after her retirement be- cause she was not someone who could, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” “perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or de- sires.” § 12111(8); see id., at 26a. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed her claim. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed, reasoning that the ADA “does not protect people who nei- ther held nor desired a job with the defendant at the time of discrimination.” 83 F. 4th 1333, 1341 (2023). In her petition for a writ of certiorari before this Court, Stanley asked us to resolve an “important and recurring question”: whether an individual who no longer “ `holds or desires' ” his job may sue under Title I of the ADA for dis- crimination with respect to the “ `post-employment distribu- tion of fringe benefts.' ” Pet. for Cert. 1. In other words, 68 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Thomas, J. Stanley asked us to decide whether former employees who suffer postemployment discrimination can sue under the ADA. Id., at 15. Stanley mentioned over two dozen times in her petition that this question has divided the courts of appeals. In two Circuits, Stanley explained, a plaintiff need not be a “quali- fed individual”—that is, someone who “holds or desires” the employment position at issue—at the time of the alleged dis- crimination. Id., at 16–18; § 12111(8). In four other Cir- cuits, however, a plaintiff “must be a qualifed individual at the time that one is discriminated against to have the right to sue under the ADA.” Id., at 18–20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stanley emphasized that this Circuit split was “dispositive” in her case, as her suit was “stymied by the Eleventh Circuit's determination that she wasn't a `qualifed individual' at the time of the discrimination.” Id., at 3 (em- phasis added). Stanley described the Circuit split as “ `in- Page Proof Pending Publication tractable,' ” “deep,” “well-recognized,” and “persistent.” Id., at 15, 21. She also conveyed a sense of urgency, tell- ing us that the Circuit split is “growing,” and unlikely to be resolved without “this Court's intervention.” Id., at 21. Stanley's emphasis on the Circuit split was understand- able, as it is no secret that Circuit splits get our attention. See this Court's Rule 10(a) (conveying that one of our leading considerations in deciding whether to grant certiorari is whether “a United States court of appeals has entered a deci- sion” that conficts with “the decision of another United States court of appeals”); see also S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Prac- tice § 4.4, p. 4–11 (11th ed. 2019) (“The Supreme Court often . . . will grant certiorari where the decision of a federal court of appeals . . . is in direct confict with a decision of another court of appeals on the same matter of federal law” (empha- sis deleted)). Stanley also emphasized in her petition that the question dividing the courts of appeals is one of “obvious importance.” Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 69 Opinion of Thomas, J. Pet. for Cert. 33. She conveyed that “[t]he circuit split mat- ters for the forty-four million Americans with disabilities whose rights under the ADA, until the split is resolved, may depend on their employers' zip codes.” Id., at 30. “[T]he persistence of the circuit split,” she told us, “means that dis- abled former employees only in certain parts of the country can vindicate their rights under the ADA.” Id., at 30–31. Stanley further assured us that this case would be a good one for resolving the Circuit split. She told us that her case “cleanly tees the issue up for this Court's resolution as a pure question of law with no relevant factual disputes.” Id., at 3. She reiterated that point in her reply brief at the certiorari stage, telling us that “[t]his case is a clean vehicle with no impediments” to settling the Circuit confict once and for all. Reply to Brief in Opposition 6. We granted certiorari, adopting the question presented as framed by Stanley.1 602 U. S. 1038 (2024). I understood us to have taken the case to resolve the question that the “cir- Page Proof Pending Publication cuits are split over”—that is, whether the ADA permits suits by former employees who no longer hold or desire their job at the time the defendant engages in a discriminatory act. Pet. for Cert. 15 (boldface deleted); § 12111(8). The Elev- enth Circuit's position on that question was the basis for its ruling against Stanley below, see 83 F. 4th, at 1341, and Stan- ley had asked us to take this case to resolve precisely that question. But, something changed after this Court granted certio- rari. In her opening brief on the merits, Stanley told us that we “need not even reach the court of appeals' erroneous holding that the [ADA] only prohibits discrimination against people who currently `hol[d] or desir[e]' a job.” Brief for 1 The question presented reads in full: “Under the Americans with Disa- bilities Act, does a former employee—who was qualifed to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefts while employed—lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefts solely be- cause she no longer holds her job?” Pet. for Cert. i. 70 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Thomas, J. Petitioner 17. In other words, according to Stanley, we need not resolve the issue that the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit had decided. Instead, Stanley urged, we should decide a materially different question: whether Stan- ley could base her ADA claim on discrimination that alleg- edly occurred while she was still employed by the City. Specifcally, Stanley contends that she suffered discrimina- tion at some point after she was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 2016 but before she retired in 2018. Because Stanley held and desired to hold her job during this period, all agree that she was a “ `qualifed individual' ” for at least some portion of that time. § 12111(8). The Eleventh Circuit did not opine on the merits of this theory because it determined that Stanley had expressly dis- avowed it in her brief before that court. 83 F. 4th, at 1344 (explaining that Stanley “affrmatively conceded” in her ini- tial brief that she did not suffer discrimination at any point “ `during her employment' ”). The court acknowledged that Page Proof Pending Publication Stanley had attempted to raise this theory at oral argument. Id., at 1343. And, the court acknowledged that the United States had raised this theory in its brief as amicus curiae, and that Stanley had attempted to adopt that amicus argu- ment. Id., at 1344. But, applying its issue-preservation rules, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Stanley had not properly presented this alternative theory. Id., at 1343– 1344. For the frst time in her opening merits brief before this Court, Stanley asked us to reconsider the Eleventh Circuit's application of its rules. She argued that “[n]othing supports the assertion” that she conceded her alternative theory below. Brief for Petitioner 24. In her view, she “repeat- edly argued” in her Eleventh Circuit brief that she suffered discrimination while employed by the City. Id., at 24–25.2 2 Appearing as amicus curiae in support of Stanley, the United States endorsed Stanley's new approach to this case. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–28. Like Stanley, the United States took issue with Cite as: 606 U. S. 46 (2025) 71 Opinion of Thomas, J. As I see it, Stanley's conduct amounts to a bait-and-switch. She urged this Court to grant certiorari to resolve a Circuit split on one specifc legal question. After we agreed to re- solve that question, she redirected us to a materially differ- ent question. Ante, at 60 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that “[w]e took this case to resolve a circuit split,” but Stan- ley invites us to address “another” question). II I do not join Part III of the Court's opinion because I would not opine on the merits of a new theory that Stanley did not develop at the certiorari stage. Redirecting this Court's focus to an entirely new question at the merits stage is diffcult to square with this Court's Rules. Our Rule 14.1 requires a petitioner to set forth the questions it would like this Court to decide in the petition for a writ of certiorari. “Only the questions set out in the Page Proof Pending Publication petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.” Rule 14.1(a). Thus, our rules prevent us from reaching any question that is not “ `fairly included' ” in the question presented. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 31 (1993) (per curiam).3 Redirecting our focus to a different question is also highly disruptive to our deliberative process, as it often leads to a the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that Stanley had “ `disclaimed' ” her al- ternative theory of liability below. Id., at 27. And, like Stanley, the United States urged us to focus on Stanley's new theory of liability, rather than the one the Eleventh Circuit addressed. Id., at 28–29. 3 To be sure, when read in isolation, the question presented on page i of Stanley's petition might be read to include the question whether Stanley could base an ADA claim on discrimination that allegedly occurred while she was still employed. But, when read in the context of the petition as a whole, it is clear that Stanley was asking us to resolve the Circuit split she repeatedly identifed: whether an employee who is no longer a “quali- fed individual” under the ADA may sue for “discrimination that harms her post-employment.” Pet. for Cert. 15 (emphasis added). 72 STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD Opinion of Thomas, J. lack of adversarial briefng. We take seriously the need for adversarial briefng. For example, when no party defends the judgment below, we ordinarily appoint counsel to offer argument and briefng in support of that judgment. E. g., Martin v. United States, 605 U. S. 395 (2025). The absence of briefng on the legal issue before us may complicate or even thwart our efforts to resolve it. See, e. g., City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 610 (2015) (dismissing a question presented as improvidently granted in part due to a lack of “adversarial briefng”). Moreover, redirecting our focus to a different question has the effect of undermining this Court's efforts to manage its merits docket. We receive thousands of petitions each year, and the vast majority of those petitions raise issues of deep importance to the parties involved in those cases. “To use our resources most effciently,” we must confne our review to “those cases that will enable us to resolve particularly Page Proof Pending Publication important questions.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 536 (1992); accord, U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S., at 33. If we were “to entertain questions not presented in the petition for certiorari, much of this effciency would vanish, as parties who feared an inability to prevail on the question presented