Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton (606 U.S. 461, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 2 Pages 461–521 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 27, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 461 Syllabus FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., et al. v. PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 23–1122. Argued January 15, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025 Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain commer- cial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to mi- nors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations subject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties. Petitioners—representatives of the pornography industry—sued the Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed H. B. Page Proof Pending Publication 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors.” 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271. It therefore determined that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scru- tiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. Pp. 470–499. (a) H. B. 1181 is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 470–495. (1) To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the First Amendment, the Court considers both the nature of the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Laws that target protected speech “based on its communicative content” “are pre- sumptively unconstitutional and may be justifed only if ” they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163. Laws that only incidentally burden protected speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642. And laws that restrict only unprotected speech, such as obscenity, re- ceive rational-basis review. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468. History, tradition, and precedent establish that sexual content that is obscene to minors but not to adults is protected in part and unprotected in part. States may prevent minors from accessing such content, Gins- 462 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Syllabus berg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 637–638, but may not prevent adults from doing the same, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383. Pp. 470–477. (2) H. B. 1181 has only an incidental effect on protected speech, and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States' traditional power to prevent minors from ac- cessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. That power in- cludes the power to require proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It follows that no person—adult or child—has a First Amendment right to access such speech without frst submitting proof of age. The power to verify age is part of the power to prevent children from accessing speech that is obscene to them. Where the Constitution reserves a power to the States, that power includes “the ordinary and appropriate means” of exercising it. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 430, pp. 412–413. Requiring proof of age is an ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing an age-based limit on obscenity to minors. Age verifcation is common when laws draw age-based lines, e. g., obtaining alcohol, a frearm, or a driver's license. Obscenity is no exception. Most States require age verifca- tion for in-person purchases of sexual material, and petitioners concede that in-person requirements of this kind are “traditional” and “almost Page Proof Pending Publication surely” constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. And as a practical matter, age-verifcation is necessary for an effective prohibition on minors ac- cessing age-inappropriate sexual content, especially on the internet. Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access content that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regulate adults' protected speech. Adults have the right to access speech obscene only to minors, see Butler, 352 U. S., at 383–384, and submitting to age verifcation bur- dens the exercise of that right. But adults have no First Amendment right to avoid age verifcation. Any burden on adults is therefore inci- dental to regulating activity not protected by the First Amendment. This makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard under the Court's precedents. Pp. 477–483. (3) Applying the more demanding standard of strict scrutiny would call into question all age-verifcation requirements, even longstanding in-person requirements. Although petitioners insist that traditional in- person requirements would survive strict scrutiny, the Court cannot share their confdence. Strict scrutiny is designed to enforce the First Amendment's prohibition on content-based laws, and it succeeds in that purpose only if, as a practical matter, it is almost always fatal in fact. Strict scrutiny is not the appropriate standard for laws that are tradi- tional and widely accepted as legitimate. Pp. 483–485. Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 463 Syllabus (4) Precedent does not call for the application of strict scrutiny. The Court's decisions applying strict scrutiny in this context all involved laws that banned both minors and adults from accessing speech that was at most obscene only to minors. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126; United States v. Playboy En- tertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 808, 811, 814; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 868, 876; Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 665. The Court has never before considered whether the more modest burden of an age-verifcation re- quirement triggers strict scrutiny. Pp. 485–491. (5) Texas contends that only rational-basis review applies. This position fails to account for the incidental burden that age verifcation necessarily has on an adult's First Amendment right to access speech obscene only to minors. Although deferential, intermediate scrutiny plays an important role in ensuring that legislatures do not use ostensi- bly legitimate purposes to disguise efforts to suppress fundamental rights. P. 495. (b) H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, Page Proof Pending Publication 520 U. S. 180, 189. Pp. 495–499. (1) H. B. 1181 furthers Texas's important interest in shielding chil- dren from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that interest. States have long used age-verifcation requirements to reconcile their interest in protecting children from sexual material with adults' right to avail themselves of such material. H. B. 1181 simply adapts this traditional approach to the digital age. The specifc verifcation meth- ods that H. B. 1181 permits—government-issued identification and transactional data—are also plainly legitimate. Both are established methods of verifying age already in use by many pornographic websites and other industries with age-restricted services. Pp. 496–497. (2) Petitioners' counterarguments are unpersuasive. Petitioners object that other means of protecting children are more effective and that children are likely to encounter sexually explicit content on other websites subject to H. B. 1181's requirements. But intermediate scru- tiny does not require States to adopt the least restrictive means of pur- suing their interests, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 800, or avoid all underinclusiveness, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. 56, 76. Pp. 497–499. 95 F. 4th 263, affrmed. 464 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Syllabus Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 500. Derek L. Shaffer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Christopher G. Michel, Rachel G. Frank, Michael T. Zeller, Vera Eidelman, Brian Hauss, Ben Wizner, Cecillia D. Wang, and David D. Cole. Principal Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae supporting va- catur. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelo- gar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Kevin J. Barber, Charles W. Scarborough, and Steven H. Hazel. Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Ken Paxton, Attorney General, pro se, Lanora C. Pettit, Princi- pal Deputy Solicitor General, Beth Klusmann, Assistant Page Proof Pending Publication Solicitor General, Eric Abels and John Ramsey, Assistant Attorneys General, and Brent Webster, First Assistant At- torney General.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for American Book- sellers for Free Expression et al. by Kenneth A. Bamberger; for the Cato Institute by Thomas A. Berry and Brent Skorup; for the Electronic Fron- tier Foundation et al. by Aaron Mackey, Elizabeth Femia, David Greene, Corbin K. Barthold, Lawrence G. Walters, Corey D. Silverstein, and Kevin S. Toll; for the Institute for Justice by Paul M. Sherman and Anya Bid- well; for the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children by Amer S. Ahmed, Jillian London, and Daniel R. Adler; for Internet Law Professors by Ronan P. Doherty; and for the National Coalition Against Censorship et al. by Lisa S. Blatt, Charles L. McCloud, and Lee Rowland. Alan Butler fled a brief for the Electronic Privacy Information Center as amicus curiae urging vacatur. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Ohio et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, and Katie Rose Talley, Deputy Solicitor General, by Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Barta, Solicitor General, and Jenna M. Lorence, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 465 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Texas, like many States, prohibits the distribution of sexu- ally explicit content to children. Tex. Penal Code Ann. General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Flor- ida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Mis- souri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Gent- ner Drummond of Oklahoma, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason Miyares of Virginia, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for the Age Verifcation Providers Associa- tion by Aaron M. Streett and Brenton H. Cooper; for the Alliance Defend- ing Freedom by James A. Campbell, John J. Bursch, and Cody S. Barnett; for the American Principles Project by Theodore M. Cooperstein and Craig L. Parshall; for Citizens Defending Freedom by Erin Elizabeth Mersino and Robert J. Muise; for the Council on Pornography Reform et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, J. Mark Brewer, and Page Proof Pending Publication Patrick M. McSweeney; for Major Religious Organizations by Gene C. Schaerr, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, Thomas R. Lee, and R. Shawn Gunnarson; for the Manhattan Institute for Policy Re- search et al. by Jonathan Berry, James R. Conde, Ilya Shapiro, and John Ketcham; for the Matthew XVIII Group et al. by Mary E. McAlister and Vernadette R. Broyles; for Members of the Texas Senate by Peter A. Gen- tala, Benjamin W. Bull, and Christen M. Price; for the Minnesota Family Council et al. by Renee K. Carlson and Brittany M. Jones; for Scholars of the First Amendment by D. Adam Candeub; for Scholars on the Neurolog- ical Effects of Pornography on Adolescents by John C. Sullivan; for State Legislators et al. by Trey Dellinger; for Them Before Us by Benjamin M. Flowers; for the Women's Liberation Front by Elspeth B. Cypher; for Sen. Mike Lee et al. by William P. Barr, Patrick F. Philbin, and Chase Har- rington; for Clare Morell et al. by Eric N. Kniffn and Rachel N. Mor- rison; for Heidi Olson by Jeffrey A. Wald; and for Laurie Schlegel by Scott L. Sternberg. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American Foundation for Ad- diction Research et al. by Daniel R. Suhr; for Atsign, Inc., by Derek T. Ho and Matthew D. Reade; for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. by Andrew S. Bruns and Amos J. B. Espeland; for the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission et al. by S. Chad Meredith and Trevor Pir- ouz Kehrer; for Exodus Cry et al. by Aaron T. Martin; for First Amend- 466 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court § 43.24(b) (West 2016). But, although that prohibition may be effective against brick-and-mortar stores, it has proved challenging to enforce against online content. In an effort to address this problem, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 129B.001 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 2024), which requires certain commercial websites that pub- lish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of their visi- tors. This requirement furthers the lawful end of prevent- ing children from accessing sexually explicit content. But, it also burdens adult visitors of these websites, who all agree have a First Amendment right to access at least some of the content that the websites publish. We granted certiorari to decide whether these burdens likely render H. B. 1181 un- constitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. We hold that they do not. The power to re- quire age verifcation is within a State's authority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content. H. B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of that Page Proof Pending Publication authority. I A In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a law requiring porno- graphic websites to verify that their users are adults. H. B. 1181's sponsors proposed the law to address their concern that the internet makes too accessible to minors “hardcore pornographic content and videos,” many of which depict “sexual violence, incest, physical aggression, sexual assault, non-consent, and teens.” App. 254–255. According to the sponsors, such pornography is “addictive,” has harmful “de- ment Scholars by Jennifer Safstrom; for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression et al. by Robert Corn-Revere and Ronald G. Lon- don; for Jaco Booyens Ministries (JBM) et al. by Lawrence B. Shallcross; for the Justice Defense Fund by Michael S. Overing, Edward C. Wilde, and Itzel Morales; for the Reward Foundation by Joel Thayer; for Social Science Scholars by Jonathan Berry and James R. Conde; and for Yoti Ltd. by James R. Marsh. Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 467 Opinion of the Court velopmental effects on the brain,” and leads to “risky sexual behaviors.” Ibid. The Texas Legislature passed the Act with only a single opposing vote, and the Governor signed it into law. The statute applies to any “commercial entity that know- ingly and intentionally publishes or distributes material on an Internet website, . . . more than one-third of which is sexual material harmful to minors.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 129B.002(a). The statute defnes “ `[s]exual ma- terial harmful to minors' ” as material that: (1) “is designed to appeal to or pander to the prurient interest” when taken “as a whole and with respect to minors”; (2) describes, dis- plays, or depicts “in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors” various sex acts and portions of the human anat- omy, including depictions of “sexual intercourse, masturba- tion, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, fagellation, [and] ex- cretory functions”; and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientifc value for minors.” § 129B.001(6). Page Proof Pending Publication H. B. 1181 requires a covered entity to “use reasonable age verifcation methods . . . to verify that an individual attempt- ing to access the material is 18 years of age or older.” § 129B.002(a). To verify age, a covered entity must require visitors to “comply with a commercial age verifcation sys- tem” that uses “government-issued identifcation” or “a com- mercially reasonable method that relies on public or private transactional data.” § 129B.003(b)(2).1 The entity may per- form verifcation itself or through a third-party service. § 129B.003(b). 1 An entity may also verify age by requiring users to “provide digital identifcation,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 129B.003(b)(1), which is defned as “information stored on a digital network that may be accessed by a commercial entity and that serves as proof of the identity of an indi- vidual,” § 129B.003(a). The State concedes that “Texas does not yet have a state issued digital identifcation card or app.” App. 189. Petitioners maintain that no other identifcation could qualify as “digital ID” under this defnition. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. We assume without deciding that petitioners are correct. 468 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court If a commercial entity knowingly violates H. B. 1181, the Texas attorney general may sue to enjoin the violation. § 129B.006(a). The attorney general may also recover a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day that the website is noncom- pliant, as well as an additional penalty of up to $250,000 if any minors access covered sexual material as a result of the violation. § 129B.006(b). H. B. 1181 is not the only law of its kind. At least 21 other States have imposed materially similar age-verifcation requirements to access sexual material that is harmful to minors online.2 B Soon after Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a trade association for the pornography industry, a group of companies that op- erate pornographic websites, and a pornography performer sued the Texas attorney general. These plaintiffs, petition- ers here, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute as fa- Page Proof Pending Publication cially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. They alleged that adults have a right to 2 See Ala. Code § 8–19G–3(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 193 (to be codifed at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18–701(A)); Ark. Code Ann. § 4–88–1304(a) (2023); 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 42, § 2 (to be codifed at Fla. Stat. § 501.1737(2)); 2024 Ga. Laws p. 316 (to be codifed at Ga. Code Ann. § 39–5–5(b)); Idaho Code Ann. § 6–3803(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Ind. Code § 24–4–23–10 (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws p. 451 (to be codi- fed at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50–6146(a)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 436.002(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2121(A)(1) (West 2025); Miss. Code Ann. § 11–77–5(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–159(1) (2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87–1003(1) (2024); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 66–501(a) (Supp. 2024); H. B. 1561, 69th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N. D. 2025) (to be codifed at N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 51–07(2)); S. C. Code Ann. § 37–1– 310(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); H. B. 1053, 100th Leg. Sess., § 4 (S. D. 2025) (to be codifed at S. D. Codifed Laws ch. 22–24); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39– 17–912(c) (Supp. 2024); Utah Code § 78B–3–1002(1) (Supp. 2024); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01–40.5(B) (2024); 2025 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, § 1 (to be codifed at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14–3–502(a)). Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 469 Opinion of the Court access the speech covered by H. B. 1181, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them from doing so. The District Court granted petitioners a preliminary in- junction after concluding that they were likely to succeed on their claim. The court held that because H. B. 1181 “re- stricts access to speech” that is constitutionally protected for adults “based on the material's content,” it is subject to “strict scrutiny”—the onerous standard of scrutiny applica- ble to direct invasions of First Amendment rights. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 373, 391 (WD Tex. 2023). Under that standard, the law would be constitutional only if Texas could show that it “(1) serve[s] a compelling governmental interest, (2) [is] narrowly tailored to achieve it, and (3) [is] the least restrictive means of ad- vancing it.” Id., at 392. The District Court acknowledged Texas's compelling interest in preventing “a minor's access to pornography.” Ibid. But, it found that Texas had failed Page Proof Pending Publication to “show that H.B. 1181 is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.” Id., at 393. In the District Court's opinion, for example, encouraging parents to install content-fltering software on their chil- dren's devices would be a less restrictive means of accomp- lishing the State's objective. Id., at 401–404. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that petitioners were unlikely to suc- ceed on the merits. The Fifth Circuit viewed H. B. 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors,” which only incidentally implicates “the privacy of those adults” seeking to access the regulated con- tent. 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271 (2024). And, because minors have no First Amendment right to access such materials, the court held that the law was “subject only to rational-basis review”—the exceedingly deferential standard applicable to laws that do not implicate fundamental rights. Id., at 269. Applying that standard, the court concluded that H. B. 1181 470 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court survived petitioners' challenge because its “age-verifcation requirement is rationally related to the government's legiti- mate interest in preventing minors' access to pornography.” Id., at 267. Judge Higginbotham dissented in relevant part. Like the District Court, he would have applied strict scrutiny and found that Texas had failed to meet its burden under that standard. Id., at 299, 303–304 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part). Petitioners sought a stay of the Fifth Circuit's judgment, which this Court denied. 601 U. S. 1172 (2024). We granted certiorari to determine whether H. B. 1181's agever- ifcation requirement is likely constitutional on its face. 603 U. S. 904 (2024). II To determine which standard of First Amendment scru- tiny applies to Texas's age-verifcation law, we must frst re- Page Proof Pending Publication view some background principles about the First Amend- ment. Specifcally, we must focus on what the First Amendment generally protects, the extent to which it per- mits States to restrict minors' access to sexually explicit speech, and how this Court has addressed earlier laws that aimed to prevent children from viewing sexually explicit speech online. A The First Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws “abridg- ing the freedom of speech.” As “a general matter,” this pro- vision “means that government has no power to restrict ex- pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, this principle “is not absolute.” Ibid. To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the First Amendment, we must consider both the nature of Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 471 Opinion of the Court the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Our precedents distinguish between two types of restrictions on protected speech: content-based laws and content-neutral laws. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justifed only if ” they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015). That standard requires that a law be “the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 478 (2014). Content-neutral laws, on the other hand, “are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or view- points from the public dialogue.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) (citation omit- ted). Under that standard, a law will survive review “if it Page Proof Pending Publication advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 189 (1997) (Turner II). At the same time, not all speech is protected. “ `From 1791 to the present,' ” certain “ `historic and traditional cate- gories' ” of speech—such as “obscenity, defamation, fraud, in- citement, and speech integral to criminal conduct”—have been understood to fall outside the scope of the First Amend- ment. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010) (citations omitted). States generally may prohibit speech of this kind without “rais[ing] any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571–572 (1942). Such prohibitions are subject only to rational-basis review, the minimum constitutional standard that all legislation must satisfy. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, n. 27 (2008). Under that standard, a law will be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 472 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court that could provide a rational basis” for its enactment. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993). B History, tradition, and precedent recognize that States have two distinct powers to address obscenity: They may proscribe outright speech that is obscene to the public at large, and they may prevent children from accessing speech that is obscene to children. By the 18th century, English common law recognized pub- lishing obscenity as an indictable offense. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K. B. 1770); Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K. B. 1727). So too did early American decisions. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 336–337 (1821); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 100–102 (Pa. 1815); Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103, 108 (Conn. 1808). By the end of the Civil Page Proof Pending Publication War, most States had prohibited obscenity by statute, and Congress had prohibited sending obscene materials by mail. See An Act Relating to the Postal Laws § 16, 13 Stat. 507; E. Hovey, Stamping Out Smut: The Enforcement of Obscen- ity Laws, 1872–1915, p. 36 (1998). And, from the late 19th century onward, this Court has consistently recognized the government's power to proscribe obscenity. See, e. g., Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U. S. 66, 77 (2023); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957); Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 42–43 (1896). Our precedents hold that speech is obscene to the public at large—and thus proscribable—if (a) “the average person, applying contemporary community standards[,] would fnd that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in- terest”; (b) “the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifcally defned by the applicable state law”; and (c) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientifc value.” Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 473 Opinion of the Court Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Our precedents refer to this standard as “the Miller test.” Miller does not defne the totality of States' power to reg- ulate sexually explicit speech, however. In addition to their general interest in protecting the public at large, States have a specifc interest in protecting children from sexually ex- plicit speech. The earliest obscenity decisions recognized that restricting obscenity served two distinct interests— curbing the “corruption of the public mind in general,” and protecting “the manners of youth in particular.” Sharpless, 2 Serge & Rawle, at 103 (opinion of Yeates, J.); see also Holmes, 17 Mass., at 336–337 (upholding an indictment for publishing an obscene book tending to “ `the manifest corrup- tion and subversion of the youth and other good citizens of [this] Commonwealth' ”). Similarly, many early obscenity statutes targeted for special regulation works “manifestly Page Proof Pending Publication tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.” E. g., Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 160, § 19 (1840); Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 130, § 10 (1836); Mich. Rev. Stat., Pt. 4, Tit. 1, ch. 8, § 10 (1838); 1838 Terr. of Wis. Stat. § 10, p. 366; Vt. Rev. Stat., ch. 99, § 10 (1840). This trend continued through the time of the Four- teenth Amendment's ratifcation, with States routinely en- forcing statutes that punished indecent publications on the ground that they corrupted “ `the morals of youth.' ” E. g., Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182, 184 (1879); Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46, 46–47 (1878); Barker v. Common- wealth, 19 Pa. 412, 413 (1852); State v. Hanson, 23 Tex. 233, 233–234 (1859). Consistent with this history, our precedents recognize that States can impose greater limits on children's access to sexu- ally explicit speech than they can on adults' access. When regulating adult access, a State must defne obscenity from the perspective of “the average” adult, Roth, 354 U. S., at 489, and so may not prohibit adults from accessing speech 474 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court that is inappropriate only for children, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). Minors, however, have long been thought to be more susceptible to the harmful effects of sex- ually explicit content, and less able to appreciate the role it might play within a larger expressive work. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 641–643 (1968); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1105 (No. 14,571) (CC SDNY 1879). They therefore possess “a more restricted right . . . to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see.” Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637. When regulating minors' access to sexual content, the State may broaden Miller's “defnition of obscenity” to cover that which is obscene from a child's perspective. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 638. To be more precise, a State may prevent minors from accessing works that (a) taken as a whole, and under contemporary community standards, appeal to the prurient interest of minors; (b) depict or describe specifcally defned sexual conduct in a way that is patently offensive for Page Proof Pending Publication minors; and (c) taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artis- tic, political, or scientifc value for minors. See Miller, 413 U. S., at 24; Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 635, 638.3 Restrictions of this kind trigger no heightened First Amendment scrutiny and are subject only to rational-basis review, even though they encompass speech that is “not obscene for adults.” Id., at 634, 639. In sum, two basic principles govern legislation aimed at shielding children from sexually explicit content. A State may not prohibit adults from accessing content that is ob- scene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at 383. But, it may enact laws to prevent minors from accessing such content. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637–638. 3 H. B. 1181 covers only depictions of activity that would qualify as “sex- ual conduct” in an adult obscenity statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 129B.001(6)(B). We therefore need not decide whether a statute addressing obscenity to minors can defne a broader range of activ- ity as “sexual conduct” than an adult obscenity statute. Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 475 Opinion of the Court C This Court has applied these principles to regulations of internet-based speech on two prior occasions, both at the dawn of the internet age. First, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997), we addressed the con- stitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 110 Stat. 133. The CDA criminalized using the in- ternet to knowingly transmit “obscene or indecent mes- sages” to a minor, or to knowingly send or display “patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to” a minor. 521 U. S., at 859–860. It provided an affrmative defense to “those who restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof.” Id., at 860–861. We held that the CDA violated the First Amendment be- cause it “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive.” Id., at 874. The CDA's age-verifcation defense was illusory because, in Page Proof Pending Publication many cases, “existing technology did not include any effec- tive method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults.” Id., at 876.4 And, even as to 4 Elsewhere in the CDA, Congress recognized that content fltering was still an emerging technology and that companies attempting to use it faced serious risks. A year before the CDA's enactment, a New York court had held that an online service provider could be held liable as a publisher for defamatory posts by third-party users because the provider had “held it- self out as” “a family oriented computer network” that screened out inap- propriate content. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, *2 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., May 24, 1995). In response, the CDA added a new § 230 to the Communications Act of 1934. § 509, 110 Stat. 137–139 (codifed as amended at 47 U. S. C. § 230). Section 230 provides that computer service providers (1) shall not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by” a third party, and (2) shall not “be held liable” for good-faith actions to restrict access to material that they consider to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, flthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” or to enable others (such as users) to restrict access to such material. § 230(c). Congress thereby aimed to spur the development and use of fltering technology so that parents could 476 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court minors, the CDA swept far beyond obscenity. Fairly read, the terms “ `indecent' ” and “ `patently offensive' ” encom- passed “large amounts of nonpornographic material with se- rious educational or other value.” Id., at 877. The Act was thus a “content-based restriction” of protected speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. Id., at 879. After Reno, Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681–736, which we addressed in Ash- croft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004) (Ashcroft II). COPA criminalized posting “content that is `harmful to minors' ” online for “ `commercial purposes.' ” Id., at 661 (quoting 47 U. S. C. § 231(a)(1)). The Act defned such content as material that is obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted to minors. 542 U. S., at 661–662 (citing § 231(e)(6)). It also provided “an affrmative defense to those who employ specifed means to prevent minors from gaining access to the prohibited materials on their Web site,” Page Proof Pending Publication such as requiring the use of a credit card or a digital certif- cate that verifes age. Id., at 662 (citing § 231(c)(1)). Soon after COPA's passage, a District Court preliminarily en- joined its enforcement, holding that the Act likely violated the First Amendment. Id., at 663. This Court held that the injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Id., at 664–665. The parties agreed that COPA was subject to strict scrutiny. So too did this Court, which briefy noted that this was so because COPA “ `effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a con- stitutional right to receive and to address to one another.' ” prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit content online. See § 509, 110 Stat. 137 (title) (“Online Family Empowerment”); 47 U. S. C. § 230 (title) (“Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material”); § 230(c) (title) (“Protection for `Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material”); 141 Cong. Rec. 22045 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox) (“We want to encourage” computer service providers “to help us control . . . what our children see” using fltering “technology” that “is very quickly becoming available”). Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 477 Opinion of the Court Id., at 665 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 874). We then focused our analysis on whether the Government had shown that it was likely to satisfy its burden under strict scrutiny. 542 U. S., at 666–670. We held that it had not, because the Gov- ernment had not ruled out that it could protect children just as well through the less restrictive means of encouraging parents to install blocking and fltering software on their computers. Ibid. We also noted that age verifcation was “only an affrmative defense,” meaning that even speakers adopting an approved verifcation method might be forced to “risk the perils of trial.” Id., at 670–671; accord, id., at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring). And, we leaned heavily on the abuse-of-discretion standard, observing that “substantial fac- tual disputes remain[ed] in the case,” and that “the factual record does not refect current technological reality” because it was “over fve years” old. Id., at 671 (majority opinion). For the past two decades, Ashcroft II has been our last word on the government's power to protect children from Page Proof Pending Publication sexually explicit content online. During this period, the “technology of the Internet” has continued to “evolv[e] at a rapid pace.” Ibid. With the rise of the smartphone and instant streaming, many adolescents can now access vast li- braries of video content—both benign and obscene—at al- most any time and place, with an ease that would have been unimaginable at the time of Reno and Ashcroft II. III With that background in mind, we turn now to the level of scrutiny that applies to H. B. 1181. Petitioners contend that the law must survive strict scrutiny because it imposes a content-based regulation on protected speech. The State, on the other hand, argues that the statute is subject only to rational-basis review because it does not burden any pro- tected speech. We think neither party has it right. Apply- ing our precedents, we hold that intermediate scrutiny applies. 478 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court A H. B. 1181 is an exercise of Texas's traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. To the extent that it burdens adults' rights to access such speech, it has “only an incidental effect on protected speech,” making it subject to intermediate scrutiny. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 659 (2000). 1 Age-verifcation laws like H. B. 1181 fall within States' authority to shield children from sexually explicit content. The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States' traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is ob- scene from their perspective. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 641. That power necessarily includes the power to require proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It fol- lows that no person—adult or child—has a First Amendment Page Proof Pending Publication right to access speech that is obscene to minors without frst submitting proof of age. The power to verify age is a necessary component of the power to prevent children's access to content that is obscene from their perspective. “No axiom is more clearly estab- lished in law, or in reason, than that . . . wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power neces- sary for doing it is included.” The Federalist No. 44, p. 285 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T. Cooley, Consti- tutional Limitations 63 (1868); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Read- ing Law 192–193 (2012). Hence, where the Constitution re- serves a power to the States, it also reserves “the ordinary and appropriate means” of exercising that power. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 430, pp. 412–413 (1833). For example, in the Eighth Amendment context we have explained that, because “capital punishment is constitutional, . . . `there must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.' ” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 869 (2015) Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 479 Opinion of the Court (alteration omitted). Similarly, because the First Amend- ment permits States to prohibit minors from accessing speech that is obscene to them, it likewise permits States to employ the ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing such a prohibition. Requiring proof of age to access that speech is one such means. Requiring age verifcation is common when a law draws lines based on age. For example, Texas, like many States, requires proof of age to obtain alcohol, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. § 106.03(b) (West 2020); tobacco, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 161.082(d), (e) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); a lottery ticket; 5 a tattoo, 25 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 229.406(a), (b) (2024); a body piercing, ibid.; freworks, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2154.252(c) (West 2019); and a driver's license, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.142(a) (West 2018). Federal law similarly mandates age verifcation to obtain certain medications from a pharmacist, 21 CFR §§ 1306.26(c), (d) (2024), or to obtain employment as a minor, 29 CFR § 570.5 (2024). Fundamen- Page Proof Pending Publication tal rights that turn on age are no different. Texas, again like many States, requires proof of age to obtain a handgun license, Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 411.174(a)(3) (West 2019); to register to vote, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 13.002(c)(2), (8) (West 2020); and to marry, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.005(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2024). In none of these contexts is the constitu- tionality of a reasonable, bona fde age-verifcation require- ment disputed. See New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 38–39, n. 9 (2022); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 202–203 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386–387 (1978). Obscenity is no exception to the widespread practice of requiring proof of age to exercise age-restricted rights. The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg required age verifca- tion: It permitted a seller who sold sexual material to a minor to raise “ `honest mistake' ” as to age as an affrmative 5 See Tex. Lottery Comm'n, News Release, Texas Lottery Adds Age Verifcation to Self-Service Vending Machines (Jan. 7, 2025). 480 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court defense, but only if the seller had made “ `a reasonable bona fde attempt to ascertain the true age of [the] minor.' ” 390 U. S., at 644. Most States to this day also require age veri- fcation for in-person purchases of sexual material.6 And, petitioners concede that an in-person age-verifcation re- quirement is a “traditional sort of law” that is “almost surely” constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. The facts of Ginsberg illustrate why age verifcation, as a practical matter, is necessary for an effective prohibition on minors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content. The statute in that case prohibited the knowing sale of sexual content to a minor under the age of 17. 390 U. S., at 633. The defendant was convicted of knowingly selling a porno- graphic magazine to a 16-year-old. Id., at 631. But, most of the time, it is almost impossible to distinguish a 16-year- old from a 17-year-old by sight alone. Thus, had the seller 6 See, e. g., Ala. Code §§ 13A–12–200.5(1), 13A–12–200.5(3)(a) (2015); Ariz. Page Proof Rev. Stat. Ann. Pending §§ 13–3501(3)(b), Publication 13–3506(A) (2018); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5– 68–501(3)(B), 5–68–502(a)(2) (2024); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 313.1(a) (West 2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–7–501(3)(b), 18–7–502(1) (2024); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–196 (2025); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 1365(a)(2), (i)(1) (2015); D. C. Code §§ 22–2201(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(F)(ii) (2001–2024); Fla. Stat. §§ 847.012(1)(b), (3) (2023); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–12–102(2)(B), 16–12–103(a) (2024); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18–1514(10), 18–1515(1) (2016); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §§ 5/11–21(b), (c)(1) (West 2023); Ind. Code §§ 35–49–3–3(a)(1), 35– 49–3–4(a)(3) (2024); Iowa Code §§ 728.2, 728.10 (2023); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21–6401(b), (h)(1) (2023); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:91.11(A)(1), (D) (West 2018); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 617.292, subd. 8(2), 617.293, subd. 1 (West 2018); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–8–206(1), (2)(a) (2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28–808(1), 28–810(1) (2016); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 571–B:1(II)(b), 571–B:2(I) (2021); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30–37–1(G)(2), 30–37–2 (Lexis Nexis 2014); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§ 235.21(1), 235.23(2) (West 2024); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14– 190.15(a), 14–19.15(c)(3) (2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2907.31(A)(1), (B)(3) (West 2020); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §§ 1040.75(13)(b), 1040.76(2) (2011); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5903(c), (e)(7)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2022); S. C. Code Ann. §§ 16–15–385(A), (C)(3) (2023); S. D. Codifed Laws §§ 22–24–28, 22–24– 31(1) (2017); Utah Code Ann. § 76–10–1206(1)(a) (Lexis Nexis 2017); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §§ 2802a(a), 2805(b)(1) (2018); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2– 390(7)(b), 18.2–391(A), (E) (2021); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.11(2) (West 2023). Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 481 Opinion of the Court in Ginsberg not had an obligation to verify the age of the purchaser, he likely could have avoided liability simply by asserting ignorance as to the purchaser's age. Only an age-verifcation requirement can ensure compliance with an age-based restriction. The need for age verifcation online is even greater. Un- like a store clerk, a website operator cannot look at its visi- tors and estimate their ages. Without a requirement to sub- mit proof of age, even clearly underage minors would be able to access sexual content undetected. “ `[T]he basic princi- ples of freedom of speech . . . do not vary' when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011); accord, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S. 707, 733 (2024). Because proof of age performs the same critical function on- line that it does in person, requiring age verifcation remains an ordinary and appropriate means of shielding minors in the digital age from material that is obscene to them. Page Proof Pending Publication H. B. 1181 imposes an age-verifcation requirement for on- line speech that is obscene to minors. The statute defnes covered “ `[s]exual material harmful to minors' ” as material that qualifes as obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted to the perspective of a minor. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 129B.001(6); see supra, at 467, 472–473. And, the statute does not ban adults from accessing this material; it simply requires them to verify their age before accessing it on a covered website. § 129B.002(a).7 H. B. 1181 thus falls 7 The parties dispute whether H. B. 1181's defnition of “ `[s]exual mate- rial harmful to minors' ” requires covered speech to be obscene to all mi- nors (including 17-year-olds) or only to a minor (including a toddler). We need not resolve that question here. Whatever obscenity to minors can mean, the Texas Legislature plainly meant to tie H. B. 1181's defnition to that category of speech. We also doubt that this dispute is as signifcant as it frst may seem. Because the statute only covers explicit portrayals of nudity or sex acts that predominantly appeal to the prurient interest, it cannot conceivably be read to cover, say, a PG–13- or R-rated movie. We further question whether it is coherent to speak of the “ `prurient in- 482 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court within Texas's traditional power to protect minors from speech that is obscene from their perspective. 2 Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access content that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regu- late the protected speech of adults. A law can regulate the content of protected speech, and thereby trigger strict scru- tiny, either “on its face” or in its justifcation. Reed, 576 U. S., at 163–164 (internal quotation marks omitted). H. B. 1181 does not regulate the content of protected speech in either sense. On its face, the statute regulates only speech that is obscene to minors. That speech is unprotected to the extent the State seeks only to verify age. And, the statute can easily “be justifed without reference to the [protected] content of the regulated speech,” because its apparent pur- pose is simply to prevent minors, who have no First Amend- ment right to access speech that is obscene to them, from Page Proof Pending Publication doing so. Id., at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is not to say, however, that H. B. 1181 escapes all First Amendment scrutiny. Adults have the right to access speech that is obscene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at terest' ” of a very young child with no concept of sexuality, so any reading of the statute may well call for assessing obscenity from the perspective of an adolescent. See Ashcroft II, 542 U. S. 656, 679 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The parties also dispute whether H. B. 1181 permits a covered website to require age verifcation for its sexual material harmful to minors but not for its other content. We need not resolve this disagreement either. Even if the statute requires covered websites to demand age verifcation for all their content, and even if such a requirement would be unconstitu- tional, petitioners still have not shown that H. B. 1181 is facially invalid. Under our precedents, a statute is facially invalid under the First Amend- ment only if its “unconstitutional applications” are “substantially dispro- portionate to the statute's lawful sweep.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 770 (2023). Here, petitioners have not even attempted to show that the covered websites that would segregate their content if given the choice substantially outnumber those that would not. Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 483 Opinion of the Court 383–384. And, submitting to age verifcation is a burden on the exercise of that right. But, adults have no First Amend- ment right to avoid age verifcation, and the statute can readily be understood as an effort to restrict minors' access. Any burden experienced by adults is therefore only inciden- tal to the statute's regulation of activity that is not protected by the First Amendment. That fact makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard under our precedents. Dale, 530 U. S., at 659. In this respect, H. B. 1181 is analogous to the prohibition against destroying draft cards that this Court upheld in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). The prohibi- tion may have had the effect of making it unlawful to protest the draft by burning one's draft card. See id., at 369. But, the “destruction” of a draft card is not itself “constitutionally protected activity,” because the card is a Government docu- ment that, among other functions, serves as proof of registra- tion. Id., at 376, 378. The prohibition on destroying draft Page Proof Pending Publication cards thus placed only an incidental burden on First Amend- ment expression, making it subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id., at 376–377. So too here, because accessing material ob- scene to minors without verifying one's age is not constitu- tionally protected, any burden H. B. 1181 imposes on pro- tected activity is only incidental, and the statute triggers only intermediate scrutiny. B Applying the more demanding strict-scrutiny standard would call into question the validity of all age-verifcation requirements, even longstanding requirements for brick-and- mortar stores. But, as petitioners acknowledge, after Gins- berg, no serious question about the constitutionality of in- person age-verifcation requirements for obscenity to minors has arisen. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (acknowledging that they “don't know of any . . . challenge being brought” to an age-verifcation requirement for “brick-and-mortar stores”). Petitioners insist that their proposed rule would not call into 484 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court question these “traditional” requirements, because such re- quirements would “almost surely satisfy” strict scrutiny. Id., at 17. They also contend that a suffciently tailored on- line age-verifcation requirement (although not Texas's) could satisfy strict scrutiny too. Id., at 6–8. But, if we are not to compromise “ `[t]he “starch” in our constitutional standards,' ” we cannot share petitioners' confdence. Ash- croft II, 542 U. S., at 670 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 830 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Strict scrutiny—which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmen- tal interest—is “the most demanding test known to constitu- tional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 534 (1997). In the First Amendment context, we have held only once that a law triggered but satisfed strict scrutiny—to uphold a federal statute that prohibited knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. See Page Proof Pending Publication Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27–39 (2010). That case involved an unusual application of strict scrutiny, since our analysis relied on the “deference” due to the Executive's “evaluation of the facts” in the context of “national security and foreign affairs.” Id., at 33–34.8 Strict scrutiny is unforgiving because it is the standard for reviewing the direct targeting of fully protected speech. Reed, 576 U. S., at 163. Strict scrutiny is designed to en- force “the fundamental principle that governments have no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 8 In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. 433 (2015), a bare majority held that a ban on the personal solicitation of campaign donations by candi- dates for judicial offce survived strict scrutiny. Id., at 444–456. But, only four Members of the majority thought that the statute triggered strict scrutiny to begin with. Id., at 442–444 (plurality opinion). The ffth Member, Justice Ginsburg, concluded that strict scrutiny did not apply and that States enjoy “substantial latitude . . . to enact campaign- fnance rules geared to judicial elections.” Id., at 457–458 (opinion concur- ring in part and concurring in judgment). Cite as: 606 U. S. 461 (2025) 485 Opinion of the Court its subject matter, or its content.” National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 766 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). It succeeds in that purpose if and only if, as a practical matter, it is fatal in fact absent truly extraordinary circumstances. Strict scru- tiny therefore cannot apply to laws, such as in-person age- verifcation requirements, which are traditional, widespread, and not thought to raise a signifcant First Amendment issue. Once again, we need look no further than Ginsberg. There, this Court observed that it “is very doubtful” that New York's “legislative fnding” about the harmful effects of the speech its statute restricted “expresses an accepted scientifc fact.” 390 U. S., at 641. Nonetheless, because ob- scenity to minors is not fully protected speech, this Court readily upheld the statute. Id., at 641–643. Had the Court applied strict scrutiny, it could not have so easily cast that doubt aside. Cf. Brown, 564 U. S., at 799–800 (declining to defer to a legislature's view of “competing psychological Page Proof Pending Publication studies” when applying strict scrutiny to a law restricting minors from purchasing violent video games). Petitioners would like to invalidate H. B. 1181 without up- setting traditional in-person age-verifcation requirements and perhaps narrower online requirements. But, strict scrutiny is ill suited for such nuanced work. The only prin- cipled way to give due consideration to both the First Amendment and States' legitimate interests in protecting minors is to employ a less exacting standard. C We also reject petitioners' contention that, regardless of frst principles, our precedents require us to apply strict scrutiny to H. B. 1181. Every case that petitioners cite in- volved a law that banned both adults and minors from ac- cessing speech. But, this Court has never held that every content-based burden on adults' access to speech that is ob- scene to minors always triggers strict scrutiny. 486 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON Opinion of the Court 1 Start with Butler, our earliest relevant precedent. There, this Court implicitly recognized that States may im- pose some burdens on adults in the course of protecting chil- dren from sexual material. The Court held that Michigan's legitimate interest in “shield[ing] juvenile innocence” could not justify a categorical ban on distributing sexually themed books “ `tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.' ” 352 U. S., at 381, 383. In so holding, the Court admonished the State for overlooking its other statutes “designed to pro- tect its children” that did not impose an outright ban. Id., at 383. One of these laws was a prohibition on exhibiting sexual material “ `tending to the corruption of the morals of youth' ” “ `in any . . . place within the view of children passing on any public street or highway.' ” Ibid., n. This law im- posed a content-based restriction on where adults could view such material. Yet, the Court implicitly suggested that it Page Proof Pending Publication was a permissible alternative to an outright prohibition. Similarly, Ginsberg upheld a law that required sellers to verify age if they wished to raise “honest mistake” of age as a defense. See 390 U. S., at 644; supra, at 479–480. In the wake of that decision, the constitutionality of laws like New York's that impose in-person age-verifcation requirements has been taken as a given. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. And, although Ginsberg did not explicitly address the burden that age verifcation imposes on adults, in the almost six decades since it was decided, no one has thought to subject such re- quirements to strict scrutiny. Petitioners invoke two pre-internet cases in which this Court applied strict scrutiny. In the frst, the Court did so to invalidate “a blanket prohibition” on “dial-a-porn” phone messages that were “indecent but not obscene.” Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126 (1989). In the second, we did so to invalidat