Mahmoud v. Taylor (606 U.S. 522, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 2 Pages 522–655 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 27, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 522 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus MAHMOUD et al. v. TAYLOR et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 24–297. Argued April 22, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025 During the 2022–2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Edu- cation (Board) introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts into the public school curriculum. Those texts included fve “LGBTQ+- inclusive” storybooks approved for students in kindergarten through ffth grade, which have story lines focused on sexuality and gender. When parents in Montgomery County sought to have their children ex- cused from instruction involving those books, the Board initially com- promised with the parents by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+- inclusive” storybooks would be taught and permitting their children to be excused from the instruction. That compromise was consistent with the Board's “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity,” which pro- fessed a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of students. Less than a year after the Page Proof Pending Publication Board introduced the books, however, it rescinded the parental opt out policy. Among other things, the Board said that it “could not accom- modate the growing number of opt out requests without causing sig- nifcant disruptions to the classroom environment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 607a. The petitioners here are a group of individual parents and an unincor- porated association of other interested parties. The individual parents come from diverse religious backgrounds and hold sincere views on sex- uality and gender which they wish to pass on to their children. Faced with the Board's decision to rescind opt outs, petitioners fled a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they asserted that the Board's no-opt-out policy infringed on parents' right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524. They relied heavily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, in which the Court recog- nized that parents have a right “to direct the religious upbringing of their children” and that this right can be infringed by laws that pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that parents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Petitioners sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting the School Board from forcing [their] children and other students—over the objec- tion of their parents—to read, listen to, or discuss” the storybooks. Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 523 Syllabus App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. The District Court denied relief, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affrmed. Held: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclu- sive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are enti- tled to a preliminary injunction. Pp. 545–570. (a) The parents assert that the Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+- inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice and opt outs—unconstitutionally burdens their religious exercise. At this stage, the parents seek a preliminary injunction that would permit them to have their children excused from instruction related to the sto- rybooks while this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form of prelimi- nary relief, the parents must show that: they are likely to succeed on the merits; they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; the balance of equities tips in their favor; and an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20. The parents have made such a showing. Pp. 545–546. (b) The parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the Board's policies unconstitutionally burden their religious exercise. The Court has “long recognized the rights of parents to direct `the religious Page Proof Pending Publication upbringing' of their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Rev- enue, 591 U. S. 464, 486 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214). Those rights are violated by government policies that “substantially inter- fer[e] with the religious development” of children. Id., at 218. Pp. 546–555. (1) For many people of faith, there are few religious acts more im- portant than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754. And the practice of educating one's children in one's religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of constitu- tional protection. The Constitution protects, for example, a parent's decision to send his or her child to a private religious school instead of a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 532–535. And the Court has recognized limits on the government's ability to in- terfere with a student's religious upbringing in a public school setting. In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, for example, the Court held that a policy requiring public school students to salute the fag could not be enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses—who consider the fag a “graven image”—consistent with the First Amendment. Barnette involved an egregious kind of direct coercion: a requirement that students make an affrmation contrary to their parents' religious beliefs. In Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause also 524 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Syllabus protects against policies that impose more subtle forms of interference with the religious upbringing of children. There, the Court considered a compulsory-education law that would place Amish children into “an environment hostile to Amish beliefs,” where they would face “pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints and lifestyles. 406 U. S., at 211. The Court concluded that such a law “substantially interfer[ed] with the religious development of the Amish child” and therefore “carrie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id., at 218. Pp. 546–550. (2) The Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story- books, combined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to forbid opt outs, substantially interferes with the religious development of petitioners' children and imposes the kind of burden on religious exer- cise that Yoder found unacceptable. The books are unmistakably nor- mative. They are designed to present certain values and beliefs as things to be celebrated, and certain contrary values and beliefs as things to be rejected. Take, for example, the message sent by the books concerning same- sex marriage. Many Americans “advocate with utmost, sincere convic- tion that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be con- Page Proof Pending Publication doned.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 679. That group includes each of the parents in this case. The storybooks, however, are designed to present the opposite viewpoint to young, impressionable children who are likely to accept without question any moral messages conveyed by their teacher's instruction. The storybooks present same-sex weddings as occasions for great celebration and suggest that the only rubric for determining whether a marriage is acceptable is whether the individuals concerned “love each other.” The storybooks similarly convey a normative message on the subjects of sex and gender. Many Americans, like the parents in this case, be- lieve that biological sex refects divine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live accordingly. The storybooks, however, suggest that it is hurtful, and perhaps even hateful, to hold the view that gender is inex- tricably bound with biological sex. Like the compulsory high school education considered in Yoder, these books impose upon children a set of values and beliefs that are “hostile” to their parents' religious beliefs. 406 U. S., at 211. And the books exert upon children a psychological “pressure to conform” to their spe- cifc viewpoints. Ibid. The books therefore present the same kind of “objective danger to the free exercise of religion” that the Court identi- fed in Yoder. Id., at 218. Pp. 550–555. Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 525 Syllabus (c) None of the counterarguments raised by the Board, the courts below, or the Board's amici give this Court any reason to doubt the existence of a burden on religious exercise here. Pp. 555–563. (1) The Court does not accept the Board's characterizations of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to objectionable ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.” The storybooks unmistakably convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender. And the Board has specifcally encouraged teachers to reinforce this viewpoint and to reprimand any children who disagree. That goes be- yond mere “exposure.” Regardless, the question in cases of this kind is whether the educational requirement or curriculum at issue would “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of the child, or pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices the parent wishes to instill in the child. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Whether or not a requirement or curriculum could be character- ized as “exposure” is not the touchstone for determining whether that line is crossed. Pp. 555–556. (2) The Board's reliance on the Court's decisions in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, is likewise unpersuasive. In those cases, the Court held that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require Page Proof Pending Publication the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 699, even when the conduct of such internal affairs might result in “inci- dental interference with an individual's spiritual activities,” Lyng, 485 U. S., at 450. That principle has no application here. The govern- ment's operation of public schools is not a matter of “internal affairs” akin to the administration of Social Security or the selection of “fling cabinets.” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 700. It implicates direct, coercive in- teractions between the State and its young residents. Pp. 556–557. (3) The courts below erred by dismissing this Court's decision in Yoder. The Court has never confned Yoder to its facts, and there is no reason to conclude that the decision is “sui generis” or “tailored to [its] specifc evidence,” as the courts below reasoned. While the Court noted in Yoder that the Amish made a showing “that probably few other religious groups or sects could make,” that language must be read in the context of the specifc claims raised by the Amish respondents, i. e., the right to withdraw their children from all conventional schooling after a certain age. 406 U. S., at 235–236. Contrary to the suggestions of the courts below, Yoder embodies a robust principle of general appli- cability. Pp. 557–559. (4) The Fourth Circuit's view that the record in this case is too “threadbare” to demonstrate a burden on religious exercise is also un- 526 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Syllabus convincing. 102 F. 4th 191, 209. That court faulted the parents for failing to make specifc allegations describing how the books “are actu- ally being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. But when a deprivation of First Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not wait for the damage to occur before fling suit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158. To evaluate the plaintiffs' claims, the Court need only decide whether—if teachers act according to the clear and undis- puted instructions of the Board—a burden on religious exercise will occur. Pp. 559–560. (5) It is no answer that parents remain free to place their children in private school or to educate them at home. Public education is a public beneft, and the government cannot “condition” its “availability” on parents' willingness to accept a burden on their religious exercise. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462. Moreover, given that education is compulsory in Maryland, the parents are not being asked simply to forgo a public beneft. They have an obligation—enforceable by fne or imprisonment—to send their chil- dren to public school unless they fnd an adequate substitute they can afford. Md. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 7–301(a)(3), (e). Nor is it of any comfort to suggest that parents can educate their children at home after school. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were Page Proof Pending Publication similarly capable of teaching their religious values “at home,” but that made no difference in the First Amendment analysis in those cases. It is similarly unconvincing to suggest that the parents could have chal- lenged the educational requirements via the democratic process. The parents tried and failed to obtain legislative change, and had every right to resort to judicial review to protect their rights. Pp. 560–563. (d) Having concluded that the Board's policy burdens the parents' right to the free exercise of religion, the Court turns to the question whether that burden is constitutionally permitted. Pp. 563–569. (1) In most circumstances, the government is generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so pursu- ant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879. But when a law imposes a burden of the same character as that in Yoder, as does the challenged Board policy here, strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable. Smith, 494 U. S., at 881. Pp. 564–565. (2) To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy “advances `interests of the highest order' and is narrowly tai- lored to achieve those interests.” Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546). The Board asserts that its curriculum and no-opt-out Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 527 Syllabus policy serve its compelling interest in maintaining a school environment that is safe and conducive to learning for all students. As a general matter, schools have a “compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learning.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119. But the Board's conduct in continuing to permit opt outs in a variety of other circumstances undermines its assertion that its no-opt-out policy is necessary to serve that interest. Pp. 565–569. (e) Without an injunction, the parents will continue to suffer an un- constitutional burden on their religious exercise, and such a burden un- questionably constitutes irreparable injury. See Roman Catholic Dio- cese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 19 (per curiam). And an injunction here would be both equitable and in the public interest. Thus, the petitioners have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. Specifcally, until all appellate review in this case is com- pleted, the Board should be ordered to notify the petitioners in advance whenever one of the books in question or any other similar book is to be used in any way and to allow them to have their children excused from that instruction. P. 569. 102 F. 4th 191, reversed and remanded. Page Proof Alito, J., delivered Pending the opinion Publication of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 581. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 592. Eric S. Baxter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William J. Haun, Michael J. O'Brien, and Colten L. Stanberry. Principal Deputy Solicitor General Harris argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With her on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Roth, Nicholas S. Crown, Michael S. Raab, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. Alan Schoenfeld argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Emily Barnet, Bruce M. Berman, Joseph M. Meyer, and Jeremy W. Brinster.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, by Jason Miyares, Attorney 528 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland (Board), has introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” sto- General of Virginia, Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Kevin M. Gal- lagher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Meredith Baker, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uthmeier of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Mur- rill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrig- ley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner F. Drummond of Okla- homa, David W. Sunday, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Caro- lina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Ken Paxton of Texas, Derek E. Brown of Utah, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for Advancing American Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for the America First Legal Foundation by Christopher Mills; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, and Walter M. Page Proof Pending Publication Weber; for Americans for Prosperity Foundation by Cynthia Fleming Crawford and Casey Mattox; for America's Frontline Doctors et al. by David A. Dalia; for the Center for American Liberty by Dale Schoweng- erdt and Josh Dixon; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Eric W. Treene, Roman P. Storzer, Steven T. McFarland, and Laura Nammo; for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. by R. Shawn Gun- narson, Christopher A. Bates, Donald N. Lundwall, Gene C. Schaerr, and Hannah C. Smith; for the Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Studies et al. by Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.; for the Ethics and Public Policy Center by Eric N. Kniffn; for the Independence Law Center by Randall L. Wenger, Janice L. Martino-Gottshall, and Jeremy L. Samek; for Law Pro- fessors by Natalie C. Rhoads; for the Legal Insurrection Foundation by Eric Hudson; for the Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, and Horatio G. Mihet; for the Manhattan Institute et al. by Ilya Shapiro; for the Maryland Family Institute et al. by Helen M. Alvaré; for Muslim Parents et al. by Steven T. Collis and John Greil; for National Religious Broadcasters et al. by William Wagner and Michael P. Farris; for the NC Values Institute et al. by Deborah J. Dewart, Tami Fitzgerald, and John W. Whitehead; for Our Duty-USA et al. by Mary E. McAlister and Vernadette R. Broyles; for Parent Nicholas Brown et al. by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, and James A. Davids; for Parents Defending Education by J. Michael Connolly and James F. Hasson; for Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 529 Opinion of the Court rybooks into the elementary school curriculum. These books—and associated educational instructions provided to teachers—are designed to “disrupt” children's thinking about sexuality and gender. The Board has told parents Protect Our Kids (California) et al. by Thomas L. Brejcha; for the Suther- land Institute by William C. Duncan; for Thirty-fve Maryland Legisla- tors by Edward M. Wenger; for the Women's Liberation Front by Elspeth B. Cypher; for Tammy Fournier by John J. Bursch, James A. Campbell, Katherine L. Anderson, and Vincent M. Wagner; for Douglas Laycock et al. by Christopher Mills; for Nathan Lewin, pro se; for S. Ernie Walton et al. by Christopher T. Holinger; and for 66 Members of Congress by Erik S. Jaffe. William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, J. Mark Brewer, and Michael Boos fled a brief for America's Future et al. as amici curiae urging vacatur. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Maryland et al. by Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland, Julia Doyle, Solicitor General, and Joshua M. Segal, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, by Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massa- chusetts, David C. Kravitz, State Solicitor, Anna Lumelsky, Deputy State Page Proof Pending Publication Solicitor, and Adam Cambier, Assistant Attorney General, and by the At- torneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Co- lumbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Letitia James of New York, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Nicholas W. Brown of Washington; for Ameri- can Atheists, Inc., et al. by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, Deborah Jeon, Sonia Kumar, Cecillia D. Wang, and Louise Melling; for the American Psychological Association et al. by Jessica Ring Amunson and Deanne M. Ottaviano; for the Authors Guild, Inc., et al. by Marc A. Fuller and Mag- gie I. Burreson; for the Coalition for Responsible Home Education by Jo- seph J. Poppen and Geoffrey M. Pipoly; for Constitutional Scholars by Joshua Matz, Martin Totaro, and Richard B. Katskee, pro se; for the Free- dom From Religion Foundation by Samuel T. Grover; for GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders et al. by Mary L. Bonauto, Gary D. Buseck, and Hannah Hussey; for Interfaith Alliance by James C. Dugan and Mia Guizzetti Hayes; for the Leadership Conference Education Fund et al. by Karen L. Loewy and Jeffrey M. Gutkin; for Lebo Pride et al. by Susan 530 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court that it will not give them notice when the books are going to be used and that their children's attendance during those periods is mandatory. A group of parents from diverse reli- gious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies. They as- sert that the new curriculum, combined with the Board's decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens their reli- gious exercise. Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 218 (1972). And a government cannot condition the beneft of free public education on parents' acceptance of such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to Page Proof Pending Publication the Board's policies. J. Frietsche; for Montgomery County Faith Leaders by Meaghan VerGow and Joshua Revesz; for Muslim Organizations by Z. Gabriel Arkles and Anya Marino; for the National Education Association et al. by Alice O'Brien, Jason Walta, Robert Kim, and Jessica Levin; for the PEN Amer- ican Center, Inc., by Linda Steinman, Alexandra Perloff-Giles, and Ryan Hicks; for Religious and Civil-Rights Organizations by Alex J. Lu- chenitser, Alexandra Zaretsky, and Randall T. Adams; for Scholars for the Advancement of Children's Constitutional Rights et al. by Cather- ine E. Smith and Travis F. Chance; for Justin Driver et al. by Amanda Flug Davidoff and H. Rodgin Cohen; and for Robert D. Kamenshine, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for AASA, The School Superintend- ents Association, et al. by John A. Freedman and Steven L. Mayer; for California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials by Glenn Katon; for the Foundation for Moral Law by Roy S. Moore and Jeffrey Tuomala; for Jaco Booyens Ministries et al. by Frank J. Wright; for the Lonang Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; for Me- lissa Moschella, Ph.D., by Robert P. George and William C. Porth; and for Lawrence G. Sager et al. by Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler. Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 531 Opinion of the Court I A 1 With just over one million residents, Montgomery County is Maryland's most populous county. According to a recent survey, it is also the “most religiously diverse county” in the Nation.1 In addition to hosting a diverse mix of Christian denominations, the county ranks in the top fve in the Nation in per-capita population of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Bud- dhists.2 The county's religious diversity is accompanied by strong cultural diversity as well. The county is home to sev- eral notable ethnic communities. For example, the Ethio- pian community in Silver Spring is one of the largest in the country.3 And according to one survey, “[o]nly 56.8% of county residents speak English at home.” N. 1, this page. Most Montgomery County residents with school age chil- Page Proof Pending Publication dren, by choice or necessity, send them to public school. As a general matter, Maryland law requires that resident chil- dren ages 5 to 18 “attend a public school regularly during the entire school year.” Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7–301(a– 1)(1) (2025). As an exception to this general rule, the State permits parents to send their children to private school or to educate them at home if certain requirements can be met. § 7–301(a)(3). Parents who cause their children to be absent 1 See A. Hertzler-McCain, Montgomery County, Maryland, Was Most Religiously Diverse US County in 2023, Religion News Service (Aug. 30, 2024), https://religionnews.com/2024/08/30/montgomery-county-maryland- was-most-religiously-diverse-u-s-county-in-2023/. 2 Public Religion Research Institute, 2023 PRRI Census of American Religion: County-Level Data on Religious Identity and Diversity 19, 28, 42–49 (Aug. 29, 2024). 3 See, e. g., R. Skirble, Silver Spring Is the Epicenter of a Thriving Ethi- opian Diaspora, Montgomery Magazine (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www. montgomerymag.com/silver-spring-is-the-epicenter-of-a-thriving- ethiopian-diaspora/. 532 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court unlawfully from school can face fnes, mandatory community service, and even imprisonment. § 7–301(e). Public education in Montgomery County is provided by Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS), one of the largest school districts in the Nation. In the 2022–2023 school year, MCPS enrolled 160,554 students in its 210 schools and had an operating budget of nearly $3 billion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 597a–598a; MCPS, FY2024 Operating Budget, p. vi–1 (2023). The district is overseen and man- aged by the Montgomery County Board of Education, a poli- cymaking body consisting of seven elected county residents and one student. See Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 3–901(b). In recognition of the county's religious diversity, the Board's “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity” pro- fess a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of MCPS students. App. to Pet. for Cert. 210a, 212a.4 These accommodations take various forms. For example, according to one MCPS Page Proof Pending Publication offcial, the Board “advises principals that schools should avoid scheduling tests or other major events on dozens of . . . `days of commemoration,' during which MCPS expects that many students may be absent . . . or engaged in religious or cultural observances.” Id., at 602a. This case, however, arises from the Board's abject refusal to heed widespread and impassioned pleas for accommoda- tion. In the years leading up to 2022, the Board apparently “determined that the books used in its existing [English & Language Arts] curriculum were not representative of many students and families in Montgomery County because they 4 The Board has modifed its religious diversity guidelines since the 2022–2023 school year, when many of the events in this lawsuit took place. The most recent version of the Board's guidelines, available online, contin- ues to state that “MCPS is committed to making reasonable accommoda- tions” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of its students. MCPS, Religious Diversity Guidelines in Montgomery County Public Schools 1 (2024–2025). Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 533 Opinion of the Court did not include LGBTQ characters.” Id., at 603a. The Board therefore decided to introduce into the curriculum what it described as “ `LGBTQ+-inclusive texts.' ” 5 Id., at 174a. As one email sent by MCPS principals refects, the Board selected the books according to a “Critical Selection Repertoire” that required selectors to review potential texts and ask questions such as: “Is heteronormativity reinforced or disrupted?”; “Is cisnormativity reinforced or disrupted?”; and “Are power hierarchies that uphold the dominant culture reinforced or disrupted?” Id., at 622a. In accordance with this “[r]epertoire” and other criteria, the Board eventually selected 13 “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts for use in the English and Language Arts curriculum from pre-K through 12th grade. Id., at 603a–604a, 622a. At issue in this lawsuit are the fve “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story- books that are approved for students in Kindergarten through ffth grade—in other words, for children who are generally between 5 and 11 years old.6 Page Proof Pending Publication A few short descriptions will serve to illustrate the gen- eral tenor of the storybooks. Intersection Allies tells the stories of several children from different backgrounds, in- cluding Kate, who is apparently a transgender child. One page shows Kate in a sex-neutral or sex-ambiguous bath- room, and Kate proclaims: “My friends defend my choices and place. A bathroom, like all rooms, should be a safe 5 Some sources in the record use different variations of “LGBTQ+- inclusive” when referring to the books at issue in this case (e. g., “LGBTQ- Inclusive”). App. to Pet. for Cert. 603a. For consistency, we use “LGBTQ+-inclusive” throughout the opinion, except in instances where the designation appears in the middle of other quoted language, in which case we retain the formulation that appears in the source. 6 This lawsuit initially concerned seven books: one approved for pre-K and Head Start students, and six approved for grades K through 5. How- ever, the one book approved for pre-K students was removed from the curriculum due to content concerns, and one of the books approved for grades K through 5 was removed for similar reasons. Brief for Petition- ers 11, n. 10; Brief for Respondents 6, n. 4. 534 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court space.” Id., at 323a. Intersection Allies includes a “Page- By-Page Book Discussion Guide” that asserts: “When we are born, our gender is often decided for us based on our sex . . . . But at any point in our lives, we can choose to identify with one gender, multiple genders, or neither gender.” Id., at 349a–350a. The discussion guide explains that “Kate pre- fers the pronouns they/their/them” and asks “What pro- nouns ft you best?” Id., at 350a (boldface in original). Prince & Knight tells the story of a coming-of-age prince whose parents wish to match him with “a kind and worthy bride.” Id., at 397a. After meeting with “many ladies,” the prince tells his parents that he is “ `looking for something different in a partner by [his] side.' ” Id., at 398a, 400a. Later in the book, the prince falls into the “embrace” of a knight after the two fnish battling a fearsome dragon. Id., at 415a. After the knight takes off his helmet, the prince and knight “gaz[e] into each other's eyes, [and] their hearts Page Proof Pending Publication beg[in] to race.” Id., at 418a–419a. The whole kingdom later applauds “on the two men's wedding day.” Id., at 424a. Love Violet follows a young girl named Violet who has a crush on her female classmate, Mira. Mira makes Violet's “heart skip” and “thunde[r] like a hundred galloping horses.” Id., at 431a, 436a. Although Violet is initially too afraid to interact with Mira, the two end up exchanging gifts on Val- entine's Day. Afterwards, the two girls are seen holding hands and “galloping over snowy drifts to see what they might fnd. Together.” Id., at 446a. Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope tells the story of Penelope, a child who is initially treated as a girl. The story is told from the perspective of Penelope, who at one point says “If they'd all stop and listen, I'd tell them about me. Inside I'm a boy.” Id., at 454a. When Pe- nelope's mother later assures her that “ `If you feel like a boy, that's okay,' ” Penelope responds: “ `No, Mama, I don't feel like a boy. I AM a boy.' ” Id., at 458a. Penelope tells her mother: Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 535 Opinion of the Court “ `I love you, Mama, but I don't want to be you. I want to be Papa. I don't want tomorrow to come because tomorrow I'll look like you. Please help me, Mama. Help me be a boy.' ” Id., at 459a. Penelope's mother then agrees that she is a boy, and Penel- ope says: “For the frst time, my insides don't feel like fre. They feel like warm, golden love.” Id., at 462a. Later, after the family starts treating Penelope as a boy, Penelope's brother complains that “ `You can't become a boy. You have to be born one.' ” Id., at 465a. This comment draws a re- buke from Penelope's mother: “ `Not everything needs to make sense. This is about love.' ” Ibid. Finally, Uncle Bobby's Wedding tells the story of a young girl named Chloe who is informed that her favorite uncle, Bobby, will be getting married to his boyfriend, Jamie. When Bobby and Jamie announce their engagement, every- one is jubilant “except . . . Chloe.” Id., at 287a. Chloe says Page Proof Pending Publication that she does not “ `understand' ” why her uncle is getting married, but her mother responds by explaining: “ `When grown-up people love each other that much, sometimes they get married.' ” Id., at 288a. The Board suggested “that teachers incorporate the new texts into the curriculum in the same way that other books are used, namely, to put them on a shelf for students to fnd on their own; to recommend a book to a student who would enjoy it; to offer the books as an option for literature circles, book clubs, or paired reading groups; or to use them as a read aloud.” Id., at 604a–605a. And “[a]s with all curricu- lum resources,” the Board voiced its “expectation that teach- ers use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books as part of instruction.” Id., at 605a. An MCPS offcial has made clear that “[t]each- ers cannot . . . elect not to use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books at all.” Ibid. The Board also contemplated that instruction involving the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would include classroom discussion. See id., at 642a (Board's lawyer: “there will be 536 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court discussion that ensues. In fact, I think everyone would hope that discussion ensues”). In anticipation of such dis- cussion, the Board hosted a “professional development work- shop” in the summer of 2022, where it provided teachers with a guidance document suggesting how they might respond to student inquiries regarding the themes presented in the books. Id., at 273a–276a, 604a, 628a–635a. For example, if a student asserts that two men cannot get married, the guid- ance document encouraged teachers to respond by saying: “When people are adults they can get married. Two men who love each other can decide they want to get married.” Id., at 628a. If a student claims that a character “can't be a boy if he was born a girl,” teachers were encouraged to re- spond: “That comment is hurtful.” Id., at 630a. And if a student asks “[w]hat's transgender?”, it was recommended that teachers explain: “When we're born, people make a guess about our gender and label us `boy' or `girl' based on Page Proof Pending Publication our body parts. Sometimes they're right and sometimes they're wrong.” Ibid. The guidance document encouraged teachers to “[d]isrupt the either/or thinking” of their stu- dents. Id., at 629a, 633a. At the same workshop, the Board also provided teachers with a guidance document that suggested particular re- sponses to inquiries by parents. For example, if a parent were to ask whether the school was attempting to teach a child to “reject” the values taught at home, teachers were encouraged to respond that “[t]eaching about LGBTQ+ is not about making students think a certain way; it is to show that there is no one `right' or `normal' way to be.” Id., at 638a. The guidance also urged teachers to assure parents that there would not be “explicit instruction” about gender and sexual identity, but that “there may be a need to defne words that are new and unfamiliar to students,” and that “questions and conversations might organically happen.” Id., at 640a. If parents were not comforted by that informa- Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 537 Opinion of the Court tion, teachers could tell them that “[p]arents always have the choice to keep their student(s) home while using these texts; however, it will not be an excused absence.” Ibid. 2 The Board offcially launched the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts into MCPS schools in the 2022–2023 school year. Shortly thereafter, parents “began contacting individual teachers, principals, or MCPS staff” about the storybooks and asking that their children be excused from classroom instruction related to them. Id., at 606a. Some parents showed up at the Board's public business meetings to ex- press their concerns about the storybooks' content. In an early 2023 meeting, for example, one parent represented her- self as “a voice for parents in [her] community, many of [whom] are actually working today and unable to attend.” See MCPS, Jan. 12, 2023, Business Meeting, at 27:15–27:20, Page Proof Pending Publication https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/196679. She said that MCPS parents were “frustrated” because, in their view, “educators and administrators are going behind what [par- ents] are teaching their kids at home, and pushing ideas of gender ideology on their kids.” Id., at 27:21–27:30. The parent felt that the Board was “implying to [children] that their religion, their belief system, and their family tradition is actually wrong.” Id., at 28:25–28:30. At the same Board meeting, one Board member responded by saying that “some of the testimony today was disturbing to me personally. Transgender, LGBTQ individuals are not an ideology, they are a reality. . . . [T]here are religions out there that teach that women should only achieve certain sub- servient roles in life, and MCPS would never think of not having a book in a classroom that showed a woman” in a professional role. Id., at 38:35–39:00. The Board's student member agreed with the sentiment and proclaimed that “ig- norance and hate does exist within our community, but 538 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court please know that every student—each of our 160,000 stu- dents in our large county—has a place in the school system.” Id., at 40:25–40:36. Initially, the Board compromised with objecting parents by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would be taught and permitting their children to be excused from instruction involving the books. That policy was con- sistent with the Board's general “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity,” which at the time provided that “[w]hen possible, schools should try to make reasonable and feasible adjustments to the instructional program to accom- modate requests from students, or requests from parents/ guardians on behalf of their students, to be excused from specifc classroom discussions or activities that they believe would impose a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 220a–221a. This compromise, however, did not last long. In March Page Proof Pending Publication 2023, less than a year after the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts were introduced, the Board issued a statement declaring that “[s]tudents and families may not choose to opt out of engag- ing” with the storybooks and that “teachers will not send home letters to inform families when inclusive books are read in the future.” Id., at 657a. According to one MCPS offcial, the Board decided to change its policy because, among other things, “individual principals and teachers could not accommodate the growing number of opt out re- quests without causing signifcant disruptions to the class- room environment.” Id., at 607a. The offcial also stated that permitting some students to exit the classroom while the storybooks were being taught would expose other stu- dents “to social stigma and isolation.” Id., at 608a. It was therefore announced that any existing accommodations would expire at the end of the 2022–2023 school year. Shortly after the Board rescinded parental opt outs, more than 1,000 parents signed a petition asking the Board to re- store opt out rights. See Brief for Petitioners 14. And Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 539 Opinion of the Court hundreds of displeased parents, including many Muslim and Ethiopian Orthodox parents, appeared at the Board's public meetings and implored the Board to allow opt outs. Id., at 14–15. At a May 2023 meeting, one community member testi- fed that “thousands” of parents felt “deeply dismayed and betrayed” by the rescission of opt outs from “content that confict[s] with their sincerely held religious beliefs.” MCPS, May 25, 2023, Business Meeting, at 35:33–35:44, https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/232766. At the same meeting, an MCPS student testifed and asked the Board “to allow students like me to opt out of content and books that contain sensitive and mature topics that go against my reli- gious beliefs.” Id., at 40:47–40:56. The Board was unmoved. After the testimony, several Board members and another MCPS offcial spoke up to “clar- ify” that the storybooks would not be used for explicit in- struction on sexuality and gender, but rather as part of the “literacy curriculum.” Id., at 1:11:14–1:16:22. According to Page Proof Pending Publication a later news article, one Board member recalled that “she felt `kind of sorry' ” for the student who testifed in favor of opt outs, “and wondered to what extent she may have been `parroting dogma' learned from her parents.” 7 The Board member also expressed her view that “ `[i]f [parents] want their child to receive an education that strictly adheres to their religious dogma, they can send their kid to a private religious school.' ” N. 7, this page. The Board member went on to suggest that the objecting parents were compara- ble to “ `white supremacists' ” who want to prevent their chil- dren from learning about civil rights and “ `xenophobes' ” who object to “ `stories about immigrant families.' ” Ibid. 7 E. Espey, Parents, Students, Doctors React to MCPS Lawsuit Target- ing LGBTQ+ Storybooks, Bethesda Magazine (June 2, 2023), https:// bethesdamagazine.com/2023/06/02/parents-students-doctors-react-to- mcps-lawsuit-targeting-lgbtq-storybooks; see also Mahmoud v. McKnight, 688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 285 (Md. 2023) (recounting the Board member's statements). 540 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court The Board continues to permit children to opt out of other school activities, including the “family life and human sexual- ity” unit of instruction, for which opt outs are required under Maryland law. Code of Md. Regs., tit. 13A, § 04.18.01(D) (2)(e)(i) (2025); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 657a. And al- though the Board has amended its “Guidelines for Respect- ing Religious Diversity” to narrow the circumstances in which opt outs are permissible, those guidelines still allow opt outs from “noncurricular activities, such as classroom parties or free-time events that involve materials or prac- tices in confict with a family's religious, and/or other, prac- tices.” Id., at 672a. B 1 At the time when this lawsuit was fled, petitioners Tamer Mahmoud and Enas Barakat had three children enrolled in MCPS, including one who was still in elementary school. Page Proof Pending Publication Mahmoud and Barakat are Muslims who believe “that man- kind has been divinely created as male and female” and “that `gender' cannot be unwoven from biological `sex'—to the ex- tent the two are even distinct—without rejecting the dignity and direction God bestowed on humanity from the start.” Id., at 165a–166a. Mahmoud and Barakat believe that it would be “immoral” to expose their “young, impressionable, elementary-aged son” to a curriculum that “undermine[s] Is- lamic teaching.” Id., at 532a. And, in their view, “[t]he sto- rybooks at issue in this lawsuit . . . directly undermine [their] efforts to raise” their son in the Islamic faith “because they encourage young children to question their sexuality and gender . . . and to dismiss parental and religious guidance on these issues.” Ibid. After the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro- duced, Mahmoud and Barakat asked to have their son ex- cused from the classroom when Prince & Knight was read. Their son's principal initially permitted the boy to sit outside Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 541 Opinion of the Court the classroom during that time. But, soon after, the Board announced that opt outs would no longer be available. Mah- moud and Barakat then felt “religiously compelled to send their son to private school at signifcant fnancial sacrifce.” Brief for Petitioners 16. Petitioners Jeff and Svitlana Roman also had a son en- rolled in an MCPS elementary school when this lawsuit was fled. Jeff Roman is Catholic, and Svitlana Roman is Ukrai- nian Orthodox. They believe that “sexuality is expressed only in marriage between a man and a woman for creating life and strengthening the marital union.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 166a. The Romans further believe “that gender and biological sex are intertwined and inseparable” and that “the young need to be helped to accept their own body as it was created.” Id., at 537a (internal quotation marks omitted). The Romans understand that their son “loves his teachers and implicitly trusts them,” and so they fear that allowing Page Proof Pending Publication those teachers to “teach principles about sexuality or gender identity that confict with [their] religious beliefs” would “signifcantly interfer[e] with [their] ability to form [their son's] religious faith and religious outlook on life.” Id., at 541a. After the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro- duced, the Romans asked the principal of their son's elemen- tary school to notify them when the books were being read and to excuse their son from that instruction. The Romans were initially told that it was their “right” to ask that their son not be present when the books are read, id., at 496a, but they were later informed that notice and opt outs would no longer be provided. Thus, the Romans, like Mah- moud and Barakat, were “religiously compelled to send their son to private school, at signifcant expense.” Brief for Peti- tioners 18. Petitioners Chris and Melissa Persak have two elementary-age daughters who attend public school in Mont- gomery County. The Persaks are Catholics who believe 542 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court “that all humans are created as male or female, and that a person's biological sex is a gift bestowed by God that is both unchanging and integral to that person's being.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 543a. The Persaks believe “that children— particularly those in elementary school—are highly impres- sionable to ideological instruction presented in children's books or by schoolteachers.” Id., at 544a. They are con- cerned that the Board's “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks “are being used to impose an ideological view of family life and sexuality that characterizes any divergent beliefs as `hurt- ful.' ” Ibid. They think that such instruction will “under- mine [their] efforts to raise [their] children in accordance with” their religious faith. Ibid. The Persaks' daughters were initially permitted to opt out of instruction related to the storybooks, but they no longer have that option. The fnal petitioner, Kids First, is an unincorporated asso- ciation of parents and teachers that was “formed to advocate for the return of parental notice and opt-out rights in the Page Proof Pending Publication Montgomery County Public Schools.” Id., at 624a. One of Kids First's board members—Grace Morrison—has a daugh- ter who previously attended an MCPS elementary school. Morrison's daughter has Down syndrome and attention def- cit disorder. She previously required special accommoda- tions from her public school, including a “full time, one-on- one paraeducator.” Id., at 624a–625a. Morrison's daughter also received special services from the school, such as speech and occupational therapy. Morrison and her husband are Catholics who believe that “marriage is the lifelong union of one man and one woman” and that gender is “interwoven” with sex. Id., at 625a. Due to their daughter's learning challenges, they fear that she “doesn't understand or differ- entiate instructions from her teachers and her parents” and that they “won't be able to contradict what she hears from teachers.” Id., at 626a. Because of the services provided to her disabled daughter in public school, Morrison faced enormous “pressure” to keep her daughter enrolled. Ibid. She asked that her daughter Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 543 Opinion of the Court be excused from “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction, even after the Board's decision to rescind opt outs. She was told, how- ever, that opt outs would not be possible. As a result, the Morrisons felt “religiously compelled” to remove their daughter from public school. Brief for Petitioners 19. They anticipate that it will cost at least $25,000 per year to replace the academic and other services that their daughter formerly received from the public school system. 2 Faced with the Board's decision to rescind opt outs, peti- tioners fled this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they as- serted that the Board's no-opt-out policy infringed their right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524 (2022). They sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting Page Proof Pending Publication the School Board from forcing [their] children and other students—over the objection of their parents—to read, listen to, or discuss” the storybooks. App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. In support of their request, the parents relied heavily on this Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205. That case concerned Amish parents who wished to withdraw their children from conventional schooling after the eighth grade, in direct contravention of a Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until the age of 16. In Yoder, we recognized that parents have a right “to direct the religious upbringing of their children,” and that this right can be in- fringed by laws that pose “a very real threat of undermin- ing” the religious beliefs and practices that parents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Given the substan- tial burdens that Wisconsin's compulsory-attendance law placed on the religious practices of the Amish, we held that it “carrie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id., at 218. 544 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court In the present case, the parents asserted that Yoder's prin- ciple applies to their situation, and they therefore asked for a preliminary injunction permitting their children to opt out of the challenged instruction pending the completion of their lawsuit. The District Court denied that relief. It charac- terized the petitioners' primary argument as an objection to school “indoctrination” and asserted that the petitioners had not “identifed any case recognizing a free exercise violation based on indoctrination.” Mahmoud v. McKnight, 688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 295 (Md. 2023). It dismissed Yoder as “sui generis” and “inexorably linked to the Amish community's unique religious beliefs and practices.” 688 F. Supp. 3d, at 294, 301. And although the District Court acknowledged that the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum might result in petitioners' being “less likely to succeed” in raising their children in their religious faiths, id., at 300, it nonetheless held that the curriculum was likely consistent with the Free Page Proof Pending Publication Exercise Clause. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affrmed. The ma- jority did not expressly endorse the District Court's view regarding the constitutionality of “indoctrination,” but it suggested that petitioners could succeed on their free exer- cise claim only if they could “show direct or indirect coercion arising out of the exposure” to the storybooks. Mahmoud v. McKnight, 102 F. 4th 191, 212 (2024). And the majority found that the evidence in the record was insuffcient to make that showing. The majority expressed concern that “[t]he record does not show how the Storybooks are actually being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. And without such evidence, the majority held, petitioners could not obtain a preliminary injunction because it could not simply be as- sumed that any past lessons had or that any future lessons would “cross the line and pressure students to change their views or act contrary to their faith.” Ibid. As for petition- ers' reliance on Yoder, the majority quickly dismissed that argument, describing the decision as “markedly circum- Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 545 Opinion of the Court scribed” and “tailored to the specifc evidence in [its] record.” 102 F. 4th, at 210–211. Judge Quattlebaum dissented. He accepted the parents' representation that “their faith compels that they teach their children about sex, human sexuality, gender and family life.” Id., at 222. And he acknowledged their claim that “the mes- sages from the books confict with and undermine the sin- cerely held religious beliefs they hold and seek to convey to their children.” Ibid. Judge Quattlebaum therefore con- cluded that the Board had “force[d] the parents to make a choice—either adhere to their faith or receive a free public education for their children.” Ibid. Forcing parents to make such a choice was, in his view, a burden on their reli- gion exercise. After the Fourth Circuit ruled, the parents asked this Court to review the decision, and we granted their petition for a writ of certiorari. 604 U. S. 1096 (2025). We now hold that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a pre- Page Proof Pending Publication liminary injunction and reverse the judgment below. II Our Constitution proclaims that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1. That restriction applies equally to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). And the right to free exercise, like other First Amendment rights, is not “shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506–507 (1969). Government schools, like all government institutions, may not place un- constitutional burdens on religious exercise. The parents assert that the Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice and opt outs—unconstitutionally burdens their religious exercise. At this stage, the parents seek a preliminary injunction that would permit them to have their 546 MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court children excused from instruction related to the storybooks while this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form of prelimi- nary relief, the parents must show that they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irrepara- ble harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the bal- ance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008). The parents have made that showing. III To begin, we hold that the parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the Board's policies unconstitutionally bur- den their religious exercise. “[W]e have long recognized the rights of parents to direct `the religious upbringing' of their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. 464, 486 (2020) (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213– Page Proof Pending Publication 214). And we have held that those rights are violated by government policies that “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of children. Id., at 218. Such inter- ference, we have observed, “carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Ibid. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that such an “ob- jective danger” is present here. A We start by describing the nature of the religious practice at issue here and explaining why it is burdened by the Board's policies. 1 At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend- ment protects “the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the performance of ” religious acts. Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 524 Cite as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025) 547 Opinion of the Court (internal quotation marks omitted). And for many people of faith across the country, there are few religious acts more important than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754 (2020) (“Religious education is vital to many faiths practiced in the United States”). Indeed, for many Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others, the religious educa- tion of children is not merely a preferred practice but rather a religious obligation. See id., at 754–756. The parent petitioners in this case refect this reality: they all believe they have a “sacred obligation” or “God-given responsibility” to raise their children in a way that is consistent with their religious beliefs and practices. App. to Pet. for Cert. 531a, 538a, 543a, 625a. The practice of educating one's children in one's religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a gener- ous measure of protection from our Constitution. “Drawing Page Proof Pending Publication on `enduring American tradition,' we have long recognized the rights of parents to direct `the religious upbringing' of their children.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214, 232). And this is not merely a right to teach religion in the confnes of one's own home. Rather, it extends to the choices that parents wish to make for their children outside the home. It protects, for example, a par- ent's decisi