FCC v. Consumers' Research (606 U.S. 656, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 2 Pages 656–747 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 27, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 656 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 24–354. Argued March 26, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025* The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. § 151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural areas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pur- sued universal service primarily through implicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the ex- pense of others. In 1996, Congress amended the Act and created a new framework for Page Proof Pending Publication achieving universal service. Section 254 of the amended statute re- quires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications services to “contribute” to a fund, known as the Universal Service Fund. See § 254(d). The FCC must use the money in the Fund to pay for universal-service subsidy programs. See §§ 254(a), (d), (e). The stat- ute designates the benefciaries of universal-service subsidies—low- income consumers, those in rural areas, schools and libraries, and rural hospitals. §§ 254(b)(3), (h)(1), ( j). And it provides detailed guidance regarding the communications services to which those benefciaries should have access. In deciding what services to subsidize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a sub- stantial majority of residential customers.” §§ 254(c)(1)(A)–(B). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made avail- able at an “affordable rate[ ].” § 254(b)(1). Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service policies. § 254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all consum- ers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should *Together with No. 24–422, Schools, Health, & Libraries Broadband Coalition et al. v. Consumers' Research et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 657 Syllabus have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public in- terest, convenience, and necessity.” § 254(b)(7). To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47 CFR § 54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund's projected quarterly expenses (the subsidy pay- ments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contribut- ing carriers' total projected quarterly revenue. § 54.709(a)(2). A car- rier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. § 54.709(a)(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Com- pany, a private, not-for-proft corporation, as the Fund's “permanent Administrator.” § 54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund's day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the fnancial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§ 54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund's expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carri- ers, and submits those fgures to the Commission for approval and even- Page Proof Pending Publication tual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§ 54.709(a)(2)–(3). In December 2021, the FCC set a 25.2% contribution factor for the frst quarter of 2022. Consumers' Research petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit, contending that the universal-service contribution scheme violates the nondelegation doctrine. The en banc court granted the pe- tition, replacing a panel decision to the contrary. See 109 F. 4th 743; 63 F. 4th 441. In the full Fifth Circuit's view, the combination of Con- gress's delegation to the FCC and the FCC's “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delegation did so independently. 109 F. 4th, at 778. Held: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the non- delegation doctrine. Pp. 672–698. (a) Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” § 1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation. At the same time, this Court has recognized that Congress may “seek[ ] assistance” from its coordinate branches and “vest[ ] discretion” in executive agencies to implement the laws it has enacted. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406. To distinguish between the permissible and the impermissible in this sphere, this Court asks whether Congress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. Id., at 409. 658 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Syllabus Under that test, Congress must make clear both “the general policy” the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105. Pp. 672–673. (b) Although the intelligible-principle standard has long guided this Court's nondelegation doctrine, Consumers' Research insists that a dif- ferent test applies here. According to Consumers' Research, universal- service contributions are taxes. And tax statutes, Consumers' Re- search argues, must satisfy a special nondelegation rule. For those statutes, Congress must set a defnite or objective limit on how much money an agency can collect—a numeric cap, a fxed tax rate, or the equivalent. Section 254 contains no such limit, so, in Consumers' Re- search's view, it is unconstitutional. The Court rejects that argument. To begin with, precedent fore- closes it: In both J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409, and Skinner v. Mid- America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 220–221, the Court declined requests to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legis- lation. The test Consumers' Research proposes also would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt, as Congress has often empowered agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. §§ 16, 243, 1815(d)(1). Consumers' Research re- Page Proof Pending Publication sponds that those other statutes can be distinguished as imposing fees, rather than taxes, and thus be exempted from its numeric-limit require- ment. But Skinner made clear that whether a charge is a tax or a fee is irrelevant to the nondelegation inquiry. See 490 U. S., at 223. Fi- nally, the Consumers' Research position produces absurd results, di- vorced from any reasonable understanding of constitutional values. Under its view, a revenue-raising statute containing non-numeric, quali- tative standards can never pass muster, no matter how tight the con- straints they impose. But a revenue-raising statute with a numeric limit will always pass muster, even if it effectively leaves an agency with boundless power. In precluding the former and approving the lat- ter, the Consumers' Research approach does nothing to vindicate the nondelegation doctrine or the separation of powers. Pp. 673–680. (c) Under the usual intelligible-principle test, the universal-service contribution scheme clears the nondelegation bar. Section 254 directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support universal-service programs. §§ 254(b)(5), (d), (e). The word “suffi- cient” sets both a foor and a ceiling—the FCC cannot raise less than what is adequate or necessary to fnance its universal-service programs, but it also cannot raise more than that amount. And the “suffciency” ceiling imposes a meaningful limit on the Commission, because Section 254 also provides appropriate guidance about the nature and content of universal service. The statute makes clear whom the program is in- Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 659 Syllabus tended to serve: those in rural and other high-cost areas (with a special nod to rural hospitals), low-income consumers, and schools and libraries. See §§ 254(b)(3), (6), (h)(1). And it also defnes the services those bene- fciaries should receive. In order for the FCC to subsidize a service, the service must be subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers, available at affordable rates, and essential to education, pub- lic health, or safety. §§ 254(b)(1), (3), (c)(1)(A)–(B). Those conditions, each alone and together, provide the FCC with determinate standards for operating the universal-service program. Consumers' Research contends that the Act gives the FCC boundless authority, but the provisions it points to show nothing of the kind. It frst argues that the Commission need not actually adhere to each of the criteria Section 254 uses to defne universal service. Properly under- stood, however, those criteria are separately mandatory. Next, Con- sumers' Research highlights Section 254(c)(1)'s description of universal service as an “evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically” in light of advances in technol- ogy. That provision, it says, enables the FCC to redefne universal service as it sees ft. But the permission Congress gave the FCC to fund different services over time does not strip the statute of standards Page Proof Pending Publication and constraints. The Commission still may fund only essential, widely used, and affordable services, for the beneft of only designated recipi- ents. Finally, Consumers' Research maintains that the statutory provi- sion enabling the FCC to articulate “[a]dditional principles” to guide its universal-service policies allows the agency to rewrite its own authority. § 254(b)(7). But that is not so, because Section 254(b)(7) requires the added principles to be “consistent with” the rest of the statute. So they cannot change the statute's other principles, much less its conditions on what subsidies can go toward and who can receive them. Pp. 680–691. (d) Consumers' Research separately claims that the FCC has imper- missibly delegated authority to the Administrator to set the contribution factor. In making this argument, Consumers' Research invokes what is commonly called the private nondelegation doctrine. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311, this Court struck down a statute authorizing certain coal producers to set rules for the rest of the indus- try, fnding the delegation improper because it was made to “private persons whose interests” are often “adverse to the interests of others.” But a counterpart case, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 388, approved a statute permitting private actors to make recommendations to a Government agency for “approv[al], disapprov[al], or modif[cation].” That arrangement was valid, because the private parties “function[ed] subordinately to” the agency and were subject to its “authority and surveillance.” Id., at 399. 660 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Syllabus Under those precedents, the Commission's use of the Administrator is permissible. The Administrator is broadly subordinate to the Com- mission: The Commission appoints the Administrator's Board of Direc- tors, approves its budget, and requires the Administrator to act “consist- ent with” its rules and directives. 47 CFR §§ 54.703(b)–(c), 54.715(c); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Communications Commission and the Universal Service Administrative Company 2 (Oct. 17, 2024). And the Commission's authority and oversight over the Ad- ministrator extend to determining the contribution factor. Working within FCC rules, the Administrator produces the initial projections of carrier revenues and Fund expenses that feed into the contribution fac- tor. §§ 54.709(a)(2)–(3). The Administrator then reports its fgures to the Commission, which reviews—and if needed, revises—the projections before approving them and publishing the contribution factor. See § 54.709(a)(3). The Commission then has 14 days to make additional changes before the factor is “deemed approved by the Commission.” Ibid. So although the Administrator makes recommendations, the Commission is, throughout, the fnal authority. Pp. 692–695. (e) The Court also rejects the basis of the decision below: that the “combination” of Congress's grant of authority to the FCC and the Page Proof Pending Publication FCC's reliance on the Administrator violates the Constitution, even if neither one does so alone. 109 F. 4th, at 778 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit founded that theory on Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub- lic Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 483–484, where this Court struck down a statute because it gave an executive offcer two “layers of protection” from the President's removal authority. Even granting that each layer of protection was alone permissible, the Court thought the combination was too much. According to the Fifth Circuit, similar reasoning applied here: Even if Congress lawfully con- ferred discretion on the Commission and the Commission lawfully sought assistance from the Administrator, the combination was imper- missible. 109 F. 4th, at 778. But the court's logic does not work. In Free Enterprise Fund, the two layers of for-cause protection operated on a single axis, with the one exacerbating the other. That is not the case here: A law violates the traditional nondelegation doctrine when it authorizes an agency to legislate. And a law violates the private nondelegation doctrine when it allows non-governmental entities to gov- ern. Those doctrines do not operate on the same axis. So a measure implicating (but not violating) one does not compound a measure impli- cating (but not violating) the other, in a way that pushes the combina- tion over a constitutional line. Pp. 696–698. 109 F. 4th 743, reversed and remanded. Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 661 Syllabus Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Ka- vanaugh, J., post, p. 698, and Jackson, J., post, p. 710, fled concurring opinions. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 711. Acting Solicitor General Harris argued the cause for peti- tioners in No. 24–354. On the briefs were former Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Vivek Suri, Mark B. Stern, Gerard J. Sinzdak, Jacob M. Lewis, and James M. Carr. Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners in No. 24–422. With him on the briefs for petitioner Competitive Carriers Association et al. in both cases were C. Harker Rhodes IV, Kevin Wynosky, and Jennifer Tatel. Christo- pher J. Wright fled briefs for petitioner SHLB Coalition et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Sean A. Page Proof Pending Publication Lev, Jason Neal, Mohammad M. Ali, and Andrew Jay Schwartzman. R. Trent McCotter argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the briefs were Jonathan Berry, Michael Buschbacher, Jared M. Kelson, James R. Conde, Robert Henneke, and Chance Weldon.† †Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the State of Alaska by Treg Taylor, Attorney General of Alaska, and Laura Wolff, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Colorado et al. by Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General of Colorado, Shannon Stevenson, Solic- itor General, Russell D. Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General, Judson Cary and Michel Singer Nelson, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, and Dayna Zolle Hauser, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kris Mayes of Ari- zona, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michi- gan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Letitia A. James of New York, Jeff Jackson of North Carolina, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of 662 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly a century ago, Congress charged the then-new Fed- eral Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) Rhode Island, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Charity R. Clark of Ver- mont, Josh Kaul of Wisconsin, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for AASA— The School Superintendents Association et al. by Ari Holtzblatt; for the American Library Association by Bryan Killian and Kimberly L. Morn- ing; for Bipartisan Former Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission by Peter Karanjia; for CoBank, ACB, et al. by Andrew D. Lipman and Russell M. Blau; for Former Leadership of the Universal Service Administrative Co. by Gina Spade and Jennifer McKee; for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by Tillman L. Lay, Gregory M. Caffas, and Amanda Karras; for Members of Congress by Kevin F. King; for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners by James Braford Ramsay; for the National Lifeline Association et al. by Miles E. Coleman, John J. Heitmann, Christian J. Myers, William A. Rivera, Louis Lopez, and David S. Yellin; for the Oglala Sioux Tribe by Mario Gonzalez and Majel Russell; for Public Citizen by Nicolas A. San- Page Proof Pending Publication sone, Allison M. Zieve, and Scott L. Nelson; for Public Knowledge et al. by John Bergmayer, Greg Guice, and Matthew Holder; for State-Level Associations by Edward A. Yorkgitis, Jr., and Ira T. Kasdan; for WTA— Advocates for Rural Broadband by Michael F. Smith; and for Julian Davis Mortenson et al. by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R. Frazelle. Jeffrey B. Wall, Morgan L. Ratner, and Christopher J. Walker fled a brief in both cases for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America urging vacatur. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 24–354 were fled for the National Foreign Trade Council by Alan B. Morrison; for NCTA—The Internet & Television Association et al. by Samuel L. Feder, Matthew S. Hellman, Rick C. Chessen, Russell P. Hanser, and Eve L. Hill; and for Gerard N. Magliocca et al. by Gerard N. Magliocca, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the State of West Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, Rusty D. Crandell, and Linley Wilson, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uthmeier of Florida, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Okla- homa, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Jason Miyares of Virginia; for the Alliance Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 663 Opinion of the Court with making communications services available, at affordable prices, to all Americans. That objective became known as “universal service.” Some decades on, near the turn of the 21st century, Congress reaffrmed its commitment to univer- sal service while providing new and more detailed instruc- tions to the FCC about how to achieve it. Under the amended statutory plan, the FCC would use required pay- ments, called contributions, from telecommunications compa- nies to subsidize basic communications services for consum- ers in certain underserved communities—particularly, rural Defending Freedom by Jacob P. Warner, James A. Campbell, and John J. Bursch; for Americans for Prosperity Foundation by Michael Pepson; for the Cato Institute et al. by Thomas Berry, Brent Skorup, Charles M. Brandt, and Ilya Shapiro; for the Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., et al. by David H. Thompson and Peter A. Patterson; for the Immigration Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec; for the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc., et al. by Jay C. Page Proof Pending Publication Johnson and Craig Gilley; for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation by Tyler Martinez; for the Southeastern Legal Foundation by Braden H. Boucek and Celia Howard O'Leary; and for TechFreedom by Corbin K. Barthold. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in No. 24–354 were fled for The Buckeye Institute by David C. Tryon and Alex M. Certo; for the Foundation for Government Accountability by David J. Craig; for the Pa- cifc Legal Foundation by Luke A. Wake and Frank D. Garrison; and for Chad Squitieri by Andrew S. Tulumello. Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the Ad Hoc Health- care Group by James U. Troup and Jeffrey A. Mitchell; for Advancing American Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for the Aleutian Pribilof Is- lands Association, Inc., et al. by Geoffrey D. Strommer and Caroline P. Mayhew; for the America First Legal Foundation by Christopher E. Mills and Reed D. Rubinstein; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, and Michael Boos; for the Competitive Enterprise Institute by Devin Watkins; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Damon Hewitt, Dariely Rodriguez, Gil- lian Cassell-Stiga, and Marc Epstein; for the Mackinac Center for Public Policy et al. by Alex T. MacDonald; for the New Civil Liberties Alliance by Zhonette M. Brown and Markham S. Chenoweth; for the Reason Foun- dation by Alexander Volokh; for Reed Smith LLP by Kyle O. Sollie; and for Ilan Wurman, pro se. 664 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court and low-income areas. To carry out that mandate, the Com- mission established discrete subsidy programs for the con- sumers Congress had identifed, set up a special fund to re- ceive and disburse the companies' payments, and enlisted a private corporation, called the Universal Service Adminis- trative Company, to help manage that fund's operations. The question in this case is whether the universal-service scheme—more particularly, its contribution mechanism—vi- olates the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine, either be- cause Congress has given away its power to the FCC or because the FCC has given away its power to a private com- pany. We hold that no impermissible transfer of authority has occurred. Under our nondelegation precedents, Con- gress suffciently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-service contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on Page Proof Pending Publication the Administrative Company only for non-binding advice. Nothing in those arrangements, either separately or to- gether, violates the Constitution. I A The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, established the FCC and empowered it to regulate communi- cations services. In the Act's very frst provision, Congress instructed the FCC to pursue the goal now called universal service. The FCC, Congress stated, was “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. § 151. The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some segments of the population without access to needed communications serv- ices. That is because providers of those services, also called carriers, can reap greater profts from some classes of cus- Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 665 Opinion of the Court tomers than from others. Carriers, for example, make more money in urban areas than in rural ones because fxed costs in cities are spreadable over many more users. See S. Ben- jamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy § 15.3.1, p. 763 (2d ed. 2006); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Univer- sal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8784 (1997) (Universal Service Order). Similarly, carriers may prefer to focus on business customers instead of residential or not-for-proft customers (like schools and libraries) because the former are willing to pay more for the same services. See id., at 8784. So carri- ers have incentives to neglect some kinds of customers in providing services or setting prices. See P. Huber, M. Kel- logg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law § 6.1.2, pp. 6–9, 6–10, and n. 26 (3d ed. Supp. 2022). The result, poli- cymakers thought, would be severe inequities in access to communications systems, and a swiss-cheese-like communi- cations network for the whole country. See ibid.; Universal Page Proof Pending Publication Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8780–8781, 8783. Under the original Act, the FCC addressed that concern— and promoted universal service—through a “patchwork quilt of implicit and explicit subsidies.” FCC, Report to Con- gress 5 (FCC 98–67, 1998). The earliest and dominant squares of that quilt were implicit subsidies, provided under the FCC's authority to set “just and reasonable” rates. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784; 47 U. S. C. § 201(b). Carriers then operated as regulated monopolies, with the FCC (and its state counterparts) superintending the rates they could charge different kinds of customers for different services. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784–8785; Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law § 6.1.1.2, p. 6–7. And regulators used that authority over rates to shift costs: Long-distance rates were set enough above cost “to subsidize local rates, business rates to subsi- dize [non-business] rates, and urban rates to subsidize rural rates.” Id., p. 6–7. So, for example, a “large New York [City] brokerage frm making heavy use of long-distance 666 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court service” would end up “subsidiz[ing] the local services of homeowners in Fishkill.” Ibid.; see Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784. Over time, though, towns like Fishkill benefted as well from explicit subsidy programs. The FCC, for example, began in the 1980s to levy assess- ments on long-distance carriers and disburse the proceeds to carriers serving high-cost communities. See id., at 8890– 8892; 47 CFR §§ 36.601–36.641, 69.116(a) (1996). And the FCC began, through the so-called Lifeline program, to make payments directly reducing low-income consumers' monthly phone bills. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8957–8958; §§ 69.104( j)–(l), 69.117, 69.203(f)–(g). In 1996, Congress overhauled the Act to “promote compe- tition and reduce regulation” in the telecommunications sec- tor. See Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56. As part of those reforms, Congress created a new framework for achieving universal service. The amended Act discarded Page Proof Pending Publication the implicit subsidies embedded in ratemaking and substi- tuted a plan for explicit transfer payments to ensure that basic communications services extend across the country. See § 254; Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8783– 8784. Section 254 of the amended statute requires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications services to “con- tribute,” in line with the statute and FCC rules, to a fund designed to “preserve and advance universal service.” § 254(d). The FCC must use the money in that fund, now known as the Universal Service Fund, to pay for subsidy programs for designated populations and facilities needing improved access. See §§ 254(a), (e); Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U. S. 140, 143–144 (2025). The statute, for example, continues the Lifeline program aid- ing low-income individuals. See § 254( j). It directs the FCC to provide assistance to rural hospitals, as well as to schools and libraries. See § 254(h)(1). And it instructs the FCC to expand communications access for consumers in “rural” and Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 667 Opinion of the Court other “high cost areas.” § 254(b)(3). The carrier contribu- tions collected to support those programs, the Act further provides, must be “suffcient” to carry them out and so to “advance universal service.” §§ 254(d)–(e). The statute also provides detailed guidance for identifying the specifc communications services to which the statute's benefciaries should have access. On the one hand, the Act recognizes that those services, given the expected pace of technological change, are unlikely to stay static: Universal service, says the statute, is “an evolving level of telecommu- nications services that the Commission shall establish peri- odically” as it accounts for “advances in telecommunications and information technologies and services.” § 254(c)(1). On the other hand, the Act specifes the relevant criteria in every period. In deciding which communications services the “defnition” of universal service encompasses, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service (1) is “essential Page Proof Pending Publication to education, public health, or public safety”; (2) has, through market forces, “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers”; and (3) is in fact “being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers.” §§ 254(c)(1)(A)–(C). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made available at an “affordable rate[ ].” § 254(b)(1). Congress thus struck a balance in establishing universal service's metes and bounds—affording the FCC latitude to adapt to technological developments, but insisting that the FCC always look to whether services are essential, affordable, and widely used. Echoing the provisions just described, Congress also listed six “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” all its universal-service policies. § 254(b). First, “[q]uality serv- ices should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.” § 254(b)(1). Second, “all regions of the Nation” should have access to those services. § 254(b)(2). Third, all consumers, “including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,” should have access to 668 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court services that are “reasonably comparable” in quality and price to those in urban areas. § 254(b)(3). Fourth, every carrier should make “an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution” to the achievement of universal service. § 254(b)(4). Fifth, the subsidies given to advance that goal should be “specific, predictable[,] and sufficient. ” § 254(b)(5). And sixth, “schools,” “libraries,” and “health care providers” should have access to services. § 254(b)(6). That list concludes with a provision enabling the FCC to add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” § 254(b)(7). The Commission now operates, under the terms of the Act, four universal-service programs. Lifeline, which predated the Act, gives low-income consumers a markdown on their monthly phone bills, usually of $9.25 per month. See § 254( j); 47 CFR §§ 54.400–54.424 (2024); supra, at 666. The Page Proof Pending Publication High Cost program, which similarly built on a pre-1996 ex- plicit subsidy program, furnishes carriers with funds en- abling them to provide basic communications services in “rural, insular, and [other] high cost areas” at costs compara- ble to those charged in urban areas. § 254(b)(3); §§ 54.302– 54.322; supra, at 666. The E-Rate program subsidizes com- munications services for schools and libraries across the country, with greater discounts going to facilities in rural or low-income areas. See §§ 254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); §§ 54.500– 54.523; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at 144. And fnally, the Rural Health program supports rural hospitals and other health care facilities, enabling them to use telemedicine in car- ing for far-fung patients and ensuring that they receive the needed communications services at roughly the rates urban facilities pay. See §§ 254(b)(6), (h)(1)(A); §§ 54.600–54.633. To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund for those programs, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47 CFR § 54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 669 Opinion of the Court numerator is the Fund's projected expenses for the upcoming quarter (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is the total projected revenue of contributing carriers during that same period. See § 54.709(a)(2). A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contri- bution factor. See § 54.709(a)(3). So, for example, if the FCC forecasts that it will need, in a given quarter, 25% of all carrier revenues to cover the costs of its universal-service programs, a carrier expecting to generate $100 million in revenue in that quarter will have to contribute $25 million. The carrier may then pass along to its customers the cost of its contributions. See § 54.712(a). Every quarter, the FCC updates its expense and revenue projections, comes up with a new contribution factor, and announces it in a public notice. See §§ 54.709(a)(2)–(3). During the next 14 days, the FCC may revise the factor as it thinks proper. See § 54.709(a)(3). Page Proof Pending Publication If the FCC takes no action within that period, the factor is “deemed approved by the Commission” and goes into effect. Ibid. Carriers must then kick in to the Fund accordingly. The FCC in 1998 appointed the Universal Service Admin- istrative Company as the Fund's “permanent Administra- tor.” § 54.701(a). The Administrator, as we will call it, is a private, not-for-proft corporation owned by an association of carriers. See § 54.5; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at 144. It manages the day-to-day operations of the Fund, “bill[ing] and collect[ing] contributions from carriers” and “distribut- [ing] the resulting pot of money, as FCC rules provide, to program benefciaries.” Ibid.; see § 54.702. More relevant here, the Administrator plays a role each quarter in produc- ing the fnancial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§ 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Specifi- cally, the Administrator estimates the Fund's expenses (again, the costs of the programs plus overhead) and adds up the estimates it receives from individual carriers about their revenues. See ibid. The Administrator then submits those 670 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court fgures, along with supporting documentation, to the Com- mission for approval and eventual use in calculating required contributions. See ibid. B In December 2021, the FCC proposed a contribution factor of 25.2% for the frst quarter of 2022. Respondents—the non-proft organization Consumers' Research, a carrier, and several consumers (collectively, Consumers' Research)—fled comments (during the 14-day, post-notice period described above) requesting that the FCC instead set the contribution factor at 0%. In support of that submission, Consumers' Research argued that the universal-service contribution scheme violates the Constitution's nondelegation rule. The Commission took no action in response, so the 25.2% contri- bution factor went into effect. Consumers' Research then petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The en banc court Page Proof Pending Publication granted the petition, replacing a panel decision to the con- trary. See 109 F. 4th 743 (2024); 63 F. 4th 441 (2023). In the full Fifth Circuit's view, the universal-service contribu- tion mechanism is unconstitutional because of its so-called “double-layered delegation.” 109 F. 4th, at 782. The court's analysis proceeded by expressing “skepti- c[ism]” about each of two aspects of the contribution scheme, while declining to rule on either one. Id., at 778. First, the court stated, Congress in Section 254 “may have delegated legislative power” to the FCC by giving it “the power to tax” carriers “without supplying an intelligible principle to guide [its] discretion.” Id., at 756. The court described Section 254's limits on the Commission's authority as “mini- mal,” “contentless,” and “amorphous.” Id., at 760, 761, 767. Nonetheless, the court decided not to decide whether Con- gress had impermissibly transferred authority to the Com- mission. Id., at 767. Second, the court continued, the Com- mission “may have impermissibly delegated the taxing power to private entities” by involving the Administrator in Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 671 Opinion of the Court setting contribution amounts. Id., at 756. The court pos- ited that the FCC had “de facto abdicate[d]” governmental responsibilities to the Administrator by giving it the “fnal say” on how much carriers pay into the Fund. Id., at 771. Again, however, the court demurred as to the bottom line, reserving judgment on whether the Administrator's role in the contribution scheme violates the Constitution. See id., at 778. The dispositive constitutional problem, the Fifth Circuit ultimately held, is “the combination of Congress's sweeping delegation to FCC and FCC's unauthorized subdelegation” to the Administrator. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Relying heavily on this Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010), the court opined that “two or more things that are not independently unconstitutional can combine to violate the Constitution's separation of powers.” 109 F. 4th, at 778 Page Proof Pending Publication (emphasis in original). And that was true here for a pair of reasons. The “double-layered delegation,” the court thought, had “no foothold in history or tradition.” Id., at 782. And, the court went on, that delegation “undermine[s] democratic accountability” by obscuring whether Congress, the FCC, or the Administrator bears responsibility for the amount of contributions. Id., at 783–784. We granted certiorari, 604 U. S. 1029 (2024), and now re- verse the decision below.1 In this Court, Consumers' Re- 1 When we granted certiorari, we asked the parties to address whether this case is moot. The parties agree that it is not moot, and we do too. The relevant facts are as follows. Consumers' Research fled suit to avoid payments arising from the contribution factor that the FCC set for the frst quarter of 2022. But by now Consumers' Research has made those payments, and a court might not be able to order a refund. Assuming not, the case would be moot—except that it qualifes as “capable of repeti- tion, yet evading review.” Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 170 (2016). A given contribution factor is in effect for only three months, a period “too short to complete judicial review of [its] lawfulness.” Ibid. And “it is reasonable to expect” that Consumers' 672 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court search separates what the Fifth Circuit combined. It con- tends (as it did below) that Congress's delegation to the FCC violates the Constitution, and that the FCC's delegation to the Administrator does so too. We reject each argument, and also reject the Fifth Circuit's combination theory. II Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” § 1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation: Legisla- tive power, we have held, belongs to the legislative branch, and to no other. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001). At the same time, we have recognized that Congress may “seek[ ] assistance” from its coordinate branches to secure the “effect intended by its acts of legislation.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United Page Proof Pending Publication States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). And in particular, Con- gress may “vest[ ] discretion” in executive agencies to imple- ment and apply the laws it has enacted—for example, by de- ciding on “the details of [their] execution.” Ibid.; see Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825) (“[T]he maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments”); Whitman, 531 U. S., at 474–475 (A “de- gree of policy judgment” can “be left to those executing or applying the law”). Research will have to make the same kind of payments again. Ibid. So the case, as the Fifth Circuit concluded, is not moot. See 109 F. 4th 743, 753 (2024). Several other courts of appeals would have arrived at the opposite conclusion, because they require a party to seek preliminary re- lief in order to avail itself of the capable-of-repetition rule. See, e. g., Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F. 3d 1002, 1008–1009 (CADC 2010), cert. denied, 563 U. S. 1001 (2011). But our decisions have never hinted at such a re- quirement. See, e. g., Kingdomware Technologies, 579 U. S., at 170; SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 108–110 (1978). And for good reason: The “capable of repetition” rule applies because of the nature of some controversies, not because of the parties' litigating decisions. Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 673 Opinion of the Court To distinguish between the permissible and the impermis- sible in this sphere, we have long asked whether Congress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409. Under that test, “the degree of agency discretion that is ac- ceptable varies according to the scope of the power congres- sionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475. The “guidance” needed is greater, we have explained, when an agency action will “affect the entire national economy” than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue (e. g., the defni- tion of “country [grain] elevators”). Ibid. But in examin- ing a statute for the requisite intelligible principle, we have generally assessed whether Congress has made clear both “the general policy” that the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority. ” Amer ican Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946). And similarly, we have asked if Congress has provided suffcient Page Proof Pending Publication standards to enable both “the courts and the public [to] as- certain whether the agency” has followed the law. OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 144 (1941). If Congress has done so—as we have almost always found—then we will not disturb its grant of authority. A Although the intelligible-principle standard has focused our nondelegation doctrine for a century, Consumers' Re- search and the dissent primarily argue that we must apply a different test here. Section 254, as just described, author- izes the Commission to raise revenue in the form of carrier “contribut[ions]” for universal-service programs. § 254(d); see supra, at 666. Consumers' Research views those re- quired contributions as taxes. See Brief for Respondents 25– 29; see also post, at 722, 738–739 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And it argues that tax statutes—and probably all revenue- raising statutes—have to satisfy a special nondelegation rule. 674 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court For those statutes, Congress must set a “defnite” or “objec- tive limit” on how much money an agency can collect—a nu- meric cap, a fxed rate, or the equivalent. Brief for Re- spondents 32, 36; see id., at 33–35; see also post, at 723–725 (stating that a “tax rate” is likely required, but a “cap” may also suffce). Without such a limit, Consumers' Research claims, no intelligible principle (however constraining) will do. See Brief for Respondents 46, 66. And all agree that Section 254 contains no determinate cap or formula. So, on Consumers' Research's telling, it effects an unconstitutional delegation.2 But this Court's precedents foreclose that argument. Twice before, we have rejected a party's request to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation. In J. W. Hampton, a taxpayer contended that when Congress is “exercis[ing] the power to levy taxes and fx customs du- ties,” it lacks the usual leeway to confer discretion on agen- Page Proof Pending Publication cies. 276 U. S., at 409. “The [legal] authorities,” the Court responded, “make no such distinction.” Ibid. And then the Court set out the “intelligible principle” standard as the uni- versal method for assessing delegations. Ibid. More than sixty years later, we reiterated that holding. In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 220 (1989), another litigant urged that “Congress' taxing power” can be dele- gated only “with much stricter guidelines” than are normally used. Citing J. W. Hampton, we again—and unanimously— rejected that “two-tiered theory of nondelegation.” 490 U. S., at 220–221. “[N]othing” in the Constitution's text or structure, Skinner explained, “distinguish[es] Congress' power to tax from its other enumerated powers” “in terms 2 Although endorsing the same rule as Consumers' Research, the dissent claims that the rule is merely an application of the intelligible-principle test. See post, at 723–724. That is mistaken: The intelligible-principle test requires an intelligible principle, not a “prescribed . . . tax rate.” Post, at 723. So what we say about the Consumers' Research position generally goes as well for the dissent's. Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 675 Opinion of the Court of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that Con- gress may delegate to the Executive.” Ibid. Nor, the Court added, did history at all distinguish the two. See id., at 221 (“From its earliest days to the present, Congress, when enacting tax legislation,” has at times delegated “dis- cretionary authority” to the Executive). So whether or not a tax is at issue—so say our cases—the usual nondelegation standard applies. And that standard is, again, trained on intelligible principles, not on numeric caps and “mathemati- cal formula[s].” United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577 (1939); see supra, at 673.3 The alternative test Consumers' Research and the dissent propose also would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt. Relying on this Court's nondelegation precedents, Congress has often enacted statutes empowering agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate. See Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 7–9 (listing nine “ex- Page Proof Pending Publication ample[s]”). Indeed, such statutes are endemic in the sphere of fnancial regulation. The Federal Reserve Board, for in- stance, funds its operations by levying on Federal Reserve Banks “an assessment suffcient to pay its estimated ex- 3 The dissent's attempt to deal with these precedents is not successful. Relegating discussion of J. W. Hampton to a footnote, the dissent refuses to acknowledge that decision's categorical rejection of a different nondele- gation standard for tax statutes than for others. See post, at 737, n. 15. The dissent contends that the tax at issue there could have met its own rate-or-cap test, but glosses over that the Court instead asked only about intelligible principles. See ibid. And although the dissent suggests oth- erwise, J. W. Hampton's holding that the statute had an intelligible princi- ple in no way hinged on the existence of a numeric rate or cap. See 276 U. S., at 404–405. The dissent's discussion of Skinner is not much better. Our holding there compels the dissent to say that it is not proposing a “different and stricter” test for “when Congress delegates the power to tax.” Post, at 723. But in the same paragraph, the dissent does just that: It asserts that a delegation involving the taxing power “must supply more signifcant limits on an agency's discretion” than one involving other Government powers. Ibid. And so the dissent collides with both J. W. Hampton and Skinner. 676 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court penses.” 12 U. S. C. § 243. The Offce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) likewise “collect[s] ” from OCC- chartered banks an “assessment, fee, or other charge” as the Offce “determines is necessary or appropriate to carry out [its] responsibilities.” § 16. And the Deposit Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which protects the savings of millions of Americans, is f- nanced through charges on banks “which the Corporation may by regulation prescribe, after giving due consideration to the need to establish and maintain the [Fund's] reserve ratio. ” § 1815(d)(1). In none of those (or many other) revenue-raising statutes does a number appear. So all would be on the constitutional chopping block under Con- sumers' Research's reasoning. Consumers' Research is conficted about how to approach that problem, but sometimes tries to draw a line between taxes and fees. Our decision in National Cable Television Page Proof Pending Publication Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974) (NCTA), recognized that distinction, as Consumers' Research notes. See Brief for Respondents 28. We there described “fees” as “bestow[ing]” a reciprocal “beneft on the [payor], not shared by other members of society.” NCTA, 415 U. S., at 341. By contrast, “taxes” are expected to “inure[ ] to the beneft” of the wider public. Id., at 343. In its brief, Consumers' Re- search argues that its numeric-cap standard applies to both taxes and fees: As to either, Congress's delegation to an agency must include an “objective upper limit[ ].” Brief for Respondents 37; see id., at 36–38. At argument, however, Consumers' Research relied on the tax vs. fee distinction to get out from under the long list of statutes its position places in jeopardy. Most of those statutes, it argued, involve not taxes but fees, where the charge refects simply “the value of the beneft to the” payor. Tr. of Oral Arg. 134; see id., at 148. So, Consumers' Research suggested, if we label carrier contributions “taxes” and then make only taxes subject to the numeric-limit requirement, there would be minimal fall- Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 677 Opinion of the Court out from adopting its position. See ibid. The dissent joins Consumers' Research in pressing that argument. See post, at 733–739. But the problems with going down that road are substan- tial. First and as already shown, precedent forecloses it. Indeed, in rejecting a stricter test for delegations made “under Congress' taxing power,” Skinner specifcally noted that its position rendered irrelevant the question (which, we noted, “so exercised the District Court”) whether the charges there were “user fees” or a “form of taxation.” 490 U. S., at 223. Either way, the Court held, the delegation in- quiry was just the same, and just the usual one. See ibid.4 Second, Consumers' Research offers no argument for why categorizing something as a fee rather than a tax should mat- ter for delegation purposes. To the contrary, its brief sug- gests the difference should make no difference—that instead all revenue-raising measures should be treated the same. Page Proof Pending Publication Brief for Respondents 36–38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 132–133 (re- peating the point). The distinction is proposed only as an artifcial method for limiting the effects of a holding in Con- sumers' Research's favor, should the court be too squeamish to go all the way. And third, the distinction between taxes and fees, even if occasionally needed, is a morass—or as the Government (which levies both) puts it, “unbelievably murky in practice.” 4 The dissent once again does not know what to do with Skinner. See supra, at 675, n. 3. According to the dissent, Skinner “did not invite courts” to “disregard the basic distinction” between fees and taxes in con- sidering the permissibility of delegations. Post, at 737. But we do not know what else the Skinner Court did when it said the following: “In light of th[e] conclusion” that the usual nondelegation test applies to tax legislation, “we need not concern ourselves with the threshold question” whether the “pipeline safety users `fees' ” at issue “are more properly thought of as a form of taxation.” 490 U. S., at 223. Fees or taxes—it just did not matter. And that was so, contra the dissent, irrespective of whether the charge at issue was numeric—a feature that Skinner's treat- ment of the purported fee/tax distinction never thought to mention. 678 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. A charge is a “fee,” according to NCTA, when it is for a “beneft” granted to the payor that is “not shared by other members of society.” 415 U. S., at 341. But articulating that test is a fair bit easier than applying it, because it is often hard to say whether a beneft is so “shared.” Consider the charge that banks pay to obtain FDIC Deposit Insurance. See supra, at 676. The banks beneft from that insurance (it helps them attract money and prevents bank runs). So maybe the charge looks like a fee? But then again, depositors also beneft (because the insur- ance protects their money) and so does the wider public (be- cause everyone gains from having a stable banking system). So maybe the charge instead looks like a tax? Or take an- other example: the OCC's assessments on banks. See ibid. Are they fees because a bank must pay them to hold an OCC- issued charter? Or are they taxes because the OCC uses Page Proof Pending Publication the funds collected for regulatory programs benefting the public? Consumers' Research does not know. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 134 (describing the OCC statute as “kind of on the line,” “tough,” and “maybe . . . questionable”).5 5 The dissent responds by replacing the test from NCTA—our leading case on the subject—with a different one, which asks as well whether a charge is for a cost imposed by the payor. Post, at 738. That alternative test, the dissent promises, reveals that all the fnancial charges we have discussed are fees, whereas universal-service contributions are taxes. But even spotting the dissent its preferred test, the guaranteed clarity fails to emerge. Take the dissent's description of the OCC's assessments: They are fees because they “offset the costs the OCC incurs in fulflling its statutory mandate to supervise, regulate, and charter national banks.” Post, at 736, n. 14. Yet much the same can be said of universal-service contributions: They pay for the costs of the programs the FCC is man- dated by statute to implement. Or similarly, consider the dissent's de- scription of Federal Reserve levies: They are fees because they pay for “regulatory costs,” rather than providing general Government revenues. Ibid. But again, that is also what carriers' contributions do, in funding the costs of universal-service regulatory programs. So the dissent's new test does not much clear away the mire. Cite as: 606 U. S. 656 (2025) 679 Opinion of the Court Or fnally and most relevantly: What category do carriers' contributions belong in? Universal service is of course a public beneft. But carriers gain in tangible ways from hav- ing an all-inclusive network, and they often receive direct subsidies from the FCC's universal-service programs. For those reasons, the carriers' main trade associations view the contributions as fees. See id., at 76, 80. The Government, by contrast, sees “genuine ambiguity” on the issue, but “as- sum[es]” they are taxes. Id., at 52–53. It is a good thing for the state of the law that we do not have to decide be- tween the two, in this case or others raising a delegation challenge.6 And yet a greater problem inheres in the shared position of Consumers' Research and the dissent: Whatever it applies to ( just taxes or fees as well), its focus on numeric limits produces absurd results, divorced from any reasonable un- derstanding of constitutional values. Under that view, a Page Proof Pending Publication revenue-raising statute containing non-numeric, qualitative 6 The dissent's case for characterizing contributions as taxes only under- scores the diffculty. Carriers, the dissent frst says, “do not gain any special beneft” from the contributions they make. Post, at 738. But as just noted, that would be news to the carriers: Although they pay the bill, they are lined up here to defend universal service, because (in their law- yer's words) they “beneft[ ] quite considerably” from the program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 76. So next the dissent tries this one: The statutory scheme creates a tax because it “takes money from some (carriers) and gives it to others (libraries, schools, and the like).” Post, at 738. But again, carri- ers both give and receive; the program, as it has from its beginnings, reallocates money among them. See supra, at 665–666. And even put- ting that fact aside, the dissent's test would turn some things it labels fees into taxes. Consider FDIC insurance charges: They are funds the FDIC takes from some (banks) and gives to others (depositors of failed banks). See post, at 735, 738, 739, n. 17. The dissent asserts in response that the FDIC's redistribution is different because “[t]he FDIC program is an insurance plan.” Post, at 739, n. 17. But in proposing yet one more dis- tinction to get everything lined up right, the dissent unwittingly proves the point: The fee/tax distinction is a diffcult one, and Skinner was right not to make the nondelegation inquiry ride on it. 680 FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Opinion of the Court standards can never pass muster, no matter how much guid- ance those standards provide and how tight the constraints they impose. But a revenue-raising statute with a numeric limit will always pass muster, even if it effectively leaves an agency with boundless power. Consider a hypothetical raised at oral argument: Congress tells the FCC it can de- mand payments from carriers of any amount it wants up to $5 trillion. (The actual cost of universal service is, of course, a tiny fraction of that amount.) According to Con- sumers' Research, that statute is permissible because . . . well, because Congress has set the $5 trillion fgure. See id., at 124 (“[T]hen we would know that Congress itself has made that determination”); see id., at 123–127; Brief for Re- spondents 5, 63, 66; see also post, at 743–744. But so what? The purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to enforce limits on the “degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” Mistretta v. United States, Page Proof Pending Publication 488 U. S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The anywhere-up-to-$5-trillion tax statute would not do that, whereas a statute with qualitative limits well might. In ap- proving the former and precluding the latter, the Consumers' Research approach does nothing to vindicate the nondelega- tion doctrine or, more broadly, the separation of powers. B We therefore return to the usual intelligible-principle test to decide