Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. (606 U.S. 748, 2025)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 2 Pages 748–830 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 27, 2025 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 748 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 Syllabus KENNEDY, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al. v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 24–316. Argued April 21, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025 In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare serv- ices. Congress codifed the Task Force's role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS's Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover with- Page Proof Pending Publication out cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” rat- ings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that mem- bers and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the ex- tent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 299b– 4(a)(1), (6). Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Afford- able Care Act's preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in fed- eral court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 em- ployees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal offcers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal offcers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government's appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratifed existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Cir- cuit affrmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior offcers because they cannot Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 749 Syllabus be “ `independent' ” and “free from `political pressure' ” while simultane- ously being supervised by a political appointee. 104 F. 4th 930, 944. Held: Task Force members are inferior offcers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause. Pp. 759–794. (a) The Appointments Clause in Article II specifes how “Offcers of the United States” must be appointed, dividing all offcers into two classes. Principal offcers must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Inferior offcers likewise may be appointed by Presidential nomination and Senate confrmation, but Congress may also “by Law vest” their appointment “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Principal offcers encompass at least department heads who report directly to the President. Inferior offcers are those “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were ap- pointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, 663. Pp. 759–761. (b) Task Force members are inferior offcers because their work is “directed and supervised” by the Secretary of HHS, a principal offcer, through two main sources of authority. Pp. 761–768. Page Proof Pending Publication (1) The Secretary's authority to remove Task Force members at will provides a “powerful tool for control.” Edmond, 520 U. S., at 664. An offcer's “ `presumed desire to avoid removal' ” generally creates “ `here-and-now subservience.' ” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 727, n. 5. Here, the Secretary has power to appoint Task Force members, and no statute restricts their removal. Therefore, the Secretary may remove Task Force members at will, enabling him to supervise and di- rect them. Pp. 762–765. (2) Beyond at-will removal, the Secretary has statutory authority to directly review and block Task Force recommendations before they take effect. Several statutes give the Secretary general supervisory authority over the Public Health Service, within which the Task Force is housed, as well as rulemaking authority with respect to the Afford- able Care Act's coverage provisions. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 202, 300gg–92; Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966; 98 Stat. 2705. During the minimum 1-year interval before recommendations become binding, the Secretary can use his supervisory authority to direct that Task Force recommen- dations he disagrees with not be “in effect” and therefore not be binding, or he can establish formal review processes through rulemaking. § 300gg–13(a)(1). Task Force members therefore “have no power to render a fnal decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by” the Secretary. Edmond, 520 U. S., at 665. Pp. 765–768. 750 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Syllabus (c) The conclusion that Task Force members are inferior offcers fol- lows a fortiori from this Court's precedents. In Edmond, Coast Guard judges who were removable at will and whose decisions could be re- viewed and reversed were deemed inferior offcers, even though superi- ors could not infuence individual proceedings. Like those judges, Task Force members are removable at will and their decisions can be re- viewed and overruled by the Secretary. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, PCAOB mem- bers removable at will by the Securities and Exchange Commission were inferior offcers, even though they were “empowered to take signifcant enforcement actions . . . largely independently of the Commission.” Id., at 504. In United States v. Arthrex, 594 U. S. 1, Administrative Patent Judges whose decisions were reviewable but who were removable only for cause were inferior offcers. If patent judges subject only to review au- thority were inferior offcers, Task Force members subject to both at-will removal and review authority are clearly inferior offcers. Pp. 768–770. (d) Braidwood's arguments against inferior-officer status fail. Pp. 770–779. (1) The independence provision in § 299b–4(a)(6) stating that Task Force members shall be “independent and, to the extent practicable, not Page Proof Pending Publication subject to political pressure” does not create for-cause removal protec- tion. To displace the default of at-will removal, Congress must use “very clear and explicit language”—“mere inference or implication” does not suffce. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 315. The term “independent” alone does not make an offcer removable only for cause, as this Court held in Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 220. Pp. 770–772. (2) Braidwood claims that 42 U. S. C. § 299b–4(a)(6)'s requirement that Task Force members be “independent and, to the extent practica- ble, not subject to political pressure” must mean that the Task Force is completely insulated from the Secretary. But “independent” is best read to mean that Task Force members must not be unduly infuenced by their outside professional affliations with universities, hospitals, and professional associations. Even if the independence provision meant some insulation from the Secretary when “practicable,” that would affect only the formulation of recommendations, not the Secretary's authority to review them before they take effect. This mirrors the “almost-universal model of adjudication in the Executive Branch” where inferior offcers make independent initial decisions subject to review by politically accountable superiors. Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 25 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). Pp. 772–776. (3) The Secretary's inability to compel the Task Force to issue par- ticular “A” or “B” recommendations does not undermine inferior-offcer status. This Court has not suggested that a principal offcer must be Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 751 Syllabus able to compel subordinates to take affrmative acts for them to qualify as inferior offcers. In Free Enterprise Fund, the SEC lacked power to require the PCAOB to “start” investigations, 561 U. S., at 504, yet PCAOB members were inferior offcers. Similarly, in Edmond and Arthrex, superiors could not compel initial decisions. Pp. 776–777. (4) When Congress wants to create an independent agency, it gen- erally does so by explicitly conferring for-cause removal protection on the agency's leadership and usually couples that protection with express Presidential nomination and Senate confrmation requirements. The statute establishing the Task Force contains none of this customary lan- guage. Pp. 778–779. (e) Congress has by law vested appointment authority in the Secre- tary of HHS through two steps. First, the 1999 statute governing the Task Force gives the AHRQ Director the authority to “convene” a Task Force “to be composed of individuals with appropriate expertise.” § 299b–4(a)(1). Congress need not use magic words to confer appoint- ment authority, and around the time of the Founding, “ `appoint' ” was synonymous with “ `allot, assign, or designate.' ” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 312–313 (Thomas, J., concurring). In the absence of a statutory provision that more explicitly confers appointment authority, Page Proof Pending Publication the AHRQ Director's power to “convene” is naturally read to include the power to appoint. § 299b–4(a)(1). Second, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, ratifed by Congress in 1984, transfers to the Secretary “all functions of the Public Health Service” and its “offcers,” “employ- ees,” and “agencies.” 80 Stat. 1610. The AHRQ Director is an “off- cer” of the Public Health Service, so Reorganization Plan No. 3 transfers all of the AHRQ Director's functions to the Secretary. After statutory codifcation of the Task Force in 1999, those powers of the Secretary included the AHRQ Director's power to appoint the Task Force mem- bers. Therefore, by virtue of the 1984 Act ratifying Reorganization Plan No. 3 and the 1999 Act conferring appointment authority, Congress vested the power to appoint Task Force members in the Secretary of HHS. Pp. 779–786. (f) Braidwood's arguments that Congress has not properly vested ap- pointment authority in the Secretary fail. Braidwood frst claims that the 1999 statute using “convene” does not confer appointment authority and is instead “agnostic” about who should appoint Task Force mem- bers. Brief for Respondents 22. Braidwood's interpretation would create a bizarre scheme where Congress was entirely indifferent about who would appoint members making legally binding healthcare recom- mendations. Braidwood next argues that even if the Director has ap- pointment authority, Reorganization Plan No. 3 does not transfer that power to the Secretary because it applies only to the Director's func- 752 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Syllabus tions as of 1966. This frozen-in-time reading fnds no footing in statu- tory text or common sense. The Plan's language “all functions” most naturally means an ongoing transfer of authority, including new powers granted by Congress after 1966. 80 Stat. 1610. Pp. 786–793. (g) The Secretary has properly exercised his appointment authority since June 2023. P. 793. 104 F. 4th 930, reversed and remanded. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito and Gorsuch, JJ., joined, post, p. 794. Principal Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Solicitor General Sauer, Acting Solicitor General Harris, Acting Assistant Attorney General Shumate, Deputy Solicitors General Kneedler and Gannon, Ephraim A. McDowell, Michael S. Raab, Daniel Aguilar, Sean R. Keveney, and Janice L. Page Proof Pending Publication Hoffman. Jonathan F. Mitchell argued the cause and fled briefs for respondents.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Illi- nois et al. by Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General, and Sa- mantha Sherman, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen- eral for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kris Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Jeff Jackson of North Carolina, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Ver- mont, Nicholas W. Brown of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wiscon- sin; for the American Hospital Association et al. by Chad Golder; for the American Public Health Association et al. by Andrew J. Pincus; for the Center for HIV Law and Policy et al. by David W. DeBruin; for the HIV and Hepatitis Policy Institute et al. by Richard H. Hughes IV, Spreeha Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 753 Opinion of the Court Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution. The U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, an entity within the Department of Health and Human Services, issues public recommendations about pre- ventive healthcare services—for example, cancer and diabe- tes screenings. Before 2010, the Task Force's recommenda- Choudhury, and Devon Minnick; for Members of the Chronic Illness and Disability Partnership by Benjamin G. Shatz and Carmel Shachar; for the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors et al. by Jose I. Abrigo, Jr., Omar Gonzalez-Pagan, Karen L. Loewy, Christopher R. Riano, Bennett Klein, Chris Erchull, and Suman Chakraborty; for Pa- tient and Physician Professional Organizations by Beth Petronio, John Longstreth, and Mary Rouvelas; for Public Citizen et al. by Nicolas A. Sansone, Allison M. Zieve, and Scott L. Nelson; for the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation, Inc., by David C. Frederick; for United States of Care et al. by Daniel G. Jarcho; and for 48 Bipartisan Economic and Page Proof Pending Publication Other Social Science Scholars by Matthew S. Hellman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Texas et al. by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General, Wil- liam F. Cole, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Eric Abels, Assist- ant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: James Uthmeier of Florida, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Liz Murrill of Loui- siana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Okla- homa, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Derek Brown of Utah, and John B. Mc- Cuskey of West Virginia; for the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons by Andrew L. Schlafy; for the Buckeye Institute by Jay R. Carson and David C. Tryon; for the Cato Institute by Thomas Berry; for the Goldwater Institute by Timothy Sandefur; for the Manhattan Insti- tute by R. Trent McCotter and Ilya Shapiro; and for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by Michael Poon. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American College of Gastroen- terology by Andrew E. Tauber; for the Christian Employers Alliance by Erin M. Hawley, John J. Bursch, Matthew S. Bowman, James A. Camp- bell, and Daniel J. Grabowski; and for Gilead Sciences, Inc., by Kwaku A. Akowuah and Madeleine Joseph. 754 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court tions were purely advisory. But the Affordable Care Act of 2010 now mandates that health insurers cover some of the recommended services at no cost to the insured. The Secretary of Health and Human Services appointed the 16 current members of the Task Force. The question in this case is whether appointment of Task Force members by the Secretary is consistent with the Appointments Clause in Article II. That question turns on whether the Task Force members are principal offcers or inferior offcers. Principal offcers must be nominated by the President and confrmed by the Senate. That process can be lengthy and therefore can hinder the Executive Branch's ability to promptly fll of- fces—and thus also impede the President's ability to execute the laws through his subordinate executive offcers. By con- trast, inferior executive offcers may be directly appointed by the President or by the head of a department, such as by the Secretary of HHS—a more effcient and expeditious process. Page Proof Pending Publication The Executive Branch under both President Trump and President Biden has argued that the Preventive Services Task Force members are inferior offcers and therefore may be appointed by the Secretary of HHS. We agree. The Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary of HHS, and their recommendations are reviewable by the Secretary before they take effect. So Task Force members are supervised and directed by the Secretary, who in turn answers to the President, preserving the chain of command in Article II. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, 663 (1997). Therefore, under Article II and this Court's precedents, the Task Force members are inferior offcers. As a result, appointment of Task Force members by the Sec- retary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause. I A In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services created an advisory body known as the U. S. Preventive Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 755 Opinion of the Court Services Task Force. The Task Force formulates and pub- lishes evidence-based recommendations regarding preven- tive healthcare services. In 1999, Congress enacted legislation codifying the role of the Task Force. See § 915, 113 Stat. 1659. That legislation established the Task Force as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which in turn is an agency in the Public Health Service within HHS. Under that 1999 statute, the Director of AHRQ “con- vene[s]” the Task Force, which is “to be composed of indi- viduals with appropriate expertise.” Ibid.; see 42 U. S. C. § 299b–4(a)(1). The Task Force reviews “the scientifc evi- dence related to the effectiveness, appropriateness, and cost- effectiveness of clinical preventive services for the purpose of developing recommendations for the health care commu- nity.” § 299b–4(a)(1). As presently constituted, the Task Force consists of 16 Page Proof Pending Publication members who are now appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Those members are “nationally recognized experts in prevention, evidence-based medicine, and primary care.” App. 39. They include researchers, professors, and practicing physicians with experience and ex- pertise in public health and across a wide range of medical specialties. They serve on a volunteer basis, so they are not paid by the Federal Government for their service on the Task Force. Preventive services “can help people avoid acute illness, identify and treat chronic conditions, prevent cancer or lead to earlier detection, and improve health.” HHS, Issue Brief—Access to Preventive Services Without Cost-Sharing: Evidence From the Affordable Care Act 1 (Jan. 2022). A wide range of individuals and organizations rely on the Task Force's preventive-services recommendations. They include “health care systems, professional societies, employers,” “Congress and other policymakers, governmental pub- lic health agencies,” and those directly “delivering clinical 756 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court services,” such as “primary care professionals.” § 299b– 4(a)(1). The Task Force develops recommendations through a standardized process. It selects a topic to study, reviews the relevant scientifc evidence, formulates a draft recom- mendation statement, takes public comments, and then votes on the fnal recommendation. The Task Force uses a letter grading system for its recom- mendations. It assigns an “A” grade to services with a high certainty of substantial net beneft and a “B” grade to serv- ices with at least a moderate certainty of a moderate net beneft. It also issues “C” and “D” grades to services with little to no net beneft, and an “I” grade to services for which the current evidence is “insuffcient” to assess the balance of benefts and harms. App. 46. The Task Force can vote to change the grade that was assigned in a previous recommendation. Page Proof Pending Publication The Task Force has given an “A” or “B” rating to more than 40 preventive services. Those services include screen- ings to detect lung, breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer; risk-reducing medications for women at high risk of breast cancer; nicotine patches for adults trying to quit smoking; statin medications to reduce the risk of heart disease and stroke; physical therapy to help the elderly avoid falls; and diabetes screenings. For many years after its initial creation in 1984 and codif- cation in 1999, the Task Force's recommendations were purely advisory. That changed in 2010 when Congress passed and President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act. 124 Stat. 119. That Act requires most health insurers and group health plans to cover certain preventive services with- out cost sharing—that is, without imposing copayments, de- ductibles, or other charges on patients. Rather than set forth a fxed list, the Act tied coverage for preventive services to the recommendations of several entities within the Federal Government, including the Pre- Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 757 Opinion of the Court ventive Services Task Force. Specifcally, the Act mandates no-cost coverage of “evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of `A' or `B' in the current recommen- dations” of the Task Force. § 300gg–13(a)(1). After the Task Force makes an “A” or “B” recommenda- tion, the insurance coverage requirements for that preven- tive service do not take effect immediately. Rather, the law directs the Secretary of HHS to “establish a minimum inter- val,” not less than one year, between when an “A” or “B” recommendation is issued by the Task Force and when insur- ers must cover the recommended service without cost shar- ing. § 300gg–13(b). During that interval, the Secretary can review the Task Force's recommendation and block it from going into effect. The Affordable Care Act also amended the statute govern- ing the Task Force to describe the Task Force as “independ- ent” and to provide that the members of the Task Force and Page Proof Pending Publication their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure. ” §§ 299b–4(a)(1), (6). B The question in this case is whether the Task Force mem- bers were appointed in a manner consistent with the Ap- pointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution. § 2, cl. 2. The plaintiffs are several individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act's preventive-services coverage requirements. The lead plaintiff, Braidwood Man- agement, runs a health and wellness center. It offers health-insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Braidwood wants to exclude coverage for certain drugs and to impose copays or deduct- ibles for other covered services. The plaintiffs—collectively, Braidwood—sued in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Braid- wood argued that the structure of the Task Force violated 758 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court the Appointments Clause. In Braidwood's view, Task Force members are principal offcers who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Ibid. The District Court agreed. It recognized that there are no statutory removal restrictions on Task Force members, meaning that the Secretary of HHS may remove them at will. But the court nonetheless concluded that Task Force members are unconstitutionally appointed principal offcers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. Becerra, 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (ND Tex. 2022). The court enjoined the Govern- ment from enforcing against Braidwood any insurance cover- age mandates based on Task Force recommendations issued after the 2010 enactment of the Affordable Care Act.1 The Government appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Until that point, the Task Force mem- Page Proof Pending Publication bers had been selected and appointed by the Director of AHRQ, an agency within the Public Health Service of HHS. But in June 2023, while the Government's appeal was pend- ing, the Secretary of HHS ratifed the appointments of the existing Task Force members and re-appointed them on a prospective basis. And from then on, the Secretary has con- tinued to appoint Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affrmed in relevant part. In a thorough opinion, the court held that the Task Force members are principal offcers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Like the District Court, the Fifth Circuit understood the Task Force members 1 Braidwood also brought a claim under the Religious Freedom Restora- tion Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq. It prevailed on that claim and secured an injunction against enforcement of the specifc requirement that it cover certain HIV-prevention medications without cost sharing. The Government did not appeal that aspect of the District Court's judgment, and this Court's decision will not affect the injunction premised on Braidwood's RFRA claim. Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 759 Opinion of the Court to be removable at will by the Secretary of HHS. But the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Secretary cannot block Task Force recommendations before they take effect. The court pointed to 42 U. S. C. § 299b–4(a)(6), which provides that Task Force members “shall be independent and, to the ex- tent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” The Task Force, according to the Fifth Circuit, “cannot be `inde- pendent' and free from `political pressure' on the one hand, and at the same time be supervised by the HHS Secretary, a political appointee, on the other.” Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Becerra, 104 F. 4th 930, 944 (2024). So the court con- cluded that the Task Force is not supervised and directed by the Secretary—and that Task Force members are therefore principal offcers and may not be appointed by the Secretary. We granted certiorari to consider whether appointment of Task Force members by the Secretary of HHS violates the Appointments Clause. 604 U. S. 1073 (2025). Page Proof Pending II Publication A The Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution specifes how “Offcers of the United States,” as distinct from employees, must be appointed. § 2, cl. 2. An offcer exer- cises “ `signifcant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.' ” Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. 237, 245 (2018). An employee, by contrast, does not exercise signifcant gov- ernmental authority. See ibid. The text of the Appointments Clause “very clearly divides all its offcers into two classes”: principal offcers and inferior offcers. United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 509 (1879). Here, all agree that the Preventive Services Task Force members are offcers. The question is whether they are principal or inferior. Principal offcers must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The constitutionally mandated joint participation of 760 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court the President and Senate in the appointments process is de- signed to promote “a judicious choice” for “flling the offces of the Union.” The Federalist No. 76, p. 455 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The President and the Senate are accountable “for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, 660 (1997). Inferior offcers may also be appointed via Presidential nomination and Senate confrmation. See Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Framers, though, recognized that requiring all offcers of the Federal Government to run the gauntlet of Presiden- tial nomination and Senate confrmation would prove admin- istratively unworkable as offces became “numerous” and “sudden removals” and prompt replacements became “neces- sary.” Germaine, 99 U. S., at 510. So on one of the last days of the Constitutional Convention—September 15, 1787—they authorized an additional and streamlined method Page Proof Pending Publication of appointment for inferior offcers. Specifcally, Congress may “by Law vest” appointment of inferior offcers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress therefore may provide that inferior executive offcers be unilaterally ap- pointed by the President or a Head of Department. The Appointments Clause is “more than a matter of `eti- quette or protocol' ”—it is “among the signifcant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.” Edmond, 520 U. S., at 659. The Appointments Clause ensures that the President or his subordinate Heads of Departments play a central role in selecting the offcers within the Executive Branch who will assist in exercising the “executive Power.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The Clause thereby helps protect the inde- pendence of the Executive Branch and maintain the Consti- tution's separation of powers. How does a court determine whether an executive offcer is principal (and must be appointed by the President with Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 761 Opinion of the Court the advice and consent of the Senate) or inferior (and may be appointed by the President or Head of Department alone)? Principal offcers in the Executive Branch encompass at least the Heads of Departments, who report directly to the President. Examples include the Secretary of State, Secre- tary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, and Attorney General. Inferior offcers are most readily defned by their relation- ship to principal offcers. “Generally speaking,” whether “one is an `inferior' offcer depends on whether he has a supe- rior” other than the President, Edmond, 520 U. S., at 662, and how much power the offcer “exercises free from control by a superior,” United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U. S. 1, 17 (2021). In Edmond v. United States, the Court summarized the governing principle: Inferior offcers are those “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice Page Proof Pending Publication and consent of the Senate.” 520 U. S., at 663. As the author of Edmond, Justice Scalia, once explained: “It is perfectly obvious” that the language in Article II au- thorizing department heads to appoint inferior offcers “was intended merely to make clear . . . that those offcers ap- pointed by the President with Senate approval could on their own appoint their subordinates, who would, of course, by chain of command still be under the direct control of the President.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 720–721 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). B Before 2010, members of the Preventive Services Task Force were not offcers at all. The Task Force was an advi- sory body, and the Task Force members made only non- binding recommendations. As a result of the 2010 Afford- able Care Act, however, the Task Force's “A” and “B” recom- mended preventive services now must be covered by health 762 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court insurers at no cost to the insured. For that reason, the par- ties here agree that the Task Force members exercise sig- nifcant governmental authority and qualify as “offcers” of the United States. They disagree, however, over whether Task Force members are principal or inferior offcers. We conclude that Task Force members are inferior offcers because their work is “directed and supervised” by the Sec- retary of HHS, a principal offcer. Edmond, 520 U. S., at 663. The Secretary's ability to direct and supervise the Task Force derives from two main sources: the Secretary's authority to remove Task Force members at will; and the Secretary's authority to review and block the Task Force's recommendations before they can take effect. 1 An offcer such as a Task Force member who is removable at will by a principal offcer (here, by the Secretary of HHS) Page Proof Pending Publication typically qualifes as an inferior offcer. So it is here. This Court has said that the authority to remove an offcer at will is a “powerful tool for control.” Edmond, 520 U. S., at 664; see Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Ac- counting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 510 (2010). The rea- son is straightforward: “ `Once an offcer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the author- ity that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the per- formance of his functions, obey.' ” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 726 (1986). An offcer's “ `presumed desire to avoid removal' ” generally creates a “ `here-and-now subser- vience.' ” Id., at 727, n. 5. The prerogative of at-will re- moval of a subordinate, then, often carries with it the power to supervise and direct that subordinate. See Intercolle- giate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F. 3d 1332, 1341 (CADC 2012) (Williams, J.). Historical practice supports treating an offcer who is re- movable at will by a principal offcer as an inferior offcer. Since the Founding, Congress has routinely tied inferior- Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 763 Opinion of the Court offcer status to at-will removability by Heads of Depart- ments. See Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 259–260 (1839). For example, in designating the “chief Clerk in the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs” as an “inferior offcer,” the First Congress made clear that the Clerk was “to be employed” as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs “shall deem proper.” Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 29. The same was true of the Chief Clerk of the Department of War. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49–50. In 1839 in Hennen, this Court explained that the First Congress had bestowed upon the Secretaries of various Departments the authority to “appoint all necessary clerks”; that those clerks were subject to at- will removal by the Secretaries; and that they fell “under that class of inferior offcers.” 13 Pet., at 259–260; see, e. g., Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553–554 (clerks to the Secretary of the Navy); see also, e. g., Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury); Page Proof Pending Publication Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 234 (deputy postmasters). On the other side of the ledger, Braidwood has not identi- fed any instance where an executive offcer was removable at will by someone other than the President and nonetheless deemed a principal offcer. Here, because the Secretary of HHS appoints the Task Force members, he also has the authority to remove the Task Force members at will. See Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. Be- cerra, 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 647 (ND Tex. 2022); Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Becerra, 104 F. 4th 930, 943 (CA5 2024). When a statute empowers a department head to appoint an offcer, the default presumption is that the offcer holds his position “at the will and discretion of the head of the depart- ment,” even if “no power to remove is expressly given.” Hennen, 13 Pet., at 259–260. That is because the “power of removal of executive offcers” is “incident to the power of appointment.” Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 119 (1926). As this Court recently summarized in Free Enter- prise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 764 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court Board, when as here Congress vests appointment of inferior offcers in “heads of departments,” “it is ordinarily the de- partment head . . . who enjoys the power of removal.” 561 U. S., at 493. The Secretary of HHS has the power to appoint (and has appointed) the Task Force members. See Part III, infra. And no statute restricts removal of Task Force members. Therefore, “there can be no doubt” that the Secretary may remove Task Force members at will. Hennen, 13 Pet., at 259. The Secretary's authority to remove Task Force members at will in turn enables him to supervise and direct them. When a Task Force member makes a decision that the Secre- tary disagrees with, the Secretary may remove that member. In other words, the Secretary “may consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for removing” the Task Force member, “on the ground that the discretion regularly en- Page Proof Pending Publication trusted to” that member “has not been on the whole intelli- gently or wisely exercised.” Myers, 272 U. S., at 135. In addition, the Secretary can block a Task Force rec- ommendation from taking effect by combining his at-will removal authority with his authority to determine when Task Force recommendations become binding. To explain: The Affordable Care Act expressly affords the Secretary the power to “establish a minimum interval” between when the Task Force issues an “A” or “B” recom- mendation and when insurers must cover the recommended service without cost sharing. 42 U. S. C. § 300gg–13(b)(1). Congress specifed that the minimum interval “shall not be less than 1 year,” leaving the Secretary with discretion to set a longer minimum interval. § 300gg–13(b)(2). So during the minimum 1-year period after the Task Force makes a recommendation before it becomes binding, the Sec- retary can request that the Task Force reconsider or with- draw a recommendation that he disfavors. He has plenty of time to remove and replace Task Force members who refuse. Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 765 Opinion of the Court And he can then request that the reconstituted Task Force modify or rescind the recommendation. Therefore, in this statutory scheme, the Secretary can use his at-will removal power to stop any preventive-services recommendation con- trary to his judgment from taking effect. In short, through the power to remove and replace Task Force members at will, the Secretary can exert signifcant control over the Task Force—including by blocking recom- mendations he does not agree with. The Secretary's power to supervise and direct Task Force members in that way is a strong indication that the Task Force members are infe- rior offcers. 2 Regardless of whether the Secretary's authority to remove Task Force members at will suffces on its own to render them inferior offcers, the Secretary also has statutory power to directly review and block Task Force recommendations Page Proof Pending Publication before they take effect. That power confrms that the Task Force members are inferior offcers. At-will removal is one means of ensuring supervision and direction. But in evaluating inferior-officer status, the Court has also examined whether the relevant offcer has the “power to render a fnal decision on behalf of the United States” without review by a principal offcer. Edmond, 520 U. S., at 665. That consideration has taken on particular importance in assessing whether adjudicative offcers are principal or infe- rior. See id., at 664–665; Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 13–14. If an adjudicative offcer's decisions are reviewable by a supe- rior, then the offcer may be considered inferior even if not removable at will. See Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 16–17; id., at 25–26 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.).2 2 Review by an Article III court does not render the adjudicative offcer inferior; it is review by a superior within the Executive Branch that does so. See Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 17. 766 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court Here, the Secretary's power to supervise and direct the Task Force members derives from more than simply at-will removal authority. As explained, at-will removal provides the Secretary with a means of ensuring that no recommenda- tion that he disapproves will take effect. But the Secretary also has the statutory authority to directly review—and, if necessary, block—Task Force recommendations before they take effect. So members of the Task Force cannot make any legally binding, fnal decision on behalf of the United States if the Secretary disagrees and wants to block it. As a result, the Secretary retains ultimate responsibility over whether Task Force recommendations become fnal decisions that mandate no-cost coverage by health insurers. To spell this out: A collection of statutes grants the Sec- retary general supervisory authority over the Task Force. That supervisory authority in turn enables the Secretary to review and, if he chooses, directly block a recommendation Page Proof Pending Publication he disagrees with. First, 42 U. S. C. § 202 provides that the Public Health Service, which houses the Task Force, “shall be administered . . . under the supervision and direction of the Secretary.” Second, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966 grants the Sec- retary authority to perform “all functions of the Public Health Service” and its “offcers,” “employees,” and “agen- cies.” 80 Stat. 1610.3 3 Braidwood contends that the Reorganization Plan does not apply to the Task Force because the Plan contains an exception for “the functions vested by law in any advisory council, board, or committee of or in the Public Health Service.” 80 Stat. 1610. That is incorrect. As Braidwood itself has explained, the Task Force “ceased to be an advisory committee” in 2010 “when Congress enacted” the Affordable Care Act and “empow- ered” the Task Force to issue binding recommendations. App. 25. Task Force members are offcers because, by operation of the ACA, their “A” and “B” recommendations are not purely advisory. And Congress has confrmed that the post-ACA Task Force is not an advisory entity by ex- pressly providing that “the Task Force is not subject to” the Federal Advi- sory Committee Act. 42 U. S. C. § 299b–4(a)(5) (2018 ed., Supp. IV). Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 767 Opinion of the Court Third, 42 U. S. C. § 300gg–92 states that the Secretary “may promulgate such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this subchapter”— including the section of the Affordable Care Act that re- quires no-cost coverage of Task Force “A” and “B” recommendations. The Affordable Care Act mandates coverage without cost sharing of “evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of `A' or `B' ” from the Task Force. § 300gg– 13(a)(1) (emphasis added). During the minimum 1-year in- terval, the Secretary can use his general supervisory author- ity under § 202 and Reorganization Plan No. 3 to direct that the Task Force's recommendation not be “in effect” and therefore not be binding on health insurers. Moreover, the Secretary can use his rulemaking authority under § 300gg–92 to establish a formal review process. For exam- ple, the Secretary can issue a regulation providing that Page Proof Pending Publication no Task Force recommendation shall be deemed “in effect” until he or his designee has affrmatively reviewed and ap- proved it.4 Taken together, those complementary review authorities ensure that the Task Force members “have no power to ren- der a fnal decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by” the Secretary of HHS. Edmond, 520 U. S., at 665. To be clear, to supervise and direct for pur- poses of the Appointments Clause, the Secretary “need not review every decision.” Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 27. Rather, “[w]hat matters is that” the Secretary “have the discretion to review decisions rendered by” the Task Force. Ibid. (em- 4 The body within HHS assigned to recommend immunization coverage requirements under the Affordable Care Act—the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices—already operates under such a regulation. The regulation states that a recommendation of the Committee is not “consid- ered in effect” until “it has been adopted by” the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who answers to the Secretary of HHS. 45 CFR § 147.130(a)(1)(ii) (2024). 768 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court phasis added). Under the statutory provisions described above, the Secretary possesses that authority.5 C Given the multiple and mutually reinforcing means by which the Secretary of HHS can supervise and direct the Task Force—namely, both the general authority to remove Task Force members at will and the more specifc statutory authority to review and block their recommendations before they take effect—this Court's precedents preordain the con- clusion that the Task Force members are inferior offcers. In Edmond v. United States, the Court ruled that judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior offcers. See 520 U. S., at 666. In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized that (i) the Judge Advocate General, who exercised administrative oversight over the judges, could remove them at will and (ii) the Court of Appeals for Page Proof Pending Publication the Armed Forces could review and reverse their decisions. See id., at 664–665. The Court reached that inferior-offcer conclusion even though, pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, no superior could “attempt to infuence (by 5 The dissent asserts that § 202 and the Reorganization Plan are inappli- cable because those statutes give the Secretary authority over the Public Health Service, and the Task Force is not part of the Public Health Service at all. Post, at 826–827 (opinion of Thomas, J.). At oral argument, the Government succinctly summed up why the dissent's position is incorrect: “[W]hen you have an entity that's convened by the Public Health Service, selected by the Public Health Service, supervised by the Public Health Service, and supported by the Public Health Service, it's part of the Public Health Service.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 34; see also post, at 798 (The “AHRQ,” which “is part of the Public Health Service,” is “responsib[le] for the Task Force”). No doubt that is why the provisions governing the Task Force are housed within the chapter of the U. S. Code entitled “Public Health Service.” See 42 U. S. C. ch. 6A. Braidwood does not even try to claim that the Task Force falls outside of the Public Health Service—on the contrary, it concedes that, from the outset, the Task Force has been estab- lished as an entity “within the Public Health Service.” Supp. Brief for Respondents 1; Brief for Respondents 34–35. Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 769 Opinion of the Court threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of individual proceedings” conducted by the Coast Guard judges. Id., at 664 (citing 10 U. S. C. § 837). Like the Coast Guard judges in Edmond, the Task Force members here are removable at will and their decisions can be reviewed and overruled by a superior—here, the Secre- tary of HHS. Therefore, the result in this case follows a fortiori from Edmond. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court considered whether members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board were inferior offcers. See 561 U. S., at 510. After fnding the members of the PCAOB removable at will by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court concluded that PCAOB members were inferior offcers. See id., at 508–510. The fact that the PCAOB was nonetheless “em- powered to take signifcant enforcement actions . . . largely independently of the Commission” was no barrier to that Page Proof Pending Publication conclusion. Id., at 504. In this case, the Task Force members are removable at will, just as the PCAOB members were. And Task Force members have no greater power than PCAOB members did to independently make fnal, binding decisions. So the re- sult in this case also follows directly from Free Enterprise Fund. And in United States v. Arthrex, after ensuring that the Director of the Patent and Trademark Offce had authority to review fnal decisions issued by Administrative Patent Judges, the Court deemed those judges to be inferior off- cers—even though they were removable only for cause and thus insulated from at-will removal. See 594 U. S., at 16– 17; id., at 25–26 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). If the patent judges in Arthrex, whose decisions were re- viewable but who were not removable at will, were inferior offcers, then there can be no doubt that the Task Force members, who are subject to both forms of control, are infe- rior offcers. 770 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court In sum, considering the Secretary's removal and review authorities together, the inferior-officer issue is quite straightforward under Edmond, Free Enterprise Fund, and Arthrex. In light of those precedents, “we have no hesita- tion in concluding” that Task Force members are inferior offcers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is per- missible under the Appointments Clause. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 510. D On three separate grounds, Braidwood resists the conclu- sion that Task Force members are inferior offcers. First, Braidwood claims that Task Force members cannot be removed at will. Second, Braidwood contends that Task Force members exercise unreviewable authority in making preventive-services recommendations. Third, Braidwood posits that Task Force members cannot be inferior offcers Page Proof Pending Publication because the Secretary lacks power to compel the Task Force to issue a particular recommendation, as opposed to power to block a recommendation. None of the three arguments is persuasive. 1 Braidwood frst claims that the Secretary cannot remove Task Force members at will. It rests that argument on 42 U. S. C. § 299b–4(a)(6). That provision states that Task Force members and their recommendations shall be “inde- pendent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” See also § 299b–4(a)(1) (“The Director shall con- vene an independent Preventive Services Task Force”). According to Braidwood, it is impossible for Task Force members to be “independent” if they are also removable at will. So they must not be removable at will, Braidwood reasons. In essence, Braidwood invites the Court to read a for- cause removal restriction into a statute that does not explic- itly provide for one. We decline to do so. The Court has Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 771 Opinion of the Court said that to “take away” the power of at-will removal from an appointing offcer, Congress must use “very clear and ex- plicit language.” Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 315 (1903); see Hennen, 13 Pet., at 259–260. “[M]ere infer- ence or implication” does not suffce. Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 315. When Congress wants to depart from the default of at- will removability and instead furnish for-cause protection, it knows how to do so. In many statutes, Congress has speci- fed that offcers shall be removed only for good cause, often using a formulation like “ineffciency, neglect of duty, or mal- feasance in offce.” 15 U. S. C. § 41 (Federal Trade Commis- sioners); 42 U. S. C. § 7171(b)(1) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission members); 49 U. S. C. § 1301(b)(3) (Surface Transportation Board members); see also Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 17 (Patent judges may be removed only “ `for such cause as will promote the effciency of the service' ” (quoting 5 Page Proof Pending Publication U. S. C. § 7513(a))). In fact, Congress has done so with respect to members of other bodies that, like the Task Force, are within the Public Health Service of HHS: Ethics board members who review research involving human subjects may be removed only “for neglect of duty or malfeasance or for other good cause shown.” 42 U. S. C. § 289a–1(b)(5)(E). Notably, however, Congress did not employ that kind of language in the statute governing the Task Force. Braidwood nonetheless suggests that the term “independ- ent” in this statute suffces to displace the default of at-will removal. But this Court already rejected that move in Col- lins v. Yellen. There, the challengers argued that the Act- ing Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency must have been removable only for cause because Congress de- scribed the agency as “ `independent.' ” 594 U. S. 220, 248 (2021) (quoting 12 U. S. C. § 4511(a); emphasis deleted). The Court disagreed, concluding that the challengers read “far too much into the term `independent.' ” 594 U. S., at 248. 772 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court The Court explained that “Congress has described many agencies as `independent' without imposing any restriction on the President's power to remove the agency's leadership.” Id., at 249. Given Collins, Braidwood's argument based on the term “independent” falls short. The word “independent” alone in a statute does not make an offcer removable only for cause. Rather, Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to insulate offcers from at-will removal. It has not done so here. 2 Next, Braidwood insists that the Task Force members can- not be inferior offcers because, in Braidwood's view, they exercise unreviewable authority in making fnal recommen- dations that are binding on health insurers. In other words, Braidwood contends that the Secretary cannot prevent the Task Force's “A” and “B” recommendations from taking Page Proof Pending Publication effect, and that the Task Force members are therefore not inferior offcers. The premise is wrong. As we have explained, the Secre- tary in fact has authority to review the Task Force's recom- mendations and can block them from taking effect. Braidwood's argument to the contrary is, essentially, just another version of its frst argument. Braidwood again falls back on the independence provision. Braidwood claims that § 299b–4(a)(6)'s requirement that Task Force members be “independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure” must mean that the Task Force is com- pletely insulated from the Secretary. As Braidwood sees it, the Task Force's recommendations cannot be “independent” or free from “political pressure” if the Secretary can review and block them. We disagree for two distinct reasons. First, the requirement that Task Force members be “inde- pendent” is best read to mean that Task Force members must not be unduly infuenced by their outside affliations. Task Force members hail from universities, hospitals, and Cite as: 606 U. S. 748 (2025) 773 Opinion of the Court professional associations. The requirement that they be “independent” instructs them not to act as mere agents or representatives of those outside entities. See Brief for United States 32 (members “must not regard themselves as mere representatives of the organizations or professions in which they serve”); Brief for State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (the provision ensures that members are not “op- erating at the behest of external entities” given their “pro- fessional and organizational ties”). To reinforce that critical aspect of independence, Task Force members are subject to rigorous confict-of-interest rules. See App. 42–44. The stated purpose of those rules is to protect the public's “confdence in the integrity of the process by which the Task Force makes its recommenda- tions.” Id., at 42. Moreover, it would not make sense to read “independent” in § 299b–4(a)(6) more broadly to also mean insulation from Page Proof Pending Publication politically accountable superiors. That is because the re- mainder of § 299b–4(a)(6) expressly provides that Task Force members shall be, “to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” (Emphasis added.) Congress therefore plainly contemplated that insulation from all political pres- sure would be impracticable. So to read the term “inde- pendent” to mean that Task Force members must be entirely shielded from political pressure would nullify Congress's purposeful choice of language—“to the extent practicable”— in the remainder of the provision. § 299b–4(a)(6). Where one reading of part of a statutory provision “deprives an- other” part “of all independent effect” and another reading “leaves both . . . with some independent operation,” we gen- erally prefer the latter. A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012). Second, even if we were to interpret “independent” to apply to political pressure, the phrase “independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure” would mean only that Task Force members are generally 774 KENNEDY v. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC. Opinion of the Court free from the Secretary's infuence in their formulation of recommendations in the frst instance. The Secretary would still retain power to review and block recommendations in the minimum 1-year period before the recommendations take effect. Braidwood disagrees. It contends that the Secretary's only power with respect to the Task Force's recommenda- tions is to determine when they take effect. It says that § 300gg–13 makes the Task Force's recommendations binding after the minimum 1-year interval regardless of what the Secretary does. But that understanding of the statute can- not be squared with the provisions discussed above that give the Secretary general supervisory authority over the Task Force. So given the Secretary's review authority, Congress's in- struction that Task Force members and their recommenda- tions be “independent and, to the extent practicable, not sub- Page Proof Pending Publication ject to political pressure” means at most that Task Force members can exercise independent judgment in generating recommendations on the front end—in the same way that the Coast Guard judges in Edmond and the patent judges in Arthrex made initial adjudicative decisions free from direc- tion by superiors. In that way, the Task Force's operation vis-à-vis the Secre- tary is entirely consistent with Congress's longstanding prac- tice—refected in Edmond and Arthrex—of authorizing inferior-offcer adjudicators in the Executive Branch to make initial, independent decisions that are only then subject to review by a superior offcer. The “modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge” generally “exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other offcials within the agency.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 (1978). But “it certainly is the norm for principal offcers to have the capacity to review decisions made by inferior adjudicative offcers.” Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 20 (quotation marks omit- Cite as: 606