FCC v. Consumers' Research (2025)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ET AL. v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 24–354. Argued March 26, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025* The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communica- tions Commission (FCC or Commission) and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States,” reliable communica- tions services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural ar- eas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pursued universal service primarily through im- plicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the expense of others. In 1996, Congress amended the Act and created a new framework for achieving universal service. Section 254 of the amended statute requires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications ser- vices to “contribute” to a fund, known as the Universal Service Fund. See §254(d). The FCC must use the money in the Fund to pay for uni- versal-service subsidy programs. See §§254(a), (d), (e). The statute designates the beneficiaries of universal-service subsidies—low-in- come consumers, those in rural areas, schools and libraries, and rural hospitals. §§254(b)(3), (h)(1), (j). And it provides detailed guidance regarding the communications services to which those beneficiaries should have access. In deciding what services to subsidize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, —————— *Together with No. 24–422, Schools, Health, & Libraries Broadband Coalition et al. v. Consumers’ Research et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Syllabus public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a sub- stantial majority of residential customers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(B). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made availa- ble at an “affordable rate[ ].” §254(b)(1). Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service poli- cies. §254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all con- sumers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7). To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47 CFR §54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected quarterly expenses (the sub- sidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contributing carriers’ total projected quarterly revenue. §54.709(a)(2). A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. §54.709(a)(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Com- pany, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund’s expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carri- ers, and submits those figures to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). In December 2021, the FCC set a 25.2% contribution factor for the first quarter of 2022. Consumers’ Research petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit, contending that the universal-service contribution scheme violates the nondelegation doctrine. The en banc court granted the petition, replacing a panel decision to the contrary. See 109 F. 4th 743; 63 F. 4th 441. In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the combination of Congress’s delegation to the FCC and the FCC’s “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delegation did so independently. 109 F. 4th, at 778. Held: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Pp. 10–37. (a) Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Pow- ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” §1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation. At the same time, this Court has recognized Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3 Syllabus that Congress may “seek[ ] assistance” from its coordinate branches and “vest[ ] discretion” in executive agencies to implement the laws it has enacted. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406. To distinguish between the permissible and the impermissi- ble in this sphere, this Court asks whether Congress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. Id., at 409. Under that test, Congress must make clear both “the general policy” the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105. Pp. 10–11. (b) Although the intelligible-principle standard has long guided this Court’s nondelegation doctrine, Consumers’ Research insists that a different test applies here. According to Consumers’ Research, univer- sal-service contributions are taxes. And tax statutes, Consumers’ Re- search argues, must satisfy a special nondelegation rule. For those statutes, Congress must set a definite or objective limit on how much money an agency can collect—a numeric cap, a fixed tax rate, or the equivalent. Section 254 contains no such limit, so, in Consumers’ Re- search’s view, it is unconstitutional. The Court rejects that argument. To begin with, precedent fore- closes it: In both J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409, and Skinner v. Mid- America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 220–221, the Court declined re- quests to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legis- lation. The test Consumers’ Research proposes also would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt, as Congress has often empowered agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate. See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §§16, 243, 1815(d)(1). Consumers’ Research re- sponds that those other statutes can be distinguished as imposing fees, rather than taxes, and thus be exempted from its numeric-limit re- quirement. But Skinner made clear that whether a charge is a tax or a fee is irrelevant to the nondelegation inquiry. See 490 U. S., at 223. Finally, the Consumers’ Research position produces absurd results, di- vorced from any reasonable understanding of constitutional values. Under its view, a revenue-raising statute containing non-numeric, qualitative standards can never pass muster, no matter how tight the constraints they impose. But a revenue-raising statute with a numeric limit will always pass muster, even if it effectively leaves an agency with boundless power. In precluding the former and approving the latter, the Consumers’ Research approach does nothing to vindicate the nondelegation doctrine or the separation of powers. Pp. 12–19. (c) Under the usual intelligible-principle test, the universal-service contribution scheme clears the nondelegation bar. Section 254 directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support univer- sal-service programs. §§254(b)(5), (d), (e). The word “sufficient” sets 4 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Syllabus both a floor and a ceiling—the FCC cannot raise less than what is ad- equate or necessary to finance its universal-service programs, but it also cannot raise more than that amount. And the “sufficiency” ceiling imposes a meaningful limit on the Commission, because Section 254 also provides appropriate guidance about the nature and content of universal service. The statute makes clear whom the program is in- tended to serve: those in rural and other high-cost areas (with a special nod to rural hospitals), low-income consumers, and schools and librar- ies. See §§254(b)(3), (6), (h)(1). And it also defines the services those beneficiaries should receive. In order for the FCC to subsidize a ser- vice, the service must be subscribed to by a substantial majority of res- idential customers, available at affordable rates, and essential to edu- cation, public health, or safety. §§254(b)(1), (3), (c)(1)(A)–(B). Those conditions, each alone and together, provide the FCC with determinate standards for operating the universal-service program. Consumers’ Research contends that the Act gives the FCC boundless authority, but the provisions it points to show nothing of the kind. It first argues that the Commission need not actually adhere to each of the criteria Section 254 uses to define universal service. Properly un- derstood, however, those criteria are separately mandatory. Next, Consumers’ Research highlights Section 254(c)(1)’s description of uni- versal service as an “evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically” in light of advances in technology. That provision, it says, enables the FCC to redefine uni- versal service as it sees fit. But the permission Congress gave the FCC to fund different services over time does not strip the statute of stand- ards and constraints. The Commission still may fund only essential, widely used, and affordable services, for the benefit of only designated recipients. Finally, Consumers’ Research maintains that the statutory provision enabling the FCC to articulate “[a]dditional principles” to guide its universal-service policies allows the agency to rewrite its own authority. §254(b)(7). But that is not so, because Section 254(b)(7) requires the added principles to be “consistent with” the rest of the statute. So they cannot change the statute’s other principles, much less its conditions on what subsidies can go toward and who can receive them. Pp. 19–30. (d) Consumers’ Research separately claims that the FCC has imper- missibly delegated authority to the Administrator to set the contribu- tion factor. In making this argument, Consumers’ Research invokes what is commonly called the private nondelegation doctrine. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311, this Court struck down a statute authorizing certain coal producers to set rules for the rest of the indus- try, finding the delegation improper because it was made to “private persons whose interests” are often “adverse to the interests of others.” Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 5 Syllabus But a counterpart case, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 388, approved a statute permitting private actors to make recommendations to a Government agency for “approv[al], disap- prov[al], or modifi[cation].” That arrangement was valid, because the private parties “function[ed] subordinately to” the agency and were subject to its “authority and surveillance.” Id., at 399. Under those precedents, the Commission’s use of the Administrator is permissible. The Administrator is broadly subordinate to the Com- mission: The Commission appoints the Administrator’s Board of Di- rectors, approves its budget, and requires the Administrator to act “consistent with” its rules and directives. 47 CFR §§54.703(b)–(c), 54.715(c); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Com- munications Commission and the Universal Service Administrative Company 2 (Oct. 17, 2024). And the Commission’s authority and over- sight over the Administrator extend to determining the contribution factor. Working within FCC rules, the Administrator produces the in- itial projections of carrier revenues and Fund expenses that feed into the contribution factor. §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). The Administrator then reports its figures to the Commission, which reviews—and if needed, revises—the projections before approving them and publishing the contribution factor. See §54.709(a)(3). The Commission then has 14 days to make additional changes before the factor is “deemed approved by the Commission.” Ibid. So although the Administrator makes rec- ommendations, the Commission is, throughout, the final authority. Pp. 30–34. (e) The Court also rejects the basis of the decision below: that the “combination” of Congress’s grant of authority to the FCC and the FCC’s reliance on the Administrator violates the Constitution, even if neither one does so alone. 109 F. 4th, at 778 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit founded that theory on Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub- lic Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 483–484, where this Court struck down a statute because it gave an executive officer two “layers of protection” from the President’s removal authority. Even granting that each layer of protection was alone permissible, the Court thought the combination was too much. According to the Fifth Circuit, similar reasoning applied here: Even if Congress lawfully con- ferred discretion on the Commission and the Commission lawfully sought assistance from the Administrator, the combination was imper- missible. 109 F. 4th, at 778. But the court’s logic does not work. In Free Enterprise Fund, the two layers of for-cause protection operated on a single axis, with the one exacerbating the other. That is not the case here: A law violates the traditional nondelegation doctrine when it authorizes an agency to legislate. And a law violates the private nondelegation doctrine when it allows non-governmental entities to 6 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Syllabus govern. Those doctrines do not operate on the same axis. So a measure implicating (but not violating) one does not compound a measure im- plicating (but not violating) the other, in a way that pushes the combi- nation over a constitutional line. Pp. 34–37. 109 F. 4th 743, reversed and remanded. KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KA- VANAUGH, J., and JACKSON, J., filed concurring opinions. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ Nos. 24–354 and 24–422 _________________ FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS 24–354 v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH, ET AL. SCHOOLS, HEALTH & LIBRARIES BROADBAND COALITION, ET AL., PETITIONERS 24–422 v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH, ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [June 27, 2025] JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly a century ago, Congress charged the then-new Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis- sion) with making communications services available, at af- fordable prices, to all Americans. That objective became known as “universal service.” Some decades on, near the turn of the 21st century, Congress reaffirmed its commit- ment to universal service while providing new and more de- tailed instructions to the FCC about how to achieve it. Un- der the amended statutory plan, the FCC would use required payments, called contributions, from telecommu- nications companies to subsidize basic communications ser- vices for consumers in certain underserved communities— particularly, rural and low-income areas. To carry out that 2 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court mandate, the Commission established discrete subsidy pro- grams for the consumers Congress had identified, set up a special fund to receive and disburse the companies’ pay- ments, and enlisted a private corporation, called the Uni- versal Service Administrative Company, to help manage that fund’s operations. The question in this case is whether the universal-service scheme—more particularly, its contribution mechanism— violates the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine, either because Congress has given away its power to the FCC or because the FCC has given away its power to a private com- pany. We hold that no impermissible transfer of authority has occurred. Under our nondelegation precedents, Con- gress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-ser- vice contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has re- tained all decision-making authority within that sphere, re- lying on the Administrative Company only for non-binding advice. Nothing in those arrangements, either separately or together, violates the Constitution. I A The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, established the FCC and empowered it to regulate commu- nications services. In the Act’s very first provision, Con- gress instructed the FCC to pursue the goal now called uni- versal service. The FCC, Congress stated, was “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some segments of the population without access to needed communications ser- vices. That is because providers of those services, also called carriers, can reap greater profits from some classes Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3 Opinion of the Court of customers than from others. Carriers, for example, make more money in urban areas than in rural ones because fixed costs in cities are spreadable over many more users. See S. Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy §15.3.1, p. 763 (2d ed. 2006); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8784 (1997) (Univer- sal Service Order). Similarly, carriers may prefer to focus on business customers instead of residential or not-for- profit customers (like schools and libraries) because the for- mer are willing to pay more for the same services. See id., at 8784. So carriers have incentives to neglect some kinds of customers in providing services or setting prices. See P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunica- tions Law §6.1.2, pp. 6–9, 6–10, and n. 26 (3d ed. Supp. 2022). The result, policymakers thought, would be severe inequities in access to communications systems, and a swiss-cheese-like communications network for the whole country. See ibid.; Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8780–8781, 8783. Under the original Act, the FCC addressed that con- cern—and promoted universal service—through a “patch- work quilt of implicit and explicit subsidies.” FCC, Report to Congress 5 (FCC 98–67, 1998). The earliest and domi- nant squares of that quilt were implicit subsidies, provided under the FCC’s authority to set “just and reasonable” rates. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784; 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Carriers then operated as regulated monopolies, with the FCC (and its state counterparts) su- perintending the rates they could charge different kinds of customers for different services. See Universal Service Or- der, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784–8785; Huber, Federal Telecom- munications Law §6.1.1.2, p. 6–7. And regulators used that authority over rates to shift costs: Long-distance rates were set enough above cost “to subsidize local rates, business rates to subsidize [non-business] rates, and urban rates to subsidize rural rates.” Id., p. 6–7. So, for example, a “large 4 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court New York [City] brokerage firm making heavy use of long- distance service” would end up “subsidiz[ing] the local ser- vices of homeowners in Fishkill.” Ibid.; see Universal Ser- vice Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784. Over time, though, towns like Fishkill benefited as well from explicit subsidy pro- grams. The FCC, for example, began in the 1980s to levy assessments on long-distance carriers and disburse the pro- ceeds to carriers serving high-cost communities. See id., at 8890–8892; 47 CFR §§36.601–36.641, 69.116(a) (1996). And the FCC began, through the so-called Lifeline program, to make payments directly reducing low-income consumers’ monthly phone bills. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8957–8958; §§69.104(j)–(l), 69.117, 69.203(f )–(g). In 1996, Congress overhauled the Act to “promote compe- tition and reduce regulation” in the telecommunications sector. See Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56. As part of those reforms, Congress created a new framework for achieving universal service. The amended Act discarded the implicit subsidies embedded in ratemaking and substi- tuted a plan for explicit transfer payments to ensure that basic communications services extend across the country. See §254; Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8783– 8784. Section 254 of the amended statute requires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications services to “con- tribute,” in line with the statute and FCC rules, to a fund designed to “preserve and advance universal service.” §254(d). The FCC must use the money in that fund, now known as the Universal Service Fund, to pay for subsidy programs for designated populations and facilities needing improved access. See §§254(a), (e); Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 2). The statute, for example, continues the Lifeline program aiding low-income individuals. See §254(j). It di- rects the FCC to provide assistance to rural hospitals, as Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 5 Opinion of the Court well as to schools and libraries. See §254(h)(1). And it in- structs the FCC to expand communications access for con- sumers in “rural” and other “high cost areas.” §254(b)(3). The carrier contributions collected to support those pro- grams, the Act further provides, must be “sufficient” to carry them out and so to “advance universal service.” §§254(d)–(e). The statute also provides detailed guidance for identify- ing the specific communications services to which the stat- ute’s beneficiaries should have access. On the one hand, the Act recognizes that those services, given the expected pace of technological change, are unlikely to stay static: Univer- sal service, says the statute, is “an evolving level of telecom- munications services that the Commission shall establish periodically” as it accounts for “advances in telecommuni- cations and information technologies and services.” §254(c)(1). On the other hand, the Act specifies the relevant criteria in every period. In deciding which communications services the “definition” of universal service encompasses, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service (1) is “essential to education, public health, or public safety”; (2) has, through market forces, “been subscribed to by a sub- stantial majority of residential customers”; and (3) is in fact “being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(C). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made available at an “affordable rate[ ].” §254(b)(1). Con- gress thus struck a balance in establishing universal ser- vice’s metes and bounds—affording the FCC latitude to adapt to technological developments, but insisting that the FCC always look to whether services are essential, afforda- ble, and widely used. Echoing the provisions just described, Congress also listed six “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” all its universal-service policies. §254(b). First, “[q]uality ser- vices should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable 6 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court rates.” §254(b)(1). Second, “all regions of the Nation” should have access to those services. §254(b)(2). Third, all consumers, “including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,” should have access to services that are “reasonably comparable” in quality and price to those in urban areas. §254(b)(3). Fourth, every carrier should make “an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution” to the achievement of universal service. §254(b)(4). Fifth, the subsidies given to advance that goal should be “specific, predictable[,] and sufficient.” §254(b)(5). And sixth, “schools,” “libraries,” and “health care providers” should have access to services. §254(b)(6). That list concludes with a provision enabling the FCC to add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7). The Commission now operates, under the terms of the Act, four universal-service programs. Lifeline, which pre- dated the Act, gives low-income consumers a markdown on their monthly phone bills, usually of $9.25 per month. See §254(j); 47 CFR §§54.400–54.424 (2024); supra, at 4. The High Cost program, which similarly built on a pre-1996 ex- plicit subsidy program, furnishes carriers with funds ena- bling them to provide basic communications services in “ru- ral, insular, and [other] high cost areas” at costs comparable to those charged in urban areas. §254(b)(3); §§54.302–54.322; supra, at 4. The E-Rate program subsi- dizes communications services for schools and libraries across the country, with greater discounts going to facilities in rural or low-income areas. See §§254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); §§54.500–54.523; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). And finally, the Rural Health program supports rural hospitals and other health care facilities, enabling them to use telemedicine in caring for far-flung patients and ensur- ing that they receive the needed communications services at roughly the rates urban facilities pay. See §§254(b)(6), Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 7 Opinion of the Court (h)(1)(A); §§54.600–54.633. To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund for those programs, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47 CFR §54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected expenses for the upcom- ing quarter (the subsidy payments it will make plus over- head) and whose denominator is the total projected revenue of contributing carriers during that same period. See §54.709(a)(2). A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contri- bution factor. See §54.709(a)(3). So, for example, if the FCC forecasts that it will need, in a given quarter, 25% of all car- rier revenues to cover the costs of its universal-service pro- grams, a carrier expecting to generate $100 million in rev- enue in that quarter will have to contribute $25 million. The carrier may then pass along to its customers the cost of its contributions. See §54.712(a). Every quarter, the FCC updates its expense and revenue projections, comes up with a new contribution factor, and announces it in a public no- tice. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). During the next 14 days, the FCC may revise the factor as it thinks proper. See §54.709(a)(3). If the FCC takes no action within that pe- riod, the factor is “deemed approved by the Commission” and goes into effect. Ibid. Carriers must then kick in to the Fund accordingly. The FCC in 1998 appointed the Universal Service Admin- istrative Company as the Fund’s “permanent Administra- tor.” §54.701(a). The Administrator, as we will call it, is a private, not-for-profit corporation owned by an association of carriers. See §54.5; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). It manages the day-to-day operations of the Fund, “bill[ing] and collect[ing] contributions from carriers” and “distribut[ing] the resulting pot of money, as FCC rules provide, to program beneficiaries.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2); see §54.702. More relevant here, the Administrator 8 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court plays a role each quarter in producing the financial projec- tions that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). Specifically, the Administrator esti- mates the Fund’s expenses (again, the costs of the programs plus overhead) and adds up the estimates it receives from individual carriers about their revenues. See ibid. The Ad- ministrator then submits those figures, along with support- ing documentation, to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating required contributions. See ibid. B In December 2021, the FCC proposed a contribution fac- tor of 25.2% for the first quarter of 2022. Respondents—the non-profit organization Consumers’ Research, a carrier, and several consumers (collectively, Consumers’ Re- search)—filed comments (during the 14-day, post-notice pe- riod described above) requesting that the FCC instead set the contribution factor at 0%. In support of that submis- sion, Consumers’ Research argued that the universal-ser- vice contribution scheme violates the Constitution’s non- delegation rule. The Commission took no action in response, so the 25.2% contribution factor went into effect. Consumers’ Research then petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The en banc court granted the petition, replacing a panel decision to the con- trary. See 109 F. 4th 743 (2024); 63 F. 4th 441 (2023). In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the universal-service contribu- tion mechanism is unconstitutional because of its so-called “double-layered delegation.” 109 F. 4th, at 782. The court’s analysis proceeded by expressing “skep- tic[ism]” about each of two aspects of the contribution scheme, while declining to rule on either one. Id., at 778. First, the court stated, Congress in Section 254 “may have delegated legislative power” to the FCC by giving it “the power to tax” carriers “without supplying an intelligible Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 9 Opinion of the Court principle to guide [its] discretion.” Id., at 756. The court described Section 254’s limits on the Commission’s author- ity as “minimal,” “contentless,” and “amorphous.” Id., at 760, 761, 767. Nonetheless, the court decided not to decide whether Congress had impermissibly transferred authority to the Commission. Id., at 767. Second, the court contin- ued, the Commission “may have impermissibly delegated the taxing power to private entities” by involving the Ad- ministrator in setting contribution amounts. Id., at 756. The court posited that the FCC had “de facto abdicate[d]” governmental responsibilities to the Administrator by giv- ing it the “final say” on how much carriers pay into the Fund. Id., at 771. Again, however, the court demurred as to the bottom line, reserving judgment on whether the Ad- ministrator’s role in the contribution scheme violates the Constitution. See id., at 778. The dispositive constitutional problem, the Fifth Circuit ultimately held, is “the combination of Congress’s sweeping delegation to FCC and FCC’s unauthorized subdelegation” to the Administrator. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Relying heavily on this Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010), the court opined that “two or more things that are not independently unconstitutional can combine to violate the Constitution’s separation of powers.” 109 F. 4th, at 778 (emphasis in original). And that was true here for a pair of reasons. The “double-layered delegation,” the court thought, had “no foothold in history or tradition.” Id., at 782. And, the court went on, that delegation “undermine[s] democratic accountability” by obscuring whether Congress, the FCC, or the Administrator bears responsibility for the amount of contributions. Id., at 783–784. 10 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court We granted certiorari, 604 U. S. ___ (2024), and now re- verse the decision below.1 In this Court, Consumers’ Re- search separates what the Fifth Circuit combined. It con- tends (as it did below) that Congress’s delegation to the FCC violates the Constitution, and that the FCC’s delega- tion to the Administrator does so too. We reject each argu- ment, and also reject the Fifth Circuit’s combination theory. II Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” §1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation: Legis- lative power, we have held, belongs to the legislative branch, and to no other. See Whitman v. American Truck- ing Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001). At the same —————— 1 When we granted certiorari, we asked the parties to address whether this case is moot. The parties agree that it is not moot, and we do too. The relevant facts are as follows. Consumers’ Research filed suit to avoid payments arising from the contribution factor that the FCC set for the first quarter of 2022. But by now Consumers’ Research has made those payments, and a court might not be able to order a refund. Assuming not, the case would be moot—except that it qualifies as “capable of repe- tition, yet evading review.” Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 170 (2016). A given contribution factor is in effect for only three months, a period “too short to complete judicial review of [its] lawfulness.” Ibid. And “it is reasonable to expect” that Consumers’ Research will have to make the same kind of payments again. Ibid. So the case, as the Fifth Circuit concluded, is not moot. See 109 F. 4th 743, 753 (2024). Several other courts of appeals would have arrived at the opposite conclusion, because they require a party to seek preliminary re- lief in order to avail itself of the capable-of-repetition rule. See, e.g., New- dow v. Roberts, 603 F. 3d 1002, 1008–1009 (CADC 2010), cert. denied, 563 U. S. 1001 (2011). But our decisions have never hinted at such a requirement. See, e.g., Kingdomware Technologies, 579 U. S., at 170; SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 108–110 (1978). And for good reason: The “capable of repetition” rule applies because of the nature of some contro- versies, not because of the parties’ litigating decisions. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 11 Opinion of the Court time, we have recognized that Congress may “seek[ ] assis- tance” from its coordinate branches to secure the “effect in- tended by its acts of legislation.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). And in particu- lar, Congress may “vest[ ] discretion” in executive agencies to implement and apply the laws it has enacted—for exam- ple, by deciding on “the details of [their] execution.” Ibid.; see Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825) (“[T]he maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments”); Whitman, 531 U. S., at 474–475 (A “degree of policy judgment” can “be left to those execut- ing or applying the law”). To distinguish between the permissible and the imper- missible in this sphere, we have long asked whether Con- gress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409. Under that test, “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power con- gressionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475. The “guidance” needed is greater, we have explained, when an agency action will “affect the entire national economy” than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue (e.g., the defi- nition of “country [grain] elevators”). Ibid. But in examin- ing a statute for the requisite intelligible principle, we have generally assessed whether Congress has made clear both “the general policy” that the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946). And similarly, we have asked if Congress has provided sufficient stand- ards to enable both “the courts and the public [to] ascertain whether the agency” has followed the law. OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 144 (1941). If Congress has done so— as we have almost always found—then we will not disturb its grant of authority. 12 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court A Although the intelligible-principle standard has focused our nondelegation doctrine for a century, Consumers’ Re- search and the dissent primarily argue that we must apply a different test here. Section 254, as just described, author- izes the Commission to raise revenue in the form of carrier “contribut[ions]” for universal-service programs. §254(d); see supra, at 4. Consumers’ Research views those required contributions as taxes. See Brief for Respondents 25–29; see also post, at 12–13, 29–30 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). And it argues that tax statutes—and probably all revenue- raising statutes—have to satisfy a special nondelegation rule. For those statutes, Congress must set a “definite” or “objective limit” on how much money an agency can col- lect—a numeric cap, a fixed rate, or the equivalent. Brief for Respondents 32, 36; see id., at 33–35; see also post, at 14–16 (stating that a “tax rate” is likely required, but a “cap” may also suffice). Without such a limit, Consumers’ Research claims, no intelligible principle (however con- straining) will do. See Brief for Respondents 46, 66. And all agree that Section 254 contains no determinate cap or formula. So, on Consumers’ Research’s telling, it effects an unconstitutional delegation.2 But this Court’s precedents foreclose that argument. Twice before, we have rejected a party’s request to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation. In J. W. Hampton, a taxpayer contended that when Con- gress is “exercis[ing] the power to levy taxes and fix customs duties,” it lacks the usual leeway to confer discretion on agencies. 276 U. S., at 409. “The [legal] authorities,” the —————— 2 Although endorsing the same rule as Consumers’ Research, the dis- sent claims that the rule is merely an application of the intelligible-prin- ciple test. See post, at 14. That is mistaken: The intelligible-principle test requires an intelligible principle, not a “prescribed . . . tax rate.” Ibid. So what we say about the Consumers’ Research position generally goes as well for the dissent’s. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 13 Opinion of the Court Court responded, “make no such distinction.” Ibid. And then the Court set out the “intelligible principle” standard as the universal method for assessing delegations. Ibid. More than sixty years later, we reiterated that holding. In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 220 (1989), another litigant urged that “Congress’ taxing power” can be delegated only “with much stricter guide- lines” than are normally used. Citing J. W. Hampton, we again—and unanimously—rejected that “two-tiered theory of nondelegation.” 490 U. S., at 220–221. “[N]othing” in the Constitution’s text or structure, Skinner explained, “distin- guish[es] Congress’ power to tax from its other enumerated powers” “in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that Congress may delegate to the Executive.” Ibid. Nor, the Court added, did history at all distinguish the two. See id., at 221 (“From its earliest days to the pre- sent, Congress, when enacting tax legislation,” has at times delegated “discretionary authority” to the Executive). So whether or not a tax is at issue—so say our cases—the usual nondelegation standard applies. And that standard is, again, trained on intelligible principles, not on numeric caps and “mathematical formula[s].” United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577 (1939); see su- pra, at 11.3 —————— 3 The dissent’s attempt to deal with these precedents is not successful. Relegating discussion of J. W. Hampton to a footnote, the dissent refuses to acknowledge that decision’s categorical rejection of a different non- delegation standard for tax statutes than for others. See post, at 28, n. 15. The dissent contends that the tax at issue there could have met its own rate-or-cap test, but glosses over that the Court instead asked only about intelligible principles. See ibid. And although the dissent suggests otherwise, J. W. Hampton’s holding that the statute had an in- telligible principle in no way hinged on the existence of a numeric rate or cap. See 276 U. S., at 404–405. The dissent’s discussion of Skinner is not much better. Our holding there compels the dissent to say that it is not proposing a “different and stricter” test for “when Congress delegates the power to tax.” Post, at 14. But in the same paragraph, the dissent 14 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court The alternative test Consumers’ Research and the dis- sent propose also would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt. Relying on this Court’s nondelegation precedents, Congress has often enacted statutes empowering agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate. See Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 7–9 (listing nine “example[s]”). Indeed, such statutes are endemic in the sphere of financial regulation. The Federal Reserve Board, for instance, funds its operations by levying on Fed- eral Reserve Banks “an assessment sufficient to pay its es- timated expenses.” 12 U. S. C. §243. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) likewise “collect[s]” from OCC-chartered banks an “assessment, fee, or other charge” as the Office “determines is necessary or appropri- ate to carry out [its] responsibilities.” §16. And the Deposit Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- tion (FDIC), which protects the savings of millions of Amer- icans, is financed through charges on banks “which the Cor- poration may by regulation prescribe, after giving due consideration to the need to establish and maintain the [Fund’s] reserve ratio.” §1815(d)(1). In none of those (or many other) revenue-raising statutes does a number ap- pear. So all would be on the constitutional chopping block under Consumers’ Research’s reasoning. Consumers’ Research is conflicted about how to approach that problem, but sometimes tries to draw a line between taxes and fees. Our decision in National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974) (NCTA), recognized that distinction, as Consumers’ Research notes. See Brief for Respondents 28. We there described “fees” as “bestow[ing]” a reciprocal “benefit on the [payor], not shared by other members of society.” NCTA, 415 U. S., at —————— does just that: It asserts that a delegation involving the taxing power “must supply more significant limits on an agency’s discretion” than one involving other Government powers. Ibid. And so the dissent collides with both J. W. Hampton and Skinner. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 15 Opinion of the Court 341. By contrast, “taxes” are expected to “inure[ ] to the benefit” of the wider public. Id., at 343. In its brief, Con- sumers’ Research argues that its numeric-cap standard ap- plies to both taxes and fees: As to either, Congress’s delega- tion to an agency must include an “objective upper limit[ ].” Brief for Respondents 37; see id., at 36–38. At argument, however, Consumers’ Research relied on the tax vs. fee dis- tinction to get out from under the long list of statutes its position places in jeopardy. Most of those statutes, it ar- gued, involve not taxes but fees, where the charge reflects simply “the value of the benefit to the” payor. Tr. of Oral Arg. 134; see id., at 148. So, Consumers’ Research sug- gested, if we label carrier contributions “taxes” and then make only taxes subject to the numeric-limit requirement, there would be minimal fallout from adopting its position. See ibid. The dissent joins Consumers’ Research in press- ing that argument. See post, at 25–30. But the problems with going down that road are substan- tial. First and as already shown, precedent forecloses it. Indeed, in rejecting a stricter test for delegations made “un- der Congress’ taxing power,” Skinner specifically noted that its position rendered irrelevant the question (which, we noted, “so exercised the District Court”) whether the charges there were “user fees” or a “form of taxation.” 490 U. S., at 223. Either way, the Court held, the delegation inquiry was just the same, and just the usual one. See ibid.4 —————— 4 The dissent once again does not know what to do with Skinner. See supra, at 13–14, n. 3. According to the dissent, Skinner “did not invite courts” to “disregard the basic distinction” between fees and taxes in con- sidering the permissibility of delegations. Post, at 28. But we do not know what else the Skinner Court did when it said the following: “In light of th[e] conclusion” that the usual nondelegation test applies to tax legislation, “we need not concern ourselves with the threshold question” whether the “pipeline safety users ‘fees’ ” at issue “are more properly thought of as a form of taxation.” 490 U. S., at 223. Fees or taxes—it just did not matter. And that was so, contra the dissent, irrespective of 16 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court Second, Consumers’ Research offers no argument for why categorizing something as a fee rather than a tax should matter for delegation purposes. To the contrary, its brief suggests the difference should make no difference—that in- stead all revenue-raising measures should be treated the same. Brief for Respondents 36–38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 132– 133 (repeating the point). The distinction is proposed only as an artificial method for limiting the effects of a holding in Consumers’ Research’s favor, should the court be too squeamish to go all the way. And third, the distinction between taxes and fees, even if occasionally needed, is a morass—or as the Government (which levies both) puts it, “unbelievably murky in prac- tice.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. A charge is a “fee,” according to NCTA, when it is for a “benefit” granted to the payor that is “not shared by other members of society.” 415 U. S., at 341. But articulating that test is a fair bit easier than ap- plying it, because it is often hard to say whether a benefit is so “shared.” Consider the charge that banks pay to obtain FDIC Deposit Insurance. See supra, at 14. The banks ben- efit from that insurance (it helps them attract money and prevents bank runs). So maybe the charge looks like a fee? But then again, depositors also benefit (because the insur- ance protects their money) and so does the wider public (be- cause everyone gains from having a stable banking system). So maybe the charge instead looks like a tax? Or take an- other example: the OCC’s assessments on banks. See ibid. Are they fees because a bank must pay them to hold an OCC-issued charter? Or are they taxes because the OCC uses the funds collected for regulatory programs benefiting the public? Consumers’ Research does not know. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 134 (describing the OCC statute as “kind of on the —————— whether the charge at issue was numeric—a feature that Skinner’s treat- ment of the purported fee/tax distinction never thought to mention. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 17 Opinion of the Court line,” “tough,” and “maybe . . . questionable”).5 Or finally and most relevantly: What category do carriers’ contributions belong in? Universal service is of course a public benefit. But carriers gain in tangible ways from hav- ing an all-inclusive network, and they often receive direct subsidies from the FCC’s universal-service programs. For those reasons, the carriers’ main trade associations view the contributions as fees. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 76, 80. The Government, by contrast, sees “genuine ambiguity” on the issue, but “assum[es]” they are taxes. Id., at 52–53. It is a good thing for the state of the law that we do not have to decide between the two, in this case or others raising a del- egation challenge.6 —————— 5 The dissent responds by replacing the test from NCTA—our leading case on the subject—with a different one, which asks as well whether a charge is for a cost imposed by the payor. Post, at 29. That alternative test, the dissent promises, reveals that all the financial charges we have discussed are fees, whereas universal-service contributions are taxes. But even spotting the dissent its preferred test, the guaranteed clarity fails to emerge. Take the dissent’s description of the OCC’s assessments: They are fees because they “offset the costs the OCC incurs in fulfilling its statutory mandate to supervise, regulate, and charter national banks.” Post, at 27, n. 14. Yet much the same can be said of universal- service contributions: They pay for the costs of the programs the FCC is mandated by statute to implement. Or similarly, consider the dissent’s description of Federal Reserve levies: They are fees because they pay for “regulatory costs,” rather than providing general Government revenues. Ibid. But again, that is also what carriers’ contributions do, in funding the costs of universal-service regulatory programs. So the dissent’s new test does not much clear away the mire. 6 The dissent’s case for characterizing contributions as taxes only un- derscores the difficulty. Carriers, the dissent first says, “do not gain any special benefit” from the contributions they make. Post, at 29. But as just noted, that would be news to the carriers: Although they pay the bill, they are lined up here to defend universal service, because (in their law- yer’s words) they “benefit[ ] quite considerably” from the program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 76. So next the dissent tries this one: The statutory scheme creates a tax because it “takes money from some (carriers) and gives it to others (libraries, schools, and the like).” Post, at 29–30. But again, car- riers both give and receive; the program, as it has from its beginnings, 18 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court And yet a greater problem inheres in the shared position of Consumers’ Research and the dissent: Whatever it ap- plies to (just taxes or fees as well), its focus on numeric lim- its produces absurd results, divorced from any reasonable understanding of constitutional values. Under that view, a revenue-raising statute containing non-numeric, qualita- tive standards can never pass muster, no matter how much guidance those standards provide and how tight the con- straints they impose. But a revenue-raising statute with a numeric limit will always pass muster, even if it effectively leaves an agency with boundless power. Consider a hypo- thetical raised at oral argument: Congress tells the FCC it can demand payments from carriers of any amount it wants up to $5 trillion. (The actual cost of universal service is, of course, a tiny fraction of that amount.) According to Con- sumers’ Research, that statute is permissible because . . . well, because Congress has set the $5 trillion figure. See id., at 124 (“[T]hen we would know that Congress itself has made that determination”); see id., at 123–127; Brief for Re- spondents 5, 63, 66; see also post, at 34–35. But so what? The purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to enforce lim- its on the “degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The any- where-up-to-$5-trillion tax statute would not do that, whereas a statute with qualitative limits well might. In ap- —————— reallocates money among them. See supra, at 3–4. And even putting that fact aside, the dissent’s test would turn some things it labels fees into taxes. Consider FDIC insurance charges: They are funds the FDIC takes from some (banks) and gives to others (depositors of failed banks). See post, at 26, 29, 30, n. 17. The dissent asserts in response that the FDIC’s redistribution is different because “[t]he FDIC program is an in- surance plan.” Post, at 30, n. 17. But in proposing yet one more distinc- tion to get everything lined up right, the dissent unwittingly proves the point: The fee/tax distinction is a difficult one, and Skinner was right not to make the nondelegation inquiry ride on it. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 19 Opinion of the Court proving the former and precluding the latter, the Consum- ers’ Research approach does nothing to vindicate the non- delegation doctrine or, more broadly, the separation of pow- ers. B We therefore return to the usual intelligible-principle test to decide whether the universal-service contribution scheme violates the Constitution’s nondelegation rule. The question is, again, whether Section 254 adequately guides the FCC in requiring contributions from carriers—whether it expresses the “general policy” the FCC must pursue in setting contribution amounts, as well as the “boundaries” it cannot cross. American Power & Light, 329 U. S., at 105. Here, that inquiry into the nature of the FCC’s discretion involves what turn out to be two closely related questions. First, how much money can the FCC raise through contri- butions? And second, on what things can it spend those funds? We consider each in turn, and find that Congress answered both. Congress, that is, imposed ascertainable and meaningful guideposts for the FCC to follow when car- rying out its delegated function of collecting and spending contributions from carriers. 1 As Consumers’ Research notes, Section 254 imposes no quantitative but only qualitative limits on how much money the FCC can raise from carriers for universal ser- vice. There is not a number or a rate in sight. Instead, the statute directs the FCC to collect the amount that is “suffi- cient” to support the universal-service programs Congress has told it to implement. §§254(b)(5), (d), (e). That lan- guage replicates or resembles the statutory terms Congress has used in other revenue-raising statutes, as described above. See supra, at 14; see, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §243 (instruct- 20 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court ing the Federal Reserve Board to levy on banks “an assess- ment sufficient to pay its estimated expenses”). Consumers’ Research argues that, even under our usual nondelegation test, the term “sufficient” does not do enough. That is because, in the Consumers’ Research view, it sets only “a floor—not a ceiling—on the FCC’s revenue- raising power.” Brief for Respondents 56. Or to put the point differently, Consumers’ Research thinks that the stat- ute gives the FCC power, all on its own, to raise our hypo- thetical $5 trillion. See supra, at 18–19. And not unrea- sonably, it thinks that would pose a constitutional problem. But in fact the word “sufficient” sets a floor and a ceiling alike. An amount of money is “sufficient” for a purpose if it is “[a]dequate” or “necessary” to achieve that purpose. Black’s Law Dictionary 1447 (7th ed. 1999). That means, of course, that the FCC cannot raise less than is adequate or necessary to finance the universal-service programs Con- gress wants. But it also means that the FCC cannot raise more than that amount. Were the FCC to raise, say, twice as much as needed, the revenue would not be “sufficient” but instead excessive. Cf. Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475–476 (similarly understanding the term “requisite” to mean “not lower or higher than is necessary”). Take another hypothet- ical from oral argument. If you told a friend to order a “suf- ficient” amount of food for five people and 500 boxes of pizza showed up at your house, you would not think he had fol- lowed instructions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 135. So too with Congress and the Commission. Budgeting, to be sure, is not an exact science, so in one quarter the Commission may col- lect a bit more than it needs and in another a bit less. See 47 CFR §§54.709(b), (c) (telling the Administrator that if it collects “excess” or “inadequate” funds in a given quarter, it should compensate in the next one). But the Commission’s mandate is to raise what it takes to pay for universal-ser- vice programs; if the Commission raises much beyond, as if it raises much below, it violates the statute. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 21 Opinion of the Court And the Commission has long viewed the statute in just that way. For many years, the Commission has construed the sufficient-funding directive to call for raising “an afford- able and sustainable amount of support that is adequate, but no greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of the universal service program.” In re High-Cost Universal Serv. Support, 25 FCC Rcd. 4072, 4074 (2010); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 (Solicitor General explaining that Congress has authorized the FCC to collect “only what’s sufficient to achieve universal service, so no more than needed to sup- port specified programs”). The Commission, in other words, sets the contribution factor to raise just enough money—a “sufficient” amount—to implement universal service as Congress directed. 2 To say that much, though, takes us only halfway, because it raises the question: Sufficient for what? If Section 254’s universal-service program is itself indeterminate—so that the FCC can turn it into anything the FCC wants—then the “sufficiency” ceiling will do no serious work. The FCC could operate—and collect contributions “sufficient” for—either the most barebones or the most extravagant program. But if Congress has given appropriate guidance about the na- ture and content of universal service, then that plus the “sufficiency” ceiling will defeat this challenge to the contri- bution system. For Congress will have provided intelligible principles to guide the FCC as it raises funds. On this further, “for what” question, our nondelegation precedents provide context—showing what kinds of statu- tory schemes have passed, and what kinds have failed, the demand that Congress give adequate guidance. Those that have failed are fewer in number—in fact, only two—but of- fer object lessons about the amount of latitude Congress can confer. In one case, the statute empowered the President 22 FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH Opinion of the Court to bar the transport of petroleum products while “estab- lish[ing] no criterion” and “declar[ing] no policy” for whether, when, or how he should do so. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 415 (1935). The statute in the second case was even worse. It authorized the President to approve “codes of fair competition” for “the government of trade and industry throughout the country,” yet imposed “few restrictions” and “set[ ] up no standards” aside from a “statement of the general aims of rehabilitat[ing], cor- rect[ing,] and expand[ing]” the economy. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 521–522, 541– 542 (1935). The law thus gave the President “virtually un- fettered” authority to govern the Nation’s trades and indus- tries. Id., at 542. At the same time, we have found intelligible principles in a host of statutes giving agencies significant discretion. So, for example, we upheld a provision enabling an agency to set air qua