Bowe v. United States (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus BOWE v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 24–5438. Argued October 14, 2025—Decided January 9, 2026 Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year sentence in federal cus- tody after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; and (3) using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). Bowe’s §924(c) conviction carried a manda- tory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for the robbery offenses. To have been properly convicted under §924(c), at least one of Bowe’s other offenses must qualify as a “crime of violence” under one of two definitional clauses in §924(c): the “elements clause,” §924(c)(3)(A), or the “residual clause,” §924(c)(3)(B). But decisions is- sued years after Bowe’s conviction call into question whether either clause can support his §924(c) conviction. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470 (residual clause void for vagueness); United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 860 (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements clause). This case concerns Bowe’s efforts to obtain postconviction relief from the mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence imposed under §924(c). A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when and how state and fed- eral prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §2254 (state prisoners); §2255 (federal prisoners). Particu- larly relevant here, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or subsequent efforts at obtaining postconviction relief require the prisoner first to seek certification from a court of appeals that the filing meets threshold conditions before a prisoner can proceed in a district court. See §2244 (authorization re- quests by state prisoners); §2255(h) (successive-motion requests by federal prisoners). While §§2244 and 2255(h) have distinct 2 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Syllabus requirements, §2255(h) cross-references some of the procedures in §2244 for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certifie[s]” a second or successive filing. Bowe first sought §2255 relief in 2016, arguing that §924(c)’s resid- ual clause was unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that—regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality— Bowe’s §924(c) conviction was proper because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. In 2019, after Davis, Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Cir- cuit under §2255(h) to file a second or successive motion. A three-judge panel found that Bowe had not met §2255(h)’s threshold conditions. Although the panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retro- active constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for suc- cessive motions under §2255(h)(2)), it held that Bowe could not make a prima facie showing that his §924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because then-binding Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. After Taylor was decided in 2022, Bowe once again sought authorization un- der §2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor leave none of his convic- tions as a valid predicate “crime of violence” under §924(c). A panel dismissed the part of Bowe’s request resting on Davis, reasoning that the claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under §2244(b)(1). The panel also denied the part of Bowe’s request that rested on Taylor, con- cluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the meaning of §2255(h)(2). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit several times, seeking authorization to pursue postconviction relief, initial hearing en banc, and reversal of Circuit precedent applying §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 mo- tions. He also requested certification of the question whether §2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. See §1254(2). Bowe’s requests were denied. Bowe eventually filed this petition for certiorari, pointing out a circuit split: Six Circuits apply §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to fed- eral prisoners, while three do not. The Court granted review. Held: 1. The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion. Pp. 5–19. (a) Section 2244(b)(3)(E) provides that the denial of authorization “to file a second or successive application” shall not be the subject of a certiorari petition. That provision does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed within §2244, which imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners. It also speaks only to a “second or successive application,” §2244(b)(3)(E), but unlike state prisoners who Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus file such “applications,” federal prisoners file “motions,” see §2255(e). Pp. 5–8. (b) The Government contends that §2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244—providing that a successive motion must be “certified as pro- vided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” the content requirements in §2255(h)—also imports §2244’s certiorari bar. But §2255(h)’s cross-reference, coupled with its context, does not provide the clear indication needed to strip this Court of ju- risdiction. Given the broad grant of certiorari jurisdiction to the Court, see §1254(1), Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose excep- tions to that jurisdiction. In Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, a case also brought by a federal prisoner, the Court held that §2244(b)(3)(E) posed no bar to its review, explaining that the Govern- ment’s reading would close the Court’s doors to a class of habeas peti- tioners “without any clear indication” that Congress intended such a result. Id., at 381. The same “clear indication” necessary in Castro to strip the Court of jurisdiction is required here: The §2244(b)(3)(E) is- sue arises in the same context and the Government argues that the very same provision bars the Court’s review in this case. This clear indication is not a “magic words” requirement; it simply asks whether text and structure unambiguously show that Congress intended to pre- vent the Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. A provision that can reasonably be read more than one way in context is not sufficiently clear. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference does not provide the clear indica- tion of intent required to strip the Court of jurisdiction. The language of the cross-reference is both narrow and specific. It says that a second or successive §2255 motion “must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” one of two threshold content requirements. It incorporates only the provi- sions in §2244 that “provid[e]” for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certifie[s]” a second or successive filing and directs that those procedures be used to evaluate whether the filing “contain[s]” the content requirements listed in §2255(h). Section 2244(b)(3)(E) is not one of those provisions, and it has nothing to do with the content requirements in §2255(h). For these reasons and others, whether §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar falls within the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference is at most ambigu- ous. Ambiguous language cannot provide the required clear indica- tion, and the Government’s remaining arguments do not supply the necessary clarity that the text lacks. The Government also suggests that it would make little sense to bar certiorari review of authorization decisions concerning state prisoners but not federal ones. That 4 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Syllabus argument carries little weight when the governing standard requires Congress to speak clearly. Moreover, Congress treated state and fed- eral prisoners differently across AEDPA, with state prisoners often facing far higher hurdles to relief. Allowing further review in this Court is thus consistent with both AEDPA’s purposes and practical considerations. Pp. 8–19. 2. Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences. Pp. 19–25. (a) The text of §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar states that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dis- missed.” State prisoners alone file habeas corpus applications under §2254. That specific reference to §2254 was deliberate: Elsewhere in this very section, Congress expressly distinguishes §2254 “applica- tions” from §2255 “motions.” §2266(a); see also §§2253(c)(1)(A)–(B) (distinguishing state habeas proceedings from proceedings under §2255). When interpreting statutes, the Court presumes that “differ- ences in language like this convey differences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86. By its plain terms, §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar applies only to state prisoners. P. 20. (b) Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244 does not make §2244(b)(1) applicable to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions. Amicus contends that §2255(h) incorporates §2244, including §2244(b)(3)(C), which requires a panel to determine that “the applica- tion makes a prima facie showing that [it] satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” From here, one of the “requirements of . . . subsec- tion” (b) is §2244(b)(1). Accordingly, amicus argues, following this chain of cross-references leads to the conclusion that §2244(b)(1) must apply to federal prisoners. But that position is erroneous under the same reasoning that explains why the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates the procedures in §2244 only as they relate to how a panel certifies a second or successive filing. At bottom, the best textual reading of both §2255(h) and §2244(b) is that, when a federal prisoner moves for authorization, a panel can authorize the filing if the filing makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies one of the two grounds in §2255(h), the “two—and only two—conditions in which a second or successive §2255 motion may proceed.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U. S. 465, 477. The argument that Congress meant for AEDPA to treat second or successive filings by federal and state prisoners the same fails. AEDPA is replete with examples of Congress treating state and federal prisoners differently—including in the context of limitations on second or successive filings. Any concern associated with Congress allowing Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 5 Syllabus old-claim litigation for federal prisoners is overstated given that all claims, even the repeat ones, must meet the “strictly limited” threshold requirements of §2255(h), Jones, 599 U. S., at 476, and should they survive that review, they must still conform with the demanding stat- ute of limitations contained in §2255(f ), Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359. Very few claims will satisfy either, let alone both. The Court leaves it to the Eleventh Circuit to determine in the first in- stance whether Bowe should receive authorization to file a second or successive motion under the correct standard. Pp. 20–25. Vacated and remanded. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Part I. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–5438 _________________ MICHAEL BOWE, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT [January 9, 2026] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress has created a comprehensive scheme to address when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postcon- viction relief in federal courts. A state prisoner can file an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. A federal prisoner, by contrast, can file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under §2255. Each provision contains its own procedural and substantive re- quirements that an individual must satisfy. This case concerns the more complicated situation when a prisoner returns to federal court after a prior attempt for relief has failed. In this situation, Congress has enlisted the courts of appeals to play a gatekeeping role in the con- sideration of second or successive filings brought by federal and state prisoners. Under this system, before a prisoner can bring such a filing in a district court, a court of appeals must certify that the filing meets certain threshold condi- tions. Section 2244 governs authorization requests made by state prisoners, and §2255(h), in turn, governs requests made by federal prisoners. The two have distinct require- ments, but through a limited cross-reference in §2255(h) to §2244 for how a filing is “certified” by a “panel,” Congress 2 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court has borrowed certain of the procedures that apply to state prisoners and applies them to federal prisoners too. This case presents two questions regarding which aspects of §2244 fall within the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference. The first is whether §2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the “de- nial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application” from being the “subject of a peti- tion for . . . a writ of certiorari,” bars this Court’s review of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal prisoners. If it does, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this case. The Court holds that it does not. In the narrow cross-reference to the procedures in §2244, Con- gress has not clearly indicated that it intended to incorpo- rate §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar. The second question is whether §2244(b)(1), which directs courts to dismiss a claim “presented in a second or succes- sive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application,” applies to motions filed by federal prisoners. It does not: Section 2244(b)(1), by its ex- press terms, applies only to state prisoners’ habeas applica- tions under §2254, not to federal prisoners’ motions under §2255. I Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is in federal custody. In 2008, he pleaded guilty to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a); (2) attempt to com- mit Hobbs Act robbery, ibid.; and (3) the use, carrying, brandishing, or discharge of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, §924(c)(1)(A). Bowe received a 24-year sen- tence; 10 of those years were imposed because of the §924(c) conviction, which carried a mandatory 10-year sentence consecutive to the sentence for the predicate robbery of- fenses. See §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Bowe did not appeal. In the decade since, this Court has issued several deci- sions that have called Bowe’s §924(c) conviction into Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court question. To appreciate the implications of those decisions, it is important first to understand how §924(c) operates. Section 924(c) applies if, as relevant here, an individual commits a qualifying “crime of violence” with a firearm. A “crime of violence,” in turn, is defined in two ways. Under the “elements clause,” it is a “felony” that “has as an ele- ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” §924(c)(3)(A). Under the “residual clause,” it is a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” §924(c)(3)(B). For Bowe to have been properly convicted under §924(c)—and thus to have received the accompanying 10-year consecu- tive sentence—his conviction for either conspiracy or at- tempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery must qualify as a crime of violence under either the elements or residual clause. Today, it is likely that neither clause would permissibly support Bowe’s §924(c) conviction. In United States v. Da- vis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019), this Court held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 470. In United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845 (2022), the Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Id., at 860. Eleventh Circuit precedent is also clear that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. See Brown v. United States, 942 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (2019) (per cu- riam). If sentenced today, therefore, Bowe likely would not be subject to the 10-year mandatory consecutive sentence that he is now serving. Nevertheless, the timing of this Court’s decisions, cou- pled with the timing of Bowe’s efforts to take advantage of them, have produced procedural complications that have so far prevented relief, leading to this appeal. Bowe, acting pro se, initially sought postconviction relief under §2255 in 2016, before the Court decided Davis, 4 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court arguing that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. A District Court rejected Bowe’s claim, in part, be- cause regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality, attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of vio- lence under §924(c)’s elements clause. App. 43. After Davis was decided in 2019, Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive mo- tion. See §2255(h). A three-judge panel declined to author- ize Bowe’s motion. Although the panel acknowledged that Davis had announced a new, retroactive rule of constitu- tional law, which is one of two grounds on which a second or successive motion can proceed, see §2255(h)(2), it held that Bowe could not “make a prima facie showing that his §924(c) conviction and sentence [were] unconstitutional” because under then-prevailing Eleventh Circuit precedent, “attempted Hobbs Act robbery” still qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause, App. 52–54. Then, after Taylor was decided in 2022, Bowe once again sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive motion. This time, Bowe argued that under Davis and Taylor, none of his convictions qualified as a predicate “crime of violence.” A three-judge panel dis- missed the part of Bowe’s request that rested on Davis, rea- soning that because the claim was “presented in a prior ap- plication” to file a second or successive motion, the panel lacked jurisdiction over it under §2244(b)(1). App. 59–60. The panel also denied the part of Bowe’s request that rested on Taylor, concluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule as needed to secure relief under §2255(h)(2). App. 59–60. Bowe did not stop there. A few months later, he again sought authorization to file a second or successive motion, again relying on Davis and Taylor. This time, Bowe also moved for initial hearing en banc. As relevant, he asked the Eleventh Circuit to overturn its precedent holding that §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar applies to federal prisoners’ Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court successive §2255 motions. In Bowe’s view, that bar applies only to state prisoners, not federal prisoners like him. A three-judge panel dismissed Bowe’s request for authoriza- tion, citing §2244(b)(1), and the Eleventh Circuit denied Bowe’s motion for initial hearing en banc. Bowe then moved for an original writ of habeas corpus in this Court. It was denied. In re Bowe, 601 U. S. ___ (2024). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit, seeking authoriza- tion, initial hearing en banc, and certification of the ques- tion whether §2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. See §1254(2) (allowing courts of appeals to certify questions of law to the Supreme Court). As before, a three-judge panel dismissed Bowe’s request for authorization, relying on §2244(b)(1). The panel also declined to certify the question Bowe requested, and the full Eleventh Circuit denied his motion for initial hearing en banc. Finally, Bowe filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Eleventh Circuit is one of six Circuits that apply §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners. Three Cir- cuits do not.1 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue. See 604 U. S. 1096 (2025). II As a threshold matter, the Government argues that the Court cannot resolve the Circuit split concerning §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar because the Court lacks jurisdic- tion to hear the case under §2244(b)(3)(E). That provision states that the “denial of an authorization by a court of ap- peals to file a second or successive application . . . shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari.” See —————— 1 Compare Winarske v. United States, 913 F. 3d 765 (CA8 2019); In re Bourgeois, 902 F. 3d 446 (CA5 2018); In re Baptiste, 828 F. 3d 1337 (CA11 2016); United States v. Winkelman, 746 F. 3d 134 (CA3 2014); Gallagher v. United States, 711 F. 3d 315 (CA2 2013) (per curiam); and Brannigan v. United States, 249 F. 3d 584 (CA7 2001), with In re Graham, 61 F. 4th 433 (CA4 2023); Jones v. United States, 36 F. 4th 974 (CA9 2022); and Williams v. United States, 927 F. 3d 427 (CA6 2019). 6 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S. 163, 171 (2009) (“Before turning to the merits, we first must address our jurisdiction”). If Bowe were in state custody, then the Government would be correct. See Stewart v. Martinez-Vil- lareal, 523 U. S. 637, 641 (1998). He is not. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) does not prevent the Court’s review because the certiorari bar does not clearly apply to motions filed by federal prisoners like Bowe. A In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “Congress established a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for the consideration of ‘second or successive’ ” filings “in the federal courts.” Id., at 641 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 657 (1996)). The associated proce- dural and substantive requirements are “stringent.” Bur- ton v. Stewart, 549 U. S. 147, 152 (2007) (per curiam). State prisoners looking to file a second or successive ap- plication must comply with §2244(b), which provides in rel- evant part: “(3)(A) Before a second or successive application per- mitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of ap- peals for an order authorizing the district court to con- sider the application. “(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order au- thorizing the district court to consider a second or suc- cessive application shall be determined by a three- judge panel of the court of appeals. “(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this sub- section. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court “(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the au- thorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion. “(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive applica- tion shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. “(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim pre- sented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the require- ments of this section.” By comparison, a federal prisoner seeking to file a second or successive motion must satisfy §2255(h). Jones v. Hen- drix, 599 U. S. 465, 477–478 (2023). That provision states in full: “A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain— “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be suf- ficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the mo- vant guilty of the offense; or “(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Unlike the provisions governing authorization decisions for state prisoners, §2255(h) does not mention this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, let alone purport to limit it. Nor does §2244(b)(3)(E) readily apply to federal prisoners on its face: Section 2244, overall, imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners with the aim of 8 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court facilitating finality,2 and the certiorari bar in particular speaks to “second or successive applications,” which federal prisoners do not file, see §2255(e) (federal prisoners must file “motions” for habeas relief, not applications). Whether the Court has jurisdiction therefore turns on the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244. In the Government’s view, the cross-reference captures all of §§2244(b)(3) and (b)(4), including the certiorari bar in §2244(b)(3)(E). Although the Government is correct that the cross-reference incorporates some of the provisions it identifies, the Government is wrong that it also incorpo- rates the certiorari bar. That is because the cross- reference, coupled with its context, does not provide the clear indication needed to strip this Court of jurisdiction. B 1 This Court has certiorari jurisdiction over any “[c]as[e] in the courts of appeals . . . upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judg- ment or decree.” §1254(1). Given that broad grant of juris- diction, Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose exceptions to that jurisdiction. In Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375 (2003), Castro (a federal prisoner) filed a motion for postconviction relief in Federal District Court. He had previously filed a motion, pro se, attacking his conviction, but he had not specifically labeled it as a §2255 motion. The District Court construed Castro’s previous filing as his first §2255 motion and the second filing before it as a second §2255 motion. Because —————— 2 See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(1) (“[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254”); §2244(b)(2) (same); §2244(c) (“[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); §2244(d)(1) (“application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in cus- tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); see also §2244(d)(2) (“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review”). Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court Castro did not receive authorization from the Court of Ap- peals before filing the second motion, the court dismissed it. The court, however, granted Castro a certificate of appeal- ability as to its determination that the motion was his sec- ond one. See §2253(c). The Court of Appeals later affirmed the dismissal. This Court granted certiorari to address the recharacter- ization of Castro’s first filing. The Court also asked the par- ties whether §2244(b)(3)(E) barred its review. Like here, the Government argued that it did. In the Government’s view, the Court of Appeals had denied Castro authorization when it affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, making that “denial” the “subject” of his “petition for . . . certiorari” for the purposes of §2244(b)(3)(E). The Court accepted that characterization of the proceedings below for the sake of ar- gument, yet disagreed that §2244(b)(3)(E) posed a bar to its review. Castro, 540 U. S., at 380. That was because the “subject” of Castro’s petition was not the denial of authori- zation, but rather “the lower courts’ refusal to recognize that [the] §2255 motion [was] his first, not his second.” Ibid.3 As relevant here, the Court stressed a fatal flaw with the Government’s argument. As it explained, “reading the stat- ute as the Government suggest[ed]” to bar jurisdiction in that case “would close our doors to a class of habeas peti- tioners seeking review without any clear indication that —————— 3 The Government stresses, and the dissent echoes, that the Castro Court “took as a given” that §2244(b)(3)(E) applies to federal prisoners by concluding that it had jurisdiction because the subject of the certiorari petition fell outside of the provision’s scope, not because the provision applied to state prisoners alone. Brief for United States 18, 30–31. As the Government elsewhere acknowledges, however, the Court did not ad- dress the threshold question whether §2244(b)(3)(E) applies to federal prisoners. Id., at 31 (observing that Castro “did not even comment on the issue”). Thus, at most, the Court assumed for the sake of its analysis that §2244(b)(3)(E) applied. That assumption is not a holding to which the Court is now bound. 10 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court such was Congress’ intent.” Id., at 381; cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 83–84 (2010) (declining to read “si- lence or ambiguous language as modifying or limiting [the Court’s] pre-existing [certiorari] jurisdiction”). That conclu- sion was also “difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that ‘we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review nar- rowly.’ ” Castro, 540 U. S., at 381 (quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002)).4 Because a “clear indication” was necessary in Castro to strip the Court of jurisdiction, a “clear indication” is re- quired here: The issue arises in the same context and the Government argues that the very same provision bars the Court’s review in this case. This clear indication, im- portantly, is not a so-called “magic words” requirement. It simply asks whether the text and structure support the un- ambiguous understanding that Congress intended to pre- vent this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. If a provision can reasonably be read multiple ways given its content and context, it is not sufficiently clear. The dissent contends that this clear-indication require- ment comes from “thin air.” Post, at 11–16 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). As just explained, however, it comes from —————— 4 The dissent’s rendition of Castro is mistaken. It suggests that the clear-indication requirement was tied to the “troublesome resul[t]” that, under the Government’s interpretation, a prisoner could not appeal a panel decision characterizing a filing as his first, not his second, even though the Court had previously allowed the Government to appeal a decision reaching the opposite result. See Castro, 540 U. S., at 380; Stew- art v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637, 641–642 (1998); see also post, at 6–7, 14–15 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). That was one troubling result of the Government’s position, but Castro also listed two more troubling results: the “clos[ing of] our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress’ intent,” and the difficulty in “reconcil[ing]” that outcome “with the basic principle that we ‘read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly.’ ” 540 U. S., at 380–381. The latter two concerns arise here, and thus Castro requires a clear indication before we will “close our doors” to this distinct class of prisoners seeking habeas relief. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court Castro itself. It also draws support from this Court’s histor- ical practice of declining to read ambiguous statutes to limit its certiorari jurisdiction, which even the dissent acknowl- edges. See post, at 15–16. The dissent also argues that this clear-indication require- ment must be mistaken because it is not derived from prin- ciples of constitutional avoidance. Constitutional avoid- ance, however, is not the only possible source of a rule like Castro’s. This Court also has required Congress to speak clearly in other contexts when Congress wishes to do some- thing that the Constitution allows. For example, the Court will interpret a “procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Boechler v. Com- missioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203 (2022). In that context, “Con- gress need not ‘incant magic words,’ but the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Con- gress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional conse- quences.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). Requiring this showing is driven by the harsh consequences of finding a procedural requirement jurisdictional, even though Congress, of course, maintains the power to impose such consequences. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514–516 (2006); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434–435 (2011). A similar logic drives the clarity required here, when reading §2255(h) as the Government and the dissent do would “close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners.” Castro, 540 U. S., at 381.5 —————— 5 No one contends that Boechler controls this case. But see post, at 13– 14. The Boechler line of cases simply demonstrates that this Court re- quires clarity in some contexts even absent constitutional concerns, un- dermining any suggestion that constitutional avoidance is the only per- missible source of Castro’s rule or other interpretative rules like it. Nor does this line of cases stand alone. See, e.g., Morrison v. National Aus- tralia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010) (describing the presumption against extraterritoriality, which requires a “clear indication of an extra- territorial application” for a statute to reach beyond domestic affairs, as 12 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 2 Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference does not provide the clear indication required to bar this Court’s review. The language of the cross-reference is both narrow and specific. It says that a second or successive §2255 motion “must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the ap- propriate court of appeals to contain” one of two threshold content requirements. (The text of the cross-reference does not end at “ ‘certified as provided in section 2244,’ ” as the dissent would have it. See post, at 5, 8, 10–11.) The cross- reference thus appears to incorporate only the provisions in §2244 that “provid[e]” for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certifie[s]” a second or successive filing and directs that those procedures be used to evaluate whether the filing “contain[s]” the content requirements listed in §2255(h). Section 2244(b)(3)(E) is not one of those provisions, and it has nothing to do with the content re- quirements in §2255(h). First, the cross-reference speaks to how a “panel” of the court of appeals certifies a filing. But this Court is not “a panel of the appropriate court of appeals,” §2255(h), so the cross-reference does not speak to this Court’s jurisdiction. Second, this Court’s review (or lack thereof ) is not part of how a panel certifies a second or successive filing. Section 2244(b)(3)(A) identifies that the filing must be certified in the court of appeals before an individual can proceed in the district court. Section 2244(b)(3)(B) requires that a three- judge panel make the certification decision. Section 2244(b)(3)(C) tells the panel that the filing must make a prima facie showing that it satisfies the relevant gatekeep- ing requirements. Finally, §2244(b)(3)(D) instructs the panel to decide whether to certify a filing within 30 days of receiving the request. These provisions all describe the —————— reflecting “a canon of construction, . . . rather than a limit upon Con- gress’s power to legislate”). Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court procedures that a panel must follow in certifying a second or successive filing, and are therefore incorporated by §2255(h)’s cross-reference. In stark contrast, the certiorari bar in §2244(b)(3)(E) says nothing about how the §2255 motion must be certified. It instead speaks to what happens after a panel has acted on a certification request: specifically, whether an individual can appeal the panel’s certification decision. If the certio- rari bar did not exist, no aspect of how the panel certifies a filing would change.6 Put simply, “the certiorari bar ad- dresses an entirely different act (filing a certiorari petition, not certifying a successive motion) by an entirely different actor (the prisoner, not the panel) in an entirely different court (this Court, not the court of appeals).” Brief for Peti- tioner 33. If Congress intended §2255(h) to incorporate this postcertification orange alongside all the panel-certification apples in §2244(b)(3), it did not say so clearly. Of course, as the Government and the dissent point out, barring appeals of certification decisions has an effect on the panel’s decision by making it conclusive. Brief for United States 47; post, at 9–10. That effect, however, has little to do with how the “motion [is] certified . . . by a panel.” §2255(h). Section 2255(h)’s reference to how the “motion must be certified” under §2244 thus does not incor- porate §2244(b)(3)(E)’s postcertification bar in the clear manner that Castro requires. Contrary to the dissent’s framing, Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236 (1998), does not support a different conclu- sion. That case concerned whether the Court had jurisdic- tion over a decision by a three-judge panel to deny a pris- oner a certificate of appealability under §2253(c), and held that the Court does have such jurisdiction. Id., at 253. —————— 6 The dissent asks “[w]hat would be the point” of subparagraph (B) without the certiorari bar in subparagraph (E). Post, at 9. The point of (B) is still apparent. It identifies who makes the authorization determi- nation in the first instance: a “three-judge panel of the court of appeals.” 14 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Section 2253(c) applies to federal and state prisoners and dictates that, before an individual can appeal from a district court’s denial of a habeas petition, he must secure permis- sion from “a circuit justice or judge.” Court-appointed amicus in Hohn argued that the decision denying permission was not a “case” in the Court of Appeals for the purposes of this Court’s jurisdiction under §1254(1). The Court rejected that construction, however, in part be- cause it would have rendered §2244(b)(3)(E) (which the Court suggested was a requirement for “state prisoners fil- ing second or successive habeas applications under §2254”) as superfluous. See 524 U. S., at 249. That was because all the reasons amicus gave for why a decision denying a cer- tificate of appealability did not constitute a “case” for the purposes of §1254(1) would equally have applied to a deci- sion denying authorization to bring a second or successive filing. Ibid. The Court nowhere held that §2244(b)(3)(E) applied to federal prisoners. (That is not surprising because the case did not present that question.) Nor does the Court’s holding today render §2244(b)(3)(E) superfluous: As all agree, it bars this Court’s review of panel authorization decisions concerning motions to file second or successive ap- plications by state prisoners. The dissent also relies on Hohn to argue that it already stands for the proposition that §2244(B)(3)(E) imposes “a ‘clear limit’ on our jurisdiction” in this case. Post, at 7, 11– 12; see also post, at 15. Not so. No one disputes that the certiorari bar clearly deprives the Court of jurisdiction over classes of cases to which it applies. See Hohn, 524 U. S., at 250. What is not clear is whether, through the cross-refer- ence in §2255(h), Congress intended for that bar to extend to federal prisoners—a point Hohn simply did not address. B For these reasons, whether §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar falls within the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference is at Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court most ambiguous. Ambiguous language, however, cannot provide the required clear indication, and the Government’s and the dissent’s remaining arguments do not supply the necessary clarity that the text lacks. To begin, the Government contends that there is textual support in §2244(b)(3)(E) for the understanding that the certiorari bar applies to federal prisoners through the cross- reference. On this score, the Government points to how §§2244(b)(3)(A)–(E) each use the term “second or successive application” instead of referring to §2254 specifically or state prisoners more generally. This stands in contrast to nearly all the other provisions in §2244. In the Govern- ment’s view, this textual variation means that Congress in- tended for §2255(h)’s cross-reference to incorporate any pro- vision in §2244 that uses the term “second or successive application” and the breadth of the cross-reference there- fore must be understood on those terms. If that were so, §2255(h)’s cross-reference would also in- corporate §2244(b)(4). That provision directs district courts to review and “dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has author- ized . . . unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of ” §2244. Put differently, once a second or successive application is certified, §2244(b)(4) tells a dis- trict court to doublecheck that the application satisfies §2244, including its gatekeeping requirements. Section 2244(b)(4), however, plainly falls outside the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference because §2244(b)(4) has nothing to do with how a filing is “certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.” §2255(h). Thus, accepting the Government’s argument that §2255(h)’s cross-reference should be understood to incorpo- rate any provision in §2244 that uses “second or successive application” would essentially require interpreting §2255(h) to mean a federal prisoner’s second or successive motion “must conform to all provisions in section 2244 that 16 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court are not expressly limited to state prisoners.” That, of course, is not what §2255(h) says. The Government also points to part of §2244(b)(3)(E) that does speak to a “panel” of “a court of appeals.” Specifically, §2244(b)(3)(E) says that an authorization decision “shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing,” thereby bar- ring panel rehearing. According to the Government, be- cause §2244(b)(3)(E) speaks to the panel in some regard, §2255(h) must have intended to incorporate that provision in its entirety. The Government is wrong, however, that the certiorari bar is incorporated in this way. Whether §2244(b)(3)(E)’s panel-rehearing bar applies to federal pris- oners says little, and certainly nothing clear, about whether Congress intended §2244(b)(3)(E)’s separate certiorari bar to extend to authorization decisions concerning federal pris- oners. Using the former to incorporate the latter is the kind of jurisdiction stripping by implication that cannot suffice. Cf. Felker, 518 U. S., at 660 (“Repeals [of jurisdiction] by implication are not favored”). Next, the Government and the dissent argue that allow- ing appeals from a panel’s certification decision to this Court is inconsistent with §2244(b)(3)(D). Post, at 20; Brief for United States 27–28. That provision, which all agree is covered by §2255(h)’s cross-reference, imposes a 30-day clock on a panel’s certification decision after a litigant seeks authorization (though most Courts of Appeals view that re- quirement as advisory, see In re Williams, 898 F. 3d 1098, 1102, n. 5 (CA11 2018) (Wilson, J., specially concurring) (collecting cases); see also infra, at 23–24, and n. 8). When an individual seeks certiorari, on the other hand, he has 90 days from the date of decision to file a petition in this Court. This Court’s Rule 13.1. The Government suggests that the 30-day limit for panel review indicates that Congress wanted the certification decision to occur quickly, and that allowing prisoners to seek certiorari for an additional 90 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court days after the panel review concludes would thwart that in- tention. The Government’s argument is misguided. Nothing about the Court’s decision today undermines §2244(b)(3)(D)’s timeline for the panel’s authorization deci- sion. Nor is this inference so compelling as to provide the needed clarity to cut off the Court’s jurisdiction: It is en- tirely plausible that Congress intended to require panels to move quickly, while still preserving the prisoner’s ability to seek further review in the rare case that warrants this Court’s attention. See §2266 (placing time limits on the in- itial review of capital cases in the lower courts but placing no limits on this Court’s review). Panels will still have the tools needed, moreover, to facilitate that quick review un- der the Court’s interpretation of §2255(h)’s cross-reference. See infra, at 23–24, and n. 8.7 From here, the Government resorts to another structural argument. The certiorari bar is found in §2244(b)(3)’s fifth subparagraph. Everyone agrees that §2255(h)’s cross- reference incorporates the preceding four subparagraphs. The Government maintains that it would be odd that Con- gress intended to incorporate four of those subparagraphs and not all five. Brief for United States 17, 23. If Congress had intended for all five to travel together, however, it did not say so explicitly. That would have been easy to do: Con- gress simply could have referenced §2244(b)(3) specifically, rather than broadly referencing §2244 with a narrow cross- reference only specifying how a second or successive filing is “certified” by a “panel.” Congress did not. The language —————— 7 Nor does the Court’s decision today risk unduly opening the flood- gates to frivolous appeals from authorization decisions concerning fed- eral prisoners. Such appeals will be governed by the ordinary rules that prevent abuses of the Court’s certiorari docket in every other circum- stance. See, e.g., this Court’s Rules 39.8, 42.2. If Congress thought it best to strip the Court of jurisdiction to keep these appeals away from the Court’s docket nonetheless, it failed to convey that intent sufficiently. 18 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court it used instead supports the understanding that the provi- sions the cross-reference incorporates turn on their sub- stance, not where they sit in a list. As explained, supra, at 12–14, the certiorari bar does not clearly fall within the scope of the cross-reference on its own terms. Finally, the Government invokes a practical concern. The Government suggests that it would make little sense to bar certiorari review of authorization decisions concerning state prisoners but not federal ones. That argument carries little weight when the governing standard requires Con- gress to speak clearly. It also misses the mark. Congress treated state and federal prisoners differently across AEDPA, with state prisoners often facing far higher hur- dles to relief. To name a few examples: The statutory re- quirements for second or successive filings for federal and state prisoners are “not identical.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 529, n. 3 (2005); compare §§2244(b)(1)–(2) with §§2255(h)(1)–(2). Indeed, the requirements for federal pris- oners are more lenient, as explained in detail below. See infra, at 21–22. Further, for state prisoners alone, Con- gress requires exhaustion, §§2254(b)–(c), and then, once in federal court, mandates deference to both the state court’s application of federal law and its factual determinations, §2254(d). This differential treatment exists for good reason. Con- gress enacted AEDPA “to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 436 (2000). The Act “recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 19 (2013). Out of respect for state courts and their abil- ity “to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erect[ed] a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for [state] prisoners.” Ibid. Federal courts “will not lightly con- clude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the ‘extreme malfunctio[n]’ for which federal habeas relief Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19 Opinion of the Court is the remedy.” Id., at 20; see also Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 38 (2011) (observing that “the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas” review of state-court pro- ceedings does not function as a “means of error correction”). Comity and federalism, however, fall away when a fed- eral court reviews a federal judgment. By the time a federal prisoner looks to file a second or successive motion, moreo- ver, he will have had fewer bites at the apple, and fewer courts reviewing his case, than most state prisoners in the same position. See §2254(b)(1)(A); In re Graham, 61 F. 4th 433, 441 (CA4 2023). Although the Federal Government has an interest in finality too, Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 662 (2005), “ ‘[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,’ ” Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 449, 460 (2012). Allowing further review in this Court is thus consistent with both AEDPA’s purposes and practical con- siderations. At bottom, the Government’s arguments suggest that §2255(h)’s cross-reference might include §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar. They do not, however, provide the necessary “clear indication” that Congress intended to “close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review.” Castro, 540 U. S., at 381. Absent such clear indication, federal prison- ers are not prohibited from seeking certiorari from a panel’s denial of authorization to file a second or successive motion. III Turning now to the merits upon which the Court granted certiorari, Bowe and the Government agree that the Elev- enth Circuit erred by applying §2244(b)(1) to Bowe’s re- quest for authorization to file a second or successive motion to vacate under §2255(h). The Court appointed Kasdin M. Mitchell as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Elev- enth Circuit’s position. 604 U. S. ___ (2025). She has ably discharged her responsibilities. The Court nevertheless agrees with the parties and holds that §2244(b)(1) does not 20 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court apply to motions filed by federal prisoners under §2255(h). The contrary decision of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed. A Begin with the text. Section 2244(b)(1) states that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus ap- plication under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” State prisoners alone file habeas corpus applications under §2254. See §2254(a) (not- ing that §2254 is limited to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); see also Magwood v. Pat- terson, 561 U. S. 320, 333 (2010) (“The requirement of cus- tody pursuant to a state court-judgment distinguishes §2254 from other statutory provisions authorizing relief from con- stitutional violations—such as §2255, which allows chal- lenges to the judgments of federal courts”). This specific reference to §2254 was deliberate: Else- where in this very section, §2244 acknowledges §2255. See §2244(a) (referencing §2255); see also §§2253(c)(1)(A)–(B) (distinguishing a “final order” in a “habeas corpus proceed- ing in which the detention complained of arises out of pro- cess issued by a State court” from one “in a proceeding un- der section 2255”); §2266(a) (distinguishing an “application under section 2254” from a “motion under section 2255”). A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation teaches that “when we’re engaged in the business of interpreting statutes[,] we presume differences in language like this convey differ- ences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017). Thus, by its plain terms, §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar applies only to state prisoners. Nor does §2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244 otherwise make §2244(b)(1) applicable to second or successive motions filed by federal prisoners. Amicus, as well as the dissent, however, argues that it does. As they see it, §2255(h) incor- porates §2244, including §2244(b)(3)(C). Section 2244(b)(3)(C), in turn, requires a panel to determine that Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 21 Opinion of the Court “the application makes a prima facie showing that [it] sat- isfies the requirements of this subsection.” From here, one of the “requirements of . . . subsection” (b) is §2244(b)(1). Following this chain of cross-references where it leads, ami- cus and the dissent say, §2244(b)(1) must apply to federal prisoners. The reasoning why this Court has jurisdiction also shows the error in this position. See supra, at 12–14. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates the procedures in §2244 only as they relate to how a panel certifies a second or successive filing. It then tells the panel to use those pro- cedures to evaluate whether the federal prisoner’s second or successive motion “contain[s]” either newly discovered evidence, §2255(h)(1), or a new rule of constitutional law, §2255(h)(2). Nothing in §2255(h) suggests that it incorpo- rates §2244 for any other purposes. Thus, by its terms, §2255(h)’s cross-reference does not incorporate the content requirements contained in §2244, like §2244(b)(1)’s old- claim bar. Amicus and the dissent’s broad reading of §2244(b)(3)(C) would also put §2255 on a collision course with §2244. Sec- tion 2244(b) imposes two limitations on the content of a sec- ond or successive habeas application: §2244(b)(1), which bars old claims; and §2244(b)(2), which prescribes “two grounds” in which a claim “not previously raised” can pro- ceed in a “second or successive application.” Burton, 549 U. S., at 153. Section 2244(b)(3)(C), on which amicus relies, requires individuals to satisfy all the “requirements of this subsection,” including both §§2244(b)(1) and (b)(2). The up- shot of amicus’s argument would therefore be that §2255(h) incorporates not only §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar, but also §2244(b)(2)’s substantive gatekeeping requirements for new claims. Section 2255(h), however, contains its own substantive requirements that are irreconcilable with those in §2244(b). 22 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court In particular, §2255(h)(1) permits a second or successive §2255 motion if the petitioner identifies “newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and con- vincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.” Section 2244(b)(2)(B) also concerns claims based on new facts, but it is more limited than §2255’s in two ways. First, it con- fines the new-facts exception to scenarios in which the new facts “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” §2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Second, it requires that the movant show “by clear and convincing ev- idence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact- finder would have found the applicant guilty of the under- lying offense.” §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). If Congress had incorporated §2244(b)(2)(B)’s more strin- gent exception into §2255(h), then §2255(h)(1)’s more leni- ent exception would become a dead letter. Because “ ‘Con- gress presumably does not enact useless laws,’ ” Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 427 (2024), it makes no sense to read §2255(h)’s cross-reference in this way. Recognizing the problem with this position, amicus and the dissent attempt to limit the scope of “requirements of this subsection” in §2244(B)(3)(C) to capture only those con- tent requirements in §§2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) that do not con- flict with §2255(h). In their view, Congress intended for the substantive gatekeeping requirements in §2244(b) to apply to federal prisoners by default, unless they deviated from those requirements in §2255(h). To amicus, the new-facts exception illustrates this approach. This argument, how- ever, is undercut by the fact that in §2244(b)(2)(A) and §2255(h)(2), Congress repeated verbatim the standard for when a second or successive filing can proceed based on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. If §2244(b)(2)(A) already provided the default rule, there would have been no need for Congress to repeat it in §2255(h)(2), rendering its Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 23 Opinion of the Court inclusion mere surplusage. Hohn, 524 U. S., at 249 (declin- ing “to adopt a construction making another statutory pro- vision superfluous”). At bottom, the best textual reading of both §2255(h) and §2244(b) is that, when a federal prisoner moves for author- ization, a panel can authorize the filing if it satisfies one of the two grounds in §2255(h), the “two—and only two—con- ditions in which a second or successive §2255 motion may proceed.” Jones, 599 U. S., at 477. B Amicus’s remaining nontextual arguments do not change this conclusion. She contends that §2244(b)(1) is a neces- sary tool, indeed “central,” for panels to meet §2244(b)(3)(D)’s 30-day deadline, and that Congress there- fore must have intended for it to apply in all cases in which authorization is needed. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 12, 23–26. That logical leap lacks sufficient founda- tion. For one, it is not clear why searching through case files to see if the litigant has raised a claim before is any easier than determining whether the litigant has identified new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law that is retroac- tive. As the parties explain, it seems just as likely that the panel’s obligation to assess only whether a filing has made a prima facie showing that it satisfies §2255(h)’s content re- quirements, and not to undertake a more searching inquiry on the merits, is what facilitates the 30-day deadline. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 9–10; Reply Brief for United States 9; see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 664, 661, n. 3 (2001). Amicus certainly provides no evidence to suggest that her hypothesis is the more plausible one.8 Regardless, —————— 8 For support, amicus relies on the fact that the three Circuits that do not apply §2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners do not consider the 30-day deadline binding, suggesting that the failure to apply §2244(b)(1)’s old- claim bar is the reason for their failure to comply with the 30-day 24 BOWE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court amicus’s “speculation as to Congress’ intent” in enacting the old-claim bar and 30-day deadlin