Chiles v. Salazar (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus CHILES v. SALAZAR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 24–539. Argued October 7, 2025—Decided March 31, 2026 Kaley Chiles holds a master’s degree in clinical mental health and a state counseling license in Colorado. Ms. Chiles does not begin counseling with any predetermined goals; instead, she sits down with clients, dis- cusses their goals, and then formulates methods of counseling that will most benefit them, seeking throughout to respect her clients’ funda- mental right of self-determination. On matters of sexuality and gen- der, Ms. Chiles’s clients, including young people, often have different goals: Some are content with their sexual orientation and gender iden- tity and want help with social issues or family relationships, while oth- ers hope to reduce or eliminate unwanted sexual attractions, change sexual behaviors, or grow in the experience of harmony with their bod- ies. With all those clients, Ms. Chiles seeks to help them reach their stated objectives. And she employs only talk therapy. In 2019, Colorado adopted a law prohibiting licensed counselors from engaging in “conversion therapy” with minors, Colo. Rev. Stat. §12–245–224(1)(t)(V), defining the term to include “any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual’s sexual ori- entation or gender identity,” as well as any “effor[t] to change behav- iors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions toward individuals of the same sex,” §12–245–202(3.5)(a). Yet the law explicitly allows counselors to provide “[a]cceptance, sup- port, and understanding for . . . identity exploration and development,” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(I), and to assist persons “undergoing gender tran- sition,” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(II). Ms. Chiles filed suit in federal court 2 CHILES v. SALAZAR Syllabus seeking a preliminary injunction, raising a First Amendment chal- lenge to the law as it applies to her talk therapy. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit determined that Ms. Chiles had Article III standing to pursue her as-applied pre-enforce- ment challenge. On the merits, however, both courts denied Ms. Chiles’s request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that Colo- rado’s law is best understood as regulating professional conduct and that it regulates speech only incidentally, thus triggering no more than rational-basis review under the First Amendment. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict over how the First Amendment interacts with laws like Colorado’s when those laws are applied to talk therapy. Held: Colorado’s law banning conversion therapy, as applied to Ms. Chiles’s talk therapy, regulates speech based on viewpoint, and the lower courts erred by failing to apply sufficiently rigorous First Amendment scrutiny. Pp. 7–23. (a) The First Amendment protects the inalienable right of every in- dividual to decide for himself “how best to speak,” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 791, and laws regulat- ing speech based on its subject matter or “communicative content” are “presumptively unconstitutional,” triggering “strict scrutiny” that re- quires the government to prove its restriction is “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests,” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163. “Viewpoint discrimination” represents an even more “egre- gious form” of content regulation from which governments must nearly always “abstain.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829. The Court has recognized only a “few historic and traditional cate- gories of expression”—such as fraud, defamation, and “fighting words”—where content-based restrictions do not automatically trigger strict scrutiny. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. 709, 717. These categories are narrowly drawn and share a long and well-recognized historical pedigree. A law regulating the content of speech cannot avoid searching First Amendment review just because it mostly regulates non-expressive conduct. What matters is whether, in fact, the law regulates speech in the case at hand, as illustrated by Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1. And the First Amendment’s protections extend to licensed professionals much as they do everyone else. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 766–767. Pp. 8–11. (b) As applied to Ms. Chiles, Colorado’s law regulates the content of her speech and goes further to prescribe what views she may and may not express, discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. The law permits Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus her to express acceptance and support for clients exploring their iden- tity or undergoing gender transition, §12–245–202(3.5)(b), but forbids her from saying anything that attempts to change a client’s “sexual orientation or gender identity,” including efforts to change “behaviors,” “gender expressions,” or “romantic attraction[s],” §12–245–202(3.5)(a). Her speech does not become “conduct” just because a government says so or because it may be described as a “treatment” or “therapeutic mo- dality.” The First Amendment is no word game, and “the exercise of constitutional rights” cannot be circumscribed “by mere labels.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429. The fact that the State’s viewpoint regulation falls only on licensed health care professionals does not change the equation. The First Amendment protects the right of all to speak their minds, and NIFLA expressly rejected the notion that professional speech is subject to “ ‘di- minished constitutional protection.’ ” 585 U. S., at 767. History is lit- tered with examples of governments that have sought to manipulate professional speech “ to increase state power, ” “ suppress minorities, ” and censor “ ‘unpopular ideas.’ ” Id., at 771. Colorado’s law does not implicate any recognized exception to the Court’s usual First Amendment rules. It does not require disclosure of “factual, noncontroversial information in . . . ‘commercial speech,’ ” id., at 768, and as applied to Ms. Chiles, it does not regulate conduct in a way that only “incidentally burden[s] speech,” id., at 769. All she does is speak, and speech is all Colorado seeks to regulate. Colorado’s argument that the law regulates speech only incidentally fails because the Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct doctrine asks whether the law restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct, or whether the law restricts expressive conduct only for reasons unrelated to its content. Colorado’s law does neither: Ms. Chiles’s speech does not bear a close causal connection to any sep- arately unlawful conduct, and the State’s law trains directly on the content of her speech, permitting some viewpoints but not others. Pp. 11–17. (c) Colorado cannot establish that applying its law to Ms. Chiles falls within a long tradition of permissible content regulation. Colorado’s arguments proceed at far too high a level of generality, asking the Court to recognize a broad “ ‘First Amendment Free Zone’ ” for speech the State considers “substandard care.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 469. The Court’s precedents foreclose aggre- gating discrete traditions of content-based regulations to sustain some new and broader category of lesser-protected speech. Even taking each of the traditions Colorado invokes on its own 4 CHILES v. SALAZAR Syllabus terms, none supports the State’s position. Colorado’s suggestion that the statute represents a traditional law licensing of medicine fails be- cause the State has not presented persuasive evidence of a historic tra- dition—the first state “counselor-licensure bill” was adopted only in 1976—and because licensing laws have traditionally addressed quali- fications, not dictated a professional’s point of view. Colorado’s anal- ogy to informed-consent laws fails because such laws regulate speech only incident to separate physical conduct and usually require disclo- sure of only factual and uncontroversial information, whereas Colo- rado’s law as applied to Ms. Chiles seeks to silence a viewpoint she wishes to express. Finally, Colorado’s invocation of traditional tort claims for malpractice fails because malpractice actions require exact- ing proof of injury caused by breach of duty, “provid[ing] breathing room for protected speech,” Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U. S. 600, 620, whereas Colorado’s law threatens fines, probation, and loss of license simply for expressing a particular view, and does not allow clients to consent to practices that depart from the prevailing standard of care. Pp. 18–22. (d) The First Amendment stands as a bulwark against any effort to prescribe an orthodoxy of views, reflecting a belief that each American enjoys an inalienable right to speak his mind and a faith in the free marketplace of ideas as the best means for finding truth. Laws like Colorado’s, which suppress speech based on viewpoint, represent an egregious assault on both commitments. P. 23. 116 F. 4th 1178, reversed and remanded. GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–539 _________________ KALEY CHILES, PETITIONER v. PATTY SALAZAR, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT [March 31, 2026] JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. Kaley Chiles is a mental-health counselor in Colorado. In this case, we consider her First Amendment challenge to a state law regulating what she may say when speaking with her clients. I A According to Ms. Chiles’s verified complaint, she holds a master’s degree in clinical mental health and a state coun- seling license. App. to Pet. for Cert. 212a (App.). Clients seek her help on a wide variety of mental-health issues, in- cluding trauma, addiction, “eating disorders, gender dys- phoria[,] and sexuality.” Id., at 206a–207a, 215a. Ms. Chiles “does not begin counseling” on any topic “with any predetermined goals.” Id., at 207a. Nor does she seek to “impose her values or beliefs” on clients. Id., at 212a. In- stead, she “sits down . . . and talks to them about their goals.” Id., at 207a; see also id., at 213a. Only after clients have identified their own aspirations does Ms. Chiles begin 2 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court “formulat[ing] methods of counseling that will most benefit” them. Id., at 207a. In any counseling that follows, as well, Ms. Chiles seeks to respect her “clients’ fundamental right of self-determination.” Ibid. On matters of sexuality and gender, Ms. Chiles’s clients, including minors, come to her with different goals in mind. Some “are content with” their sexual orientation and gen- der identity and seek assistance only with “social issues, family relationships,” and the like. Id., at 207a, 213a–214a. In cases like those, Ms. Chiles does not try to persuade her clients to “change their attractions, behavior, or identity,” but aims instead to help them address their stated goals. Id., at 214a; see also id., at 207a. Other clients, however, come to her hoping to “reduce or eliminate unwanted sexual attractions, change sexual behaviors, or grow in the experi- ence of harmony with [their] bod[ies].” Ibid. And in these cases, too, Ms. Chiles seeks to help her clients reach their own stated objectives. Ibid. In doing so, she does not pre- scribe any medicines, perform any physical treatments, or engage in any coercive or aversive practices. Id., at 205a– 207a. All Ms. Chiles offers is talk therapy. Ibid. B In 2019, Colorado adopted a law prohibiting licensed counselors from engaging in “conversion therapy” with mi- nors. Colo. Rev. Stat. §12–245–224(1)(t)(V) (2025). The State reports that it adopted the law “in response to a grow- ing mental health crisis among Colorado teenagers and mounting evidence that conversion therapy is associated with increased depression, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, and suicide attempts.” Brief for Respondents 11–12. Any Col- oradan who thinks a licensed counselor is engaging in con- version therapy may file a complaint with a regulatory board. See §12–245–226(1)(a)(II)(B). A complaint, in turn, triggers a disciplinary review process that can yield a fine, Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court probation, or the loss of a license. See §12–245–225; Brief for Respondents 9. The term “conversion therapy” may evoke physical tech- niques such as “ ‘electric shoc[k ]’ ” therapy aimed at chang- ing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Id., at 4. But Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy reaches further, forbidding “any practice or treatment . . . that at- tempts . . . to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity.” §12–245–202(3.5)(a) (emphasis added). The law forbids as well any “effor[t] to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or ro- mantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” Ibid. At the same time, the law explicitly allows coun- selors to engage in “practices” that provide “[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for the facilitation of an indi- vidual’s . . . identity exploration and development.” §12– 245–202(3.5)(b)(I). Likewise, the law allows counselors to provide “[a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transi- tion.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(II). After Colorado adopted its new law, Ms. Chiles filed suit in federal court and sought a preliminary injunction prohib- iting the State from enforcing it against her. She did not dispute that the statute has many valid applications. In- deed, Ms. Chiles did not take issue with Colorado’s effort to ban what she herself calls “long-abandoned, aversive” phys- ical interventions. Brief for Petitioner 10. Instead, Ms. Chiles objected to Colorado’s law only as it applies to her talk therapy, therapy that involves no physical interven- tions or medications, only the spoken word. Motion for Pre- liminary Injunction in No. 22–cv–2287 (D Colo.), ECF Doc. 29, pp. 2–3, 15. Ms. Chiles’s as-applied challenge ran this way. With re- spect to gender identity, she claimed, the law permits her to speak in ways that encourage a client “ ‘undergoing gen- der transition,’ ” but the law prohibits her from speaking in ways that help a client “realign [his] identity with [his] sex.” 4 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court Brief for Petitioner 11; see ECF Doc. 29, at 17–20. With respect to sexual orientation, Ms. Chiles continued, Colo- rado’s law similarly allows her to affirm a client’s sexual orientation, but prohibits her from speaking in any way that helps a client “change” his sexual attractions or behav- iors. Brief for Petitioner 11; see ECF Doc. 29, at 17–20. Even though Colorado’s law surely has other constitutional applications, she insisted, these constraints strip her of her First Amendment right to speak freely with her clients in ways she believes might help them meet “their own goals.” Brief for Petitioner 12; see ECF Doc. 29, at 2–3. C Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit determined that Ms. Chiles had Article III standing to pursue her as- applied pre-enforcement challenge. 116 F. 4th 1178, 1199, 1201 (2024); Civ. Action No. 1:22–cv–2287 (D Colo., Dec. 19, 2022), App. 139a. In support of their conclusion, both courts read Colorado’s law as prohibiting licensed counselors like Ms. Chiles from engaging in any attempt—including through speech—to help a minor client change his gender identity or sexual ori- entation. 116 F. 4th, at 1197; App. 141a–142a. Both courts understood this prohibition as extending to any attempt— including through speech—to change a client’s “behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” §12–245–202(3.5)(a); see 116 F. 4th, at 1197; App. 141a–142a. As both courts saw it, too, Ms. Chiles had previously spoken in ways the law now forbids, and she would continue speaking the same way but for Colorado’s new law. 116 F. 4th, at 1196–1198; App. 141a–142a. Fi- nally, both courts concluded that Ms. Chiles had alleged a “credible threat” that the State would enforce its law against her if she continued speaking as she had in the past and wished to do in the future. Indeed, both courts Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court observed, Colorado authorities had refused to disavow bringing enforcement actions against her. 116 F. 4th, at 1198–1199; App. 142a–144a. Under these circumstances, the courts held, Ms. Chiles faced an “ongoing injury resulting from the statute’s chilling effect” on her speech. 116 F. 4th, at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted); see App. 140a–141a. Satisfied as well that Ms. Chiles’s injury was traceable to Colorado’s law and redressable by an as-applied constitutional ruling in her favor, both courts held that she possessed Article III standing to bring suit. 116 F. 4th, at 1194, 1199; App. 145a, n. 5. In coming to this conclusion, the lower courts joined others that have found standing in similar cases involving similar statutes. See, e.g., Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F. 4th 1055, 1066 (CA9 2022); Catholic Charities of Jackson, Le- nawee and Hillsdale Ctys. v. Whitmer, 162 F. 4th 686, 691 (CA6 2025).* —————— *We, too, agree that Ms. Chiles has standing. Before us, Colorado only halfheartedly contests the point, suggesting Ms. Chiles cannot establish a present “intention” to speak in a way the law forbids. Brief for Re- spondents 23, n. 18. But the State’s argument is based not on some new insight about Ms. Chiles’s state of mind, only a new and narrowed con- struction of the statute that the State advances for the first time in this Court. Id., at 18–19. Colorado’s late-breaking construction of its law, however, would render much of the law’s language superfluous. Reply Brief 2–6; People v. Rodriguez-Morelos, 562 P. 3d 71, 73 (Colo. 2025) (re- citing the presumption against surplusage when construing state stat- utes). The State’s new interpretation also seemingly stands at odds with how the State itself understood its law in proceedings below. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Complaint in No. 22–cv–2287 (D Colo.), ECF Doc. 52, p. 5, n. 3. Separately, Colorado suggests that Ms. Chiles has not shown a credible threat that the State will enforce its law against her. Brief for Respondents 23, n. 18. But Colorado has fought this suit through three courts over three years and, at argument here, expressly declined to dis- avow enforcement against Ms. Chiles. Tr. of Oral Arg. 80–81. As the lower courts held, no more is required under this Court’s precedents. 116 F. 4th, at 1199; App. 145a; see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 159 (2014). 6 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court Turning to the merits, both the district court and the Tenth Circuit denied Ms. Chiles’s request for a preliminary injunction. The courts recognized that Ms. Chiles provides only “talk therapy.” 116 F. 4th, at 1193; see App. 152a. And they acknowledged that Colorado’s law regulates the “ver- bal language” she may use. 116 F. 4th, at 1208; see App. 152a. But, the courts held, the main thrust of the State’s law is to delineate which “treatments” and “therapeutic mo- dalit[ies]” are permissible. 116 F. 4th, at 1208, 1210; see App. 151a. Accordingly, the courts reasoned that Colo- rado’s law is best understood as regulating “professional conduct.” 116 F. 4th, at 1206, 1208, 1214; see App. 151a, 155a. At most, they continued, Colorado’s law regulates speech only “incidentally” to professional conduct. 116 F. 4th, at 1204; see App. 155a. As a result, the courts con- cluded, Colorado’s law triggers no more than “rational basis review” under the First Amendment, requiring the State to show merely that its law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 116 F. 4th, at 1215; App. 156a. Be- cause the State satisfied that standard, the courts held that Ms. Chiles was not entitled to the relief she sought. 116 F. 4th, at 1220–1221; App. 157a. At the Tenth Circuit, Judge Hartz dissented. As he saw it, the majority committed “several fundamental errors.” 116 F. 4th, at 1227. While Colorado’s law may ban conduct in other applications, he observed, with respect to Ms. Chiles it regulates only what she may and may not say. Id., at 1231. And under this Court’s precedents, he argued, that kind of speech regulation triggers far more demanding scru- tiny than mere rational-basis review. Id., at 1226–1229. Nor, Judge Hartz continued, does the fact that Ms. Chiles happens to hold a professional license change the equation. Id., at 1229–1230. To the contrary, he said, the majority’s effort to recast Ms. Chiles’s speech as “professional conduct” amounted to little more “than a labeling game.” Id., at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court After the Tenth Circuit ruled, Ms. Chiles sought certio- rari. In doing so, she argued that the Tenth Circuit’s deci- sion “worsened a circuit conflict” over how the First Amend- ment interacts with laws like Colorado’s. Pet. for Cert. 16; compare 116 F. 4th, at 1221, and Tingley, 47 F. 4th, at 1077, with Catholic Charities of Jackson, 162 F. 4th, at 696; Otto v. Boca Raton, 981 F. 3d 854, 868–870 (CA11 2020); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F. 3d 216, 229 (CA3 2014), abrogated in part by National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 767–769 (2018) (NIFLA); Tingley v. Ferguson, 57 F. 4th 1072, 1083– 1085 (CA9 2023) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of re- hearing en banc). We agreed to hear the case. 604 U. S. 1193 (2024). II The question before us is a narrow one. Ms. Chiles does not question that Colorado’s law banning conversion ther- apy has some constitutionally sound applications. See Brief for Petitioner 53. She does not take issue with the State’s effort to prohibit what she herself calls “long-abandoned, aversive” physical interventions. Id., at 10. Instead, Ms. Chiles stresses that she provides only talk therapy, employ- ing no physical techniques or medications. Yet, she argues, Colorado’s law still applies to her, prescribing what she may say in “voluntary counseling conversations” with her cli- ents. Id., at 50. And because that application of the law strikes at the heart of the First Amendment’s protections for free speech, she contends, it warrants considerably more searching scrutiny than the rational-basis review the Tenth Circuit applied in this case or the intermediate-scrutiny re- view some other lower courts have employed in cases like hers. Id., at 38; see, e.g., King, 767 F. 3d, at 237. We agree. To explain why, we begin by outlining the relevant First Amendment principles that govern us before discussing how they apply here. 8 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court A The First Amendment “envisions the United States as a rich and complex place” where all enjoy the “ ‘freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think.’ ” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U. S. 570, 584, 603 (2023) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 660–661 (2000)). Often, speech may prove illuminating and inspiring. Some- times, it can be misguided, offensive, or cause “incalculable grief.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 456 (2011). But either way, the First Amendment protects the inalienable right of every individual to decide for himself “how best to speak.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 791 (1988). In this Nation, no official—“high or petty”—may command our tongues or silence our voices. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943). Consistent with the First Amendment’s jealous protec- tions for the individual’s right to think and speak freely, this Court has long held that laws regulating speech based on its subject matter or “communicative content” are “pre- sumptively unconstitutional.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015). As a general rule, such “content- based” restrictions trigger “strict scrutiny,” a demanding standard that requires the government to prove its re- striction on speech is “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Ibid. Under that test, it is “ ‘rare that a regulation . . . will ever be permissible.’ ” Brown v. Enter- tainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 799 (2011) (quot- ing United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 818 (2000)). We have recognized, as well, the even greater dangers as- sociated with regulations that discriminate based on the speaker’s point of view. When the government seeks not just to restrict speech based on its subject matter, but also seeks to dictate what particular “opinion or perspective” in- dividuals may express on that subject, “the violation of the Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995). “Viewpoint discrimination,” as we have put it, rep- resents “an egregious form” of content regulation, and gov- ernments in this country must nearly always “abstain” from it. Ibid.; see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. 388, 393 (2019) (describing “the bedrock First Amendment principle that the government cannot discriminate” based on view- point (internal quotation marks omitted)); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 112–113 (2001); Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642. Of course, with almost any rule comes exceptions. And this Court has recognized a “few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the bar” where content-based restrictions on speech will not automatically trigger strict scrutiny—categories that include fraud, defa- mation, and “fighting words.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (alterations and in- ternal quotation marks omitted). But, as we have taken pains to emphasize, these exceptional categories are few and narrowly drawn, and all share a long and well- recognized historical pedigree. Ibid.; see NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767. Indeed, even within these categories we have some- times still applied strict scrutiny when governments have sought to regulate speech based on viewpoint. See, e.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 392, 395–396 (1992) (ad- dressing an ordinance that barred certain “fighting words” based on viewpoint). From these general principles, other more specific ones follow. So, for example, a law regulating the content of speech cannot avoid searching First Amendment review just because it mostly regulates non-expressive conduct. Take a classic illustration: Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). There, the State of California charged Paul Cohen with “maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace.” Id., at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Often, of course, 10 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court a person disturbs the peace through conduct alone (say, by brawling at a city council meeting). But that is not always true. And in Mr. Cohen’s case, California charged him for disturbing the peace because he wore a jacket bearing the words “ ‘Fuck the Draft’ ” in the corridor of a municipal courthouse. Ibid. As applied to him, the Court recognized, the law implicated core First Amendment concerns because the only “ ‘conduct’ ” he engaged in was the speech he dis- played. Id., at 18. And, we held, California could not con- stitutionally punish him because of the “content” of his mes- sage. Ibid. We repeated the point in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1 (2010). That case involved a federal law banning the provision of “ ‘material support’ ” to certain for- eign terrorist organizations. Id., at 8–9. Much as Califor- nia had in Cohen, the federal government in Holder argued that the law did not trigger strict scrutiny because it ad- dressed “conduct, not speech.” 561 U. S., at 26. We disa- greed. True, we acknowledged, the law often might regu- late conduct. But, we observed, in the case before us the government threatened to prosecute lawyers, doctors, and others for providing spoken training and expert advice (such as “ ‘how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes’ ”) to certain groups. Id., at 16, 21–22. And that application of the law, we held, sought to “regulat[e] speech on the basis of its content” and thus demanded strict-scrutiny review. Id., at 27–28. As Holder indicates, too, the First Amendment’s protec- tions extend to licensed professionals much as they do to everyone else. It’s a point we have since discussed at length in NIFLA. There, California sought to require crisis preg- nancy clinics to make certain statements to their clients. The State argued that its law did not trigger demanding First Amendment review because it sought to regulate only “ ‘professional speech’ ” by state license holders. 585 U. S., at 766–767. We rejected that move. By compelling clinics Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court to speak the State’s message, the law regulated speech based on its content. Id., at 766. And, we held, California had failed to “identif[y] a persuasive reason for treating pro- fessional speech as a unique category . . . exempt from ordi- nary First Amendment principles.” Id., at 773. In reaching that conclusion, to be sure, we acknowledged two kinds of content-based restrictions that can apply to professional speech without triggering strict scrutiny. First, courts generally deploy less searching review when faced with laws that require speakers to disclose only fac- tual, noncontroversial information in “ ‘commercial speech.’ ” Id., at 768; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 650–653 (1985). Second, laws regulating conduct in ways that inci- dentally sweep in speech may also generally avoid strict scrutiny. NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 769. As with laws address- ing fraud, defamation, and “fighting words,” laws regulat- ing speech along these two lines enjoy a long historical tra- dition. Id., at 767. But, we stressed, neither “turn[s] on the fact” that a licensed professional happens to be speaking. Id., at 768. Nor, we emphasized, do these narrow categories of lesser-protected speech warrant a new rule exempting a broader “category called ‘professional speech’ ” from de- manding First Amendment review. Ibid. B Applying these principles, we conclude that the courts be- low failed to apply sufficiently rigorous First Amendment scrutiny in this case. Start with the most obvious point. While the First Amendment protects many and varied forms of expression, the spoken word is perhaps the quintessential form of pro- tected speech. And that is exactly the kind of expression in which Ms. Chiles seeks to engage. As a talk therapist, all Ms. Chiles does is speak with clients; she does not prescribe 12 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court medication, use medical devices, or employ any physical methods. App. 205a–207a. Next, and nearly as clear to our eyes, Colorado seeks to regulate the content of Ms. Chiles’s speech. When it comes to issues of human sexuality, some of her clients “are con- tent with” their sexual identity and orientation and want help only “with social issues [or] family relationships.” Id., at 207a, 214a. But other clients seek her counsel on how to “reduce or eliminate unwanted sexual attractions, change sexual behaviors, or grow in the experience of harmony with [their] bod[ies].” Id., at 207a. And in those cases, Col- orado regulates how Ms. Chiles may respond. Under its law, she may not speak in any way that attempts to change a client’s “sexual orientation or gender identity”—including a client’s “behaviors or gender expressions”—or in any way that seeks to “eliminate or reduce” a client’s “sexual or ro- mantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” §12–245–202(3.5)(a). Doubtless, Colorado sees things differently. The State in- sists, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that its law does not “regulate expression” at all, only “conduct,” “treatment,” or a “therapeutic modality.” Brief for Respondents 2, 36–37, 47; 116 F. 4th, at 1208. As a result, Colorado reasons, its law triggers no more than rational-basis or intermediate- scrutiny review. Brief for Respondents 42–44. But the State’s premise is simply mistaken. In many applications, the State’s law banning “conversion therapy” may address conduct—such as aversive physical interventions. But here, Ms. Chiles seeks to engage only in speech, and as ap- plied to her the law regulates what she may say. Her speech does not become conduct just because the State may call it that. Nor does her speech become conduct just be- cause it can also be described as a “treatment,” a “therapeu- tic modality,” or anything else. The First Amendment is no word game. And the rights it protects cannot be renamed Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court away or their protections nullified by “mere labels.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963). Our precedents have long made that much clear. Califor- nia faulted Mr. Cohen for the “conduct” of wearing an offen- sive jacket. Cohen, 403 U. S., at 16. The federal govern- ment insisted that its law banning support to terrorists regulated “conduct” even as applied to the written and spo- ken advice of professionals like lawyers and doctors. Holder, 561 U. S., at 10, 26. But the effort to recast speech as conduct failed in those cases—and it must here too. Un- der the First Amendment, what matters is not how a gov- ernment describes its law or whether the law may regulate conduct in other circumstances. What matters is whether, in fact, the law regulates speech in the case at hand. As applied here, Colorado’s law does not just regulate the content of Ms. Chiles’s speech. It goes a step further, pre- scribing what views she may and may not express. For a gay client, Ms. Chiles may express “[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for the facilitation of . . . identity explo- ration.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(I). For a client “undergoing gender transition,” Ms. Chiles may likewise offer words of “[a]ssistance.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(II). But if a gay or transgender client seeks her counsel in the hope of chang- ing his sexual orientation or gender identity, Ms. Chiles cannot provide it. The law forbids her from saying anything that “attempts . . . to change” a client’s “sexual orientation or gender identity,” including anything that might repre- sent an “effor[t] to change [her client’s] behaviors or gender expressions or . . . romantic attraction[s].” §12–245– 202(3.5)(a). Colorado disputes none of this; neither does the dissent. See post, at 20–21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.) (ac- knowledging that Colorado has engaged in viewpoint dis- crimination). Of course, Ms. Chiles remains free to say other things. As Colorado and the dissent emphasize, she may “shar[e] in- formation” about sexual orientation or gender identity. 14 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court Brief for Respondents 20. She can “criticiz[e] Colorado’s law.” Ibid. She can “writ[e] papers” espousing her views. Post, at 20 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). She may even encour- age a client to seek advice from someone else who doesn’t hold a state license. Brief for Respondents 20. But true as all that may be, it is also true that she cannot voice certain “perspective[s]” the State disfavors when speaking with consenting clients. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829. And, under our precedents, viewpoint restrictions like that are not subject to mere rational-basis review or intermediate scrutiny. Rather, they represent “an egregious form of con- tent discrimination” where First Amendment concerns are at their most “blatant.” Ibid.; see also Reed, 576 U. S., at 168–169; contra, post, at 8, 20–21 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (contending that “heightened scrutiny . . . is not warranted” even while admitting that Colorado’s law discriminates based on viewpoint). The fact that the State’s viewpoint regulation targets only licensed healthcare professionals like Ms. Chiles changes nothing. Colorado and the dissent may believe that the First Amendment should carry “far less salience” for the Nation’s millions of “medical professionals” than for everyone else. Post, at 2 (opinion of JACKSON, J.); post, at 17–26; Brief for Respondents 23. They may believe that state-imposed orthodoxies in speech pose few dangers and many benefits in this field (and who knows what others). But their policy is not the First Amendment’s. The Consti- tution does not protect the right of some to speak freely; it protects the right of all. It safeguards not only popular ideas; it secures, even and especially, the right to voice dis- senting views. Consistent with these principles, our prece- dents have expressly rejected the State and dissent’s notion that “professional speech” represents some “separate cate- gory of speech” subject to “diminished constitutional protec- tion.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted). History is littered with examples of official efforts Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court to manipulate and control professional speech—including “the content of doctor-patient discourse”—in ways designed “to increase state power,” “suppress minorities,” and muz- zle “unpopular ideas.” Id., at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted) (recounting examples). And the “dangers associ- ated with” censorship, we have recognized, are no less acute “in the fields of medicine and public health” than they are anywhere else. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does Colorado’s law implicate any recognized excep- tion to our usual First Amendment rules. As we have seen, some laws regulating speech based on its content—like ones addressing fraud, defamation, and “fighting words”—do not generally trigger heightened scrutiny because of their long historical pedigree. See Part II–A, supra. As we have seen, too, NIFLA recognized that two kinds of such laws some- times apply to professionals. See 585 U. S., at 768. But Colorado’s law fits in neither category. The State does not require professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial speech.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, Colorado seeks to sup- press views Ms. Chiles wishes to express. Nor, with respect to Ms. Chiles, does Colorado’s law regulate conduct in a way that only “incidentally burden[s] speech.” Id., at 769. All Ms. Chiles does is speak—and, as far as she is concerned, speech is all Colorado seeks to regulate. Resisting this conclusion, Colorado and the dissent try to shoehorn the State’s statute into the latter category. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents 37. By defining prohibited “con- version therapy” broadly, Colorado observes, its law pro- scribes a “wide range” of “treatments.” Id., at 18. Any ac- tivity that seeks to change a client’s gender identity or sexual orientation—whether it involves “electric shocks” or consists of “words only”—is banned. Ibid. And considering the full scope of the law’s many applications, the State sub- mits, it seeks to regulate mostly conduct and reaches speech only incidentally. Ibid. The dissent pursues a similar 16 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court theme, insisting that Colorado has only incidentally prohib- ited Ms. Chiles’s speech because the law’s “primary objec- tive” is to regulate medical treatments. Post, at 8–26 (Opin- ion of JACKSON, J.). This argument echoes Colorado’s claim that it seeks to regulate only conduct, and they falter for similar reasons. If a government could reclassify talk therapy as speech in- cident to conduct, it might just as easily do the same for speech incident to “teaching or protesting.” Otto, 981 F. 3d, at 865. “[B]oth are activities, after all.” Ibid. Were that the rule, “[w]hat an opportunity for [the] suppression of dis- sent this would offer.” 116 F. 4th, at 1228 (Hartz, J., dis- senting). Governments could easily wield all manner of laws regulating some conduct to silence speech they disfa- vor. It is a result that would not “compor[t ] with the First Amendment’s animating principles” so much as betray them. Contra, post, at 17 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). Recognizing as much, our precedents in Cohen and Holder already foreclose exactly this move. California pros- ecuted Mr. Cohen under a law banning disturbances of the peace. Cohen, 403 U. S., at 16. The federal government threatened lawyers and doctors with prosecution under a law prohibiting support for terrorists. Holder, 561 U. S., at 10, 14–15, 25. In both cases, the government defended its actions on the ground that the law in question was gener- ally aimed at certain types of conduct. But in both cases, we emphatically rejected that argument. Just because a law may “generally functio[n] as a regulation of conduct,” we held, does not exempt it from demanding First Amend- ment review when a government seeks to apply that law to speech alone. Id., at 27–28. At bottom, Colorado and the dissent fundamentally mis- conceive this Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct prece- dents. In these cases, the question is not whether a law mostly addresses conduct and only sometimes sweeps in speech. Instead, the focus lies on two entirely different Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court questions: whether the law in question restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct—or whether the law restricts expressive conduct only for rea- sons unrelated to its content. Illustrative of the first cate- gory, this Court has held that strict scrutiny does not apply to regulations aimed at speech promoting the sale of con- traband because such speech is often bound up with tradi- tional criminal conduct. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 297–298 (2008); see also Giboney v. Empire Stor- age & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502 (1949); Brief for Eugene Volokh as Amicus Curiae 3–11. Illustrative of the second category, “an ordinance against outdoor fires” would not re- quire a court to apply strict scrutiny even if it prohibited burning a flag in protest, because the law forbids conduct without regard to the message it may convey. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011). Colorado’s law does not regulate speech incident to con- duct under either test. The State does not dictate what Ms. Chiles may say because her speech bears a close causal con- nection to some separately unlawful conduct like a tradi- tional crime. Rather, Ms. Chiles seeks to speak with inter- ested clients about steps they might take to change unwanted behaviors, expressions, or attractions related to sexual orientation or gender identity—conduct Colorado it- self does not dispute those clients (or anyone else) may law- fully undertake. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58 (conceding that “life coaches” and other non-licensees can lawfully convey the advice Ms. Chiles seeks to offer). Nor does Colorado seek to regulate Ms. Chiles’s speech for reasons unrelated to its content, like a ban on outdoor fires that happens to sweep in flag burning. Instead, the State’s law trains directly on the content of her speech and permits her to express some viewpoints but not others. Colorado does not regulate speech incident to conduct; it regulates “speech as speech.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 770. 18 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court C Perhaps sensing that this Court’s existing precedents of- fer it little support, Colorado ultimately pivots, urging us to reshape our doctrine. In doing so, the State begins by point- ing again to NIFLA. There, recall, the Court observed that our cases have identified “two circumstances” in which speech by professionals may warrant “diminished” First Amendment protection: when a law seeks to compel disclo- sure of factual, noncontroversial information in commercial speech; and when a law regulates speech only incidentally to conduct. Id., at 767–768 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Still, Colorado emphasizes, NIFLA left open the pos- sibility that a future party might present “persuasive evi- dence . . . of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition” of content regulation regarding additional categories of pro- fessional (or other) speech that might likewise warrant only “diminished” First Amendment protection. Id., at 767 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 472 (2010). Seeking to take up this challenge, Colorado contends that its law falls within a long tradition of permissible content regulation. It’s a line of argument that comes with a daunt- ing burden. Under our precedents, the State must present “persuasive” historical evidence in order to overcome our “especia[l]” “reluctan[ce] to mark off new categories of speech for diminished constitutional protection.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, Colorado insists, it can carry that burden in this case be- cause States have traditionally enjoyed wide latitude to proscribe “substandard care” even when that involves reg- ulating the content of speech. Brief for Respondents 16. As evidence, Colorado points to the history of state laws licens- ing the practice of medicine, regulating informed consent, and permitting tort suits for medical malpractice. Id., at 23–36. The dissent pursues the same point citing the same authorities. See post, at 9–11, 26–31, 35 (opinion of Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19 Opinion of the Court JACKSON, J.) (suggesting that States may ban “substandard care” provided “via speech” in light of licensing, informed consent, and malpractice laws). This argument stumbles out of the gate, for it proceeds at far too high a level of generality. From three specific sets of laws, Colorado and the dissent ask us to recognize a cav- ernous “First Amendment Free Zone,” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted), one in which States may censor almost any speech they consider “substandard care.” It is, once more, an approach our precedents already foreclose. Consider a couple examples. In Alvarez, the federal gov- ernment pointed to specific, historical laws proscribing fraud and defamation and asked us to extrapolate from them a much broader rule allowing it to enforce content- based restrictions on any “false statements.” In NIFLA, California suggested that informed-consent laws and our speech-incident-to-conduct doctrine might be cobbled to- gether to sustain the recognition of a field of “professional speech” subject only to rational-basis review. We rejected both efforts, stressing instead that discrete traditions of content-based regulations cannot be aggregated together to sustain some new and broader category of lesser-protected speech. Alvarez, 567 U. S., at 718–722 (plurality opinion); id., at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767–768; see also Button, 371 U. S., at 439–440 (distinguishing State’s law from laws proscribing accepted “common-law offenses”); Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 539 (1989) (similar). And Colorado’s similar effort can succeed no more than others like it have in the past. Beyond that problem lies another. Taking each of the three traditions Colorado and the dissent invoke on its own terms—as we must—none delivers the support they sup- pose. Start with Colorado’s suggestion, endorsed by the dis- sent, that the State’s statute represents nothing more than 20 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court a traditional law licensing the practice of medicine. See Brief for Respondents 27–28; post, at 26–27 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). We cannot agree for at least two reasons. First, the State has not presented persuasive evidence that its law is part of a historical tradition. When assessed at the level of generality our precedents demand, what Colo- rado describes turns out to be a relatively recent innova- tion. Indeed, the briefing before us suggests that the very first state “counselor-licensure bill” was adopted only in 1976. National Academies, Institute of Medicine, Provision of Mental Health Counseling Services Under TRICARE 94 (2010); D. Bergman, The Role of Government and Lobbying in the Creation of a Health Profession: The Legal Founda- tions of Counseling, 91 J. Counseling & Development 61 (2013) (Bergman); see also Brief for Petitioner 42. And that is far from the sort of “persuasive evidence” of a historically grounded practice our precedents require. NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, licensing laws have traditionally addressed what qualifications an individual must possess before practicing a particular profession. See Bergman 62 (licensing laws generally “establis[h] minimum standards of preparation and ensur[e] the professional is qualified”); R. Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 885, 887 (2000) (a “licen- sure scheme typically sets out certain requirements that the professional must fulfill before practicing”). And what- ever traditional interest a State may have in ensuring a professional possesses a particular set of qualifications, that interest does not automatically entail a right to dictate a professional’s point of view. NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 773. Turn now to Colorado’s effort, again echoed by the dis- sent, to compare its statute to informed-consent laws. See Brief for Respondents 34–36; post, at 9–11 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). Those laws generally require a doctor to in- form a patient about “the nature of [a proposed] procedure” Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 21 Opinion of the Court and its attendant “risks.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 769–770 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). As such, informed- consent laws do not usually trigger strict scrutiny because they regulate speech only incident to separate physical con- duct that would, “without [the] patient’s consent,” amount to “an assault.” Id., at 770 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Usually, too, informed-consent laws require practi- tioners to disclose only factual and uncontroversial infor- mation. See id., at 769–770. But all that is a far cry from how Colorado’s law operates here. As applied to Ms. Chiles, the State seeks neither to regulate her speech incident to any conduct, nor does it seek to compel disclosure of factual and uncontroversial information. Instead, it seeks to si- lence a viewpoint she wishes to express. Colorado and the dissent close by asking us to analogize the State’s law to traditional tort malpractice claims. See Brief for Respondents 25–26; post, at 27–29 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). But here again the differences are impossible to ignore. In a traditional malpractice action, liability at- taches only if the plaintiff shows, among other things, that he has suffered an injury caused by the defendant’s breach of the applicable duty of care. See, e.g., Day v. Johnson, 255 P. 3d 1064, 1068–1069 (Colo. 2011). Those kinds of “[e]xact- ing proof requirements,” we have observed, may “provide sufficient breathing room for protected speech.” Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U. S. 600, 620 (2003). Yet Colorado’s law contains nothing like them, instead threatening individuals with fines, proba- tion, and the loss of their licenses simply for expressing a particular view. See §§12–245–202(3.5), 12–245–224(1)(t), 12–245–225. Nor does Colorado’s law allow clients to con- sent to practices that depart from the prevailing standard of care, while malpractice law sometimes does. See Re- statement (Third) of Torts: Medical Malpractice §11 (2024); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F. 2d 987, 995 (CA2 1987). 22 CHILES v. SALAZAR Opinion of the Court Consider, too, where the State and dissent’s logic leads. Not long ago, many medical experts and organizations, in- cluding the American Psychiatric Association, considered homosexuality a mental disorder. See American Psychiat- ric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men- tal Disorders 38–39 (1952); cf. American Psychiatric Asso- ciation, Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil Rights, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 497 (1974). On the view Col- orado and the dissent advance, a law adopted during that era prohibiting counselors from engaging in the “substandard care” of affirming their clients’ homosexuality would have been subject to only rational-basis or interme- diate-scrutiny review—and likely upheld. See 116 F. 4th, at 1237–1238 (Hartz, J., dissenting). Today, tomorrow, and forever, too, any professional speech that deviates from “current beliefs about the safety and efficacy of various medical treatments” could be silenced with relative ease. Post, at 24 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). It is a consequence Colorado freely acknowledges. Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–63. And one the dissent embraces. Post, at 23–26, and n. 9 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). So what if that kind of reflexive deference to currently prevailing professional views may not always end well? Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 205–207 (1927). Fortunately, that is not the world the First Amendment envisions for us. Licensed professionals “have a host of good-faith disagreements” about the “prudence” and “eth- ics” of various practices in their fields. NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 772. Medical consensus, too, is not static; it evolves and always has. A prevailing standard of care may reflect what most practitioners believe today, but it cannot mark the outer boundary of what they may say tomorrow. Far from a test of professional consensus, the First Amendment rests instead on a simple truth: “[T]he people lose” whenever the government transforms prevailing opinion into enforced conformity. Ibid. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 23 Opinion of the Court III We do not doubt that the question “how best to help mi- nors” struggling with issues of gender identity or sexual ori- entation is presently a subject of “fierce public debate.” Tin- gley v. Ferguson, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1). But Col- orado’s law addressing conversion therapy does not just ban physical interventions. In cases like this, it censors speech based on viewpoint. Colorado may regard its policy as es- sential to public health and safety. Certainly, censorious governments throughout history have believed the same. But the First Amendment stands as a shield against any effort to enforce orthodoxy in thought or speech in this coun- try. It reflects instead a judgment that every American pos- sesses an inalienable right to think and speak freely, and a faith in the free marketplace of ideas as the best means for discovering truth. However well-intentioned, any law that suppresses speech based on viewpoint represents an “egre- gious” assault on both of those commitments. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 KAGAN, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–539 _________________ KALEY CHILES, PETITIONER v. PATTY SALAZAR, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT [March 31, 2026] JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, concurring. The Court today decides that the Colorado law challenged here, as applied to talk therapy, conflicts with core First Amendment principles because it regulates speech based on viewpoint. See ante, at 23. I agree. I write only to note that if Colorado had instead enacted a content-based but viewpoint-neutral law, it would raise a different and more difficult question. As the Court states, governments must “nearly always” abstain from adopting viewpoint-based restrictions. Ante, at 9. Those laws represent a particularly “egregious form” of content-based regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns to the highest possible degree. Ibid.; see Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. 388, 393 (2019). A law drawing a line based on the “ideology” of the speaker—disadvantaging one view and advantaging another—skews the marketplace of ideas our society depends on to discover truth. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995). And such a law suggests an impermissible motive— that the government is regulating speech because of its own “hostility” toward the targeted messages. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992). If the First Amendment 2 CHILES v. SALAZAR KAGAN, J., concurring prohibits anything, it is the “official suppression of ideas.” Id., at 390; see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 181– 183 (2015) (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment). Because viewpoint-based laws always raise that specter, they are the most suspect of all speech regulations. So much so that this Court has refused to permit viewpoint discrimination even within unprotected categories of speech, like fighting words or obscenity. See R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 384–390. Colorado’s law, as applied to talk therapy, regulates based on viewpoint, for the reasons the Court gives. See ante, at 13–14. The law forbids a counselor to provide ther- apy designed to “change [a minor’s] sexual orientation or gender identity.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §12–245–202(3.5)(a) (2025); see §12–245–224(1)(t)(V). At the same time, the law specifically allows a counselor to offer therapy expressing “[a]cceptance, support,” and other affirmation of the minor’s “identity exploration.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(I)–(II). So, for example, the law prevents a therapist from saying she can help a minor change his same-sex orientation, but permits her to say that such a goal is impossible and so she will help him accept his gay identity. Colorado does not dispute that point. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 78. Nor does it dispute that un- der normal First Amendment principles, that difference constitutes viewpoint discrimination. See ibid. Indeed, the case is textbook. The law “distinguishes between two op- posed sets of ideas”—the one resisting, the other reflecting, the State’s own view of how to speak with minors about sex- ual orientation and gender identity. Iancu, 588 U. S., at 394. Or said just a bit differently, the law draws a line based on the speaker’s “opinion or perspective,” and thus enables “speech on only one side”—the State’s preferred side—of an ideologically charged issue. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829;