T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25–197. Argued April 20, 2026—Decided June 18, 2026 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers seeking review and rejection of state-court judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus- tries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284. This case asks whether the doctrine applies only to final judgments rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, or whether it also bars suit when the state-court judgment at issue remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Petitioner T. M. alleges that she has a medical condition that causes changes in her mental status, including psychosis, when she ingests gluten. In March 2023, T. M. accidentally ingested gluten and was taken to the emergency room at Baltimore Washington Medical Cen- ter, where, after an administrative hearing and over her and her fa- ther’s objections, she was involuntarily committed for about three months. During her stay, T. M.’s treating psychiatrist and the medical center obtained an order authorizing the facility to forcibly inject T. M. with antipsychotic medication. These events prompted a flurry of liti- gation, with T. M. and her parents filing several state and federal law- suits seeking T. M.’s release and to avoid the forced injections. T. M. and respondents negotiated a settlement agreement to facilitate T. M.’s discharge, and the state judge presiding over T. M.’s state ha- beas petition entered the agreement as a consent order on June 12, 2023. The consent order provided for T. M.’s immediate release subject to several conditions, including that T. M. obtain a new treating psy- chiatrist, continue taking her prescribed medications, and dismiss 2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Syllabus with prejudice all pending actions against respondents. Ten days after the state court entered the consent order, T. M. and her parents ob- tained new counsel and sued respondents in Federal District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking a declaration that the consent order violated T. M.’s federal and state due-process rights, a declaration that the order was obtained under duress, and an injunction preventing its enforcement. Meanwhile, T. M. appealed the consent order to the Ap- pellate Court of Maryland and raised similar arguments. T. M. later successfully moved to stay the state-court appeal to prevent incon- sistent rulings. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doc- trine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting T. M.’s argument that Rooker-Feldman applies only to judgments that are final judgments from the highest court of a State in which the decision could be had. Held: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdic- tion over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court pro- ceedings commenced and seeking district court review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment re- mains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Pp. 5– 18. (a) Federal district courts generally lack “any power to review di- rectly cases from state courts.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomo- tive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286. The Supreme Court is the only fed- eral court with appellate jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and that jurisdiction extends only to “[f]inal judgments or decrees ren- dered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to declare a state-court judgment “null and void” because doing so would be “an exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” which only the Supreme Court pos- sesses, and the “jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.” Id., at 414–416. In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to “review” a final judicial determination of the D. C. high court because such “[r]eview . . . can be obtained only in [the Supreme] Court” under §1257. Id., at 476, 482. Rooker and Feldman rest on two closely related bases of reasoning. First, when plaintiffs “essentially invit[e] federal courts of first in- stance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” they are seeking an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 283–284. Second, such “appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state-court judgment is lodged, . . . by 28 U. S. C. §1257, exclusively in [the Supreme] Court.” 544 U. S., at 283. This Court has since refused Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus to expand the Rooker-Feldman doctrine but has also reaffirmed its rule in the narrow ground it occupies. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. Pp. 5–8. (b) T. M.’s case falls within “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker- Feldman,” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284, because she is complaining of in- juries caused by, and seeking relief from, the state-court judgment it- self, arguing that the consent order violates her federal and state due process rights and was entered into under duress. The consent order was rendered 10 days before T. M. commenced this federal lawsuit, and she plainly seeks “review and rejection” of the “ ‘Consent Order’ ” by asking the District Court to declare it “unconstitutional, unenforce- able, and void ab initio” and to enjoin its “enforcement.” 139 F. 4th 344, 347. P. 8. (c) The Court rejects T. M.’s argument that Rooker-Feldman should apply only to final judgments rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, i.e., the kinds of judgments that strictly fall within this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1257. Pp. 9–18. (1) T. M.’s theory cannot be squared with the Court’s precedents. T. M. reads the Court’s prior Rooker-Feldman cases not to evince any concern about district courts exercising what amounts to appellate ju- risdiction over state-court judgments, but instead as relying on a strict negative inference from §1257: when this Court has jurisdiction over a state-court judgment, district courts must not. But this Court’s prece- dents plainly adopted a more functional view of what constitutes orig- inal and appellate jurisdiction under §1331. In Rooker, nothing in the Court’s reasoning suggested the outcome would have been different had the judgment still been on appeal; the Court held that seeking to “reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment” would be an “exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” which the District Court lacks because it has “strictly original” jurisdiction. 263 U. S., at 416. Later cases confirmed that Rooker-Feldman bars suits in federal district court that “see[k] what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment,” regardless of whether the judgment formally falls within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005–1006. In fact, Feldman explicitly rejected the notion that district courts have jurisdiction to review state-court judgments so long as the judgments are not yet within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. 460 U. S., at 483– 484, n. 16 (explaining that irrespective of the Court’s “jurisdiction to review a final state court judgment . . . ‘lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions’ ”). Pp. 9–13. (2) If departure from this Court’s precedents alone were not enough to affirm the dismissal of T. M.’s suit under Rooker-Feldman, adopting T. M.’s rule would also create anomalous outcomes and 4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Syllabus undermine federalism principles. Allowing federal district courts to review state-court judgments while they are on appeal in the state- court system would undermine the “[c]ooperation and comity” on which the Nation’s federal system is built. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 586. T. M.’s rule would also produce arbitrarily different results depending on when a federal suit seeking review of a state-court judgment is filed, encouraging parties to file earlier in fed- eral court while the state appellate proceedings are pending, and to duplicate their efforts even though the state process may resolve the dispute in their favor. T. M.’s contention that abstention and preclusion doctrines can do nearly all of the work that Rooker-Feldman does is unavailing. It is unclear if such doctrines even apply in cases where a plaintiff com- plains of injuries that stem directly from a state-court judgment rather than attempting to relitigate the same claims. Federalism principles are thus best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal plaintiffs seeking review of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court. Pp. 13–16. (3) T. M. contends that the Court should adopt her position be- cause it will generally cabin Rooker-Feldman, a doctrine she claims has caused confusion and is overused as a docket-clearing mechanism in the lower courts. T. M.’s proposed rule would fail to address the source of confusion in current Rooker-Feldman doctrine—determining when a plaintiff is seeking federal review and rejection of a state-court judgment—and would add a new source of confusion by requiring courts to determine whether a state-court judgment is a reviewable final judgment under §1257(a). In any event, the animating force be- hind T. M.’s arguments is the belief that Rooker and Feldman were wrongly decided, but this issue is not fairly included in the question presented. The Court today neither expands nor constrains Rooker- Feldman but leaves the doctrine as it found it. Pp. 16–18. 139 F. 4th 344, affirmed. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concur- ring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–197 _________________ T. M., PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [June 18, 2026] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under what has become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284 (2005). This case asks whether this rule bars suit when the state- court judgment at issue is subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. A straightforward application of the logic and reasoning underlying Rooker-Feldman leads to one conclusion: It does. Because this suit falls within the narrow doctrine’s limits, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly affirmed its dismissal. I A Petitioner T. M. alleges that she has a medical condition that “ ‘causes changes in [her] mental status upon ingesting any amount of gluten’ and can result in ‘episodes of psycho- sis.’ ” 139 F. 4th 344, 347 (CA4 2025) (alteration in 2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court original). In March 2023, T. M. accidentally ingested glu- ten and was taken to the emergency room at Baltimore Washington Medical Center. After an administrative hear- ing before a Maryland administrative law judge (ALJ), and over her and her father’s objection, she was involuntarily committed to the facility, where she stayed for about three months. During her stay, T. M.’s treating psychiatrist and the medical center sought, and were granted by a clinic re- view panel, an order authorizing the facility forcibly to in- ject T. M. with antipsychotic medication. That order was later affirmed by an ALJ. These events jumpstarted a flurry of litigation, with T. M. and her parents filing several state and federal lawsuits seeking to have T. M. released from involuntary commit- ment and to avoid the forced injections. In state court, T. M. filed two petitions for judicial review of the ALJ deci- sions allowing her involuntary admission and upholding the forced-injection order. She also filed a state habeas pe- tition and a separate civil action, with several emergency motions, seeking release from the medical center. In fed- eral court, T. M. filed a due-process suit seeking damages and an injunction requiring her discharge. T. M.’s father, for his part, filed a state-court action against respondents seeking an order requiring them to recognize T. M.’s pur- ported advance medical directive listing him as T. M.’s healthcare agent if she became incompetent to make deci- sions. In the midst of those lawsuits, T. M. and respondents ne- gotiated a settlement agreement to facilitate T. M.’s dis- charge, and the state judge presiding over the state habeas petition entered the agreement as a consent order. The con- sent order provided for T. M.’s immediate release subject to several conditions, including that T. M. would “(1) obtain a new treating psychiatrist and continue to take her hospital- prescribed medications; (2) regularly meet and consult with a third-party provider regarding her treatment and Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court medication; (3) accept a referral to [an outpatient clinic] and follow their recommendations; (4) take all prescribed medi- cations; and (5) dismiss with prejudice all of her [and her parents’] pending actions against [respondents].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. The consent order also required T. M.’s parents to monitor her use of her medications and report if she stopped taking them. The state court, counsel for T. M., and respondents signed the consent order on June 12, 2023, and respondents discharged T. M. B Unfortunately, the consent order did not end the parties’ dispute in either state or federal court. Ten days after the state court entered the consent order, T. M. and her parents obtained new counsel and sued respondents in the District Court for the District of Maryland. This lawsuit is now be- fore the Court. The complaint sought a declaration that the consent order violated T. M.’s federal and state due-process rights, a declaration that the order was obtained under du- ress, and an injunction preventing the order’s enforcement. Meanwhile, back in state court, T. M. appealed the con- sent order to the Appellate Court of Maryland and raised similar arguments. About four months later, T. M. moved to stay the pending appeal in the Appellate Court of Mary- land, contending that a stay was warranted to “prevent in- consistent rulings” because both the state appeal and the pending federal lawsuit were “based on the same facts and events.” Motion to Stay in No. 1:23–cv–1684, ECF Doc. 81– 1, p. 1. The Appellate Court of Maryland granted the stay, which remains in effect. In the federal case, the Maryland District Court dis- missed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that T. M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine, addressed in de- tail below, generally holds that federal courts lack jurisdic- tion over lawsuits brought by parties who received adverse 4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court judgments in state courts and then turn to federal courts seeking “review and rejection of ” those judgments. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284.1 The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The panel observed that in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923), this Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to “ ‘declar[e]’ that [a] state court’s judgment was ‘null and void’ ” under the Federal Constitution because doing so “ ‘would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction,’ ” which only the Supreme Court possesses. 139 F. 4th, at 348 (quoting 263 U. S., at 414–415, 416). Because T. M. was asking the District Court here to do precisely that, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that this “case is too much like Rooker to justify a different” conclusion and thus required dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman. 139 F. 4th, at 346. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit also rejected T. M.’s argument that Rooker- Feldman applies only to judgments that are “‘final judg- ment[s] from the highest court of a State in which the deci- sion could be had,’ ” reasoning that this Court has never im- posed such a requirement. 139 F. 4th, at 353–354. T. M. filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court judg- ment that remains subject to further review in state court. The Sixth Circuit has taken the same position as the Fourth Circuit. See RLR Invs., LLC v. Pigeon Forge, 4 F. 4th 380, 389–390, 396 (2021). Other Circuits have held that Rooker- Feldman applies only if the state-court proceedings have “ended.” See, e.g., Federación de Maestros de P. R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P. R., 410 F. 3d 17, 24–25 (CA1 2005) (outlining three-part test to determine whether state —————— 1 The District Court also granted respondents’ motion to dismiss T. M.’s parents’ claims on the merits. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court proceedings have functionally “ended”).2 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Ap- peals. 607 U. S. 1079 (2025). II A “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and gen- erally can resolve only the cases that Congress grants them power to hear.” Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, 607 U. S. 421, 424 (2026). As relevant here, Congress in 28 U. S. C. §1331 granted federal district courts “original ju- risdiction of all civil actions” raising federal questions. Dis- trict courts generally lack “any power to review directly cases from state courts.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Lo- comotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286 (1970). Instead, this Court is the only federal court with appellate jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and that jurisdiction extends only to “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the high- est court of a State in which a decision could be had.” §1257(a). Thus, “from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems” with “[e]ach system proceed[ing] independently of the other with ulti- mate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either system.” Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 286.3 The Court delineated some of the bounds that separate these two systems in Rooker and Feldman. First, in Rooker, —————— 2 See also, e.g., Malhan v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of State, 938 F. 3d 453, 459–460 (CA3 2019); Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F. 3d 1266, 1275–1277, and n. 9 (CA11 2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F. 3d 1027, 1032, n. 2 (CA10 2006); Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F. 3d 77, 89 (CA2 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 410 F. 3d 602, 604, n. 1 (CA9 2005). 3 To be sure, “Congress . . . may explicitly empower district courts to oversee certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas review of state prisoners’ petitions.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 292, n. 8 (2005) (citing 28 U. S. C. §2254(a)). 6 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked juris- diction to resolve a case that sought “to have a judgment of a circuit court in Indiana, which was affirmed by the Su- preme Court of the State, declared null and void” because it violated the Constitution’s due process, contracts, and equal protection clauses. 263 U. S., at 414. The Court ex- plained that “entertain[ing] a proceeding to reverse or mod- ify [a] judgment for errors of that character” would be “an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.” Id., at 415–416. As a result, the suit was “plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction” because the “jurisdiction possessed by the Dis- trict Courts is strictly original.” Ibid. The Court also laid out the path to challenging a state-court judgment: “If the constitutional questions . . . actually arose” in the suit, “it was the province and duty of the state courts to decide them” in the first instance. Id., at 415. “If the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding,” including through appellate review in this Court. Ibid. Second, in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld- man, 460 U. S. 462 (1983), the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to “review” a final judicial determination of the D. C. high court because such “[r]eview . . . can be obtained only in this Court” under §1257. Id., at 476, 482. The plaintiffs there had challenged as unconstitutional a court rule requiring D. C. bar appli- cants to have graduated from an approved law school. They had also sought a waiver of that rule. This Court held that the Federal District Court had no jurisdiction to review the D. C. high court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ waiver petitions, but possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the rule itself because, in the latter situation, the “district court is not reviewing a state-court judicial decision.” Id., at 486. Rooker and Feldman are thus built on two closely related bases of reasoning. The first is that, when plaintiffs Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court “essentially invit[e] federal courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” they are seeking an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See Exxon, 544 U. S., at 283–284 (describing Rooker and Feldman). The second is that such “appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state-court judgment is lodged, . . . by 28 U. S. C. §1257, exclusively in this Court.” 544 U. S., at 283. Federal district courts, by contrast, are “empowered to exercise [only] original, not appellate, jurisdiction.” Ibid. In the years since Rooker and Feldman, this Court has refused to expand the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4 In the “narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman,” however, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its rule. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. In Exxon, the Court held that the “Rooker- Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state- court judgments rendered before the district court proceed- ings commenced and inviting district court review and —————— 4 For instance, this Court has held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when the federal plaintiff “was not a party in the state court” because that plaintiff would not have been in any “position to ask this Court to review the state court’s judgment.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006 (1994); see Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam) (The “Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment” even if “they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment”). This Court has also held that Rooker- Feldman does not apply when there is parallel litigation, such as when a party files a federal action raising the same claim as one in a state court action that has not yet reached a judgment. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 293– 294. Finally, this Court has held that Rooker-Feldman bars suits “chal- leng[ing]” an “adverse” state-court decision, but does not bar a suit chal- lenging a “statute or rule governing th[at] [state-court] decision.” Skin- ner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011); see also Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 235 (2023). 8 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court rejection of those judgments.” 544 U. S., at 284.5 In those cases, Rooker-Feldman continues to require “dismiss[al] for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.” 544 U. S., at 284; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam) (“The doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances’ . . . where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfa- vorable state-court decision to a lower federal court”); Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 235 (2023) (“Th[e] doctrine prohib- its federal courts from adjudicating cases brought by state- court losing parties challenging state-court judgments”). B Under these precedents, T. M.’s case falls within “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. T. M. is complaining of injuries caused by, and is seeking relief from, the state-court judgment itself, arguing that the consent order violates her federal and state due process rights and was entered into under duress. See App. 40–45 (complaint alleging injuries stemming from the consent order). The consent order was rendered 10 days before T. M. commenced this federal lawsuit. T. M. plainly seeks “review and rejection” of the consent order by asking the District Court to “[d]eclare that the ‘Consent Order’ ” is “unconstitutional, unenforceable, and void ab initio” and to enjoin “enforcement of the ‘Consent Order.’ ” 139 F. 4th, at 347. Thus, T. M.’s case is the “ ‘paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from pro- ceeding’ ”: She does not like the result reached in state court —————— 5 Exxon elsewhere also noted that in both Rooker and Feldman, the federal plaintiffs sued “after the state proceedings ended.” 544 U. S., at 291. The dissent argues that this fact was a “key featur[e]” of those cases, post, at 6–7 (opinion of BARRETT, J.), but Exxon never mentioned this fact in the cited “hold[ing]” when it described the “kind” of cases to which Rooker-Feldman still applies. See 544 U. S., at 284. Needless to say, neither Rooker nor Feldman constrained their rules of decision to cases that perfectly match their facts. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court and “repaired to federal court to undo the [state] judgment in [her] favor.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 293. III Instead of disputing any of the points discussed above,6 T. M. asks this Court to add a new requirement to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In T. M.’s view, endorsed by the dissent, the Court should adopt a new rule specifying that Rooker-Feldman bars only federal suits seeking review and rejection of “[f]inal judgments” that are “rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). See Brief for Petitioner 19; post, at 6 (opinion of BARRETT, J.). Because that rule is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents, risks producing anomalous re- sults, and undermines federalism interests, the Court de- clines to adopt it. A T. M.’s theory, echoed by the dissent, fails because it re- quires a reimagining, rather than an application, of the Court’s Rooker-Feldman precedents. Taking T. M.’s argu- ment step-by-step illustrates the point. In T. M.’s view, Rooker-Feldman has never rested on any distinction between what, in substance, qualifies as original and appellate jurisdiction. Instead, on her theory, an action commenced in federal district court “seeking the adjudica- tion of a freestanding [federal-question] cause of action” al- ways technically “invok[es] the district court’s original ju- risdiction” under 28 U. S. C. §1331 and is akin to a collateral attack. Brief for Petitioner 32; see post, at 2–3 (opinion of BARRETT, J.). Therefore, as T. M. sees things, —————— 6 In the Fourth Circuit, T. M. contended that she was not a “ ‘state- court loser’ ” and that her suit was “really about injuries inflicted by the medical center rather than the consent order,” but the Fourth Circuit rejected those arguments and she has not raised them here. 139 F. 4th, at 350–352. 10 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court the Court’s prior Rooker-Feldman cases should not be read to evince any concern about district courts exercising what amounts to appellate jurisdiction over state-court judg- ments, but instead should be read as relying on a strict neg- ative inference, from §1257, that when this Court has juris- diction over a state-court judgment, district courts must not. In T. M.’s view, it follows from here that, for Rooker- Feldman to bar a federal suit, it is not enough that a state- court loser seeks what is effectively appellate review of prior state-court judgment. For T. M., the judgment under attack must be a “[f]inal judgmen[t] or decre[e] rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” §1257(a), at the time the federal suit is initiated, be- cause only then does this Court gain jurisdiction over a state-court judgment. T. M.’s theory cannot be squared with this Court’s prece- dents, which plainly adopted a different, more functional view of original and appellate jurisdiction than what T. M. advances here. In Rooker, for example, it was true that the judgment at issue had been affirmed by the state high court by the time the federal suit was filed, but nothing in this Court’s reasoning suggested that the outcome would have been different had the judgment still been on appeal. There (as here), Rooker’s federal suit sought to “reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment,” which the Court held would be an “exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” 263 U. S., at 416, and not a collateral attack invoking original jurisdiction. There (as here), the District Court would lack such “appellate” ju- risdiction because it has “strictly original” jurisdiction. Ibid. There (as here), it would be the “province and duty of the state courts to decide” the federal questions first, and “[i]f the decision was wrong,” Rooker could seek “reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate pro- ceeding,” including in this Court under §1257. Id., at 415. Later cases delineating the bounds of Rooker-Feldman, see n. 4, supra, confirmed the understanding that Rooker- Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court Feldman bars suits in federal district court that “see[k] what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment,” regardless of whether the judgment formally falls within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005–1006 (1994). As this Court ex- plained in Exxon, the doctrine “ ‘recognizes that 28 U. S. C. §1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not au- thorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see §1257(a).’ ” 544 U. S., at 292 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002)). In Lance, too, this Court emphasized that “[t]he doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances’ where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.” 546 U. S., at 466 (citation omitted). None of these cases suggests that district courts have jurisdiction to review state-court judg- ments, and declare them void, so long as the judgments are not yet within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. In fact, Feldman explicitly rejected that notion. There, the Court addressed a Fifth Circuit case holding that Rooker did not apply because the judgment “ ‘could not have been reviewed on a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,’ ” given the plaintiff ’s failure to raise the relevant federal issue in state court. 460 U. S., at 483, n. 16 (quoting Dasher v. Supreme Ct. of Tex., 658 F. 2d 1045, 1051 (1981)). The Court rejected that reasoning as “flawed” because “the fact that we may not have jurisdiction to re- view a final state-court judgment . . . does not mean that a United States district court should have jurisdiction over the claims.” 460 U. S., at 484, n. 16. After all, the Court explained, “ ‘lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.’ ” Id., at 483, n. 16; but see id., at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing, as T. M. and the dissent do here, that the Feldman majority improperly “fail[ed] to distinguish between . . . appellate 12 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court review and collateral attack”). Feldman thus explicitly re- jected T. M.’s view that Rooker rested solely on a strict neg- ative inference from §1257.7 The dissent, for its part, admits that this Court has relied on both §§1331 and 1257 in justifying Rooker-Feldman, but contends that Exxon “buried” and “discarded” the §1331 ra- tionale. Post, at 7–8. Had the Court in Exxon intended to bury or discard the §1331 rationale, one might have ex- pected it to say so rather than to quote affirmatively a case that directly describes the doctrine as resting on both §§1331 and 1257. See 544 U. S., at 292 (citing Verizon Md. Inc., 535 U. S., at 644, n. 3). Moreover, Exxon acknowl- edged, without disapproval, Rooker’s reasoning that “[f]ederal district courts . . . lacked the requisite appellate authority, for their jurisdiction was ‘strictly original.’” 544 U. S., at 284. It also summarized Rooker and Feldman as “essentially invit[ing] federal courts of first instance to re- view and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” 544 U. S., at 283, and it held that Exxon’s federal suit did not fall within Rooker-Feldman because Exxon did “not repai[r] to federal court to undo the Delaware judgment in its fa- vor,” 544 U. S., at 293. All these statements are only con- sistent with the view that Rooker-Feldman is based on both §§1331 and 1257, and none even suggests that the state- —————— 7 Indeed, even though the state-court judgment in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923), was a final judgment of a state high court, it did not fall within this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction under §1257 either because the Court’s jurisdictional deadline for filing the pe- tition for a writ of certiorari had passed. See id., at 416; this Court’s Rule 13.2 (describing civil filing deadline as jurisdictional). Still, the Court reasoned, “an aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly” in federal district court “what he no longer can do directly” in this Court. 263 U. S., at 416. True, T. M. seeks federal appellate review of a state- court judgment prematurely (before receiving a final judgment this Court can review), whereas Rooker tried to do so belatedly. Either way, the same principle applies: T. M. “cannot be permitted to do indirectly” what she cannot yet “do directly.” Ibid. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court court judgment at issue must be a “[f]inal judgmen[t] . . . rendered by the highest court of a State” under §1257(a).8 Ultimately, adopting T. M. and the dissent’s rule would require the Court to abandon a central part of Rooker’s rea- soning and reinterpret the doctrine to rest solely on a strict negative inference from §1257. See Brief for Petitioner 33– 34 (acknowledging that the Court’s precedents have rested in part based on the distinction between original and appel- late jurisdiction); post, at 3 (acknowledging that Rooker rested in part on §1331). The Court declines to do so. B The fact that T. M. and the dissent’s rule departs from this Court’s precedents is enough to affirm the dismissal of T. M.’s suit under Rooker-Feldman. If more is necessary, however, the Court also declines to distort the Rooker-Feld- man doctrine in service of a rule that would create anoma- lous outcomes and undermine the federalism principles upon which the doctrine rests. The upshot of T. M. and the dissent’s rule would be that federal district courts could not exercise jurisdiction if a plaintiff seeks review of a state high-court judgment, but they could exercise jurisdiction if —————— 8 The dissent also appears to equate Exxon’s reference to the fact that “ ‘state proceedings [had] ended’ ” in Rooker and Feldman with a judg- ment being final under §1257. Post, at 6 (emphasis deleted). Exxon, however, did not itself draw that connection. Likely as a result, many of the Circuits that interpreted Exxon to hold that Rooker-Feldman applies only when state-court proceedings have “ended” have not adopted T. M. and the dissent’s §1257 finality rule. See, e.g., Federación de Maestros de P. R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P. R., 410 F. 3d 17, 24–25 (CA1 2005); Malhan, 938 F. 3d, at 459–460 (collecting cases). They in- stead reasoned that a state proceeding may “end” even without a final judgment from a state high court, such as when a state-court loser does not appeal to the state high court. See Federación de Maestros, 410 F. 3d, at 24–25. Based on this reasoning, these Circuits created multipart anal- yses to determine whether state proceedings have functionally “ended” (and thus Rooker-Feldman may apply), see 410 F. 3d, at 24–25, which neither the dissent nor T. M. embrace. 14 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court the plaintiff seeks the same review of a state lower-court judgment while that judgment is on appeal in the state- court system. That makes little sense. To start, allowing federal district courts to review state- court judgments while they are on appeal in the state-court system would undermine the “[c]ooperation and comity” on which our federal system is built. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 586 (1999). Indeed, that is the reason why, “ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the power to intervene in State litigation only after ‘the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had’ has rendered a ‘final judgment.’ ” Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945); see North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U. S. 156, 159 (1973) (explaining that one of §1257’s purposes is to “limi[t] review of state court determinations of federal con- stitutional issues to leave at a minimum federal intrusion in state affairs”). It is difficult to see why Congress would have authorized district courts to review final state-court judgments pending appeal in state court when it did not au- thorize this Court to do so. T. M. and the dissent’s rule also would produce arbitrar- ily different results depending on when, exactly, a federal suit seeking review of a state-court judgment is filed. In their view, a district court can review a state-court judg- ment so long as it has not been affirmed by the state high court by the time the federal action is filed. Yet a state high court may well affirm such a judgment while such a federal action is still pending. In that event, the plaintiff would be in the exact same situation Rooker disapproved: seeking to have declared null and void “a judgment of a [state court], which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.” 263 U. S., at 414. Yet, under T. M. and the dissent’s rule, a district court would have jurisdiction to proceed simply be- cause the plaintiff filed her federal suit while the state ap- pellate proceedings were pending, rather than waiting for Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court the state high court to act. Such a rule would only encour- age parties to file earlier in federal court, duplicating their efforts even though the state process may well resolve the dispute in their favor. T. M., her amici, and the dissent respond that federal courts have at their disposal various abstention and preclu- sion doctrines, which generally prevent federal courts from interfering with state proceedings or bar parties from relit- igating issues already decided. According to T. M., those doctrines prevent federal-court intervention while state ap- pellate proceedings are ongoing and thus do “nearly all,” but apparently not all, “of the work that Rooker-Feldman does.” Reply Brief 18; see Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae 7–16 (listing nine doctrines); see also post, at 4–5 (opinion of BARRETT, J.) (describing preclusion and abstention doctrines). It is unclear, however, if such doc- trines even apply in cases, like this one, where a plaintiff does not attempt to relitigate the same claims in state and federal forums but rather complains of injuries that stem directly from a state-court judgment. See Letter Order in No. 1:23–cv–1684 (D Md.), ECF Doc. 27, pp. 3–5 (holding that neither abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), nor Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), nor Maryland’s collat- eral-attack doctrine applied to this case); see also Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U. S. 405, 411 (2020) (explaining that issue preclusion “pre- cludes a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment”). Federalism principles are thus best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal cases in which plaintiffs seek re- view of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those 16 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.9 C Finally, T. M. contends that the Court should adopt her position for the more practical reason that it will generally cabin Rooker-Feldman, a doctrine she claims has caused confusion and is overused as a docket-clearing mechanism in the lower courts. See Brief for Petitioner 35. As T. M. admits, however, most of the confusion in the lower courts “stems from the need to determine when a plaintiff is seek- ing federal ‘review and rejection’ of a state-court judgment.” Id., at 37; see Gilbank v. Wood Cty. Dept. of Human Servs., 111 F. 4th 754, 792–798 (CA7 2024) (en banc) (majority opinion of Kirsch, J.); id., at 760, 769–778 (dissenting opin- ion of Hamilton, J.) (describing the confusion over the “ ‘re- view and rejection’ ” requirement). That “review and rejec- tion” question is not disputed in this case, so adopting T. M.’s rule does nothing to ameliorate any confusion over that distinct issue.10 —————— 9 Strangely, the dissent resists the idea that federalism principles play any role in Rooker-Feldman at all. Post, at 9–11. It is true that neither Rooker nor Feldman uses the word “federalism,” but both discuss the ap- propriate roles of the state and federal courts. See supra, at 5–7. The dissent’s resistance to acknowledging federalism values here is also in- consistent with its own interpretation of Rooker-Feldman as a “ ‘§1257 Rule.’ ” Post, at 11. The Court has consistently explained that §1257’s finality requirement rests in part on principles of federalism. See Penn- sylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 48–49, n. 7 (1987) (“[T]he justifications for the finality doctrine” include “efficiency, judicial restraint, and feder- alism”); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945) (similar). 10 Nor did the Fourth Circuit apply an overly broad interpretation of “review and rejection” in this case. It emphasized that T. M.’s complaint, which plainly sought to void and enjoin the consent order, sat “[i]n con- trast” to two other federal actions T. M. filed, neither of which were dis- missed under Rooker-Feldman. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2. The first was a due-process suit, which she voluntarily dismissed but which Rooker- Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court In fact, T. M. and the dissent’s rule would needlessly com- plicate the Rooker-Feldman analysis. It is not always straightforward to determine whether a given state-court judgment is a reviewable final judgment under §1257(a) be- cause that question requires determining whether the judg- ment is both “subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribunal” and also “an effective determina- tion of the litigation.” Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Cal., 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). Nor is it neces- sarily clear when state proceedings have “ended.” See Fed- eración de Maestros de P. R., 410 F. 3d, at 24–25 (describing test to determine whether proceedings have functionally “ended”). For example, in this case, the parties dispute whether the consent order is appealable under Maryland law. See Brief in Opposition 23–24; Reply Brief for Peti- tioner 9–10. If it is not, then the consent order may be final for §1257 purposes and the “end” of state-court proceedings. Further, even if a state judgment is technically subject to further review in state proceedings, it may nevertheless be reviewable by this Court under §1257 under a limited set of circumstances. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477–486 (1975) (describing four sets of circum- stances within the Court’s “pragmatic approach” to final- ity). Thus, T. M. and the dissent’s rule would both fail to address the source of confusion in the current Rooker-Feld- man doctrine and add a new source to the mix. Finally, the animating force behind many of T. M.’s and the dissent’s arguments appears to be the belief that Rooker —————— Feldman would not have barred because it was commenced before the consent order was entered. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2.; see Exxon, 544 U. S., at 293–294. The second was a federal discrimination suit, which was dismissed on the merits and did not implicate Rooker-Feldman because, though it involved the same parties and facts, the suit did not seek re- view and rejection of the consent order. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2.; see Doe v. University of Md. Medical System Corp., 2025 WL 3553026, *1–*2 (CA4, Dec. 11, 2025) (describing T. M.’s claims). 18 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION Opinion of the Court and Feldman were wrongly decided and so should be cab- ined whenever possible, if not outright overruled. Cf. post, at 2–5 (raising doubts about Rooker-Feldman’s conceptual basis). This issue is not fairly included in the question pre- sented and was not pressed at the certiorari stage. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). IV The Court today neither expands nor constrains Rooker- Feldman. Instead, the Court leaves the doctrine as it found it: narrowly confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. Because T. M.’s suit falls within these strict limits, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–197 _________________ T. M., PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [June 18, 2026] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. When you lose in trial court, you go to an appeals court. The so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine reflects that com- monsense understanding. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). At its core, the doctrine says that parties who lose in state trial court do not get to appeal to a federal trial court. Instead, they may take their appeal to a state appeals court and, if a federal statute al- lows, ultimately seek review in this Court. That “basic fact” has been a part of our law for more than 200 years. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 244 (2023) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Court’s opinion thus properly rejects petitioner’s quest to reimagine, artificially cabin, or overrule Rooker-Feld- man. Ante, at 5–18. I join it in full. I write separately to explain why Rooker, properly understood, is correct as an original matter. I A unanimous three-page opinion, Rooker was uncontro- versial in its day. It started as an ordinary lawsuit. Wil- liam and Dora Rooker sued Fidelity Trust Company in state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 191 Ind. 141, 143, 131 N. E. 769, 770 (1921). The trial court entered judgment against the Rookers. Id., at 154–155, 131 N. E., at 773. The 2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION THOMAS, J., concurring Rookers sought review in the State Supreme Court and lost. Id., at 163, 131 N. E., at 776. This Court denied certiorari. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 259 U. S. 580 (1922). The Rookers then sought review from this Court on a writ of er- ror instead. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114, 116 (1923). But, the Court declined to grant relief on their claims of constitutional errors in the state-court judgment and dismissed the writ. Id., at 116–118. Unsatisfied, the Rookers filed a bill in equity in Federal District Court. Rooker, 263 U. S., at 414. They asked the Federal District Court to declare the state trial court’s judg- ment “null and void” on the ground that it “was rendered and affirmed in contravention of the” Constitution. Id., at 414–415. The District Court dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction, and this Court affirmed that “plainly” correct decree. Id., at 415, 417. “Under the legislation of Con- gress,” this Court recognized, “no court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to re- verse or modify the judgment for” constitutional errors. Id., at 416. “To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdic- tion.” Ibid. “The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Court held that district courts have no jurisdiction to “get rid of ” state-court judgments even “for alleged errors of law.” Ibid. Rooker was thus based on two premises. See ante, at 5– 7, 9–10. First, “to reverse or modify the” allegedly errone- ous judgment of another court is to “exercise . . . appellate jurisdiction.” Rooker, 263 U. S., at 416. Second, “[t]he ju- risdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly origi- nal”; only “this Court” has “appellate jurisdiction” over state-court judgments. Ibid. From these two premises, it follows that district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify the allegedly erroneous judgments of state courts. The conclusion follows from the premises, so the only ques- tion is whether the premises are true. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring II Rooker’s first premise was recognized long before Rooker, and its second has been an indubitable “fact of federal stat- utory law” for more than 200 years. Reed, 598 U. S., at 244 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). A The power to revise or modify another court’s judgment or decree has been recognized as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction from before the ratification of the Constitution. 1 The Constitution vests the “judicial Power” in this Court and in the “inferior Courts” that Congress creates. Art. III, §1. The jurisdiction of federal courts to exercise that judi- cial power is limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.” §2, cl. 1. That jurisdiction, in turn, comes in two types: “original” and “appellate.” §2, cl. 2. If a court exercises appellate ju- risdiction, it does not exercise original jurisdiction. Mar- bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175 (1803); 3 J. Story, Com- mentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1698, p. 574 (1833) (Story). Original jurisdiction is “[a] court’s power to hear and de- cide a matter before any other court can review the matter.” Black’s Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999). In a typical orig- inal case, a plaintiff sues a defendant. The plaintiff com- plains of an injury that the defendant’s allegedly illegal con- duct caused and “seeks a remedy that runs against the defendant.” Reed, 598 U. S., at 243 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The case is “original” inasmuch as there is no earlier pro- ceeding in which another court had already “determine[d] that defendant’s duties or liabilities (e.g., a judgment for money damages or an injunction).” Ibid. Unlike the plaintiff in a typical original action, the appel- lant in a typical appeal cannot simply complain of an injury that the other party caused before a court has spoken. 4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION THOMAS, J., concurring Instead, “the subject matter” under consideration “has al- ready been instituted in, and acted upon, by some other court.” 3 Story §1755, at 627. As the party who lost in the other court, the appellant “complain[s] of an injury caused by” that court’s allegedly erroneous judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 291 (2005). He thus seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to remedy an injury of that description and, ordinarily, the ap- pellate court cannot directly redress the injury that caused the plaintiff to file his original suit. The remedy, instead, consists in “correcting that judicial action (e.g., reversal or vacatur of the challenged judgment),” not in awarding dam- ages. Reed, 598 U. S., at 244 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). When a party asks one court to revise another’s judg- ment, he invokes what the Constitution calls “appellate Ju- risdiction.” Art. III, §2, cl. 2. Appellate jurisdiction is a court’s “power to revise the judgments rendered” by other courts. 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 353 (11th ed. 1867) (Kent); accord, 3 W. Blackstone, Commen- taries on the Laws of England 56 (1768) (Blackstone) (“re- verse judgments in certain suits originally begun in [an- other] court”); ibid. (high court had appellate jurisdiction to correct “mistake[s] of the law, committed by [other] courts”); W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution 241 (2d ed. 1829) (Rawle) (“revision of the [decisions] of other courts”); 3 Story 626 (power to “revis[e] and correc[t] the proceedings in a cause already instituted”); 1 G. Curtis, Commentaries on the Jurisdiction, Practice, & Peculiar Jurisprudence of the Courts of the United States §113, p. 131 (1854) (Curtis) (same); Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (1891) (same); 1 A. Bur- rill, A New Law Dictionary 79 (1850) (“review the proceed- ings of another [court]”). For that reason, exercising that revising power over the judgments of “state tribunals” in Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 THOMAS, J., concurring cases involving “[federal] questions” is appellate in nature. 1 Kent 353.1 The Founders accepted this straightforward account of appellate jurisdiction without reservation. The Articles of Confederation gave the Confederation Congress authority to create courts with “appellate power . . . to be exercised in revising the decisions of state tribunals” in cases of cap- tures. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 345 (1816) (Story, J., for the Court); see Art. IX. In 1780, the Confed- eration Congress created a court under that authority whose jurisdiction allowed it to “hear new evidence without deference to state courts’ ” legal conclusions. W. Pryor, The Appellate Jurisdiction Clause, in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 499 (3d ed. 2025) (Pryor). That power was “ap- pellate” in nature precisely because it was the “power to re- vise the decisions of state courts.” Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 345; 3 Story 605–606. When the Founders deliberated about whether to replace the Articles with the Constitution, all maintained the same view about the nature of appellate jurisdiction. At that time, different “technical sense[s] ha[d] been affixed to the term ‘appellate’ ” such that any technical interpretation would “not be understood in the same sense” in different jurisdictions. The Federalist No. 81, pp. 488–489 (C. Ros- siter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). That fact showed “the impro- priety of a technical interpretation.” Id., at 489; accord, ante, at 10. Instead, the Federalists thought that the term “appellate jurisdiction” in the proposed Constitution —————— 1 To “revise” originally meant to “review” for error. 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828); The Federalist No. 81, p. 489 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The revising power did not require literally changing another court’s judgment. See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101 (1807) (“grant[ing]” motion “for a habeas corpus to the marshal of the district of Columbia,” even though it did not change the lower court’s order, is an exercise of “appellate” juris- diction); Black’s Law Dictionary 331 (12th ed. 2024) (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack”); infra, at 8–11. 6 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION THOMAS, J., concurring “denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal to re- view the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both.” The Federalist No. 81, at 489. For their part, the Anti-Federalists seemed to agree. They worried that “ap- pellate jurisdiction,” as used in the Constitution, would au- thorize civil-law “appeals,” which involved the power to “re- examine the whole merits of ” a previously initiated case, including review of facts. 2 H. Storing, The Complete Anti- Federalist 433 (1981); see also United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (CC Mass. 1812) (Story, J.). All appeared to agree, however, that “the revising power” of a court is “appellate” in nature. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 344. Traditionally, the “most usual modes of exercising appel- late jurisdiction” were “by a writ of error, or by an appeal.”2 3 Story §1756, at 627. But, courts could also exercise appel- late jurisdiction through writs of habeas corpus or manda- mus, provided that granting such a writ would involve re- vising the decision of another court on the merits. Ibid.; 1 Curtis §113, at 131; Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 175. Today, this Court usually exercises appellate jurisdiction by writs of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §§1257(a), 1254(1). But, it also hears “appeal[s],” in some cases, §1253, applications for stays of lower court judgments, in others, §2101(f ), and even peti- tions for mandamus, §1651(a). —————— 2 A writ of error was “a process of common law origin; and it remove[d] nothing for re-examination, but the law.” 3 Story §1756, at 628. In the technical sense, an appeal was “a process of civil law origin, and re- move[d] a cause, entirely subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to review and a re-trial.” Id., at 627–628. But, “appeal” is also used “in legal lan- guage to denote the nature of appellate jurisdiction, as distinguished from original jurisdiction, without regard to the particular mode, by which a