Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. v. DOE ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 24–856. Argued April 28, 2026—Decided June 23, 2026 Plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them be- cause of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend them. Plaintiffs allege that Cisco and its executives are liable for aiding and abetting violations of interna- tional law, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). One plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil ac- tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS lay mostly dormant for two centuries after its enactment. In the last few decades, however, litigants have urged courts to allow private rights of action under the ATS for various alleged human rights abuses. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, this Court held that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac- tion.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable tension with that point—the Court said that the ATS allows for the possibility of new, judicially created causes of action to enforce norms of interna- tional law. Id., at 724–725. Though Sosa did not “close the door” on judicially created rights of action under the ATS, Sosa emphasized the narrowness of its view and underscored the need for “vigilant door- keeping.” Id., at 729. Sosa proposed a two-step framework for creating those causes of action: First, a plaintiff must show that the norm has a “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations,” id., at 732; second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for the court to create the proposed cause of action when the political branches have not acted, id., at 726, 736, n. 27. Since Sosa, the Court has never 2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Syllabus created an ATS right of action. In this case, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. The Ninth Circuit focused on whether aiding-and-abetting liability may be imposed under the ATS. 73 F. 4th 700, 716. At Sosa’s first step, the Ninth Circuit found that “aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently definite and universal to be a viable form of liability under the ATS.” 73 F.4th, at 718. At the second step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns” nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason to decline to recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at 720. The Ninth Circuit also held that the TVPA “encompasses claims against those who aid and abet torture.” Id., at 744. The Court granted certiorari to deter- mine whether Cisco may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses under the ATS, and whether two of its executives may be held liable under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. Held: 1. Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of inter- national norms under the ATS. Pp. 7–12. Two points drive the Court’s decision. First, judicial authority under Sosa’s second step was “narrow at the outset.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. 628, 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Sosa instructed federal courts to exercise “great caution in adapting the law of nations to pri- vate rights,” 542 U. S., at 728, and to assess the “practical conse- quences” of creating new liability under the ATS, including the “risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.” Id., at 728, 732–733. Because ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy, it is difficult to think of a case in which a court “might safely conclude” that a new ATS cause of action would not have detrimental foreign policy conse- quences. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 284 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Second, the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727; Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–635 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Court has “rejected the prac- tice of fashioning rights of action as [it] see[s] fit,” FS Credit Opportu- nities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ___, ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). Congress is better positioned than courts to evaluate the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. This is especially true in an area like this one, where the Constitution expressly delegates author- ity to Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.” Art. I, §8, cl. 10. For that reason, creating any cause of ac- tion “is an extraordinary act that places great stress on the separation of powers.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Because of these concerns, Sosa consciously designed a test that would be extremely difficult to meet. But what Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments have made impossible. Since Sosa was Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus decided, the Court has firmly committed to the view that judicially cre- ated causes of action offend the separation of powers in almost every circumstance. Recent cases emphasize that “ ‘[i]f there are sound rea- sons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a dam- ages remedy, the courts must refrain from creating it.’ ” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 491 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 137; alterations omitted). In the ATS context, there will always be at least a “single sound reason” to conclude that Congress might not want the judiciary to take the lead. Sosa itself identified one applicable in every case: “the possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable.” 542 U. S., at 727. And Congress has cre- ated an “alternative remedial structure”—the TVPA—which precludes the creation of a cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137. The Court therefore will not continue to “indulge the fiction” that creating new ATS causes of action is sometimes appropriate. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 274. Correcting Sosa’s unfulfilled prediction will not upset reliance interests and will promote stability. Sosa was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the political branches. In truth, this class is a null set. And because courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, there is necessarily no liability for aid- ing and abetting such violations. 2. The TVPA, which contains an express cause of action against someone who “subjects” another to torture, does not provide for aiding- and-abetting liability. Pp. 12–14. In Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, the Court held that §10(b) of the Securities Ex- change Act of 1934 does not create civil aiding-and-abetting liability because the statute does not mention “aiding and abetting,” differenti- ating §10(b) from other civil statutes in which Congress expressly pro- vided for that specialized form of liability. Id., at 175−177, 182−183. The TVPA similarly nowhere mentions aiding-and-abetting liability, and that silence is enough to settle the issue. Plaintiffs argue that “subjects” in the TVPA is broad enough to in- clude aiding-and-abetting liability, but it is not. To “subject” another to torture means “to cause to undergo or submit to,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2275, signaling a causal connection be- tween torturer and victim. Aiding-and-abetting liability, by contrast, encompasses many forms of assistance provided by those who are one (or more) steps removed from the torturer. See Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471, 497. Central Bank rejected a similar argu- ment that the phrase “ ‘directly or indirectly’ ” authorized aiding-and- abetting liability, explaining that “aiding and abetting liability 4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Syllabus extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity.” 511 U. S., at 175−176. The same analysis applies here: Aid- ing-and-abetting liability sweeps more broadly than the language Con- gress chose. 73 F. 4th 700, reversed and remanded. BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which KAGAN, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined as to Parts I–III and V. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–856 _________________ CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DOE I, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 23, 2026] JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court. The Alien Tort Statute grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases involving violations of the law of nations. While conceding that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,” we have also said that courts have narrow authority to create causes of action under it. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 713, 724–725 (2004). These positions are in ob- vious tension with one another. More significantly, how- ever, asserting such authority would intrude on both Con- gress’s prerogative to provide rights of action and the power of the political branches to direct the Nation’s foreign pol- icy. It is therefore unsurprising that this Court has never created an ATS action. The authority to do so, always de- scribed as slight, is more accurately described as nonexist- ent. Today, we close the door that Sosa cracked and hold that courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms. We also hold that the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which contains an express cause of action, does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability. 2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court I A In the early days of our Nation, two incidents involving foreign diplomats “caused substantial foreign-relations problems.” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 253 (2018). The French Minister Plenipotentiary complained to the Continental Congress and threatened to leave the coun- try after the Secretary of the French Legation was as- saulted in Philadelphia. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro- leum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 120 (2013). And a New York constable caused an “international incident” a few years later when he entered the house of the Dutch Ambassador to arrest one of his servants. Jesner, 584 U. S., at 253. At the time, the Articles of Confederation did not provide a federal forum to redress injuries like these. True, the wronged foreign officials could resort to state court. But Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay cautioned that “the Federal Government does not appear . . . to be vested with any judicial powers competent to the cognizance and judg- ment of such cases.” 3 Dept. of State, The Diplomatic Cor- respondence of the United States of America 446 (1837). Other leading figures were similarly troubled that the Ar- ticles failed to “provi[de] for the case of offenses against the law of nations” and “consequently le[ft] it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with for- eign nations.” The Federalist No. 42, p. 265 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The new Constitution equipped the Federal Government to deal with this problem. Article III extends the judicial power to “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls,” and “to Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” §2. The First Congress implemented these provisions through the Judiciary Act of 1789, which estab- lished lower federal courts and granted them jurisdiction to hear suits implicating foreign affairs. See, e.g., §9, 1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court Stat. 77 (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); ibid. (juris- diction over “suits against consuls or vice-consuls”); §11, id., at 78 (jurisdiction over suits where “an alien is a party”). The Act also included what is now known as the Alien Tort Statute. §9, id., at 77. The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS lay mostly dormant after its enactment. Liti- gants only occasionally invoked its jurisdictional grant. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (SC 1795) (sei- zure of slaves from a captured ship); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9,895) (Pa. 1793) (seizure of a brig and cargo by French privateers). And in time, another statute authorized federal courts to hear claims arising under trea- ties. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, §1, 18 Stat. 470, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §1331. So for almost 200 years, the ATS did vir- tually no work. That changed in 1980. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, the Second Circuit permitted an ATS suit by for- eign plaintiffs against a foreign offender for engaging in tor- ture in violation of international law. The court identified no express cause of action; instead, it held that the ATS “open[s] the federal courts for adjudication of the rights al- ready recognized by international law.” Id., at 887. Taking note, other plaintiffs urged courts to allow private rights of action under the ATS for various alleged human rights abuses. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774 (CADC 1984) (per curiam); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F. 3d 232 (CA2 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F. 3d 161 (CA5 1999); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467 (CA9 1994); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F. 3d 844 (CA11 1996). While the Courts of Appeals wrestled with novel ATS suits, Congress enacted a related cause of action. The Tor- ture Victim Protection Act of 1991 allows certain victims 4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court who are tortured or killed to recover damages against the perpetrators. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350. But because many human rights abuses fall outside the TVPA, plaintiffs continued pressing courts to fashion rights of action under the ATS. Over a decade later, this Court interpreted the ATS for the first time. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, we held that the ATS does not permit a court to create a cause of action for arbitrary detention in violation of international law. 542 U. S., at 699, 736–738. In so holding, we stressed that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac- tion.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable tension with the first point—we said that the ATS allows for the possibility of new, judicially created causes of action to enforce norms of international law. Id., at 724–725. To justify this conclusion, Sosa reasoned that the First Congress would not have expected the ATS to “l[ie] fallow” until Congress or state legislatures enacted causes of action for violations of the law of nations. Id., at 719. Law-of- nations offenses formed part of “the ambient law of the era,” and some “were understood to be within the common law.” Id., at 714, 720. William Blackstone’s legal treatise dis- cussed three: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id., at 715 (citing 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 68 (1769)). Given this history, Sosa “assume[d] that the First Congress un- derstood that the district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations.” 542 U. S., at 724. But Sosa “found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses.” Ibid. And it acknowledged that when the ATS was enacted, no one would have understood the statute as a grant of au- thority to create causes of action. Id., at 725–726. None- theless, Sosa asserted that courts have very modest Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court authority to create causes of action under the ATS for vio- lations of international norms. Id., at 724–725. Recognizing the tension between this interpretation of the ATS and the limits of the judicial role, Sosa emphasized the narrowness of its view. Though it did not “close the door” to “independent judicial recognition of actionable in- ternational norms,” it underscored the need for “vigilant doorkeeping.” Id., at 729. To that end, Sosa proposed a two-step framework. First, a plaintiff must show that the norm has a “definite content and acceptance among civi- lized nations.” Id., at 732. (This was an effort to head off judicial creativity with respect to the norms themselves.) Second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for the court to create the proposed cause of action when the political branches have not acted. Id., at 726, 736, n. 27; Jesner, 584 U. S., at 257–258 (plurality opinion). (This was a warning that courts must tread lightly, because creating rights of action is Congress’s prerogative, and foreign policy is the political branches’ domain.) In Sosa, the plaintiff ’s claim failed at the first step, so the Court had no occasion to proceed to the second. 542 U. S., at 736–738. Since Sosa, we have repeatedly turned away plaintiffs as- serting claims under the ATS. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe- troleum Co., we held that any ATS claims are subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality; thus, those “seek- ing relief for violations of the law of nations occurring out- side the United States” are “barred.” 569 U. S., at 124. We reiterated that point in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, holding that “allegations of general corporate activity . . . cannot alone establish domestic application of the ATS.” 593 U. S. 628, 634 (2021). And in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, we refused to impose ATS liability on foreign corporations. 584 U. S., at 272. 6 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court B Plaintiffs in today’s case are practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement that originated in China in the 1990s. They contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them because of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Sys- tems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveil- lance technology that allowed China to identify and appre- hend them. By engaging in this conduct, plaintiffs say, Cisco and its executives aided and abetted violations of in- ternational law—namely, torture; cruel, inhuman, or de- grading treatment; forced labor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against humanity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance. One plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. After the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1247 (ND Cal. 2014), the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, 73 F. 4th 700, 746 (2023). It did not decide whether the underlying violations of interna- tional law satisfied Sosa’s test. 73 F. 4th, at 716. Instead, it analyzed only whether aiding-and-abetting liability may be imposed under the ATS. Ibid. At Sosa’s first step, the Ninth Circuit found that “aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently definite and universal to be a viable form of lia- bility under the ATS.” 73 F. 4th, at 718. And at the second step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns” nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason to decline to recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at 720. The Ninth Circuit also held that the TVPA “encom- passes claims against those who aid and abet torture or ex- trajudicial killing.” Id., at 744. Judge Christen dissented in part. She saw “several sound reasons to decline to recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting” the alleged acts. Id., at 748. Notably, she reasoned that “a finding of liability in this case would necessarily require a showing that the Chinese Communist Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court Party and Ministry of Public Security violated international law.” Ibid. And such a finding “could have serious ramifi- cations” for U. S.-China relations, “fraught as they already are.” Id., at 749. Permitting aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATS is thus “inconsistent with [the court’s] obli- gation to exercise ‘great caution in adapting the law of na- tions to private rights.’” Id., at 751 (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 728). Six judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. They reasoned that ATS liability should be restricted “to causes of action comparable to historically recognized torts.” 113 F. 4th 1230, 1237 (CA9 2024) (opinion of Buma- tay, J.). That is so because creating any additional liability under the ATS violates the separation of powers. Id., at 1245–1247. And the dissenting judges would exercise greater caution before “intrud[ing] in the delicate relations with another world superpower.” Id., at 1237, 1247–1248. We granted certiorari to determine whether Cisco may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses under the ATS, as well as whether two of its executives may be held liable under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. 607 U. S. 1120 (2026). II Our starting point is Sosa’s key insight: The ATS “is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.” 542 U. S., at 724. Put differently, “[a]s enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of certain causes of ac- tion,” which “bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law.” Id., at 713. Justice Scalia would have stopped there. Id., at 743–744 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). He cited “[t]he general rule” that “ ‘grants of jurisdiction alone . . . are not themselves grants of lawmaking author- ity’ ” and noted that Sosa had not identified any reason why the ATS is an exception. Ibid. He then observed that Sosa’s 8 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court “reasons why courts must be circumspect” in developing law under the ATS are actually “reasons why courts cannot pos- sibly be thought to have been given” this power in the first place. Id., at 747. These criticisms resonated, and since then, various Mem- bers of the Court have thoughtfully explained the problems with Sosa’s openness—no matter how limited—to judicially created causes of action under the ATS. See Jesner, 584 U. S., at 274 (THOMAS, J., concurring); id., at 280–293 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg- ment); Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–640 (opinion of THOMAS, J., joined by GORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ.); see also id., at 658 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (noting the “strong arguments that federal courts should never recognize new claims un- der the ATS”). These opinions highlight the great difficulty of satisfying Sosa’s second step under our modern separa- tion-of-powers precedent. Two points drive our decision today. First, judicial au- thority under Sosa’s second step was “narrow at the outset.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Indeed, Sosa instructed federal courts to exercise “great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights.” 542 U. S., at 728. Before doing so, courts must assess the “practical consequences” of creating new liability under the ATS, in- cluding the “risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.” Id., at 728, 732–733. But ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy. As we have explained, “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in th[is] context.” Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 116. After all, the “point of [a new ATS cause of action is] to vindicate ‘a norm of international character.’ ” Jesner, 584 U. S., at 284 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 725). It is thus difficult to think of a case in which a court “might safely conclude” that a new ATS cause of action would not have detrimental foreign policy consequences. Jesner, 584 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court U. S., at 284 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Even suits against American defendants (like this one against Cisco) generally require a court to examine allegations of heinous acts com- mitted by foreign nations or individuals.1 The second point is that the power to create causes of ac- tion belongs to Congress. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727; Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–635 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). For this reason, Sosa cautioned that the “decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judg- ment in the great majority of cases.” 542 U. S., at 727. This understates the point. While our cases at one time permitted courts to provide redress if Congress remained silent, see, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964), “we have since rejected the practice of fashioning rights of action as we see fit,” FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2026) (slip op., at 3–4). That is so because “[h]ome-grown causes of action are difficult to reconcile with ‘the Constitu- tion’s separation of legislative and judicial power.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 491 (2022)); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 133 (2017). Congress is better positioned than courts to evalu- ate the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. See Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 638–639 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). This is especially true in an area like this one, where the Constitution ex- pressly delegates authority to Congress. Art. I, §8, cl. 10 (Congress may “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations”). For that reason, creating any cause of action “is an extraordinary act that places great stress on —————— 1 The dissent is confident about the ability of federal courts to “improve foreign relations” and make judgments that are “ ‘consonant with U. S. foreign policy interests.’ ” Post, at 16 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). The Constitution’s allocation of power, however, requires greater judicial hu- mility. 10 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court the separation of powers.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Sosa acknowledged both these points: that crafting new causes of action under the ATS “raise[s] risks of adverse foreign policy consequences,” 542 U. S., at 728, and intrudes on Congress’s prerogative to create private rights of action, id., at 727. Because of these concerns, it consciously de- signed a test that would be extremely difficult to meet. But what Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments have made impossible. Since Sosa was decided, we have firmly committed to the view that judicially created causes of action offend the sep- aration of powers in almost every circumstance. As a re- sult, we have virtually eliminated the practice of fashioning them. Our cases have emphasized that “‘[i]f there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy, the courts must refrain from creating it.’ ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; alterations omitted); Jesner, 584 U. S., at 264 (quoting this language). Indeed, “ ‘[e]ven a single sound reason to defer to Congress is enough.’ ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491 (quoting Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 635 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); emphasis added). In the ATS context, there will always be at least a “single sound reason” to conclude that Congress might not want the judiciary to take the lead. Sosa itself identified one applicable in every case: “the pos- sible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable.” 542 U. S., at 727. For Sosa, this was reason “for judicial caution.” Ibid. Under our current prec- edent, it is reason not to proceed at all. Cf. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 458 (2015) (“ ‘growth of judicial doctrine’ ” is a relevant consideration when recon- sidering a prior case). Though one is enough, there is another “sound reason” staying the judiciary’s hand. Our post-Sosa cases have stressed that if Congress has created “an alternative Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court remedial structure,” then “that alone” precludes the crea- tion of a cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137 (emphasis added); see also Egbert, 596 U. S., at 493. Such a structure exists here: the TVPA, which creates an express cause of action under the ATS. Sosa acknowledged that Congress had limited the TVPA “to specific subject matter” and had taken no subsequent action to expand the covered conduct. 542 U. S., at 728. Again, for Sosa, this was reason to slow down, ibid.; under our current precedent, it is reason to stop. Beyond changes in the law, it is hard to see how correct- ing Sosa’s unfulfilled prediction would upset reliance inter- ests. Any such interests would belong to future plaintiffs— who surely are not relying on the remote possibility that U. S. courts would create an ATS action if they were some- day injured and sought one. As for stability, today’s deci- sion promotes rather than undermines it. We have never— not once—created an ATS cause of action. Cf. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 274 (2021) (“No one can reasonably rely on a supposed exception that has never operated in practice”). And given the “high bar” that Sosa set, 542 U. S., at 727, it is a stretch to believe that we ever would have. We thus see no need to “indulge the fiction” that cre- ating new ATS causes of action is sometimes appropriate. Edwards, 593 U. S., at 274. Doing so would “mislea[d] liti- gants” by suggesting that recovery might be available while “needlessly expend[ing] . . . scarce [judicial] resources.” Id., at 275.2 —————— 2 While few plaintiffs have successfully litigated ATS suits to final judgment, many more have sued and obtained large settlements. See C. Ewell, O. Hathaway, & E. Nohle, Has the Alien Tort Statute Made a Difference?: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Assessment, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1205, 1251–1252, 1278 (2022) (discussing ATS settle- ments, some of which resulted in “multimillion-dollar payments to plain- tiffs”). Shutting off the possibility of additional ATS liability thus also provides clarity to defendants. 12 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court In sum, we close the door that Sosa cracked to judicially created ATS liability. We do not disturb Sosa’s holding that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute; nor do we revisit its as- sumption that causes of action are available for torts corre- sponding to the Blackstone three.3 We conclude only that Sosa was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the politi- cal branches. In truth, this class is a null set. What result for this case? Cisco argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS for the torts alleged by the plaintiffs. Cisco is correct. Courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, so there is neces- sarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations. Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against Cisco must be dismissed. III One of the plaintiffs also sued two Cisco executives under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. Recall that the TVPA provides a cause of action against someone who —————— 3 The dissent recruits the Blackstone three as support for judicial power to create ATS actions. If the Blackstone three, the dissent asks, then why not more? Post, at 12. The Blackstone three do not give the dissent what it is looking for, because Sosa did not invoke them as evi- dence that the ATS originally granted courts the authority to create causes of action. Under the prevailing jurisprudence of the time, Sosa said, such torts were understood to be “found or discovered” by courts rather than “made or created.” 542 U. S., at 725. Offering examples, Sosa stated that offenses against ambassadors “appea[r] to have been” at top of mind, violations of safe conduct “were probably understood to be actionable,” and “individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy may well have also been contemplated.” Id., at 720. Those are the only ATS actions this Court has ever specifically mentioned, and to the extent there has been reliance on the availability of those three ac- tions, we see no need to revisit them. But while we say “this far and no further,” the dissent would go very far indeed. In the name of honoring the expectations of the First Congress, it would leverage the Blackstone three to justify power that would have confounded the First Congress. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court “subjects” another to torture. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350. In Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), we held that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not create civil aiding-and-abetting liability. Our analysis was straightfor- ward: Section 10(b) “ ‘does not in terms mention aiding and abetting.’ ” Id., at 175. That fact differentiates it from other civil statutes in which Congress expressly provided for that specialized form of liability. Id., at 176−177, 182−183 (col- lecting statutes). Because Congress “‘ha[s] little trouble’” imposing aiding-and-abetting liability “ ‘expressly,’ ” its omission of the phrase in §10(b) was dispositive. Id., at 177 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 734 (1975)). Just so here. The TVPA nowhere mentions aiding-and- abetting liability, and that silence is enough to settle the issue. As then-Judge Kavanaugh put it, Central Bank makes it “crystal clear” that no aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the TVPA because Congress has not expressly provided for it. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 87 (CADC 2011) (dissenting opinion). We agree. Plaintiffs counter that “subjects” is broad enough to in- clude aiding-and-abetting liability. It is not. To “subject” another to torture means “to cause to undergo or submit to.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2275 (1993); see also American Heritage Dictionary 1788 (3d ed. 1992) (“[t]o cause to experience”). The term thus signals a causal connection between torturer and victim. Aiding-and-abet- ting liability, by contrast, encompasses many forms of as- sistance provided by those who are one (or more) steps re- moved from the torturer. See Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471, 497 (2023) (disclaiming a “strict nexus” require- ment). Central Bank rejected a similar argument—that the phrase “ ‘directly or indirectly’ ” in §10(b) authorized aiding- and-abetting liability. 511 U. S., at 175−176. The “basic 14 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE Opinion of the Court flaw” in that interpretation “is that aiding and abetting li- ability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity.” Id., at 176. After all, it encom- passes those “who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.” Ibid. The “basic flaw” we identified in Central Bank exists here too: Aiding-and-abetting liability sweeps more broadly than the language Congress chose.4 * * * We recognize, as does the dissent, post, at 23–24, that ATS and TVPA cases frequently involve heinous and inhu- mane acts. The political branches or other international ac- tors may well provide redress. But we decline to distort the statutory text or the Constitution’s allocation of powers to enlist U. S. courts in that project. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— 4 We have noted that the TVPA “contemplates liability” against those “who do not personally execute the torture”—in particular, those who “giv[e] an order to torture.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 449, 458 (2012); see also post, at 25 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (relying on this assertion). Such liability, however, is much more limited than aiding-and-abetting liability. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of JACKSON, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–856 _________________ CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DOE I, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 23, 2026] JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, con- curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part. I agree with JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s discussion of the Al- ien Tort Statute. See post, at 5–10 (dissenting opinion). But I think the Court is correct to conclude that the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) does not encompass aiding-and-abetting liability. I write separately because, while my textual analysis of the TVPA tracks the major- ity’s, see ante, at 12–14, I do not agree with how the major- ity deploys Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), here. Central Bank is relevant insofar as it instructs that “there is no general presumption” that a statute imposes aiding-and-abetting liability; rather, Congress must pro- vide it. Id., at 182. And here, Congress’s use of the term “subjects” does not do so. But, as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR dis- cusses, post, at 26–27, the majority is wrong to treat Central Bank as creating a “magic words” test for aiding-and-abet- ting liability generally. Contra, ante, at 10–11; see Soto v. United States, 605 U. S. 360, 373 (2025) (“[W]e have so often denounced” a “ ‘magic words’ test”). Instead, the absence of the words “aid” and “abet” in the statute we interpreted in Central Bank was but one consideration of many. See 511 U. S., at 176–180. I therefore concur only in the judgment as to the majority’s TVPA holding. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–856 _________________ CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DOE I, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 23, 2026] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join as to Parts I, II, III, and V, dissent- ing. Petitioner Cisco Systems, Inc., allegedly knowingly de- signed and intentionally built a mass-surveillance system for the Chinese Communist Party to use to identify, track, arrest, and torture thousands of religious minorities. As all agree, if respondents’ allegations were to be proved true, then that would mean Cisco violated universally recognized norms of international law. Respondents thus sued Cisco in a federal action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which vests jurisdiction in district courts over “any civil ac- tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations,” 28 U. S. C. §1350. In Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain, 542 U. S. 692 (2004), this Court held that the ATS permits federal courts to find implied causes of action au- thorizing plaintiffs to sue defendants who violated interna- tional law. The Court nonetheless closes the courthouse doors not just to respondents, but to virtually every future litigant seeking redress for a violation of international law under the ATS. It thus overrules Sosa, without even acknowledg- ing that it is doing so. Today’s decision marks yet another low point in this Court’s esteem for its precedents. 2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Further, the Court also errs by ignoring the plain mean- ing of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) and slamming the door completely shut to claims by U. S. citi- zens against those who aid and abet torture. I respectfully dissent from both of the Court’s holdings. I A The following factual allegations are drawn from re- spondents’ amended complaint and are assumed to be true because this appeal arises from the grant of a motion to dis- miss. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 734 (2011). Respondents are members of Falun Gong, a Chinese spir- itual movement. Falun Gong members believe in the three core tenets of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Tolerance.” App. 2. Many of its members have vocally opposed the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP). In 1999, the CCP designated Falun Gong organizations as illegal and called for violent political crackdowns against them. During these “violent struggle” campaigns (or “douzheng”), CCP and Chinese Government officials sub- jected Falun Gong targets to brutal human-rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, and reeducation through labor. Id., at 12; see 73 F. 4th 700, 712 (CA9 2023) (detailing “beatings with steel rods[,] . . . shocking with elec- tronic batons, sleep deprivation, . . . violent force-feeding,” and more). The United States State Department estimates that hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong believers have been persecuted, and media sources report that thousands have been tortured to death. To target Falun Gong members, the CCP determined that it needed to develop a sophisticated, nationwide internet- surveillance tool to track Falun Gong activity online. It thus devised the anti-Falun Gong “ ‘Golden Shield’ ”: a “ ‘vast and multi-tiered’ ” bespoke “ ‘surveillance system’ ” that the CCP contemplated would obtain and organize all Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting manner of data on the Falun Gong members across China, including address information, internet history, and finan- cial and family information. Id., at 710. At the time the CCP came up with the idea, however, Chinese engineers lacked the technical expertise to create such technology. As a result, the CCP turned to American technology companies and invited them to submit proposals to design its Golden Shield system. Petitioner Cisco answered the CCP’s call with an aggres- sive campaign to secure the Golden Shield contract. Cisco’s CEO (and other senior executives) personally met with China’s President and other officials to discuss and “ex- plicit[ly] support” “the Golden Shield’s douzheng objectives and goals.” App. 62. Internal files reveal Cisco’s “pledge to satisfy the repressive anti-Falun Gong purposes of the” pro- gram, while characterizing Falun Gong and its members as “ ‘viruses,’ ” “ ‘despicable,’ ” and an “ ‘evil cul[t]’ ”—all mirror- ing CCP propaganda denigrating Falun Gong members as “subhuman.” Id., at 20–21. Cisco’s public Chinese market- ing materials also described the company’s “promis[e] to tailor the apparatus” to meet the CCP’s objectives, includ- ing “the douzheng of ” Falun Gong. Id., at 22–23; see 73 F. 4th, at 710 (describing Cisco brochures offered at Chi- nese trade shows marketing its services “as useful to the ‘douzheng’ of Falun Gong”). Cisco’s push succeeded. In 2001, the CCP selected Cisco to submit designs for the Golden Shield and later awarded it contracts to develop the program. Cisco, using engineers working from the United States, then created a massive surveillance system that “ ‘analyzed patterns of Falun Gong Internet activity to enable the intelligent identification of individual Falun Gong Internet users,’ ” while providing “ ‘real time monitoring’ ” of “ ‘Falun Gong Internet traffic patterns’ ” and sharing the results with the CCP to “facili- tate the . . . forced conversion through torture’ ” of Falun Gong members. Id., at 711. Over time, Cisco engineers in 4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting San Jose, California continued to provide support while also upgrading and expanding the system. For example, Cisco later created a video-surveillance system that, combined with facial-recognition technology, has become a “ ‘primary means’ of identifying Falun Gong practitioners through non-internet activities, such as protests or religious prac- tice.” Ibid. Armed with the vast suite of technological tools Cisco pro- vided, the CCP identified, arrested, and tortured thousands of Falun Gong members. Id., at 712. B Respondents in this case are among those victims or are family members of those who have disappeared and are sus- pected or confirmed dead. They allege that the CCP used information collected and stored by the Golden Shield pro- gram in forced-conversion sessions to which they were sub- jected. For example, on top of prolonged isolation and phys- ical torture, Chinese officials leveraged information about some of respondents’ family members (and employed threats against those family members) to coerce respond- ents into renouncing their religious beliefs. In 2011, respondents filed this action against Cisco and two of its executives, suing under the ATS and alleging that Cisco aided and abetted seven international-law violations: torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; forced la- bor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against hu- manity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance. One of the respondents, who is a U. S. citizen, also brought a claim alleging that two individual defendants aided and abetted his torture in violation of the TVPA. After the District Court dismissed the action, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that aiding-and-abetting liability was available under both the ATS and the TVPA. Id., at Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 709. This Court then agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s judgment. 607 U. S. 1120 (2026).1 II A straightforward application of this Court’s settled case law should have allowed respondents’ ATS claims against Cisco to proceed. A The ATS, enacted in 1789, permits foreign nationals harmed by violations of international law to obtain compen- sation for their injuries in U. S. court. See 28 U. S. C. §1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola- tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). The statute is limited: As this Court explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, the ATS “is in terms only jurisdictional,” meaning that it gives courts authority to en- tertain suits but does not itself create any causes of action that permit plaintiffs to sue someone. Id., at 712. Even so, consulting the historical context surrounding the ATS’s passage, the Court determined that Congress “intended” for the ATS “to have practical effect the moment it became law.” Id., at 724. Consistent with that understanding, Sosa held that, although federal courts should be “restrained” in doing so, they may find implied private causes of action un- der the ATS “for violations of any international law norm” comparable to “the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.” Id., at 725, 732. Those paradigms in- clude three international-law offenses that were well estab- lished when the ATS was enacted: “violation of safe con- ducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and —————— 1 Petitioners did not allege a split among the Circuits over whether aid- ing-and-abetting liability is available under either statute. See Pet. for Cert. 14–24, 29–33. 6 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting piracy.” Id., at 715. As all agree, the ATS allows implied private rights of action for at least these three offenses. To invoke an additional implied cause of action under the ATS, Sosa explained, the plaintiff must identify a norm of international law that has sufficiently “definite content” that has gained “acceptance among civilized nations.” Id., at 732. As part of that inquiry, courts must also make a “judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id., at 732–733. Applying this test, the Court rejected the arbi- trary-detention claim that had been raised there. The plaintiff had not alleged a sufficiently definite norm of in- ternational law. Recognizing the plaintiff ’s proposed cause of action would also have “breathtaking” consequences by permitting “a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the world,” so long as it is “unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place.” Id., at 736. The Court thus declined to allow a new cause of action under the ATS. Ibid. “In the years since, this Court has read Sosa to announce a two-step test for recognizing the availability of a cause of action under the ATS.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. 628, 648 (2021) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and con- curring in judgment). At step one, courts ask “ ‘whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged violation is “of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.” ’ ” Ibid. If the plaintiff makes that required showing, then the court must determine “ ‘whether allowing [a] case to proceed un- der the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial discretion.’ ” Ibid. That discretionary inquiry must account for “the po- tential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes [of action],” as courts must be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing for- eign affairs.” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting B This case succeeds at each of Sosa’s steps. At step one, there is no dispute. Respondents allege that Cisco aided and abetted the violation of seven international-law norms: torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; forced la- bor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against hu- manity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance. See 73 F. 4th, at 713. Before this Court, Cisco does not make any arguments at all at step one. See Brief for Peti- tioners 17. It does not dispute that all seven norms are spe- cific, universal, and obligatory, as required by Sosa. Nor does it dispute that international law recognizes aiding- and-abetting liability, either in general or as a substantive part of each of these seven norms. Cisco, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, in- stead exclusively focuses on Sosa’s second step, at which courts ask “‘if there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages rem- edy.’ ” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 264 (2018). Both fail to demonstrate that it would be improper to allow this case to proceed. First, Cisco and the United States argue that an aiding- and-abetting theory of liability can never satisfy Sosa’s sec- ond step because such liability will always endanger for- eign-policy concerns. Those concerns, however, are best ad- dressed on a case-by-case basis, rather than a categorical one. See Sosa, 542 U. S., at 733, n. 21 (discussing possibil- ity of “case-specific deference to the political branches”). This case disproves the idea that recognizing aiding-and- abetting liability will necessarily impair U. S. foreign-policy interests. The political branches have already consistently condemned China’s treatment of Falun Gong members. The Solicitor General confirmed in this very case that “the United States [has] long condemned China’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners,” and has sanctioned Chinese of- ficials for “gross violations of human rights,” including 8 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 9. Sim- ilarly, in 2020, the Trump administration released a report on the Government’s strategic approach to China that high- lighted how the Government had released “statements call- ing on the [Chinese] government to respect the rights of ” religious minorities including “Falun Gong adherents, all of whom face repression and persecution in China”; the report also announced that the “United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our technology to support China’s military and its technology-enabled au- thoritarianism.”2 In addition, the State Department has “denounce[d]” China’s “particularly abhorrent behavior” to- ward Falun Gong. Dept. of State, Annual Report on Inter- national Religious Freedom 2000, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., xxix, xxxii (Joint Comm. Print 2000). So has Congress. See, e.g., H. Res. 605, 111th Cong., p. 5 (2010) (condemning the Chinese Government’s “campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners”); see also Brief for Members of Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 22–26 (listing other congressional resolutions and actions con- demning China’s persecution of Falun Gong). Given that both political branches have so publicly and directly con- demned China’s persecution of Falun Gong members, it strains credulity to say that allowing a private suit against an American company to proceed would meaningfully change the state of relations between the United States and China. In addition, any potential foreign-policy consequences are further reduced because neither China nor any Chinese in- strumentality is a party to the case itself. Rather, the suit —————— 2 National Security Council, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 15 (2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives. gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples- Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/ 2PHC-HLKP). Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting is against an American company and focuses primarily on its conduct in the United States. China also could have ap- peared in this case if it opposed it. It could have filed a brief in this case saying so, just as it did in a previous ATS case that involved China. See Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1264, 1296–1301 (ND Cal. 2004) (noting that, in an ATS suit against Chinese local-government officials, China, “through the United States Department of State, submitted a letter to this Court urging this Court not to assert juris- diction over the instant cases”). Other foreign states have filed similar materials in other ATS cases. See, e.g., Jesner, 584 U. S., at 271 (citing brief filed by the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan in ATS suit against a Jordanian bank). That China has not done so here is additional evidence that this case is unlikely to aggravate U. S.–China relations. Second, Cisco and the United States argue that this Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), fore- closes aiding-and-abetting liability here, reading that case to permit aiding-and-abetting liability only if a statute ex- pressly so states. Central Bank has minimal bearing here. It involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the text of which limits liability to those who “‘directly or indirectly’ ” engage in certain kinds of conduct. Id., at 171. The Court there recognized that Congress “has taken a statute-by- statute approach to civil aiding and abetting.” Id., at 182. The Court reasoned that the text of that statute did not ex- tend liability to aiders and abettors because they do not nec- essarily engage in the underlying activity they facilitate. Id., at 176–177. That conclusion was buttressed by the fact that it was “uncertain” whether state common law supplied “a deeply rooted background of aiding and abetting tort lia- bility.” Id., at 181–182, 184. Here, by contrast, the ATS does not limit liability to those who engage in certain acts. Instead, it authorizes courts to entertain suits involving a “tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations.” 10 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting §1350. As noted above, Cisco does not dispute that liability for aiding and abetting the seven underlying violations is universally recognized in international law. Central Bank’s holding about a textually distinct statute rooted in domestic law thus says little about what the ATS recognizes under international law. Because Cisco does not dispute that Sosa’s first step is satisfied and has not identified a sound reason for this suit not to proceed at Sosa’s second step, the Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.3 III The majority, however, is in a rush. Not wanting to dally on niceties like binding precedent, or to confine itself to de- ciding the case before it, the majority casts aside Sosa’s two- step framework altogether. It disclaims any future author- ity by any court to find additional causes of action in all cases to come, even though it declines to disturb the three implied causes of action previously recognized under the ATS. Ante, at 1. In short, it overturns Sosa. In doing so, the Court brushes past the stare decisis factors that this —————— 3 The Ninth Circuit treated aiding-and-abetting liability as the rele- vant international-law norm at Sosa’s first step, concluding that “cus- tomary international law recognizes aiding and abetting liability as a specific and universal form of liability.” 73 F. 4th 700, 718 (2023). Ar- guably, however, the relevant norm for the Sosa analysis might be the underlying offense that Cisco allegedly aided, such as torture. Whether aiding-and-abetting liability is available would then be assessed simply by determining the substantive breadth and scope of liability of a norm that has been sufficiently established. See 113 F. 4th 1230, 1243 (CA9 2024) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). For exam- ple, Blackstone described slightly varying scopes of secondary liability as to each of the three offenses he identified. See 4 W. Blackstone, Com- mentaries on the Laws of England 69–73 (1769). If the majority were inclined to preserve Sosa’s two-step framework, and if the parties dis- puted Sosa’s first step at all before this Court, the Court could have va- cated and remanded this case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider what the relevant norm is for purposes of Sosa’s first step. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Court considers when deciding whether to overturn prece- dent. It also slams the door in the faces of victims of horrific mistreatment without giving any reason to think that Con- gress, whom the Court purports to respect, would have wanted to do so. The majority errs at each turn. A To begin, the majority fails to demonstrate that Sosa is wrong, never mind that there is the special justification needed to overturn it. Start with the common ground: There is no dispute that the ATS contains judicially implied causes of action. Spe- cifically, it contains implied causes of action for “ ‘violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.’ ” Ante, at 4 (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 715). Those causes of action appear nowhere in the ATS’s text. They instead come from authoritative accounts of interna- tional law, most no