Mullin v. Al Otro Lado (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MULLIN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. AL OTRO LADO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 25–5. Argued March 24, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 66 Stat. 163, gov- erns the process by which an alien who “arrives in the United States” is inspected by border officials, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. The question in this case is when an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” within the meaning of that phrase in two key INA pro- visions—8 U. S. C. §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1): when the alien is standing in Mexico at the border, or only when the alien crosses the border and enters the country? In the spring of 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began experiencing a surge of aliens seeking admission at ports of en- try along the U. S.-Mexico border, with numbers sometimes far exceed- ing safe and secure processing capacity. In November 2016, the De- partment of Homeland Security responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce the policy, officials stood on the U. S. side of the border and prevented aliens from entering the United States beyond the number the port could adequately pro- cess. The metering policy continued through the change in Presiden- tial administrations. In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration- advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. The District Court certified a class of all noncitizens who seek 2 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Syllabus or will seek to access the asylum process by presenting themselves at certain ports on the U. S.-Mexico border and were or will be denied access to that process by CBP officials. The court granted summary judgment for the class and declared that the Government’s denial of inspection and asylum processing to class members who are in the pro- cess of arriving in the United States is unlawful regardless of the pur- ported justification for doing so. The Government rescinded the me- tering policy in November 2021, shortly after the District Court entered summary judgment. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit then affirmed in relevant part, holding that an alien “arrives in the United States”—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—when the alien, while standing on the Mexico side of the border, encounters a United States official at the border. Held: An alien standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States” by attempting, and failing, to set foot in this country. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border. The INA thus neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him. Pp. 7–18. (a) This case is not moot. The District Court’s declaratory judgment, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed, continues to bar the Government from using metering to deal with border surges within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The Government represents that it would like to resume the use of metering when border conditions warrant it. The controversy remains live because a ruling for the Government could reverse the declaratory judgment and thus give the Government the effectual relief it seeks. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165. P. 8, n. 7. (b) The phrase “arrives in the United States” in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) carries its ordinary meaning: A person arrives in a geo- graphic location only when he enters it. To “arrive” is to “reach a des- tination,” American Heritage Dictionary 102, and the preposition “in” means “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of ” a place, id., at 910. A person arrives in a destination when he enters within its area—not before—and that conclusion does not change because someone or some- thing blocks entry. Everyday examples of how people ordinarily use the phrase “arrives in” confirm this understanding. Several features of statutory context support this ordinary-meaning reading. First, other provisions of the INA refer to both actual en- trance and attempted entrance into the United States, but §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) contain no reference to attempted entry, and this fact signals that Congress enacted the disparate language “ ‘intentionally and purposefully.’ ” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208. Second, the INA elsewhere refers to aliens who arrive near a land bor- der, language Congress could have used but did not use in the provi- sions at issue. Third, Congress easily could have required inspection Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus of any alien who “arrives at” or “reaches” the border, as it did in an earlier provision allowing asylum applications by aliens “at a land bor- der or port of entry.” §1158(a) (1994 ed.). Fourth, Congress’s 1996 amendment replacing “at a land border or port of entry” with “arrives in the United States” suggests that these phrases should not be read to have the same meaning and that the current phrase requires aliens to be present in the United States. Pp. 8–11. (c) Respondents’ principal textual argument rests on the canon against surplusage. They observe that §1158(a)(1) allows asylum ap- plications by aliens who “arriv[e] in the United States” and also by those “physically present in the United States,” and they argue that the first phrase would be wholly redundant if read to require physical presence. This argument has some force but does not overcome the arguments pointing the opposite way. The anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule; Congress sometimes “enacts provisions that are su- perfluous,” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U. S. 91, 107. Here, the superfluity is only partial, not total, and it is understanda- ble. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 both created expedited removal—a streamlined process for removal of arriving aliens—and inserted the “arrives in” language in §1158(a)(1) to correspond with the event—arrival—that triggered that new removal process. In any event, the Court would choose an inter- pretation that entails some redundancy over one that contradicts what words usually mean. Pp. 11–15. (d) Even if statutory text and context were not enough, the presump- tion against extraterritoriality would tip the scale against respond- ents’ interpretation. Nothing in the text of §1158(a)(1) or §§1225(a)(1) and (a)(3) manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to require that aliens be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum while they are outside the United States. The Court’s interpretation links inspection and the asylum process to what occurs on the U. S. side of the border. Respondents’ interpretation focuses on the other side of the border, giving the provisions extraterritorial reach. Pp. 15–16. (e) Respondents’ remaining arguments fail. First, the Court’s deci- sion in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, forecloses respondents’ argument that the Government’s interpretation violates the Nation’s obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U. N. T. S. 150, to which the United States ac- ceded in 1968. The “text of Article 33” of the Convention, which re- spondents invoke, “cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory,” 509 U. S., at 183. Second, respondents’ concern that the Government’s in- terpretation will create perverse incentives for illegal entry is over- stated. Metering does not permanently bar any alien from arriving 4 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Syllabus and applying for asylum. It merely delays entry, whereas illegal entry carries adverse legal effects including criminal liability, §1325(a), and ineligibility for asylum and certain government benefits, §§1231(a)(5), 1621(a), 1641(b). Regardless, this concern cannot defeat the best read- ing of the statutory text. Last, respondents’ argument that the Gov- ernment might someday prevent all potential arriving asylum appli- cants from reaching the point where they could file an application addresses a hypothetical future policy, not the rescinded metering pol- icy at issue, which merely delayed entry to improve conditions at cer- tain ports of entry. Pp. 16–18. 138 F. 4th 1102, reversed and remanded. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–5 _________________ MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AL OTRO LADO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2026] JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a straightforward question: whether an alien1 who seeks to enter the United States2 from Mexico “arrives in the United States” when he or she is still in Mex- ico. In the decision below, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Ninth Circuit answered “yes.” That is wrong. In ordinary speech, no one would say that a person “arrives in” a place—for example, a house, a city, or a country—be- fore the person enters that place. The context in which the phrase “arrives in the United States” is used in the immi- gration statutes at issue here supports an ordinary-mean- ing reading. So does the presumption against extraterrito- riality. We therefore reverse. —————— 1 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3). 2 The term “United States,” “when used in a geographical sense,” ordi- narily means the “continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, and the Common- wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.” §1101(a)(38). 2 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court I A Two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA or the Act), 66 Stat. 163, are central to this dis- pute. Congress adopted both provisions in substantially their current form in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546. And both provisions contain the phrase “arrives in the United States.” The first, 8 U. S. C. §1225(a), governs the inspection of aliens who seek admission to the United States.3 An alien who wishes to enter the United States lawfully must first be “admitted.” As used in the INA, “admission” is a term of art that means the “lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an im- migration officer.” §1101(a)(13)(A). So an alien cannot law- fully enter this country without first being inspected by an immigration officer, and immigration officers must inspect all aliens “who are applicants for admission or [are] other- wise seeking admission” to the United States. §1225(a)(3). An alien is deemed an “applicant for admission” if he “ar- rives in the United States.” §1225(a)(1). The Government correspondingly must inspect an alien who “arrives in the United States”—say, at the San Ysidro, California, port of entry through which millions of people pass every year. But an alien is not entitled to inspection until he “arrives in the United States.” The meaning of the phrase “arrives in the United States” accordingly determines whether and when the Government must inspect an alien seeking to enter the country. —————— 3 The provision states in part: “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in interna- tional or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chap- ter an applicant for admission.” §1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court The second of the two key statutory provisions, §1158(a)(1),4 governs a process that may begin during in- spection. During inspection, an immigration officer decides whether the alien is inadmissible under §1182, which bars entry on grounds related to, among other things, national security, foreign-policy concerns, and the alien’s health or criminal activity. If the officer concludes that the alien is inadmissible, the officer must generally “order the alien re- moved from the United States without further hearing or review.” §1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This procedure is known as ex- pedited removal. An officer may not proceed with expedited removal, how- ever, if the alien indicates an “intention to apply for asylum under” §1158 or voices a “fear of persecution.” §1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). In that event, the immigration officer must refer the alien to an asylum officer for what is known as a “credible fear” interview, at which the alien must es- tablish a “significant possibility” of eligibility for asylum under §1158. Ibid.; §1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If the officer deter- mines that the alien does not have a credible fear of perse- cution, the officer must “order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review,” although the alien may request “prompt” and limited review by an immigration judge. §§1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), (III). But if the asylum officer decides that the alien does have a credible fear, the officer must detain the alien for further consider- ation of the alien’s application for asylum. Asylum is a status that entitles an alien who is a “refu- gee” to remain and work in the United States. —————— 4 That provision states: “Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.” §1158(a)(1) (emphasis added). 4 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court §1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is an alien who is unable or un- willing to return to the country of his nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac- count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic- ular social group, or political opinion.” §1101(a)(42)(A). Any alien who “arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum, §1158(a)(1), and the Attorney General or the Sec- retary of Homeland Security may—but need not—grant such an application, §1158(b)(1)(A). In sum, an alien that “arrives in the United States” is en- titled to inspection, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. By contrast, until an alien “ar- rives in the United States,” he is not entitled to inspection, is not an applicant for admission, and cannot apply for asy- lum, except on other grounds not here at issue. B In the spring of 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protec- tion (CBP) began to experience a surge of aliens seeking ad- mission at ports of entry along the U. S.-Mexico border. The number of aliens seeking to enter sometimes far exceeded the number CBP could properly process. Long delays slowed the inspection process, and, in the meantime, CBP sometimes ran short of chairs, meals, and beds. The result- ing conditions were often unsafe for aliens, and they ren- dered border facilities unsecure. In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Secu- rity responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the num- ber of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce the policy, offi- cials stood on the U. S. side of the border and prevented en- try into the United States by more aliens than the port could adequately process. The metering policy continued through the change in Presidential administrations. In April 2018, a CBP official distributed a memorandum that allowed CBP offices to Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court “meter the flow of travelers at the land border” when “nec- essary or appropriate to facilitate orderly processing” and to “maintain the security of the port and safe and sanitary conditions.” App. 122. The memorandum empowered of- fices to “establish and operate physical access controls at the borderline, including as close to the U.S.-Mexico border as operationally feasible.” Ibid. But officers could not “dis- courage” an alien “from waiting to be processed” if the alien claimed “fear of return” or sought “any other protection.” Id., at 122–123. And the memorandum stated that an alien “must be fully processed” once the alien “is in the United States.” Id., at 123. The Government reiterated the policy in a second 2018 memorandum, this one issued by the Sec- retary of Homeland Security. Id., at 124–129.5 —————— 5 As noted above, two different Presidential administrations found that surges of aliens seeking admission at ports of entry along the southern border had overwhelmed those ports’ processing capacities and that al- lowing all these aliens to enter the country created unacceptable condi- tions at the port facilities. Both administrations found that metering was an appropriate response to the problem, and in reaching that con- clusion they presumably considered alternatives, such as releasing on parole all the aliens who could not be expeditiously processed. See 8 U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A). As we note below, a third Presidential admin- istration rescinded the policy after a District Court ruled it unlawful. The centerpiece of the principal dissent is an impassioned argument against the administrations’ policy choice, but we have neither the abil- ity nor the authority to assess and countermand that choice. Assessing the policy would require, among other things, extensive inquiry into the number of aliens seeking admission at various ports of entry, the capac- ities of those ports and available detention facilities, the effects of at- tempting to detain all the aliens who could not be expeditiously pro- cessed, and the effects of alternative policies, such as granting parole. We lack the resources and expertise needed to make such an assessment on our review of the District Court’s summary judgment, and more to the point, we lack the authority to do so. Our authority is limited to inter- preting and applying the law. 6 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court C In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration-advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Respondents argued that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. They sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief that would end the metering policy. The District Court certified a class of all noncitizens who “seek or will seek to access” the asylum process “by present- ing themselves” at certain ports on the U. S.-Mexico border and “were or will be denied access” to that process by CBP officials. App. to Pet. for Cert. 300a, n. 3. The court then granted summary judgment for the class and declared that the Government’s “denial of inspection or asylum pro- cessing” to class members “who are in the process of arriv- ing in the United States” is “unlawful regardless of the pur- ported justification for doing so.” Id., at 253a. The administration rescinded the metering policy in November 2021, shortly after the District Court ruled the policy un- lawful. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Re- view, 138 F. 4th 1102 (2025).6 It held that an alien “arrives in the United States”—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—when the alien, while “standing on” the Mexico side of the border, encounters a United States offi- cial at the border. Id., at 1113, 1115. The majority based this conclusion on other language in the provision that al- lows certain aliens to apply for asylum. Such an application —————— 6 Before reaching the merits, the panel majority held that the Govern- ment’s rescission of the metering policy did not moot the claim now be- fore us. The dissent did not disagree with that conclusion. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court may be filed by not only an alien who “arrives in the United States” but also any alien who “is physically present in the United States.” §1158(a)(1). The majority reasoned that if, as the Government maintained, an alien “arrives in the United States” only when he enters the country, the phrase “arrives in the United States” would be “completely sub- sumed within the phrase ‘physically present in the United States.’ ” 138 F. 4th, at 1114. The majority stated that its interpretation, by contrast, gave “every clause and word of ” §1158(a)(1) an independent meaning. Id., at 1115. And be- cause §1225(a)(1), the provision governing inspection and admission, contains nearly identical language, the majority construed it the same way. Id., at 1118–1119. Judge Ryan Nelson dissented. He argued that an alien “arrives in the United States” only when he “crosses the border” into the United States, and he charged that the majority’s reading defied “[t]ext, history, precedent, and common sense.” Id., at 1129, 1133. The Ninth Circuit called for briefing on whether to rehear the case en banc, and 12 judges dissented when the court denied rehearing. Judge Bress, joined by 11 other active judges, argued that the panel’s ruling contravened the “clear statutory text” of §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) and was “gravely wrong.” Id., at 1168, 1177. Judge Bea and two other senior judges noted their agreement with the dis- sents. Id., at 1177–1178 (Bea, J., respecting denial of reh’g en banc). We granted certiorari. Noem v. Al Otro Lado, 607 U. S. 1040 (2025). II We hold that an alien who is standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States” by attempting, and failing, 8 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court to set foot in this country. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border.7 A 1 We begin by considering what the phrase “arrives in the United States” means when used in everyday speech. That meaning is clear. A person arrives in a geographic location only when he enters it. To “arrive” is to “reach a destina- tion.” American Heritage Dictionary 102 (def. 1) (3d ed. 1992); see also Webster’s Third New International Diction- ary 121 (def. 1.a) (1993) (“to reach a destination: come to the end of a journey”); 1 Oxford English Dictionary 651 (def. 5.a.1) (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]o come to the end of a journey” or “to a destination”). The preposition “in” means “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of.” American Heritage Dictionary, at 910 (def. 1.a); accord, 7 Oxford English Dictionary, at 759 (def. 1.a). On these definitions, a person arrives in a desti- nation when he enters within its area—not before. Everyday examples confirm that understanding. A run- ning back does not arrive in the end zone when he reaches the 1-yard line. A guest does not arrive in a house when he knocks on the front door. An army does not arrive in a city by encamping outside its walls. And a letter does not arrive —————— 7 We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the case is not moot. The Dis- trict Court’s class-wide declaratory relief, which the panel affirmed, con- tinues to bar the Government from using metering to help deal with bor- der surges within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. Although the Government has rescinded the metering policy, respondents have not carried their burden to establish that it is “ ‘absolutely clear’ ” that the Government would not “reimpose” metering if it could. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 720 (2022). To the contrary, the Government repre- sents that metering remains an “important tool,” Reply Brief 1, of which it “would likely resume the use . . . as soon as changed border conditions warranted,” Pet. for Cert. 26. The controversy remains live because a ruling for the Government could reverse the declaratory judgment and so give the Government “ ‘effectual relief.’ ” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013). Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court in a mailbox while it remains in the mail carrier’s hand just inches away. Respondents suggest that the meaning of the phrase “ar- rives in” shifts when someone “block[s]” the way of the per- son seeking to arrive. Brief for Respondents 25. In that circumstance, respondents say, to arrive in a place is merely to “be at its threshold.” Id., at 23. So, on respond- ents’ view, a person does arrive in a house when, although he “is not in the house” and is merely “ready” to “take the step over” the threshold, the homeowner “stand[s] on the other side” and prevents entry. Tr. of Oral Arg. 70. Put simply, an alien “arrives in” the United States by “attempt- ing to come into the United States.” Brief for Respondents 20. We disagree and return to our earlier examples. The run- ning back does not arrive in the end zone (and six points do not go up on the scoreboard) when he is tackled at the 1- yard line by the defense. The guest does not arrive in the house when the homeowner locks the door right before the guest tries to open it. The army does not arrive in the city when the city’s defenders repel the attack outside city lim- its. And the letter does not arrive in the mailbox when a dog assaults the carrier a step away from the mailbox. A person arrives in a destination only when he enters it, and that conclusion does not change because someone or some- thing blocks entry. A person arrives in the United States, then, only when he enters it. 2 Several features of statutory context suggest that the meaning of the phrase “arrives in the United States” in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) conforms to ordinary usage. The first is the absence from those provisions of reference to attempted entry. Other provisions of the INA refer to both actual entrance into the United States and attempted entrance. For example, an alien who “enters or attempts to 10 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court enter” the country at an improper time or place commits a misdemeanor, §1325(a)(1), and an alien who “enters” or “at- tempts to enter” the country after being removed commits a felony, §1326(a)(2)(B). Immigration officers may arrest aliens “entering or attempting to enter the United States” unlawfully. §1357(a)(2). We “are required to give effect to Congress’ express inclusions and exclusions.” National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 126 (2018). So the use of attempt language elsewhere in the INA and the absence of that language in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) signal that Congress enacted the disparate lan- guage “ ‘intentionally and purposefully.’ ” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983)). An alien who un- successfully attempts to arrive in the United States does not arrive in the United States. Second, the INA elsewhere refers to aliens who arrive near a land border. It empowers the Attorney General to deputize state or local law enforcement to help enforce the Act in the event of an “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land border.” §1103(a)(10) (emphasis added). Had Con- gress meant for aliens who arrive at or near the border to be able to apply for asylum and to be entitled to inspection, it could have said so using similar language in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1). Again, we credit that it did not. See Na- tional Assn. of Mfrs., 583 U. S., at 126. Third, Congress easily could have required immigration officers to inspect any alien who “arrives at” or “reaches” the U. S. border. And it could have used similar language in specifying which aliens may apply for asylum. It did something like that in an earlier provision. See §1158(a) (1994 ed.) (allowing an alien “physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry” to apply for asylum (emphasis added)). As just noted, the INA uses similar phrases in other provisions. See, e.g., §1103(a)(10) Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court (referring to “aliens arriving . . . near a land border”). That Congress chose not to adopt those “readily available and ap- parent alternative[s]” supports our conclusion that the or- dinary meaning of “arrives in the United States” controls. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U. S. 181, 188 (2008). Fourth, that Congress amended §1158(a) in IIRIRA to re- place “at a land border or port of entry” with “arrives in the United States” suggests that we should not read those phrases—which carry different ordinary meanings—to have the same meaning. “When Congress amends legisla- tion,” we presume that it “intends the change to have real and substantial effect.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 393 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whatever the proper interpretation of the pre-IIRIRA pro- visions, §1158(a) now “require[s] that one must be present in the United States to be eligible for asylum.” Sadhvani v. Holder, 596 F. 3d 180, 183 (CA4 2009). Respondents contend that our interpretation of the phrase “arrives in the United States” puts too much weight on the Act’s use of the preposition “in.” According to re- spondents, “in” tells us little about the meaning of §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) because “it would make no sense to say someone arrives ‘at the United States’ or ‘upon the United States.’ ” Brief for Respondents 22. Yet it would be natural to say—and Congress “easily” could have said, had it wanted to adopt respondents’ rule, Knight, 552 U. S., at 188—that an alien must be inspected and allowed to ap- ply for asylum if he “arrives at the border,” or “near” the border, or “upon” a spot adjacent to the border. Congress did not use those terms. B 1 Respondents rest their principal textual argument on the same ground as the Ninth Circuit panel majority: the canon against surplusage. Recall that §1158(a)(1) allows an alien 12 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court to apply for asylum not only when he “arrives in the United States” but also if he “is physically present in the United States.” Respondents correctly observe that an alien who “arrives in the United States” is, on the Government’s view, “physically present” in the United States. So, they main- tain, the phrase “arrives in the United States” is wholly re- dundant if read to require physical presence in this country. To avoid that result, they argue, the phrase “arrives in” “must apply to at least some noncitizens who are not geo- graphically ‘present in’ the country.” Brief for Respondents 24. Their alternative interpretation of “arrives in the United States” applies that way, and they urge us to adopt it. 2 Although that argument has some force, in the end it does not overcome the arguments that point the opposite way. The anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule. As Justice Scalia put it, the canon expresses “our general reluctan[ce] to treat statutory terms as surplusage.” Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The canon is based on an infer- ence about how a careful writer or drafter of statutes ordi- narily uses language, namely, that such a person is usually economical in the use of words. But even excellent writers do not always trim every unnecessary word, and the same is true of Congress. We have acknowledged that Congress sometimes “enacts provisions that are superfluous.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U. S. 91, 107 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, we have adopted inter- pretations under which, for example, three distinct verbs in the same clause “all mean the same thing.” Freeman, 566 U. S., at 635. Nor are other examples of redundancy “un- common.” Ibid. Some statutes, for instance, pick out a “general” category alongside a “specific” subcategory that Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court “might in other circumstances be deemed surplusage.” Lo- renzo v. SEC, 587 U. S. 71, 80 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). And statutory context can rebut the “idea that each subsection” must have wholly independent mean- ing. Id., at 81. The anti-surplusage canon is useful, but it is “subordinate to the ‘cardinal canon’ that ‘a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ” United States Postal Service v. Konan, 607 U. S. 391, 406 (2026). Respondents thus err in suggest- ing that the “term ‘arrives in’ must apply to at least some noncitizens who are not already geographically ‘present in’ the country.” Brief for Respondents 24 (emphasis added). To bolster their argument, respondents assert that we should reject the Government’s interpretation because it yields “pure” surplusage. Ibid. That charge, which the principal dissent repeats, is mistaken.8 Still, it is true that if “arrives in the United States” means “sets foot on U. S. soil,” then this category of aliens is a subset of those who are “physically present in the United States.” What ex- plains this redundancy? The most plausible explanation is the link between the “arrives in the United States” language and expedited re- moval. Both were added by IIRIRA in 1996. Before then, aliens who were “physically present” in the United States could apply for asylum, see §1158(a) (1994 ed.), but no —————— 8 The reach of the phrase “arrives in the United States” is not the same as that of the phrase “physically present in the United States.” The phrase “arrives in the United States” allows the submission of an asylum application by aliens who wish to apply when they arrive in the country. But certain aliens may apply only well after they enter. Some, for exam- ple, may have come here on visas but then decided to apply for asylum due to changes in conditions in their home country. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, p. 116 (1996) (noting that “visa overstayers account for a substantial portion of those waiting in the ‘asylum backlog’ ”). These al- iens are “physically present in the United States,” but they are not aliens who apply when they “arriv[e].” Thus, “physically present in the United States” and “arrives in the United States” are not coterminous. 14 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court provision of the INA authorized expedited removal of arriv- ing aliens who were inadmissible under §1182. The expe- dited removal process created by IIRIRA begins when an alien “arrives in the United States” and is inspected, see §§1225(a)(1), (3), and it seems likely that the “arrives in the United States” language was added to §1158(a)(1) to corre- spond with the event—arrival—that triggered this new pro- cess. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21–22 (Government counsel ar- guing for this explanation of the partial redundancy); Brief for Respondents 8–9 (explaining that IIRIRA added the phrase “arrives in the United States” to “mirror” that phrase’s inclusion “in the new §1225(a)(1)”). This explanation makes sense of the way that §1158(a) is framed. A careful writer or drafter of statutes may some- times include language that is not strictly necessary in or- der to make an important point as clear as possible. Lo- renzo, 587 U. S., at 80. And that may well be the reason for the inclusion of the “arrives in the United States” phrase in the provisions in question. This new language in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) makes it clear that arriving al- iens are subject to expedited removal but that even those aliens may apply for asylum and that, when they do so, their applications are governed by a special process that al- lows only limited and expedited review of adverse credible- fear decisions. The language allowing applications by al- iens who are “physically present in the United States,” §1158(a)(1), was retained in 1996 so that aliens could con- tinue to apply for asylum well after they arrived.9 For these reasons, the redundancy that troubled the Ninth Circuit is understandable. At any rate, if forced to choose between an interpretation that entails some redun- dancy and one that contradicts what words usually mean, we would choose the former. See United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128, 137 (2007) (the anti- —————— 9 See n. 8, supra. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court surplusage canon “does not require us to avoid surplusage at all costs”); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The In- terpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012) (“Put to a choice, however, a court may well prefer ordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage”). C Even if statutory text and context were not enough to re- ject the Ninth Circuit’s and respondents’ interpretation of “arrives in the United States,” the presumption against ex- traterritoriality would tip the scale against that position. This presumption is a “ ‘longstanding principle of American law’ ” under which courts will not give a statute effect out- side the territory of the United States unless Congress “ ‘clearly expresse[s]’ ” a contrary intent. Morrison v. Na- tional Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010); see RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 335 (2016) (asking whether Congress “affirmatively and un- mistakably instructed” that the statute have extraterrito- rial effect). We ask two questions when we analyze whether a statu- tory provision applies outside our borders. We first exam- ine the text of the statute and ask whether the provision “unmistakabl[y]” applies to foreign conduct. Abitron Aus- tria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 600 U. S. 412, 417–418 (2023). If it does, the inquiry ends. If it does not, we move to the second step and ask whether the statute focuses on domestic or foreign conduct. Id., at 419. We have sometimes used the presumption against extra- territoriality to determine whether statutes with more-or- less settled meanings applied outside the United States. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 329, 338. Here, the presumption serves a somewhat different purpose: to deter- mine whether either of two interpretations of the phrase “arrives in the United States” gives extraterritorial reach to the provisions in which that phrase appears. See Small v. 16 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court United States, 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) (“In determining the scope of [a] statutory phrase we find help in the ‘com- monsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind’ ”). The answer is plain. Nothing in the text of §1158(a)(1) or §§1225(a)(1) and (a)(3) manifests an unmistakable congres- sional intent to require that aliens be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum while they are still outside the United States. We must therefore consider the conduct relevant to the provisions’ focus. And on this score, the difference be- tween the two interpretations favors ours. On our view, the provisions link inspection and the asylum process to what occurs on the U. S. side of the border, while the Ninth Cir- cuit’s and respondents’ interpretation trains its sight on the other side. Because that interpretation would give the pro- visions extraterritorial reach, we presume that we should not read the provisions that way. III Respondents’ remaining arguments fail. First, respond- ents are mistaken that the interpretation we adopt allows the Government to violate the obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U. N. T. S. 150, that the United States assumed through its accession to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U. S. T. 6223, T. I. A. S. No. 6577. The Protocol requires nations to com- ply with Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. Article 33.1 provides that no nation “shall expel or return (‘re- fouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of ” certain grounds. 19 U. S. T., at 6276. The Government’s metering policy, respondents press, flouts that obligation. Our precedent forecloses this argument. We held in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 183 (1993), Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court that the “text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens out- side its own territory.” Because aliens who are standing in Mexico are outside the territory of the United States, the refusal to allow them to enter does not violate Article 33. In Sale, we ruled that Article 33 allowed the Government to “gather fleeing refugees” en masse to “preven[t]” them “from reaching our shores” and to “return them to the one country they had desperately sought to escape” “without first determining whether they may qualify as refugees.” Id., at 158, 160, 183. If that course of action is consistent with Article 33, the Article surely allows border officials to stop aliens without valid travel documents from entering the United States until they can be processed in a safe and orderly way. The Convention’s bar on refoulement imposes a duty on nations not to send refugees that are within their borders to certain places. It does not establish that refugees have a right to enter a nation at the time they prefer. Second, respondents maintain that we should reject the Government’s interpretation because it will create perverse incentives for aliens to enter the country illegally. Accord- ing to respondents, if border officials may turn away aliens who arrive at ports of entry and thus deny them the chance to apply for asylum, some aliens will respond by attempting to enter the country illegally at other locations. That concern is overstated and in any event cannot defeat the best reading of the text. Metering does not permanently bar any alien from arriving in the United States and then applying for asylum. It merely delays the date when some may enter. Illegal entry, on the other hand, may be expen- sive and dangerous, and it carries adverse legal effects. En- try at an improper location is a crime. §1325(a). An alien becomes ineligible for asylum if he unlawfully re-enters the country after having been removed. §1231(a)(5). And an alien unlawfully present in the country is ineligible for var- ious government benefits. §§1621(a), 1641(b). An alien 18 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO Opinion of the Court whose admission and inspection are delayed due to meter- ing would need a powerful reason to apply for asylum im- mediately for it to be preferable to run all the risks of illegal entry. Last, respondents argue that acceptance of the interpre- tation we adopt could cause drastic harm because the Gov- ernment at some time in the future might prevent all po- tential arriving asylum applicants from ever reaching the point where an application could be filed. For present pur- poses, it suffices to say that the rescinded metering policy was never anything like that imagined future policy. The Government’s policy merely delayed entry by some aliens as a way of improving a situation that both interfered with the proper conduct of inspection and created unsanitary, in- humane, and sometimes dangerous conditions at ports of entry. If the Government ever adopts the sort of policy that respondents fear, we are confident it would be quickly chal- lenged. * * * The wisdom of the policy of metering alien arrivals at the southern border is not before us. We decide only that an alien standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States.” The INA neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him. We reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and re- mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–5 _________________ MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AL OTRO LADO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2026] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. The Court’s opinion correctly holds that an alien “who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico” does not “ ‘ar- riv[e] in the United States’ when he or she is still in Mex- ico.” Ante, at 1 (footnote omitted). I join it in full. I write separately to address two further problems with the deci- sion below. First, the District Court appeared to effectively grant the classwide injunctive relief that Congress has pro- hibited in this context. See 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1). Second, the relief that the District Court provided may well have unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s inherent au- thority to exclude aliens from the country. I A The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes var- ious restrictions on judicial review of immigration enforce- ment. As relevant here, §1252(f )(1) provides: “Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain parts of the INA. It contains an exception only for relief granted on an indi- vidual basis. Ibid. This provision thus “strips lower courts 2 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO THOMAS, J., concurring of ‘jurisdiction or authority’ to ‘enjoin or restrain the opera- tion of ’ ” these parts of the INA on a classwide basis. Gar- land v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. 543, 548 (2022) (quoting §1252(f )(1)). In Aleman Gonzalez, we interpreted this ju- risdictional bar to “prohibi[t] lower courts from entering in- junctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.” 596 U. S., at 550. B Respondents sought relief that §1252(f )(1) prohibits. The District Court certified their proposed class of “ ‘all nonciti- zens who seek or will seek to access the U.S. asylum process by presenting themselves’ ” at a port of entry at the U. S.- Mexico border and who “ ‘were or will be denied access to the U.S. asylum process by or at the instruction of ’ ” border officials. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1033, n. 2 (SD Cal. 2022). They asked the court for an in- junction against the Government’s “metering” practice, which temporarily prevented class members from entering the country to be inspected under §1225. Id., at 1035–1036; see ante, at 4–5. They also asked the court to appoint a magistrate judge as a “special master . . . to monitor and oversee” the Government’s “implementation of all class- wide injunctive relief.” 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1036. The District Court acknowledged that our interpretation of §1252(f )(1) in Aleman Gonzalez barred this relief. 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1045.1 It correctly concluded that Aleman —————— 1 The District Court followed Aleman Gonzalez’s holding on this point, but it expressed its view that “Aleman Gonzalez . . . deflates the histori- cal and traditional role of Article III courts” and “undermines” the “fun- damental principal of federalism” that “federal agencies and courts are bound to give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1044 (SD Cal. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ibid. (expressing its Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring Gonzalez “squarely” controls this case, such that the re- quested injunctive relief “must be construed as enjoining or restraining the operation of §1225 because it would have the effect of interfering with the Government’s efforts to op- erate §1225.” 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations adopted). After all, by requiring border officials to carry out §1225’s inspection and asylum- interview procedures for the class members, the requested injunction would “order federal officials to take” actions to “implement” or “carry out” a covered provision. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S., at 550. Nonetheless, the District Court effectively gave Respond- ents all that they asked for in the form of nominally declar- atory relief. Even after Aleman Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit maintains that §1252(f )(1) allows “classwide declaratory relief.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105, 1120 (2010); see also Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Re- view, 138 F. 4th 1102, 1123–1124 (2025) (case below). So, the District Court issued a declaration that the Govern- ment’s metering policy was unlawful. As a source of au- thority for this relief, it invoked §706(1) of the Administra- tive Procedure Act (APA), which allows courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de- layed,” 5 U. S. C. §706(1) (emphasis added). See 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1032, 1049. Citing §706(1) and the Ninth Circuit’s precedents authorizing declaratory relief, the Dis- trict Court entered a judgment “that, absent any independ- ent, express, and lawful statutory authority, Defendants’ refusal to provide inspection or asylum processing to” aliens “who are in the process of arriving in the United States” at —————— displeasure that “Aleman Gonzalez . . . confers to immigration enforce- ment agencies power to unilaterally ignore or deviate from the Congres- sional mandates set forth in the removal provisions of the INA”); id., at 1043 (describing “competing obligations” between obeying Supreme Court precedent and not “applying §1252(f )(1) in a manner that produces absurd results” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration adopted)). 4 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO THOMAS, J., concurring ports of entry “is unlawful regardless of the purported jus- tification for doing so.” Id., at 1049. The Ninth Circuit af- firmed. 138 F. 4th, at 1123–1124, 1128. II In a future case, this Court should address this apparent end-run around §1252(f )(1) and Aleman Gonzalez. I am skeptical that the relief that the District Court or- dered complies with §1252(f )(1). The statute provides that “no court” may “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” §1225, subject to limited exceptions. §1252(f )(1) (emphasis added). In California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393 (1982), decided before §1252(f )(1) was enacted, the Court interpreted near-identical language in the Tax In- junction Act to bar all declaratory relief. Compare 28 U. S. C. §1341 (“district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain . . . the collection of ” state taxes) with 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1) (“no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the oper- ation of ” specified provisions).2 In Grace Brethren Church, the plaintiffs sought a “declaratory judgment holding state tax laws unconstitutional.” 457 U. S., at 408. Even though the plaintiffs did not seek an injunction, the Court held that the Act barred granting the declaration. Id., at 411. It rea- soned that “there is little practical difference between in- junctive and declaratory relief,” id., at 408, so the declara- tion in question was an order to “enjoin, suspend or restrain” the collection of taxes and thus barred by the Act, 28 U. S. C. §1341.3 —————— 2 Section 1252(f ) was added to the INA as part of the Illegal Immigra- tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009– 611 to 3009–612. 3 As Judge Fuentes of the Third Circuit has explained, the Court has applied this reasoning in other contexts, as well. Alli v. Decker, 650 F. 3d 1007, 1018 (2011) (dissenting opinion). In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), the Court held that a declaratory judgment would have Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 THOMAS, J., concurring The same rationale seems to apply to §1252(f )(1): Declar- atory judgments that immigration enforcement actions are unlawful have the practical effect of “restraining” the Gov- ernment in the same way that an injunction would. See Alli v. Decker, 650 F. 3d 1007, 1019 (CA3 2011) (Fuentes, J., dis- senting). After all, the Government “conform[s] its current conduct to what a court has declared to be the law,” just as it would under an injunction. Tr. of Oral Arg. 89. If any- thing, §1252(f )(1) more clearly forbids such declaratory re- lief than the Tax Injunction Act because it carried over nearly the exact words that Grace Brethren Church had al- ready interpreted to preclude declaratory relief. See Wil- liams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 434 (2000); Learning Re- sources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229, 344–345 (2026) (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). Even if some declaratory relief were compatible with §1252(f )(1), the relief entered here likely is not. The Gov- ernment was subject to a declaration that, under §706(1) of the APA, it was illegal for it to withhold inspection from the class members. See supra, at 3–4. The court’s judgment was therefore a declaration that the Government’s meter- ing policy resulted in “agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” A §706(1) order, by its plain terms, “compel[s]” the agency to carry out the relevant duties un- der §1225. So, like the injunction held unlawful in Aleman Gonzalez, this judgment under §706(1) appears to “require officials to take actions that (in the Government’s view) are not required by” covered provisions of the INA, contrary to §1252(f )(1). 596 U. S., at 551. The Court has repeatedly reserved the question whether §1252(f )(1) bars declaratory relief. Ibid., n. 2; Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. 785, 801, n. 4 (2022). In this case, the —————— “virtually the same practical impact as a formal injunction,” id., at 72, so the holding of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), barring injunctions against state criminal proceedings, id., at 41, applied to declaratory judg- ments, too. 6 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO THOMAS, J., concurring Government did not press the issue, and the Court correctly reverses the Ninth Circuit’s clearly erroneous merits hold- ing. The Court should soon address the apparent resistance to, and evasion of, §1252(f )(1) in a future case. III Separately, even if the statute authorized the District Court’s order effectively requiring executive officials to bring certain aliens into the country, it would raise serious constitutional questions. “[T]he President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 712 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring). There is “founding-era ev- idence” showing “that ‘the executive Power,’ Art. II, §1, in- cludes the power to deport aliens.” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148, 217 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). For exam- ple, William Blackstone explained that the King could send alien friends “home whenever the king sees occasion.” 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 252 (1765). And, at the time of ratification, Framers of the Constitution argued that the President would have the same power. See Ses- sions, 584 U. S., at 218 (collecting sources). Congress, for its part, has no enumerated power to re- quire the President to bring certain aliens into the country. The Constitution grants Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Art. I, §8, cl. 4. But, the class members in this case are not naturalized or even on the path to naturalization. The Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18, likewise does not give Congress this power. Congress may pass laws “which shall be neces- sary and proper for carrying into Execution” its powers and those of the other branches of the Federal Government. Ibid. But, a law is not “proper” in this sense if it “purports to direct another branch’s exercise of its power,” or, at a minimum, “takes one of those actions and the branch to which the power is allocated objects to the action.” Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 THOMAS, J., concurring Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 50 (2015) (THOMAS, J., con- curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). So, any statute that forced the President to allow aliens to cross the border against his will would appear to exceed Congress’s enumerated powers, and a court could not enforce it against the President. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–5 _________________ MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AL OTRO LADO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2026] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting. Since 1917, Congress has required immigration officers to inspect noncitizens who arrive at ports of entry to deter- mine whether they may enter the United States. Since 1980, Congress has allowed noncitizens who are fleeing per- secution in their home country to apply for asylum as part of this inspection process. Congressional statutes lay out a mandatory set of procedures to guide this process. A noncit- izen who “arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . )” and seeks admission “shall be inspected by immigration officers,” 8 U. S. C. §§1225(a)(1), (3), and “may apply for asylum,” §1158(a)(1). If a noncitizen who “is arriving in the United States” lacks valid travel documents, the officer “shall order [her] re- moved,” unless she conveys an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, which in turn requires the officer to “refer” her for further processing of her asylum applica- tion. §1225(b)(1)(A). This system is designed to ensure that the Government processes each person seeking to come into the United States to determine who should be let in, who should be turned away, and who should be allowed to apply for asylum. 2 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting The Court today holds that the Executive Branch may circumvent all these mandatory procedures by having U. S. immigration officers stand at the border and physically block noncitizens from setting a foot onto U. S. soil. They may do so even if the asylum seeker is at the threshold of a port of entry designate