Trump v. Slaughter (2026)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. SLAUGHTER CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 25–332. Argued December 8, 2025—Decided June 29, 2026 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is a regulatory agency that has accumulated vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers. The FTC’s powers belong not to the President or his appointees alone, but instead to five Commissioners, each of whom serves for seven years and may be removed by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U. S. C. §41. Soon after President Trump began his second term in January 2025, he fired the FTC’s two Democratic appointees, Rebecca Slaughter and Al- varo Bedoya. He did not identify a cause under the statute. He instead told them their “continued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Administration's priorities” and that they were removed “pursu- ant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution.” App. 28. Slaughter filed suit against the President and other executive officials, seeking relief to restore her to office. She argued that her removal was ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the Constitution. The District Court granted Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. It acknowledged that Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, generally permits the President to remove executive officers at will, but explained that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, carved out an exception for the FTC. The court declared the President’s “purported removal” ultra vires and issued a permanent injunction barring interference “with Ms. Slaughter’s right to perform her lawful duties.” App. 90–91. A divided Court of Appeals denied the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, and this Court stayed the District Court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment. Held: The FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the 2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Syllabus separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. Pp. 2–36. (a) The Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in a “President of the United States of America” and instructs that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §§1, 3. To vest the executive power in one person was to establish a hierarchy—a “Chief Magis- trate” with whom the buck stops, and below him various “assistants or deputies” who “derive their offices from his appointment” and remain “subject to his superintendence.” The Federalist No. 72, p. 436 (A. Hamilton). To remain accountable to the President, those officers must be removable by the President. Pp. 4–13. (1) The idea that one President would be in charge was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1787. The flurry of state constitutions that followed the Declaration of Independence “made of the guberna- torial magistrate a new kind of creature, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor.” G. Wood, The Creation of the American Repub- lic, 1776–1787, p. 136. Almost every State had but a nominal Gover- nor, who could act only with his council’s consent. These early chief executives were “little more than chairmen of their executive boards.” Id., at 138. The Framers chose to depart from this model, for they had seen its flaws up close. For “fear” of “monarchical . . . power,” William Living- ston lamented, the States “improvidently” had devised executives “too weak & inefficatious to operate with proper energy & vigour.” 5 Papers of William Livingston 56–57 (C. Prince, M. Lustig, & D. Vorhees eds.). Thus when delegates at the Constitutional Convention objected to “unity in the Executive magistracy” as “the foetus of monarchy,” 1 Rec- ords of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 66 (M. Farrand ed.) (E. Ran- dolph), others replied that the concern was quite backward. “[I]nstead of being the fetus of Monarchy,” they explained, “[u]nity in the Execu- tive” was “the best safeguard against” it—for only a “single Person” could produce the “vigor and activity” necessary to preserve the Con- stitution’s separation of powers. Id., at 66, 109 (J. Wilson). In opting for one President, however, the Framers did not opt for the President to work alone. They knew that Congress would “institut[e] the great Departments” and allow the President to “appoint[ ] officers therein, to assist [him] in discharging the duties of his trust.” 30 Writ- ings of George Washington 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed.). These officers were to serve as envoys of the President, not his equals. They “ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate,” Ham- ilton explained, “and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence.” The Federalist No. 72, at 436. Because these officers were subject to the President’s superintend- ence, they had to be removable by him at will. The power to remove at Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus will was a necessary corollary of the Constitution’s design. The “unity” of the Executive Branch would be “destroyed” if it were vested “osten- sibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and co-op- eration of others, in the capacity of counselors to him.” Id., No. 70, at 424 (A. Hamilton). Text and structure thus both taught that the Pres- ident had to be able to remove those who fail to live up to their duties, lest he fail to live up to his. (2) This aspect of the President’s role was confirmed in the Consti- tution’s first year and the years that followed, resulting in a “regular course of practice” that “liquidate[d] & settle[d]” the President’s power of removal. 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed.). When the First Congress met in 1789, one of its first tasks was to establish the first executive departments—and with them the first de- partment heads. Under the Constitution, those officers had to be ap- pointed by the President, with the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. The question before Congress was how those officers were to be removed. Madison contended that removal was part of “the Executive power” vested in the President, which “the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify.” 1 Annals of Cong. 463. It is only with that power, he explained, that “the chain of dependence [can] be pre- served”—“the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest” made to “depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.” Id., at 499. Madison emerged victorious, and Congress’s confirmation of the President’s power gained fame as “the Decision of 1789.” Chief Justice Marshall described the decision as “a full expression of the sense of the legislature,” 5 J. Marshall, The Life of George Washington 199–200, and early Presidents of all persuasions agreed. Pp. 9–13. (b) What text, history, and structure settle, the Court’s precedent confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at will. Pp. 13– 25. (1) As early as 1839, the Court reaffirmed what the First Congress had held. It was “very early adopted, as the practical construction of the Constitution,” the Court noted, that the power “to remove, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution,” was “vested in the President alone.” Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 259. See also Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324, 330 (“[T]he decision of Con- gress in 1789, and the universal practice of the Government under it, ha[s] settled the question beyond any power of alteration”). The Court's landmark decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, confirmed the President’s power to fire his subordinates at will. The case arose when President Wilson fired Frank Myers—the post- master in Portland, Oregon—without consulting the Senate, notwith- standing an 1876 statute that required the President to receive the 4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Syllabus “advice and consent of the Senate” not only to appoint postmasters but also to remove them. §6, 19 Stat. 80. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft noted that in the wake of the political differences following the Civil War between President Johnson—a Jacksonian Democrat— and congressional Republicans, Congress had sought to “curtail the then acknowledged powers of the President” with the Tenure of Office Act. Myers, 272 U. S., at 165–166. Under that law, the President was required to receive the Senate’s consent before firing most officers. See ibid. “[T]he injury and invalidity” of the Act was “immediately recog- nized by the Executive and objected to”—and not just by President Johnson, but by General Grant who succeeded him. Id., at 167. What these events revealed, Chief Justice Taft wrote, was a consistent Pres- idential rejection of “the validity of such legislation” as incompatible with “the legislative action of 1789.” Id., at 172–173. The law concerning postmasters thus raised the question whether “to set aside” the First Congress’s “construction, thus buttressed, and adopt an adverse view” contrary to the Constitution’s text, history, and structure. Id., at 175. The Court refused to do so, and instead hewed to the “constitutional construction . . . reached by the First Congress . . . and acquiesced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a century.” Id., at 176. Pp. 13–16. (2) Nine years after Myers, the Court decided Humphrey’s Execu- tor v. United States. Pp. 16–25. (i) Humphrey’s arose when President Roosevelt fired an FTC Commissioner without specifying a cause for his removal, contrary to a statute permitting removal only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” §1, 38 Stat. 718. The Court ruled against Pres- ident Roosevelt, distinguishing Myers by explaining that some presi- dentially appointed officials may perform “executive function[s]” but exercise “no part of the executive power,” 295 U. S., at 628, and holding that the FTC’s duties were “neither political nor executive, but pre- dominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative,” id., at 624. Because these quasi functions did not require the use of “executive power,” the Court reasoned, Humphrey needed to answer only to Congress and the courts. Id., at 628. Pp. 16–18. (ii) Humphrey’s framework has not withstood the test of time. From the start, Humphrey’s was tethered to a highly circumscribed view of the FTC’s role. Humphrey’s by its terms applied only to agen- cies that occupy “no place in the executive department,” are “independ- ent of executive authority,” and exercise “no part of the executive power.” Id., at 625, 628. Indeed, the Court took pains to emphasize that “the character of the office”—executive or nonexecutive—would determine the result of future cases. Id., at 631. In later cases, the Court concluded that more functions fell on the Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 5 Syllabus executive side of that line—and thus within the President’s exclusive control. Soon enough, the Court recognized that Humphrey’s flunked even its own test. “[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC,” even “at the time of Humphrey’s Executor,” the Court explained in 1988, “would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some degree.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 690, n. 28. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U. S. 477, and Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Pro- tection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, the Court reiterated Myers’s rule that the President exercises “general administrative control of those exe- cuting the laws” and must be able to “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 492–493 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 117, 164); Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 214 (same). And the Court refused to extend Humphrey’s to “new situation[s].” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 220; see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 483. At this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observation that an agency that “exercises no part of the executive power” need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal. 295 U. S., at 628. Pp. 18–21. (iii) If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, the Court overrules it. Humphrey’s has for decades been a result in search of a rationale, and every relevant factor to stare decisis—the “quality” of the deci- sion’s reasoning, its “consistency” with the Court’s other cases, the “workability” of its rule, and reliance interests, Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 203—counsels in favor of letting Humphrey’s go. Slaughter relies on reliance. She argues that Congress has relied upon Humphrey’s to create agencies that are “insulated from presiden- tial control.” Brief for Respondent 15. But that is precisely the prob- lem. Despite what Humphrey’s may say, independent agencies are not “independent” in the sense that they are free of the President and thus responsive “only to the people of the United States.” 295 U. S., at 625. Placing the power to administer laws in officers who enjoy “freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection)” does not deliver us to a promised land of technocratic governance—it often results only in an “increased subservience to congressional direction.” FCC v. Fox Tele- vision Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 523 (plurality opinion). Pp. 21–25. (c) With these principles in mind, the FTC’s for-cause removal pro- vision violates the separation of powers. In its present form, the FTC enforces and administers some 80 statutes covering almost every facet of the Nation’s economy, and the tasks it undertakes are “the very es- sence of ‘execution’ of the law.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 733. The FTC has the power to promulgate substantive rules carrying the force of law, investigate businesses and enforce statutes through in- house adjudications, and file civil suits on behalf of the United States 6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Syllabus in federal court. The FTC unquestionably exercises executive power and must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive. Pp. 25–27. (d) Because the FTC’s activities fall well within the heartland of ex- ecutive power, the Court has no occasion today to define the bounds of what such power entails. Not all offices created by Congress neces- sarily come with executive power, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 137–138 (per curiam), and the Court has left open the possibility that some functions traditionally handled outside the Executive Branch may not be encompassed by Myers’s general rule. One example the Court has given of such an entity is the Federal Reserve, to the extent that it follows in the tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8. And as the Government recognizes, the permissibility of tenure protections for non-Article III courts is not presented or briefed in this case. The Court leaves those questions for another day. All the Court does today is recognize what has been clear for a century—that those who fall within the President’s “general administrative control” must be remov- able by the President at will. Myers, 272 U. S., at 135. Pp. 27–28. (e) Slaughter’s counterarguments are rejected. She relies on Humphrey’s and stare decisis, but she does not defend Humphrey’s on its own terms. She does not argue that the FTC today occupies “no place in the executive department” or exercises “no part of the execu- tive power.” 295 U. S., at 628. Her historical arguments regarding early multimember agencies fail because the members of these agen- cies, too, were removable by the President at will. Slaughter ultimately proposes that the Court police Congress’s deci- sions in this area only for “reasonableness.” She argues that Congress may “reasonably” decide “that the President should be able to remove some duly appointed officers only for certain causes and through cer- tain processes.” Brief for Respondent 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Slaughter’s supposed limiting principle is neither limiting nor much of a principle. On her view, Congress could commandeer the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Ser- vices, most (if not all) of the Department of Justice, and a number of other agencies besides. Indeed, if Slaughter were correct, then it is not clear why Congress would need to allow the President any say in fir- ings at all. Slaughter’s view is incompatible with our constitutional design. Alt- hough it is up to the Senate to decide whether to confirm those with whom the President would prefer to work, neither Congress nor the Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 7 Syllabus courts may saddle him with those with whom he cannot work. Subor- dinates who exercise the President’s power are subject to removal by him. Then, and only then, can they remain accountable to the Presi- dent, and the President to the people. Pp. 28–36. Reversed and remanded. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part III–B. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25–332 _________________ DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. REBECCA KELLY SLAUGHTER ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 29, 2026] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly 250 years ago, the Framers decided to vest “[t]he executive Power” in one person—“a President of the United States of America.” Art. II, §1, cl. 1. The choice was not made lightly. Within living memory were the “long train of abuses and usurpations” of a King who reigned as “a Ty- rant.” Declaration of Independence ¶¶2, 30. Indeed, sev- eral delegates to the Constitutional Convention pushed for a multimember council instead of “unity in the Executive magistracy,” which they feared would serve as “the foetus of monarchy.” 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 66 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Farrand’s Records) (E. Ran- dolph). But unity won out. Our Constitution’s drafters knew from experience that a “plurality in the executive”— the model in use by most States at the time—not only “di- minishe[s]” the “activity, secrecy, and dispatch” necessary to ensure “good government” but “tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.” The Federalist No. 70, pp. 423– 424, 427 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). With just one 2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court President in charge, they reasoned, there would be no doubt “on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure . . . ought really to fall.” Id., at 428. One hundred years ago, this Court honored the Conven- tion’s choice in the seminal case of Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). There, we held that the Constitution “grants to the President” the “general administrative con- trol of those executing the laws, including the power of ap- pointment and removal of executive officers.” Id., at 163– 164. Because no one could “execute the laws” “alone and unaided,” Chief Justice Taft explained for the Court, the President must be permitted to “select those who . . . act for him” and “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.” Id., at 117. “[T]o hold otherwise would make it impossible for the President” to fulfill his constitu- tional obligation “to take care that the laws be faithfully ex- ecuted.” Id., at 164. Today we confront one of several regulatory agencies that deviate from this model of Presidential supervision—the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since its creation in 1914, the FTC has accumulated vast rulemaking, enforce- ment, and adjudicatory powers under more than 80 stat- utes. Not only does it promulgate rules that carry the force of law, but it also enforces those rules against private par- ties, collecting civil penalties in the billions of dollars. Its powers, however, do not belong to the President or his ap- pointees alone; they instead belong to five Commissioners, each of whom serves for seven years and may be removed by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 38 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C. §41. We hold that such protection from removal is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. I When President Trump began his second term in Janu- ary 2025, the FTC was led by two Republicans and three Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court Democrats. On his first day in office, he designated a new Chair, replacing President Biden’s pick. See 15 U. S. C. §41 (permitting the President to choose a Chair “from the Com- mission’s membership”). As is customary, the former Chair, Lina Khan, resigned her seat a few weeks later, per- mitting President Trump to appoint a replacement (contin- gent, of course, on the Senate’s advice and consent). In the meantime, however, the FTC would be split down the mid- dle. That split came to an abrupt end in March, when Presi- dent Trump fired the two remaining Democratic Commis- sioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. He did not assert that they were “inefficien[t],” “neglect[ed]” their “dut[ies],” or committed “malfeasance in office,” as the stat- ute required. §41. He instead told them that their “contin- ued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Admin- istration’s priorities” and that they were removed from office “pursuant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution.” App. 28. Slaughter promptly filed suit against the President and other executive officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore her to office.1 She alleged that her removal was ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the Constitution. The District Court agreed, granting Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. 791 F. Supp. 3d 1 (DC 2025). It acknowledged that Myers generally permits the President to remove “executive officers” at will, as part of his “general administrative control of those executing the laws.” 791 F. Supp. 3d, at 11 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 164). But it considered itself bound by Humphrey’s Executor v. United —————— 1 Slaughter was initially joined in her lawsuit by Bedoya, who similarly sought to be restored to office. After litigation commenced, however, Bedoya formally resigned from his position on the FTC, and the District Court dismissed his claims as moot. Thus only Slaughter’s claims are at issue here. 4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). That case, the District Court explained, carved out an exception to Myers’s general rule for the FTC, which the Humphrey’s Court described as a multimember “expert” agency that exercised solely “quasi- legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions. 791 F. Supp. 3d, at 13, 17–18. The court declared the President’s “purported removal” ultra vires and issued a permanent injunction barring interference “with Ms. Slaughter’s right to perform her lawful duties.” App. 90–91. A divided Court of Appeals denied the Government’s mo- tion for a stay pending appeal. 2025 WL 2551247 (CADC, Sept. 2, 2025) (per curiam). The panel held that the Gov- ernment has “no prospect of success on appeal,” as this very issue had been settled by Humphrey’s Executor. 2025 WL 2551247, *3. Judge Rao dissented, explaining that Humph- rey’s Executor does not license a “headless fourth branch” of independent agencies exercising “considerable executive power.” 2025 WL 2551247, *13 (quoting Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 1)). We stayed the District Court’s order and granted certio- rari before judgment. 606 U. S. 1051 (2025). II A The Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in a “Pres- ident of the United States of America” and instructs that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §§1, 3. To vest “the whole executive power” in just one per- son was not to suggest that he could execute the laws alone and unaided. The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison). But it was to establish a hierarchy—a “Chief Magistrate” with whom the buck stops, and below him various “assis- tants or deputies” who “derive their offices from his ap- pointment” and remain “subject to his superintendence.” Id., No. 72, at 436 (A. Hamilton). To remain accountable to Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court the President, those officers must be removable by the Pres- ident. 1 The idea that one President would be in charge was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1787. Just ten years earlier, the colonists had “thrown off the Yoke” of King George III and his colonial governors, 5 Papers of John Adams 26 (R. Taylor ed. 1983) (S. Adams), who had laid a “[f]oundation sufficient on which to erect a Tyranny,” J. Adams, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 260 (L. Butterfield ed. 1961). Now citizens, they had no intention of reestablishing “the kingly office” by another name. 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 337 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Thus the flurry of state constitutions that followed the Declaration of Independence “made of the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of crea- ture, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor.” G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, p. 136 (1998) (Wood); see also J. Rakove, Original Meanings 250–252 (1996). Almost every State had but a nominal Gov- ernor, who could act only with his council’s consent. These early chief executives were “little more than chairmen of their executive boards.” Wood 138. The Framers chose to depart from this model, for they had seen its flaws up close. Common was the complaint that the States’ feeble and divided executives left no “effec- tual check” for “the instability & encroachments” of legisla- tures. See 2 Farrand’s Records 35 (J. Madison). For “fear” of “monarchical . . . power,” William Livingston lamented, the States “improvidently” devised executives “too weak & inefficatious to operate with proper energy & vigour.” 5 Pa- pers of William Livingston 56–57 (C. Prince, M. Lustig, & D. Vorhees eds. 1988). The Convention was determined not to make the same mistake. See Wood 467. So when delegates objected to “unity in the Executive magistracy” as “the foetus of 6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court monarchy,” 1 Farrand’s Records 66 (E. Randolph), others could soundly reply that the concern was quite backward. “[I]nstead of being the fetus of Monarchy,” they explained, “[u]nity in the Executive” was “the best safeguard against” it—for only a “single Person” could produce the “vigor and activity” necessary to preserve the Constitution’s separa- tion of powers, and only a “single Person” could make the office “responsibl[e]” to the people. Id., at 66, 109 (J. Wil- son). “Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction.” 2 id., at 329 (C. Pinckney). Any more than one person in charge, as James Wilson put it, “oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.” 1 id., at 97. That the Constitution forged a new path was not hidden from those who ratified it. Hamilton frankly conceded that only two States thus far “have intrusted the executive au- thority wholly to single men,” The Federalist No. 70, at 424, anticipating Roger Sherman’s critique of the Constitution that every other government has “a Council of advice, with- out which the first magistrate could not act,” 1 Farrand’s Records 97. To Hamilton, however, that was the point. Un- like most States, the Federal Government would have “a vigorous executive” who could act with “secrecy . . . and dis- patch”—and would not be able to “conceal [his] faults” be- hind a council. The Federalist No. 70, at 423–424, 427. “[A] plurality in the executive,” Hamilton argued, “tends to con- ceal faults and destroy responsibility.” Id., at 427. “It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to deter- mine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.” Id., at 428. If the executive power were not placed in a “single hand,” then “the people” would be “deprive[d] . . . of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power”—“the restraints of public opinion” and the “opportunity of discovering with facility Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust.” Id., at 424, 428–429. In opting for one President, however, the Framers did not opt for the President to work alone. They knew (as our first President would write) that it would be “impossib[le]” for just “one man . . . to perform all the great business of the State.” 30 Writings of George Washington 334 (J. Fitzpat- rick ed. 1939). So they anticipated that Congress would “in- stitut[e] the great Departments” and allow the President to “appoint[ ] officers therein, to assist [him] in discharging the duties of his trust.” Ibid. As James Wilson explained at the Convention, “there can be no good Executive without a re- sponsible appointment of officers to execute.” 2 Farrand’s Records 538–539. These officers were to serve as envoys of the President, not his equals. Their very purpose, after all, was to assist him “to discharge his arduous employment,” not theirs. 4 Debates on the Constitution 109 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1891) (J. Iredell) (emphasis added). As such, the Government’s “min- isters” were required to “exercise their functions in subor- dination to the Executive,” whether their tasks were big or small. 2 Farrand’s Records 54 (G. Morris). Hamilton made the same point. “The persons . . . to whose immediate man- agement” the President’s powers “are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence.” The Fed- eralist No. 72, at 436. In so structuring the Government, the Convention “rejected a committee-style Executive Branch in favor of a unitary and accountable President, standing under law, yet over” his department heads. A. Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev. 647 (1996). It helped in reaching that conclusion, of course, that everyone at the Convention knew who that President would be—the Convention’s presiding officer, George 8 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court Washington. See J. Flexner, George Washington and the New Nation: 1783–1793, pp. 133–134 (1970).2 Because these officers were subject to the President’s su- perintendence, they had to be removable by him at will. For one, that was just part of what it meant to wield “the exec- utive power,” as it was understood at the time of ratifica- tion. Jefferson wrote as early as 1780 that “[t]he power of appointing and removing executive officers [is] inherent in [the] Executive,” as “[h]e who appoints may remove.” 4 Pa- pers of Thomas Jefferson 281 (1951). And as to this power, the Constitution’s words were chosen carefully—it was the President who would “appoint” the principal “Officers of the United States,” with the Senate providing “Advice and Con- sent.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2; cf. The Federalist No. 66, at 404 (A. Hamilton) (“[I]n all the governments with which we are ac- quainted . . . those who hold offices during pleasure [are] dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them”). If the Framers intended to depart from this convention, one might have expected them to say so. For another, the power to remove at will was a necessary corollary of the Constitution’s design. The “unity” of the —————— 2 Indeed, Washington himself was known to favor a capable, vigorous, and unified Executive Branch. See G. Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism 56, 142–145 (1993). Throughout the Revo- lutionary War, he had complained about the “vital and inherent Princi- ple of Delay . . . in transacting Business” through the Continental Con- gress’s multimember executive committees, 3 Writings of George Washington 12 (W. Ford ed. 1889), which he felt led to “unpunishable Neglect of Duty,” id., at 34. Even in peacetime, he saw the Confederation Congress as “not only slow, debilitated, and liable to be thwarted by every breath, but . . . defective in that secrecy, which for the accomplish- ment of many of the most important national purposes is indispensably necessary.” 29 id., at 153 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939). It is little wonder then, that the Convention created a powerful Presidency, one fit for Washington. As South Carolina delegate Pierce Butler put it, the Con- vention’s members “cast their eyes towards General Washington as Pres- ident; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.” 3 Farrand’s Records 301–302. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court Executive Branch would be “destroyed,” Hamilton wrote, if it were vested “ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and co-operation of others, in the capac- ity of counselors to him.” Id., No. 70, at 424. But that is precisely what would occur if the President’s so-called as- sistants could exercise his power against his wishes. Only if the President’s deputies were removable at will would they truly be “subordinate” to “the sole executive magis- trate.” See id., No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison). And only then could the Constitution live up to James Iredell’s boast that “the President” would “be personally responsible for every- thing.” Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Con- stitution (1788), in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 348 (P. Ford ed. 1888); see also 1 Writings of James Monroe 331 (S. Hamilton ed. 1898) (“I would repose the whole trust of this department in one officer, so he alone should be responsible for all its transactions”). Text and structure thus both taught that the President had to be able to remove those who fail to live up to their duties, lest he fail to live up to his. 2 This aspect of the President’s role was confirmed in the Constitution’s first year—and in the years that followed. The result was a “regular course of practice” that “liqui- date[d] & settle[d]” the President’s power of removal, 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908), a con- struction followed by every branch of “the Genl. Govt, . . . thro all the vicissitudes of Party,” 9 id., at 333 (1910). See also The Federalist No. 37, at 228–229 (J. Madison). That practice began in the First Congress. When it first met in 1789, one of its first and most pressing tasks was to establish the first executive departments—and with them the first “Heads of Departments.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2. In doing so, it debated how those officers should be removed. Some felt that the Senate had to consent to all removals, as one 10 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court of the two entities that “appoint[ed]” the official in the first place. 1 Annals of Cong. 472–473 (Rep. Gerry). Others ar- gued that the Constitution was silent on the question, giv- ing Congress the “right” to select whether an officer may be removed, and if so by whom—“the President, the President and Senate, or the Legislature, or any other person whom they might introduce into office, merely for that particular purpose.” Id., at 521 (Rep. Sedgwick). And a third group contended that removal was part of “the Executive power” vested in the President, which “the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify.” Id., at 463 (Rep. Madison). By this point, the arguments made by the third group will sound familiar. Madison led the charge. “I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive,” and thus vested in the President, “it is the power of appointing, over- seeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.” Ibid. And if that is so, he explained, then the “power of removal from office” must follow. Id., at 499. For it is only with that power that “the chain of dependence [can] be preserved”— “the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest” made to “depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.” Ibid. Others agreed. Some focused on text. “[T]he power of removal [is] an Executive power,” Representative George Clymer said, “and as such belong[s] to the President alone, by the express words of the Constitution.” Id., at 382. Others focused on structure. “The Constitution places all Executive power in the hands of the President,” Representative Fisher Ames explained, “and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries.” Id., at 474. “But in order that he may be responsible to his country,” he continued, “he must have a choice in selecting his assis- tants, a control over them, with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment cease to exist.” Ibid. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court The third group emerged victorious. They successfully convinced the House of Representatives to delete a clause in the draft bill that said that the Secretary of Foreign Af- fairs was “to be removable by the President,” for such lan- guage would “ha[ve] the appearance of conferring the power upon him” when in fact it was his all along. Id., at 505, 507 (Rep. Benson). What they favored instead—and what they got—was a new clause that assumed “the power of removal to be in the President,” so as to “establish a legislative con- struction of the Constitution.” Id., at 578 (Rep. Benson). The bill as amended passed the House, and then the Sen- ate, a feat that was repeated first with laws establishing the Department of War and then again with the Treasury. These statutes thus “implicitly endorsed the view that the President had a constitutional power to remove executive officers.” A. Bamzai & S. Prakash, The Executive Power of Removal, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 1756, 1793 (2023) (Bamzai & Prakash). Congress’s confirmation of the President’s power quickly took hold—and even gained fame as “the Decision of 1789.” “After very long debates,” Madison wrote to Jefferson, Con- gress had endorsed the view that “the Executive function of removal” was “vested in the President,” a decision “most consonant to the text of the Constitution” and “to the requi- site responsibility and harmony in the Executive Depart- ment.” 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Con- gress 893 (C. Bickford, K. Bowling, H. Veit, & W. diGiacomantonio eds. 2004). Even those who opposed Con- gress’s decision recognized that the decision had been made. Take Representative Richard Bland Lee, who had argued that the question of who may remove officers was up to “[t]he Legislature,” as it could “create and establish offices” as it saw fit. 1 Annals of Cong. 525. After the bills had been enacted, Lee wrote that it “was determined in the affirmative” that the President “had, or ought to have, from a fair Construction of the constitution,” the power to remove 12 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court his own appointees. 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, at 866–867. And even those far removed from the debates saw the issue as settled, including Chief Justice Marshall, see 5 J. Marshall, The Life of George Washington 199–200 (1807) (Marshall) (the decision was “a full expression of the sense of the legislature”), Chancellor Kent, see 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 289– 290 (1826) (the decision “firmly and definitively settled” the matter), and Justice Story, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1537, p. 395 (1833) (Story) (expressing doubts about the decision from first principles, but noting that “[t]he public . . . acquiesced in this decision” and that it “has not been questioned on many other occasions”). Early Presidents of all persuasions, too, hewed to the De- cision of 1789. Washington saw it as his “indispensable duty” to remove officers who failed to live up to his expecta- tions. 36 Writings of George Washington 216 (1941). His Cabinet agreed, taking the stance that the ability to “re- move from office” was “an essential attribute of Executive Power.” 20 Papers of George Washington: Presidential Se- ries 355, 357, n. 2 (D. Hoth & W. Ferraro eds. 2019). The first President Adams said the same. See 20 Papers of John Adams 150–151 (S. Georgini et al. eds. 2020) (noting his support for “the President[’s] Power of Removal, according to the Constitution”). So did Jefferson. See 4 Papers of Thomas Jefferson, at 281 (the power to “remov[e] executive officers [is] inherent in [the] Executive”). So did Madison. See 2 Papers of James Madison 192 (D. Mattern, J. Stagg, M. Johnson, & A. Colony eds. 2013) (one of the “[c]onstitu- tional attributes of the Executive” is to determine “[t]he tenure of the office” of subordinates). So did Monroe, along with the second President Adams. 7 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 424–425 (C. Adams ed. 1875) (citing Monroe for the view that “the tenure of all subordinate executive Offices” is “necessarily the pleasure of the chief by whom Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court they were commissioned,” and agreeing with “the principle established by Mr Monroe”). And so did Jackson—much to Congress’s dismay. Unlike his predecessors, who (except for Jefferson) utilized their removal power sparingly, Jackson fired hundreds “of subor- dinates for personal and partisan reasons.” L. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829– 1861, p. 33 (1954) (White); see also id., at 307–308. But even Jackson’s most vehement critics acknowledged that he had the power to do as he pleased. “I consider it . . . a set- tled point,” Senator Daniel Webster said, “settled by con- struction, settled by precedent, settled by the practice of the Government, and settled by statute.” 11 Cong. Deb. 461 (1835). When Webster tried to unsettle the Decision of 1789 through new legislation, the effort failed, only further ce- menting the President’s power. See White 41–44. As Web- ster—still in the Senate—put it 15 years later: “[S]ince the practice has become a settled practice, since every Administration has indulged in it, and since it must now be considered, as the legal construc- tion of the Constitution, . . . it follows . . . that this power, thus legally vested in the President, must be ex- ercised by him as independently of our control as any other power that is to be exercised by him under the Constitution.” Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 1126 (1850). B What text, history, and structure settle, our precedent confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at will. 1 Twice in the 19th century, we reaffirmed what the First Congress had held. The text of the Constitution “is silent with respect to the power of removal from office,” we noted 14 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court in our first case on the subject. Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 258 (1839). But “it was very early adopted, as the prac- tical construction of the Constitution,” that the power “to remove, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution,” was “vested in the President alone.” Id., at 259. “And such would appear to have been the legislative construction of the Constitution” too, given “the organiza- tion of the three great departments” “in the year 1789.” Ibid. Our second case was of a piece. “[T]he decision of Congress in 1789, and the universal practice of the Govern- ment under it,” we explained, “ha[s] settled the question be- yond any power of alteration.” Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324, 330 (1897). Our landmark decision, however, came 100 years ago in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52. That case arose from an unlikely source—a dispute over management of the post office in Portland, Oregon. See id., at 106. Under an 1876 statute, the President had to receive the “advice and con- sent of the Senate” not only to appoint postmasters but also to remove them. §6, 19 Stat. 80. For reasons that are now lost to history, President Wilson fired Portland’s postmas- ter, Frank Myers, and did so without the Senate’s consent. 272 U. S., at 106–107. Myers sued for backpay. See id., at 106. In a scholarly opinion, Chief Justice Taft rejected Myers’s suit and reaffirmed the President’s power to fire his subor- dinates at will. That power arose, he wrote for the Court, from the Constitution’s text, history, and structure, just as the First Congress had held in 1789. See id., at 136. “The vesting of the executive power in the President was essen- tially a grant of the power to execute the laws,” Chief Jus- tice Taft explained. Id., at 117. “As he is charged specifi- cally to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication,” he continued, “was that as part of his executive power” he must be able to “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.” Ibid. “Mr. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court Madison and his associates” made this same point, the Chief Justice noted, and they “dwelt at length upon the ne- cessity there was for construing Article II to give the Presi- dent the sole power of removal in his responsibility for the conduct of the executive branch.” Ibid. But Chief Justice Taft emphasized that it was not just the First Congress that had come to this conclusion. The First Congress supplied “a precedent upon which many fu- ture laws . . . would be based”—and if it had erred, the next Congresses would have “dissent[ed] and depart[ed]” from its view. Id., at 136. Quite the opposite occurred, the Chief Justice explained. The Decision of 1789 “was soon accepted as a final decision of the question by all branches of the Gov- ernment.” Ibid. For “74 years, there was no act of Con- gress, no executive act, and no decision of this Court at var- iance with the declaration of the First Congress.” Id., at 163. In the wake of the Civil War, Chief Justice Taft noted, Congress sought to “reverse this constitutional construc- tion”—but in the end only confirmed it. Id., at 164. “This reversal grew out of the serious political differences” be- tween President Johnson—a Jacksonian Democrat—and congressional Republicans, who boasted “a two-thirds ma- jority” in both Houses of Congress. Id., at 165. Over John- son’s veto, Congress sought to “curtail the then acknowl- edged powers of the President” with the Tenure of Office Act, which required him to receive the Senate’s consent be- fore firing most officers. Id., at 165–166. “[T]he injury and invalidity” of the law was “immediately recognized by the Executive and objected to”—and not just by Johnson. Id., at 167. “General Grant, succeeding Mr. Johnson in the Presidency”—and no fan of Johnson or his program—“earnestly recommended in his first message the total repeal” of the law. Id., at 167–168. “What faith can an Executive put in officials forced upon him?” Grant asked. Id., at 168. “How will such officials be likely to serve an 16 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court Administration which they know does not trust them?” Ibid. Despite Grant’s efforts, “[t]he feeling growing out of the controversy with President Johnson retained the act on the statute book”—and led to one other such law, the one for postmasters at issue in that very case—“until 1887,” when the Tenure in Office Act was repealed. Ibid. What these events revealed, Chief Justice Taft wrote, was not Presidential “acquiescence” but resistance, a con- sistent rejection of “the validity of such legislation” as in- compatible with “the legislative action of 1789.” Id., at 172– 173. At issue in Myers, then, as the Chief Justice saw it, was whether “to set aside” the First Congress’s “construc- tion, thus buttressed, and adopt an adverse view,” contrary to the Constitution’s text, history, and structure. Id., at 175. The Court refused to do so. It hewed instead to the “constitutional construction . . . reached by the First Con- gress of the United States . . . and acquiesced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a century.” Id., at 176. Any law to the contrary, the Court concluded, was “in violation of the Constitution, and invalid.” Ibid. 2 While Myers was perhaps our best word on the subject, it was not our last. a Just nine years after Myers, we handed down Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S. 602. The case arose out of President Roosevelt’s decision to fire one of President Hoover’s ap- pointees to the Federal Trade Commission, William Humphrey, two years into Humphrey’s seven-year term. Humphrey lauded Hoover “as the foremost figure of the world,” a man who fought back against “the demagogue, the fanatic, the reformer, and the fool.” Washington, D. C., Evening Star, Mar. 11, 1932, p. D11, col. 8. On the Com- mission, Humphrey sought to do the same. He often spoke Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court to the press, and described the FTC variously as “a publicity bureau” used “to spread Socialistic propaganda,” Boston Globe, Dec. 14, 1926, p. 5, cols. 3–4, a “bureaucracy gone insane,” N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1929, p. 19, col. 1, and “an in- strument of oppression and disturbance and injury,” Or- lando Evening Star, Jan. 7, 1931, p. 3, col. 3. Roosevelt saw matters differently, and requested Humphrey’s resigna- tion. Humphrey refused, so Roosevelt fired him in a one- line letter that did not specify a cause for his removal— seemingly contrary to a statute permitting removal of Com- missioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea- sance in office.” §1, 38 Stat. 718. Humphrey died soon thereafter, and the executor of his estate sued for backpay. See 295 U. S., at 618–619. On a day that New Dealers would dub “Black Monday,” the Court ruled unanimously against the President—as it did in two other cases decided that same day, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), and Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935). See A. Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval 279–290 (1960). Schechter and Radford were quite a blow to the President, invalidating aspects of his signature legislation. Schechter found an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in a statute that gave the President free rein to prescribe “standards of fair competi- tion” business was obliged to follow. 295 U. S., at 534, 542. And Radford found a violation of the Takings Clause in a statute that allowed farmers who defaulted on their mort- gages to retain possession of their property for years on end. 295 U. S., at 575–576, 601–602. Having to contend with Myers, Humphrey’s said far less. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, started by reaf- firming that the President possesses “the exclusive and il- limitable power” to remove “all purely executive officers,” just as Myers held. 295 U. S., at 627–628. He then pivoted. There are some presidentially appointed officials, he 18 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court explained, who may perform “executive function[s]” but ex- ercise “no part of the executive power.” Id., at 628. And for those officials, “the decision in the Myers case cannot be ac- cepted as controlling.” Id., at 627. The Court held that William Humphrey was one such of- ficial. That was because the FTC’s duties were very lim- ited—they were “neither political nor executive, but pre- dominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” Id., at 624. When courts requested the FTC’s help as a “master in chancery” to recommend appropriate remedies in antitrust litigation, for instance, it acted solely as a judicial aid. Id., at 628. When Congress requested the FTC’s help to “mak[e] investigations and reports” on certain topics, it acted solely as a legislative aid. Ibid. And when it brought (and adju- dicated) charges against corporations it suspected of using “unfair methods of competition” in commerce, it acted “in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.” Ibid. Because these quasi functions did not require the use of “ex- ecutive power,” Justice Sutherland reasoned, Humphrey needed to answer only to Congress and the courts. Ibid. Although the President may be the “master in his own house,” he warned, he may not “impos[e] his control in the house of another.” Id., at 630. b From the start, Humphrey’s was tethered to a highly cir- cumscribed and almost fictional view of the FTC’s role. Humphrey’s by its terms applied only to agencies that oc- cupy “no place in the executive department,” are “independ- ent of executive authority,” and exercise “no part of the ex- ecutive power.” Id., at 625, 628. Indeed, Justice Sutherland took pains to emphasize that “the character of the office”— executive or nonexecutive—would determine the result of future cases, and to reiterate that the Court’s decision was limited “to officers of the kind here under consideration.” Id., at 631–632. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 19 Opinion of the Court In later cases, although Humphrey’s announced dividing line remained intact, more and more functions, we con- cluded, in fact fell on the executive side of that line—and thus within the President’s exclusive control. Where Humphrey’s suggested that the power to enforce the law against particular parties could be merely “quasi-judicial,” or “in aid” of federal courts, see id., at 628, we held the op- posite. “A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law,” we explained in 1976, “and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the re- sponsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe- cuted.’ ” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (per curiam) (quoting Art. II, §3). And where Humphrey’s suggested that the power to “fill[ ] in” “the details” of a “general standard” could be merely “quasi-legislative,” or “in aid” of Congress, 295 U. S., at 628, we again held the opposite. Although “some administrative agency action . . . may resemble ‘law- making,’ ” we explained in 1983, when an agency exercises “legislatively delegated authority” to regulate private con- duct, it exercises “[e]xecutive” power. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 953, n. 16; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”). Soon enough, we recognized that Humphrey’s flunked even its own test. “[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC,” even “at the time of Humphrey’s Executor,” we explained in 1988, “would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some degree.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 690, n. 28. Not one for understatement, Justice Scalia observed in dissent that the Court had “swept” Humphrey’s “into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles.” 487 U. S., at 725. The Court put the matter more delicately, but no less definitively. “We undoubtedly did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial’ ” in Humphrey’s, the Court noted, “but our present 20 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER Opinion of the Court considered view is that” the constitutional question “cannot be made to turn on” such “rigid categories,” at least for in- ferior officers. 487 U. S., at 689. Contra, post, at 7 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (asserting that Morrison v. Ol- son in fact “applied and expanded Humphrey’s”). Fast forward another few decades, and Humphrey’s premises had been further undermined. In two cases, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U. S. 477 (2010), and Seila Law LLC v. Con- sumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197 (2020), we again considered the permissibility of restrictions on the President’s power of removal. In both cases, we reiterated Myers’s rule that the President exercises “general adminis- trative control of those executing the laws” and thus must be able to “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 492– 493 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 117, 164); Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 214 (same). In both cases, we emphasized that Humphrey’s had to be read “on its own terms,” and thus ap- plies only to agencies that perform “ ‘specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid.’ ” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 215, 219, n. 4 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at 628); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 493. And in both cases, we refused to extend Humphrey’s to a “new sit- uation”—in Free Enterprise Fund, two layers of for-cause removal within an agency, 561 U. S., at 483, and in Seila Law, for-cause removal protection for the sole head of an agency, 591 U. S., at 220. As we put it in Seila Law, Humphrey’s is not a “freestanding invitation for Congress” to limit the President’s constitutional power. 591 U. S., at 228. Humphrey’s framework, in short, has not withstood the test of time. While Humphrey’s was surely right to focus on “the character of the office” at issue, 295 U. S., at 631, and surely right to say that “purely executive” powers must be controlled by the President, id., at 632, we long ago Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 21 Opinion of the Court abandoned the notion that there are some powers that are only partly executive. Forty years have now passed, in fact, since we recognized that the FTC exercises executive power—and did so even in 1935, when Humphrey’s was de- cided. See Morrison, 487 U. S., at 690, n. 28; id., at 724– 725 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 216, n. 2. And more than 200 years have passed since we recognized that the Constitution “vests the whole executive power in the President” alone. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819 (1824) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). At this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observa- tion that an agency that “exercises no part of the executive power” need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal. 295 U. S., at 628; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 423–425, and n. 3 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex- plaining that Humphrey’s stands only for the proposition that there would be “no strict constitutional impediment to a ‘branchless’ agency” that exercises “no governmental power”). If Congress wishes to establish independent agen- cies to assist it with its functions, it may do so. Cf. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 137–138. But it may not foist those agencies upon the President, and thus deprive him of “the executive power vested [in him] by the Constitution”—something Humphrey’s itself never purported to permit. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at 628. c If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it. Humphrey’s has for decades been a result in search of a ra- tionale. As we have often said, stare decisis is not an “inex- orable command,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808,