Full opinion text
ORDER THRASH, District Judge. This is a race and sex discrimination action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys’ Fees or, in the Alternative, Plaintiffs Motion for Interim Award of Attorneys’ Fees [Docs. 182 & 191], Plaintiffs Bills of Costs [Docs. 185 & 309], and Plaintiffs Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 312], Plaintiff seeks $1,544,222.10 in fees plus costs. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motions for attorneys’ fees are granted, as modified by the Court, in the amount of $1,089,-610.45, and the Bills of Costs already taxed by the Court to Defendant is affirmed, as modified, in the amount of $15,997.64. /. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Webster Green Thumb Company (“Webster Green Thumb”) is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Newnan, Georgia. It is engaged in the business of landscaping and tree removal. Defendant Fulton County (“Fulton County”) is a political subdivision of the State of Georgia. Webster Green Thumb and Fulton County are the only parties that remain at this stage of the litigation. All other parties have been dismissed. Accordingly, Webster Green Thumb seeks recovery of its attorneys’ fees from Fulton County alone. In this action, the Plaintiff successfully challenged Fulton County’s 1994 Minority and Female Business Enterprise (“MFBE”) program. The facts of this case are stated in detail at 44 F.Supp.2d 1359, 1363-71 (N.D.Ga.1999), and 51 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1356-61 (N.D.Ga.1999), and are not recited here except to the extent they specifically affect issues relating to the Court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on September 17, 1996. The Complaint was amended twice, first on January 10, 1997, and again on February 4, 1998. The purpose of the First Amended Complaint was to add Willie F. Hill, Kelly Goff, Marjorie Simpson and Minority Distributing Corp. as Plaintiffs. All these additional Plaintiffs, however, were ultimately dismissed by the Court either in its December 9, 1998, Order or its February 12,1999, Summary Judgment Order. At the time of the Court’s February 12, 1999, Summary Judgment Order, the named Plaintiffs were Daniel Webster, Peggy Webster, Kelly Goff and Webster Green Thumb. The Defendants at that time consisted of (1) Fulton County, (2) the six individual members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners at the time (Mitch Skanda-lakis, Nancy Boxill, Emma Darnell, Michael Hightower, Gordon Joyner and Tom Lowe), and (3) Michael Cooper, Director of Fulton County’s Department of Contract Compliance and Equal Employment Opportunity during the time relevant to this case. The Second Amended Complaint asserted six claims for relief. Plaintiffs asserted in Count I that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiffs on the grounds of race and sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Counts II and III, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant Fulton County discriminated against the putative class of Plaintiffs by engaging in a policy, pattern, or practice of discriminating on the basis of race and sex in awarding contracts for goods and services. In Count IV, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. 1, § 1, ¶2. In Count V, Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendants impermissi-bly violated O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220 by providing tax money to persons for no reason other than their race. Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiffs asserted a retaliation claim pursuant to Section 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause. In asserting these claims, Plaintiffs sought declaratory, in-junctive, and monetary relief. Following discovery, Plaintiffs and Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Court entered an Order on February 12, 1999, denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants’ summary judgment motion was granted as to all claims asserted on behalf of Plaintiff Kelly Goff because he lacked standing to sue. The Court also dismissed the state law-based claims in Counts V and VI of the Second Amended Complaint entirely. The Court found that Defendants Skandalakis, Boxill, Darnell, Hightower, Joyner and Lowe were entitled to absolute and qualified immunity as to the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reason to continue the case against them in their official capacities since Fulton County was already a party over which the Court had jurisdiction. Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on all claims as to Defendants Skandalakis, Box-ill, Darnell, Hightower, Joyner and Lowe. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in all other respects as to Defendants Fulton County and Cooper. The Court stated in its February 12, 1999, Summary Judgment Order that it would first conduct a bench trial regarding the 1994 MFBE program’s constitutionality. A separate jury trial on Plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages would follow. The bench trial was conducted over six days beginning May 11, 1999. The Court then recessed for two days prior to closing arguments to review the voluminous documentary evidence introduced at trial. Closing arguments were held on May 24, 1999. The Court spent three weeks working on its findings of facts and conclusions of law. The Court, in an Order entered June 11, 1999, struck down the Fulton County MFBE program as an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court explained its decision, as noted in its Conclusion to the June 11, 1999, Order by stating: In summary, Fulton County has operated a minority and female preference program for most of the past two decades. The program has been good for economic development in the minority business community. Historically, minorities have been the victims of pervasive discrimination in all facets of economic enterprise. As a matter of good public policy, this alone might justify minority set aside programs by public agencies. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that such programs involving racial or ethnic preferences must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Applying the high standards set by the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the Fulton County 1994 MFBE Program cannot survive strict scrutiny with respect to the evidentiary foundation for such a program or narrow tailoring to meet a compelling governmental interest. There is no evidence that the Fulton County Government has significantly or systematically discriminated against African-American or other minority businesses in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. There is insufficient evidence that it has become a passive participant in a pervasive system of discrimination in the private sector and that racial and ethnic preferences have been adopted as a last resort to eliminate that discrimination. The program itself does nothing to remedy discrimination in private sector contracting. The goals set by the program are not based upon any realistic assessment of the availability of minority business enterprises in the Atlanta metropolitan marketplace. Likewise, Fulton County has not produced sufficient probative evidence of discrimination against female business enterprises to justify a gender preference program. Therefore, race, ethnic and gender balancing in Fulton County contracting must end. Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1383 (N.D.Ga.1999), aff'd, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir.2000). Final judgment on the claim for declaratory and equitable relief was entered in favor of Plaintiff Webster Green Thumb. Plaintiffs on June 24, 1999, filed their first motion requesting attorneys’ fees for work done on the case up to that point and provided the Court a supporting itemization of their fees on July 23, 1999. After careful consideration, the Court chose to defer all attorneys’ fees, issues until conclusion of the entire case. A jury trial on damages was held beginning February 14, 2000. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff against Fulton County for $8,750 in compensatory damages as lost profits. The jury also awarded Plaintiff $1.00 in nominal damages against Michael Cooper. The jury, however, rejected Plaintiffs claim for $1 million in punitive damages against Cooper. After the jury was dismissed, the Court sustained Cooper’s defense of qualified immunity based upon the jury’s factual findings and dismissed the action against him. Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff against Fulton County. Plaintiff as the prevailing party in this case now seeks an award of attorneys’ fees from Fulton County. Both parties have fully briefed the Court on the fee petition. In addition, the Court conducted a day-long evidentia-ry hearing on July 3, 2000, to assist it in rendering a reasonable award. Additional submissions were made after the hearing. II. DISCUSSION The award of attorneys’ fees in this action is governed by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended. That act provides as follows: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). This statute is interpreted broadly since it is remedial in nature and facilitates private enforcement of civil rights. Williams v. City of Fairburn, 702 F.2d 973, 976 (11th Cir.1983). Although awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial court, such discretion is a narrow one in that attorneys’ fees should be denied only when special circumstances would render an award unjust, Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir.1986), or the statute is being subverted into a ruse for providing “windfalls” to attorneys. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir.1983). Importantly, one need not succeed on all claims in order to obtain attorneys’ fees. Id. With these general principles in mind, the Court now turns to the particulars of Plaintiffs request for attorneys’ fees and Fulton County’s contentions why the requested fees should not be fully awarded in this case. A. PREVAILING PARTY STATUS Fulton County contends that Plaintiff should not be entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees for work relating to the bench trial, at which Plaintiff sought de-, claratory and injunctive relief. Fulton County contends that Plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” at the bench trial. Section 1988 by its terms limits eligibility for attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A party is not a prevailing party if it only “conceivably could benefit” from the court’s judgment. Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1999). There must exist evidence that the court’s judgment “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (quoted in Barnes, 190 F.3d at 1278). Thus, a party that succeeds on the merits nonetheless is not a prevailing party for the purpose of attorneys’ fees if it does not directly benefit from the court’s order at the time it is rendered. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763-64, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (noting that plaintiff was not prevailing party because he did not directly benefit from final judgment at the time it was entered). The analysis begins with the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), and Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), two cases where the Supreme Court held that the litigants were not prevailing parties for the purpose of attorneys’ fees. In Hewitt, a prisoner successfully argued that his administrative segregation and subsequent conviction for participating in a prison riot violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court noted that during the pendency of the lawsuit the plaintiff had been released from prison. The Court held that he, therefore, was not a prevailing party for the purpose of attorneys’ fees because the vindication of his constitutional rights was merely a “moral satisfaction.” Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 762, 107 S.Ct. 2672. Even though the plaintiff was subsequently returned to prison, and thus ultimately may have bene-fitted from his victory in the Section 1983 case, the Court said “that fortuity can hardly render him, retroactively, a ‘prevailing party’ ....” Id. at 763-64, 107 S.Ct. 2672. In Rhodes, two prisoners successfully challenged a prison’s magazine subscription policy as a violation of their procedural and substantive due process rights. The plaintiffs, nevertheless, were not entitled to attorneys’ fees because the policy modification caused by the suit could not have benefitted either of the two plaintiffs, one of whom had been released before the district court entered its order and the other of whom had died. Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct. 202. In this case, Fulton County contends that Plaintiff has not directly benefitted from the injunction the Court issued and, therefore, should not recover attorneys’ fees for work relating to its prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief. To support this argument, Fulton County relies on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1999). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that a job applicant was not a prevailing party for the purpose of attorneys’ fees even though he obtained an injunction that permanently enjoined Broward County, Florida, from continuing certain preemployment psychological testing. The district court held that such testing violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Broward County, 190 F.3d at 1278. The Eleventh Circuit stated that while it was conceivable that the plaintiff could benefit from the injunction if he ever reapplied to Broward County for a job, the plaintiff had presented no evidence that he planned to reapply and, thus, did not directly benefit from the injunction. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, however, specifically noted in a footnote that it was not foreclosing the possibility that a successful litigant could recover attorneys’ fees if he “establishes that he continues to have or is reasonably likely to have some legal relationship to the defendant.” Id. at 1278 n. 3 (emphasis added). It simply found no evidence that Barnes was eligible to reapply for the deputy position or that he intended to reapply once the court barred continued use of the psychological examinations. Id. Although it followed the Hewitt and Rhodes holdings in Broward County, the Eleventh Circuit expressly recognized that cases in the employment context may be distinguishable from these prisoner cases if the plaintiff can show that he remains eligible for the position he sought and is likely to reapply after successfully challenging the employment practice. See Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 n. 3 (11th Cir.1999) (“In an employment case, however, it may be possible to allege and show — without requiring any speculation by the court— that the plaintiff retains a sufficient connection to the defendant that he likely will be affected by the court’s judgment.”). The case presently before this Court is distinguishable from Hewitt, Rhode and Broward County on just such grounds, as well as a number of others. This case is much closer to the employment context referenced in the Broward County footnote than the prisoner context that Hewitt and Rhodes represent or the actual situation in Broward County. Plaintiff was seeking work from Fulton County on a contractual basis. Unlike the plaintiff in Broward County, Plaintiff in this ease presented evidence throughout the litigation that it remains in the tree removal business, would like to obtain contracts with Fulton County, and is reasonably likely to reapply for County contracts in the future. Plaintiff will directly benefit from this Court’s decision in all future bids it submits to Fulton County. Its ability to avail itself to the benefits of the injunction is not dependent on mere “fortuity,” as the Supreme Court has said exists when an ex-convict commits another crime, is arrested and convicted, and just happens to be rein-carcerated in the very same prison or system as before. In addition, Plaintiffs success in obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief cannot be termed mere “moral satisfaction.” Fulton County alleges that the MFBE program would have been up for renewal only three months after this Court issued the injunction, notes that Plaintiff did not have any pending bids with the County, and implies that the MFBE program was going to be allowed to lapse without renewal. Based on these allegations, Fulton County contends that the allegedly soon-to-be-nonexistent MFBE program could no longer have harmed Plaintiff and this Court’s injunction, therefore, could not have benefit-ted Plaintiff. The Court cannot accept this characterization of the evidence. Despite Fulton County’s contentions to the contrary, evidence exists that Fulton County would not have allowed its MFBE program to lapse three months after this Court issued the injunction and instead would have renewed a program that has directly harmed Plaintiffs chances of obtaining County business. Indeed, if Fulton County really had planned to disman-tie the MFBE program on its own accord within the three months immediately following issuance of the injunction, there would have been little reason for the County to request, as it did, a stay of the injunction until after the Eleventh Circuit decided the case on appeal. Certainly, if the County did not intend to renew the MFBE program, it would not have wasted the taxpayers’ money appealing the Order abolishing it. Finally, even if this Court somehow held that Plaintiff has not directly benefitted from the declaratory and injunctive relief — either because Plaintiff is not likely to submit bids to the County in the future or because Fulton County would have allowed the MFBE program to expire— Plaintiff still would not lose his status as prevailing party for the work done relating to the prayer for declaratory and injunc-tive relief. That is because Plaintiff was also seeking monetary damages and was awarded them at the jury trial. The issues that surround the prayers for declaratory and injunctive relief are intertwined with Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages. Plaintiffs success on the damages claims depended greatly on the Court’s judgment of the constitutional issues involved in this case. Declaratory and injunctive relief were necessary steps for Plaintiff to achieve monetary relief for damages it incurred. To obtain monetary damages, Plaintiff needed to show that Fulton County’s MFBE program was unconstitutional. The interrelationship of all the issues in this case would be obvious if the case had been tried in one proceeding. Unlike in Broward County where the plaintiff obtained only injunctive relief and failed on all damage claims, Plaintiff in this case won at both the bench and jury trials. This Court, therefore, must take into account the interrelationship of Plaintiffs different prayers for relief. In contrast, there was no reason for the Eleventh Circuit to do so in Broward County because the district court dismissed the plaintiffs claims for monetary damages. As the Supreme Court held in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), any time a plaintiff wins even nominal damages for a civil rights violation, he becomes a prevailing party pursuant to § 1988 since “[a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant’s behavior for the plaintiffs benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay.” Id. Plaintiff has thus met the statutory threshold for obtaining attorneys’ fees. See Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (“At the outset we noted [in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ] that no fee award is permissible until the plaintiff has crossed the ‘statutory threshold of prevailing party status.’ ”) With that threshold met, this Court now turns to he task of calculating a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees. B. REASONABLE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES Plaintiff seeks a total attorneys’ fee award of $1,544,222.10. This total requested amount represents $1,051,235.00 for 5,292.6 hours of work conducted up through the bench trial on declaratory and injunctive relief, an additional $209,627.50 for 869.0 hours of work related to the jury trial on damages, $27,307.50 for 99.3 hours of work related to the attorneys’ fee petition since the March 10, 2000, supplemental filing following the jury trial, a 15% enhancement for exceptional results obtained, and $62,826.60 in expenses. Fulton County responds that this Court should drastically reduce Plaintiffs request for attorneys’ fees on grounds that many of the claims asserted were ultimately unsuccessful, that Plaintiff is not entitled to an enhancement, and that Plaintiffs lodestar amount should be reduced on grounds that Plaintiff obtained minimal results. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established the framework and methodology for calculating the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fee award to a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The starting point for calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” for the attorneys’ services. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933; Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541; accord ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999). The product of these two numbers is commonly termed the base figure, or the “lodestar.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). After calculating the lodestar, the court may within its discretion adjust the amount upwards or downwards based on a number of factors, such as the quality of the results obtained and the legal representation provided. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541; Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir.1996). The fee applicant is the party that “bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427 (quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir.1988)); accord Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir.2000). That burden includes: supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can determine the reasonable hourly rate. Further, fee counsel should have maintained records to show the time spent on the different claims, and the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.... A well-prepared fee petition also would include a summary, grouping the time entries by the nature of the activity or stage of the case. Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. (citations omitted). These obligations of the fee applicant are especially important in cases where the applicant has only partially succeeded in the suit. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Similarly, those parties opposing fee applications also have obligations. Their objections and proof concerning hours they want excluded must be specific and “reasonably precise.” Id. at 428, 103 S.Ct. 1933. When the parties fulfill their respective obligations, this assists the court in fulfilling its duty to render an order that articulates both its decisions and reasons for the decisions, thus allowing for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 428-29, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir.2000) (“[W]e have said that a court’s order on attorneys’ fees must allow meaningful appellate review.”); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir.1987) (“A prerequisite for our review of an attorney’s fee award is that the district court’s opinion must have explained the reasons for the award with ‘sufficient clarity to enable an appellate court to intelligently review the award.’ ”). 1. THE “LODESTAR” a. REASONABLE HOURS “[A]ll reasonable expenses and hours incurred in case preparation, during the course of litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs under § 1988,” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir.1983)), but “[cjounsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” because, for example, the case is overstaffed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Work performed by multiple attorneys, however, is not subject to reduction where the attorneys were not unreasonably doing the same work. Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 594 (11th Cir.1984); Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir.1983). As to the work performed, compensable activities include pre-litigation services in preparation of filing the lawsuit, background research and reading in complex cases, productive attorney discussions and strategy'sessions,'negotiations, routine activities such as making telephone calls and reading mail related to the case, monitoring and enforcing the favorable judgment, and even preparing and litigating the request for attorneys’ fees. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (allowing compensation for productive attorney discussions and strategy conferences); Webb v. Board of Ed., 471 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985) (allowing compensation for pre-litigation services in preparation of suit); Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir.1985) (allowing compensation for preparing and litigating fee request); Adams v. Mathis, 752 F.2d 553, 554 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that measures to enforce judgment are compensable); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 & n. 5 (2d Cir.1983) (allowing compensation for background research and reading in complex cases); Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F.Supp. 1069, 1079 (D.Mass.1982) (compensating for negotiation sessions), aff'd as modified, 786 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir.1986); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1321, 1348 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (compensating routine activities such as telephone calls or reading mail that contribute to the litigation). Reasonable travel time of the prevailing party’s attorneys ordinarily is compensated on an hourly basis, although the rate may be reduced if no legal work was performed during travel. University College, 706 F.2d at 1208. As with attorneys’ work, the hours expended by paralegals, law clerks, and other paraprofessionals are also compensable to the extent these individuals are engaged in work traditionally performed by an attorney. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir.1988). In short, “with the exception of routine office overhead normally absorbed by the practicing attorney, all reasonable expenses incurred in case preparation, during the course of litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs under section 1988,” and “the standard of reasonableness is to be given a liberal interpretation.” NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir.1983)). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that its decisions regarding attorneys’ fees “contemplate a task-by-task examination of the hours billed” and that applicants should “show the time spent on the different claims.” ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427, 429 (11th Cir.1999). The Eleventh Circuit has also stated that where a fee application and supporting documents are voluminous, a district court is not required to engage in an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee award. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir.1994). In such cases, it is sufficient for the district court to determine the total number of hours devoted to the litigation and then reduce that figure in gross with an across-the-board percentage reduction if such a reduction is warranted. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has even intimated that such a method may be the preferred course with a voluminous fee request to avoid waste of judicial resources. Id. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has provided its district courts with two avenues for determining a fee award in cases where the request is voluminous: (1) a district court may attempt to reduce the hours on a task-by-task basis, or (2) the court may simply add up the total number of hours expended and then reduce that amount on a percentage basis, if reduction is warranted. Both of these two alternative methods comport with Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has stated: The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The Court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment. This discretion, however, must be exercised in light of the considerations we have identified. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); accord Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1579-81 (11th Cir.1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court explicitly stated that a court could simply reduce the award to account for the plaintiffs limited success instead of eliminating hours specifically expended on unsuccessful claims.”) This case certainly meets the requirements for a voluminous fee request. Furthermore, Fulton County’s objections are themselves quite voluminous. Indeed, in Loranger, the case in which the Eleventh Circuit adopted the percentage-reduction method, the amount of the fee request was less than exists here. The Court has given considerable thought to employing the Loranger method of computing fees because of the already enormous expenditure of judicial resources which this case represents. In the end, however, this Court has chosen to engage in an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee award. It has done so for three reasons. First, this case involves numerous different claims — some of which were successful, some of which were unsuccessful, some of which are discrete, and some of which are interrelated. Even if the Court chose to reduce the award on a percentage basis, it still would have to analyze the relationship of the claims to determine the proper percentage by which to reduce the award. Indeed, it might have had to spend as much time as it has doing an hour-by-hour analysis. Second, any such percentage reduction would necessarily be somewhat more arbitrary than a by-the-hours analysis. Third, Plaintiffs counsel has provided the Court with very detailed summary breakdowns for each part of the case to assist the Court in calculating the total hours expended on each task. Furthermore, Defendants have provided their own summaries stating exactly which specific tasks and hours they are challenging. The Court has relied on both parties summaries extensively in calculating the fee award. The Court’s reference to these summaries, however, has not prevented the Court from conducting its own hour-by-hour analysis of the fee request. The summaries merely have aided the Court in fulfilling its duty. Additionally, the Court notes that both parties were given ample opportunity to question each other on these summaries and all other related documents at an all-day evidentiary hearing on July 3, 2000. Both parties did so and, in so doing, provided greater focus to the fee issues before the Court. Significantly, with a couple of minor exceptions that will be noted, Fulton County does not in any way place in issue the veracity of Plaintiffs counsel with respect to the time recorded on their time records. A computation of the hours reasonably expended should not include time spent on “discrete and unsuccessful” claims, Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1397 (11th Cir.1996), but should include time spent on all claims that arise out of the same course of conduct and share a “common core of fact,” even if a specific individual claim did not succeed. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir.1991); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 771 (11th Cir.1988); Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578 (11th Cir.1987); Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94 v. Cobb County, 734 F.Supp. 502, 504 (N.D.Ga.1990). In determining whether claims are related by a common core of fact, the Eleventh Circuit has taken an expansive view. See Popham, 820 F.2d at 1579 (“Because plaintiffs counsel is required to ‘explore every aspect of the case, develop all the evidence and present it to the court,’ courts have expansively treated .claims as being related”) (citations omitted). A court also should not discount an attorneys’ fee award based on the court’s rejection of an alternative legal ground, when one of the grounds is accepted. As the Supreme Court has stated: Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 441, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) Where entries specify activities that were directed towards both a successful claim and a “discrete and unsuccessful” claim, the allocation of reasonable hours can become quite complicated. In such instances, the Court in this case has followed Judge Forrester’s example in Duckworth v. Whisenant, No. 1:89-CV-1102-JOF (N.D.Ga. Jan. 31, 1995), aff'd, 97 F.3d 1393, 1397 (11th Cir.1996), not to exclude the entire combined entry, but instead to attempt an apportionment of each activity in an evenhanded manner. See Duckworth, 97 F.3d at 1397 (affirming Judge Forrester’s award of attorneys’ fees and wholly incorporating his order as the appellate decision). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, where all the theories of recovery arise from a common core of facts, a district court should focus on “the significance of the overall results as a function of total reasonable hours,” and reducing the lodestar based on a simple ratio of successful issues to issues raised is improper. Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.1988). With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to the specific hours Plaintiff has requested in its requests for attorneys’ fees to determine their reasonableness. Because the Eleventh Circuit has stated that its decisions regarding attorneys’ fees “contemplate a task-by-task examination of the hours billed,” ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427, 429 (11th Cir.1999), this Court has divided Plaintiffs attorneys’ fee request based on stages of litigation, just as the Eleventh Circuit did in Barnes. The Court looks first at the hours expended on the complaint and accompanying mandatory disclosures filed in this case. The Court then reviews, in the following order, time spent on issues related to class certification, Plaintiffs activities related to depositions, Plaintiffs document production and analysis, Plaintiffs written discovery, Plaintiffs other investigation and background research, Plaintiffs involvement with its own and Fulton County’s expert reports, motions filed with the court related to discovery, the parties’ motions for summary judgment, pre-trial motions for the bench and jury trials, hours expended in preparation for and attendance at the bench and jury trials, time spent on miscellaneous correspondence and conferences, preparation of the fee requests, taxable costs and non-taxable expenses. i COMPLAINT AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURES Plaintiff in this case filed the original Complaint, a First Amended Complaint, and a Second Amended Complaint. For all three pleadings and the accompanying mandatory disclosures that must be filed with the Court, Plaintiff requests fees for 69.4 hours of work. According to Plaintiff, work on the Complaint, Amended Complaints and Mandatory Disclosures is divided as follows: Attorney Mason Barge — 19.7 hours; Attorney Patrick McKee — 41.8 hours; associate attorney Deborah Barrow — 2.5 hours; associate attorney Holli Hidden — 4.1 hours; and associate attorney Susan Rickertsen—1.3 hours. Fulton County contends that the Court should reduce the requested fee award for those portions of the complaints and mandatory disclosures that are attributable to unsuccessful Plaintiffs and successful Defendants in this case. Plaintiffs Marjorie Simpson, Willie F. Hill and Minority Distributing Company were dismissed by the Court on December 9, 1998. Plaintiff Kelly Goff was dismissed by the Court in its February 12, 1999, Summary Judgment Order for lack of standing. Plaintiffs Daniel and Peggy Webster’s equitable claims were dismissed following the bench trial for lack of standing. Ultimately, they were dismissed from the case entirely because they lacked standing on their damages claims also. Thus, of the original seven Plaintiffs in this case, only one, Webster Green Thumb, remained a party throughout the entire case and ultimately succeeded. Defendants Mitch Skandalakis, Nancy Boxill, Emma Darnell, Michael Hightower, Gordon Joyner and Tom Lowe, all of whom were members of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners at the time this case was filed, were dismissed in the Court’s February 12, 1999, Summary Judgment Order. As to claims asserted against them in their individual capacities, the Court held that the commissioners were entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. As to claims asserted against them in their official capacities, the Court held that there was no reason to continue the case against the commissioners since Fulton County remained a party to the case. The Court dismissed all claims against Defendant Andrew Jenkins of the County’s Department of Public Works in its December 9, 1998, Order. Defendant Michael Cooper, Director of Fulton County’s Department of Contract Compliance and Equal Employment Opportunity during the time relevant to this case, remained a party throughout the entire course of the lawsuit until he was dismissed after the jury trial. Thus, only two of the original Defendants in this case remained throughout the case, and Plaintiff Webster Green Thumb is a prevailing party against only one of them, Fulton County. Fulton County, therefore, contends that the Court should reduce the time that Plaintiffs counsel spent drafting the Complaint and Amended Complaint in this case by 60% to reflect that almost all of the Plaintiffs and Defendants in this action ultimately were dismissed. Although Fulton County is correct that all but one of the Plaintiffs in this case was dismissed and that Plaintiff succeeded in its claims against only one of the Defendants, that fact alone does not mandate that the Court reduce the attorneys’ fee award for time spent on activities that relate to the dismissed Plaintiffs or Defendants. This is especially true with regard to the Complaint. As discussed above, a fee petition should not be reduced where claims arise out of the same course of conduct and share “a common core of fact,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and the Eleventh Circuit has taken an expansive view of the issue. Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578 (11th Cir.1987). In this case, it is clear that all the claims asserted by all the Plaintiffs against all the Defendants arise out of the same course of conduct and share a common core of fact. Indeed, the claims all share an identical core of fact. Even if only one Plaintiff; Webster Green Thumb, had sued only one Defendant, Fulton County, the original Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint still would have been almost identical to those actually filed. The only difference would have been that some of the parties named in the complaints would not have been included. Plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for the time spent on the original Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint. It is also true, however, that a computation of hours reasonably expended should not include time spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims. Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1397 (11th Cir.1996). The First Amended Complaint added discrete and unsuccessful claims. The overriding purpose of the First Amended Complaint was to add Willie F. Hill, Kelly Goff, Marjorie Simpson and Minority Distributing Corp. as Plaintiffs, and Andrew Jenkins as a Defendant. As explained above, all these Plaintiffs were dismissed by the Court, as were all claims against Defendant Jenkins. Accordingly, the Court should reduce the attorneys’ fee award for all of the hours spent on this First Amended Complaint. Mr. Barge himself admitted, both in a brief and at the evidentiary hearing, that time spent on the First Amended Complaint may not be compensable and that he did not include his own hours spent on this task in the attorneys’ fees petition. See Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Supplemental Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses of Litigation, at 5 [Doc. 338]. Plaintiffs records, however, do include 12.0 hours that Patrick McKee spent on January 3 and 4,1997, on the Motion to Amend the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, 12.0 hours should be excluded from compensable time that Patrick McKee spent on the task of “Complaints and Mandatory Disclosures.” Otherwise, all hours in this category are compensable. Given the factual complexity of this case, the Court concludes that 57.4 hours spent on the Complaint and Second Amended Complaint in this case is not excessive. See, e.g., Barnes, 168 F.3d at 432 (compensating 40 of 147.88 hours requested for a much simpler complaint where only 14% of the paragraphs were not derived from already existing sources). ii CLASS ACTION ISSUES Plaintiff requests fees for 324.0 hours related to its unsuccessful attempt to obtain class certification and its Motion to Contact Class Members. According to Plaintiff, work related to this task is divided as follows: Mason Barge — 129.2 hours; Patrick McKee — 36.1 hours; Deborah Barrow — 82.7 hours; Holli Hidden — 20.8 hours; and Susan Rickertsen- — 55.2 hours. Fulton County contends that all time spent on class issues is noncompensable because Plaintiff did not succeed on any of its motions in this category and the Court refused to certify this case as a class action. After careful consideration of the matter, the Court agrees with Fulton County. Given Eleventh Circuit case law, the effort to obtain class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was probably doomed from the start. See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004-07 (11th Cir.1997). As discussed immediately above, time spent on dismissed Plaintiffs should be excluded from a fee award if the result is discrete and unsuccessful. Duckworth, 97 F.3d at 1397. The Court views the motions pertaining to class certification and contacting potential class members as akin to the dismissed Plaintiffs issue. The Court’s refusal to certify the class is in effect no different that the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs Simpson, Hill, Goff, Daniel and Peggy Webster, and Minority Distributing Corp. Both the dismissed Plaintiffs and the prospective class were not entitled to participate in the lawsuit. Since time spent on discrete and unsuccessful issues of the dismissed Plaintiffs is not compensable, neither should this Court include in the fee award time spent on unsuccessful attempts to add new plaintiffs. Accordingly, all discrete and separable time that Plaintiffs counsel spent on class issues in this case is excluded from the fee award. Plaintiff contends that even if time spent on class certification is noncompensable, time spent on the Motion to Contact Class members nevertheless should be compensated. According to Plaintiff, this motion represented an attempt to obtain discovery from individuals who might be potential witnesses, in addition to potential parties, in the case. That may be true, but the Court refuses to compensate this time. If Plaintiff had not attempted to certify this case as a class action, Plaintiff would not have needed a motion from the Court to seek out witnesses. It makes little sense for the Court to compensate Plaintiff for such a motion here where class action status ultimately was denied. in. DEPOSITIONS & WITNESSES Plaintiff requests fees for 407.2 hours related to depositions and other pretrial activities involving witnesses. According to Plaintiff, work related to this task is divided as follows: Mason Barge— 80.1 hours; Patrick McKee—239.3 hours; Deborah Barrow—57.5 hours; Holli Hidden—28.1 hours; and assistant Dan McKee—2.2 hours. Fulton County challenges this requested amount on a number of grounds. First, Fulton County says that all hours spent deposing the dismissed Defendants should be excluded. Fulton County states that 44.7 hours were spent by Plaintiff deposing dismissed Defendants Andrew Jenkins, Nancy Boxill, Emma Darnell, Robert Fulton, Michael Hightower, Gordon Joyner, Tom Lowe and Mitch Skandalakis. The Court disagrees that the time spent deposing these individuals should be excluded. These individuals were not deposed simply as Defendants. They were also deposed as commissioners and employees of Fulton County who .knew details of the County’s minority and female contracting practices. Their depositions, therefore, were an integral part of Plaintiffs discovery as it related to Defendant Fulton County. Accordingly, all time spent on these depositions is compensable. Second, Fulton County contends that the Court should exclude 70% of the time Patrick McKee spent preparing for and defending the deposition of Daniel Webster and 60% of the time spent preparing for and defending the deposition of Peggy Webster. Fulton County argues that 17 hours spent on these depositions should be attributed to Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages, 3.4 hours should be attributed to their participation in the case as ultimately dismissed Plaintiffs, and 1.6 hours should be attributed to the unsuccessful retaliation claim. Thus, in all, 22.0 hours should be excluded from the Websters’ depositions. In addition, Fulton County contends that an estimated 5 hours should be excluded for time that Mason Barge spent preparing for and defending the deposition of Kelly Goff. The Court disagrees. First, Plaintiff should not be penalized for defending depositions that Fulton County requested and conducted. Second, as to the Webster’s depositions, this Court refuses to split the case into the smallest atoms possible. That would occur if the Court apportioned time spent in the Websters’ depositions, by the specific questions and answers to a particular claim. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (stating that “fee-shifting statutes favor [ ] treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”). While ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999), set forth a demanding standard for district courts to meet in explaining the reasons underlying their award of attorneys’ fees, the Court does not believe that the Eleventh, Circuit intended the Barnes decision to turn its district judges into bean counters, as would result if the Court followed Fulton County’s reasoning to its illogical conclusion. Time spent preparing for and defending the Websters’ and Kelly Goffs depositions is compensable in whole. Third, Fulton County contends that the Court should exclude 33.0 of .the hours that Plaintiff spent on the depositions of Michael Cooper, Ben Edwards, and Bill Mowrey. Fulton County says this requested exclusion reflects the amount of time that Plaintiff spent in the depositions on the failed punitive damages claim. The Court believes that a reduction is not warranted. The questions asked in the depositions related not only to punitive damages, but also to the issues of declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory damages. It is impossible for this Court to separate out any group of questions in those depositions as applying only to punitive damages and not affecting the other claims at all. Because the time spent on these depositions related not only to the unsuccessful claim for punitive damages, but also to the successful claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory damages, all the hours are compen-sable. Given both the factual complexity of this case and its protracted course, the Court concludes that 407.2 hours spent on depositions and witnesses is not excessive. iv. DOCUMENT PRODUCTION & ANALYSIS Plaintiff requests fees for 2,444.0 hours related to document production and analysis. According to Plaintiff, work related to this task is divided as follows: Mason Barge — 205.6 hours; Patrick McKee — 88.7 hours; Deborah Barrow — 769.4 hours; Holli Hidden — 1,240.6 hours; Susan Rick-ertsen — 81.3 hours; and Dan McKee — 58.4 hours. About 40% of the time that Plaintiffs counsel expended in the entire case was spent on document production and analysis. Not surprisingly, time spent on this task is what Fulton County most strongly challenges in the whole fee request. First, Fulton County challenges all time included in this category that led to information Plaintiff used in its attempt to certify the case as a class action. Specifically, Fulton County contends that this Court should exclude all time spent on document production and analysis up until May 1, 1998, the date of Plaintiffs last brief on the class certification issue. In all, Fulton County seeks to have the Court exclude 1,918.5 hours for this reason. This amount represents 78% of all time spent on document production and analysis. Fulton County’s position, as it stated in its closing argument at the evidentiary hearing, is that the Court should deduct hours spent on any task related to an unsuccessful claim even if time spent on that task also had a permissible purpose. That is not the law in this Circuit or any other. Indeed, the law is the opposite. “Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 441, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The time that Plaintiff spent on document production and analysis in this case did not relate solely to the unsuccessful class certification issue, but also provided information that supported the core of Plaintiffs successful claims. As the Court wrote in its June 11, 1999, Order following the bench trial: In this regard,, the Court accepts as credible the testimony of Thomas Bruns that various contracting procedures were employed by Fulton County department heads, buyers and the Office of Contract Compliance to award contracts to minorities in order to achieve the numerical percentages established by the program. The Court accepts this testimony as credible because it is corroborated by the documentary evidence from the bid files. The procedures used to achieve the participation goals included disqualifying majority firm bidders for failing to comply with the program (Pl.Exh.3-25), awarding contracts to higher bidders in order to obtain minority participation (Pl.Exh.35, 37), splitting bids so that minority firms received part of a contract when a majority firm was the overall low bidder (Pl.Exh.49-54), solicitation of minority firms after bids were closed (Pl.Exh.56, 57), rebidding contracts in order to obtain minority participation (Pl.Exh.58), treatment of the participation goals as mandatory requirements (Pl.Exh.64-66, 70, 71, 116), awarding “points” for minority participation in evaluation criteria (Pl.Exh.73-77), and awarding an entire contract to minority vendor overall low bidders rather than splitting the contract to give part to majority firms low bidding on some items (Pl.Exh.78-84). The rebuttal testimony of Mr. Cooper offered by the County as to these examples of the practices identified by Mr. Bruns either fails to address the exhibits relied upon by the Court or is contradicted by the documents. Webster, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1381-82. All this corroborative evidence was obtained through the document production and analysis. Because time spent on document production and analysis provided information that supported the core of Plaintiffs successful claims, it is compensable regardless of whether the same information was used-for unsuccessful claims. Second, Fulton County challenges the hours spent on additional review of documents to prepare the class certification motion. At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff segregated 59,0 hours spent by Deborah Barrow and 0.8 hours spent by Holli Hidden and admitted that those hours should have been included in the class certification category rather than document production and analysis. According to Plaintiff, these hours reflect time spent reviewing documents solely to prepare the class certification motion. The Court instructed Plaintiff to move the 59.8 hours to the class certification category and provide the Court with an amended summary calculation to reflect this change. Plaintiff has provided the Court with an amended summary calculation that moves these 59.8 hours and also another 5.6 hours to the class certification category. (Plaintiffs Amended Summaries in Support of Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs, at 2.) [Doc. 344] It is that amended summary from which the Court is calculating Plaintiffs award. Accordingly, these hours are not discussed here but instead have been included in the Court’s analysis of the class certification issue. Third, Fulton County challenges certain time entries of associates that were logged under “Document Production & Analysis” instead of “Class Certification.” Fulton County contends that these entries relate solely to class certification and, therefore, are not compensable. The challenged time entries are hs follows: (1) 17.6 hours spent by Deborah Barrow on February 16-19, 1998, to “prepare written document concerning motion to certify class”; (2) 6.0 hours spent by Deborah Barrow on February 28, 1998, for “organization and indexing of master file and prepare docs for motion to certify class”; (3) 2.0 hours spent by Susan Rickertsen on February 12, 1998, to “review summaries of bid file reviews; identify examples of issues that might be pertinent to class motions and other matters; prepare note to Holli Hidden and Deborah Barrow;” and (4) 3.4 hours spent by Holli Hidden on February 14, 1998, to “compile evidence in support of motion for class cert.” As to the first and second items noted above, Mr. Barge explained on cross-examination at the evi-dentiary hearing that the information compiled was used not only for the motion to certify the class but also as a source to determine possible witnesses for Plaintiffs case, to prove the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination, and to discredit one of Fulton County’s witnesses at the jury trial. As a result, these time entries are compensable because they do not relate solely to the class certification issue but instead played a role in Plaintiffs overall success in this case. As to the third item noted above, Plaintiffs amended summary moved these 2.0 hours from “Document Production & Analysis” to “Class Certification.” Thus, Plaintiffs challenge to the inclusion of these 2.0 hours in this category is moot, and they have already been excluded by the Court’s decision to exclude time spent on class certification. The same is true of the fourth item. Accordingly, none of Fulton County’s objections here have merit. Fourth, Fulton County challenges the billing judgment of Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiffs document production and analysis process was inefficient. Accordingly, Fulton County requests that this Court should reduce by 50% all hours spent on document production and analysis after the class certification motion was fully briefed on May 1, 1998, The Court disagrees. At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff explained in great detail the method it employed for document production and analysis and its reasons for employing those methods. Mr. Barge testified that Plaintiff first requested that Fulton County provide it with a list of purchase orders within the MFBE program. According to Mr. Barge, approximately 4,000 purchase orders fell within this category. Several months after receiving the purchase order lists, Plaintiff requested access to the bid files that corresponded to each of the purchase orders to determine the County’s bidding procedure, how bidders were treated in general, and whether minority bidders were treated differently. When Fulton County finally provided the first of these files to Plaintiff, counsel immediately noticed that the numbering system for the bid files was completely different from the purchase order lists. Furthermore, the files did not include purchase order numbers, so there was no way to know from the information in the bid file which bidder actually received the contract. Plaintiff had to go through each file gleaning all information there and not knowing what information would end up being beneficial. The goal was to match purchase orders to bid files and the identification of discrimination-related legal issues. To deal with Fulton County’s confusing system, Plaintiffs counsel set up their own computer database in an attempt to organize documents they had reviewed and to prevent attorney duplication in review of the files. Fulton County knew that it was providing Plaintiff with a confusing array of information, and it did nothing to make Plaintiffs task any easier. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Fulton County to provide Plaintiff a list of bid files and their corresponding purchase orders. The Court refused to compel Fulton County to provide this information and instructed Plaintiff that it would have to do the work itself. Mr. Barge sent Fulton County’s counsel a letter that Plaintiff would do the work itself but stated tha