Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND...................... 1301 II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES..............................1303 A. General Problem.............................1303 B. Fee Award ..................................1304 1. “Lodestar” Analysis.......................1305 (a) Billable Hours and Time Records.......1306 (b) Hourly Rate...........................1307 (c) Discretionary Multiplier................1310 (i) Risk of Litigation..................1310 (ii) Complexity of Issues...............1312 (iii) Demonstrated Skill of Attorneys..,. 1313 (iv) Delay in Payment.................1313 2. Expenses..................................1313 C. Fee Award Allocation and Its Effect on Private Fee Arrangements ...........................1314 1. Immunity of Represented Class Members and Opt-Outs from Fee Payments from the Fund 1315 2. Effect of a Fee Award on a Client's Private Fee Liability to a Class Attorney..........1317 III. GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES..............1318 A. Guidelines for Fees ..........................1320 1. Court Time................................1320 2. Management Committee Meetings..........1320 3. Depositions................................1321 4. Document Review and Preparation of Legal Submissions...............................1321 5. Other Activities ...........................1321 B. Guidelines for Allowable Expenses............1321 1. Travel ....................................1321 2. Telephone, Postage, Duplicating, Photocopying and Book Purchase Charges.......1322 3. Paralegals, Paraprofessionals and Clerks.... 1322 IV. APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FEE PETITIONS 1322 A. Independent Counsel.........................1323 B. Lodestar Analysis............................1324 1. Hours Allowed............................1324 2. Hourly Rate...............................1325 3. Multiplier.................................1328 4. Interest...................................1328 V. FEE AWARDS..................................1329 A. Professors Twerski, Henderson, Jr., Gillette, Arnolds, Kamp and Monaghan................1329 B. Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Committee...................................1330 1. Committee Expenses.......................1330 2. Individual Awards to Committee Members .. 1331 (a) Stanley Chesley, Esq., et al...........1331 (b) Phillip E. Brown, Esq., et al..........1331 (c) Benton Musslewhite, Esq., et al.......1332 (d) Thomas W. Henderson, Esq., et al.... 1332 (e) Newton B. Schwartz, Esq., et al......1332 (f) John O’Quinn, Esq., et al............1333 (g) Gene Locks, Esq., et al...............1333 (h) Dean, Falanga and Rose...............1333 (i) Schlegel & Trafelet, Ltd................1333 C. Yannacone and Associates....................1334 1. Burke, Curry, Hammill & O’Brien..........1334 2. Albert J. Fiorella, Esq.....................1334 3. O’Hagan, Reilly & Gorman, P.C............1334 4. Levine & Grossman .......................1334 5. Victor D. Russo, Jr., Esq..................1335 6. Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., Esq...............1335 7. Irving Like, Esq...........................1335 8. Edward F. Hayes, III, Esq.................1336 D. Independent Counsel.........................1336 1. Kelly & Luglio; Mokotoff, Mondshine & Aliano; Greenwald & Thompson; Meyerson, Shniper & Gerasimowicz; Marlene Manes and Richard Ellison, Esqs.; Ann Meroney, Esq.; Woll, Crowley, Berman & Olsman; Sullivan & Associates.................................1336 2. Allen H. Kline, Esq.; William J. Risner, Esq.; Ashcraft & Gerel..........................1337 E. Independent Counsel Who Did Not Directly Benefit the Class............................1338 VI. TABLE OF ORIGINALLY ALLOWED FEES AND EXPENSES.....................................1338 VII. ADOPTION OF MAGISTRATE’S REPORT ON MODIFICATION AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF FEE AWARDS..................................1341 VIII. FINAL AWARDS AFTER MODIFICATION AND SUPPLEMENTATION...........................1344 IX. CONCLUSION 1346 APPENDIX Magistrate's Report and Recommendation on Attorney Fees...................................1347 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES AS MODIFIED AND FINAL JUDGMENT WEINSTEIN, Chief Judge: Counsel seek attorney fees and expenses from a settlement fund in this class action by Vietnam veterans and members of their families for injuries said to be caused by the veterans’ exposure to herbicides in Vietnam. See In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.1984). A final decision on fairness of the settlement was subject to a satisfactory resolution of the attorney fees issue and to the conclusion that a feasible distribution plan was possible. Id. at 862. As indicated infra Part VIII, total fees allowed and expenses are on the order of $10,000,000. Interest earned from the date of the settlement is over $15,000,000 so that the settlement fund, now amounting to considerably more than the original $180,-000,000, is unimpaired. A number of attorneys who expended time and money in the course of work related to the “Agent Orange” litigation waived any right to court-awarded fees and reimbursement of expenses. The court appreciates their generosity. Because this is a multidistrict litigation, materials developed during discovery are intended to be used by any present or future litigants in related cases. See In re “Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 751-52, 770 (E.D.N.Y.1984). The court will require, as a condition to receipt of payment pursuant to this judgment, that an attorney file with the court all originals or copies of discovery materials in his or her possession obtained during the litigation and not subject to a protective order unless the Magistrate on application directs otherwise. First Amendment and other considerations such as the concern expressed by many class members that the materials be available for historical and scientific study support this condition. See generally Cohen, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 1813 (1984). I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This multidistrict litigation began as a series of individual cases in the Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York and Northern District of Illinois. The first case in this district was Dowd v. Dow Chemical Co., 79-C-467, filed on February 23, 1979 by a local attorney, Victor Yannacone, Jr. Another complaint was filed in this district on March 20, 1979 in Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 79-C-747, the docket number under which the case ultimately was to proceed as a class action. On May 14, 1979, the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation transferred the Illinois and other New York cases to this district for consolidation of pretrial proceedings. Some 600 additional tag-along cases were subsequently transferred under M.D.L. No. 381. Mr. Yannacone organized a consortium of local lawyers, known variously as the “Long Island Consortium” or “Yannacone and Associates,” for the purpose of handling the multidistrict litigation as lead counsel for the plaintiffs. Consortium members were to contribute funding, participate in prosecution of the “Agent Orange” litigation, and share in the proceeds of any resulting fees. In Pretrial Order No. 26, the court on December 26, 1980 tentatively ruled that the litigation would proceed as a class action. See In re “Agent Orange”Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762, 787-92 (E.D.N.Y.1980). At the same time, Yannacone and Associates were designated attorneys for the plaintiff class. Mr. Yannacone also made case management arrangements with regional counsel representing individual Vietnam veterans and their family members throughout the country. Under these agreements, the “associated” attorneys were to share with Mr. Yannacone’s firm any contingent fees recovered under their retainer agreements. In return the Yannacone firm was to act as lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation on behalf of those plaintiffs. These agreements were made both before and after provisional class certification in December 1980. The associated counsel in general contributed nothing of substance to prosecution of the class action. They served primarily as a conduit for information between the class attorneys and some members of the class. Some associated counsel represented plaintiffs in individual lawsuits that were transferred to this court as part of the multidistrict litigation. To the extent that those plaintiffs did not opt out of the class action their individual cases have been dismissed as duplicative of the class action. As early as 1980 Yannacone and Associates experienced internal dissension. By the summer of 1983 management problems had become serious, in part because of the great difficulty of funding such a massive litigation. At least one law firm, Ashcraft & Gerel of Washington, D.C., and several individual lawyers were consulted about the possibility of restructuring the membership of the consortium. By notice of motion dated September 19, 1983, Yannacone and Associates asked to be replaced as lead counsel. Plaintiff counsel cited inability to bear the financial expense of continued litigation as the grounds for their motion. By undated notice of motion received September 23, 1983, Stephen J. Schlegel of Chicago, Illinois, Benton Musslewhite of Houston, Texas, and Thomas W. Henderson of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, jointly moved for an order designating their respective law firms as the new Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”). Both applications were granted in Pretrial Order No. 60 on September 26, 1983. See In re “Agent Orange”Product Liability Litigation, 571 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y.1983). The members of the original plaintiffs’ management committee were directed to cooperate with the new committee. One member of the original committee, David Dean of Carle Place, New York, remained directly associated with the new committee. Others continued to assist in various capacities. At pretrial conferences after October 1983, the court indicated that it would hold Mr. Dean directly responsible for taking the lead in preparing and trying the case. Mr. Schlegel assumed the responsibility of “managing partner” of the PMC. On motion of the PMC, by Pretrial Order No. 89 the court on February 2, 1984 approved the expansion of the plaintiffs’ management committee to its current membership of nine lawyers who had worked informally as a management group since October 1983. The PMC includes lawyers from Long Island, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, Houston and San Francisco. It set up a central headquarters two blocks from the courthouse. Monetary contributions of PMC members were used to run this office. On October 21, 1983, a trial date of May 7, 1984 was set. Between October 1983 and May 1984, the PMC undertook a vast amount of necessary discovery and other trial preparation, laying much of the groundwork essential to prosecution of the case. Settlement negotiations also were commenced between plaintiffs and the defendant chemical companies. On the eve of trial the parties agreed to a $180 million settlement of the plaintiffs’ claims against the chemical companies. Pursuant to the court’s direction, on July 23, 1984 the Magistrate issued an order that set forth the procedure for submission of requests for payment of attorney fees and expenses. All fee applications were to be submitted by August 31, 1984 on a form available from the Clerk of the Court. Subsequent fee petitions were accepted by the court if the circumstances excused their lateness. Hearings on attorney fee applications were held on September 26 and October 1, 1984. More than 100 attorneys have submitted petitions for fees and expenses. Most of them were neither present nor past members of the PMC. A few did not serve as counsel of record, but assisted in the litigation at the request of the management committee. Fee requests have also been received from lawyers who filed individual lawsuits that were transferred to this court as part of the multidistrict litigation, but who did not work on the class action and did no work at the management committee’s request. Still other attorneys seek fee awards who neither assisted in the class action nor filed suit, but who undertook such tasks for their individual clients as monitoring the litigation’s progress, assembling medical records, pressing claims for benefits before the Veterans Administration and submitting claim forms in the class action settlement. Many lawyers, both class and nonclass counsel, have previously made private fee arrangements with individual class members. II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES A. General Problem An informed assessment of the fee petitions requires consideration of the system of toxic tort litigation as well as of the unique circumstances of this case. Private enforcement of tort law is at best only a third line of defense against the hazards of toxic substances. Cf Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes — Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, A Report to Congress in Compliance with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) by the “Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group,” 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm.Print 1982). The first and most important protection is government and private testing, control and regulation to prevent harm while affording society the benefits of modern chemical products. A second safeguard is compensation and treatment through government mandated or privately arranged compensation schemes. The third shield is private suits against manufacturers and others. This last alternative of private tort remedies is necessarily inefficient in several respects: its high ratio of transaction costs to recovery; its hit or miss characteristics, in that some receive very high amounts and some nothing; and its questionable deterrent value in preventing the harm in the first place. Nevertheless, the private tort suit has substantial utility as a backup compensation system with limited value as a deterrent against human exposure to unreasonable hazards when (1) the first two defenses fail through government and private neglect or (2) strict liability is the basis of recovery and the failure occurs through ignorance of the effects of actions taken by manufacturers and others in reasonable reliance on then current knowledge. In general, the desirable prophylactic and cost shifting effects of privately prosecuted individual and class actions probably outweigh the costs to defendants, the court system and society generally. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y.1968), remanded on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.1971); Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1972). Given the extensive financing and large numbers of skilled lawyers needed to bring a complex class action and prosecute it to a successful conclusion, and the large risk of no recovery — or of a limited one — even when a case appears to have merit, substantial legal fees must be provided when a substantial fund is created if attorneys are to be induced to prosecute these actions. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse of the class action device exists. Overly generous fee awards may encourage eases without merit to be brought and pressed beyond reasonable limits, forcing defendants to settle to avoid burdensome litigation expenses and adverse publicity. The costs of such dubious litigation in terms of increased insurance premiums and legal expenses may keep useful products out of the marketplace to the detriment of the general public. As the Supreme Court remarked in a related context, “ ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee’ is one that is ‘adequate to attract competent counsel, but ... [that does] not produce windfalls to attorneys.’ ” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 case, quoting S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5913); see also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C.Cir.1984). One potential check on abuse is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It requires belief in the merits of the case. A party or his attorney must sign each pleading, motion, or other paper, thus certifying that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. The threshold level of egregiousness required to make out a case under Rule 11 is so high, and the probability of successful motions for improper certification so low, that the Rule in general provides little protection for prospective defendants, the public and the courts. It is in light of these realities that the court must approach the problem of attorney fees and expenses. At the outset of this litigation it appeared that there might be some basis for believing that the herbicide known as “Agent Orange” had caused widespread damage to Vietnam veterans and, perhaps, to their families. The lawyers who originally brought this suit skillfully used publicity together with legal theory and discovery procedures to mobilize potential class members and carry the case forward through the early pleading and motion stages. The attorneys constituting the PMC, who replaced the original committee in September of 1983, acted with professional skill to conduct discovery and prepare the case for trial. Their work revealed a lack of sufficient factual support at this time in plaintiffs’ claims, but did result in a significant benefit to the class by way of settlement. Under the circumstances, suggestions made at the settlement hearings by some veterans that lawyers are entitled to no fees or reimbursement of expenses are untenable. B. Fee Award Generally speaking the federal courts have no power to award attorney fees to a prevailing party absent statutory authorization. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). A well-established exception to this rule applies when a common fund has been created in a class action. See generally Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-79, 100 S.Ct. 745, 749-50, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980); 1 M. Derfner & A. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees ch. 2 (1983). The common fund doctrine, “part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164, 59 S.Ct. 777, 779, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), contemplates “fair and just allowances for expenses and counsel fees.” Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881). This equitable doctrine covers claims “filed not only by a party to the litigation, but also by an attorney whose actions conferred a benefit upon a given group or class of litigants.” City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (Grinnell I), 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir.1974). In addition, the equitable supervisory authority that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants federal courts in class actions extends to attorney fee questions and itself provides a quasi-substantive predicate for fee allowances. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 768 (9th Cir.1977); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1803 (1972 & Supp.1984). The Rule recognizes applicability of the common fund doctrine to class action cases. Compensation must motivate representation in worthy cases and reflect benefits to the class arising from the attorney's work. As one formulation of the purposes behind a fee award in class actions puts it, the guiding principles should be to provide compensation sufficient to stimulate the motive for representation of classes and to ensure that the fees awarded are consistent with the benefits bestowed upon the class, insofar as the bestowing of those benefits can be shown to be the product of the lawyer’s work. Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.47 at 67 (5th ed. 1982). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has pointed out that the existence of a benefit to the class is central to the common fund theory: [Ijntrinsic in every case is the requirement that benefits must accrue to those against whom expenses are assessed. [.Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 264 n. 39, 95 S.Ct. at 1625 n. 39.] “The award of fees under the equitable fund doctrine is analogous to an action in quantum meruit: the individual seeking compensation has, by his actions, benefited another and seeks payment for the value of the service performed.” Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. [(Lindy I)], 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir.1973). Those who receive no benefit from the lawyer’s work should not be required to pay for it. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 736 (2d Cir.) (footnote and some citations omitted), vacated on reh’g on other grounds, 590 F.2d 433 (1978) (en banc), aff'd, 444 U.S. 472, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980). In assessing the attorney fee applications in this case, therefore, it is necessary to focus upon the benefit to the class alleged to have resulted from each applicant’s efforts. 1. “Lodestar" Analysis The current “lodestar” approach to attorney fee awards followed in this and other circuits emphasizes the need to examine the award’s fairness to both the attorney and the common fund beneficiaries. As long ago as 1881, the Supreme Court admonished that “fee awards under the equitable fund doctrine were proper only ‘if made with moderation and a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the fund.’ ” Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469 (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 536). The Grinnell opinions, which adopted the lodestar framework for the Second Circuit, require a district court to undertake a factually based analysis. The “touchstone” for the fee award is “the actual effort made by the attorney to benefit the class.” City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (Grinnell II), 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir.1977). Moreover, the district court in making its decision must “act ‘as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’ ” Id. (quoting Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975)). “The numerous exacting standards that have been set down by the courts should be strictly applied to ensure that [the fee award] aspect of the class action is not subjected to abuse.” Manual for Complex Litigation, supra, § 1.47 at 67. Care must be exercised to ensure that counsel is compensated only for the benefit received by the class; to protect members of the class a philosophy of adequacy rather than generosity must be followed. See Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1098. Even the appearance of a windfall to the attorney receiving a fee award must be avoided. Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469. The lodestar analysis is divided into two steps, the first theoretically objective, the second more subjective. See generally 2 M. Derfner & A. Wolf, supra, ch. 16. First, “attorney’s fees are calculated by multiplying the number of billable hours that the prevailing party’s attorneys spend on the case by ‘the hourly rate normally charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.’ ” New York State Ass ’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1098). What is appropriately deemed billable and what are normal hourly rates are issues subject to dispute requiring the exercise of some judicial judgment. Second, once the base fee is calculated the district court within fairly broad parameters of discretion may adjust the time-rate figure upward or downward on the basis of other factors reflecting considerations such as risk of litigation and quality of representation. The lodestar approach was developed by appellate courts in the 1970’s to limit the almost unreviewable judgment previously exercised by district courts, supplant the percentage-of-recovery method of awarding fees, and increase the small hourly rate fees then being awarded under fee-shifting statutes. See, e.g., the debate between the majority and dissent in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also 2 M. Derfner & A. Wolf, supra, § 15.01[1]. The lodestar method, however, has significant disadvantages. Because the first step in the process calls for a calculation based on hours worked, counsel has an incentive to expend time and expand effort in order to increase the lodestar figure. But cf. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1328 (C.D.Cal.1977) (“counsel will not expend exorbitant amounts of time, for which there is no guarantee of reimbursement, in litigation of a substantially risky nature”). The current lodestar approach thus tends to encourage excess discovery, delays and late settlements, while it discourages rapid, efficient and cheaper resolution of litigation. Not only does lodestar analysis tend to enhance plaintiffs’ attorney fees, but it tends to increase enormously the cost of the litigation to the defense in fees and to the court in hours it must spend on supervision. To some extent excessive claims of hours worked can be offset by disallowing hours that produce no benefit for the class or that exceed the limits of reasonableness for a given task. The lodestar figure, moreover, can be decreased for inefficiency in representation. See infra Part II.B. l.c.iii. Courts are reluctant to cut fee requests on the basis of useful hours worked to the degree required for effective general deterrence of inefficiency because of the penal nature of such measures, the need to highlight an attorney’s failings in justifying a lodestar decrease and the difficulty of deciding after the event what might have been a more sensible course. Legal research and litigation are to a large degree arts. Like any creative artist, the good litigator may pursue many blind alleys and revise many drafts before producing the convincing brief or argument. In the end, close scrutiny of the work may ameliorate but cannot eliminate the problem of unnecessary work and undue delay under lodestar. Because the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet modified its fee award approach, district courts in this circuit must follow the lodestar analysis. In any event, the result under lodestar in the instant case is consistent with an appropriate award under prior and alternative theories of fee recovery. (a) Billable Hours and Time Records Attorneys seeking a fee award must submit detailed records. The Second Circuit requires submission of contemporaneous records for work performed after June 15, 1983. New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1147-48; Birmingham v. Sogen-Swiss International Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 523-24 (2d Cir.1983). For work prior to that date, reconstructed records are acceptable, “although the absence of contemporaneous records is to be considered in determining the actual time spent in the rendition of services.” Birmingham, 718 F.2d at 524 (citing, inter alia, Grinnell I). A lodestar calculation does not contemplate that a court blindly accept counsel’s records. “The calculations made by petitioners are, of course, subject to our own determination of reasonableness.” Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 516 F.Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (citing Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 & n. 9 (2d Cir.1980); Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F.Supp. 471, 479 (S.D.N.Y.1979)). The district court must review the activities for which time is claimed to ascertain whether they resulted in some compensable benefit to the class. For example, an attorney’s work on a fee application is not to be counted when “the fee will reduce the fund obtained in a class action.” Seigal, 619 F.2d at 165. See also Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1102 (a firm is not "entitled to compensation from the fund for its efforts in preparing and supporting its fee application in the district court and on appeal”). Fee application efforts are compensable in statutory fee cases. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). Class actions “doubtless present many instances of duplicative work including the overstaffing of conferences and court appearances.” Seigal, 619 F.2d at 165. Such duplication is an inherent danger in any litigation run by committee. The problem is especially acute when the case involves an enormous plaintiff class and a turnover in management committee membership. See Sun Publishing Co., Inc. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 594 F.Supp. 1512, 1517-18 (E.D.Va.1984) (holding in statutory fee context that no fees would be awarded for duplicative work occasioned by midstream change in counsel and disallowing time expended by previous counsel). “Ample authority supports reduction in the lodestar figure for overstaffing as well as for other forms of duplicative or inefficient work.” Seigal, 619 F.2d at 165 n. 9. Moreover, “[i]n assessing the extent of staffing and background research appropriate for a given case, a district court must be accorded ample discretion.” New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1146. One instance of duplicative work arising from the nature of a class action, but having little or nothing to do with the committee structure of class representation, concerns the filing of individual lawsuits by class members. Attorneys who file individual suits on the same claims involved in the class action do not substantially aid the prosecution of the class action. These collateral cases ultimately are dismissed as duplicative. An award of fees for such “me too” litigation would encourage fruitless and unnecessary work: While there is no first-in-time rule governing the award of counsel fees where multiple litigation is brought, a duplicative action which contributes virtually nothing to the ultimate result cannot justify an award of counsel fees____ Where [the] goal [of the litigation] is fully achieved by a single well-managed action, an award of compensation to latecomers who add nothing of value would encourage the bringing of superfluous litigation solely for an award of fees. Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 759 (2d Cir.1984). See also Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y.1980); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) II 61,-887 at 73,728 (D.Conn.1977); Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y.1974). Finally, as part of its assessment of the billable hours claimed, a court has a duty to analyze the tasks performed, to assure the class that the various tasks are being performed by individuals with the appropriate skills. For example, paralegal tasks should not be undertaken by senior partners who seek compensation for their time at premium rates. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1330 (C.D.Cal.1977). Tasks appropriate for paralegals would include substantial time spent in photocopying, making prints of microfilmed documents, organizing files, and other activities of a routine clerical nature. Work accomplished primarily by associates should not be billed at senior partners’ rates. The particular task undertaken, hours expended, and number and training of the legal personnel involved are all appropriate subjects of a court’s scrutiny in determining the base time-rate figure under the lodestar approach. (b) Hourly Rate Determining the applicable hourly rate often presents difficult questions. Under the standard formulation, a district court is to look to “the hourly rate normally charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.” Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1098, quoted in New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1140. See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (in setting statutory fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, courts are to look to “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community”). Problems arise in applying this general standard in a complex multidistrict litigation that is national in scope, involves counsel from all over the country and extends over many years during which the rates for particular lawyers and classes of lawyers are changing. In a recent case involving nonlocal counsel, the Second Circuit stated that “[njormally, a district court ... will consider the prevailing rates in the district in which the court sits.” Polk v. New York State Dept, of Correctional Services, 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.1983) (arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the civil rights fee award statute). See also Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 251-52 (D.C.Cir.1982) (elaborating on the general rule), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103 S.Ct. 1190, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983). Thus the normal guideline looks to a uniform rate based on the hourly rate prevailing in a district court’s local community. Obviously such a simple parochial rule is inappropriate in a multidistrict litigation requiring participation of attorneys from many districts. Courts in civil rights cases have developed several exceptions to the locality rule. First, when a need for “the special expertise of counsel from a distant district” is shown, the appropriate hourly rate is that of the attorney’s own community. Polk, 722 F.2d at 25 (citing cases). The same broader view is applied when local counsel are unwilling to handle the case. See Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 140-41 (8th Cir.1982) (en banc) (stating principle but applying forum rates after finding that competent local counsel were available for less). Second, when a lawyer files a suit in his or her home district that is properly maintainable there, and the case is transferred to the forum district, the attorney should receive fees at the prevailing home rate, “at least in the absence of any indication that the suit was filed in the high-rate district with little prospect of litigation but in the hope of securing a high fee.” Polk, 722 F.2d at 25. Assuming that this statutory decisional law serves as precedent for common fund cases, its application to cases involving large numbers of nonlocal counsel is far from clear. On the one hand, the general rule’s utility is called into question when few of the many attorneys for whom a rate must be determined come from the forum. On the other hand, the alternative of looking to each attorney’s local rates has serious drawbacks when large numbers of non-local counsel are involved. First, it would minimize the forum court’s presumed familiarity with hourly rates, which forms the basis for the forum rate rule. See Donnell, 682 F.2d at 251. Second, it would require an intensive case-by-case inquiry that would be nearly unworkable; ease of administration is a basic reason for the general rule. See id. Simplicity becomes an especially important goal in a complex case involving a hundred or more fee applications and tens of thousands of pages of supporting documentation and requiring a number of years for prosecution during which rates for particular attorneys and geographic locations change in different ways. Third, use of individualized rates would negate in large part the neutrality of the forum rate rule, see id., in that it would consistently favor fee applicants at the expense of the fund: nonlocal attorneys with higher individual rates would receive those rates; those with lower individual rates would receive the forum rate. A workable and fair compromise may well be to apply a uniform, nationally prevailing rate when such a rate can be developed. This solution has been adopted by courts faced with complex attorney fee distributions of large magnitude. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48, 83 (E.D.Pa.1983) (setting uniform rates that were “in conformity with the regular hourly rates billed to noncontingent clients by private law firms in major metropolitan areas”), rev’d, 751 F.2d 562, 590-91 (3d Cir.1984) (objecting to the failure of the trial court to determine that national rate through an examination of available data); 3 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 6924e (1977). A national rate approach in special instances recognizes the national character of the lawsuit and of class counsel while retaining a vitally important administrative simplicity together with an essential neutrality of result as between fee applicants and fund beneficiaries. Fortunately too, for purposes of fee determination, a national bar has developed in this country; no longer are the highest paid and most skillful attorneys limited to one or a few great legal centers. For example, there are specialists commanding substantial fees in each of the cities from which lead counsel come — and they earn high fees for work all over the country. In litigation stretching over a number of years, a question arises about whether current or historical rates should be used to calculate attorney fees. In a recent decision involving a civil rights fee award under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, the Second Circuit held that historical rates should be considered in multi-year cases: If the services were rendered over two or three years, relevant figures for the current year will normally still be appropriate. Even in protracted cases, it will be sufficient to divide the litigation into just two phases and use one rate for the early phase and a current rate for the later phase. New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1153. The Second Circuit has permitted the application of a single rate for as long a period as seven years. See United States v. Bosurgi, 750 F.2d 216, 218-20 (2d Cir.1984) ($125 for partners and $75 for associates during the period from 1965 to 1971). Lower court decisions have applied historical rates in common fund cases as well. See, e.g., Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 621 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Weiss v. Drew National Corp., 465 F.Supp. 548, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y.1979); cf. Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (historical rates used for fee award charged to defendants in antitrust case under 15 U.S.C. § 15), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.1978). But see Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1096 n. 26 (5th Cir.1982) (15 U.S.C. § 15 case stating in dicta that prevalent practice of federal courts today is to use current rates “to compensate counsel for inflation and delay in receipt of payment”), modified on other grounds, 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc); City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, 440 F.Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (applying present rates for seven years of litigation “to compensate for lost interest and inflation”). As the Second Circuit has noted, “[n]either historic nor current rates are ideal. Historic rates have the advantage of precision ... [but] do not reflect inflation or the cost of foregone interest____” New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1152. The Court of Appeals settled on an historical rate approach because it “at least conforms to Congress’ instruction to avoid windfall awards through use of higher current rates” under 42 U.S.C. ■ § 1988; although current rates incorporate inflation into fee awards, the incorporation is imprecise and may overcompensate a fee applicant. 711 F.2d at 1152-53. In Darling-Delaware, by way of contrast, the district court justified a current rate calculation in part on the grounds that it would cost more to award separate compensation for delay. 440 F.Supp. at 1134. The Second Circuit’s concern with avoiding windfall fee awards through use of higher current rates applies with equal force in common fund cases. See, e.g., Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469. Nevertheless, the court in New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, disapproving application of a flat current rate, made an assumption not generally applicable to common fund cases. It assumed no cost in waiting for a fee, writing: the premise underlying use of current rates — that the firm would have billed and collected from the client during the litigation and therefore had the use of the money — is not true for non-profit law offices and frequently not true for private firms, especially in civil rights litigation. 711 F.2d at 1153. The court’s assumption, whatever its soundness in civil rights cases, does not apply in commercial or tort actions. Tort cases normally are prosecuted by private firms for profit on a contingent fee rather than an hourly rate basis. If a fee award in a tort case is to be calculated by use of an hourly rate that in reality is never charged in tort actions, then the fact that tort lawyers usually do not bill and collect fees during the litigation has little relevance. Contingent fees often reach one-third to one-half of the recovery; they usually are significantly higher than would be fee awards based on an hourly rate. Contingent fees take into account not only the risk of nonrecovery, but the fact that the lawyer must wait for years before collecting a fee to cover long-paid out-of-pocket expenses, overhead costs and living costs. A lawyer who borrows to pay these advances pays interest; a lawyer who uses her or his own capital loses interest that would have been earned. The premise underlying use of current rates, which holds true for most commercial litigation, remains valid for tort cases in a period of inflation during which the cost of money is closely tied to the rate of inflation. The delay or opportunity cost factor, of course, could be considered in determining whether to award a multiplier. Weiss, 465 F.Supp. at 552; see also Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117. Nevertheless, so long as the rate of increase in the applicable hourly rate does not significantly differ from the costs of delay in payment, it does not make an appreciable difference whether the opportunity cost factor is taken into account at the lodestar or the multiplier stage of analysis. Moreover, ease of administration, an ever-present concern in the fee award process in a large, complex case, favors the application of a uniform rate throughout based on present hourly rates if the result is reasonable. Courts must recognize that the entire process of fee fixing is so imprecise and has so many arbitrary and subjective aspects that pretensions of exactitude about any element leads to illusory accuracy. Ultimately the good sense and experience of the trial bench and bar must be relied upon for a reasonably acceptable result. (c) Discretionary Multiplier After the time-rate figure has been calculated, the district court in its discretion may adjust it upward or downward on the basis of frankly subjective factors. Such considerations include “the risk of litigation, the complexity of the issues, and the skill of the attorneys.” New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1140 (citing Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1098). The court must set forth specific facts supporting such an increase or decrease in an attorney’s compensation. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1098; Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 473. Applying a multiplier that increases the lodestar is not mandatory. See Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 581 F.Supp. 811, 813 (E.D.Pa.1983). Such adjustments will not be made without good reason. Generally, an “attorney will receive an otherwise reasonable compensation for his time from the lodestar figure alone.” Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099. Accord, Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. (i) Risk of Litigation Precedent indicates that in general, the greater the contingent nature of success — that is, the risk of failure — the more weight that a district court may place upon this factor in increasing the lodestar figure. See, e.g., Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 471. In general, the court is sympathetic to the use of a risk multiplier. Yet, as indicated in the discussion that follows, the present law on the subject is far from settled. Thus, in the instant case a risk multiplier has not been granted. Instead, for reasons suggested infra Part II.B.l.c.ii and iii, a multiplier for demonstrated skill has been granted. As a preliminary matter, application of the general rule depends on how “success” is defined. In assessing the risk of success, a court may look to the probability of a partial recovery by compromise rather than the probability of a complete recovery upon the eventual conclusion of the ease. “The greater the probability of success, of either ultimate victory on the merits or of settlement, the less this consideration should serve to amplify the basic hourly fee.” Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 471. Judge Gibbons has pointed out “that in a ease where some recovery is virtually certain, the fact that the total recovery may be uncertain cannot, consistent with the spirit of Lindy Brothers I, justify a substantial departure from the lodestar of reasonable value of services computed on a time basis.” Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II), 540 F.2d 102, 128 (3d Cir.1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Certainly a ease may involve a high level of contingency, in the sense that the chances of complete triumph — a finding of one-hundred percent liability on all claims at the end of a trial— are remote. Yet the result in fact obtained — for example, a comparatively modest compromise settlement before trial that takes into account the numerous unresolved hurdles to full recovery — may be much less unlikely: that defendants would consider settlement to avoid the further burden of litigation and to improve their respective financial pictures might fairly be anticipated. From this perspective, the risk of triumph may not have been so high at the beginning of a lawsuit that it necessarily warrants a contingency or risk-of-litigation multiplier. Looking beyond this preliminary point, a blind application of the contingency multiplier doctrine in high-risk cases might raise serious problems. First, it might lead to a sharp, troublesome disparity of treatment for cases at the highest level of the risk spectrum: an attorney who brought an extremely high-risk lawsuit that was not quite frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be rewarded with a very high contingency multiplier, perhaps as much as four or more times the base lodestar figure. Cf. Fried v. Utilities Leasing Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) H 95,695 (E.D.Pa.1976) (quadrupling thought to be warranted by contingency and by quality of counsel’s work). Yet an attorney who prosecuted a similarly high-risk case that fell on the other side of the Rule 11 threshold would not only receive no fee award, but might face an assessment of defendant’s own legal expenses as a penalty. Second, as noted above, a case involving dim prospects for ultimate victory on the merits nevertheless may hold out a significant possibility of settlement. Rewarding the filing and prosecution of large, complex lawsuits with poor prospects for success arguably risks fueling the growth of “nuisance” or “strike” litigation, in which settlement becomes the main object and attorney fee awards an overpowering motivating force. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 27 (D.C.Cir.1984); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 491-97, 499 (1981); cf. 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1803 at 270-71 (Supp.1984) (“the class action device must be protected against the taint that it is a source of strike suits promoted by attorneys who simply are seeking fat fees” even in the absence of significant empirical evidence of such behavior). To avoid these two problems, in marginal cases — particularly those in which a comparatively modest compromise settlement has been reached — many courts would probably conclude today that the base lodestar fee should not be increased to account for the contingent nature of success. Instead, unless other multiplier factors such as quality of representation are relevant, they probably would conclude that the fee award should be based on the straight time-rate figure. See Tornabene v. General Development Corp., 88 F.R.D. 53, 61-64 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (noting “substantial obstacles” to proof of plaintiffs case and relatively small size of class settlement, and holding that “the results achieved do not warrant approval of the fees sought,” notwithstanding the risk of success, magnitude and complexity of the litigation, and quality of representation), aff'd mem., 657 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.1981); cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1550 n. under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 whether an increase for risk of litigation is ever warranted); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940-41, 1943, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (limited success in relation to scope of litigation in civil rights case requires reduction in lodestar award under § 1988); Selzer v. Fleisher, 629 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir.1980) (“any award must be proportionate to the result achieved”), cert. denied sub nom. Berkowitz v. Selzer, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981); Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 355, 364 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (denying adjustment in lodestar figure, because, inter alia, “the settlement represents a compromise — plaintiffs did not ‘win’ ” a final verdict on the merits), aff'd, 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984). See also Laffey, 746 F.2d at 26-27 (criticizing the contingency multiplier doctrine); Leubsdorf, supra, 90 Yale L.J. at 485-88 (same). It might be claimed that failure to grant a contingency multiplier to an attorney who brought suit on, and successfully settled, a high-risk claim would undercut the economic motivation to accept meritorious cases despite their limited chances of success. But other considerations reduce the persuasive power of this contention. First, a refusal to grant contingency multipliers in high-risk cases merely increases the contingent nature of the multiplier, not that of the fee award itself; it does not affect an attorney’s entitlement to compensation based on time expended at the allowed hourly rate, a payment that constitutes “otherwise reasonable” compensation. No empirical evidence suggests that this approach will so discourage the legal profession’s efforts on behalf of common fund plaintiffs that it should not be entertained. Second, and more fundamentally, the contingency multiplier serves in part to regulate the volume of litigation; it presents the question of the extent to which society should encourage litigation of claims the merits of which are obscure. Concededly, an increase in the lodestar award to reflect the “risk of litigation” does make some sense on a policy basis; counsel has an incentive to pursue meritorious claims despite factual and legal obstacles. See Leubsdorf, supra, 90 Yale L.J. at 480-82. Nevertheless, this rationale must be balanced against the overall public interest in efficient judicial administration, if not in legal morality. At some point, the latter considerations suggest that the legal profession should be encouraged to think at least twice before initiating sprawling, complicated cases of highly questionable merit that will consume time, expense and effort on the part of all concerned, including the courts, in a degree vastly disproportionate to the results eventually obtainable. At the very least, then, in borderline cases a rule is supportable providing that counsel’s activities should neither be rewarded with a contingency multiplier nor be penalized by Rule 11 sanctions. It is not necessary to decide this issue in the context of the instant litigation since a skill rather than a contingency multiplier is being awarded. (ii) Complexity of Issues Complexity is not an independent consideration in the multiplier calculus. It simply represents an aspect of each of the risk and quality factors. The more novel and complex the issues, the greater the risk of litigation, and “for counsel to benefit in their fee request by the existence of novel questions of law, it should appear that counsel’s treatment of these issues materially assisted the Court in resolving them.” Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 648-49 (M.D.Ala.1976). Cf. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 954-55 (1st Cir.1984). In this sense, therefore, the novelty and complexity of the issues are taken into account in deciding whether counsel “demonstrated a high level of skill and expertise throughout the pendency of th[e] lawsuit.” Pollard, 69 F.R.D. at 649. See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548-49, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (stating in statutory fee context that complexity of issues presumably is fully reflected in number of billable hours and therefore no upward adjustment. can be awarded on this basis, absent unusually efficient and skilled efforts by counsel). (iii) Demonstrated Skill of Attorneys The “quality of representation” factor is intended to permit a district court either to reward “particularly resourceful” legal work that “secures a substantial benefit ... with a minimum of time invested,” or to decrease “the objectively determined fee where the benefit produced does not warrant awarding the full value of the time expended.” Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 168-69 (3d Cir.1975), quoted in Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 112. “Any increase or decrease in fees to adjust for the quality of work is designed to take account of an unusual degree of skill, be it unusually poor or unusually good.” Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. See also Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1100. A quality multiplier in general should not be awarded for the level of skill normally expected of counsel, because it will have been accounted for already in the computation of the hourly rate usual for such a lawyer. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.47 at 71 (5th ed. 1982); supra Part II.B.l.b; cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (statutory fee applicant must show that quality of services rendered was superior to that reasonably to be expected given the hourly rate allowed). In considering whether to adjust the lodestar figure, a court may look to, among other things, (1) the result obtained, evaluated in terms of (a) the extent of possible recovery compared with the amount of actual verdict or settlement, and (b) the benefit conferred on the class, as well as (2) the efficiency of “the professional methods utilized in processing the case.” Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 118. Although not generally considered an aspect of proficiency, related criteria such as tenacity, demonstrated ability to bear strains attendant upon preparation of a difficult case for trial under the pressure of short time schedules, and skill shown in coordinating the work of many attorneys also may be taken into account. These qualities of character and administrative skill often make the difference between success and failure in a lawsuit. They are properly considered lawyer’s skills. Perhaps of even greater value as compensable skills are those related to settlement negotiation and settlement. Public policy clearly favors settlements at the earliest practicable stage of a dispute. Assuming, for example, that counsel was so skillful in negotiating a settlement that the case was settled after a few hundred hours of lawyer’s work rather than after many thousands of hours, a multiplier of ten or more would appear to be justified. This answer would allow some escape from the present lodestar disincentive to early settlement. That a settlement has been arrived at notwithstanding the formidable factual and legal obstacles to recovery does not, however, necessarily reflect skill by the attorneys. A case may be settled for “reasons that had little, if anything, to do with the quality of the performance of plaintiffs’ counsel.” Pollard, 69 F.R.D. at 649. See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 849, 858-59 (1975) (“Dawson II”). The fee applicant desiring an increase in his or her lodestar award to reflect highly skilled and efficient representation bears the “heavy burden of proving entitlement to such an adjustment.” Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 118, quoted in Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1100. A quality multiplier need not be granted for all counsel or for all tasks. See Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 255 n. 49 (D.C.Cir.1982) (“The special quality of one lawyer’s services provides no logical basis for granting all the lawyers a quality adjustment.”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103 S.Ct. 1190, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983); Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160,165 (2d Cir.1980) (suggesting that district court could award or withhold a multiplier based on relative productivity of legal theories propounded); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1337-38 (C.D.Cal.1977) (awarding different multipliers to different attorneys based' on the quality of their work and its importance to the case); cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48, 83 (E.D.Pa.1983) (setting different rates for lead and nonlead counsel), rev’d on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562, 590-91 (3d Cir.1984). Quality of representation can justify a decrease as well as an increase in the lodestar figure. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. at 84-85, rev’d on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562, 600-01 (3d Cir.1984). Cf. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 578 F.Supp. 1262, 1278 (D.Ariz.1984) (disallowing time in lodestar calculation in lieu of “a substantial negative multiplier”). (iv) Delay in Payment Delay in payment may be considered by a court in awarding a multiplier. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 588-89, 601-02 (3d Cir.1984); Undy II, 540 F.2d at 117; Weiss v. Drew National Corp., 465 F.Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y.1979). Under certain circumstances, delay in payment instead may be taken into account in determining the appropriate hourly rate. See supra Part II.B.l.b and infra Part IV.B.2. The court’s task is not necessarily limited to “a mechanical calculation of the delay factor on the basis of interest rates”; rather, allowance for delay in payment is subject to the court’s discretion. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d at 601-02 (Becker, J., concurring). 2. Expenses Upon submission of adequate documentation, plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to reimbursement of those reasonable and necessary out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the course of activities that benefited the class. See, e.g., In re THC Financial Corp. Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 721, 740 (D.Hawaii 1980); In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357, 1388-89 (N.D.Ga.1979), modified and remanded on other grounds, 645 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.1981). Expenses must be both reasonable in amount and reasonably related to the interests of the class: As a premise the petitioners should assume their class clients have agreed to pay modest to moderate travel and per diem costs when the trip served their beneficial interests. Petitioners should not expect to recover from their involuntary clients for unnecessary or extravagant travel and related expenses. Over-staffing at meetings, conferences, or court app