Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION LAMBERTH, District Judge. This matter comes before the court on defendants’ Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Foreign Service Grievance Board (“FSGB”). On March 12, 1989, plaintiff Frank A. Bettucci was mandatorily retired as an employee of the Foreign Service in the Agency for International Development (“AID”). Bettucci appealed the AID’s decision to the FSGB and’the FSGB affirmed the AID’s decision. Bettucci subsequently filed this suit for review of the conclusion reached by the FSGB. Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the relevant law, defendants’ motion to affirm the decision of the Foreign Service Grievance Board will be granted. I. Background In 1966, plaintiff Frank Bettucci entered the Foreign Service and was employed by the Agency for International Development (“AID” or “Agency”) on a limited appointment basis, grade FSLR-4. During his tenure with the agency, Bettucci served in varying employment capacities throughout the world in locations including Vietnam, Haiti, Burundi, Upper Volta, and Washington, D.C. In 1981, his grade was adjusted to grade FS-02 and in 1983 he was promoted to grade FS-01. After his promotion to grade FS-01, Bet-tucci elected to compete to enter the Senior Foreign Service. In November 1987, the Senior Threshold Selection Board (“STB”) ranked plaintiff in the lower 5% of all career Foreign Service Officers in grade FS-01. The Board subsequently referred Bettucci’s evaluation file to the 1987 Performance Standards Board (“PSB”) pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 4008. This Board concluded that Bettucci did not meet the requisite standards of a grade FS-01 officer and it was recommended to the Director of Personnel that he be man-datorily retired from the Foreign Service. The Director of Personnel concurred with the Board’s recommendation and on January 19, 1988, the Director informed Bettucci that he failed to meet the standards of his class and as such, he would be mandatorily retired on March 12, 1988 pursuant to § 608(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. See 22 U.S.C. § 4007(c)(1). In response to this determination, Bettuc-ci filed a grievance with the AID which the Agency eventually denied in its entirety. This grievance asserted the following claims: (1) that the 1987 Senior Threshold Selection Board violated its Precepts by low ranking Bettucci within his class; (2) that the 1987 Performance Standard Board violated its Precepts by recommending that plaintiff be mandatorily retired; (3) that the Senior Threshold Selection Board and the Performance Standard Board improperly considered Bettueci’s corridor reputation; (4) certain portions of Bettucci’s Employee Evaluation Reports (“EER”) contained inaccurate, erroneous, and falsely prejudicial materials which wrongfully influenced the Senior Threshold Selection Board and the Performance Standard Board in making their recommendations concerning him; (5) the AID failed to follow its own rules and regulations governing the assignment of Bettucci to his posts of duty; (6) the AID failed to provide Bettucci with adequate training to enable him to remain competitive in his position; and (7) the AID violated its own rules and regulations by the manner in which it implemented the Performance Standard Board’s recommendation that Bet-tucci be mandatorily retired from the Foreign Service. Bettucci presented this grievance to the AID and after an investigation and review of his submissions, the agency affirmed the decision imposing mandatory retirement on him. In October 1988, Bettucci appealed the AID’s decision to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (“FSGB” or “Board”) and on March 10, 1989, the AID granted Bettucci’s request for prescriptive relief. This stay was subsequently revoked at the Agency’s request on May 30,1989 and Bettucci’s mandatory retirement became effective on June 30, 1989. The original grievance presented to the Board by Bettucci included numerous complaints with some dating back to his entry into the Service in 1966. In light of the statutory time limitations for filing grievances contained in section 1104(a) of the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4134, and the large quantity of disparate material presented to the Board, the Board requested a pre-hearing meeting of the parties on February 22, 1989. Upon examination of the issues and motions before it, the Board affirmed its prior ruling as to which issues had been properly raised for consideration before the Board in its order of March 26, 1989. The Board decided that the various financial claims presented by Bettucci in his original submission to the Agency should be considered separately from issues related to the Agency’s recommendation that Bettucci be mandatorily retired. The Board issued a decision denying the financial claims on January 29,1990. The Board proceeded to identify the substantive issues related to his mandatory retirement and conducted a separate hearing on these issues. In its May 14, 1990 decision, the Board identified the issues it considered as follows: I. Whether (AID) violated the rules, regulations, and/or procedures governing the assignment process in reference to the plaintiff. II. Whether [AID] violated the rules, regulations, and/or procedures governing the training opportunities granted or denied [plaintiff]. III. Whether the Employee Evaluation Reports (“EERs”) relied on by AID in the proceedings to mandatorily retire [plaintiff] were inaccurate, erroneous, or falsely prejudicial. IV. Whether the 1987[STB] violated applicable precepts, rules, regulations, or policies in low-ranking [plaintiff] and referring him to the Performance Standards Board (“PSB”). V. Whether the 1987[PSB] violated applicable precepts, rules, regulations or policies in recommending that [plaintiff] be mandatorily retired. VI. Whether improper matters, including but not limited to [plaintiffs] “corridor reputation”, were factors in or considered in the proceedings to mandatorily retire (him). VII. Whether [AID violated applicable rules, regulations or policies in the decision to mandatorily retire [plaintiff] or in the implementation of that decision]. FSGB’s May 14,1990 Op. at 3. The Board rejected each of Bettueei’s claims after a hearing and its consideration of the arguments raised by both Bettucci and the Agency. Bettucci filed a complaint in this court seeking judicial review of the FSGB’s January 29 and May 14, 1990 decisions. This court referred Bettueci’s complaint to United States Magistrate Deborah Robinson for preparation of proposed findings of fact and recommended disposition of the defendants’ motion to affirm the FSGB’s findings. Magistrate Judge Robinson answered each of the above issues in the negative and affirmed the conclusions reached by the Board. In response to Magistrate Judge Robinson’s decision, Bettucci filed his objections to Magistrate Judge Robinson’s Report and Recommendation. The issue presently before this court is whether, upon de novo review, the evidence supports the findings of law and fact as reached by Magistrate Judge Robinson in order to permit this court to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. II. Analysis A. Standard of Review In 1980, Congress established “the framework for hiring, promoting, and retaining Foreign Service officers.” Molineaux v. United States, 12 F.3d 264, 264 (D.C.Cir.1994) (citing Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 94-465, 94 Stat.2071 (1980)). The Foreign Service implemented an “up or out system” with officers granted career appointments after a probationary period. Once an officer has secured a career appointment, the officer is required to be promoted into the Senior Foreign Service within twenty years. If such a promotion is not attained, the officer is involuntarily retired. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4007). The Foreign Service Act sets forth detailed procedures pursuant to which the Foreign Service Grievance Board is to conduct hearings at the behest of an individual subject to an adverse employment decision within the Foreign Service. See 22 U.S.C. § 4136. These provisions require the FSGB to conduct a hearing at the request of a grievant in any case which involves disciplinary action or the retirement of a grievant from the Service under section 4007 or 4008. As stated, Bettucci, plaintiff in the instant case, was mandatorily retired pursuant to section 4008. Therefore, he was entitled to a hearing under section 4136. As required by statute, the hearing was conducted by the FSGB and Bettucci presently seeks review in this court of the FSGB’s decision to affirm the Agency’s determination to mandatorily retire him. Judicial review of a final decision of the Foreign Service Grievance Board is set forth in section 1110 of the Foreign Service Act, as amended. See 22 U.S.C. § 4140. This section provides for judicial review of the final decisions of the Board in federal district court according to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. The pertinent section of the APA, section 706(2), defines the possible standards of judicial review of the Grievance Board’s decision: [T]he reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 5 U.S.C. § 706. In determining which standard to apply, a reviewing court must determine whether the Board’s action constitutes formal or informal adjudication. Formal adjudications are those required by statute to be considered through on-the-record proceedings and involve the development of a record through a trial-type hearing. Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Med. Program of Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1996). In essence, formal adjudications are designed to produce a record that is to be the basis of the agency action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). An informal adjudication, by contrast, is “a residual category including all agency actions that are not rulemaking and that need not be conducted through ‘on the record’ hearings.” Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 n. 37 (D.C.Cir.1981). In the instant case, the FSGB is mandated by statute to conduct a hearing at the request of a Foreign Service employee who has been subjected to retirement pursuant to section 4007 or 4008. The FSGB procedures as set forth in this statute require testimony .to be given under oath, provide for examination and cross-examination of witnesses, permit the reception of oral or documentary evidence by the Board, and require a verbatim transcript to be made of any hearing to be included in the record of proceedings. In light of the nature of the mandatory hearing conducted by the FSGB, this court concludes that such hearings must be characterized as formal adjudications for the purpose of determining what standard of review should be applied to the Board’s ultimate determination. Because it is this court’s conclusion that the process employed by the Board is tantamount to a formal adjudication, judicial review of the Grievance Board’s decision is limited to determining whether the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was procedurally correct. In this case, Bettucei has the burden of showing that the Grievance Board made an error that was a substantial factor in causing his mandatory retirement. See Reiner v. United States, 686 F.2d 1017, 1021 (D.C.Cir.1982). In reviewing the Board’s determination, this court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the Board’s decision. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814. However, the Court must give the Board’s determination a “thorough, probing, in-depth review.” Id. at 415, 91 S.Ct. 814. Although the court is required by statute to give great deference to the determinations of the Board, the court may set aside findings of the Board if they are not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence requires that the evidence in support of an agency finding must be sufficient to support the conclusion of a reasonable person after considering all of the evidence in the record as a whole, not just the evidence that is consistent with the agency’s finding. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). “The substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight ... [and] courts [must] consider the whole record.” Id. The Board’s determinations are presumed to be valid, but only when they are supported by substantial evidence and are not contrary to statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159 (D.C.Cir.1983). B. Analysis of the Board’s Determination to Mandatorily Retire Bettucei As stated, the determinations of the FSGB must be supported by substantial evidence and may not be contrary to statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. Bet-tucci’s opposition to defendants’ motion to affirm the decisions of the FSGB challenges the ultimate conclusions reached by the Board in its January 29, 1990 and May 14, 1990 decisions and asserts various procedural and statutory deficiencies in the hearings conducted by the Board prior to these decisions. Accordingly, this court will first consider the procedural and statutory arguments set forth by Bettucci and subsequently consider the remaining substantive challenges to the conclusions reached by the Board as presented by Bettucci. 1. Bettucci’s Claims of the Board’s Procedural and Statutory Deficiencies Bettucci raises five preliminary issues, each alleging that his hearing before the Board was procedurally deficient in some manner. These issues include the following: (1) Whether the Board erred by wrongfully limiting its jurisdiction to hear all issues raised by Bettucci. (2) Whether the Board erred by revoking prescriptive relief during the proceedings. (3) Whether the Board failed to ensure a full and fair hearing and failed to properly give Bettucci the consideration due a pro se litigant. (4) Whether the Board abused its discretion in refusing to permit Bettucci to call essential witnesses and whether the Board permitted the Agency to intimidate Bettucci’s witnesses. (5) Whether bias on the part of the Board deprived Bettucci of a fair hearing. a. Whether the Board Erred by Limiting Its Jurisdiction to Consider Only Those Issues that Were Not Time Barred In his initial grievance, Bettucci raised ten separate claims for financial reimbursement allegedly incurred during the course of his tenure with the Agency. The Board held that six of the issues were time barred pursuant to section 1104(a) of the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4134, because they were not filed within three years of their occurrence as required by statute. Section 1104(a) states that: (a) A grievance is forever barred unless it is filed with the Department within a period of 3 years after the occurrence or occurrences giving rise to the grievance or such shorter period as may be agreed upon by the Department and the exclusive representative. There shall be excluded from the computation of any such period any time during which, as determined by the [Board], the grievant was unaware of the grounds for the grievance and could not have discovered such grounds through reasonable diligence. 22 U.S.C. § 4134(a). In support of his argument that the Board erred by limiting its jurisdiction to actions that were not time barred, Bettucci contends that the grievances he has complained of are in the nature of “continuing violation[s] of the rules, regulations, and policies designed to deprive Bettucci of his right to be treated fairly and equally to his peers in the foreign service of the United States.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 64. Bettucci claims that the continuing nature of the alleged mistreatment that he has received constitutes a pattern of harassment and reprisal. He admits that “a number of issues that (he) raised were based on incidents outside of the three (3) year statute of limitations for the presentation of grievances.” Id. at 69. Paradoxically, Bettucci then contends in the very next sentence that the record is clear that he did present grievances on these issues within the applicable time frame, but that these grievances were totally ignored by the Agency. Aside from the conclusory allegations set forth in Bettucci’s opposition to the motion to affirm the Board’s conclusion, the record is devoid of any showing that the Board’s jurisdictional determinations were improper or not supported by substantial evidence. The Board’s preliminary examination of jurisdictional issues is mandated by regulation and was proper in this case. See 22 C.F.R. § 904.2. Bettucci has failed to set forth any evidence establishing that he was unaware of the grounds for the claims documented in the grievance or unable to discover them through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Indeed, defendants are correct in their assertion that Bettueci presents no causal connection between the alleged mistreatment he received and his failure to present the untimely issues in a timely manner. Accordingly, it is this court’s conclusion that the Board did not err in limiting its jurisdiction to the grievances that were timely filed. b. Whether the Board Properly Revoked Bettucci’s Prescriptive Relief On March 10,1989, the Agency granted Bettucci’s request to stay his involuntary separation pending a final resolution of his grievance. On May 30, 1989, the Board granted the Agency’s request to revoke the stay. Bettueci claims that the revocation of the stay was contrary to the regulations governing the award of prescriptive relief and therefore, the Board’s actions were improper. Moreover, Bettueci contends that “the Board prejudged evidence prior to it being heard by the Board and had already arrived at a decision prior to the conclusion of the hearing.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 73. The applicable statute and regulation regarding prescriptive relief provide that: (a) If the Board determines that the agency is considering involuntary separation of the Grievant ... which is related to a grievance pending before the Board, and that such action should be suspended, the agency shall suspend such action until the Board has ruled on the grievance. 22 C.F.R. § 904.4(a). See also 22 U.S.C. § 4136(8). As this regulation indicates, the suspension of any action pending final determination by the Board is an action taken at the Board’s discretion. In the application for revocation of the prescriptive relief, the Agency argued that equitable principles should govern such a determination. In light of the absence of any case law construing this provision of the Foreign Service Act, it is this court’s conclusion that it was not inappropriate for the Board to rely on equitable principles in determining whether Bettueci’s prescriptive relief should be revoked. In this ease, the balance of the equities tipped in favor of revoking the prescriptive relief at issue. The Board considered the cost to the Agency of .continuing to compensate Bettueci during the remainder of the proceedings and the likelihood that Bettueci would suffer irreparable harm should the prescriptive relief be revoked. Because Bettueci failed to claim any com-pensable damage resulting from the revocation of the prescriptive relief, it cannot be said that the revocation resulted in irreparable harm. Had Bettueci prevailed in his grievance claim, an award of backpay, attorney’s fees, the correction of his record, and other relief could have been awarded to him. As such, Bettueci would have been fully compensated despite his claims to the contrary. Given the fact that the Board affirmed the Agency’s decision to mandatorily retire Bet-tucci, any alleged error resulting from the revocation of the prescriptive relief could be characterized as harmless. C. Whether the Board Failed to Afford Bettueci a Full and Fair Hearing Given His Pro Se Status During the course of the proceedings before the Board, Bettueci claims that he was forced to terminate the services of his retained counsel and that he proceeded pro se after unsuccessful efforts to locate alternate counsel. Bettueci contends that despite assurances from the Board that his pro se status would be taken into consideration, the Board failed to accommodate him. Bettueci asserts that the deprivation of a fair hearing is evidenced by the refusal of the Board to allow Bettueci to complete his oral testimony and the frequent interruption of this testimony, by permitting attorneys for the Agency to object to testimony offered by Bettueci and to cross-examine Bettueci during the course of his testimony, and “by the obvious harsh rush to judgment [by the Board] without consideration of developing a full and complete record on which a well reasoned decision could be made.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 80. The record is devoid of any evidence that the Board failed to consider Bettucci’s pro se status in the treatment of either Bettueci or the matter before the Board. Indeed, Bet-tucci’s current criticisms of the manner in which the Board handled his case are belied, by his own statement on the record made during the course of the proceedings: I would like to add to that and say I certainly appreciate your patience in my lack of experience and greenness in conducting these interviews and presenting my testimony, because I know you have been very kind and patient with me on that, and I appreciate that. Record of Proceedings (“ROP”), Part III, May 15,1989 Trans, at 299. Bettucci’s questioning of the cross-examination conducted by counsel for the Agency during his own testimony is rebutted by a party’s right as specified by statute to conduct cross-examination of witnesses at the hearing. See 22 U.S.C. § 4136(3) (“Each party ... shall be entitled to examine and cross-examine witnesses at the hearing ...”). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the examination of Bettucci was conducted in a harassing or vexatious manner. Bettucci’s attempts to call into question the manner in which counsel for the Agency voiced objections to certain evidence is equally without meiit. In addition to there being no evidence in the record to support such a claim, at the conclusion of the hearing before the Board, the Chairman commented: I want to commend Counsel, too, and I think you [Bettucci] will agree that they have—particularly when you were not represented by counsel—they have entertained some of the things that they would have instinctively objected] to if you had counsel. I know I could see some restraint on their part. That should be acknowledged. It may not have seemed that way to you because you did catch at times a deluge of objections, but there again we tried to protect you from that, too. ROP, Part III, May 15, 1989 Trans, at 300. Such observations by the Chairman and the lack of evidence to the contrary in the record lead this court to conclude that Bet-tucci was afforded a full and fair opportunity to proceed given his pro se status. The Board not only acted properly, it also gave more than ample consideration to Bettueci’s situation in this case. See PSGB May 14, 1990 Op. at 67-70 (detailing the Board’s treatment of Bettucci). d. Whether the Board Acted Improperly with Respect to Bettucci’s Witnesses Bettucci next contends that the Agency and the Board acted improperly in the treatment of Bettucci and his witnesses. The improper treatment alleged by Bettucci centers on the number of witnesses he was permitted to call at the hearing before the Board and allegations that the Board permitted the Agency to intimidate Bettucci’s witnesses. i. The Board’s Limiting of the Number of Witnesses to Be Called by Bettucci The Board required both the Agency and Bettucci to submit lists of proposed witnesses prior to the hearing. The Agency submitted a list of twenty-two witnesses and that list was approved by the Board after reduction of the number of witnesses to fifteen. Bettucci submitted a list of seventy-seven witnesses and in response, the Board required Bettucci to make a showing of relevance for these witnesses and to indicate the length of time that each witness was expected to testify. In sum, Bettucci claims that “the Board gave total discretion to the Agency to call any witness it wished but limited the Grievant to a few witnesses.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 81. The Board acted properly in taking steps to limit the number of witnesses and to ensure the relevancy of the testimony to be offered by each witness. By regulation and statute, the Board may: (a) ... in its discretion order a prehear-ing conference of the parties (which may be presided over by any member) for the purpose of considering: (4) identification of witnesses the parties may wish to call and the intended scope of their testimony; limitation on the number of witnesses; and arrangement for the appearance of witnesses. 22 C.F.R. 906.5(a)(4). See also 22 U.S.C. § 4136. Moreover, the Board is charged by applicable regulations to act as a gatekeeper in determining whether the presence of a witness is required at trial. See 22 C.F.R. § 906.8(b) (“If the Board determines that the actual presence of such witness at the hearing is required for just resolution of the case, the witness shall be made available at the hearing, with necessary costs and travel expenses paid by the Agency which is a party to the hearing.”). In the instant case, the Board requested that both parties limit the number of witnesses after review of the parties’ witness lists. See ROP, Part II at 733. (“The panel is concerned about the number of witnesses the parties have proposed.”). However, this request was completely disregarded by Bettucei. In response to the requests made by the Board for the parties to reexamine the proposed ■witnesses, Bettucei actually increased the number of his proposed witnesses. On February 24,1989, Bettucei submitted a Proposed Amended Witness List containing a list of seventy-two named witnesses. Id. at 785-90. On March 24, the Board made its request that the parties reexamine the number of proposed witnesses. Id. at 733. On April 7, 1989, Bettucei submitted a list of seventy-seven proposed witnesses without any explanation for the increase in number. Id. at 708-14. Furthermore, Bettucei failed to clearly and specifically identify the nature of the proposed testimony of these witnesses or its relevancy. Id. In contrast, the Agency reduced its proposed witness list to fifteen after the Board made its request. Id. at 718-22. Accordingly, the Board was well within its discretion in limiting the number of witnesses to be called by the parties and there is no indication in the record that the Board abused its discretion in making this determination. Moreover, Bettucei has made no effort to demonstrate that any witness or potential testimony that the Board excluded was relevant or that any exclusion was harmful to his case. ii. Agency Intimidation of Witnesses Bettucei also alleges that the Agency with the Board’s assistance engaged in actions designed to intimidate the witnesses Bettucei intended to call at the hearing. Bettucei states “[i]t is clear that each of the witnesses employed by the Agency is under its control and the entity to whom each of them must depend for a paycheck ... the very fact that they may be asked to testify on behalf of the Grievant in an action against the Agency is threatening.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 84. Furthermore, Bettucei asserts that the Board improperly granted the Agency the right to be present at any time that Bettucei interviewed witnesses who were Agency employees. The regulations governing access to witnesses in hearings before the Board are designed to ensure that litigants have access to potential witnesses who are employees of the Foreign Service. See 22 C.F.R. § 903.10 (“The grievant ... shall be given access to witnesses employed by the foreign affairs agencies.”). However, a grievant is required to advise the agency of the agency witnesses to be interviewed. Id. There is no prohibition within the rules preventing an Agency representative from attending the interview of a witness. Moreover, Bettucei has failed to present any extraordinary circumstances in the instant case that would warrant the exclusion of an Agency representative from such an interview. Bettucei simply draws the unsubstantiated conclusion that “[t]he effect of the Agency’s counsel being present during the Grievant’s attempt to prepare for the hearing was to intimidate the witnesses and prevent a fair assessment of the testimony, memory and effectiveness of the witnesses.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 83. The Board provided Bettucei with a thorough explanation of the procedures to be followed with respect to access to witnesses and the presence of Agency counsel when the witnesses were being interviewed by Bettuc-ci. The Chairman explained that Bettucei would be afforded the opportunity to.meet with an employee from the Agency without an Agency representative if the employee chose to do so. ROP, Part III, April 26,1989 Trans, at 221. However, the Chairman made it clear to Bettucei that the employees had a right to have counsel present when being interviewed by Bettucei. Specifically, the Chairman stated: [T]o the extent that you have asked for the Board’s intervention in this matter of contacting witnesses, we have tried to map out a fair procedure, which will recognize the interests of the Agency in their own employees, and sometimes the employees are reluctant to talk to outsiders.... If they say the wrong thing, are they going to be subject to some kind of reprisal? They have the right to ask that counsel be present when ... they are being asked questions about the business of the Agency, they have the right to rely on counsel.... If the employee is willing to meet with you one on one without counsel present, that is fine, and should be permitted, and the Board would insist that that be allowed. Id. at 223. No evidence has been presented by Bettueci suggesting that this procedure was not followed by the Board or that such a procedure was prejudicial to Bettucci’s case. As such, Bettueci has failed to identify any actions taken by the Board with respect to his proposed witnesses that could be characterized as improper. The record is similarly devoid of any evidence suggesting any improper action by the Board in this regard. e. Whether Bias on the Part of the Board Deprived Bettueci of a Fair Hearing Finally, Bettueci asserts that “[f]rom the inception of this matter before the Foreign Service Grievance Board, it has been clearly evident that the Board was biased against the Grievant and in favor of the Agency.” Opp. to Mot. to Affirm at 85. This assertion is supported, in part, by Bettucci’s belief that the Board “suggested” to the Agency that it should raise certain jurisdictional challenges to portions of Bettucci’s grievances and that the Agency followed this suggestion. Bettueci also contends that the Board proceeded to rule on the jurisdictional issue without ruling on his request for an increased amount of time to respond to the jurisdictional issues raised. Bettueci states that his overseas assignment precluded him from adequately responding to the matters before the Board and that the Board only “grudgingly” permitted him an additional week to respond to the jurisdictional issues. Furthermore, Bettueci claims that the Board precluded him from conducting proper discovery and unfairly limited the scope of his questioning in comparison to the limits imposed on the Agency. Bettueci concludes his argument on this issue by stating that “[t]he record is replete with instances in which the Board showed their bias in favor of the Agency.” Opp. Mot. to Affirm at 86. Bettueci fails to cite with specificity even one instance of bias contained in the record. Moreover, this court’s own review of the record has failed to uncover any hint that the Board exhibited any degree of bias in favor of the Agency or against Bettueci. In sum, Bettucci’s claims on this issue amount to an argument aptly described in the words of the Immortal Bard as being “full of sound and fury and signifying nothing.” f. Conclusion In sum, it is this court’s conclusion that Bettucci’s claims that the hearing before the Board was procedurally or statutorily defective are without merit. 2. Review of the Substantive Issues Considered by the Board As previously stated, the Board considered the various financial claims presented by Bettueci separate from his contentions concerning mandatory retirement. In its January 29, 1990 decision, the Board rejected Bettueci’s financial claims and in its May 14, 1990, the Board affirmed the Agency’s decision to involuntarily retire Bettueci. Accordingly, the court will consider separately whether each of the Board’s decisions are supported by substantial evidence from the record. a. The Board’s January 29, 1990 Decision The Board’s January 29, 1990 decision addresses Bettucci’s financial claims concerning the alleged denial of travel and other monetary benefits accrued during his tenure with the Agency. An individual raising griev-anees other than those concerning disciplinary actions must comply with the applicable time limit for filing such grievances and must meet the burden of proof set forth in the applicable regulations. The applicable time limit for filing non-disciplinary grievances is set forth in section 1104 of the Foreign Service Act. 22 U.S.C. § 4134. This section requires that grievances be filed within a period of three years after the occurrence giving rise to the grievance and this time limit may be equitably tolled. Section 905.1 of the Foreign Service Grievance Board Regulations provides the burden of proof that a grievant must meet and states that: (a) In all grievances other than those concerning disciplinary action, the grievant has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the grievance is meritorious. 22 C.F.R. § 905.1(a). In the instant case, Bettucci raised ten separate claims for financial reimbursement. In the original grievance submitted by Bet-tucci, these claims were numbered eight through fifteen and included the following: 8. Unfair treatment for shipment of a POV [“personally owned vehicle”] whereby grievant had to pay the cost of shipment of the POV to post. 9. Unfair treatment for processing a travel voucher for a dependant’s 180 TDY where the Controller intimidated grievant to change costs of the claim. 10. Unfair treatment for a travel voucher where grievant turned in an unused air ticket and was charged for the cost of the ticket. 11. Unfair treatment for lost annual leave when leave carry-over was approved by the mission. 12. Unfair treatment by PER for charging grievant the cost of airfare to post when PER neglected to issue travel authorization for grievant and family’s travel with AID/W. 13. Unfair treatment for PER- holding grievant and family at home leave residence without orders for unusually long periods of time. Requests for administrative leave were never responded to. 14. Unfair treatment for assigning griev-ant to a post with less than adequate medical facilities when his dependent infant was refused medical clearance to travel and grievant paid cost of airfare for dependent travel to post. 15. Unfair treatment for approved overtime/comptime which was later denied. ROP, Part V, Vol. 1 at 2. The Board rejected each of these claims for at least one of the following reasons: either the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations or Bettucci failed to carry his burden of proof by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims were meritorious. The Board’s opinion concerning these financial claims rejected claims 8, 9,10,11,13, and 14 as time barred. Claim 8, involving the shipment of a second privately-owned vehicle, was rejected by the Agency because Bettucci did not file the grievance on this until after four years after the Agency rejected his application. The Board agreed that the grievance was not timely filed and that Bettucci provided no evidence to show that he was entitled to shipment of a second vehicle. A review of the Bettucci’s grievance confirms that Bettucci filed his request outside the applicable time limit and moreover, his submission failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to shipment of a second vehicle. See ROP, Part V., Vol. 2 at 365-80. Claims 9 and 10 were rejected by the Board on similar grounds and stem from the same course of events. Bettucci filed a grievance concerning claim 9 indicating that he was not properly reimbursed for transfer expenses in 1983 and for subsequent medical expenses incurred in 1984 after members of his family were medically evacuated from Burundi in November 1983. With respect to this claim, Bettucci alleges that he should be reimbursed for medical expenses that were not paid by the Office of medical Services or by the insurance company. Id. at 397-400. Bettucci also contended in claim 10 that he was entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred by other members of his family in 1984 after his wife was medically evacuated from Burundi in November 1983. These issues were grieved in Bettucci’s submission of July 26, 1988 — more than four years after the agency’s actions regarding the transfer and medical expenses incurred in 1983 and 1984. The Board properly concluded that these claims were time barred. Claim 11 requested reimbursement for lost annual leave in Burundi and was rejected by the Agency because it was similarly time barred. Bettucci claimed that he lost 152 hours of annual leave carry-over in December 1983 after this time was canceled by the OAR/Burundi. Bettucci also alleges that additional leave was lost in April 1984. The record clearly indicates that claim 11 was submitted outside the applicable three year time limit. Accordingly, the Agency and the Board did not err in rejecting this claim. See ROP, Part V, Vol. 2 at 353-54. Claim 13 refers to Bettucci’s request of June 6, 1984 for administrative leave to be used that same year to re-establish his family in Fort Lauderdale. Although the Agency rejected this request in 1984, Bettucci failed to grieve this issue until July 1988. Therefore, the grievance was clearly filed outside the three year limit. See ROP, Part V, Vol. 2 at 355-59. Finally, claim 14 concerned Bettucci’s request for a travel voucher for his dependent son. Again, this claim was considered time barred by both the Agency and the Board. The voucher was submitted and rejected in 1983 and Bettucci’s grievance on this matter was not submitted until 1988. Bettucci’s submissions are devoid of any evidence indicating that he brought the grievance on this issue within the applicable time limit. As such, the Agency and the Board did not err in rejecting this claim as time barred. Id. at 350-52. See generally ROP, Part I, 75-78 (FSGB’s Op. at 2-3) (detailing the Board’s consideration of the time barred claims); ROP, Part III, May 11, 1989 Trans, at 245 (transcript of hearing before the Board and Board stating “[w]e don’t have the authority to entertain the claim [for reimbursement] because it was a matter that could have been raised at any time after it was denied and you waited beyond the three years to grieve it.”). The remaining claims are summarized in the Board’s decision as arising from “generalized allegations that the agency subjected him to mismanagement, neglect, lack of equal consideration, etc.” and that his claims “were the result of the agency’s refusal to grant him fair and equal consideration.” ROP, Part I at 79. In one specific example presented in the Board’s decision, Bettucci’s submission for claims totaling $17,957.57 are supported by his assertion that “he was not treated fairly, due to neglect, error or omission.” Id. Indeed, Bettucci prefaced his submission setting forth his claims for financial reimbursement in the following manner: The following details describe a series of Personnel administrative actions which grievant alleges have not been given fair consideration or treatment due to neglect, error or omission. These additional claims are requested as relief under this grievance. ROP, Part V, Vol. 2 at 347. After reviewing this and other submissions, the Board concluded “[the evidence presented by Bettucci] is not the kind of evidence that would enable the Board to determine whether [he] is legally entitled to the amounts claimed.” Id. The Board characterized his submissions as “a disjointed narrative with many unsubstantiated allegations” and stated that “[he] has failed to show in this instance, or in other monetary claims, the specific basis or authority on which his claim rests.” The Board ultimately concluded that “[Bettucci] has not met the burden of proof, under section 905 of the Board’s regulations, to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his complaints ... are meritorious.” Id. Upon review of the record, it is this court’s conclusion that the Board’s January 29, 1990 decision rejecting Bettucci’s financial claims is supported by substantial evidence. The record is clear that Bettucci failed to demonstrate that his claims were filed within the applicable time limits or that the applicable time limits should be tolled. Notwithstanding that the majority of his financial claims were time barred, the record similarly demonstrates that he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the financial claims were meritorious. See, e.g., ROP, Part III. May 11, 1989 Trans, at 244 (“That is a claim for reimbursement for your son’s travel in the period June 1983 ... You attached a travel claim that was not dated. There is no signature of an approving official. There is no evidence that the travel voucher was ever actually submitted.”); id. at 250 (indicating that Bettucci failed to “show how much money was involved” in his grievance claims); id. at 251 (discussion between Board members, counsel for the Agency, and Bettucci regarding unsuccessful search conducted by members of the Board for documents that demonstrated that Bet-tucci’s claims were timely filed). Moreover, the actual grievance of March 8, 1989 containing Bettucei’s financial claims and the accompanying attachments confirms that the conclusions reached by the Board are supported by substantial evidence. See ROP, Part Y, Vol. 2 at 347-97 (Bettucei’s March 8, 1988 grievance); ROP, Part V, Vol. V at 550-817 (accompanying attachments referenced in Bettucci’s March 8, 1998 grievance). Therefore, it is this court’s conclusion that the Board’s decision regarding Bettucci’s financial claims was correct. b. The Board’s May H, 1989 Decision The Board’s May 14, 1990 opinion addressed the substantive issues related to the mandatory retirement of Bettucci. As discussed in Part I of this opinion, the Board identified the issues it considered as follows: I. Whether [AID] violated the rules, regulations, and/or procedures governing the assignment process in reference to [Bettucci]. II. Whether [AID] violated the rules, regulations, and/or procedures governing the training opportunities granted or denied [Bettucci], III. Whether the Employee Evaluation Reports (“EERs”) relied on by AID in the proceedings to mandatorily retire [Bettucci] were inaccurate, erroneous, or falsely prejudicial. IV. Whether the 1987[STB] violated applicable precepts, rules, regulations, or policies in low-ranking [Bettucci] and referring him to the Performance Standards Board (“PSB”). V. Whether the 1987[PSB] violated applicable precepts, rules, regulations or policies in recommending that [Bettuc-ei] be mandatorily retired. VI. Whether improper matters, including but not limited to [Bettucei’s] “corridor reputation”, were factors in or considered in the proceedings to mandatorily retire [him]. VII. Whether [AID] violated applicable rules, regulations or policies in the decision to mandatorily retire [Bet-tucci] or in the implementation of that decision. FSGB May 14, 1990 Op. at 3. The court will now consider whether the conclusions reached by the Board on these issues were supported by substantial evidence from the record. i. Whether the Agency Violated the Rules, Regulations, and/or Procedures Governing the Assignment Process in Reference to Bettucci In his Post-Trial Brief submitted to the Board and his opposition to the motion to affirm the Board’s decision, Bettucci argued that the Agency violated its own rules, regulations, and/or procedures governing the assignment process. ROP, Part I at 420. Specifically, Bettucci asserts that because in his view he had no performance problems while employed with the Board, his failure to obtain the assignments he sought could only be attributed to improper actions by the Agency. In support of his assertions, Bettucci contends that he was not properly assigned to the overseas post he requested because his “corridor reputation” was unfairly considered. Bettucci alleges that witnesses testified as to their awareness of his reputation and that his reputation was a consideration in the assignment process. Bettucci also states that the individuals involved in the assignment process had access to and awareness of his 1986 grievance and consideration of this material would have been equally improper. See ROP, Part I at 424-25 (Griev-ant’s Post-Trial Brief of Aug. 14, 1989 at 53-54). Furthermore, Bettucci alleges that the Assignment Board failed to properly consider the health of his family in making assignment determinations. Specifically, Bettucci states that the Assignment Board failed to assign him to a post of duty with adequate medical facilities. Finally, deficiencies in language training are also asserted by Bettucci. In this regard, Bettucci claimed that the Assignment Board ignored the option of assigning him to a post for which he was language qualified. In its rejection of Bettucci’s grievance on this issue, the Board concluded that although Bettucci cited several witnesses who testified that they were aware of his corridor reputation, he failed to point to any Assignment Board members that actually relied on this reputation in making assignment determinations. Moreover, the Board’s opinion indicates that Bettucci’s failure to obtain certain assignments was attributable to his performance problems, his arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. FSGB May 14, 1990 Op. at 8. The Board’s opinion states “Griev-ant argues that he had no performance problems ... But the record shows clearly that grievant did have performance problems, namely his difficulty in working with others, which impeded his assignments.” Id. at 8-9. The Board also cited the credible testimony of Assignment Board members that indicated that they followed the appropriate precepts. Id. at 9. The record amply supports the conclusion that the opinion of the Board is supported by substantial evidence. Bettucci states that the testimony of witnesses John Steele, John Speicher, Dan Sutton, Carole Jones, and Robert Halligan demonstrates that the Assignment Board acted improperly with respect to determining Bettucci’s assignment. However, the testimony of these witnesses indicates otherwise. Not only is the record and testimony of these witnesses devoid of any suggestion that consideration of Bettuc-ci’s corridor reputation was a substantial factor in the assignment process, the record also fails to suggest that any improper consideration was undertaken by the Board including consideration of Bettucci’s past grievances or the medical necessities of his family. John Steele testified that during the relevant time period, he was the second level supervisor of Bettucci for a period of 14 months. Steele indicated that he was familiar with the work performed by Bettucci in his division and rated his performance as a rating officer. ROP, Part III, April 11 Trans, at 19-20. When asked as director of the Office of Management Support and supervisor of Bettucci if Bettucci could perform in an FS-1 position, Steele stated that “because of [Bettucci’s] judgment, ... I questioned how well he could perform in an FS-1 position.” Id. at 29. Steele was also questioned before the Board regarding Bet-tucci’s capacity to handle a large overseas installation as executive officer. Id. at 35. Steele responded by testifying that the attitude problems exhibited by Bettucci made it difficult for him to respond to the type of problems that executive officers frequently encounter because in Steele’s opinion, the proper attitude is a critical characteristic in that position. Id. at 36. Steele also stated that when he brought Bettucci’s interest in obtaining certain positions to the attention to supervisors, “[t]heir responses were universally negative.” ROP, Part III April 28, 1989 Trans, at 203. With respect to Bettucci’s corridor reputation, Steele testified that he was aware that Bettueci did have such a reputation and that in fact all employees had such a reputation. Id. at 208 (stating that Bettucci’s reputation was that he was difficult to work with and contentious). When asked if Bettucci’s reputation impacted his decisions to assign Bet-tueci, Steele clearly stated “I can say with certainty that [discussions of assignments for Bettueci] were not affected by that reputation.” Id. at 209. Steele explained that official reports that would be made available to an assignment board would be one of the causes of a corridor reputation. Id. at 216. In Steele’s view, it would not be possible to sever a corridor reputation from the negative reports properly considered by the assignment board as the former is the product of the latter. Steele’s testimony offers no evidence that the assignment board improperly relied on any corridor reputation that Bettuc-ci may have developed. See Part III, April 11, 1989 Trans, at 28-64; ROP, Part III, April 28,1989 Trans, at 196-221. The testimony of John Speicher also confirms that Bettueci received negative evaluations during the course of his employment with the Agency that placed Bettueci in the lower 5-10% of all rated individuals. ROP, Part III, April 12,1989 Trans, at 60. Speicher served as a Career Development Officer (“CDO”) and counseled Bettueci when he received his poor evaluation. Id. at 67. Speicher confirmed deficiencies in Bettucci’s interpersonal skills and stated that “if a person has a reputation for poor performance or a bad reputation or a professional reputation or a corridor reputation ... it will impact on how this person is viewed against other qualified candidates that are coming up for the same job at the same time.” Id. at 74. Speicher equated a corridor reputation with a performance record and indicated that the two were essentially inseparable. Id. at 78. As an assignment board member, Speicher recalled Bettucci’s name coming before the Board but had no specific recollection of giving any consideration to his corridor reputation. Id. at 101. In fact, Speicher had no recollection of the actual consideration of Bettueci for an assignment when his name came before the Board. Id. Speicher also testified that he acted as an advocate for Bettueci before the Board but admitted that other candidates had superior qualifications for the positions for which Bettueci applied. Id. at 103. One of the final questions put to Speicher was whether he had any reason to believe that the assignment board violated its precepts with respect to Bettueci. Id. at 104. In response to this question, Speicher simply stated “no” and concluded that he believed that the Board identified a good assignment for Bettueci. Id. Bettueci also asserts that the testimony Daniel Sutton supports his argument that the Agency violated rules, regulations, or procedures in assigning grievant between March 1985 and March 1988. Sutton was a voting member of the Assignment Board from March 1983 through December 1984 and acted in a supervisory role with respect to Bet-tueci thereafter. ROP, Part III, April 28, 1989 Trans, at 152. Sutton also signed off on an EER for Bettueci covering the period of June 1986 through December 1986. Id. Sutton testified regarding his efforts to improve Bettucci’s negative reputation within the Agency. Id. at 157. Although Sutton suggested that greater detail in Bettucei’s 1987 EER would have been helpful, he testified that he could recall no erroneous, incorrect, or falsely prejudicial information contained in this report chronicling Bettucei’s shortcomings. Id. at 162. Carole Jones, Employee Relations Specialist for foreign service personnel during April 1987, also testified during the proceedings before the Board. Bettueci contacted Jones during April 1987 because he was having difficulty obtaining an oversees assignment. ROP, Part III, April 26, 1989 Trans, at 17. Jones testified that it was her understanding that Bettueci was having difficulty in obtaining overseas assignments because of the nature of his reputation. Id. at 23. She also stated that members of the Career Development office discussed his corridor reputation and what could be done to improve this reputation. Id. at 131. However, Jones ultimately indicated that she had no personal, first-hand knowledge of this reputation and although Jones made certain recommendations pertaining to Bettueci’s assignments, there is no evidence that she had any role in actually assigning Bettucci. Id. at 39-40. Finally, Bettucci alleges that the testimony of Robert Halligan reveals the impropriety of the actions taken by the Assignment Board. Halligan served as Director of Personnel from 1986 through 1988. ROP, Part III, April 26, 1989 Trans, at 168. His duties in this capacity included determining who would sit on the Performance Standard Board (“PSB”), convening the PSB, and taking the results of the PSB and sending letters to Agency employees who were recommended for selection out and to those who were not recommended for selection. Id. While not a member of the PSB, Halligan was responsible for reviewing the recommendations of the PSB and acting on these recommendations. Id. at 158-69. Halligan testified that he reviewed the recommendation provided by the PSB regarding Bettucci recommending Bettucci for “retirement due to relative performance.” Id. In following the recommendation of the Board, Halligan stated that he had no reason to question the judgment of the PSB. Id. at 164. Halligan also testified that he attempted to assist Bettucci in obtaining a suitable overseas assignment. Id. at 168. In fact, Halli-gan directed that Bettucci be assigned to the overseas post of Sri Lanka. The directing of the assignment was prompted by the fact that the Agency has an obligation to assign Foreign Service officers overseas and a consequence of the fact that Bettucci was not “sought after” for an overseas assignment. Halligan also testified regarding the corridor reputation of Bettucci. Halligan stated that he was unaware of Bettucci’s corridor reputation and would not have considered it in deciding whether the affirm the recommendation of the PSB. Id. at 180. The record also indicates that Halligan considered only the recommendation of the PSB. This recommendation included a review of Bettuc-ci’s entire file relative to other members of his class. Id. at 182. Halligan stated that he had no reason to believe that the PSB violated its Precepts with respect to Bettucci. Id. In response to Bettucci’s argument that prior grievances were improperly considered, Halligan concluded his testimony by stating that the Assignment Board would not have access to personnel files that would contain a grievance filed by any individual. Id. at 205. Therefore, any grievances filed by Bettucci would not be considered by the Assignment Board in their decisions to assign Bettucci. Similarly, the PSB would not have access to grievances filed by an employee. Id. In sum, Bettucci points to the testimony of several witnesses as supporting the conclusion that the Agency violated rules, regulations, or procedures in assigning him between March 1985 and March 1988. However, an actual review of the testimony offered by these witnesses fails to suggest that the Agency acted improperly in any manner when assigning Bettucci. Although these witnesses testified as to the existence of Bettucci’s negative corridor reputation, the testimony reveals that the reputation is simply mirrors Bettueci’s evaluation reports. Bettucci’s negative reports do not exist in a vacuum and it is natural for reviewing parties to draw conclusions regarding Bettucci’s abilities and qualifications from these reports. There is no testimony or other evidence suggesting that Bettucci’s reputation was a substantial factor in assigning him or that the reputation was relied on by the Assignment Board to an extent greater than any reputation that would be generated from simply reading his evaluation reports. Bettucci’s contentions that he could not obtain an overseas assignment for improper reasons, in particular due to the reliance on corridor reputation, is belied by the testimony of Halligan as discussed above. As stated, Halligan testified that he never considered reputation in Bettucci’s case. Moreover, the review of the record as discussed above demonstrates that there is extensive evidence supporting the conclusion that Bettucci had performance problems and that the Agency made every effort to assist Bettucci in improving his performance and his reputation within the Agency. Bettucci’s claims are unsubstantiated and a review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial evidence to support the Grievance Board’s decision on this issue. ii. Whether Bettucci’s Career Development and Training Assignments Violated Applicable Rules and Regulations Bettueci contends that the Agency-deprived him of effective career development, training, and foreign language instruction. ROP, Part I at 437 (Grievant’s Post-Trial Brief at 66). In the area of career development, Bettueci alleges that career counseling and interaction with a career development officer was unavailable to him pri- or to 1985. Id. After that date, Bettueci states that the contact was sporadic and was reactive rather than proactive. Id. Bettueci also argues that “circumstances indicate that the Agency, in an attempt to validate the erroneous comments in the 1995 EER grieved [by Bettueci], chose to make it appear that Grievant had a problem which required counseling.” Id. at 437-38. Deficiencies in significant training opportunities are also alleged by Bettueci. Id. at 439. This training deficiency is cited as the primary factor preventing Bettueci from competing for advancement in the Foreign Service. Id. at 439-40. Bettueci contends that the Agency denied him the requisite language training necessary for overseas duty and that his performance rating was consistently downgraded due to language deficiency. Id. at 441. The Board characterized Bettucci’s arguments in the following manner: “grievant is essentially arguing that his career did not prosper as he thought it should, or as well as those of some of his peers... In these generalized allegations, gr