Pirschel v. Sorrell (2 F. Supp. 2d 930, 1998)

OPINION AND ORDER

FORESTER, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for review.

1. Factual Background.

In early 1997, Plaintiff Mark Pirschel was a student at Montgomery County High School (MCHS). On Friday, February 28, 1997, Plaintiff and his friends attended a basketball tournament held at Estill County High School (ECHS) in which MCHS was a participating team. After entering the gymnasium, Plaintiff went out to his truck to dispose of beer stored there. While carrying the beer across the ECHS parking lot, he was apprehended by Irvine police officer James Fee. Fee ordered Plaintiff to pour the alcohol out in a dumpster and go back inside the gymnasium.

Fee later informed both ECHS and MCHS officials of the incident. According to Plaintiff, Defendant MCHS Principal Roy Sorrell, who was in attendance, informed him that regardless of whether he actually consumed any alcohol he would be suspended because he was in possession of alcohol on school property. During this encounter, it was determined that Plaintiff had consumed no alcohol that evening. Plaintiff did not deny that he was in possession of the beer during his encounter with Sorrell or when talking about the incident with Assistant Principal White. Sorrell then telephoned Plaintiffs parents and informed them of their son’s suspension. Sorrell then contacted the Montgomery County Superintendent to confirm the five-day suspension, which became effective March 3,1997.

On April 9, 1997, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging a panoply of claims, including those made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, under § 1983 Plaintiff alleges that the manner in which he was informed of the suspension violated his procedural due process rights and MCHS’s disciplinary policy regarding alcohol possession by students was unconstitutionally applied. Plaintiff also asserts various state law claims. Defendants move for summary judgment, asserting that the suspension, as a matter of law, did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

II. Discussion.

In his complaint, Plaintiff cites a number of provisions from the Federal and Kentucky constitutions. The gravamen of the complaint, however, is that the manner in which Sorrell carried out the suspension violated Plaintiffs procedural due process rights and that Plaintiffs actions were beyond the scope of KRS 158.150(l)(a), making his suspension improper.

a. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979).

Once the moving party shows that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence” to demonstrate that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Co., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir.1993). Conclusive allegations are not enough to allow a nonmoving party to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 343. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmov-ing party].” Anderson, All U.S. at 252. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

b. Is the Basketball Tournament a School-Sponsored Activity?

Plaintiff claims that his possession of beer on ECHS property did not warrant suspension under the terms of KRS 158.150, which provides

(1) All pupils admitted to the common schools shall comply with the lawful regulations for the government of schools: (a) ... the use or possession of alcohol or drugs ... on school property, as well as off school property at school-sponsored activities, constitutes cause for suspension or expulsion from school....

KRS 158.150(l)(a). Plaintiff contends that because the incident did not occur on MCHS property, the suspension exceeded the bounds of Sorrell’s authority. In addition, Plaintiff believes that the basketball game is not the type of school-sponsored activity contemplated by the Kentucky General Assembly. Thus, the task at hand is to determine whether a student’s attendance at an event in which his school is a participant is a school-sponsored activity within the meaning of KRS 158.150.

KRS 158.150(l)(a) lists two settings in which possession of alcohol is punishable: on school property and off of school property at school-sponsored activities. In light of this distinction, Plaintiffs position that a principal in one county is without the broad authority to suspend for possession at any time on school property in another county is persuasive. Clearly, various acts committed by students raise concern. KRS 158.150 permits certain conduct to either be “pigeonholed” into one of the two punishable contexts or come outside of the province of school officials. While Sorrell would have certainly been correct in suspending a student for possession of alcohol on MCHS grounds after school, it is doubtful that a principal in Fulton County is able to suspend one of her students for walking through an empty Boyd County schoolyard on a Sunday while in possession of a bottle of beer. Therefore, plaintiff in this case could not properly be suspended for possessing alcohol on school property.

The second setting in which possession of aleohol may give rise to suspension requires a different approach. The distinction made in KRS 158.150(l)(a) between “on school property” and “off of school property at a school-sponsored activity” reflects a balance struck between those acts which trigger the duties of school officials acting as in loco parentis and conduct where the imposition of discipline is better left to the exclusive province of parents and law enforcement. For example, Sorrell may properly discipline a student found with alcohol during a school club trip. See Clark County Bd. of Educ. v. Jones, 625 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Ky.App.1981). The question here, however, is not as clear.

Whether an activity is a school-sponsored activity is a question of law. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir.1989). School sponsorship may be found where school officials schedule, set eligibility requirements for, and fund an activity. Id. Here, the assumption that MCHS officials play a role in setting eligibility requirements for its athletes and approving funding for their equipment as well as scheduling games weighs in favor of the tournament being a school-sponsored activity. Whether the activity is a school-sponsored activity for the students attending the tournament as spectators requires further consideration.

In deciding whether Plaintiffs conduct while attending the tournament at ECHS justified the suspension, the mission of school administrators and the amount of deference given to their decisions must be analyzed. The United States Supreme Court has on a number of occasions addressed these issues. “The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.” Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) (suspension for lewd language in speech not violative of due process). “The system of public education that has evolved in this nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Only when official action has no valid educational purpose is judicial intervention required to protect a student’s constitutional rights. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). So long as official conduct is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, such conduct does not run afoul of the constitution. Id.; Poling, 872 F.2d at 762 (student declared ineligible in school election due to rude content of campaign speech not violative of First Amendment). Thus, while students clearly are not stripped of their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, decisions made by school officials in imposing discipline are afforded considerable deference. See id.

With the mission of school officials in mind, it must now be determined if Plaintiffs conduct arose at a school-sponsored activity. In light of a school’s function of teaching students the shared values of a civilized social order, sporting events in which one’s school is a participant, regardless of where played, are school-sponsored activities. By involvement with their school’s teams, whether as a player or a fan, students learn the importance of fair play and experience a camaraderie which few events create. Attending games also teaches young people how to conduct themselves in large groups. In addition, spectators, like the players, are able to enjoy the “thrill of victory” as well as endure “the agony of defeat”, with each preparing students how to handle successes and disappointments that may come later in life. These and the numerous other benefits conferred upon students who support their school’s teams are consistent with the goals of educators.

In addition, educators are entitled to exercise greater control over activities which “the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Clearly, when school officials make available various extra-curricular activities, the performance of its students during those activities is a reflection of the school itself. One school’s dominance in an activity may become so inextricably tied to the school as a whole that reference to that school without mention of the activity is rare. In the context of sporting events, student attendance at games, whether played at home or away, plays a large role in the success of the team as the so-called “sixth man” often is the difference between winning and losing. Thus, just as á school may take pride in the success of its teams on the field, it may be equally as proud of its students’ expression of loyalty for their team, at home and away, in an exuberant yet civilized manner.

While a school may reap the benefits of a successful team and well-behaved fans, it may also be strapped with a negative label in the event its teams display poor sportsmanship. For example, most, if not all, University of Kentucky basketball fans recall Duke University star Christian Laettner stepping on a Kentucky player’s chest during a NCAA tournament game. Although that incident took place several years ago, many still consider Duke a dirty team. Teams at the high school level are not immune from this phenomenon. Undoubtedly, if during the game at ECHS, a MCHS player committed a similar transgression, those in attendance would characterize the team as dirty. Thus, if a player acting in this manner is ignored by either the coach or by other school officials, the school in essence sanctions the conduct.

The same may be said with respect to the conduct of the students attending the game. Just as a school may be labeled as having excellent students based on others’ perception of their conduct, a negative reputation will result if students’ behavior is unbecoming. The conduct at issue here, possession of alcohol, is of even greater concern in light of teen drug and alcohol use as well as the number of lives taken by those driving while intoxicated. Thus, just as an athlete’s improper conduct on the field has a negative impact on a school’s image, so do students using or. possessing alcohol while attending games.

Plaintiff argues that school sponsored events are limited to those where a student requires permission to attend, citing the MCHS definition of school related trips and activities. According to MCHS’s policy governing school-related trips, the Principal must approve all regularly scheduled athletic events, athletic events which are part of a tournament, and trips made within a 150 mile radius of the school. [Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4], Thus, the argument goes, since Plaintiff did not need Sor-rell’s permission to attend the tournament, the activity was not a school-sponsored activity. This argument is unpersuasive. Based on Plaintiff’s reasoning, a basketball game in which MCHS is the visiting team is a school-sponsored activity for the players but not their fellow students attending the game. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the Court is aware of none, where “school-sponsored activities” for purposes of KRS 158.150(l)(a) is defined in this bifurcated manner. Further, the quoted MCHS provision indicates that the trip, and not a student’s participation, requires Principal approval. This is a reasonable requirement considering that the school normally provides transportation to and from these types of events and the requirement does not diminish