Full opinion text
ORDER AFFIRMING REPORT & RECOMMENDATION KIMBALL, District Judge. This matter was.referred to Magistrate Ronald N. Boyce pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Judge Boyce issued a Report and Recommendation, dated August 7, 1998. Defendant Beckwith filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 19, 1998. The United States similarly filed objections on August 20, 1998. Defendant then filed a response to the United States’ objections on August 26,1998. Having reviewed and analyzed the Report and Recommendation and the objections and responses of the parties, this Court finds no merit to either parties’ objections. Accordingly, this Court approves the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in all its particulars and adopts it as the Court’s own Order. REPORT & RECOMMENDATION BOYCE, United States Magistrate Judge. The defendant, Randy Lee Beckwith, has been indicted and charged with one count of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d)) and one count of use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, the bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). The offenses were allegedly committed in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 27, 1996 (File Entry #1). The defendant made a motion to suppress evidence, alleging his arrest in Denver, Colorado on or about August 30, 1996, was illegal and that evidence taken from him and statements obtained from him should be suppressed (File Entry # 28). Defendant filed a second similar motion to suppress (File Entry # 29). The United States made a preliminary response to the defendant’s motions (File Entry #34). The defendant submitted a supplemental memorandum and another memorandum was submitted and filed seeking suppression of a statement defendant allegedly made to FBI Agent Castro in the Denver County Jail (File Entry # 58). An initial hearing on the motions to suppress was held on January 14, 1998 (File Entry # 61). A second hearing was held on January 23, 1998. Post hearing briefs were requested. The defendant submitted a post hearing fhemorandum on March 19, 1998 (File Entries #’s 83 & 85). The United States submitted its post hearing memorandum received by the Magistrate Judge on May 5, 1998. The defendant submitted a reply memorandum on May 19, 1998 (File Entry # 96). The reply was received by the Magistrate Judge on May 26, 1998. A final argument was held on June 9,' 1998. Additional memorandum were submitted. Defendant’s last memorandum was submitted on July 13,1998. The case has been referred to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). This report and recommendation is submitted pursuant to the reference on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds. Evidence The initial hearing on this motion was held on January 14, 1998. At that time, Officer Wayne C. Depew, a police officer with the City and County of Denver, testified. He had been an officer for twenty seven (27) years (Tr. p. 6). On August 30, 1996 Officer Depew was working as a patrolman with the Denver Police Department (Tr. p. 7). He was assigned to District Six, the lower downtown area with lower income housing areas. It was considered a high crime area, with a large volume of narcotics activity. The officer was also engaged in narcotics efforts. As a uniformed officer he would make arrests in “buy/bust operations” by narcotics detectives (Tr. p. 8). On August 30, 1996 a vehicle stop was made of a driver named Dale Robbins. The vehicle was a four door silver Nissen. The vehicle was in bad shape. The back window was out, with a plastic cover, it had California plates. The vehicle was in a “signed left turn lane from Broadway Southbound.” The vehicle had to make a left turn onto 21st Street. The vehicle came out of the lane and crossed back into the lane of traffic. The driving action violated the Denver City Code by violating a designated lane assignment. The vehicle. failed to turn and returned to the traffic. There was another officer along with Depew who was driving the police vehicle and that officer, Bloodworth, mentioned the driving violation and the officers pulled in behind the vehicle to stop it. At that time they also noticed that the California license plate had expired (Tr. pp. 8-10). Officer Henry Bloodworth was the officer driving the vehicle and Depew informed Bloodworth of the driving violation. The defendant’s vehicle was pulled to the curb (Tr. pp. 10-11). Officer Bloodworth approached the driver, Depew went to the passenger side for safety reasons. Depew observed that the vehicle’s back window was out. In the rear of the vehicle was numerous articles of clothing suggesting people were living in the vehicle (Tr. p. 12). He noticed a bottle of Chlorox bleach and discolored rags with a red substance. Depew could not hear the conversation between Officer Bloodworth and the driver. Depew initiated a conversation with the passenger (Tr. p. 12). The defendant Randy Lee Beckwith was the passenger. The officer asked Beckwith for his name. Beckwith stated he had no “I.D.” on him. The officer then asked Beckwith to exit the vehicle, which he did. A pat down was conducted but nothing was found (Tr. p. 13). Defendant seemed nervous while talking to the officer. Defendant gave the officer the name of Christopher Ayer with a date of birth of September 8, 1956. Because of the out of state plates, the officer asked defendant where he was staying and he said a motel on South Broadway in Denver, but could not give a name of the motel or its address. The officer wanted the information for a field card contact (Tr. pp. 14-15). Defendant said he just met the driver. The officer asked defendant to get back in the vehicle after the officer had obtained the information he had sought (Tr. p. 15). Officer Depew than walked around to the driver’s side of the vehicle where Officer Bloodworth was talking to the driver (Tr. pp. 15-16). Officer Depew asked the driver the name of the passenger and the driver said “Randy” and he said he didn’t know his last name. The driver said he’d met the passenger a couple of days before. The driver did not know the name or address of the motel where the two were staying but said it was on South Broadway. Because the passenger said his name was Christopher and the driver said it was Randy and based on the passenger’s behavior Offi- ■ cer Depew believed the passenger had lied to the officer about the passenger’s name and the officer had a right to make an arrest (Tr. pp. 16-17). The officer went around to the passenger and told him he was under arrest'. The defendant asked what for and the officer told him that the driver said his name was Randy. Defendant finally gave the officer the name of Randy Beckwith (Tr. p. 17). Defendant was taken out of the vehicle, told he was under arrest and then defendant was told what the driver had said. The arrest was based on a Denver City ordinance, a misdemeanor (Tr. p. 17). Defendant was handcuffed, patted down and a large quantity of cash was found in defendant’s front pant’s pocket. Twenty dollar bills were found which appeared discolored with red dye on them. The officer put the money in defendant’s shirt pocket (Tr. p. 18). In another pocket a small amount of what appeared to be black tar heroin was found (Tr. p. 19). This was a felony narcotics violation (Id.). When the officer was placing defendant in the car, he noticed defendant make a motion with his leg and the officer observed a brown wallet lying on the concrete in the gutter. The officer picked it up. It was bulging with twenty dollar bills. It contained a California driver’s license and “ID” in the name of Randy Beckwith. It also contained a photograph of defendant (Tr. pp. 19-20). The officer gave defendant his wallet but kept the “ID.” The officer did not, at that time, suspect defendant as being involved in a bank robbery (Tr. p. 20). In the police car, on the way to police headquarters, Officer Depew gave the defendant a Miranda warning, which defendant said he understood (Tr. p. 21). During the ride to the police station, defendant was moving about quite a bit and this raised the officer’s suspicion. The officer took defendant’s wallet out of his pants from where defendant was attempting to remove it. The officer put the wallet in defendant’s shirt pocket. During the ride to police headquarters, defendant said he would like to help the police and would make drug buys in the area (Tr. p. 21). On arrival at the police station, because of what defendant had said, he was taken to the vice bureau to meet with the narcotics detectives. Defendant was placed in a holding cell (Tr. pp. 21-22). The officer observed a large amount of cash on the floor of the cell. Apparently it was the money that had been put in defendant’s shirt pocket, which now didn’t have any cash in it. Defendant was trying to push the money under a bench (Tr. p. 23). The traffic stop of the vehicle and defendant was routine (Tr. p. 28). The driver was cited for a no insurance, and expired plates. Officer Bloodworth gave the driver a break and did not charge the lane violation (Tr. p. 28). The driver’s name was Robbins (Tr. p. 31). When defendant said his name was Christopher Ayer, the officer suspected that he was lying (Tr. pp. 31-32). No middle name was given by defendant when he first gave the name of Christopher Ayer to Officer Depew (Tr. p. 33). Prior to defendant’s arrest he was free to leave, he could have gotten out of the vehicle and left (Tr. p. 35). The officer did not inform Beckwith of that fact (Tr. p. 35). , After defendant’s arrest, a packet of heroin was found in his pocket (Tr. p. 36). After defendant was handcuffed, that was the time when the officer found defendant’s wallet (Tr. p. 37). The stop of the vehicle by the officers was about 15:10 hours (3:10 pm). The rags and “chlorine bleach” the officer observed was not confiscated (Tr. p. 41). The defendant was given a Miranda warning, orally, after his arrest while defendant was in the police vehicle as it was pulling away. The warning was deficient because defendant was not told he could have an attorney present before or during questioning, even if he could not afford an attorney (Tr. p. 53). Defendant was not questioned, but defendant volunteered a willingness to help the narcotics detectives (Tr. p. 54). During the initial encounter, defendant was cooperative (Tr. p. 55). Special Agent Michael Castro, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Denver field office, testified that in August, 1996 he was working bank robberies investigations (Tr. pp. 61-62). The agent became familiar with the defendant when the Denver Police robbery unit and another FBI agent gave Agent Castro some information that money with red dye stains was taken from defendant which was similar to the security dye used against bank robberies (Tr. p. 63). Agent Castro was working on an August bank robbery in Denver and the driver of the vehicle ■who was with defendant, Robbins, matched the description of the bank robber (Tr. pp. 63-64). Castro was advised that the defendant was cooperative and was willing to give information, however it was also said that the other officers felt defendant was not involved (Tr. p. 64). The agent was interested in talking to Beckwith about the dye stained money (Tr. p. 65). The agent went to the Denver County Jail and indicated he would like to speak to Beck-with. He came from where he was being detained into one of the interview rooms. No threats were made, the agent intro.duced himself to Beckwith. The agent’s intent was to have Beckwith be a witness for the agent about the Denver bank robbery (Tr. pp. 65-66). The agent had a conversation with Beckwith. The agent told Beckwith he’d like him to be a witness. Beckwith said he may know where the red dye came from but wanted his drug case fixed (Tr. p. 67). The agent said he couldn’t promise him anything like that and that condition would have to go through the prosecutor and defense counsel and the agent would have to know what Beckwith knew. The agent also said he would like Beckwith to take a polygraph exam (Tr. p. 67). The conversation lasted about 10 to 20 minutes. The interview was on September 5, 1996. The agent set a polygraph exam for September 11,1996. The polygraph exam on September 11,. 1996 took place at the county jail. It was conducted by Bill Irvin, an FBI polygraph examiner. The exam was conducted in an office. Beckwith was brought to the office and given a Miranda warning (Tr. p. 68). This was done verbally and in writing (Tr. pp. 69-70). A written consent to a polygraph examination was obtained from Beckwith. Exhibit 1 is an advice of rights form which was executed by Beckwith at 10:05 am. The form was reviewed with the defendant, he waived his rights and signed the form which the agent also signed. Exhibit 2 is a form for consent to interview with a polygraph (Tr. p. 70). No threats were made by the agents to Beckwith nor were promises made. At no time did defendant indicate he did not wish to continue to speak with the agents (Tr. p. 71). During the polygraph exam, the agent observed measurements that were different. After the exam, the examiner told Beckwith there was a problem with the question on the Denver bank robbery and the response was deceptive (Tr. pp. 72-74). Beckwith was insistent that the red dye stained money did not come from the Denver or a Colorado Bank robbery. He said it may come from a robbery outside of Colorado. Defendant wanted to be retested (Tr. p. 74). He said he was being truthful and the agents were wrong about defendant possibly participating in the Denver robbery (Tr. p. 75). At the first interview by Agent Castro in the Denver county jail, on September 5th, no Miranda or other warning was given defendant (Tr. p. 75). Agent Michael Howell was with Agent Castro at that time. No tape recording of the conversation was made (Tr. pp. 75-76). Defendant spoke to someone from the FBI on three occasions. One, the day of the defendant’s arrest, second, to Agent Castro on September 5, 1996, and third, at the time of the polygraph exam (Tr. p. 76). Defendant agreed to a polygraph examination at the time of the first conversation with Castro and at the second meeting with him (Tr. p. 77). Apparently, the defendant said he knew he was not involved in the Denver bank robbery, was facing a drug charge, and he had information that would help clear him of the Denver robbery (Tr. p. 79). The polygraph exam reflected two deceptive responses by defendant to questions he was asked (Id.). Both related to the Denver bank robbery and not the instant charge (Tr. p. 80). After the test was completed, the examining agent told Beckwith that the examiner had a problem about the test (Tr. pp. 82-83). The defendant was deceptive about two questions. Defendant was told he needed to “come clean or else there’d be no deal.” Agent Castro said he could not make a deal with Beckwith (Tr. pp. 83-84). At the September 5, 1996 meeting, Castro mentioned the need for approval by an assistant United States Attorney (Tr. pp. 85-87). The agent, on September 5, 1996, did not threaten the defendant if he did not cooperate (Tr. p. 88). The agent didn’t believe that defendant had committed the Denver robbery (Id.). The agent, on September 11, 1996, told Beckwith to tell the truth or he could not be used as a witness. If he was deceptive, the agent could do nothing for him (Tr. p. 89). The first interview of defendant by the FBI included Agent Ron Knight and a Denver officer (Tr. p. 90). Beckwith, on September 5, 1996, indicated to Agent Castro that Beckwith had information on a bank robbery somewhere else than Denver (Tr. p. 91). After the polygraph examination on September 11, 1996, the interview was terminated after back and forth discussion (Id.). Defendant stated that the dye stained money did not come from a Colorado bank robbery (Tr. p. 92). Defendant was told if he did not provide information, the drug charge would not be dropped and he could not be used as a witness because he was deceptive on the polygraph examination. The September 11 interview was terminated (Id.). Special Agent, William Irwin, FBI, testified that in September 1996 his principal duty was as a certified polygraph examiner (Tr. p. 5). In September 1996 he was asked to conduct an examination of the defendant Randy Beckwith. The examination was at the county jail and Agent Irwin and Agent Castro were present. Beckwith was present, he was not handcuffed during the examination (Tr. p. 6). On first meeting Beckwith, Irwin introduced himself, advise of rights was given to Beckwith and in compliance with FBI policy, the defendant was advised as to his status during the polygraph exam. The advice of rights form (FD 395) was read and reviewed with Beckwith, as was the consent to polygraph form (FD 328) (Exhibits 1 & 2) (Tr. p. 7). Beckwith and the agent signed the forms (Tr. p. 8). There was a significant discussion about the defendant’s rights and defendant, who is a paralegal, wanted to make certain the agent understood that the defendant knew his rights and he was not going to be tricked. Defendant also indicated his willingness to be given a polygraph examination (Tr. pp. 8-9). He waived his rights and was willing to talk. He wanted to talk about the Denver bank robbery but not other matters (Tr. p. 9). The person with whom defendant had been arrested bore a strong resemblance to the bank surveillance photographs from the Denver robbery. The agents wanted to clear Beckwith of that robbery before any further discussions. Defendant was not a suspect (Tr. p. 9). This discussion occurred prior to the administration of the polygraph exam. Beckwith made it clear he had information in which the FBI would be interested and that he wanted to talk and make a deal (Tr. p. 10). He wanted to use his information as leverage to get out of his heroin possession charge. There was a substantial discussion before the test, which lasted about an hour (Tr. p. 11). The test was administered and the interview continued about the Denver bank robbery (Tr. pp. 11-12). When he was told he was deceptive, Beckwith said it wasn’t possible (Tr. p. 12). The post examination interview lasted about an hour, going over the same issue, and then it terminated (Tr. p. 13). Defendant did not say he didn’t want to keep talking (Tr. p. 14). Beckwith was comfortable during the interview. Beckwith never said where he got the red dye stained money, he only made insinuations (Tr. p. 14). The polygraph examination was run in two series. One series consisting of three charts and one zone of comparison test, a fourth chart (Tr. p. 20). Beckwith was deceptive on at least one question (Tr. p. 21), and apparently two with regard to the Denver bank robbery (Tr. pp. 23-24). The agent examiner told defendant he was deceptive to questions five and seven which were relevant questions (Tr. pp. 27-32). The agent did not become aggressive or threaten the defendant (Tr. pp. 33-34). Agent Irwin did not refer to Agent Castro as a “bulldog” that would pin something on Beckwith (Tr. p. 34). The examiner agent was not authorized to make' any deal (Tr. p. 36). Beckwith never said he wanted a lawyer, he did indicate that if it took an assistant United States Attorney to make a deal that he wanted to talk to one (Tr. pp. 36-37). No threats were made to get Beck-with to speak about Dale Robbins, who was the person with Beckwith when he was arrested (Tr. p. 37). At no point did defendant invoke his right to an attorney (Tr. p. 38). The examiner agent did not call Beckwith a “liar” (Tr. p. 39). The agents did not play good cop/bad cop with Beckwith (Id.). Agent Castro was a spectator during the polygraph examination (Tr. p. 40). Beckwith became agitated at one time (Tr. p. 41). The agents acted professionally during the interviews (Tr. p. 42). Questions five and seven of the test questions, during the polygraph exam, were those which related to the Denver bank robbery. Questions four and six were unrelated and are called control questions (Tr. p. 46). The examination technique was administered in a standard fashion (Tr. pp. 46-48). There were no trick questions (Tr. p. 49). Agent Scott D. Montefuseo, FBI, testified he was a case agent for the robbery in this case. On March 5, 1996 a federal warrant was issued for defendant for a probation violation. However, neither of the two Denver arresting officers knew anything about the warrant (Tr. p. 52). Officer Harry Henry Bloodworth, Denver Police Department, testified that on August 30, 1996 (Tr. p. 59) he made a traffic stop of Beckwith and Dale Robbins. A citation was issued to Robbins for expired plates and no proof of insurance. Before pulling the vehicle over, the vehicle went through a turn lane without signaling (see Exhibit B). Once behind the vehicle Bloodworth noticed the vehicle plates were expired and there was a broken window. The vehicle was stopped for the traffic violations (Tr. pp. 55-56). Robbins was asked to exit the vehicle (Tr. p. 62). The stop was on the 2000 block of Broadway, southbound (Tr. p. 57). Robbins was questioned by Officer Bloodworth on the driver’s side of the vehicle, towards the front. An NCIC check was run on Robbins and Beck-with. The report was negative (Tr. p. 61). Beckwith was arrested for false information under a Denver ordinance. There is also a false information statute in Colorado (Tr. p. 63). The court took judicial notice of the Denver Ordinance (Tr. p. 64). The ordinance, Sec. 38.40 provides: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully to give false information to an officer or employee of the city when such officer or employee is acting in their official capacity, concerning the identity of any person participating in, connected with, or responsible for, or concerning the manner of the commission of, any act, when, as part of their official duties or employment, such officer or employee is investigating: 1. The legality of such act; or 2. The identity of the person participating in, connected with, or responsible for the commission of such act. Defendant Randy Lee Beckwith testified that the area of his being stopped on August 30, 1996 was in downtown Denver. He was wearing sunglasses (Tr. p. 67). He wore them until later on in the day when an FBI agent told him to take them off (Tr. p. 68). The first time the defendant talked to the FBI, on the day of his arrest, he was given a Miranda warning (Tr. p. 68). Defendant was interviewed on September 5, 1996 in the Denver County jail and on September 11, 1996 he took a polygraph test (Tr. p. 68). Beckwith was not given a Miranda warning on September 5 (Tr. p. 69). On September 11th, there were two FBI agents present. An hour was spent setting up the test. Written questions were given to Beckwith to which he objected. The agents told Beckwith that with cooperation and taking the polygraph test that they would assist him with his federal probation violation and they would talk to the district attorney about the drug charges. He also sought to remove the suspicion about a possible involvement in the Denver bank robbery. This was first mentioned by Beckwith before the polygraph test on September 5 (Tr. p. 70). Prior to the test on September 11, the agents were amicable, Beckwith was comfortable (Tr. p. 71). After the test was administered, which was twice, Agent Irwin spun Beckwith’s chair around and told him he was lying about the Hampton (Denver) bank robbery. Beckwith was angry and perturbed. There was good cop/bad cop pressure. Irwin told Beckwith he’d get thirty years (Tr. p. 72). They were face to face and Irwin was swearing. Agent Irwin said Beckwith better talk or Irwin would bury defendant (Tr. p. 73). Defendant did request ... either [they] initiate what “we originally bargained or that” he “get an attorney.”' (Tr. p. 73). The agent said it was not possible until they talked to the United States Attorney. Beckwith knew the law and his rights and he would not say anything incriminating. He demanded to see a lawyer (Tr. p. 73). Beckwith persisted he was innocent of the Denver bank robbery (Tr. p. 74). The agents asked Beckwith where he got the money he had in his possession. He had knowledge where it came from, he never said it came from a particular place or robbery, but it did not come from the Denver robbery (Tr. p. 75). The questioning went on for twenty minutes after defendant asked for a lawyer. The defendant asked for a lawyer three times. Defendant said Agent Castro took the polygraph straps off defendant, spun his chair around, and in defendant’s face said to defendant to quit lying, tell the truth or he was going to get 25 to 30 years (Tr. p. 75). Defendant was afraid (Tr. p. 76). He thought he might be indicted for something he didn’t do. He was indirectly afraid for his physical safety (Tr. p. 76). He felt physically threatened (Tr. p. 77). Beckwith has spent quite a few years in prison (Tr. pp. 77-78). The agents did not draw their guns (Tr. p. 78). Defendant wanted to talk to the police from the very beginning when arrested (Tr. p. 79). When Officer Depew directed defendant to get out of the ear, the officer did not touch the defendant (Tr. p. 81). The first Miranda warning given by an FBI agent was about an hour after the defendant’s arrest (Tr. p. 82). Defendant said nothing at the time. They told defendant he had a parole violation. Defendant did not invoke the right to silence or to a lawyer. Defendant was on parole from a federal bank robbery conviction (Tr. pp. 83-84). Defendant wanted to talk to the police or FBI for several reasons; he had concern over his parole; he was concerned over the money and concern over the drug charge because of Colorado’s “three strikes” law (Tr. p. 84). The agreement to take the polygraph exam was voluntary “under certain parameters.” The defendant did not say he wanted to stop the exam (Tr. p. 86). Defendant was promised that he would be taken out of the jail and then to Englewood (a federal correctional institution) for a parole violation. The promise was oral. In exchange, defendant was to give the source of the dye stained money. No such information was provided (Tr. p. 86), because the agents couldn’t make a deal (Tr. p. 87). However, they said they could make the state charges go away and remove defendant to Englewood (Tr. pp. 87-88). Based on the evidence the court enters the following: Findings of Fact 1. On August 30,1996, Denver City police officers Wayne C. Depew and Harry H. Bloodworth were conducting patrol on Broadway, a high crime area of downtown Denver. Officer Depew observed a four door silver Nissen, in bad condition, with a back window out, that was in a turn lane. Instead of turning, the vehicle pulled straight into the lane of traffic without signaling. This was a violation of a Denver City traffic ordinance. The officers pulled in behind the vehicle for the traffic violation and observed the vehicle also had expired California plates. The officers stopped the vehicle which was being driven by Dale Bobbins. Defendant Randy Lee Beckwith was a passenger in the front seat. Officer Bloodworth approached the driver and because the area was considered a dangerous high crime area, Officer Depew exited the vehicle and went to the passenger side of the vehicle where defendant Randy Lee Beckwith was located. 2. In the rear of the vehicle was clothing, a bottle of Clorox bleach and discolored rags with red stains on them. Depew initiated a conversation with Beckwith but did not suspect defendant of a robbery. The officer asked the defendant his name and he replied he had no ID on him. The officer asked Beckwith to exit the vehicle, which he did. A pat down was conducted. Nothing was found or seized. Beckwith seemed nervous. Defendant told the officer his name was Christopher Ayer, born September 8, 1952. Because of the out of state plates, the officer asked Beckwith where he lived and was staying and defendant said a motel on South Broadway in Denver, but he could not give a name or address. The purpose of the inquiry was to field card the defendant so that the police department would have knowledge of who is in the area. The inquiry was not related to the reasons for the stop of the vehicle or an investigation of a crime. It was an encounter during the vehicle stop and the inquiry was for information. Beckwith said he had just met the driver. The officer told Beckwith to get beck into the vehicle which he did. 3. Officer Depew walked around to where Officer Bloodworth was talking to the driver and Depew spoke to Dale Robbins. Depew asked Robbins the name of the passenger and Robbins said “Randy.” Robbins also told Depew they were staying at a motel on Broadway. Depew went back to the defendant and told him he was under arrest for giving false information to a police officer. The officer intended to arrest under Denver City Ordinance Section 38-40, not Colorado state law, CRS 18-8-111. Defendant was told why he was under arrest. A search of defendant produced a large quantity of cash in the defendant’s front pant’s pocket. Twenty dollar bills, discolored with red dye, were found. In another pocket a small amount of black tar heroin was found. This was a felony narcotics violation under Colorado law. While Officer Depew was placing the defendant in the police vehicle, the officer observed a brown wallet laying on the concrete. Defendant had apparently attempted to push it under the vehicle. It was Beck-with’s wallet and was bulging with twenty dollar bills, photographs, and papers of defendant. 4. Defendant was taken to the police station. During the ride, defendant was moving about. Defendant was attempting to remove his wallet and the officer removed it and put it in the defendant’s shirt pocket. Following defendant’s arrest Officer Depew gave the defendant a Miranda warning, however, the warning did not advise defendant he could have an attorney if he could not afford one. During the ride to the police station, the defendant volunteered that he would like to help the police make drug buys. Those comments were spontaneous. Defendant was taken to a vice squad holding cell. Officer Depew observed a large amount of cash on the floor. The cash in defendant’s shirt was not there and defendant was attempting to push the money under a bench. The driver of the Nissen vehicle, Robbins, was cited for no insurance and expired plates and allowed to leave the scene of the stop. 5. Defendant was interviewed by the FBI on the day of his arrest and given a Miranda warning. Apparently defendant did not make a statement and nothing was said. Defendant had given information to Denver officers that he would like to speak to FBI agents. The defendant was anxious to make a deal. 6. The defendant was contacted by Agent Michael Castro, FBI, because Denver officers had told Castro about Beckwith and the dye stained money. Castro was working bank robberies and Castro was advised that Beckwith was cooperative and willing to give information. The contact of Beckwith by Agent Castro was on September 5, 1996 at the Denver County Jail where Beckwith was being held. The agent was interested in Beckwith being a witness to a Denver bank robbery. The agent told Beckwith he would like him to be a witness. The agent could not promise anything and a deal would have to be worked out with the prosecutor and counsel. The agent asked Beckwith to take a polygraph examination. No Miranda or other warning was given to defendant at the interview. No threats were made and defendant wanted to take the polygraph examination and possibly obtain the dismissal of the state drug charge, to help on his alleged parole violation, and to take suspicion off him on a Denver bank robbery. At this time, defendant insinuated he may have information about a bank robbery other than the Denver robbery. The conversation lasted ten to fifteen minutes. 7. As a result of the conversation between Agent Castro and the defendant, and defendant’s willingness to take a polygraph examination as part of the efforts of defendant to make a deal, a polygraph examination of the defendant was set for September 11, 1996 at the Denver County Jail. FBI Agent William Irwin, a polygrapher, conducted the proceedings and the testing process on Beckwith. Agent Castro and Beckwith were the only other persons present other than Irwin. Defendant was given a Miranda warning from an FBI form (Pla.Exh. 1). The form was read and explained to the defendant. The defendant executed the form waiving his Miranda rights. The advice given fully complied with Miranda. A second form, Consent to Interview With Polygraph, was provided to defendant and he executed it consenting to the polygraph examination. The defendant wanted the examination because he strongly asserted he was not involved in the Denver bank robbery and defendant wanted to make a bargain with the FBI. Defendant was not a suspect in the Denver robbery, but the other person in the vehicle with defendant, when he was arrested, bore a strong resemblance to the bank robber. 8. During the polygraph examination and post examination interview, Beckwith was comfortable. He was not threatened and no force was employed against him. He was not told to speak or he would be buried. Beck-with became agitated and upset when the examiner, Irwin, told Beckwith that the examination showed he was deceptive on two responses pertaining to the Denver bank robbery. Defendant did not invoke his right to silence or to an attorney during the examination or interview. No threats were made to defendant to get him to speak about Dale Robbins or any other bank robbery. Beck-with was not called a “liar” or threatened with a severe sentence by the FBI agents “unless Beckwith cooperated.” No intimi--dation techniques were used or force employed for the interview: Beckwith was told that the agents did not have authority to make a deal and that such a circumstance could only occur through the United States Attorney’s office. Beckwith Was a trained paralegal who knew his rights and was also a person who had had prior encounters with law, legal proceedings and law enforcement personnel. He knew of an outstanding federal parole or probation warrant. Because an agreement could not be made and defendant was believed by the agents to be deceptive, the interrogation on September 11, 1996 was concluded. 9. Defendant Beckwith had been interested in striking some kind of a deal from the time of his original arrest. There was a probation or parole violator’s warrant outstanding for Beckwith when he was arrested by the Denver police. Denver officers knew nothing of the warrant when Beckwith was arrested, but he was made aware of the outstanding warrant soon thereafter. Defendant wanted to eliminate himself from suspicion in a Denver bank robbery. At the September 11, 1996-session, defendant Beckwith was aware of his Miranda rights, waived his preinterrogation rights and consented to taking a polygraph examination. Beckwith was anxious to participate, to work out a deal to be exonerated of the Denver bank robbery, to have his state drug charge dismissed and to gain some benefit on his outstanding alleged probation violation. The chance of a deal broke down when the polygraph examination of Beckwith indicated he was deceptive as to the Denver bank robbery. Defendant made an insinuation that he might know where dye stained money came from or about another non Colorado bank robbery. Discussion The Stop The facts show the vehicle in which the defendant was riding on August 30, 1996, was lawfully stopped for two traffic violations. First -the vehicle, driven by Dale Robbins, drove through a turn lane into a direct lane of traffic without signaling in violation of a Denver City ordinance. (See Defendant’s Exhibit B). Second, the vehicle had expired California plates which is a violation of Colorado law. ColoRev Stat. §§ 42-3-128, 42-3-133. Consequently, the stop of the vehicle by the Denver officers was lawful. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 801 (10th Cir.1997)(“Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.” It is irrelevant “that the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle.”). Detention and Arrest Following the stop of the vehicle, Officer Depew approached the passenger side of the vehicle and initiated a conversation with Beckwith. Officer Depew asked defendant for his name and defendant replied that he had no “ID.” The officer then asked defendant to exit the vehicle. This was permissible. Asking the vehicle passenger’s name was a mere police citizen encounter which required no suspicion. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Simmons, 918 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.1990). It was permissible for the officer to ask the passenger to exit the vehicle during the traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). In Wilson the court said once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer “may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. p. 886. Officer Depew made a pat down and found nothing. The defendant then gave the officer defendant’s name of Christopher Ayer and a date of birth. The officer’s inquiry was to gather information for a “field card” of the defendant because of the out of state plates on the vehicle and so officers would know who was in the area. The inquiry was apparently not for the purposes of the traffic violations or any act that defendant had committed. After gathering the information he sought, Officer Depew asked defendant to get back in the vehicle and the officer went to where Officer Bloodworth was dealing with the driver. Depew asked the driver, Dale Robbins, questions including the name of defendant. Robbins said defendant’s name was “Randy” which was not a name defendant gave. The officer concluded defendant had given the officer a false name and that Denver City Ordinance 38-40 had been violated. The officer then arrested the defendant for the ordinance violation. Defendant contends the arrest was without probable cause and that there had been no violation of the Denver City Ordinance. An officer may arrest on probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)(“A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that the person had committed a crime.”); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). The standard is an objective standard, Id., however the officer’s experience and training may be credited in determining whether probable cause exists. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) the court observed: Articulating precisely what “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical-conceptions that deal with “ ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Sis * * * * * ... and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found ... * . * * * * * They are instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed. [Illinois v.] Gates, supra, [462 U.S. 213] at 232, 103 S.Ct. [2317], at 2329[, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)]; Brinegar, supra at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310 (“The standard of proof [for probable cause] is ... correlative to what must be proved”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (“This Cour[t] [has a] long-established recognition that standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application”; “[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29, 88 S.Ct., at 1884 (the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment “will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases”). The standard is one of an “objectively reasonable police officer.” Id., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. p. 1661-62. In Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) the court said probable cause for an arrest exists “if ‘at the moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’ that” an offense had been committed. Id. p. 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Indisputable or necessarily convincing evidence is not required, only “reasonably trustworthy information.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Hugaboom, 984 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir.1993)(the evidence must warrant a prudent officer in the belief that an offense has or is being committed). See also United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Guerrero-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 983 (10th Cir.1996). In this case, Officer Depew had probable cause to believe defendant had given him a false name. Before responding to the officer’s question, defendant said he had no “ID.” He said he was staying with the driver in a motel on South Broadway. The defendant was a passenger in the driver’s vehicle which looked like it had been lived in. The driver, who was with defendant and had been living with the defendant for a few days, stated the defendant’s name was Randy. Under the circumstances this statement could be credited. However, as said in Ornelas, supra, the “standard of proof [for probable cause] is ... correlative to what must be proved.” 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. at 1661. This requires an examination of the test of the Denver City Ordinance 38-40. It provides: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully to give false information to an officer ... when such officer ... is acting in [an] official capacity concerning the identity of any person participating in, connected with, or responsible for, or concerning the manner of the commission of, any act, when, as part of [an officer’s] official duties ..., such officer is investigating: 1. The legality of such act; or 2. The identity of the person participating in connection with, or responsible for the commission of such act. The ordinance is not a mere false information to an officer provision. Rather it applies only when the officer is acting in an official capacity concerning a person [involved in or connected with] an act, and the officer is investigating the legality of the act or the person participating, connected with or committing the act. In this case, the only “act” was the illegal operation of the vehicle. This was not the “act” of defendant, Beck-with. Further, Officer Depew’s questions were not directed to investigating any “act.” The officer was field carding the defendant for information purposes. The inquiry was unrelated to the act that Officer Bloodworth was investigating. Officer Depew was gathering information as to defendant’s status. Therefore, there was no violation of the Denver City Ordinance and defendant’s arrest was unlawful and without probable cause. Search Incident to Arrest Officer Depew conducted a search of the defendant following his arrest. A large quantity of cash was found in defendant’s front pant’s pocket. That evidence was acquired illegally from the warrantless search incident to an illegal arrest because of the lack of probable cause and must be suppressed. Beck v. Ohio, supra; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); United States v. Welker, 689 F.2d 167 (10th Cir.1982). The small amount of heroin found on defendant must also be suppressed as well as any references to it, except as the arrest may otherwise be attenuated from such reference. The defendant’s wallet, actions in regard thereto, and the case on defendant’s wallet must be suppressed as acquired incident to an illegal arrest. Defendant’s Statements To Officer DePew and an Unidentified FBI Agent On August 30, 1996 Following defendant’s arrest, he was given an incomplete Miranda warning by Officer Depew. However, the officer did not interrogate defendant. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). If defendant had been interrogated, the incomplete Miranda warning and the prior illegal arrest would have warranted suppression of any statement defendant gave at that time Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). However, defendant made spontaneous statements about a desire to make drug buys for the Denver narcotics officers. Spontaneous statements are not within the Miranda governance and would be admissible inspite of a deficient warning. United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. De La Luz Gallegos, 738 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 892 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir.1985). However, defendant was, at the time, in illegal custody. If the statements were the product of the illegal arrest, they may still be subject to suppression even if spontaneous for Miranda purposes, unless attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). However, that issue need not be addressed because defendant’s statements are not logically probative of the bank robbery in this ease, and could be prejudicial if brought out at trial. Rule 403, F.R.E. The relevance of what was said is only to this motion to show defendant’s desire to make a deal. The defendant was also questioned by an unidentified FBI agent on the day of defendant’s arrest. Defendant testified that at that time, he was given a Miranda warning. He has not challenged the adequacy of the warning. Rather, defendant merely said he did not say anything. Therefore, the issue of anything said at that time, has not been contested or preserved and suppression will not be considered. Statements To Agent Castro on September 5, 1996 When defendant was first arrested, it was for violation of Denver City Ordinance 38-40. However, when the heroin was found on his person, defendant was apparently charged with a felony drug offense under Colorado law. The charge was tainted by the initial illegal arrest. Defendant wanted to make a deal with the FBI in hopes of eliminating the Colorado drug charge and apparently on August 30th, or around that time, indicated a willingness to cooperate. Defendant was also motivated by other considerations as well. Agent Castro was advised of defendant’s cooperativeness and determined to talk to defendant at the jail. The defendant was brought to a room at the jail where Agent Castro talked to defendant. No Miranda warning was given, although defendant was in custody. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968)(questioning suspect in jail as to an offense different than the reason for confinement was custodial requiring a Miranda warning). Miranda, is not offense specific and á warning must be given for any custodial interrogation. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); United States v. Bautista, supra. The fact that defendant was not the “focus” of a crime, is not relevant. Miranda, supra, n. 4. The government has not made a showing that any proper, prior warning was effective. Consequently, even if the September 5th questioning could be considered attenuated from the illegal arrest, the absence of a Miranda warning and waiver requires suppression of any statement made to Agent Castro on September 5th. Attenuation will not be considered as to such statement. However, it should be noted that there are no facts that any conduct on the part of Agent Castro on September 5, 1996 would have rendered any statement defendant made involuntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir.1998). Statements Made on September 11,1996 Because of defendant’s willingness and desire to cooperate with the FBI, he was considered a potential witness or informant. However, in order to judge the credibility of the information the defendant may provide, he was asked to undergo a lie detector examination. The defendant was willing and eager to take the exam in order to work a favorable deal. Arrangements ■ were made for a polygraph examination to be taken at the Denver County Jail. The exam was administered by Special Agent William Irwin, FBI, a polygrapher. Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and a written rights and waiver form was executed by defendant. He also voluntarily executed a “Consent To Interview With Polygraph.” In each instance defendant acknowledged a waiver of his rights. The examination was performed and was willingly and voluntarily taken by the defendant. He knew the questions to be asked. According to Irwin the test indicated defendant was deceptive with regard to two questions pertaining to the Denver bank robbery. As a result, a discussion took place between defendant, Agent Irwin and Agent Castro, who was present. This was in an effort to still work out a deal. Because the polygraph examination and interview was preceded by a Miranda warning, which was not tainted by other interrogations where no Miranda warning were given, and on the prior occasions no involuntary statements were taken, the interrogation in this case satisfied Miranda requirements. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1115-18 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1986). Therefore, the defendant’s statements on 11 September, 1996 are not inadmissible because of the prior Miranda violation on September 5th. No basis exists to conclude that there was any deficiency in the Miranda warnings or waiver, Elstad, supra. Defendant contends the post polygraph exam statements of defendant were involuntary and inadmissible as the product of coercion and promise. He also contends he invoked his right to counsel. The argument must be rejected. The mere taking of a polygraph exam is not proper or coercive. Wyrick v. Fields, supra. The defendant wanted to take the exam and to pass it in order to make a deal with the government. After the polygraph exam defendant was told of the fact that he had registered deceptive on two questions related to the Denver bank robbery. Defendant disputed that he was deceptive or not telling the truth. Informing defendant of the results of a polygraph exam does not constitute misconduct or overreaching sufficient to raise an issue of an involuntary confession Wyrick, supra. Colo rado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). There is no evidence to support a conclusion that Agent Irwin lied or misstated the results of the examination The court has found there were no threats, promises or good cop/bad cop psychological interrogation methods employed. Therefore, there is no misconduct that meets the Colorado v. Connelly, supra, standard. No unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel was made by defendant. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). At best, defendant knew a deal could not be made except with approval of the assistant United States attorney and defendant may have requested such a person. However, that is not a request for counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); State v. Galli 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) pp. 3-4 (“Likewise we hold that defendant’s request to speak to a prosecutor does not constitute even an equivocal assertion of the right to counsel. Thus police are free to continue to question a suspect who has only requested to speak to a prosecuting attorney.”)(eiting cases). The statements made by defendant, when considered under the totality of the circumstances, were voluntary and part of an effort to make a deal. Colorado v. Connelly, supra; United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir.1998)(statement by college educated person in course of considering a deal is voluntary); United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819 (1997); United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Headdress, 953 F.Supp. 1272 (D.Utah 1996). It should be remembered defendant is a paralegal and a person with prior experience in the criminal justice system. Defendant is not entitled to suppression of statements made on September 11, 1996 based on a claim they were involuntary. Defendant’s Status At the time of the defendant’s interrogation and polygraph exam on September 11, 1998, defendant was being held in Colorado State custody based on a narcotics charge against him. Although defendant had an outstanding federal probation or parole violation warrant pending, that warrant had not been served pending resolution of the Colorado charge. The defendant was in custody on the narcotics charge. The heroin had been found because of an illegal arrest and defendant’s continued custody was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The question is presented as to whether the original Fourth Amendment violation on August 30, 1996 tainted the statements of defendant made to Agent Irwin and Castro on September 11,1996. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Lanier v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 25, 106 S.Ct. 297, 88 L.Ed.2d 23 (1985)(fact that confession is voluntary and Miranda warnings were given and understood is not alone enough to purge the taint of an illegal arrest). The next issue arises as to whether the circumstances of this ease require exclusion of defendant’s September 11, 1996 statements or whether the taint of the illegal arrest on August 30, 1996 was attenuated by the circumstances of the September 11, 1996 interrogation. Attenuation The Defendant’s Statements of September 11, 1996 At the time the defendant was interviewed and polygraphed by the FBI on September 11, 1996, he was being held by Colorado authorities on a controlled substance charge arising from his arrest by Officer Depew for a violation of the Denver City ordinance. The interrogation by the FBI was in no way related to that charge. That was a matter of interest to Colorado state authorities. The FBI was interested in information that defendant might have on an unrelated out of state bank robbery or the Denver bank robbery and whether defendant would be a credible possible witness. Defendant affirmatively indicated a desire to speak to the FBI and was anxious to make a deal and not just on the Colorado charge, but also his federal probation or parole matter. The FBI had to also know if defendant was telling the truth about not being involved in the Denver bank robbery. None of the federal interests were related- to the basis of defendant’s state arrest and charge. Federal officers did not participate in the circumstance of defendant’s arrest or subsequent narcotics charge. That was only collaterally of interest in maybe making a deal if defendant was credible. Normally, when a person is illegally arrested, statements given by the person as to the offense for the arrest, are not admissible. Brown v. Illinois, supra; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Taylor v. Alabama, supra, Lanier v. South Carolina, supra. However, see New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Fourth Amendment violation does not bar statements made outside home, Rule in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) which was violated was designed to protect the integrity of the home, not exclude statements made outside the home). However, the rule of exclusion is not a per se rule but depends on the circumstances and on whether those circumstances show sufficient attenuation from the constitutional violation that the subsequent evidence should be admitted. In United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.1986) the court explained the concept and the limitation on exclusion of evidence derived to some extent from a primary illegal activity. The court said: Nonetheless, .-... even though evidence would not have come to light but for prior illegal police conduct, such evidence is not inadmissible per se: We need not hold that all evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959). Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417. The rule of Wong Sun is quite clear: evidence should not be excluded as a “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it comes to light as a result of prior illegal police activity; rather evidence, the knowledge of which is obtained as a result of prior police illegality, is admissible so long as (1) it has not been subsequently obtained through exploitation of that illegality, or (2) it has been subsequently obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the prior illegality to purge the evidence of the taint. Accord, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). 793 F.2d at 1148. A “but for” standard is not the measurement. Id. p. 1148. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) the court stated that the proper inquiry is whether the evidence was obtained through “exploitation of the primary illegality” so as to purge the evidence of its taint. In this case, the primary illegality was not involved in the September llth inquiry. That inquiry involved an unrelated matter. The inquiry was involved with whether defendant could cooperate and the FBI agents pursued that matter. Although his interest did involve the Colorado drug charge, it was broader than that specific matter. As far as the inquiry involved defendant’s interest in the drug matter, the United States had no interest in it at all. This is not an exploitation of the primary illegality which was the improper arrest for giving a false identity to a Denver officer or the eventual drug charge. In Brown v. Illinois, supra, the Supreme Court identified three factors for consideration in evaluating a claim of attenuation. First, is the time elapsed between the illegal acti