Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER HURD, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Janet Schrader Bennett (“plaintiff’) brought suit against defendants, The Progressive Corporation (“Progressive”), Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Progressive”), Larry Mitchell (“Mitchell”), Michael Beney (“Beney”), and John Barbagallo (“Barbagallo”), alleging in her Amended Complaint ten causes of action. In plaintiffs first cause of action, she alleges, as against all of the above defendants, that the actions of Mitchell, her supervisor, including his unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, unwanted touching, hugging and kissing of plaintiff, retaliatory actions against plaintiff on occasions when plaintiff attempted to ignore his unwanted advances, threats to plaintiff about reporting his behavior, and his forcing and coercing plaintiff against her will to engage in sexual intercourse, constitute the creation of a hostile work environment and discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. In plaintiffs second cause of action, she alleges, as against all of the above defendants, that the actions of Mitchell, using his position as plaintiffs supervisor to retaliate against plaintiff when plaintiff attempted to ignore his unwelcome sexual advances while ceasing and desisting such retaliatory conduct when plaintiff did not resist such sexual advances, constitute quid quo pro sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. In plaintiffs third cause of action, she alleges, as against all defendants, she was discharged in retaliation for lodging a sexual harassment complaint against Mitchell, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a). In plaintiffs fourth cause of action, she alleges, as against all defendants, that the actions of Mitchell, her supervisor, including his unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, unwanted touching, hugging and kissing of plaintiff, retaliatory actions against plaintiff on occasions when plaintiff attempted to ignore his unwanted advances, threats to plaintiff about reporting his behavior, and his forcing and coercing plaintiff against her will to engage in sexual intercourse, constitute the creation of a hostile work environment and discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), N.Y.Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. In plaintiffs fifth cause of action, she alleges, as against all defendants, that the actions of Mitchell, using his position as plaintiffs supervisor to retaliate against plaintiff when plaintiff attempted to ignore his unwelcome sexual advances while ceasing and desisting such retaliatory conduct when plaintiff did not resist such sexual advances, constitute quid quo pro sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of NYHRL. In plaintiffs sixth cause of action, she alleges, as against all defendants, she was discharged in retaliation for lodging a sexual harassment complaint against Mitchell, in violation of NYHRL, N.Y.Exee.Law § 296(3-a)(c). In plaintiffs seventh cause of action, she alleges, as against defendants Mitchell, Be-ney, and Barbagallo personally, that the actions of Mitchell, in committing the above acts, and the actions of Beney and Barbagallo, as superiors to Mitchell, in conducting an ineffective sexual harassment investigation and in unlawfully terminating plaintiffs employment, constitute aiding and abetting a NYHRL violation pursuant to N.Y.Exee.Law § 296(6). In plaintiffs eighth cause of action, she alleges, as against all defendants, that the conduct of Mitchell, Beney, and Barbagallo amounts to intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of New York State law. In plaintiffs ninth cause of action, she alleges, as against Progressive only, she worked in excess of forty hours a week during her employment, and has received no overtime compensation, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(e). In plaintiffs tenth cause of action, she alleges, as against Progressive only, she worked in excess of forty hours a week during her employment, and has received no overtime compensation, in violation of Section 663 of New York Labor Law. Plaintiff has stipulated to the dismissal of all causes of action against Mitchell, Beney, and Barbagallo, with the exception of the seventh cause of action, for aiding and abetting a violation of NYHRL. (Stipulation and Order, Docket nos. 30,16). Plaintiff has also stipulated to the dismissal of the eighth cause of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as against all defendants. (Stipulation and Order, Docket nos. 16, 14). All defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Oral argument was heard on July 26, 2002 in Albany, New York, and decision on the motions was reserved. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the following comprise the facts necessary to deciding this motion. In January of 1997, plaintiff was hired as a claims representative in the Albany, New York office of Progressive. Her immediate supervisor in the Albany office was Steven DeHart. During plaintiffs first few weeks of employment, she received training and a “training box” containing materials designed to familiarize employees with company procedure and to give them other information Progressive deems relevant. Progressive contends that contained in such boxes are copies of “The Progressive Way,” a manual on policies. Included in “The Progressive Way” is an anti-sexual harassment policy, as well as an “open door policy” and a section informing employees of an “alertline” they can call if they have a grievance against another employee or supervisor. Neither the “open door policy” nor the “alertline” are specifically tailored to solely apply to sexual harassment, and “The Progressive Way” contains no specific complaint procedure dealing with only sexual harassment. Plaintiff claims she did not receive a copy of “The Progressive Way.” Her supervisor does not recall giving her or seeing her with a copy of the document, nor does he recall anyone else giving her a copy. Plaintiff was given two tests during the training period, but it is unclear what material was tested. She did know there existed a general reference source in the Albany office entitled “The Progressive Way,” but believed it contained benefits information. Although plaintiff was aware of Progressive’s human- resources department, she was not aware of the company sexual harassment policy. In September of 1997, plaintiff was offered a transfer to a claims representative position in Progressive’s Utica office. She accepted and in November of 1997 began working in Utica. There is some amount of dispute as to plaintiffs duties as a claims representative. According to plaintiff, since Progressive’s main business function in its Utica office was to process claims, and since claims representatives were not permitted to create and sell actual insurance policies, her duties largely comprised of processing claims under automobile insurance policies. Progressive, on the other hand, describes plaintiffs position as encompassing a broad range of activities, including making determinations as to whether insurance coverage applies to claims, making decisions whether or not to investigate accidents, investigating liabilities of accidents, evaluating accident injuries and damages, negotiating settlements of claims with the claimant and his or her attorney, deciding whether to investigate potential fraud and conducting such investigations, handling the salvaging of vehicles, and “even .■.. acting on behalf of Progressive at trial.” (The Progressive Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 12, ¶ 47). Plaintiffs supervisor in the Utica office was Larry Mitchell. Mitchell’s supervisor was Michael Beney, who worked for Progressive out of Syracuse. Mitchell and Beney were close personal friends. Beney was also a friend of Mitchell’s wife, and served as an usher in Mitchell’s wedding. Beney’s superior was John Barbagallo, the regional general manager for Progressive’s central New York operations. Sometime after plaintiff transferred, she perceived the running and operation of the Utica office to be far inferior to that of the Albany office. Because of this, she even considered returning to Albany. Nevertheless, she remained and made suggestions to Mitchell about how to improve the efficiency of the office, and she claims some changes were in fact made. She began to work long hours to aid in the implementation of the changes, sometimes staying in the office until 9:00 in the evening with Mitchell. Other employees in the Utica office were less than fond of the negative comparisons between offices, and became hostile to plaintiff. Plaintiff has described the atmosphere in the office to be a “terrible working environment.” (Depo. of J. Bennett, at 357). Concerned over co-worker hostility towards her, plaintiff looked to Mitchell for protection, who she believed shared her business views. Occasionally, Mitchell intervened to stop the hostility. Within one to two months after plaintiffs transfer to the Utica office, Mitchell began to comment on her appearance, including comments about her looks in general, her clothes, her perfume, and how she looked in particular outfits. Mitchell also began to place his hands on plaintiffs shoulders while she worked at her desk. Largely distressed by the conduct, plaintiff attempted to initially ignore it. This conduct, according to plaintiff, worsened with time. When plaintiff was working late with Mitchell, he initiated conversations with her about his personal life, including his sexual relationship with his wife. She claims he told her his wife was not satisfying him physically. One evening, Mitchell’s wife phoned the office, and plaintiff heard Mitchell explain to his wife that he was on the road working with another Progressive employee. Mitchell explained his prevarication by telling plaintiff that she was his wife’s “enemy” and that lying about being at the office alone with plaintiff was necessary. Also during this time period, Mitchell increased plaintiffs work load, and at least some of the work was beyond her training and expertise. This caused plaintiff to continue working late during thé week and on the weekends with Mitchell. While still speaking to plaintiff about his difficulties with his wife, Mitchell began to ask plaintiff about her personal life, including questions about her sexual activities and her relationship with her boyfriend. He claimed they had a lot in common. In February of 1998, around three months after plaintiff transferred to the Utica office, Mitchell arranged to drive plaintiff to a Syracuse salvage yard for training she needed to succeed on an “outside road adjuster” exam that plaintiff was to take in March. Plaintiffs career track at Progressive was to become an outside road adjuster, a position involving significant time outside the office estimating vehicle damage. On the drive back to Utica, Mitchell and plaintiff stopped at a restaurant for dinner. Such meals were not uncommon when traveling in connection with Progressive business. During dinner, Mitchell again without provocation began discussing his personal life with plaintiff. He told plaintiff he was unhappy with his marriage, and that he wanted a relationship with plaintiff beyond that shared by ordinary colleagues. Though this caused plaintiff more distress, she did nothing. Plaintiffs father was ill, her mother had recently lost her job, and her brother had moved in with her after losing his home. The financial constraints of supporting her family and herself necessitated her keeping the Progressive job. In addition, plaintiff claims knowledge at that time of another instance where Mitchell had personal animosity towards another Progressive employee and increased his work load to such an extent that the employee resigned. Thus, though her family advised her to quit, plaintiff continued to try and ignore Mitchell’s behavior. Plaintiff did, however, try to distance herself from Mitchell. Mitchell responded by making her job less bearable. He would refuse to answer work-related questions she posed, delay projects plaintiff was working on, and cease intervening in intra-office disputes between plaintiff and other employees in the Utica office. When plaintiff narrowed the “distance” between them, he reciprocated by refraining from the above activities, but when she sensed him pursuing the same line of inappropriate conduct, he did not. He began leaving plaintiff sexually suggestive poems at her desk, a practice that continued for some months. Plaintiff was convinced Mitchell would continue this behavior if she resisted his attempts to transform their relationship into a physical one. Also in early 1998, Mitchell, claiming a desire to talk about work with her, began to pressure plaintiff into taking drives with him during work hours. Diming these car trips, Mitchell would stop the vehicle and retrieve alcohol from the trunk. If plaintiff resisted his attempts to coerce her into drinking, he would become angry. She would sometimes agree to have a drink, only to pour out the beverage when Mitchell was not watching. Mitchell intimated that he was her “only protection” in the Utica office. This caused plaintiff further distress, and her family and friends began to notice the emotional problems she was having. Mitchell began to arrange plaintiffs work load so that they would be in the Utica office alone at the end of work days. The pressure to make plaintiff drink aleo-hoi surfaced again during these times. He would arrive at her desk without warning, brandishing alcohol. Plaintiff informed Mitchell that drinking alcohol was never done in the Albany office. Mitchell responded, in effect, that he was in charge of the Utica office and that he could do as he wished. In the effort to convince plaintiff to drink alcohol, Mitchell would speak of his personal life, place his hands on plaintiff, and attempt to hug and kiss her. Plaintiff believed Mitchell was trying to force her to drink so that she would be more amenable to a physical relationship. Plaintiff did occasionally submit to his demands that she drink in the office, but she also claims she often poured out the beverage when Mitchell was not looking. Mitchell then began placing telephone calls to plaintiff at home. He would ask plaintiff to take vacation time and spend time with him. Plaintiff considered lodging a complaint to Beney, but did not due to her knowledge of Mitchell’s close relationship with Beney, and Mitchell’s statement that Beney pushed out Mitchell’s predecessor in order to employ Mitchell in the same position. Plaintiff believed that lodging said complaint put her job in jeopardy. As a result, plaintiff submitted to Mitchell’s persistent efforts to hug and kiss her in the office. By June of 1998, Mitchell’s behavior had become so unbearable that plaintiff began calling in sick to work just to avoid it, staying home the entire first week of June. Plaintiff claims she told Mitchell that she would be forced to resign if he continued his behavior. She claims he apologized, told her he would cease his efforts, and that a working relationship would be their sole connection. Around this time, plaintiff arrived at work one day to find that Mitchell had made a schedule entry for her to take her father to a doctor’s appointment in the afternoon. Mitchell talked her into going for another drive to discuss changes in the office. On the drive there was no work-related discussion, and after stopping at a restaurant for lunch, Mitchell asked plaintiff if she would like to stay in a hotel room with him. She refused. Nonetheless, on the way back to Utica, Mitchell repeatedly asked plaintiff to stay with him in hotels they were passing on the road, again indicating a desire to elevate their relationship. She refused again, citing her relationship with her boyfriend and the recent conclusion of her unfriendly divorce. She pleaded with Mitchell to stop his efforts. This caused her further distress. She again considered lodging a complaint, but did not for the same reasons as before. Plaintiff did, however, place a phone call to Albany and inquire about a marketing position in the Albany office. Mitchell became aware of this, and informed plaintiff he would help her obtain the position if she agreed to a personal relationship with him. In the meantime, plaintiff became engaged to her boyfriend. Plaintiff again tried to keep her distance from Mitchell. When she did, he would ignore her in the office when she posed work-related questions. Mitchell had informed plaintiff of his past infidelities, and that the affairs in those cases were never more than physical relationships. Plaintiff believed this to be the case with her, and in the face of Mitchell’s continued pressure, and fearful of losing her job, plaintiff finally submitted and had sexual intercourse with Mitchell in early summer of 1998. Though they had sexual intercourse twice, plaintiff stopped the act on the second occasion and left Mitchell in the room. After plaintiffs submission to Mitchell, he became more aggressive. He would grab and kiss her in the office. He was also incensed about plaintiffs engagement to her fiancé, and would make derogatory comments about him to plaintiff. When plaintiffs fiancé called, Mitchell would leave the office and return only after everyone but plaintiff remained. Plaintiff agreed to meet with Mitchell at a restaurant in August of 1998. At this meeting, plaintiff wished to again advise Mitchell that she would report his behavior if he did not stop his efforts at elevating their relationship. When plaintiff arrived at the meeting, it was apparent Mitchell was intoxicated, and plaintiff decided to abort her plan. Plaintiff exited the restaurant and was allegedly attacked by Mitchell’s wife. The following day she was unable to work and called in sick due to stomach problems caused by distress. Mitchell called her and drove by her house. Plaintiff confronted Mitchell outside of the house and begged him to stop, telling him she was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, it was not proper behavior for a manager, that she was soon to be married, and that if he did not cease a complaint would be filed. He tried to calm plaintiff down and then informed her that lodging a complaint would result in her career at Progressive being over because of his relationship with Beney. He informed her he would “spit on her grave” and that he would watch her “go down” without admitting to any wrongdoing. Plaintiff was fearful of reporting Mitchell’s behavior to Beney, so she explained the situation in general terms to a Syracuse office claims representative she met in the course of work. Plaintiff claims this employee, Joanne Weimeier (“Weimeier”), told her that she had heard a rumor of an affair between Mitchell and a “claims assistant” that started before plaintiff worked in Utica. According to plaintiff, Weimeier advised plaintiff against reporting the behavior to Beney, since he and Mitchell were friends, and that she would find someone else for plaintiff to talk to about Mitchell. Also in August of 1998, after hiring a private investigator, plaintiff arranged to meet with Mitchell. At the behest of the investigator, plaintiff concealed a tape recorder to capture their conversations. When plaintiff arrived at the restaurant, it was apparent to her Mitchell was intoxicated. He tried to reach under the table and place his hand on plaintiffs leg in an effort to hold her hand. She became upset, began screaming at Mitchell, and exited the restaurant. Mitchell followed her into the parking lot, begging her to return inside. She refused. After Mitchell, in the days and weeks following this incident, repeatedly drove by her house and called her, plaintiff felt she had no option but to report the behavior to Beney. On September 9 or 10, 1998, plaintiff met with Beney in his office in Syracuse. Plaintiff told Beney she was having personal problems with Mitchell, that working conditions were poor in the Utica office, and that she wanted Beney to speak to Mitchell. Beney told her to go home for the day. Before she left, he placed a phone call to Mitchell and set up a meeting with him the next day. He told plaintiff he would speak to her after that. Beney called Human Resources employee Veronica Buttacavoli (“Buttacavoli”) and asked her how to proceed. On September 11, 1998, Beney and Mitchell met. Mitchell informed Beney that he and plaintiff had a consensual personal relationship but that it had ended by mutual agreement. That same day, Beney drove to Syracuse and took plaintiff to lunch. During lunch, he relayed what Mitchell had told him. Plaintiff indicated she did not wish to speak any more before calling her fiancé, who was an attorney. After her conversation with her fiancé, plaintiff called Beney and arranged to meet with him the next day. On September 12, 1998, plaintiff met with Beney in Syracuse and gave him the details of Mitchell’s behavior. She told Beney that the relationship was not consensual, that she occasionally submitted to Mitchell’s pressure to get her to drink alcohol at work against her will, but that she never brought the alcohol into the office. Plaintiff told Beney about the poems and her attempts to tape record conversations. After hearing the details, Beney apologized to plaintiff and reassured her that Mitchell would no longer be her manager. Plaintiff claims she was told by Beney that she had a long career ahead of her at Progressive, and was given a telephone number, the alertline number, to call if she had further problems. Plaintiff was scheduled to go to Tampa, Florida the following day for training. Beney told plaintiff to go to Tampa. Two days after the meeting, on September 14, 1998, Beney turned the matter over to Buttacavoli. The Human Resources employee had begun working for Progressive four or five months earlier, and had never before investigated a sexual harassment complaint. Beney had also never investigated a sexual harassment complaint. The record is unclear as to the extent of Barbagallo’s experience with sexual harassment complaints. On September 15, 1998, Buttacavoli interviewed plaintiffs co-workers in the Uti-ca office. That same day, plaintiff alleges she received a phone call from Beney while she was in Florida. During the conversation, Beney told her again that the situation was under control. Plaintiff was under the impression that Mitchell was no longer working for Progressive and that Beney was now in charge. According to plaintiff, Beney told her that he was speaking to her co-workers and that he had spoken to his supervisor, Barbagallo. The following day, September 16, 1998, Buttacavoli interviewed Mitchell. The same day, plaintiff, while still in Florida, had a phone conversation with Weimeier, the Syracuse office claims representative, during which she claims Weimeier told her Mitchell was still working in Utica, that there was a rumor of a lawsuit, and that Progressive was trying to find a way to dispose of plaintiff. Plaintiff immediately called Beney, who informed her that Mitchell was indeed still working in the Utica office, but denied Progressive was trying to find a way to fire her. On September 17, 1998, Buttacavoli, from Human Resources, arrived in Florida to interview plaintiff. Plaintiff reiterated what she had told Beney of Mitchell’s behavior. When plaintiff informed Buttaca-voli that Mitchell was still working in Uti-ca, Buttacavoli was, according to plaintiff, surprised. Plaintiff then told Buttacavoli of the threats she received from Mitchell regarding the reporting of his conduct, and was told not to worry, that the company was there to help plaintiff. The next day, plaintiff left Florida and attempted to reach Beney and Buttacavoli by phone. She was not successful. Butta-cavoli had concluded her four-day investigation and was presenting her findings via conference call to Steve Garfunkel, an attorney for Progressive, Beney, Barbagallo, and Letitia Linker, Buttacavoli’s supervisor. The assembled Progressive employees determined that plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment was without merit. Plaintiff was finally able to speak with Beney by telephone on September 20, 1998. According to plaintiff, Beney led her to believe that he had corrected her problem with Mitchell, and told her to meet him at the Utica office the following day. On September 21, 1998, Beney escorted her into a conference room in the Utica office, where he and Barbagallo informed her she was fired for violating Progressive’s alcohol policy (“the alcohol policy”). The alcohol policy provided for mandatory termination for any employee who consumes alcohol at work. Mitchell was also terminated. Nothing was said to plaintiff regarding the sexual harassment investigation. In connection with the terminations, Beney prepared termination notification forms for both Mitchell and plaintiff. The space reserved for the reason for termination, called the “reason code,” was left blank on both forms. On June 7, 1999, plaintiff filed administrative charges of sexual discrimination and retaliation with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and with the State Division of Human Rights. On December 17, 1999, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue to plaintiff. On April 14, 2000, the State Division of Human Rights issued an Order dismissing plaintiffs charge for administrative convenience. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on February 14, 2000. III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir.1999). The moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Ca-trett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir.1990). Facts, inferences therefrom, and ambiguities must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Richardson, 180 F.3d at 436; Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1983). Once the moving party has met the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Courts have urged care in reviewing discrimination claims, noting that “[bjecause direct evidence of ... discriminatory intent will rarely be found, ‘affidavits and depositions must carefully be scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’ ” Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Sews., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushi-ta Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 110 (“[e]ven in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclu-sory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). To withstand a summary judgment motion, sufficient evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248-49,106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsu-shita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Conversely, “summary judgment is appropriate only where application of the law to those undisputed facts will reasonably support only one ultimate conclusion.” Richardson, 180 F.3d at 438. B. Quid Pro Quo Harassment / Hostile Work Environment In plaintiffs first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action, she alleges quid pro quo sexual harassment and the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of both Title VII and NYHRL. For the purposes of whether such claims have merit, there is no need to distinguish between “hostile work environment” and “quid pro quo” sexual harassment. Yerry v. Pizza Hut of Southeast Kansas, 186 F.Supp.2d 178, 183 (N.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir.2001)). “[T]hese labels, to the extent they are useful at all, are so merely as descriptions of varying workplace conditions that violate Title VII’s basic prohibition on sex discrimination in terms or conditions of employment.” Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), and “[rjequiring an employee to engage in unwanted sex acts is one of the most pernicious and oppressive forms of sexual harassment that can occur in the workplace.” Jin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 335, 344-45 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Harris vs. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), and noting that the Court called such conduct “appalling” and “especially egregious”). To prevail on her Title VII claim, plaintiff must prove that she is a member of a protected class, that she was subjected to unwelcome advances by her supervisor, that such harassment was based upon her sex, and that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir.1993). Such proof involves both subjective and objective components. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the defendants, for the purposes of summary judgment, have conceded that Mitchell’s conduct satisfies these substantive elements, plaintiff must establish some basis for imputing liability to Progressive for the unlawful conduct of its employees. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399. Though determination of whether a substantive sexual harassment violation has occurred is the same under Title VII and NYHRL, the standards governing imputation of liability to the employer differ. See, e.g., Dyke v. McCleave, 79 F.Supp.2d 98, 102 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (collecting cases); Rivera v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Nos. 95-CV-0829, 95-CV-0830, available at 1996 WL 637555, at *12 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (noting also that summary judgment may not be appropriate under Title VII, but may be under NYHRL). 1. Progressive’s Liability under Title VII Under Title VII, where the perpetrator of the harassment was the victim’s supervisor, an employer is presumed responsible. Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-ton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243 (2d Cir.2001). Once it is assumed that sex discrimination has occurred, agency law principles, and not the specific cause of action framed by a plaintiff, are what give rise to the presumption. Jin, 295 F.3d at 342 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754, 118 S.Ct. 2257). In other words, the presumption of employer liability does not automatically arise. The perpetrator must have not only been using his position as a supervisor to aid the harassment, such aid must comprise “something more” than the agency relationship itself. Jin, 295 F.3d at 342-43 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760, 762-63, 118 S.Ct. 2257). “Although the [Supreme] Court did not define the exact contours of what that ‘something more’ would have to be, it did identify one class of cases that clearly satisfies the standard: ‘when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate’.” Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760, 118 S.Ct. 2257). In Ellerth, the Court noted that a tangible employment action “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. The list given, however, is non-exhaustive, and the tangible employment action need not have any economic effect at all. Jin, 295 F.3d at 344, 348. Also, the action taken does not have to flow from an employee’s negative response to harassment either. Id. at 345-49. An unlawful tangible employment action is also taken if the supervisor grants a tangible job benefit based on the submission to demands. Id. at 345. Indeed, the Second Circuit in Jin reaffirmed a prior vicarious liability decision, imposing automatic liability on an employer “when a supervisor bases decisions affecting terms and conditions of a subordinate’s employment on the submission to sexual demands ...,” without regard to whether such a decision is favorable or unfavorable to the employee. Id. at 349 (reaffirming Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994)). Thus, a tangible employment action taken by a supervisor, whether that action gives or takes away a job benefit of the employee, imputes vicarious liability to the employer, and an employer can raise no defense to avoid such liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257; Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has argued that her termination constitutes a tangible employment action, thus imputing automatic vicarious liability to Progressive. Whether a termination constitutes a tangible employment action depends on whether such termination was a culmination of the sexual harassment, or if the plaintiff was fired for another reason. See Citroner v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 208 F.Supp.2d 328, 341 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (stating, “defendant is entitled to rely on Faragher and Ellerth because, even though plaintiff was terminated, this termination was not the culmination of any harassment against plaintiff’). In the instant case, factual questions remain as to the true reason for plaintiffs termination. She alleges that the hostile work environment Mitchell created coerced her, against her will, into drinking, and that such drinking was used as the reason for her termination. She alleges that the real reason she was fired was not due to a violation of the office alcohol policy, but rather because she lodged a complaint against Mitchell to Be-ney, and the company used her violation of the alcohol policy as a convenient means to head off any problems arising from the sexual harassment complaint lodged against Mitchell. Plaintiff alleges, and Mitchell does not deny, that Beney was friends with Mitchell and his wife, citing, among other things, Beney’s participation as an usher in Mitchell’s wedding. As such, sufficient factual disputes have been raised as to whether or not the termination, in the end, was a culmination, or result, of Mitchell’s harassment. See Lee v. Glessing, 140 F.Supp.2d 215, 220 (N.D.N.Y.2001) (“In the context of employment discrimination cases, summary judgment is ‘ordinary inappropriate because the allegations therein require exploration into an employer’s motivation and intent for an employment decision”). Even if plaintiffs termination was not the culmination of Mitchell’s sexual harassment, numerous other actions by Mitchell himself could qualify as tangible employment actions. Plaintiff was allegedly on a career track to become an outside road adjuster. Such a position involves significant time out of the office, and is essentially a promotion. Mitchell denied her the opportunity to pursue such an avenue, or at least slowed down the process, by ensuring that plaintiff spent an increasing amount of time in the office with him. This could be found by a jury to significantly hamper, or even eliminate, a tangible job benefit. Also, according to plaintiff, Mitchell varied and extended plaintiffs working hours, and assigned her work which she was not yet qualified to do. She had to put in many night and weekend hours, alleging she frequently was to be found at work when all other employees at or above her rank and prestige, with the frequent exception of Mitchell, were out of the office. These additional hours and duties were all assigned, according to plaintiff, so as to expand and increase the success of Mitchell’s opportunistic efforts to transform their working relationship into a romantic and sexual alliance. Such surplus burdens on her work schedule were based on her responses to his sexual advances, whether such responses were negative or positive. Indeed, as time wore on, and especially after she submitted to his coercion, Mitchell sought to increase their time spent alone and changed her hours and duties accordingly. Thus, these alterations in the otherwise structured working conditions of the claims representative, or even inside process leader, could be found by a jury to be “significant changes” in her employment status. See Cady v. Cortland, No. 96-CIV-1229, available at 2000 WL 1456285, at *14 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (finding female police officer’s allegations of being denied opportunity to handle disturbance calls, being required to perform more desk duties, not being advised of her schedule in advance, being forced to perform her duties in civilian clothes, and not being allowed to participate in training raised “at least triable issues regarding whether [plaintiff] suffered tangible employment action”). Further, when plaintiff attempted to distance herself from Mitchell, he allegedly responded by not answering her work-related questions, by delaying work projects she was completing, and by refusing to intervene and quell the intra-office hostility between plaintiff and the rest of her co-workers. All these actions mark a significant change in plaintiffs duties and conditions of employment. There can be little doubt, also, that all of the above actions were performed under the guise of supervisory authority. With respect to the termination, the supervisory authority is rather obvious. Beney, and certainly Barbagallo, had the power to significantly affect plaintiffs employment, presumably both by dismissing her or by transferring her. Even if Beney, or Mitchell, could not unilaterally terminate her, sufficient facts have been alleged that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that either could recommend her firing, and that such recommendation would be followed. See Hill v. The Children’s Village, 196 F.Supp.2d 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (having authority to recommend termination shows supervisory status). Similarly, Mitchell was in charge of the Utica office. He was plaintiffs boss. He could alter her schedule and duties, as it is alleged he did, as her supervisor. See id. (having authority to change an employee’s schedule indicates supervisory status). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could find any of the above actions to constitute a tangible employment action and, thus, hold Progressive automatically liable. Even assuming, arguendo, that a tangible employment action was not taken against plaintiff, material factual disputes still remain so as to preclude summary judgment on the Title VII sexual harassment claim. If no tangible employment action is taken by the supervisor, an employer may avoid liability if it can show: “(1) that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that [plaintiff] unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. The employer bears the burden of persuasion with regards to proving this affirmative defense. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. With respect to the first prong, i.e., whether the employer exercised reasonable care in preventing and correcting inappropriate behavior, “the mere existence of a grievance procedure ... coupled with [plaintiffs] failure to invoke that procedure does not serve to insulate an employer from liability on summary judgment.” Robles v. Cox & Co., Inc., 154 F.Supp.2d 795, 805 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399). Indeed, merely showing that a plaintiff grasped the employer’s management hierarchy, and knew where to direct general complaints, is insufficient to grant an employer’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Bayard v. Riccitelli, 952 F.Supp. 977, 985 (E.D.N.Y.1997). Instead, the policy should alert employees to management interest in specifically correcting sexual harassment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73, 106 S.Ct. 2399. Even so, the mere demonstration of the existence of a written sexual harassment policy, though an important consideration, Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275, is in no way dispositive. Leopold, 239 F.3d at 245. Such policy must also be reasonably disseminated to the employees. Hill, 196 F.Supp.2d at 399 (denying an employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff claimed she did not see the policy until after her termination). In addition, the employer’s response to the inappropriate conduct must be effective, which is usually a determination within the province of the jury. Yerry, 186 F.Supp.2d at 186 (citing Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180-81 (2d Cir.1996)). “If the evidence creates an issue of fact as to whether an employer’s action is effectively remedial and prompt, summary judgment is inappropriate.” Id. (citing Richardson, 180 F.3d at 441). In the instant case, plaintiff alleges she did not know of Progressive’s sexual harassment policy, contained in “The Progressive Way.” She claims she did not receive it when she went through training near the commencement of her employment in Albany, despite Progressive’s claim that all new employees receive it during training and that it provides employees with updated versions in the event policies change. She also denies that she received periodic memoranda on the policy. Though plaintiff admits she received some “box” during training, her supervisor during the training period could not recall whether or not he or anyone else gave plaintiff “The Progressive Way,” nor could he recall seeing her with the book. Progressive claims plaintiff took two “exams” in which items from “The Progressive Way” were tested. Though Progressive has submitted a copy of test scores, these copies give only her score. They do not indicate that the test was specifically over the company’s sexual harassment policy, nor is the actual test submitted to the court by defendants. Plaintiff admits taking the test for which the scores have been offered, but denies that it was a test on sexual harassment. It is even conceivable that plaintiff could do well on the test without reading “The Progressive Way.” Plaintiff does admit to knowing of a document entitled “The Progressive Way,” which was a “reference source” in the Albany office, but claims she thought it contained benefits information. A factual dispute as to whether she was aware of the sexual harassment policy alone is sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the affirmative defense. Further, even if plaintiff did know of the sexual harassment policy specifically, it contains no specific procedure for sexual harassment complaints, aside from the unhelpful advice to contact someone. See Cady, supra, at *14 n. 12 (even assuming tangible employment action occurred, factual issue with regards to whether plaintiff knew of policy and fact that employer admitted it had “no set procedure” on how to handle a sexual harassment complaint precluded summary judgment). Progressive claims that its “open door policy” and company “hotline” were both avenues for processing such complaints. The “hotline” does mention its utility for reporting “employee harassment,” but also is seemingly applicable to all types of conduct. In the event that an employee feels uncomfortable with either the hotline or the open door policy, he or she may take a complaint straight to the human resources officer. Such avenues of complaint, geared not specifically towards sexual harassment complaints, but instead to any run-of-the-mill behavior an employee deems inappropriate, are insufficient as a matter of law to sustain an employer’s burden on the first prong of the affirmative defense. Yet another avenue mentioned in “The Progressive Way” directs, “[a]t the time you experience or become aware of any threat, assault, harassment or verbal abuse arising out of the work relationship would could affect you or others while at work, you should: (1) Use Progressive’s standard emergency procedures as a guideline to ensure your personal safety and/or the safety of others; [and] (2) Report the incident as soon as possible to your manager, HR representative, business unit General Manager, Corporate functional head or Policy Team member. A timely, impartial and thorough investigation of all reported incidents will be conducted.” This section goes on to assure an employee that an investigation, complete with interviews and statements, will ensue. This policy simply outlines a general grievance procedure. It is not specific to sexual harassment and, it seems, applies only where violence or a threat to personal safety is involved. The first step it advises an employee to take is to use “emergency procedures” to ensure personal safety. While in the actual language there is not an “and” between numbers one and two, neither is there an “or,” thus giving rise to a reasonable conclusion that both steps are necessary. Further supporting a reasonable conclusion that this section of “The Progressive Way” is geared towards events giving rise to physical danger is the introductory paragraph, which encourages the reporting of behavior “that may impact [someone’s] safety or the safety of other Progressive people while at work.” Reasonable minds could conclude that, even if plaintiff had possession of “The Progressive Way,” the generalized complaint procedures contained therein are insufficient to carry Progressive’s burden on the first prong of its affirmative defense. Plaintiff admits she knew of Progressive’s human resources department, but simple knowledge of an employer’s hierarchical structure is not sufficient, and pursuing her claim through that channel would have made no difference. That is where it ended up anyway. Also, the person alleged to be the central figure in the investigation into plaintiffs complaint Veronica Buttacavoli, had no experience investigating sexual harassment complaints, and had only been working at Progressive for four or five months. And, as plaintiff alleges, and there is sufficient factual support for the notion that, Beney and Barba-gallo both participated in the investigation. Beney initiated the investigation, and was kept apprised of its progress, and Barba-gallo was not a stranger to the case either. According to plaintiff, Barbagallo became aware of the situation near the beginning of or before the investigation; Progressive has indicated Barbagallo knew of the situation even earlier, approximately a week and a half before the reins were handed over to Buttacavoli. Neither of these two had any tangible experience in dealing with sexual harassment cases. See Hill, 196 F.Supp.2d at 399 (finding issue as to inadequate implementation where investigators had insufficient training to recognize sexual harassment). No Progressive employee part of the investigation had any specific procedures to follow with regards to conducting a sexual harassment investigation, aside from general directions to interview and take statements from people. Human Rights employee Buttacavoli had no experience investigating sexual harassment claims, and, perhaps amazingly, concluded the investigation in four short days. The level of harassment alone and the competing versions of the facts may lead a jury to believe that a four-day investigation would lack depth. Plaintiff has thus contested Progressive’s contention that the investigation was effective and adequate, and summary judgment is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving it. Factual questions remain on the second prong of the defense as well. The Second Circuit utilizes a burden-shifting approach with respect to the second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, i.e., whether plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm. Leopold, 239 F.3d at 246. The employer bears the initial burden of showing that plaintiff completely failed to utilize the complaint procedures. Id. If the employer carries this burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a reason or reasons as to why such procedures were not utilized. Id. The employer is then entitled to rely on the absence or inadequacy of such proffered reason or reasons in carrying its ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. While conclusory allegations of fear of reprisal or repercussions for reporting conduct is insufficient for a plaintiff to carry her burden of production, Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F.Supp.2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y.1998), a reluctance to report sexual harassment using the procedures in place may defeat an employer’s use of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense if such reluctance is based on a credible fear of what the employer might do in response. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295. This credible fear must be based on more than a plaintiffs subjective belief. Leopold, 239 F.3d at 246. Here, Progressive has alleged that plaintiff completely failed to utilize its complaint procedures. As noted, Progressive had no actual complaint procedure specific to sexual harassment. This alone may be enough to defeat summary judgment. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff going to Beney with her complaint is consistent with Progressive’s open door policy. Surely Progressive is not insinuating that the plaintiff was required to go to the “open door” of Mitchell, the perpetrator of the harassment. It could even be argued, however, that she did go to Mitchell in a way consistent with the policy. She voiced her objections to Mitchell regarding his behavior. He knew of her reservations regarding her conduct. Even if plaintiff did not utilize the open door policy in a way consistent with Progressive’s intent, the inherent vagaries in such a policy can effectively usurp its intended purpose of covering any and all grievances. Moreover, it can be argued that Beney, by not insisting she follow the vague and broad standards set out in “The Progressive Way” in their initial meeting, may have opened up a new complaint procedure for plaintiff. Even though he may have advised her of the different grievance procedures Progressive had instituted to deal with complaints, he still went ahead and initiated the investigation. This- is not to suggest that an employer should ignore an employee’s sexual harassment complaint when they become aware of it simply because that employee did not follow the procedure precisely as it is set forth in its manual. It is axiomatic to simultaneously contend, however, that strict adherence to written grievance procedures is absolutely essential, and that investigations arising out of other, unwritten avenues of complaint were flawlessly conducted. If the latter were correct, why would an employer require an employee to go through the formal channels, especially when those formal channels are vague and may process and investigate claims with less speed and ferocity. A formal complaint procedure specific to sexual harassment may eliminate this issue, but such is not present here. Even if Progressive could show that the plaintiff completely failed to utilize complaint procedures it had in place, summary judgment is still inappropriate because the plaintiffs fear of repercussions or retaliation if she was to report the complaint could be found by the jury to be credible. As discussed above, Mitchell and Beney were close. It is reasonable for plaintiff, and any other person in her position, to believe Mitchell’s threats that Beney would side with Mitchell and that she would be the one detrimentally affected if a complaint were lodged. Moreover, the fact that the harassment began approximately eight months before she reported the harassment is not alone dispositive, and, in fact, is reasonably explained by her fear of retaliatory termination and the financial insecurity such termination would bring with it. 2. Progressive’s Liability under NYHRL As noted, the analysis under Title VII and NYHRL differs in terms of employer liability for the unlawful conduct of employees. See Dyke, 79 F.Supp.2d at 102. It has been well documented, by both federal courts within the Second Circuit and by New York state courts, that employer liability under NYHRL is not judged under respondeat superior, but instead requires a more stringent showing, in particular, that the employer had knowledge of and acquiesced in, or subsequently condoned, the discriminatory conduct. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n. 1 (2d Cir.1997); Hill, 196 F.Supp.2d at 401; Ponticelli v. Zurich American Ins. Group, 16 F.Supp.2d 414, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Kolp v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 15 F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (W.D.N.Y.1998); See also State Division of Human Rights ex rel. Greene v. Saint Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 684, 687, 496 N.Y.S.2d 411, 487 N.E.2d 268 (1985); Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, 284 A.D.2d 66, 729 N.Y.S.2d 77, 85-86 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (First Department); Lewis v. Bryan, 270 A.D.2d 234, 704 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y.App.Div.2000) (Second Department); Grand Union Co. v. Mercado, 263 A.D.2d 923, 694 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y.App.Div.1999) (Third Department); Community Action Organization of Erie Cty., Inc. v. Mercado, 261 A.D.2d 935, 689 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (N.Y.App.Div.1999) (Fourth Department). Though this standard is said to somewhat mirror the mandates of the Second Circuit prior to Faragher and Eilerth., an employer, in order to incur liability under NYHRL, must become “a party to [an employee’s discriminatory conduct] by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” Ponticelli, 16 F.Supp.2d at 433 (quoting Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital, 66 N.Y.2d at 687, 496 N.Y.S.2d 411, 487 N.E.2d 268). “Condonation ... contemplates a knowing, after the fact forgiveness or acceptance of an offense. An employer’s calculated inaction in response to discriminatory conduct may, as readily as affirmative conduct, indicate condonation.” Father Belle Community Center v. State Division of Human Rights ex rel. King, 221 A.D.2d 44, 642 N.Y.S.2d 739, 746 (N.Y.App.Div.1996). An employer may disprove condonation by showing that it reasonably investigated the complaint of unlawful harassment and took corrective action. Vitale, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 218. Even with the heightened standard of imputing liability, summary judgment is still inappropriate on plaintiffs NYHRL sexual harassment claim against Progressive. Factual issues remain for the jury’s determination as to whether Progressive subsequently, in effect, condoned Mitchell’s sexual harassment by allegedly conducting its investigation in an ineffective and inadequate manner, whether such a manner of investigation may have resulted from the investigator’s or investigators’ lack of experience or from Mitchell and Beney’s close ties, and whether the consequent agreement with Mitchell’s side of the story flowed from and was tainted by such ties. See Hill, 196 F.Supp.2d at 401 (finding factual issues as to whether condonation occurred where results of investigation may have been “foregone conclusion” due to harasser and investigator’s close relationship). In short, factual issues as to the reasonableness of the investigation, based on the above factors, and as discussed in part, supra, preclude summary judgment. C. Retaliation In plaintiffs third and sixth causes of action, she alleges her termination was a direct result of her complaints to defendants about Mitchell’s behavior, in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and NYHRL, § 296(3-a)(c). As was the case with plaintiffs sexual harassment claims, the substantive contours of plaintiffs retaliation claims are determined by the same standards under Title VII and NYHRL. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1305 n. 4. In order to make out a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiff is required to demonstrate that she: (1) engaged in a protected activity known to Progressive; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Gregory, 243 F.3d at 700; Quinn, 159 F.3d at 769. “Protected activities” include not only the filing of formal charges of discrimination, but also more informal objections of unlawful discrimination, such as making complaints to management, so long as the employee has a good faith, reasonable belief that the actions being challenged did violate anti-discrimination laws. Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2000); Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990). There can be little doubt that the plaintiffs lodging of a sexual harassment complaint to Beney is well within the definition of “protected activity”; thus, plaintiff has satisfied the first element of her prima facie case of retaliation. Similarly, as plaintiff was terminated, there is no dispute that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” See Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (“A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment”). The element of the plaintiffs prima facie case upon which the parties significantly differ is whether there exists a causal connection between the lodging of the complaint and her termination. A causal connection may be established either “indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct, or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the defendant.” Martin v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 115 F.Supp.2d 307, 311 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (quoting Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir.1991) (emphasis in original)). While the Second Circuit, when confronted with retaliation actions, has declined “draw[ing] a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship,” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001) (holding, however, that a five month gap between protected speech and retaliatory action was not too long to support causal inference in § 1983 retaliation action), courts have readily found a showing of temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse employment action to merit the inference of a causa